Airbus Amber

DISCLAIMER
This document is issued in order to ease the Operator's change management concerning One Engine Taxi at Departure.
However, the Operator should review this document and may neeed to adapt it, taking into account its specificities (operations, policies, local authorities, etc).
The Operator remains solely responsible for its operations, and AIRBUS hereby disclaims any and all liability in this respect.

Risk Definition Initial Risk Assessment Response Actions Target Status after actions
Calculated Residual
Domain Hazard Description / Safety Risk identified Possible consequences Sev Occ Mitigation means Sev Occ
risk risk
Documentation:
The FCTM raises awareness about this risk
Airport assesment by the operator, considering different factors (slope,
Engine damage weight, etc)
Extremely
GND OPS High thrust FOD due to ingestion of sand, dust, etc Luggage damage Hazardous Occasional 16 Hazardous 4
improbable
At worst: Ground personnel injury Training:
- Knowledge (engine danger areas)
- Situation awareness
- Communication
Documentation:
The FCTM raises awareness about this risk
Airport assesment by the operator, considering different factors (slope,
Luggage damage weight, etc)
Extremely
GND OPS High thrust Jet blast Equipment damage (fence, etc) Hazardous Occasional 16 Hazardous 4
improbable
At worst: Ground personnel injury Training:
- Knowledge (engine danger areas)
- Situation awareness
- Communication
Taxiway excursion Training:
High asymetrical thrust (when maneuvering the At worst: Ground personnel, passenger or cabin crew Extremely
GND OPS Collision with vehicle, aircraft, ground Hazardous Occasional 16 - Knowledge Hazardous 4
aircraft) injury improbable
personnel, etc - Situation awareness
Documentation:
SOPs, checklists, standard callouts

Training:
- ATC gives the takeoff clearance earlier than
- Correct application of SOP and checklists
expected, or Rushed actions and checklists, workload Minor (e.g. warmup time not respected) to hazardous (e.g.
GND OPS Hazardous Remote 12 - Leadership, communication: inform ATC that expedited takeoff is not Hazardous Improbable 8
- ATC proposes a last minute change for increase, undetected errors takeoff in wrong direction, runway incursion)
possible due to one engine taxi. Do not enter a runway for departure if not
another runway or runway entry
ready to take off.
- Workload management: if necessary, stop the aircraft and set the parking
brake
- CRM principles
Documentation:
SOPs, checklists, standard callouts
Airport assesment by the operator (in order to mention where the 2nd
engine should be started, for pilot situation awareness and decision making)

Training:
- Correct application of SOP and checklists
The 2nd engine is started late, near the takeoff Rushed actions and checklists, workload Minor (e.g. warmup time not respected) to hazardous (e.g. - Decision making, situation awareness
GND OPS Hazardous Remote 12 Hazardous Improbable 8
runway increase, undetected errors takeoff in wrong direction, runway incursion) - Leadership, communication: if necessary, inform the other crewmember
and/or ATC that more time is necessary to properly perform actions and
checklists. Do not enter a runway for departure if
not ready to take off.
- Time management: anticipate the start of Engine 2
- Workload management: If necessary, stop the aircraft and set the parking
brake
- CRM principles
Loss of nose wheel steering due to total loss
of electrical power. Risk of: Documentation:
GND OPS Loss of the electrical generator on the running At worst: Ground personnel, passenger or cabin crew Extremely
- Taxiway excursion Hazardous Remote 12 MPD (Maintenance Planning Document) task to regularly check the Hazardous 4
[A320/A330 specific] engine during One Engine Taxi without APU injury improbable
- Collision with vehicle, aircraft, ground electrical network in case of One Engine Taxi without APU
personnel, etc
Total loss of thrust. Risk of: Documentation:
Extremely
A/C - Aircraft stuck on taxiway Disruption of runway operations Hazardous Improbable 8 The FCTM does not recommend to perform One Engine Taxi when crossing Hazardous 4
improbable
Loss of the running engine - At worst: Aircraft stuck on an active runway an active runway
Total loss of thrust. Risk of: Documentation:
Extremely
A/C - Aircraft stuck on taxiway Ground collision with other aircraft Catastrophic Improbable 10 The FCTM does not recommend to perform One Engine Taxi when crossing Catastrophic 5
improbable
Loss of the running engine - At worst: Aircraft stuck on an active runway an active runway
Training:
A/C Total loss of air conditioning: Risk of Extremely
Loss of the pack associated with the running At worst: Passenger discomfort Minor Remote 6 Systems knowledge: air conditioning can be recovered by starting the APU Minor 2
[A320/A350 specific] excessive temperature improbable
engine or the other engine
Documentation/Procedure:
- SOP: monitor engine parameters (e.g. EGT) during engine start. If
installed, the taxi camera on the vertical stabilizer can be used (A350)
- A320/A330: ENGINE TAILPIPE FIRE QRH procedure
- A350: ENG TAIL PIPE FIRE abnormal not-sensed ECAM procedure
Tail pipe fire mainly affects the turbine area, but it is not
Excessive fuel in the combustion chamber or in Tail pipe fire with no ground personnel around
A/C considered sensitive since no flammable fluid pipe is Major Remote 9 Minor Improbable 4
the turbine area during engine start the aircraft to alert the flight crew Training:
present
- Leadership and team work, communication (with cabin crew, ATC, or
surrounding aircraft in order to visually confirm the tail pipe fire)
- Knowledge: refer to Safety First article ([Link]
com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/documents/archives/tail-pipe-or-engine-fire.
pdf)
Fuel leak at engine start with no ground
Damaged engine fuel system (drain line, seal, Documentation:
A/C personnel around the aircraft to alert the flight Any significant leak will be detected by the flight crew Minor Remote 6 Minor Improbable 4
etc) SOP: monitor fuel consumption during flight
crew
A320: Optional Mod 36298/P9608 and Mod 166992/P21570 allow to keep
High electrical load during One Engine Taxi IFE powered during One Engine Taxi without APU
A/C Electrical load shedding At worst: IFE (depending on aircraft configuration) and
without APU Insignifiant Occasional 4 Insignifiant Occasional 4
[A320/A330 specific] galleys are powered down
A330: Optional Mod 210562/S36362 allows to keep IFE powered during
One Engine Taxi without APU
Training:
A/C Failure at 2nd engine start The failure is discovered late Return to gate, delay Major Remote 9 - Knowledge (company’s MEL policy about failures during taxi-out) Major Remote 9
- Decision making
Documentation/Procedure:
- The FCTM raises awareness about this risk
- The FCOM indicates the maximum allowed fuel imbalance
Maximum fuel imbalance may be reached in - A320/A330: FUEL IMBALANCE QRH procedure
A/C Fuel imbalance Aircraft handling qualities are not significantly affected Minor Remote 6 Minor Improbable 4
the case of very long taxi - A350: FUEL WINGS NOT BALANCED ECAM procedure

Training:
- Situation awareness
Documentation:
Engine anti-ice leads to higher ground idle. On The FCTM mentions that a slippery taxiway may prevent or make one
a slippery surface, risk of: engine taxi more difficult
At worst: Ground personnel, passenger or cabin crew Extremely
EXT Icing conditions - Taxiway excursion Hazardous Remote 12 Hazardous 4
injury improbable
- Collision with vehicle, aircraft, ground Training:
personnel, etc - Knowledge
- Situation awareness
Ice accretion. Nacelle and fan of the non- Documentation:
running engine are less prone to ice, The FCTM mentions not to perform one engine taxi at departure in icing
compared to the running engine, due to the conditions with OAT at +3 °C (37 °F) or below.
Extremely
EXT Icing conditions fan airflow speed. However, ice accretion on Damage to fan blades due to ice ingestion Minor Remote 6 Minor 2
improbable
the non-running engine cannot be excluded, Training:
depending on humidity, OAT, wind speed, - Knowledge
aircraft speed and taxi time. - Situation awareness
Check temperature in cabin and use the APU if needed (However, the use
EXT
High OAT during One Engine Taxi without APU Difficulty to cool down the cabin At worst: Passenger discomfort Minor Remote 6 of APU bleed may lead to exhaust gases ingestion into the air conditioning Insignifiant Remote 3
[A320 specific]
system).
Training:
EXT Tail wind or crosswind during taxi Difficulty to start the 2nd engine Pilot workload increase Minor Remote 6 - Knowledge Minor Improbable 4
- Situation awareness
Documentation:
SOP: obtain the signal from ground personnel before requesting the taxi
clearance
One engine taxi is initiated without having One engine taxi is initiated while the ground Extremely
PROC Ground personnel injury Hazardous Remote 12 Hazardous 4
received the signal from the ground personnel personnel is still connected improbable
Training:
- Communication
- Situation awareness
No immediate consequence (At worst: Engine Training:
PROC Engine warm-up time not respected Engine thermal stress Minor Remote 6 Minor Improbable 4
deterioration in case of repetitive SOP deviation) Procedure: Correct application of SOP
One engine taxi performed with Engine 2
PROC Training:
running, instead of Engine 1 Noise due to PTU running At worst: Passenger discomfort Insignifiant Remote 3 Insignifiant Improbable 2
[A320 specific] Procedure: Correct application of SOP
The PTU is not tested before takeoff. No immediate
The PTU does not start. Therefore, the PTU
PROC Yellow electric pump not switched OFF before consequence. But a failed PTU combined with an engine Training:
automatic test (launched during Engine 2 Minor Remote 6 Minor Improbable 4
[A320 specific] Engine 2 start failure during takeoff is classified hazardous (Landing gear Procedure: Correct application of SOP
start) cannot be performed
retraction not possible on obstacle-limited runway).
If the PTU fails during its automatic test, nose Training:
PROC Extremely
2nd engine started during a turn wheel steering is lost (depending on aircraft At worst: cabin crew injury Hazardous Remote 12 Procedure: Correct application of SOP Hazardous 4
[A320 specific] improbable
configuration). Risk of taxiway excursion
Training:
PROC
2nd engine started while braking On some aircraft, a brake jerk may occur At worst: Passenger discomfort Minor Remote 6 - Procedure: Correct application of SOP Minor Improbable 4
[A320/A330 specific]
- Communication, CRM principles
Training:
Extremely
PROC 2nd engine started without coordination PF surprise and/or startle effect PF workload increase Minor Remote 6 - Procedure: Correct application of SOP Minor 2
improbable
- Communication, CRM principles
Training:
Thrust asymetry at takeoff power application. Extremely
PROC 2nd engine not started before takeoff At worst: Passenger or cabin crew injury Hazardous Remote 12 - Procedure: Correct application of SOP Hazardous 4
Risk of runway excursion at low speed improbable
- Situation awareness
Documentation:
In order to reduce PF workload, the FCOM mentions that the PM starts the
engine.
The FCTM mentions that one engine taxi always remains a flight crew
decision. The flight crew can always taxi with both engines running.

Training:
Increased workload
- Procedure: Correct application of SOP
More actions and head down time during one
PROC Reduced situation awareness, undetected errors Major Occasional 12 - Situation awareness Major Remote 9
engine taxi, compared to all engine taxi Decreased capacity to monitor for the PM (the
- Decision making: Take into consideration possible threats. Depending on
PM starts the 2nd engine)
conditions (taxi time so short that fuel saving is negligible, not appropriate
considering workload; fatigue, complex airport, etc) dual engine taxi may be
the best option.
- Time management: anticipate tasks
- Workload management: If necessary, stop the aircraft and set the parking
brake

Documentation:
The FCTM mentions that one engine taxi always remains a flight crew
decision. The flight crew can always taxi with both engines running.
Corporate or societal expectations to reduce One engine taxi is performed in non-optimal or Extremely
MISC Minor to hazardous Hazardous Improbable 8 Hazardous 4
fuel and CO2 footprint inapropriate situations Training: improbable
Leadership, decision making: Take into consideration possible threats.
Depending on conditions (taxi time so short that fuel saving is negligible,
fatigue, complex airport, etc) dual engine taxi may be the best option.
Documentation: The flight crew knows the aircraft configuration, thanks to
One Engine Taxi without APU is performed on
the FCOM which includes the ACS (Aircraft Configuration Summary) table.
A320 CEO without mod 157621 (wiring
Non compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1195 The ACS table indicates if the aicraft is equipped with the One Engine Taxi
modification to comply with certification
PROC requirements (only one engine fire No immediate consequence Without APU Capability (Mod 157621).
requirements) Minor Remote 6 Minor Improbable 4
[A320 specific] extinguisher bottle is powered in the case of
engine fire) Training:
Note: all A320 NEO are equipped with mod
Procedure: Correct application of SOP (emphasizing the difference of
157621
procedure between CEO with and without mod 157621)

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