Course: 2024 Experi.

Rocket Engine-2:
Homework 1
Name: Mankani Mlungisi
Student ID: LS2407205
October 15, 2024

The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (1986)

Introduction
The Challenger accident occurred on January 28, 1986. Flight 51-L of the
Challenger was originally scheduled for July 1985, but by the time the crew
was assigned in January 1985, launch had been postponed to late November
to accommodate changes in payloads. The launch was subsequently delayed
further and finally rescheduled for late January 1986

Figure 1: An Artist’s depiction of the Space Shuttle ready for launch.

1
The Accident
On January 28, 1986, at 11:38 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, Space Shuttle
Challenger launched Mission 51-L. After 73 seconds, it came to an explosive
end as the hydrogen and oxygen propellants burned, destroying the External
Tank and subjecting the Orbiter to extreme aerodynamic loads that resulted in
total structural collapse. The seven members of the crew died all. 110 seconds
after launch, the two Solid Rocket Boosters soared out of the fireball and were
destroyed by the Air Force range safety officer.

The Shuttle’s whole structure was fastened to the launch pad, and the liquid-
fueled main engines of the Challenger were turned on sequentially and ramped
up to full thrust 6.6 seconds prior to launch. The Shuttle assembly is bent for-
ward from its fasteners that secure it to the pad when the main engines thrust.
The securing bolts of the Solid Rocket Boosters are explosively released when
the Shuttle assembly returns to its upright position. Structural loads are stored
in the completed structure during this prerelease ”twang” action. In a structural
vibration mode that occurs at a frequency of roughly three cycles per second,
these loads are released during the initial moments of flight.

Photographic data indicated that a large puff of grey smoke was spurting from
the area of the right Solid Rocket Booster’s aft field joint shortly after liftoff,
or .678 seconds into the flight. The two 39B pad cameras that were supposed
to capture the exact location of the puff were not working. The first smoke ap-
peared in the 270–310 degree sector of the aft field joint of the right solid rocket
booster’s perimeter, according to computer graphic analysis of footage from
other cameras. This portion of the external tank was facing the solid booster.
The material that was vaporised and pouring out of the joint suggested that
the sealing action inside the joint was incomplete.

Between .836 and 2.500 seconds, eight additional recognizable puffs of smoke
that were becoming darker in colour were observed. It seemed like smoke was
rising from the joint. The next new puff of smoke was visible close to the joint,
but each puff was left behind by the Shuttle’s upward journey. The repeated
puffs of smoke in this sequence approximated the frequency of the joint flexing
caused by the dynamics of the structural load at a rate of around four times per
second. Using computer graphics in NASA images taken from many cameras in
this series, the origin of smoke puffs was once again determined to be around
the 270–310 degree sector of the initial smoke spurt.

A circumferential white vapour pattern was seen emerging from the External
Tank bottom dome at 73.124 seconds. This marked the start of the hydrogen
tank’s structural failure, which eventually resulted in the collapse of the aft
dome. Massive volumes of liquid hydrogen were discharged from the tank as a
result, and the hydrogen tank was forced upward into the intertank structure
by a rapid 2. 3 million-pound forward thrust. The lower portion of the liquid

2
oxygen tank and the intertank structure were impacted at around the same
moment by the spinning right Solid Rocket Booster. The whitish vapours that
emerged in the intertank area at 73.137 seconds indicate that these structures
failed.

The hydrogen that was pouring out of the failed tank bottom and the liquid
oxygen breach near the intertank burned massively and almost explosively in
a matter of moments. At this time in its trajectory, the Challenger was com-
pletely engulfed in the explosive burn and was flying at a Mach number of 1.92
at a height of 46,O00 feet. As the Challenger left the oxygen-hydrogen flames,
its reaction control system failed and its propellants burned hypergolically. The
edge of the main fireball displays the reddish brown hues of the hypergolic fuel
burn. The Orbiter shattered into multiple big chunks that emerged from the ex-
plosion due to tremendous aerodynamic loads it broke into several large sections
which emerged from the fireball. One wing of the Orbiter, the main engine/tail
portion with the engines still burning, and the forward fuselage trailing a mass
of umbilical lines pulled away from the payload compartment are identifiable
as separate sections on film. This latter series of events was corroborated by
evidence found in the 51-L mission hardware’s recovered debris.

The Cause of the Accident

The consensus of the Commission and participating investigative agencies was
that the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint
between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor. The specific
failure was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot gases
from leaking through the joint during the propellant burn of the rocket motor.

The Commission conducted a thorough review of all available data, reports,

and records in order to reach this conclusion. It also oversaw and directed a
number of tests, analyses, and experiments conducted by NASA, civilian con-
tractors, and other government agencies. Finally, it developed specific failure
scenarios and a range of most likely causative factors.

Three questions were critical in the analysis of the causes of the accident,namely:
1. What were the circumstances surrounding mission 51-L that contributed
to the catastrophic termination of that flight in contrast to successful
flights preceding it?
2. What evidence pointed to the right Solid Rocket Booster as the source of
the accident as opposed to other elements of the Space Shuttle?
3. Finally, what was the mechanism of failure?
A combustion gas leak through the right Solid Rocket Motor aft field joint
initiated at or shortly after ignition eventually weakened and/or penetrated the

3
Figure 2: An illustration of transparent external tank, with right Solid Rocket
booster.

External Tank, initiating vehicle structural breakup and loss of the Space Shut-
tle Challenger during STS Mission 51-L. Orings in the right solid booster aft
field joint were not following the opening of the gap between the tang and clevis
at time of ignition.

Conclusion
The cause of the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in
the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor. A flawed design that was
too sensitive to many variables was the cause of the failure. These variables
included the impact of temperature, material properties, physical dimensions,
processing, and the joint’s response to dynamic loading. This accidents shows
the significance of testing elements,devices or technologies determine the success
of the whole system.