Resolved: The African Union should grant diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Somaliland as an

independent state.
Block Guidelines
AT Aff
AT: Ethiopia/Somalia War
No Ethiopia/Somalia war
AT: Democracy in Somaliland
Somaliland is not democratic
Somaliland democracy declining
Can support Somaliland economic development without independence
Foreign investment high now
Somaliland can secede without further support
AT: Justification to Secede
A justification to secede does not create a right to secede
AT: Oppressed Ethnic Groups
Secession doesn’t solve oppression of ethnic groups and just makes violence
against them more likely
Better to improve situations for ethnic groups within states
Neither secession nor international law protect minority rights
Right to secede makes it less likely states will accommodate ethnic groups
AT: Oppressed Ethnic Minorities
Minorities can’t stop two countries from joining, so there is no reason they should be
entitled to splitting
AT: Colonization is Bad
Colonization is wrong but that doesn’t mean succession is right
AT: “Rights”
Protection of rights requires strong states to protect people from violence
AT: “Freedom of Association”
Freedom of association is incompatible with political stability
No absolute right to freedom of association
AT: Popular Democracy Permits Secession
Many popular democratic interests against secession
AT: Self-Determination
Much opposition to self-determination
AT: Freedom of Association
Governments are not clubs
AT: Right to Secede
Secession is a weak right that is outweighed by countervailing needs
Must consider all consequences before saying there is a right to secede
AT: Human Rights
 Human rights pushes secessionism
Secession crushes the human rights of others in new territories
People can vote
AT: International Law
Secession is part of domestic law, not international law
Secession only recognized in international law in limited circumstances
International law protects minorities to avoid secession
The international law claim is narrow at best
International law does not support secession
International law ignores the practical failures of secession
International law does not protect a right to secede
AT: Colonial Borders
AT: International Law
AT: Neocolonialism
AT: Pandora’s Box
AT: Territorial Control
AT: War
AT: Terrorism
AT Neg
AT: Secession Bad
(1) US Supports secession in other areas;
(2) This situation is different – Somalia is a failed experiment
(3) Other countries in Africa have succeeded
AT: Not Ready to be Independent
Somaliland has a strong economy
Somaliland has a strong governance system
Somalia is a failed state
Somaliland is the only credible government
Somalia stable
AT: US-Somalia Relations
Benefits outweigh any reduction in US-Somalia relations
AT: Somiland Will Fail
AT: Ethiopia MOU

Block Guidelines
1. Type of response: tag of response. Response
i. Implications
 2. DL: IMF doesn’t force austerity. Bob of Sunshine 2020 explains that the IMF no longer requires
austerity measures.

Types of responses:

- Delink (DL): directly disapproving their point

- Nonunique (NU): happens in both worlds, not unique to a single world
- Turn (TURN): anything that generates offense
- Disad (DA): a turn that brings in a new impact
- Mitigation: limits the severity, “oh it’s not actually that bad”
- Weighing (OW): comparative analysis
- Scope: impacting to more people
- Magnitude: severity
- Probability: low probability of happening
- Timeframe: the timeline is unclear
- Urgency: need to deal with it right now
- Long Term: impacts are more permanent
- Short Term: similar to urgency
- Prereqs/Co-ops/Short Circuits: if your point becomes true, theirs becomes true too
- Prereq: linking into their case
- Type of prereq: Co-op: specific for impacts and responses (not cases)
- Type of prereq: Short Circuits: if our case happens, theirs *can’t*
happen
- Uniqueness: more unique
- Directness: shorter link chain (less steps to prove)
- Clarity: more contextualized
- Historical precedence: has empirical backing
- Reversibility: your impacts are non reversible therefore more important

AT Aff
 AT: Ethiopia/Somalia War
No Ethiopia/Somalia war

Nicolas Fischer, 11-12, 24, Somaliland: What elections mean for regional power dynamics,
[Link]

According to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), a Berlin-based think tank,
it is unlikely that a serious armed conflict will break out between Ethiopia and Somalia. That is partly
due to the military balance of power — Ethiopia is one of the largest military powers in the region and
far superior to Somalia — and partly because both states have a common interest in fighting the Al-
Shabaab militias in southern Somalia, which want to establish an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa.
According to the SWP, Ethiopia is currently deploying around 10,000 soldiers in Somalia, only one-third
of whom are part of the AMISOM and ATMIS peacekeeping missions of the African Union (AU). The rest
of the Ethiopian contingent are to contain the capabilities of Al-Shabaab in the neighboring country,
maintain a buffer zone and thus prevent their attacks in Ethiopia itself. Somalia and Somaliland: Here are
the differences and issues
 AT: Democracy in Somaliland
Somaliland is not democratic

Wilson, 2-12, 24, Eliot Wilson is a freelance writer on politics and international affairs. He was senior
official in the U.K. House of Commons from 2005 to 2016, including serving as a clerk of the Defence
Committee and secretary of the U.K. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. The Hill,
[Link]

Somaliland still faces challenges of corruption, economic and political marginalization, and violence
against women. But over the same 33-year period, Somalia, which asserts its sovereignty, has been in
freefall, beset by internal violence and weak political institutions. Freedom House, which produces an
annual assessment of political freedoms and civil liberties, last year rated Somaliland as “partly free”
with a score of 44 out of 100. Somalia was declared “unfree” with just 8 of 100. For context, the United
States only managed 76 of 100.

Somaliland democracy declining

Mariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, Somaliland: The Horn of
Africa’s Breakaway State, [Link]

The territory has widely been seen as an “oasis” for stability in a turbulent region. “From the
Somalilanders’ perspective, they have a completely reasonable argument,” Bronwyn Bruton, democracy
and governance expert, said in 2018. “Somaliland is trying to break off from Somalia, which hasn’t been
a functioning country in decades.” Democracy and civil liberties watchdog Freedom House rates
Somaliland’s freedom index at “partly free,” scoring a forty-four out of one hundred in 2023, while
Somalia got only eight in the same year—an unequivocally “not free” status, and the fourteenth-lowest
worldwide However, Somaliland’s score has declined in recent years following crackdowns on
opposition protestors when its parliament postponed the 2022 presidential election.
Can support Somaliland economic development without independence

Mariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25, 24, Council on Foreign Relations, Somaliland: The Horn of
Africa’s Breakaway State, [Link]

Somaliland has nonetheless negotiated its own foreign investment deals despite opposition from the
federal government in Mogadishu. In 2016, it struck a landmark deal with DP World of Dubai, part of
the UAE, to develop and manage the Port of Berbera, a joint venture expected to produce millions of
dollars of income a year for Somaliland. Landlocked Ethiopia joined the port development project two
years later, aiming to expand its access to the sea In January 2024, Somaliland sparked another
diplomatic row with Somalia when it agreed to lease Ethiopia rights to twelve kilometers (twenty miles)
of coastline and access to Berbera for commercial and military purposes for fifty years in exchange for its
formal recognition and part ownership of Ethiopia Airlines, the national carrier.

Foreign investment high now

Leipzig, 2021, Markus Virgil Hoehne is lecturer at the Institute for Social Anthropology at the University
of Leipzig. His books include Milk and peace, drought and war: Somali culture, society, and politics
(London 2010) and Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting
political visions (Nairobi / London 2015), Somaliland: 30 Years of De Facto Statehood, and No End In
Sight, [Link]
sight-30363

Today, the overwhelming majority of people in the center and the west of Somaliland are in favor of
independence. Here, the country has developed impressively regarding infrastructure, private
businesses and in the educational sector over the last 15 years. Consequently, international aid
organizations and state agencies for development cooperation increasingly engaged – short of
international recognition. Hargeysa developed into a real capital, at eye-level with major east African
cities.

Somaliland can secede without further support

Leipzig, 2021, Markus Virgil Hoehne is lecturer at the Institute for Social Anthropology at the University
of Leipzig. His books include Milk and peace, drought an war: Somali culture, society, and politics
(London 2010) and Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting
political visions (Nairobi / London 2015), Somaliland: 30 Years of De Facto Statehood, and No End In
Sight, [Link]
sight-30363
Thirty years after its declaration of independence, Somaliland is still at the margins of the international
political system, despite considerable successes in terms of peace and state building and its huge and
very effective diaspora investments. Non-recognition in itself would be less of a problem, as Somaliland
shows that political order, democratic process, and a certain degree of development can be achieved
without much international assistance.

1. T - Loans from the IMF have only trapped African nations in a cycle of devastation. Actionade
23 writes, “The IMF continues to stifle economic development across Africa. Countries in Africa
pay interest rates four times higher than the US, and the amount African governments are
forced to spend on interest payments is often higher than spending on education [and] health.”
NLM 22 concludes that “IMF borrower countries experience higher rates of poverty.”
a. Implication: Their argument is a reason you should negate, as you prevent the spread of
devastation to Somaliland.
 AT: Justification to Secede
A justification to secede does not create a right to secede

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 7, 2003, Secession,

[Link]

The distinction between establishing that a group is morally justified in unilaterally seceding (in the
sense of having a liberty-right) and establishing that the group has a moral claim-right to unilaterally
secede is crucial, though it is rarely explicitly drawn by philosophers writing about secession. Having the
liberty-right does not imply having the claim-right: a group might be morally justified in seceding and
yet it might not be the case that others (including the state from which the group is seceding) are
obligated to refrain from interfering with the group’s attempt to secede.

Therefore, an argument that suffices to establish that a group is justified in seceding under such and
such conditions may not suffice to establish that the group has a (claim-) right to secede under those
conditions. Yet when philosophers attempt to develop a moral theory of secession by appealing to
intuitions about hypothetical examples of secession, it is often unclear whether the intuition elicited is
about the moral justifiability of the secession (the mere permissibility) or about the existence of a
moral claim-right.
 AT: Oppressed Ethnic Groups
Secession doesn’t solve oppression of ethnic groups and just makes violence against
them more likely

Horowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at
Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013),
Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., [Link]
right-to-secede/

Reinterpreting the principle of self-determination, some theorists have proposed that victimized ethnic
groups ought to have a right to secede from states in which they are located. Proponents of such a right
assert that, by separating antagonistic groups, secession can alleviate ethnic conflict. Secession,
however, does not create homogeneous successor states or assure protection of remaining minorities,
and its converts domestic ethnic conflict into more dangerous international conflict. Recognition of a
right to secede would dampen attempts to adopt conciliatory policies in the undivided state, and would
likely increase ultimately fruitless secessionist warfare. The best hope for severely divided societies lies
not in encouraging secession or partition but in devising institutions to increase the satisfaction of
minorities in existing states.

Better to improve situations for ethnic groups within states

Horowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at
Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013),
Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., [Link]
right-to-secede/

Guarantees of minority protection in secessionist regions are likely to be illusory; indeed, many
secessionist movements have as one of their aims the expulsion or subordination of minorities in the
secessionist regions. The very existence of a right to secede, moreover, is likely to dampen efforts at
coexistence in the undivided state, including the adoption of federalism or regional autonomy, which
might alleviate some of the grievances of putatively secessionist minorities. Since most secessionist
movements will be resisted by central governments and most secessionists receive insufficient foreign
military assistance to succeed, propounding a right to secede, without the means to success, is likely to
increase ultimately fruitless secessionist warfare, at the expense of internal efforts at political
accommodation and at the cost of increased human suffering. Efforts to improve the condition of
minorities ought to be directed at devising institutions to increase their satisfaction in existing states,
rather than encouraging them to think in terms of exit options. In those rare cases in which separation
of antagonists is, at the end of the day, the best course, partition can be accomplished reluctantly, as a
matter of prudence, without recognizing a right to secede. But neither partition nor secession should be
viewed as generally desirable solutions to the problems of ethnic conflict.

Neither secession nor international law protect minority rights

Horowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at
Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013),
Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., [Link]
right-to-secede/

There are always ethnic minorities in secessionist regions. There were Efik and Ijaw, among others, in
Biafra; there are Hindus in Kashmir, Muslims in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, Javanese in Aceh and Irian Jaya,
Serbs and Roma in Kosovo; and there are minorities in all the rump states as well. As a matter of fact, it
is often the desire of regional majorities to deal with minorities—and not to deal with them in a
democratic way—that motivates or contributes to the secessionist movement in the first instance.
Proponents of rights to secession assure us that minority rights must be guaranteed in secessionist
states and that secession should Donald L. Horowitz 9 be less favored if minority rights are unlikely to be
respected,11 but the verbal facility of this formulation masks the difficulty of achieving any such results.
If, after all, conditions on the exercise of an international law right to secede can be enforced, why not
enforce those conditions in the undivided state so as to forestall the need to secede? International law
has been notoriously ineffective in assuring longstanding, internationally recognized minority rights, and
proponents of secession have no new ideas to offer on this matter. If the failure to respect minority
rights in the undivided state induced a regional group to consider secession, why should anyone assume
that the situation will be different when that group, a minority in the undivided state, comprises a
majority in the secessionist state? If anything, the treatment of minorities in smaller states is less visible
to outsiders.

The more circumscribed the asserted right to secede, ironically enough, the more dangerous conditions
may become for minorities in the secessionist region. By the time it is concluded that the majority in the
undivided state is unalterably hostile to minority interests, thus in some formulations permitting the
minority to secede, that group may have accumulated so many grudges that, in their turn, minorities in
the secessionist region may be particularly vulnerable to the expression of violent hostility or the
settlement of old scores. There are many examples: the fate of Serbs and Roma in Kosovo, of Biharis in
Bangladesh, of Sikhs and Hindus in Pakistan at the time of partition, and of Muslims in India at the same
time. If the problem of minorities is that they do not enjoy “meaningful political participation”12 in the
undivided state, there is no reason to think that minorities will enjoy it in the secessionist state either.
Secession merely proliferates the arenas in which the problem of intergroup political accommodation
must be faced—and often more starkly. Contrast Yugoslavia, with six or seven groups and the complex
alignments they created with Bosnia, in which three groups confront each other. Secession can hardly
be said to solve the problem of intergroup accommodation, except, of course, insofar as it enables the
former minority, now a new majority, to cleanse the secessionist state of its minorities—which it could
not do previously—and induces the rump state to do the same with members of the secessionist group
who find themselves left on the wrong side of a new international boundary.

Right to secede makes it less likely states will accommodate ethnic groups

Horowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at
Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013),
Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., [Link]
right-to-secede/

Articulating a right to secede will undermine attempts to achieve interethnic accommodation within
states. As things now stand, the principal reason that states are reluctant to devolve power to
territorially concentrated minorities, either by means of regional autonomy or federalism, is their fear
that it will lead to secession. That fear is usually unfounded, unless the conflict has already dragged on
for a long time and the central government has been utterly ungenerous. Nevertheless, central
governments are risk averse about devolution. The best way to dry up devolution as a tool of interethnic
accommodation—and a promising tool it is—is to establish a right, recognized in international law, for
territorially concentrated minorities to secede. If there is a well-recognized right to secede, the first
stirrings of territorially based ethnic discontent will be likely to be met with repression. The possibility
that federalism or regional autonomy can lawfully ripen into secession will make any such experiment
too costly to entertain. It has been difficult to persuade central decision makers in Indonesia and Sri
Lanka to devolve power to regions. A right to secession would easily dissuade them. One reason central
governments are so reluctant to countenance the possibility of secession, even for troublesome regions
that some central decision makers might wish to be free of, is that the secession of one region upsets
ethnic balances and forces groups in other regions to think afresh about whether they wish to remain in
the truncated state with its new ethnic balances. This was clearly visible in Yugoslavia after the

Slovene and Croat decisions to secede, when others had to decide in turn whether the relative
expansion in Serb power in the rump state was in their interest. Yoruba narrowly decided to stay in
Nigeria, despite the relative increase in Hausa power when Ibo decided to leave the state in 1967, and
the departure of East Bengal (Bangladesh) from Pakistan destabilized relations among the groups that
remained in the rump state. Quite often the fears of central authorities about secession are derided as
unsubstantiated apprehensions of domino effects. But domino effects are usually conceived as action
based merely on a successful example in another location, whereas what is involved in the first
secession is action that affects directly, rather than just by example, the relative positions of other
groups remaining in the state. The creation of a right to secede could not be more untimely. More and
more states have been designing internal political arrangements, including devolution, to reduce the
incidence of ethnic conflict. That is where the emphasis needs to be, not on making exit strategies more
plausible. More about this shortly. A right to secede effectively advantages militant members of ethnic
groups at the expense of conciliators. Since most central governments will not recognize the right to
secede, those who wish to pursue such a course will need to resort to arms. Those who are willing to
resort to arms are by no means simply latter-day versions of the politicians of their own group whom
they seek to displace. Contrast Hashim Thaci of the Kosovo Liberation Army with the Kosovar political
leader Ibrahim Rugova; Prabhakaran of the Tamil Tigers with Amirthalingham of the Tamil United
Liberation Front, whom he had assassinated; the Southern People’s Liberation Army in the Sudan with
the old Liberal Party that preceded it. Violence disproportionately attracts people with 12 Journal of
Democracy an interest in aggression. The people willing to take up arms for secession are those who are
willing to be brutal with their ethnic enemies and with their own rivals as well. As their advantage
grows, new bouts of ethnic cleansing can be expected. In some formulations, secession is said to be an
“exceptional” right that “comes into play if” it “is the only way that a defined population can exercise its
right of internal self-determination.”17 But the facts do not support the assumption that secession is
ever “the only way.” Are the Kurds in Iraq secessionist or autonomist? They have gone back and forth.
Are Philippine Muslims? They, too, have gone back and forth. Ibo tried unsuccessfully to secede and
then reintegrated into Nigerian politics. In such cases, it looks to outsiders at any given moment as if
secession is “the only way” minorities can participate in determining their own future, but there is more
fluidity to ethnic politics than those who write about populations that are “unalterably hostile”18 to
each other have sensed. Moreover, the seemingly moderate position of some proponents of a right to
secession that secession is justified only if others are unalterably opposed or minorities have been
victimized is not likely to work out moderately in practice, for it is an incentive to ethnic polarization. If
independence can only be won legitimately after matters have been carried to extremes, then, by all
means, there are people willing to carry them to extremes. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Sikh
separatists in the Indian Punjab were willing to attack Hindus in order to precipitate attacks on Sikhs
elsewhere in India. There is no shortage of methods to satisfy tough standards of victimization or
oppression. A right to secede could indeed contribute to the sense that secession is the only way. There
may be times when it is felt best to part peoples. The British believed such a time had come in India in
1947, and the United Nations believed such a time had come a year later in Palestine. When it is
prudent, parting can be done by consent, as in the former Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia, or
occasionally by international action. To do this requires the creation of no rights. Consider the pernicious
effect on the balance of intragroup opinion of a right to secede in a concrete case: Sri Lanka. Will the Sri
Lankan Tamils return as readily as they would otherwise to a thoroughly reconstructed but undivided Sri
Lanka if they discover that the secession to which they turned so reluctantly was merely an exercise of
their rights under international law? It is always hard for antagonistic groups to accommodate each
other in a single state. A right to secede will make it harder
 AT: Oppressed Ethnic Minorities
Minorities can’t stop two countries from joining, so there is no reason they should be
entitled to splitting

Christopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page
number at end of card.

Clearly, this is too strict a requirement. Against this, one might suggest that, unlike secessions, political
mergers are permissible in the absence of unanimity because they add to the territory over which one’s
federal government presides, whereas state breaking restricts one’s government’s area of jurisdiction.
This qualification helps some, but it remains too restrictive because it would also prohibit mutual
divisions. What if 90 percent of the Norwegians and 90 percent of the Swedes had favored political
divorce, for instance?[25] Or imagine that the vast majority of Germans later decided that the merger
was a mistake and 90 percent of them voted to divide once again into East and West Germany. Would
we object to either of these divisions on the grounds that a 10 percent minority would be forced to
belong to smaller states? Presumably not. And if a minority does not have a right to block either political
mergers or mutual divisions, it is not clear why they should have a right to contest unilateral divisions.
Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (p. 62). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
 AT: Colonization is Bad
Colonization is wrong but that doesn’t mean succession is right

Christopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page
number at end of card.

In conclusion, the value of group autonomy is an admittedly substantial assumption necessary for the
argument in favor of secessionist rights, but it is an assumption that can be denied only by those willing
to concede that we do no necessary injustice to groups of people when we colonize them, annex their
legitimate states, or dismantle their legitimate democracies. Of course, virtually everyone now
acknowledges the injustice of colonizing a foreign population, but the pivotal lesson of this chapter is
that one cannot consistently invoke group autonomy to explain the impermissibility of colonization
without also acknowledging the legitimacy of the secessionist claims to self-determination. Charles
Beitz is no staunch supporter of self-determination, but even he appreciates that “it is not clear why the
groups eligible to claim a right of self-determination should be limited to those, like colonial populations,
that are already recognized as territorially distinct.”[18] Put simply, if I am right about the implications
for state breaking that follow from properly valuing group autonomy, then the only way to question the
primary right to secede defended here is to deny (1) that there are nonconsequential reasons against
forcibly colonizing others, (2) that legitimate states are entitled to an appropriate degree of sovereignty,
and (3) that there are deontological

Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (p. 55). Cambridge U niversity Press. Kindle Edition.
 AT: “Rights”
Protection of rights requires strong states to protect people from violence

Christopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page
number at end of card.

To appreciate fully this analogy between a citizen and Antonio, we must understand why political states
offer the only hope of escaping the state of nature. A stateless environment would be an insecure place
in which peace would be unavailable and moral rights would be disrespected because, among other
things, there will always be people unwilling to honor the moral rights of others if violating them has no
legal repercussions. Moral rights will be respected and peace will be ensured only if police effectively
protect individuals and recognized judges impartially adjudicate conflicts according to established rules.
[14] But even if one acknowledges the value of peace and security, one might deny the necessity of
territorially defined states. If the primary function of a political state is to protect rights and secure
peace, then why could these same benefits not be supplied by private protection agencies or via some
other arrangement? Why not sort people into protective agencies according to religion, eye color,
preference for a particular set of rules, or by consent? Most importantly, how can we justify coercing
people into territorially defined political units when the benefits of these states might be achieved
through less coercive or even consensual means? The proper response is that political coercion is
permissible because (and only when) no other arrangement is feasible. It is no mere historical accident
that states are territorially defined; they are territorial because this is the only way for them to perform
their functions.[15] Peace would be unavailable in the absence of a decisive and accepted method of
enforcing common rules and adjudicating conflicts. Because conflicts typically occur between parties in
spatial proximity (since conflicts require interactions, and we most often interact with those nearby),
and because a judge can peacefully and decisively settle conflicts only if she has authority over both
parties, a judge must have power over all those who share spatial proximity.[16] Thus, since conflicts will
proliferate and escalate if those around us follow different rules and appeal to competing authorities,
we cannot politically sort ourselves according to religious affiliation, sexual preference, or eye color as
long as we live among people of varying religions, sexual preferences, and eye colors. I will return to the
necessity of political society later, but hopefully this quick sketch explains why states must be
territorially defined.[17] Given that states must be territorial, it is easy to see why the consent of their
constituents is a luxury they can ill afford. The benefits of political society accrue only if all those in close
proximity are similarly bound, so a state must insist that residents either play by the promulgated rules
or leave. If each citizen were at liberty to secede (as opposed to emigrate) and citizenship were
established consensually, the numerically diminished and spatially disparate remaining people could not
perform the functions of securing peace and protecting rights.[18] Indeed, the fact that emigration does
not threaten a state’s capacity to secure peace and protect rights confirms that states must be
territorial. Whereas unlimited secession precludes a country from uniformly coercing all those in spatial
proximity, emigration does not lead to conflicts between parties who play by different rules and appeal
to different authorities. Thus, the fact that emigration is not as disruptive as secession is further
evidence for the link between states being territorial and their being capable of performing their
political functions.[19] Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (pp. 15-16). Cambridge
University Press. Kindle Edition.
 AT: “Freedom of Association”
Freedom of association is incompatible with political stability

Christopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page
number at end of card.

In short, freedom of political association is incompatible with political stability, and samaritanism is an
ineliminable ingredient of political legitimacy, because people cannot enjoy the benefits of political
stability without uniformly restricting the political liberty of those around them. To emphasize:
emphasize: The reason that I have no moral right to be free from political coercion (i.e., to secede) is
that, even if I would rather forego the benefits of political society, my state may permissibly coerce me
in order to secure political stability for my fellow citizens. To return to the analogy, the justification for
my state’s coercive presence stems from the same samaritan source as Antonio’s duty to Bathsheba.
The only normative difference between Antonio and me is a Hohfeldian one: Samaritanism gives
Antonio a duty (correlative to Bathsheba’s claim-right) where ordinarily he would have a liberty-right,
and it leaves me with no moral claim (correlative to the state’s liberty-right) where ordinarily I would
have a claim-right.[20] In less Hohfeldian terms, this difference is merely that samaritanism requires
Antonio to do something (escort Bathsheba safely from Pleasantville) that he would not ordinarily have
to do, and it leaves me morally liable to an imposition (the state’s coercion) that I would ordinarily not
be required to endure. Once one recognizes the two facts (1) that a political state is necessary to avoid
the hazards of the state of nature and (2) that a government can successfully eliminate these dangers
only if it is territorially defined, one appreciates why political legitimacy has the same grounds as
Antonio’s samaritan duty to Bathsheba. Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (pp. 16-17).
Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.

No absolute right to freedom of association

Christopher Health Wellman, philosopher, St. Louis, 2015, A Theory of Succession, Kindle edition. Page
number at end of card.

If it were true either that we had consented to be governed or that very few of us would elect to secede
if given the opportunity, then freedom of association would not be incompatible with statism. However,
because it is historically inaccurate to posit widespread consent and unrealistically optimistic to predict
that most of us would not secede a territorial monopoly of power that cannot be achieved if everyone’s
consent is required. No private agency would be selected by all, and competing agencies would clash in
a manner that undermines peace. I must confess, though, that if someone could generate conclusive
evidence that a just and secure peace could be established in the state of nature, I would embrace
anarchism rather than statism. In the absence of such evidence, however, there is no reason to jettison
the descriptive premise upon which the samaritan theory of political legitimacy relies. Conclusion If it
were true either that we had consented to be governed or that very few of us would elect to secede if
given the opportunity, then freedom of association would not be incompatible with statism. However,
because it is historically inaccurate to posit widespread consent and unrealistically optimistic to predict
that most of us would not secede if given the opportunity, we must choose between denying the
legitimacy of existing states and qualifying freedom of association. The samaritan account of political
legitimacy explains why states may permissibly coerce citizens without their consent and, in so doing,
explains why we do not have a perfectly general and absolute right to freedom of association. Without
denying the importance of being able to choose one’s associates, we must acknowledge that this
discretion may permissibly be restricted in the political context, because (unlike the case of choosing a
marital partner or a religious community) its costs in the political arena are prohibitive. In the end, we
are forced to choose between statism and unrestricted freedom of association, and the samaritan
account makes plain why we must give up the latter and its permissive implications for secession. Thus
we must confess that, while there may be unilateral rights to secede even from just states, these rights
cannot be established merely by a straightforward appeal to the value of freedom of association.
Wellman, Christopher Heath. A Theory of Secession (pp. 32-33). Cambridge University Press. Kindle
Edition.
 AT: Popular Democracy Permits Secession
Many popular democratic interests against secession

Oberman, 2017, Kieran Oberman is a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh., Does
Catalonia have a right to secede?, [Link]
catalonia-have-right-to-secede/

First, democracy. This is the ‘go to’ argument of many Catalan secessionists. According to Catalan
President, Carles Puigdemont, a vote on independence is simply an “expression of a free democracy”. In
this view, Catalans have a right to decide whether Catalonia is independent just as they have a right to
decide on any other issue affecting them. The problem with this argument is that it assumes what is
precisely at issue: that Catalonia represents the appropriate constituency to make this decision.
Another plausible constituency would be Spain itself. For it is not just Catalonia that is affected by the
issue of independence. Catalan independence would have significant repercussions for Spain’s
economy and identity. It would also have ripple effects on other regions, including the Basque country
which has only recently escaped the violence of its own secessionist conflict. short, the democracy
argument fails to overcome what we might term the ‘symmetry problem’. Democracy can be
advanced both as an argument for secession and an argument against it. To justify secession, we need
to justify ‘asymmetry’: to explain why it is Catalonia, not Spain as a whole, that has a right to decide.
 AT: Self-Determination
Much opposition to self-determination

Oberman, 2017, Kieran Oberman is a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh., Does
Catalonia have a right to secede?, [Link]
catalonia-have-right-to-secede/

Democracy is not the only argument that suffers from the symmetry problem. Another is national self-
determination. The idea that a nation has a right to determine its own future is fine as far as it goes. The
problem arises when there is more than one nation in play. Catalan national self-determination butts up
against Spanish national self-determination. One cannot give full expression to the one without limiting
the other. Some will stamp their feet at this and proclaim that “Catalonia is not Spain”. If there were two
discreet nations then Spain would be other-determining not self-determining when it takes part in
Catalan affairs. But the very fact people proclaim this slogan demonstrates how controversial it is.
National identity is not physics. Nations exist, split or overlap depending on inter-subjective beliefs. As
long as there are people inside Catalonia and the rest of Spain who believe in an over-arching Spanish
nation, the concept of national self-determination can be invoked by both sides. It offers no firm ground
for secession.
 AT: Freedom of Association
Governments are not clubs

Oberman, 2017, Kieran Oberman is a Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh., Does
Catalonia have a right to secede?, [Link]
catalonia-have-right-to-secede/

The other argument that avoids the symmetry argument is freedom of association. This the kind of
argument that it takes a philosopher to come up with. The argument likens states to clubs. Just as you
and your friends don’t need anyone’s approval to set up a new club or split from an old one, so regions
don’t need their state’s approval to secede. The problem with the argument is quite simple: the analogy
fails. States are not like clubs. People do not voluntarily join states for the sake of their hobby or
passion; they are forced into states for the sake of justice and peace. States set the background rules;
clubs and other associations offer people the opportunity to pursue particular interests.

If Catalans want to form associations, they can do so. Catalonia already has all kinds of clubs and
associations, including many operating across the region (the Catalan Football Federation, the Catalan
Association for Science Communication and so on and so forth). They don’t need a state to be their club,
nor should they want it to be. A state that tries to be a club is like a parent who tries to be a friend. We
need states. We need parents. But if we are to maintain our individual autonomy, these unchosen
authorities in our lives must assume their proper roles and not pretend to be something they are not.
 AT: Right to Secede
Secession is a weak right that is outweighed by countervailing needs

Neera Chandhoke, 2012, Contextualizing the Right of Secession,

[Link]
login=false&redirectedFrom=fulltext

The argument holds that secession is a contingent right, which can be invoked only when certain
circumstances prevail, such as institutionalized violations of fundamental rights and/or violations of
contractual obligations. Whereas secession is clearly a right that supervenes upon groups in
undemocratic states if they have been subjected to irrevocable and institutionalised injustice, the right is
a weak one in formal democracies, even if these democracies are imperfectly just and inadequately
democratic. A weak right is one that can be overridden by moral considerations that have a bearing
upon the right. The first set of such considerations relates to the immediate fall out of secession: (a)
minority rights, (b) third-party interventions, and (c) the violent nature of the struggle. The second set of
moral considerations have to do with the ultimate objective of normative political theory: what kind of a
society provides the best context for human beings to live out their lives.

Must consider all consequences before saying there is a right to secede

Neera Chandhoke, 2012, Contextualizing the Right of Secession,

[Link]
login=false&redirectedFrom=fulltext

If it is true that a range of legitimate interests is relevant to determining the nature of the moral right
to secede, and if the extent that these interests are impacted by secession depends on the existing
institutional resources, including not just those of the remainder state and the new state, but also
those of regional and international organizations, then it follows that a theory of the moral right to
secede must take into account existing institutional realities at all levels. Buchanan’s latest work on
secession delves into just this—he argues that the moral right to secede is institution-dependent in the
sense that whether a group has the moral right to secede depends on the nature of existing institutions
and whether or not they can adequately mitigate the risks that secession would pose to various morally
important interests. This means that properly theorizing the right to secede requires empirically-backed
premises that characterize a) the range of morally significant interests at risk in various cases of
secession and b) the ability or inability of existing institutions to mitigate those risks. If this is true, then
it seems that both remedial right only and primary right views are incomplete, as neither provide these
important empirical premises.
 AT: Human Rights
Human rights pushes secessionism

Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both
Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review,
[Link]

Third, secessionists feel that they can exploit the language of human rights to promote their agenda.
After WWI, President Wilson promoted the idea of a nation’s right to self-determination to promote
world peace. U.S. presidents emphasized this self-determination principle in international treaties
following WWII in the context of decolonization.76 The United Nations Charter explicitly includes
decolonization as part of the U.N. agenda.77 In 1960, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution
1514 titled the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.”78 The
“external” right to self-determination in the form of statehood exists in cases of colonial or alien
occupation.79 At the same time, international bodies promoted the imperatives of social and cultural
rights, devolution, and autonomy arrangements within existing states to protect minority rights. This is a
manifestation of the “internal” right to self-determination within democratic states.80 Secessionists
have used the international community’s prioritization of both self-determination and group/minority
rights to push these agendas even further. Secession is thus demanded even outside of decolonization
processes and even when the parent state makes every effort to accommodate group rights, as was
evident in Quebec.81

Secession crushes the human rights of others in new territories

Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both
Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review,
[Link]

Moreover, while secessionists often promote their cause in the name of their right to ethnic-national–
self-determination, the resulting new state’s boundaries are usually not drawn according to the traits
of the populace. Instead, they are usually drawn according to earlier sub-national administrative
borders.97 Thus, ironically, ethnic groups may become new minorities in the newly created state.98
The legitimacy for secession is thus weakened. Secessionism may, in fact, become an ongoing process
where countries liberated through secession become subject to secessionist demands as well.99 Thus,
for example, Bangladesh seceded in 1971 from Pakistan—which itself had won independence in 1947
after being ruled by Britain.100 East Timor seceded from Indonesia in 2002, which itself had been a
Dutch colony until WWII.101 This potentially endless process of secession may threaten the idea of self-
determination and statehood.102

People can vote

Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both
Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review,
[Link]

For democracies, one of the most important sources of legitimacy is majority rule, by which every adult
citizen has one vote, and by and large, the majority determines election results. If citizens wish to
change the governing law, they are expected to use political means, rather than resort to violence.
Citizens may petition their representatives, hold public demonstrations, or even run for office to change
the governing law from within.
 AT: International Law
Secession is part of domestic law, not international law

Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both
Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review,
[Link]

How does the law deal with secession? Secession is traditionally thought to be regulated solely under
international law. But, in fact, it lies at the intersection between the constitutional law of a given
country and international law. Secession remains part of the “internal affairs” of the state so long as
the state does not abrogate its duties under international law to properly treat the minority wishing
to secede. But, if the state mishandles the affair, the situation might deteriorate into a conflict that
places it in the province of international law. A great conflict of wills between the state and the
secessionists regarding the application of international law is implied in secession. While those wishing
to secede may seek external intervention and the world’s recognition that a change in the boundaries of
an existing state is warranted, the parent state may ferociously defend its territorial integrity.109

Secession only recognized in international law in limited circumstances

Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both
Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review,
[Link]

Given that national boundaries are at stake, it may be surprising that international law is vague on
when secession is justified and how the international community should view “newly” self-declared
states. International law clearly legitimizes secession only in the case of decolonization or alien
domination.110 It is not even clear whether international law recognizes a remedial right to secede
when the parent state persecutes minorities or seriously abuses their human rights.111 In 2009, Serbia
led the General Assembly to ask for an advisory opinion of the ICJ regarding the question: “Is the
unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in
accordance with international law?”112 The ICJ distinguished the issue before it from that decided by
the Canadian Supreme Court in the Quebec case. The Canadian case dealt with the question of whether
there is a right under international law to unilaterally secede.113 The ICJ defined the issue before it as
whether Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence violated international law.114 Nor did it
discuss the legal consequences of the unilateral declaration of independence.115 The ICJ did state that
“[d]uring the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of self-determination
developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing
territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.”116 This language is
identical to article 1 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. Article 1 states, “The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is
an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.”117 This language is thus open to
conflicting interpretations. One possible interpretation is that when people do not have a right to vote
for the governing institutions, they are subject to alien domination and are entitled to an external right
to self-determination.

International law protects minorities to avoid secession

Rivka Weill, Visiting Law Professor, Yale Law School , 2018, Secession and the Prevalence of Both
Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses Worldwide, Cardozo Law Review,
[Link]

Rather than recognizing a remedial right to secede, international law is geared toward establishing
internal protections for minorities as a way to avoid secession. International law defines what
countries should do, rather than the consequences of failing to do what they should.122 International
law thus forces democracies to face an untenable dilemma. If they fail to accommodate group rights of
minorities, they may face charges that they are violating human rights—which in turn may lead to
secessionist claims for remedial secession to end the injustices inflicted by the parent state. On the
other hand, if democracies foster minorities’ separate identities by promoting group rights, including an
official recognition of the minorities’ language, culture, religion, etc., they may actively support the
separation of these minorities from the existing state. Democracies may find themselves providing the
very resources and fostering the separate identities that allow minorities to embark on secession. For
example, ironically, in Eastern Europe, secessionist movements arose when the protection of rights
improved.123 This is a lose-lose situation for the states, and the solution requires a delicate, almost
unachievable, balance: states must enable group identity to be formed without enabling minorities to
overreach their status or undermine the unity of the state.124 This may partly explain this Article’s
findings that even consociationalist and consensus democracies ban secession.125 It is also unclear
under international law which groups should be “entitled” to secede in non-decolonization contexts.126
Should the right to secede be limited to groups sharing ascriptive characteristics (that is, characteristics
of “being” rather than those of “achieving,” such as ethnicity),127 or should the right be widened to
include majorities that share only the will to secede?128 International law fails to define what “people”
are entitled to self-determination.129

The international law claim is narrow at best

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 7, 2003, Secession,

[Link]

There is yet another desideratum for a theory of secession: As suggested earlier, the implications of
each type of theory for international law regarding secession should be explained. And presumably an
account of the morality of secession should provide some guidance for determining what the posture of
international law should be regarding secession. In the next section, we explore briefly the relationship
between views about the moral (claim-)right to unilateral secession and the question of what position
international law should take on unilateral secession.
The deficiencies of existing international law regarding secession motivate the project of developing
principled proposals for reform. At present international law recognizes only a very narrow set of
circumstances under which the unilateral right to secede exists as an international legal right, namely,
when a group is subject to colonial domination or is the victim of an unlawful occupation by a foreign
entity or is subjected to an Apartheid-like regime. The difficulty with this conception of the international
legal right to unilateral secession is that, while clearly embodying the idea that serious and persistent
injustices can generate a right to unilateral secession, it arbitrarily restricts the injustices that generate
the right.

International law does not support secession

Horowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at
Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013),
Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., [Link]
right-to-secede/

The so-called right to secede has its origins in the principle of national self-determination. As is well
known, that principle formed an integral part of Woodrow Wilson’s plans for post-World War I Europe.
The establishment of, for example, Rumania as a state for Rumanians certainly exemplified application
of the self-determination principle, but, even apart from the presence of minorities in such new states,
the Wilsonian policy fell far short of according national or ethnic groups their own states. Indeed, Wilson
may well have envisioned autonomy rather than independence, and he did not necessarily think in
terms of an ethnic fulfillment for the right to self-determination. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, for
example, were multinational states, and Wilson’s proposal that a right of self-determination be
incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations was rejected. By the time of the Atlantic Charter
in 1941, self-determination was to be limited to peoples living under foreign domination.1
Decolonization was thus an exercise of selfdetermination, and it was soon made clear by the United
Nations (in 1960) and the Organization of African Unity (in 1964), among others, that secessionist
threats to the territorial integrity of states would not be regarded as further exercises of self-
determination

International law ignores the practical failures of secession

Horowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at
Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013),
Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., [Link]
right-to-secede/
Despite important differences in scope and reasoning among these justifications for secession, there is a
substratum of assumptions in all of them. Secession, it is assumed, can produce homogeneous successor
states. In those cases in which heterogeneity remains, it is asserted, minority rights can nevertheless be
guaranteed. Like the Badinter Commission, most writers advocating a right to secede make no provision
for further secessions, except, of course, insofar as infinite regress of secessionist rights may be implied
in their formulations. Secession will also, it is assumed, result in a diminution of conflict that produced
the secessionist movement. Rarely are these assumptions discussed or even rendered explicit, but they
are essential to the analysis. “If you can think about something which is attached to something else
without thinking about what it is attached to, then you have what is called a legal mind.”10 So
pronounced the late constitutional lawyer, Thomas Reed Powell, three-quarters of a century ago. Most
theorists of a right to secession have, in this caricatured sense, legal minds. They have generally not
concerned themselves with the ethnic politics that produces secessionist claims and that will be affected
by new rights to secede. It is no accident that most people who do study ethnic politics are decidedly
less enthusiastic about secession than are the international lawyers and philosophers who are the main
proponents of a right to secede.

International law does not protect a right to secede

Horowitz, 2003, Donald L. Horowitz, James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus at
Duke University, recently became a senior fellow at the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
Professor Horowitz is the author of numerous books and articles, including the seminal volume Ethnic
Groups in Conflict (2000) and, most recently, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (2013),
Horowitz, Donald. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”. Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no.
2, Apr. 2003, pp. 5-17., [Link]
right-to-secede/

As I indicated at the outset, rights to secession are only in some formulations grounded in the extreme
oppression of minorities. In others, rights to secede derive from the alleged commitment of
international law to democracy. In fact, international law has not had a particularly deep or
longstanding commitment to democracy. Only in 1992 did Thomas Franck purport to discover an
“emerging entitlement” to be governed democratically.19 International law has always placed great
emphasis on the writings of jurists, but traditionally for their syntheses of legal rules and for their
influence on state practice that could then change the law, not for the direct creation of new rights by
cobbling together new formulations. Such a practice is particularly doubtful when it is recalled that
international law is a field in which judicial and bureaucratic institutions far outrun representative ones.
In 1998, the British jurist James Crawford produced a long and exhaustive survey of state practice and
the international law pertaining to secession.20 Crawford’s conclusion was simply stated: . . . State
practice since 1945 shows very clearly the extreme reluctance of States to recognize or accept unilateral
secession outside the colonial context. That practice has not changed since 1989, despite the emergence
during that period of 22 new States. On the contrary, the practice has been powerfully reinforced.21
Bangladesh, Crawford noted, was best viewed not as exemplar of a recognized right to secede but
“rather as a fait accompli achieved as a result of foreign military assistance in special circumstances.”22
Other cases, such as Eritrea and the Baltic states, involved mutual consent. Where central governments
oppose unilateral secession, Crawford found, the secessionists gain little or no international recognition.
This certainly has been the case in northern Somalia and Transdniestria, among others. And, finally,
there is “no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based merely on a majority vote of the
population of a given subdivision or territory. In principle, self-determination for peoples or groups
within the State is to be achieved by participation in its constitutional system, and on the basis of
respect for its territorial integrity.”23 Crawford might have, but did not, note the contrary but truly
exceptional position of the government of the United Kingdom, which has stated, in ways meant to be
binding, that a majority of the people of Northern Ireland might vote to dissolve their union with Britain
and to join the Irish Republic instead. But this has not been the position of other states, and it is not the
position of the United Kingdom with respect to Scotland or Wales. If a right to secede is a by-product of
an emerging right to democratic governance, there is not much evidence of it. Subtract the Franck
formulation and a somewhat earlier one by Cassese,24 and the dedication of international law to
democratic governance becomes much thinner. What little there is mainly is confined to writers, rather
than custom, state practice, treaties, or court decisions. Why the connection of international law to
democratic governance is so thin should be very clear. However much we may favor the worldwide
spread of democracy—and I have done my time trying to spread democratic institutions to reduce
ethnic conflict—valorizing a right to democratic governance would imperil the universality of
international law. Despite the developments of the post–Cold War period, there are almost as many
authoritarian as democratic states. If international law is to enhance its influence on state behavior,
which it needs to do in order to reduce and regulate interstate conflict and to facilitate interstate
transactions, it cannot simultaneously undercut the governing arrangements of nearly half the states
that are to be subjected to the rules laid down.25 There is, of course, an even more obvious reason
why international law ought to be exceedingly restrained in its enthusiasm for secession. Secession is an
anti-state movement, and an international law that forgets that states are its main subjects risks its own
survival. There is always a tendency of law to preempt social complexity with rules, and there are many
temptations to the promiscuous creation of rights. But law does best when it is informed by what Karl
Llewellyn called “situation sense,”26 a sound idea of the type of phenomenon it seeks to govern. If self-
determination is a phrase “simply loaded with dynamite,”27 in the words of Wilson’s secretary of state,
there are international lawyers who are playing with this dynamite

AT: Colonial Borders

Neg Argument: Somaliland should stick to its colonial borders—granting recognition to countries that
break these colonial borders could unleash instability and chaos around Africa

Somaliland retains its colonial borders

Mohamed et al. 16— [Mohamed, Ali; Guest Writers. “Why Not Recognize Independent Somaliland? - the World from PRX.”
2016. The World from PRX. July 31. [Link] Joel.

[Ali Mohamed is co-founder of the Horn of Africa Freedom Foundation. It is a grassroots organization, located in Lewis Center, Ohio, that
advocates for the advancement of freedom and democratic values for the indigenous people of the Horn of Africa.]
Despite its achievements, no country in the world has yet recognized Somaliland’s independence.
The US State Department and the African Union each cling to the fiction that Somaliland is part of the
failed state of Somalia. It would have made sense to award Somaliland the diplomatic recognition it
deserves. Its brief history of freedom and democracy stand in stark contrast to the terrorism, reign
of warlords and piracy that is rife in Somalia, where US President Barack Obama and the UN are
expending vast resources to fund African troops, which are propping up the corrupt transitional Somali
government.

The argument against Somaliland’s independence comes from the African Union (AU), which has
been tough on Somaliland for creating an independent democratic state. There is understandable
paranoia about accepting new states with shifting borders inherited from colonial powers in Africa.
The AU’s argument to deny Somaliland sovereignty is not valid, however, because it has had
defined colonial borders that were established at the time of independence.

The irony is that US State Department diplomats, for political reasons, endorsed the position of the
African Union in order to appease other African leaders and to get their military support for America’s
counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia.
 AT: International Law
Neg Argument: International Law prevents Somaliland from gaining independence

Current international legal framework unfairly prevents Somaliland from being recognized
despite meeting the criteria for statehood – this legal framework needs to be changed

Schaefer 23 - [ Schaefer, Matthew.. “Somaliland and the Need to Update International Law on Statehood Recognition.” Michigan Journal
of International Law. April 4, 2023. [Link] ] Elene.

[Matthew R. Schaefer (born February 11, 1976) is an American attorney and politician serving as a member of the Texas House of
Representatives for the 6th district. A Republican, Schaefer is assigned to the Licensing and Administrative Procedures committee and the Public
Education committee.]

Thirty years ago, in response to the deteriorating state Somalia found itself in after the fall of Said Barre’s
military junta, the United Nations established United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSCOM II). At the
time, events such as the Battle of Mogadishu vividly illustrated Somalia’s precarious situation.
Unfortunately, little has changed in the decades since.

Amongst the chaos in Somalia, however, one region has meaningfully invested in peace, security, and
stability. The northern subregion of Somaliland, previously a British colony and protectorate, merged
with the former Italian-held region to its south following their respective grants of independence in 1960
to form a single state, Somalia. However, a number of political and military conflicts, particularly the
violent repression of the Barre regime, eventually pushed Somaliland to declare independence from
Somalia in 1991.

Thirty-two years later, Somaliland is still seeking international recognition as an independent state.
The quasi-state has taken a variety of steps to develop itself in that time: creating a democratically
approved constitution, holding free and fair elections, printing its own currency, creating its own
security forces, and issuing passports. To many outside observers, it seems clear that, “[u]nlike the
remainder of Somalia and most of its neighbors on the Horn of Africa,…[Somaliland is] democratic and
relatively secure.” Building on that perception, Somaliland hosts diplomatic offices for six countries,
including the United Kingdom, and it has started to take on foreign investment for development.

With such a track record, why is Somaliland’s independence still denied by the international community?
This discussion will attempt to explain the incongruencies in international law that have allowed this lack
of recognition to continue, ending with a proposal that could address this problem.

The prevailing definition of a state in international law is outlined in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. It asserts: “The state as a person of international law
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c)
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” According to Professor
Frederick Tse-shyang Chen, these four criteria seem to offer flexibility in how a state can satisfy them
rather than providing rigid thresholds for acceptance.

International scholarship largely considers Somaliland as having satisfied such criteria: “Somaliland’s
territory has been unchanged from the times of the British Somaliland protectorate with 3.5 million
permanent inhabitants residing in it and a functioning government that uses every opportunity to enter
into diplomatic relations with other States.” Ignoring the political arguments made against
Somaliland’s recognition, if operating by themselves, the Montevideo criteria, having been fulfilled,
should make this case for international recognition open-and-shut.
Professor Chen, however, also outlines another important and operative doctrine relevant to this case:
“’Divided states [are] in fact admitted to the UN only after the conflicting claims of the two sides [have]
been formally adjusted, either in favour of division…or in favour of reunification.’” While not universally
recognized as a formal requirement, “in practice the admission of an entity as a Member State of the
United Nations can be regarded as the approved seal of Statehood,” making such acceptance worth
acquiring in order to externally solidify otherwise de facto statehood. At present, Somaliland is still a
legal territory of Somalia and, while peace talks have occurred, Somaliland President Muse Bihi
Abdi has indicated that his people are past the point of trying to reconcile and reunite with the rest
of the country. As long as this impasse remains, it seems as though Somaliland will be precluded
from recognition under the current international law regime.

For Somaliland, this means that no matter how much stability and development the region
continues to foster, its efforts towards recognition on the international level are futile as long as it is
handcuffed to the southern region. Coming at the expense of people who have organized a functional
system but will continue to be precluded from international resources like the World Bank, the current
international order privileges an existing state that has been littered with problems for years.

The situation in Somaliland shows that the existing system of recognition requires a new rule
governing situations like this. In response, this blog proposes an unable or unwilling standard for
state division. This rule would consider the totality of the present circumstances, comparing the
facts present between the states that would exist following the separation of the existing state. In
evaluating the differences between the incubating states, there would have to be a clear and
overwhelming disparity between the two and a record of that disparity existing for an extended period.
The completion of some requisite conditions for the separating region would be required for this
analysis to occur: (1) an open declaration of independence, (2) an extended period of time following
the declaration of independence, (3) a genuine unwillingness or inability to rectify differences, (4)
an otherwise peaceful coexistence with the region being separated from, and (5) fulfillment of the
Montevideo criteria.

Such a legal doctrine is in accordance with a number of existing and accepted components of
international law. For one, the declaratory conception of state recognition, in which recognition comes “as
‘a declaration or acknowledgement of an existing State of law and fact,’” supports this approach. If the
international community is to accept that some states exist even while lacking apparent foreign
recognition, a point some scholars argue is implicit in contemporary examples like Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a natural extension of that logic is to create a threshold in which quasi-states’ internal
conceptions of existence, acting appropriately relative to impotent actors, is accepted. Moreover, if we are
to genuinely uphold the concept of self-determination, a founding purpose of the United Nations, the
international community should not prevent those willing to work to become a successful independent
state from separating from those who are not.

An “unable or unwilling” standard related to state formation is also conceptually rooted in a disputed and
substantively debated doctrine related to the use of armed force.[21] By enabling states to intervene
against individuals or groups operating in other states which are intransigent in their responsibility to
prevent or address ongoing or previous harms, the unable or unwilling standard has created an effective
exception to use of force prohibitions for those trying to maintain peace and order lawfully.[22] With
such a legal doctrine recognizing the differences in capacity that obviously exist amongst the international
community, it logically follows that such an approach can be successfully applied in other areas of
international law outside of armed conflicts. Adopting such a solution in the case of statehood
recognition, using prerequisites that are still difficult to fulfill, will ensure peoples can meaningfully
aspire for and work towards a better way of life, without opening the floodgates to secession claims
by territories of stable states.

One potential critique of this standard is the possibility that the remainder of the state being seceded from
could negotiate in bad faith simply to stall or preclude fulfillment of the third criterion and, ultimately,
independent statehood. This risk could be reduced by a standard to assess what constitutes a “genuine”
unwillingness to rectify differences. One such possibility could be a temporal test, establishing something
like a statute of limitations which could be used to delineate when attempts at reconciliation are genuine
and when they are pretextual.
 AT: Neocolonialism
Neg Argument: Efforts to reorganize African borders through Somaliland recognition – and
especially by Western countries—is a form of Neocolonialism

Recognizing Somaliland is simply recognizing facts on the ground

Meservey 19 –[Meservey, Joshua. 2019. “Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t ‘Neocolonial’ Plot. It’s Self-Determination.” The
Heritage Foundation. [Link]
determination.] Joel.

[Joshua Meservey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute where he focuses on great power competition in Africa, African geopolitics, and
counterterrorism.
He was previously a research fellow for Africa at the Heritage Foundation. Before joining Heritage, he worked at the Atlantic Council’s Africa
Center and at the US Army Special Operations Command where he helped write an Army concept paper. He has testified twice before the Senate,
five times before the House of Representatives, and once before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. ]

Finally, while Somaliland should do what it reasonably can to assuage unionist concerns, the reality of
living in a democracy is that the groups that win elections—
and multiple international observer missions have deemed Somaliland’s vote credible—get to set a
country’s direction.

Until unionists prevail in a vote, it’s not unfair that they are prevented from determining Hargeisa’s policy
on independence.

No matter what irredentists may claim, Somaliland is the only credible government authority within
its borders. Those boundaries also comport with the standards for legitimate borders that African
states established 60 years ago.

Furthermore, it is Somalilanders and no one else who began the movement for independence decades
ago and constructed a government far more democratic and effective than the one in Mogadishu.

Reciting these facts is not a “neocolonial assault.” It’s a simple acknowledgment of reality.
 AT: Pandora’s Box
Neg Argument: Granting diplomatic recognition to Somaliland could open a Pandora’s Box of other
African regions’ claims to independence, thus sparking regional or continental instability

The AU’s own 2005 fact-finding mission recommended against this argument, as Somaliland
has a unique claim to independent recognition

Pijović 13–[ Nikola Pijović. 2013. “Seceding but Not Succeeding: African International Relations and Somaliland’s Lacking International
Recognition.” Croatian International Relations Review 19 (68). De Gruyter Open: 73–105. doi:[Link] Joel.

[Nikola Pijovic is a PhD Scholar with the National Security College, Australian National University. His PhD focuses on Australia’s
contemporary foreign policy towards the African continent. His past academic appointments include a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship at the
University of Adelaide, a Lectureship in International Relations at Queen's University Belfast, and an Honorary Research Fellowship at the
University of Western Australia’s Africa Research & Engagement Center. His past research examined cyber security policy in the Anglosphere
(Five Eyes community), and Australian foreign policy.]

As early as 2002, Somaliland invited the AU to send a fact finding mission to the country (ICG 2006:
2). Its diplomats paid successive visits to the AU in 2003, 2004, and early 2005, and on that last visit
Somaliland’s
President Kahin sought observer status to be awarded to his country so it could better follow events on the
continent and have a permanent representation at the Union. It took the AU a few years, but a fact
finding
mission was in the end dispatched in April 2005, and was headed by then Deputy Chairperson of the
African Union Commission, Patrick Mazimhaka. The mission’s report acknowledged the peace and
stability achieved in Somaliland, and was generally supportive of Somaliland’s independence
claims. It stated that “the fact that the ‘union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified’
and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for
recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history”. The mission further
recommended that Somaliland’s case “should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a pandora’s
box’”. As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case, and
noted that “the lack of recognition ties the hands of the authorities and people of Somaliland as they
cannot effectively and sustainably transact with the outside to pursue the reconstruction and
development goals… the AU should be disposed to judge the case of Somaliland from an objective
historical viewpoint and a moral angle vis-à-vis the aspirations of the people” (African Union 2005).

The observations of the AU’s 2005 fact finding mission to Somaliland were generally positive, and left
the Union with a clear recommendation: judge Somaliland’s case on its own merits, and don’t use
the notion of “opening a Pandora’s box” as an alibi for not dealing with this issue. However,
Somaliland’s bid for observer status to the AU was unsuccessful, and the AU never actually gave
Somaliland any feedback following its 2005 fact finding mission (Clapham et. al. 2011: 11). In fact,
Somaliland’s future status was discussed by AU foreign ministers in 2006, and Kenya, Rwanda, and
Zambia contributed to the debate and discussion by stating “that the Somaliland peace and stability has to
be acknowledged and recognized, and that the African Union has to find a way to reward and consolidate
its stability and its emerging democracy” (Voice Of America 2006). Furthermore, at an AU Executive
Council Meeting in Addis Ababa in January 2007, the then Chairman of the Executive Council from the
Republic of Congo concluded that

`Meservey 21 writes that a frequent concern expressed by

those opposed to Somaliland’s independence is that it would
encourage other secessionist movements on the continent.
However, that hypothesis has already been tested and
proved wrong. Eritrea was granted independence in 1991,
and South Sudan in 2011. There was no subsequent
explosion of independence claims in either case. In fact,
establishing a standard for independence based on the
Somaliland model would raise the bar for achieving
recognition, since there is no other African secessionist
movement with nearly the same autonomy and success as
Somaliland. Its borders are also today the same as they were
upon independence in 1960, aligning them with the African
Union member states pledge that countries should abide
within the boundaries

…there is a reality in Somaliland that cannot be ignored. …. We cannot afford to close our eyes
or shy away from that reality. It is in the interest of Africa to pay attention to these issues. There
were positive developments in Somaliland, including the restoration of stability and peace, the
establishment of democratic institutions and processes and the efforts deployed internally
towards reconstruction. Some of these achievements in Somaliland should inspire the rest of
Somalia. This is an issue that is now known to the African Union policy organs and it should be
discussed at an appropriate time (quoted in Somaliland Times 2007).
 AT: Territorial Control
Neg Argument: the Somaliland government doesn’t even control the territory within its own borders
—its claims to independence are therefore invalid

Hargeisa effectively controls its territory—and even if it didn’t, many legitimate governments
face internal disagreements—this isn’t unique, and doesn’t nullify Somaliland’s
independence claims

Meservey 19 –[Meservey, Joshua. 2019. “Somalilanders’ Quest for Independence Isn’t ‘Neocolonial’ Plot. It’s Self-Determination.” The
Heritage Foundation. [Link]
determination.] Joel.

[Joshua Meservey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute where he focuses on great power competition in Africa, African geopolitics, and
counterterrorism.
He was previously a research fellow for Africa at the Heritage Foundation. Before joining Heritage, he worked at the Atlantic Council’s Africa
Center and at the US Army Special Operations Command where he helped write an Army concept paper. He has testified twice before the Senate,
five times before the House of Representatives, and once before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. ]

The fact that there are unionists concentrated in the Warsengali and Dhulbahante clans is not
evidence that the Somaliland government lacks control of its territory—every country has groups
that disagree with government policy. What matters is effective, on-the-ground authority.

Somaliland does have a border dispute with the Somali state of Puntland that, because of clan ties,
claims parts of Somaliland’s territory in which the Warsengali and Dhulbahante live. Both clans have in
the past also fought with Somaliland for control of the area.

Yet the authority of Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, over the region has grown steadily. Now,
according to the scholar Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute think tank, who recently
traveled to parts of the contested area, it appears to extend all the way to the border that Somaliland
claims. Somaliland also routinely conducts state functions such as elections in the contested areas,
where its currency is also widely accepted.

Puntland’s claims also breach the standard for determining borders that African countries themselves set. The
Organization of African Unity, the precursor to today’s African Union, vowed in 1964 to recognize only those
borders “existing on [member states’] achievement of national independence.” Somaliland claims the territory of the
colonial-era British Protectorate, but Puntland wishes to ignore the decades old African consensus on borders by
insisting on new ones that did not exist during colonial times.

Another of Gaildon’s errors is that he presumes a unanimity of opposition to independence among the Warsengali
and Dhulbahante, for which there is no evidence.

The sentiment is difficult to gauge, and the best data is 20 years old. Nonetheless, during Somaliland’s 2001
referendum—which the international observer mission reported was overwhelmingly perceived by Somalilanders as
a vote on independence, and which passed with 97% of the vote—the highest percentage of “no” votes in any region
was only 16%. Voters who were opposed may have abstained from the vote, and turnout was indeed significantly
lower in opposition areas, but it still registered at 35%, even in the most ardently unionist area of Somaliland.

Furthermore, clan elders in the contested regions have in the past reportedly contemplated switching
their allegiance from Puntland to Somaliland, suggesting their affinity for their clan brethren in
Puntland is not as ardent as some claim.
Finally, while Somaliland should do what it reasonably can to assuage unionist concerns, the reality
of living in a democracy is that the groups that win elections—
and multiple international observer missions have deemed Somaliland’s vote credible—get to set a
country’s direction.

Until unionists prevail in a vote, it’s not unfair that they are prevented from determining Hargeisa’s policy on
independence.
 AT: War
Neg Argument: Granting diplomatic recognition to Somaliland could bolster its claims for
independence, thus stoking war with Somalia

There will be no war with Somalia

Cannon 10/24— [Cannon, Brendon J. 2024. “Somaliland Election: A Crucial Test for Democracy and International Recognition.” Globely
News. October 28. [Link] Joel.

[Brendon J. Cannon is Assistant Professor of International Security at Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He earned a Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Utah, USA (2009). His research is at the nexus of international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. He has
published on topics related to regional security and geopolitics, the arms industry, and shifting distributions of power across the Indo-Pacific.]

Neither Waddani nor Kulmiye will be wishy-washy on this issue. And there will be forward movement on
the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement. This is likely to lead to increased tensions in the Horn region. As it
is, Ethiopia and Somaliland are disturbed by the prospect of a resurgent Somalia supported by Egypt with
arms and troops.

There won’t be a shooting war — Mogadishu still has far too many problems with al-Shabaab, clan
infighting, and a lack of resources and training. But history shows that states take extreme measures if
they feel existentially threatened.

Mogadishu’s stance is to retake Somaliland at all costs. And it has much of the world’s tacit support for
its “one Somalia” policy. That makes Somaliland a textbook case of an existentially threatened state.

Neither Somaliland nor Somalia have the capacity to fight a war

Weiss & Barnett 1/24— [Weiss, Caleb. 2024. “A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink - War on the Rocks.” War on the
Rocks. January 24. [Link] Joel.

[Caleb Weiss is a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation and a research analyst at FDD’s Long War Journal. Caleb earned an MA in
International Relations and Affairs from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. || James Barnett is a research fellow at Hudson Institute, where
he studies conflict, terrorism, and geopolitics in Africa. He has extensive fieldwork experience, including in conflict environments across Nigeria
and in Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine.]

Neither Somalia nor Somaliland has much in the way of conventional militaries with which to fight
a protracted conflict. The broad failure of internationally assisted state-building and military
capacity-building in Somalia is well documented: The vast majority of what could be construed as
“security forces” in Somalia are clan militias or warlord armies of questionable loyalty to the
central government (which is itself perennially divided). Within the nominal Somali National Army,
the only consistently effective units are small special forces groups trained by the United States and
Turkey to combat al-Shabaab. No Somali government since 1991 has had the conventional military
capacity to challenge the authority of the Somaliland administration in the latter’s territory, and no
degree of bellicose rhetoric from Mogadishu will change that.

Somalia’s inability to wage a conventional war with Somaliland applies as well to the case of
Ethiopia, which has traditionally had one of the largest and best equipped militaries in Africa and
presently maintains several thousand troops in Somalia as contingents in the African Union peace
enforcement mission and as unilateral deployments. Egypt, which has its own acrimonious
dispute with Ethiopia and has a close relationship with Somali President Hassan Sheikh, has staunchly
backed Mogadishu in the dispute. But setting tough rhetoric aside, Cairo has struggled to effectively
support its principal ally within Sudan’s ongoing civil war despite sharing a border with the country. It is
therefore unclear how significantly Egypt could become involved in any proxy conflict with Ethiopia.
 AT: Terrorism
Aff Argument: Recognizing Somaliland’s independence is necessary for the international
community, notably the United States, to fight terrorism from bases in Somaliland

Fighting terrorism doesn’t require recognition of Somaliland – port or military deals in

Somaliland would just need approval from Somalia’s government

Webb 2/24— [Webb, Maxwell. 2024. “What the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal Means for Washington’s Strategy in the Red Sea.” Atlantic
Council. February 22. [Link]
the-red-sea/.] Joel.

[Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the
Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.]

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous
security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could
spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed
properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.
The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions
flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may
be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence
based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in
using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab.
Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this
engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With
Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United
States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the
already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the
United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made
easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing
could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues to increase.

Non-unique: the US is already slated to build 5 military bases in Somalia

Faruk 2/24— [FARUK, OMAR. 2024. “US to Build 5 New Military Bases for Somali Army, Which Faces a Rebellion by an Extremist
Group.” AP News. February 15. [Link]
Joel.

[Omar Faruk Osman is a Somali journalist and trade unionist, who is the General Secretary of the Federation of Somali Trade Unions (FESTU).
As the head of the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) he is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Global Union
Federation - the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ).]

The U.S. will build up to five military bases for the Somali army in a project that seeks to bolster
the Somalian national army’s capabilities amid ongoing threats from an extremist group.

Somalia’s defense minister and the U.S. charge d’affaires signed a memorandum of understanding
Thursday in Mogadishu, the Somali capital.
The agreement comes at a time when the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, known as
ATMIS, is scaling back its presence in Somalia.

The new bases will be associated with the Somali military’s Danab Brigade, established in 2017
following an agreement between the U.S. and Somalia to recruit, train, equip and mentor 3,000 men
and women from across Somalia to build a strong infantry capability within the Somali army. The
brigade has been pivotal as a quick-reaction force in efforts to repel the extremist group al-Shabab.

The U.N. Security Council has authorized the reduction of the peacekeeping force in Somalia, and the
Somali government says it is achieving progress in improving security.

But al-Shabab continues to carry out sporadic attacks across Somalia, including in public places.
The group’s latest attack, an incident inside a military base in Mogadishu, killed four Emirati troops and a
Bahraini military officer.
AT Neg
 AT: Secession Bad
(1) US Supports secession in other areas;
(2) This situation is different – Somalia is a failed experiment

National Security Journal, November 4, 2024, U.S. Foreign Policy Blindspot: Ignoring Somaliland and
South Yemen’s Case for Independence, [Link]
ignoring-somaliland-and-south-yemens-case-for-independence/
Confederations Dissolve. Washington Errs When It Ignores Reality: Both Somaliland and South Yemen say they want independence. In both
cases, their independence would benefit U.S. national security yet, in both cases, the State Department rejects
recognition, essentially arguing once in a marriage a country must remain wed no matter how abuse its partner becomes. The State
Department explains that it recognizes existing borders and that allowing states to fracture could set
precedents and unleash chaos. To some extent that is true, especially in states facing secession movements without precedent as
independent states. Nigeria, Ethiopia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and even Russia and China could all theoretically collapse
into constituent units.
The problem comes when the State Department confuses these cases with
confederated states seeking to revert to their previous status . Whereas the United State once blessed their disunion to
the benefit of both freedom and security, today the State Department does the opposite, often achieving results inimical to both freedom and
U.S. strategic interests. Consider the history of dissolution: In 1958, Egypt briefly united with Syria to former the United
Arab Republic. After his successful nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was an outsized figured in
the Arab world. He had numerous supporters in Syria, a state both Nasser and the West feared could fall to communism. Syrians
expected they would be equal partners in the new Republic, but Nasser had other id eas. Egypt was bigger
and, in Nasser’s view, more important and so had every right to dominate the union. By 1961, the marriage was over. After a
coup d’état in Syria, Syria dissolved the union. The Hashemite Arab Federation, a monarchist block that formed in reaction to
the United Arab Republic and briefly united Jordan and Iraq lasted less than six months, dissolving when revolutionaries overthrew the Iraqi
monarchy in 1958. President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger masterminded the secret diplomacy that led
Washington to recognize the People’s Republic of China. While Kissinger and President Jimmy Carter may have been fine throwing Taiwan
under the bus, Congress was not. Rhetoric of “One China” or not, the United States supports Taiwan and its right to exist as a separate entity
outside Chinese Communist control. In
Africa, colonial powers drew borders with little regard to the ethnic and
linguistic topography. In December 1950, the United States supported federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Again, it was not a
happy union and, in 1991, Eritrea regained its independence, against with U.S. support. Among the most bizarre borders in Africa are those of
The Gambia, a former British colony that spans both banks of the Gambia River as it runs through the former French colony Senegal. Gambia is
only 31 miles at its widest, while its Atlantic coast is 50 miles long, the third shortest in Africa. A popular but apocryphal story suggests the
British marked the borders by firing cannonballs from the river, drawing the border where they landed. In reality, the British and French drew
the borders at a slightly greater range in the last decade of the 19th century. The Gambia’s economy revolved around its river. What was
Gambia’s gain was Senegal’s loss, though, as international borders essentially cut the country in half, handicapping cohesion and economy. In
1981, the two countries agreed to confederate, joining militaries, economy, and currency and inaugurated the Senegambia Confederation early
the next year. A Senegalese would always be president, and a Gambian his vice president. In practice, it never worked. One hundred and
fifty years of different colonial influences and created schisms too great to overcome . Distrust grew over
economic stewardship and, in 1989, Gambia sued to dissolve the union. Facing separate tension with Mauritania, Senegalese President Abdou
Diouf agreed to let Gambia revert to its former independent status. The end of the Cold War unleashed a cascade of dissolution of forced
marriages. East Timor won its independence after near a quarter century in a union with Indonesia imposed at the point of the gun after
Portugal abandoned its former colony. As the Soviet Union collapsed into its constituent republics, President George H.W. Bush urged Ukraine
to reconsider secession in what became known as the “Chicken Kiev” speech. Ukrainians and other Soviet peoples ignored him. More people
won their freedom in 1991 than in any other year, a record that will likely stand until the People’s Republic of China collapses. The
United
States did not stand in the way of Czechoslovakia’s divorce and established warm relations with both the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, the American military actually fought for the right of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics to regain
independence. More recently, President Barack Obama disapproved of the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” vote to leave the European Union, but
neither he nor Donald Trump obstructed the British public’s democratic rights to do so. Israel makes no secret that it considers West Bank
Palestinians to be outside Israel proper, rather than a federal component of a unitary state. Still, a core belief in Washington in favor of a “two-
state solution” is consistent with U.S. support for unraveling ties between peoples forced together by forces beyond their control. Given its long
history of accepting the dissolution of unhappy unions, the United States’ refusal today to recognize both Somaliland and South
Yemen is an anomaly. The State Department previously recognized both countries. Secretary of State Charles Herter congratulated
Somaliland upon its independence in 1960 and the State Department formally recognized South Yemen in 1967. Both countries
entered unions with their neighbors. Somaliland joined with former Italian colonial possessions to form Somalia, and North and
South Yemen merged after the fall of the Soviet Union. Both were unhappy unions. Somali dictator Siad Barre waged a campaign of
genocide against the Isaaqs, the predominant clan in Somaliland, and longtime Yemeni dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh sought to marginalize South
Yemenis in his own quest for dominance.

(3) Other countries in Africa have succeeded

Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’
Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination,
[Link]
its-self-determination

It is Somalilanders, and no one else, who have split themselves from Somalia, just as the Eritreans did
from Ethiopia in 1991, and the South Sudanese did from Sudan in 2019. I’m sure Gaildon didn’t
begrudge the Eritreans and South Sudanese their countries, or decry the U.S.’ recognition of them as a
“stealth, neocolonial assault.”
 AT: Not Ready to be Independent
Somaliland has a strong economy

Michael Rubin, November 26, 2024, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute,
[Link] Somaliland
Deserves Independence Before Palestinians

It hosts an international airport, its port exceeds Mombasa in capacity, and it rapidly gains on Djibouti.
Once its chief exports were livestock and charcoal. Today, its tech and finance sector is worth billions of
dollars. Businesses flock to Somaliland because its economy is fanor less corrupt and more transparent
than that of any other country for 1,000 miles. The Palestinian economy, in contrast, rivals Somalia and
South Sudan as the world’s most corrupt. Somaliland is also an environmental leader. It leads the largest
cheetah rescue operation in Africa.

Whereas Palestinians embrace terrorism, Somaliland shuts it down. Weapons smugglers avoid the
country, and its coast guard has secured Somaliland’s 460-mile coast.

Somaliland is ready for independence. It has a functioning economy, has government capacity, and
demonstrates a multidecade commitment to democracy. It values freedom and, unlike the
Palestinians, leans West. Yet the Biden administration remains inexplicably hostile to Somaliland.
College students, activists, and self-described anti-racists remain silent. Perhaps behind White House
and progressive rhetoric, black lives don’t matter after all?

Somaliland has a strong governance system

Aleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International University, 2024, January 24, Somaliland has been
pursuing independence for 33 years. Expert explains the impact of the latest deal with Ethiopia,
[Link]
explains-the-impact-of-the-latest-deal-with-ethiopia-221502

Somaliland’s political system is democratic in a neighbourhood of authoritarian states like Djibouti,

Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudans.

Somaliland has organised successful elections and peaceful transfers of political power. Recently,
however, there has been some backsliding.

Its security apparatus is elaborate. With the active contribution of citizens, it has ensured a measure of
internal stability and security in an otherwise troubled region.

Somalia is a failed state

Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’
Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination,
[Link]
its-self-determination

Joshua studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy at The Heritage Foundation.

Yet, it’s a strange notion that because Somaliland has shortcomings, it should be forced to remain in a
paper union with Somalia, a country so dysfunctional it was the most infamous failed state on the
planet for two decades.

In fact, Freedom House in its latest 2022 report rates Somalia as “not free” with a score of 7 out of
100. That’s the 12th-worst ranking in the world, inferior to basket cases like Yemen, Belarus, and
Afghanistan, and tied with Saudi Arabia. (Somalia did eke out a narrow win over North Korea,
however.)

Somaliland, meanwhile, was rated “partly free” with a score of 49. If Somaliland’s insufficiencies
disqualify it from independence, then Somalia has much less of a case for nationhood.

Somaliland is the only credible government

Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’
Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination,
[Link]
its-self-determination

Finally, while Somaliland should do what it reasonably can to assuage unionist concerns, the reality of
living in a democracy is that the groups that win elections—and multiple international observer missions
have deemed Somaliland’s vote credible—get to set a country’s direction.

Until unionists prevail in a vote, it’s not unfair that they are prevented from determining Hargeisa’s
policy on independence.

No matter what irredentists may claim, Somaliland is the only credible government authority within its
borders. Those boundaries also comport with the standards for legitimate borders that African states
established 60 years ago.

Furthermore, it is Somalilanders and no one else who began the movement for independence decades
ago and constructed a government far more democratic and effective than the one in Mogadishu.

Somalia stable

Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundatiion, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’
Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination,
[Link]
its-self-determination
Despite those challenges, Somaliland is peaceful. It has largely quelled al-Shabaab, and its border
dispute with Puntland, while concerning, is localized and the occasional clashes are small-scale. The
territory’s stability distinguishes it in a tumultuous region. A civil war rages in Ethiopia, Sudan is
undertaking a hopeful but difficult and uncertain political transition, Eritrea is an authoritarian pariah,
South Sudan could return to civil war at any moment, and a contentious election looms in Kenya, which
has had violent polls in the past. Amid all this instability, Washington should be seeking out areas of
calm, with Somaliland being the obvious option. The danger there that U.S. efforts will be wiped away
by war or unrest is lower than in arguably any country in the region.
 AT: US-Somalia Relations
Benefits outweigh any reduction in US-Somalia relations

Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundation, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’
Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination,
[Link]
its-self-determination

A Rupture with Mogadishu. One virtually certain consequence of Washington recognizing Somaliland is
that it would damage relations with southern Somalia that would view it as dismembering the country.
Yet Somaliland, in practice, is already separate from the rest of Somalia and has, for 30 years,
repudiated Mogadishu’s sovereignty claims. Somaliland has taken the decision to carve itself off from
the rest of the country, and American recognition of its independence would simply be acknowledging
that reality.

While a break with Mogadishu would be unfortunate, it would not badly harm U.S. strategic interests
because Washington derives little benefit from its current relationship with the federal government.
Its political elites’ power struggles obstruct the battle against al-Shabaab, and the rampant corruption
siphons off American aid money and fuels further violent conflict.

Despite massive military, diplomatic, and financial support, Mogadishu has made scant progress
rectifying the many thorny issues facing the country.34

As mentioned earlier, American recognition of Somaliland may bring a unity and seriousness of purpose
to the federal government facing the prospect of other attempted defections by its federal member
states.

Somalia’s anger over American recognition could give China an advantage in the strategically situated
country. However, Somalia badly needs American security assistance and humanitarian aid, which would
dampen an overreaction from Mogadishu and likely facilitate an eventual rapprochement. And while
Beijing could replace any American aid Mogadishu rejects, it could not and would not provide the kinetic
counterterrorism support that the U.S. does, and which is important to keeping al-Shabaab at bay.
Beijing has made some recent investments in Somalia and publicly proclaims its interest in strong
diplomatic relations, but Somalia for the foreseeable future is unlikely to achieve enough stability to be
the type of partner with which Beijing can build strong ties. There are also other countries with far more
influence in Somalia than China,35

Turkey is probably the foreign country with the most influence in Somalia due to a long campaign by
Ankara to build commercial, diplomatic, and military ties to Mogadishu, which, even if they are friendly
with Beijing, would limit the gains the Chinese government would make if the U.S. was evicted from
Somalia

Another problematic country for the U.S., Turkey, might also benefit from a Washington–Mogadishu
rupture by replacing some of the withdrawn American counterterrorism assistance. Ankara already
trains Somali forces and provides military materiel, and it has some experience and the willingness to
engage in kinetic operations, such as in Libya. Yet while Turkey is a challenge for the U.S., it is not a
strategic competitor like China or even Russia. Ankara also already enjoys a strong position in Somalia
and may be unwilling to undertake significant extra effort and expense for marginal gain.
 AT: Somiland Will Fail

Joshua Meservey, Former Research Fellow, Africa, Heritage Foundation, May 9, 2022, Somalilanders’
Quest for Independence Isn’t “Neocolonial” Plot. It’s Self-Determination,
[Link]
its-self-determination

Somaliland Failure. It is possible that Somaliland could fail, as did the world’s newest country, South
Sudan, and reflect poorly on Washington. However, this is a remote possibility, as the territory has
proven for three decades its ability to competently govern itself and has developed a habit of
democracy and the institutions that help protect it. The territory, in fact, possesses a track record far
superior to South Sudan’s at independence.

A greater risk is that recognition leads to a surge in development assistance that triggers elite
competition and disrupts Somaliland’s tradition of independence and self-reliance that likely accounts
for much of its success. The plan that the U.S. should have in place before recognition must account for
this danger by ensuring that any American aid is limited, targeted, and accounted for. The focus of the
U.S.’s post-recognition strategy should be on providing diplomatic support and motivating and
facilitating mutually beneficial trade and private investment.
 AT: Ethiopia MOU
Aff Argument: The Ethiopia MOU on recognition proves that recognizing Somaliland is largely
beneficial—the AU should follow Ethiopia’s lead by recognizing Somaliland

Risk: The Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU is a wildly risky deal which heightens regional tensions,
nurtures terrorism, and risks war

Webb 10/24 – [ Maxwell, Webb. “Nine Months Later: The Regional Implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU.” Atlantic Council,
October 2, 2024. [Link]
mou/. ] Elene.

[ Maxwell Webb is IPF Atid Coordinator of Leadership Initiatives. Originally from Dallas, he graduated from The George Washington
University with a BA in International Affairs with a dual concentration in Conflict Resolution and International Development as well as a
regional focus on the Middle East and Horn of Africa. Max has previously served as the IPF Atid National Organizing Fellow from 2021-2022. ]

In the near future, regional tensions bring into doubt the future of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU.
Ethiopia took a big risk by embarking on a deal with an unrecognized state. Though the risk could
produce a high return on investment—increased trade revenue in the region, greater security in the Gulf
of Aden, and for both Ethiopia and Somaliland a boost to national pride—the pressure is on for Ethiopia
to take a different path. Despite progress with Somaliland, there is still room for Ethiopia to walk its
commitments back. Already bogged down in conflict in the Ethiopian region of Amhara and scarred by
his mishandling of the war in Tigray, Abiy is looking for a win in building the Ethiopian navy back up.
Yet facing pressure from actors on all sides, he may be keen to look for another avenue to naval power,
such as Djibouti’s recent proposal to give Ethiopia access to a new port and trade corridor. Supporters of
the Somaliland MOU must think strategically about how to ensure the reward of coastal access is
worth the risk posed to Ethiopia, and all eyes should be focused on the next round of negotiations in
Ankara.

If Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia all continue down this path, there may soon be a situation in which
Ethiopian and Egyptian troops are stationed opposite one another along the Somalian border, the
Ethiopians in their territory and the Egyptians in Somalia as a part of AUSSOM. With two powerful
militaries stationed across from each other, increased proximity heightens the risk, even if small, that
mistakes could escalate into skirmishes or worse—interstate conflict in the Horn. Even if Egypt and
Ethiopia were to go to war directly, it’s easy to fathom a situation in which the various regional players
end up on different sides of proxy wars. Conflicts in and near the Horn of Africa have long been
hotbeds for proxy conflicts, as typified by the ongoing Sudanese civil war.

Instability between regional countries could also empower Al-Shabaab to escalate its aggression in
the Horn. The militant group has benefited from the past nine months of instability, and periods of
transition between military deployments are always fragile. According to the nonprofit organization
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, the first nine months of 2024 have already seen 127 events of
violence targeting civilians perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, with 187 reported fatalities. This year has also
seen an increase in recruitment efforts by the militant group, fueled by the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU.
With Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia at odds, it will be incredibly challenging to successfully
transition the current mission to AUSSOM without things falling through the cracks. Moreover, if
Ethiopia (with its extensive experience fighting Al-Shabaab) does not contribute to the deployment, a
critical base of institutional knowledge will be missing. An emboldened Al-Shabaab with ties to the
Houthis, in a region where leaders are unable to cooperate with each other on matters of security,
would pose a threat to countries around the world. If left unmanaged, there could be much larger
consequences for the international community down the line.
Though the moment feels catastrophically tense, increased violence is not inevitable. Ethiopia, Egypt, and
Somalia may walk their rhetoric back, negotiations may succeed in Ankara, and the Ethiopia-Somaliland
MOU could still go through and lead to many positive outcomes for the parties and the region. Yet those
invested in the Horn of Africa must keep a close eye on how things develop. Though different in
many ways, the leaders of the countries involved in Horn geopolitics share one thing in common:
They are all opportunistic leaders who are looking for a chance to gain the upper hand in a battle
for power, influence, and opportunity at a time when the global system is under immense strain.

Ultimately, noncooperation in this part of the world will lead to many lost opportunities. Immense
potential in the Horn remains untapped while the region suffers from clashes. Restoring peace to the
region, reducing the threats posed by violent extremism, addressing critical challenges around food and
energy security (amid climate change, no less), and harnessing the political and economic opportunities of
the Red Sea all depend on greater collaboration and cooperation—not fragmentation and hostility.
Cooperation will not only benefit the people of the region and the security interests of the international
community but will also address the needs of those same leaders looking to stitch themselves into the
fabric of their countries’ national ethos.

The past decade has seen a rise in middle-power politics around the world. The situation in the
Horn of Africa is not unique, but it is a prime example of where this new form of competition could
serve as a tinderbox, igniting regional war, if not handled properly.

Terrorism argument moved to AT Pro, where it belongs (bottom of page 42)