The Fukushima Daiichi Accident
Engineering Disasters and Learning from
Failure-SM111 assignment
SUBMITTED BY: AKASH GOWDA H U
ROLL NO: 221ME304
S2 SECTION
OVERVIEW:
The Fukushima nuclear disaster (福島第一原子力発電所事故, Fukushima daiichi genshiryoku
hatsudensho jiko) was a nuclear accident in 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
in Ōkuma, Fukushima, Japan. The result was the most severe nuclear accident since the
Chernobyl disaster in 1986, classified as level seven on the International Nuclear Event Scale
(INES) after initially being classified as level five, and thus joining Chernobyl as the only other
accident to receive such classification. While the 1957 explosion at the Mayak facility was the
second worst by radioactivity released,[clarification needed] the INES ranks incidents by impact
on population, so Chernobyl (335,000 people evacuated) and Fukushima (154,000 evacuated)
rank higher than the 10,000 evacuated from the Mayak site in the rural southern Urals.
ACCIDENT:
The Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011 occurred at 14:46 Japan Standard Time
(JST), 05:46 UTC26, off the eastern coast of Japan. This event was among the largest recorded
earthquakes, When the earthquake occurred, three of the six boiling water reactors at the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP were operating at full power and three were shut down for refuelling and
maintenance. The operating reactors of Units 1–3 were shut down automatically when sensors at
the plant detected the ground motion and triggered reactor protection systems in accordance with
the design.
The earthquake caused damage to on-site switchyard equipment, offsite substation equipment,
and the power lines supplying off-site AC power to the plant, leading to the loss of all off-site
electrical power. The on-site replacement power facilities — emergency diesel generators —
which were designed to deal with such loss of off-site power situations, automatically started in
order to restore AC power in all six units. The operation of both isolation condenser loops
lowered the reactor pressure and temperature so rapidly that the operators manually stopped
them, in accordance with procedures, in order to prevent thermal stress on the reactor pressure
vessel. Afterwards, only one of the loops was used by the operators to control the cooling rate in
a range prescribed by the procedures.
In Units 2 and 3, the increase in reactor pressure automatically activated safety relief valves,
which were designed to protect the reactor from overpressurization by releasing steam from the
reactor vessel to the suppression pool section of the primary containment vessel. The decay heat
from the nuclear fuel in Units 4–6 also had to be removed: In Unit 4, the equipment for cooling
and refilling of spent fuel pool water stopped working as a result of the loss of off-site power.
SOLUTIONS:
This framework needs to address off-site remediation, on-site stabilization and
preparations for decommissioning, management of contaminated material and
radioactive waste, and community revitalization and stakeholder Engagement. Generic
remediation strategies and criteria (reference and derived action levels) for residual
radiation doses and contamination levels. A plan for the stabilization of conditions on
the site of a damaged nuclear facility and preparations for its decommissioning.
Development of a generic strategy for managing large quantities of contaminated
material and radioactive waste, supported by generic safety assessments for storage
and disposal facilities.
Sufficient flexibility to ensure that the management of post-accident conditions can be
adapted in response to changing conditions and acquired information and experience.
The plan needs to be flexible and readily adaptable to changing conditions and new
informationRetrieving damaged fuel and characterizing and removing fuel debris require
solutions that are specific to the accident, and special methods and tools may need to
be developed. National strategies and measures for post-accident recovery need to
include the development of a generic strategy for managing contaminated liquid and
solid material and radioactive waste, supported by generic safety assessments for
discharge, storage and [Link] is necessary to recognize the socioeconomic
consequences of any nuclear accident and of the subsequent protective actions, and to
develop revitalization and reconstruction projects that address issues such as
reconstruction of infrastructure, community revitalization and compensation.
Professionalism & Conscientiousness:
One factor that contributed to the disaster was a lack of professionalism and
conscientiousness among the plant's operators and management. There were several
instances of poor decision-making, communication failures, and inadequate safety
measures that could have been avoided with more rigorous adherence to professional
and ethical standards.
example, the plant's operators were not adequately trained to handle the complex
emergency situation that arose after the earthquake and tsunami. They also failed to
follow established safety protocols, such as failing to fully close the reactor's pressure
relief valves, which allowed hydrogen gas to build up and eventually explode, leading to
the release of radioactive materials.
Additionally, there were communication failures between the plant's operators, the
government, and the public. The operators did not adequately communicate the severity
of the situation to the government or the public, which delayed the response and
evacuation efforts. This lack of transparency and honesty contributed to the public's
distrust of the government and nuclear energy, leading to a significant loss of public
support for nuclear power.
In summary, a lack of professionalism and conscientiousness among the plant's
operators and management contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster by leading to
poor decision-making, communication failures, and inadequate safety measures.
REFERENCES:
● [Link] (BBC)
● [Link] (IAEA)
● [Link] (NLM)
● [Link] (WIKI)
● [Link]
[Link] ([Link])
● [Link]
61 (CEIP)