Week 5

Enemy Images, Coercive Socio-Engineering and Civil War

in Iraq
The article challenges the rational, utility-maximizing model often used to explain U.S. policy toward Iraq.

It argues that ideational factors—specifically, the Bush administration’s perception of Iraq—played a

critical role in shaping decisions.

The administration viewed Ba'athists and Sunnis as a "diabolical enemy", leading to an exclusive elite pact

that marginalized these groups.

This exclusionary policy fueled civil war by:

Imposing a “victor’s peace”, violently suppressing former regime members.

Provoking an insurgency to overturn the U.S.-imposed order.

Contrasting U.S. Narratives: From Invasion to Withdrawal

Bush’s "Mission Accomplished" Speech (May 1, 2003)

Framed the invasion as a moral mission to spread democracy.

Expected Iraqis to welcome their "liberation."

Panetta’s Withdrawal Speech (December 15, 2011)

Took a modest and sober tone, emphasizing sacrifices over triumph.

Declared Iraq could now "govern and secure itself," reflecting disillusionment with U.S. intervention.

Flawed Assumptions and Rising Violence (2003–2007)

The U.S. assumed a quick withdrawal and self-funded reconstruction through oil revenues.

This optimism collapsed as violence escalated:

Summer 2003: Resistance movement began attacking U.S. forces.

April 2004: Insurgency escalated into full-scale rebellion.

2007: U.S. military casualties peaked at 904 deaths.

Iraq descended into sectarian civil war:

2004: 16,800 civilians killed

2005: 20,200 killed

 2006: 34,500 killed (3,709 in October alone)

Misinterpretation of Iraq’s Conflict

Early media and academic narratives blamed violence on deep-seated sectarian divisions

("primordialization").

This view:

Absolved U.S. policymakers of responsibility.

Reinforced Orientalist stereotypes (e.g., Arabs as inherently violent).

Later analyses recognized that U.S. policy itself was a major driver of conflict.

How U.S. Policy Fueled Civil War

The political settlement imposed by the U.S. after the invasion led to instability:

“Victor’s peace”: New elite sought to crush former Ba'athists.

Exclusive elite bargain: Sunnis were deliberately excluded, fueling resentment.

This system was not accidental—it was shaped by the ideological worldview of Bush administration

officials.

The "Diabolical Enemy Image" and U.S. Decision-Making

Key figures (Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith) had a simplistic, moralistic understanding of Iraq.

Their binary thinking led to:

Sectarian governance that deepened divisions.

Misunderstanding Iraq’s social structure and the consequences of exclusionary policies.

This ideological certainty justified the war and later influenced how Iraq was governed, contributing to

instability and civil war.

Historiographical Gaps

Existing literature on U.S. policy in Iraq generally falls into three categories:

Eyewitness journalism – Provides valuable details but lacks deep analytical frameworks.

Policymaker memoirs – Often serve as self-justifications but unintentionally reveal underlying ideational

influences.

Academic studies – Many focus on structural forces (e.g., U.S. hegemony, geopolitical goals) rather than

policy decision-making dynamics.

 The article critiques rationalist interpretations, which assume that U.S. actions were designed to maximize

strategic interests, such as controlling Iraq’s oil or reshaping the Middle East. While such structural

explanations capture broad geopolitical motivations, they often overlook how cognitive biases and

ideological worldviews shaped specific policy choices.

Policy Miscalculations and Violence

The U.S. assumed a quick transition, expecting Iraqi oil revenues to fund reconstruction.

However, by 2004, a full-blown insurgency emerged, fueled by sectarian exclusions in Iraq’s political

system.

The U.S. unintentionally deepened sectarian divides, making governance more fragile and conflict-prone.

Theoretical Contribution

The article proposes a hybrid approach, combining:

Cognitive theory – Examines individual-level decision-making, focusing on how key figures (Bush,

Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith) processed information.

Constructivism – Emphasizes socially constructed meanings, showing how enemy images shaped moral

certainty and led to coercive socio-engineering in Iraq.

Structural Explanations Overlook Policy Incoherence

Many studies assume rational state behavior, emphasizing U.S. goals of oil control and regional dominance.

However, internal debates, ideological biases, and unintended consequences show that policymaking was

not purely strategic.

Cognitive and Constructivist Approaches Offer a Better Framework

Cognitive Biases: Policymakers filtered reality to fit pre-existing beliefs, reinforcing cognitive consistency.

Enemy Images: The Bush administration saw Ba’athists and Sunnis as inherently evil, justifying

exclusionary policies.

Constructivist View: The U.S. framed Iraqis (especially Ba’athists) as opposed to Western values,

reinforcing an “us vs. them” dynamic.

Key Policy Consequences

The “Victor’s Peace” Strategy Backfired

The U.S. expected a quick transition after eliminating the old regime.
 Instead, exclusionary policies (e.g., de-Ba’athification, dissolving the Iraqi army) fueled insurgency.

Rather than achieving stability, the U.S. created a “loser’s peace”, where marginalized groups resisted

through violence.

Bush Doctrine and Coercive Socio-Engineering

Iraq was a test case for spreading democracy by force, but the rigid belief system of policymakers blinded

them to resistance.

Instead of adapting policies, the focus remained on defeating the enemy, deepening long-term instability.

1. Iraq as a ‘Diabolical Enemy Image’

Despite al-Qaeda’s clear role in 9/11, Iraq was quickly brought into U.S. policy discussions.

By November 2001, Bush had already asked Rumsfeld for invasion plans; by January 2002, Iraq was

included in the “Axis of Evil.”

Bush framed Saddam Hussein as the embodiment of Iraqi evil, linking him to crimes like torture, rape, and

mass killings.

Elie Wiesel reinforced this moral absolutism, comparing Saddam’s brutality to the Holocaust and urging

Bush to act.

2. Enemy Image in U.S. Decision-Making

The perception of Iraq as a diabolical enemy was shared across the Bush administration.

Rumsfeld and Feith likened the Ba'ath Party to the Nazis and Soviet Communists, justifying total political

exclusion.

Wolfowitz dismissed Sunni political integration, reducing Ba'athists to “Nazis.”

3. Paul Bremer and the CPA’s Role

As head of the CPA (May 2003–April 2004), Bremer wielded unchecked authority in Iraq.

He reinforced the Ba'athist-Nazi analogy, portraying the party as irredeemable.

His sweeping de-Ba’athification policy led to:

Mass purges of officials

Political exclusion

State collapse

4. The Sunni Community as the ‘Enemy Other’

 U.S. officials blurred distinctions between Ba'athists and Sunnis, treating both as enemies.

Wolfowitz and Bremer dismissed Sunni grievances, framing them as “sore losers.”

Feith opposed policies sympathetic to Sunnis, reinforcing their exclusion.

5. Consequences for U.S. Policy and Iraq

This rigid enemy image shaped a victor’s peace, imposing terms on the defeated with no compromise.

By treating Ba'athists and Sunnis as irredeemable, U.S. policies fueled sectarian violence and insurgency.

Cognitive rigidity ensured policy remained inflexible, deepening Iraq’s instability.

. De-Ba'athification as the First CPA Policy

The U.S. demonization of the Ba'ath Party led to its immediate political exclusion.

Feith’s order, enforced by Bremer, banned the top four levels of Ba’athists from government and high-

ranking public jobs.

Feith dismissed concerns about administrative consequences, framing it as essential for a ‘New Iraq.’

2. Impact on Iraqi Society

The purge crippled state institutions, including justice, defense, education, health, and communications.

Lt. Gen. Sanchez noted it “eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation.”

Since Iraq’s economy relied on state employment, thousands lost livelihoods, impoverishing many

families.

3. Ba'athist Reaction: From Shock to Insurgency

Initial confusion: Some mid-level Ba'athists, interviewed in May 2003, believed they were politically

irrelevant and should be left alone.

De-Ba'athification was perceived as persecution beyond the party, affecting the Sunni population at large.

This alienation drove many toward resistance and violent insurgency.

4. Exclusive Political Settlements: The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)

Formed in July 2003 to shape post-war Iraq, the IGC excluded Ba’athists and former regime figures.

Sunni representation was minimal, favoring exiled politicians over those who had lived under Saddam.

5. The Danger of Exclusive Elite Bargains

Post-conflict stability depends on inclusive power-sharing among key elites.

According to Stefan Lindemann’s theory:

 Inclusive bargains promote stability.

Exclusive bargains alienate key groups, fueling conflict.

6. U.S. Policy and Sunni Exclusion

The Ba’ath Party and Sunnis were broadly treated as irreconcilable enemies.

Their political and economic exclusion fueled resentment and insurgency.

7. Bremer’s Vision for Iraq’s New Leadership

After a UN resolution, Bremer sought a 30-member interim government.

His selection prioritized ethnic, tribal, and religious diversity but deliberately omitted Sunni political elites.

Anglo-American advisors handpicked figures, further sidelining former Sunni leaders.

1. Bremer’s Struggle to Find Sunni Leadership

Bremer recognized the need for “effective, patriotic Sunni members” but faced challenges:

Most politically active Sunnis had either been:

Co-opted into Saddam’s regime.

Killed as traitors.

Politically inactive.

His perception led him to dismiss Sunni leaders as compromised or non-existent, reinforcing their

exclusion from governance.

2. Sunni Marginalization in the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)

Formed in July 2003, the IGC included only five Sunni Arabs.

Of these, only two had political backgrounds:

Naseer al-Chaderchi (leader of an irrelevant old party, aged 70).

Mohsen Abdel Hamid (head of the weak Iraqi Islamic Party, seen as a controlled Sunni presence).

Meanwhile, six exile-based parties (U.S.-allied) dominated the IGC:

14 of 22 members had lived in exile or outside Saddam’s rule since 1991.

3. The Rush to Hand Over Sovereignty (November 2003 Agreement)

Rising violence and the U.S. presidential campaign pressured Bremer to transfer sovereignty by June 2004.

The 15 November Agreement planned for an unelected interim government, triggering opposition from

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani:

 He demanded direct elections, fearing a temporary government could become a dictatorship.

4. Lakhdar Brahimi’s Alternative Plan for Sunni Inclusion

UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi mediated between al-Sistani, the CPA, and the IGC.

His consultations revealed deep political polarization:

Sunnis and secular elites feared marginalization.

Minorities worried about Shia-majority domination.

Women’s groups feared losing secular rights under religious parties.

Brahimi’s warning: Iraq was heading toward civil war due to exclusionary politics.

5. Brahimi’s Proposed Reforms

To prevent civil conflict and reverse Sunni exclusion, Brahimi proposed:

A caretaker government of former Ba’athist technocrats until the 2005 elections.

Shifting IGC members’ focus to building national political organizations.

A National Conference (1,000-1,500 delegates) to:

Open dialogue between the state and society.

Reintegrate marginalized Sunnis and alienated political groups.

6. U.S. Rejection of Brahimi’s Plan

Brahimi’s proposals clashed with U.S. assumptions, particularly the enemy image of Ba’athists and Sunnis.

Bush administration rejected Brahimi’s preferred choices for prime minister and president, fearing they

wouldn’t publicly praise the U.S. for Iraq’s liberation.

Instead, the premiership went to Iyad Allawi, a U.S.-allied exile politician.

Vice-presidencies went to members of exile groups:

Ibrahim al-Jaafari (Dawa Party).

Rowsch Shaways (Kurdistan Democratic Party).

Ministerial positions were distributed among the same elite exile factions, solidifying an exclusive U.S.-

backed political system.

The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy

Decision-Making
 Background and Research Focus

Since the 1970s, social psychologists have studied schemas—mental structures that shape general

knowledge.

Political scientists studying foreign policy have focused on elite belief systems but overlooked broader

cognitive structures.

Notable exceptions: Axelrod (1973), Jervis (1976), Khong (1991), and Larson (1985).

Main argument: Schema theory provides a more comprehensive framework for foreign policy decision-

making than belief systems theory.

Schemas vs. Belief Systems

Belief Systems (Rokeach, 1968): A person’s entire set of beliefs about the world, including political

strategies (George, 1969).

Used to analyze leaders like Kissinger and the Bolshevik operational code.

Schemas (Taylor & Fiske, 1991): Cognitive structures that organize knowledge based on experience, not

just abstract principles.

Advantages of Schema Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis

Bridges Political Science & Social Psychology

Explains how policymakers process information through reasoning and analogical thinking.

Predicts Changes in Cognitive Structures

Unlike belief systems, schemas explain when and how policymakers change their views.

More Individualized & Dynamic

Schemas vary across individuals and evolve with new experiences, while belief systems are often static.

Encourages More Detailed Research

Raises new research questions and fine-tunes analysis of how policymakers interpret and use information.

Criticism and Clarifications

Critics argue that schemas resemble older concepts like:

Cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948)

Stereotypes (Allport, 1954)

Personal constructs (Kelly, 1955)

Inferential sets (Jones & Thibaut, 1958)

Attitudes

Key difference: Schemas are purely cognitive, while attitudes also include evaluative components.

What Are Belief Systems?

A belief system is a structured set of connected ideas and opinions.

If you know one belief, you can often predict others (Philip Converse, 1964 called this "constraint").

Example:

Someone who supports free speech might also oppose censorship and favor democracy.

Hierarchy of beliefs:

Core beliefs (e.g., freedom, equality) shape smaller opinions.

Robert Putnam (1973): Leaders who see politics as conflict are less willing to compromise.

What Are Schemas?

A schema is a mental framework that helps people organize and interpret information.

It allows for quick understanding by fitting new information into existing knowledge.

Example:

Hearing “dog” immediately brings up related ideas (fur, barking, pet).

Learning about a new dog breed fits into the existing "dog" schema.

How Are Schemas and Belief Systems Similar?

Both help organize thoughts:

Belief systems structure political ideas.

Schemas structure general knowledge.

Both have hierarchical structures:

Belief systems: Core values shape smaller opinions.

Schemas: General categories (e.g., “animal”) contain specific ones (e.g., “dog” and “cat”).

How Are They Different?

 Belief Systems Schemas

Interconnected: Changing one belief often affects Can be independent: Different schemas don’t always

others. connect.

Example: Supporting democracy often shapes Example: A person may admire a leader’s style

views on government and rights. without linking it to their political beliefs.

How Are Schemas and Belief Systems Different?

Belief systems focus on abstract ideas and principles.

Example: "Democracy is the best form of government."

Schemas rely on specific experiences, stories, and comparisons.

Example: A leader might compare foreign leaders to people they’ve dealt with before, rather than thinking

in abstract terms.

How Do People Use Schemas?

People solve problems using real-life examples rather than abstract theories.

Example: Ronald Reagan

Reagan compared the Soviet Union to Hollywood producers he had negotiated with, rather than relying on

political theories.

Example: U.S. Officials and the Vietnam War

Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy used historical comparisons (e.g., Vietnam = Korea, Munich, or

Malaya), even when those comparisons were inaccurate.

This shows that even experts rely on schemas rather than complex belief systems.

Schemas vs. Ideologies

Schemas Belief Systems / Ideologies

Personal and experience-based Shared sets of political beliefs

Flexible, can vary from person to person Structured and ideological

Example: "Liberals are caring and idealistic." Example: "A good society values equality."

Why Does This Matter?

Schemas help explain how people process new information and why they use concrete examples instead of

abstract reasoning.
 Schemas are flexible and personal, while belief systems are structured and ideological.

Operational Codes: Why They Are Not a Recipe for Action

George (1969) cautioned against assuming that belief systems (or "operational codes") directly dictate

actions.

Decision-making is shaped by context, available options, and expected outcomes, not just beliefs.

Analysts should study how beliefs influence decision-making rather than assuming they determine

behavior.

How Do Schemas Influence Interpretation?

Schemas shape how people perceive and categorize information.

Example: The same statement may be seen as more assertive when spoken by a man than by a woman

(Taylor et al., 1978).

Example: A shove may be viewed as violent if done by a Black person but playful if done by a White

person (Duncan, 1976).

Foreign Policy Example:

Dean Rusk (U.S. Secretary of State): Saw Vietnam as communist aggression, like Korea.

George Ball (Under Secretary of State): Saw it as a civil war, based on France's colonial experience

(Khong, 1991).

How Do Schemas Fill in Gaps When Information Is Missing?

When facts are unclear, people rely on schemas to make assumptions.

Example: The Domino Theory in the Cold War—U.S. leaders assumed that if Vietnam fell to communism,

the rest of Asia and Europe would follow, despite a lack of intelligence confirming this (Gelb & Betts,

1979).

What Are "Scripts," and How Do They Guide Action?

Event schemas are called "scripts"—they provide a sequence of expected actions.

Example: A military intervention script might include:

Send military aid.

Use covert operations.

Consult allies.
 Launch airstrikes.

Send troops.

When Do Schemas Influence Decision-Making the Most?

Schemas are used more often when policymakers:

Are under time pressure (Jamieson & Zanna, 1989).

Need quick answers (Kruglanski, 1989).

Have to justify their choices to others (Higgins et al., 1982).

Do Schemas Always Lead to Biases?

Early research suggested schemas distort reality and cause errors.

Newer studies suggest schemas can be updated if evidence is clear and unambiguous (Fiske & Taylor,

1991).

Example: If a woman behaves assertively, it may challenge gender stereotypes and lead to updated views

(Locksley et al., 1980).

However, in foreign policy, evidence is rarely "clear"—even conciliatory gestures from adversaries may be

viewed with suspicion.

George's (1969) Caution on "Operational Code"

The term "operational code" is misleading—beliefs alone do not dictate actions.

Predicting behavior based solely on belief categories is ineffective.

Instead, focus should be on how beliefs shape decision-making processes (George, 1979; Holsti, 1976):

Defining a situation

Analyzing options

Predicting outcomes

Schema Theory in Decision-Making

Schemas and Information Processing

Schema theory explains perception as a multi-stage process, including:

Selection and encoding of information (similar to belief systems).

Storage and retrieval of memory (unique to schema theory).

Ambiguous information is interpreted through pre-existing schemas.

 Example: U.S. policymakers misinterpreted intelligence during the Vietnam War due to Cold War schemas

(e.g., domino theory), even when evidence contradicted it.

Scripts in Foreign Policy

Schemas include "scripts"—structured sequences for responding to situations.

Example: U.S. intervention follows a predictable script:

Military aid

Covert operations

Diplomatic consultations

Military involvement

Policymakers use schemas to predict adversaries' reactions, sometimes leading to misjudgments.

Example: Dean Rusk's confidence in Vietnam based on his Korean War schema was misplaced.

Theory vs. Evidence in Schema Research

Schemas Shape Interpretation

Early research: Assumed schemas distort information to fit pre-existing beliefs.

Newer research: When evidence is clear and unambiguous, it can override schemas (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).

However, unambiguous evidence is rare in international relations.

Example: U.S. policymakers often viewed Soviet conciliatory gestures as deceptive rather than sincere.

Schemas and Memory Distortions

Once an event is integrated into a schema, memory is reconstructed to fit it.

Example: Truman "remembered" threatening Stalin with nuclear action over Iran, though no records

support this.

Retrospective reinterpretation shapes historical narratives (e.g., post-Vietnam, the Korean War was

reframed as a "victory").

Schema Change and Resistance

Persistence of Schemas

Like belief systems, schemas are resistant to change.

 Instead of replacing old schemas, people modify them by adding subtypes (Weber & Crocker, 1983).

Example: Reagan and Bush only adjusted their Soviet schema after multiple unilateral concessions by

Gorbachev.

Counterfactual Reasoning and Schema Change

People defend schemas by constructing explanations that justify them.

One way to weaken schemas: Ask individuals to explain the opposite of what they believe (Anderson,

1982, 1983).

Individual Differences in Schema Usage

Experts vs. Novices

Experts (e.g., Kissinger, Acheson):

Have complex, well-organized schemas.

Can process incongruent information better.

Less likely to change schemas due to an extensive knowledge base.

Novices (e.g., Truman, Reagan):

Rely more on simple schemas and stereotypes.

Measurement Challenges in Schema Research

Difficulties in Identifying Schemas

Public statements may not reflect true schemas because politicians shape their arguments for persuasion.

To identify schemas, researchers should:

Look for consistency over time.

Compare public vs. private statements.

Examine archival records for schema-based distortions.