Week 6

The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?
1. Media Advancements in the 1980s
Technological Growth: Enabled real-time global news coverage.
Key Events: Tiananmen Square protests, fall of Berlin Wall – widely broadcasted.
Impact on Foreign Policy:
Policymakers forced into rapid responses due to media pressure.
Reduced time for deliberate decision-making.
2. The CNN Effect
Definition: Media influences political decisions, prompting rapid government action in crises.
Post-Cold War Shift:
Weakened ideological alignment between journalists and policymakers.
Journalists gained more freedom to critique U.S. foreign policy.
Examples of Media Influence:
Gulf War (1991): Governments shaped media narratives.
Kurdish Crisis (1991): Media pressure led to Kurdish safe havens.
Somalia Intervention (1992): Media coverage drove Operation Restore Hope, which ended in failure.
3. Criticism of the CNN Effect
Concerns:
Policymakers forced into hasty, ill-planned decisions.
Media bypasses traditional policy-making channels.
Key Critics:
George Kennan: Media-driven interventions undermine structured policy-making.
James Hoge: News pressure leads to rushed and often flawed decisions.
Realist Perspective:
Argues against media-driven foreign policy.
Emphasizes maintaining elite control over decision-making.
4. Alternative View: Manufacturing Consent
Concept: Media does not drive policy but serves as a tool for government propaganda.
Contradiction with CNN Effect:
CNN effect = Media compels government action.
Manufacturing consent = Media manipulated to justify government policies.
5. Media-Policy Interaction Model
Proposed by the Author:
Rejects simplistic one-way influence theories.
 Suggests a two-way relationship between media and government.
1. Media Influence in Humanitarian Interventions
1984 Ethiopian Famine: Sparked discussions on media’s role in crisis response.
Key Works:
Crosslines Special Report: Somalia, Rwanda and Beyond
From Massacres to Genocide
World Society Approach:
Highlights non-state actors' role in humanitarian intervention.
Views media activism positively—mobilizing intervention rather than being reckless.
Contrast with Realist Critics:
Kennan & Hoge: Media influence seen as disruptive to foreign policy decision-making.
Common Ground: Both realists and humanitarians largely accepted the CNN effect as fact, despite lack of
definitive proof.
2. Manufacturing Consent: An Alternative Perspective
Developed by Noam Chomsky & Edward Herman.
Argues Against CNN Effect:
Media does not drive policy but is shaped by political elites.
Governments manipulate media to align with state interests.
3. Two Versions of Manufacturing Consent

Executive Version (Robert Entman):

Media aligns with official government agenda.

Example: 1983 Korean Airline shootdown framed in line with U.S. anti-Soviet rhetoric.

Elite Version (Lance Bennett):

Media follows political discourse among elites (“indexed” to government debates).

Media criticism only appears when political elites are internally divided.
1. The Role of Policy Clarity in Media Influence
Kofi Annan’s Observation:
When government policies are clear, media has little effect.
When policies are unclear, leaders may act due to public pressure.
Strobel’s Conclusion:
Media influence depends on policy coherence.
Clear strategic interests = less media impact.
Uncertain policies = greater media influence.
Minear et al.’s Findings:
Reinforce that media influence decreases as policy clarity increases.
2. Case Studies: Northern Iraq (1991) & Somalia (1992)
Used to assess media’s role in humanitarian interventions.
A. Shaw’s Study on Northern Iraq (1991)
Argument:
Media framed Kurdish suffering against Western inaction → led to political pressure for intervention.
This contributed to the creation of Kurdish safe havens.
Limitations:
Does not examine the policy-making process.
Assumes media was the main driver without fully considering policymakers' perspectives.
B. Livingston and Eachus on Somalia (1992)
More rigorous analysis using official statements, media coverage, and policy processes.
Key shift in debate:
Not just if media influences policy, but who controls the media narrative.
3. Key Takeaways on Media Influence
Context-Dependent:
Media plays a role when government policy is uncertain.
When leaders lack a clear strategy, media pressure can tip decisions toward intervention.
Framing Matters:
Emotional, graphic coverage → increases demand for intervention.
Sensationalist or detached reporting → can lessen urgency.
Need for Policy Analysis:
Some case studies (e.g., Shaw) highlight media’s role but fail to assess internal decision-making.
Who Controls the Narrative?
Livingston and Eachus emphasize elite control over media messages.
Media influence is not independent—it interacts with government interests and elite conflicts.
4. Conclusion
Media can shape humanitarian intervention but is not an autonomous force.
Influence depends on policy uncertainty, elite interests, and media framing.
1. Ambiguity in Media Influence
Strobel’s Contradictions:
Claims media has strong influence, supplementary role, or no decisive impact.
This inconsistency raises doubts about the exact role of media in shaping foreign policy.
2. Policy Certainty as a Key Factor
Findings from Research:
Media most influential when policy is uncertain or ill-defined.
 When governments have clear policies, media has minimal impact.
Supporters of This View:
Kofi Annan: Media effects diminish when strategic interests are defined.
Strobel: Media only shapes decisions in times of policy uncertainty.
3. Framing and Media Pressure
Shaw’s Study (1991):
Graphic portrayals of Kurdish refugee suffering pressured Western leaders.
Emotive framing can push governments toward action.
Limits of Media Pressure:
Liberia: Media coverage alone did not lead to intervention.
Framing must align with political priorities to be effective.
4. Who Controls the Media Agenda?
Livingston and Eachus (Somalia, 1992):
Media influence depends on whether journalists or elites set the news agenda.
U.S. government used media strategically to promote its own policies.
Suggests media does not act independently but is often aligned with state interests.
5. The Media-Policy Interaction Model
Proposed Model:
Uncertain Policy → Media pressure more likely to influence decisions.
Pro-Intervention Framing → Emotional/advocacy-driven coverage increases intervention chances.
Elite Consensus/Conflict → Divided elites make media criticism more effective.
6. Implications and Future Research
Reconciliation of Theories:
CNN Effect: Media drives policy.
Manufacturing Consent: Government controls media narratives.
New Model: Media interacts with policy uncertainty and elite dynamics.
Future Research Directions:
Systematic case studies needed to test if media influence correlates with policy uncertainty and advocacy-
driven framing.

Public Opiniion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the

Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research
Programs and Debates
1. Key Historical Developments
World War I and Its Aftermath
Rise of propaganda and “public relations warfare.”
 Liberal (Wilsonians) View:
Public opinion promotes peace and checks autocratic decisions.
Realist (Morgenthau) View:
Public emotions hinder rational diplomacy.
World War II and the Almond-Lippmann Consensus
Scientific polling enabled systematic study of public opinion.
Almond-Lippmann Consensus: Public opinion is:
Volatile and unstable.
Lacks coherence.
Has minimal influence on foreign policy.
Vietnam War and Challenges to the Consensus
Studies found public opinion could be stable, structured, and influential.
Shifted research focus to public influence on policy decisions.
2. Theoretical Perspectives
Liberal View
Democracies are more peaceful due to public constraints on leaders.
Public engagement & education lead to better policies.
Wilson & Elihu Root: Public oversight prevents misinformation-driven conflicts.
Realist View
Public opinion is uninformed, emotional, and erratic.
Diplomacy requires secrecy and expertise.
Morgenthau: Rational policy should not rely on public sentiment.
3. Future Research Directions
Case Studies: Use archival sources to assess direct policy impact.
Cross-National Studies: Compare public opinion’s role in different systems.
Standardized Survey Questions: Improve consistency in measuring public opinion.
Time-Bound vs. Universal Findings: Separate Cold War trends from long-term patterns.
· Introduction:
· Add a brief overview of how the Vietnam War challenged the Almond-Lippmann consensus (to set up
later discussions).
Clarify the historical shift in perspectives from World War I optimism to Cold War skepticism.
· Lippmann’s Skepticism:
· Emphasize how his "pictures in the head" concept critiques media simplification.
Highlight how his Cold War-era views on mass opinion being destructive influenced later policymakers.
· World War II and Public Opinion Research:
· Specify how Gallup polling data shaped policymakers’ concerns about isolationism.
 Explain the strategic role of polling during WWII in shaping U.S. support for global institutions like the
UN.
· The Almond-Lippmann Consensus:
· Strengthen the explanation of "non-attitudes" with examples of public inconsistency in foreign policy
preferences.
Add how policymakers manipulated public opinion (e.g., by controlling information flow).
· Future Research Directions:
· Suggest integrating digital media's role in modern public opinion research.
Expand on how cross-national comparisons might reveal differences in how democracies handle foreign
policy responsiveness.
· Public Opinion as Irrational and Unreliable
· Scholars like Almond (1956) argued that public opinion is erratic and irrational, often showing apathy
when concern is needed and panic when calm is necessary.
Key figures supporting this thesis included:
Thomas A. Bailey, a leading diplomatic historian.
Hans Morgenthau, a major realist thinker in international relations.
George F. Kennan, who likened democratic foreign policy to a dinosaur—slow to react but destructive
once provoked.
· Empirical Evidence of Public Ignorance
· Polling data consistently showed low levels of public knowledge on foreign affairs.
Surveys revealed that many Americans were unaware of basic geopolitical facts (e.g., China's communist
government, NATO membership, or Pacific geography).
This ignorance led some, including Lippmann (1955) and Bailey (1948), to advocate for stronger executive
control over foreign policy, with Bailey even suggesting that deception might be necessary for effective
governance.
· Public Opinion Lacks Structure and Coherence
· Early studies assumed that public views on foreign policy followed a clear isolationist-internationalist
spectrum, similar to the liberal-conservative divide in domestic politics.
However, Philip Converse (1964) found that mass public opinion lacks consistency, ideological structure,
and long-term stability—describing it as "non-attitudes".
Data from the National Election Studies (NES) confirmed that public beliefs on foreign policy fluctuated
unpredictably, unlike the more stable and correlated views of political elites.
· Public Opinion’s Limited Impact on Foreign Policy
· While policymakers publicly acknowledged public opinion’s importance, empirical studies found that it
had little real influence:
Miller and Stokes (1963) showed that House Representatives were more influenced by constituents on
domestic issues than on foreign policy.
 Cohen (1973) found that State Department officials viewed public opinion as something to be "educated"
rather than followed.
A consensus emerged by the 1960s that presidents and policymakers had near-total autonomy in foreign
affairs. The view was summed up by a State Department official:
"To hell with public opinion... We should lead, and not follow." (Cohen, 1973:62)
Case studies of major foreign policy decisions rarely mentioned public opinion, raising questions about
whether it was truly irrelevant or simply overlooked in research.
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: A Shifting Perspective
Assumed Influence of Public Opinion
Public sentiment is often seen as shaping foreign policy.
Lincoln and Hull emphasized its importance, but empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
Post-WWII Fears
Concerns arose that public opinion was ill-informed, emotional, and a constraint on diplomacy.
Cohen (1973) found little systematic evidence supporting this claim.
Minimal Impact on Policy
Studies (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Cohen, 1973) showed public opinion had little effect on decision-making.
Presidents were seen as having near-total freedom in foreign affairs.
Public opinion was often ignored in case studies, possibly due to crisis-driven policymaking.
Vietnam War: A Turning Point
The war challenged the idea of a "strong executive" free from public influence.
Lippmann reversed his stance, criticizing U.S. policy.
Polling flaws limited understanding of public attitudes, but academic surveys (Verba-Stanford, Rielly,
Holsti & Rosenau) offered deeper insights.
Evolving Research
Late 20th-century studies challenged earlier assumptions, using better methodologies to analyze public
opinion’s role.
Ole R. Holsti explores whether public opinion is irrational and erratic or stable and rational in shaping U.S.
foreign policy.
Early Views: Public Opinion as Weak or Irrelevant
Policymakers like Lincoln and Hull emphasized public opinion’s influence, but scholars were skeptical.
Post-WWII fears saw the public as ill-informed and a constraint on diplomacy.
Studies (Cohen, 1973; Miller & Stokes, 1963) found little policy impact, reinforcing the idea that
presidents had a "free hand" (Lipset, LaFeber).
Vietnam War: Rethinking Public Influence
The war challenged executive independence; even Lippmann shifted, seeing public judgment as more
reliable.
Critics argued polling oversimplified opinions, while independent surveys (Verba-Stanford) found nuanced
views, supporting both war efforts and negotiations.
Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Thesis (Volatility of Public Opinion)
Almond & Lippmann saw public opinion as irrational and unstable.
Caspary (1970) and Mueller (1973) argued it followed logical patterns, especially regarding war
opposition.
Page & Shapiro (1988) found stability in polling data, and Jentleson (1992) showed the public supports
military action based on clear objectives.
Nincic (1988) suggested the public moderates foreign policy shifts.
The Paradox: Stability Despite Limited Knowledge
The public lacks deep foreign policy knowledge but responds rationally to real-world events.
While ideological structure is weak, public opinion changes in a predictable and coherent way.
Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: Stability, Ideology, and Alternative Models
Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Thesis (Public Opinion as Unstable)
Caspary (1970): Public opinion is stable, generally supporting international engagement.
Mueller (1973): Opposition to war follows a rational pattern, rising with battle deaths.
Page & Shapiro (1988): Public opinion is largely stable, shifting predictably in response to major events.
Peffley & Hurwitz (1992a): Foreign policy attitudes remain stable even amid geopolitical shifts.
Jentleson (1992): Public support varies based on intervention type—higher for deterring aggression than
regime change.
Nincic (1988): Public moderates policy, balancing hawkish and dovish administrations.
Key Question: How can an uninformed public still make rational foreign policy decisions?
Philip Converse and Ideological Structure in Public Opinion
Converse (1964): Argued the public lacks ideological consistency, unlike political elites.
Criticism: Achen (1975), Sullivan et al. (1978) questioned methodology; others (Nie & Anderson, 1974)
found rising ideological consistency in the 1960s-70s.
Consensus: Simple left-right or internationalist-isolationist labels fail to capture public opinion fully.
Alternative Models of Foreign Policy Attitudes
Mandelbaum & Schneider (1979): Three outlooks—Liberal Internationalism, Conservative Internationalism,
Non-Internationalism.
Wittkopf (1986, 1990): Two dimensions—Militant Internationalism (MI) vs. Cooperative Internationalism
(CI), creating four types:
Hard-liners (High MI, Low CI)
Internationalists (High MI, High CI)
Isolationists (Low MI, Low CI)
Accommodationists (Low MI, High CI)
Connections to International Relations:
 Realism aligns with Militant Internationalism (MI) (security-focused, military-centric).
Liberalism aligns with Cooperative Internationalism (CI) (diplomacy, economic cooperation).
Similar divisions appear in Hughes (1980) and Billington (1987).
Attitude Structures in Foreign Policy
Holsti critiques limiting public opinion to militant vs. cooperative internationalism, highlighting the roles
of unilateralism and multilateralism.
Some issues (e.g., trade protectionism, U.S.-Israel policy) do not fit neatly into internationalist-isolationist
frameworks.
Hurwitz & Peffley’s Hierarchical Model (1987, 1990):
Core values (e.g., morality of warfare, ethnocentrism) shape broad postures (militarism, anticommunism,
isolationism).
These postures influence specific policy preferences (e.g., defense spending, intervention, nuclear arms).
Suggests the public uses heuristics (mental shortcuts) to form opinions despite low factual knowledge.
Cognitive Misers and Public Opinion
Americans are poorly informed about foreign affairs, even after major events (e.g., Persian Gulf War).
Despite this, they use simplistic heuristics to maintain consistent attitudes, contradicting Converse’s claim
of incoherent public opinion.
Scholars (Conover & Feldman, 1984) argue public thinking goes beyond simple ideological divisions.
Does Public Opinion Influence Foreign Policy?
Debate: Does public opinion shape policy or is it manipulated by elites?
Historically, analysts viewed public opinion as weak, often influenced by elite messaging (e.g., Truman on
communism, Reagan on Nicaragua).
Evidence of Constraint:
Kennedy considered a Cuban missile trade-off due to public justification concerns.
Public impatience influenced Carter’s Iran hostage rescue and Reagan’s Lebanon withdrawal.
Presidents use public opinion data, but analysts (Cantril, 1967) argue it aligns with rather than dictates
policy decisions.

Defining the American Public Opinion/ Foreign Policy

Nexus
Evolving Views on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
Cold War–Vietnam Era: Scholars endorsed a "followership" model, where the public passively deferred to
policymakers (Gamson & Modigliani, 1966; Verba et al., 1967). Lipset (1966) argued that presidents
shaped, rather than followed, public opinion.
Rosenau’s Model (1961): Applied the two-step flow hypothesis (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955), suggesting
media informed opinion leaders, who then shaped public attitudes. He likened the public to a theater
audience, mostly reacting emotionally while elites actively interpreted events.
 Shifting Views Post-Vietnam War
The Vietnam War challenged the irrational public thesis as opposition grew predictably with rising
casualties and elite polarization (Mueller, 1973; Holsti & Rosenau, 1984, 1992).
Later studies (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Wittkopf, 1990) found public opinion stable, coherent, and rooted in
core values (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987).
By the 1980s–1990s, scholars recognized a reciprocal relationship: leaders shape public opinion but are
also constrained by it (LeoGrande, 1993; Wittkopf & McCormick, 1993).
The "Opinion-Policy Nexus"
Holsti (1992) noted the unclear mechanisms through which public opinion influences policymaking.
Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson (1994): Policymakers anticipate public reactions, treating opinion as a “dog
that could bark”—a latent force they must consider.
Powlick & Katz’s Framework: Public opinion actively influences policy when:
Elite debates arise over an issue.
Media coverage increases public attention.
Public engagement rises, making policymakers responsive.
While developed for the U.S., this model may apply to other political systems.
1. Early Views: The "Followership Model"
Public opinion seen as passive, granting policymakers broad autonomy.
Lipset (1966): The president shapes public opinion rather than follows it.
Gamson & Modigliani (1966); Verba et al. (1967); Mueller (1973): Public defers to leaders on foreign
policy.
2. Early Models: Public as Uninformed, Opinion Leaders as Key
Rosenau (1961): Two-step flow hypothesis → Media influences opinion leaders, who then shape public
attitudes.
Almond (1960), Converse (1964): Public opinion is volatile and uninformed, should not drive policy.
3. Vietnam War Challenges Assumptions
Mueller (1973); Holsti & Rosenau (1984): Public opposition rose predictably with casualties & elite
polarization.
Page & Shapiro (1992); Wittkopf (1990): Public opinion is more stable and coherent than assumed.
Hurwitz & Peffley (1987): Core values shape foreign policy views.
Aldrich, Sullivan, & Borgida (1989): People use cognitive shortcuts to form opinions.
4. Reciprocal Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy
LeoGrande (1993); Wittkopf & McCormick (1993): Leaders try to shape opinion but are also constrained
by it.
Hughes (1979); Stimson (1991): Public preferences influence decision-making.
Holsti (1992): The exact mechanism of influence remains unclear.
5. Public Opinion as a "Barking Dog" (Stimson, MacKuen & Erikson, 1994)
 Public is often inactive, but policymakers fear potential mobilization.
Public opinion influences policy when:
Elite Debate – Divisions among leaders increase public engagement.
Media Coverage – Shapes public awareness and response.
Public Activation – If public attention rises, leaders adjust policy.
6. Latent vs. Activated Public Opinion
Almond (1960); Reilly (1995): Public generally disengaged from foreign affairs.
Kegley & Wittkopf (1996): Public knowledge about international events is low.
Converse (1964): Public shows "non-attitudes", meaning unstable opinions.
Key (1964): Latent opinions (deep-seated values) can be activated under certain conditions.
Graham (1989); Powlick (1991): Policymakers anticipate public reactions even if opinion remains inactive.
1. Role of Foreign Policy Elites in Opinion Activation
Public opinion is shaped by foreign policy elites, including:
Executive branch officials
Members of Congress
Leaders of interest groups
Media commentators, academics, and think-tank researchers
Holsti & Rosenau; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: These elites frame issues and influence public
engagement.
2. Almond’s Mood Theory and Its Challenges
Gabriel Almond (1960): Public opinion is generally inactive, activated only by:
Grave crises that disrupt normal affairs.
Public confidence/assertiveness in foreign policy.
Criticism: Almond viewed opinion as unstable and unpredictable.
Caspary (1970); Page & Shapiro (1992):
Found that public opinion is more stable than Almond claimed.
Opinion can be activated by less severe events (e.g., Michael Fay caning, Ethiopian famine).
3. The Role of Elite Debate in Opinion Activation
Page (1996): Public deliberation is essential for engagement.
Without media coverage, elite debates remain private and do not influence the public.
4. Elite Consensus vs. Polarization in Public Opinion
Gamson & Modigliani (1966); Brody & Shapiro (1991):
Elite consensus → Greater public support for policy.
Zaller (1992):
Elite dissensus → Public polarization, with different groups adopting opposing views.
5. Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) Model (Zaller, 1992, 1993)
Explains how people form political opinions through three steps:
 Receive – Exposure to political information.
Accept – Filtering information based on existing beliefs.
Sample – Recalling and using information when forming opinions.
Two Key Effects:
Mainstream Effect – When elites agree, the public adopts the consensus view.
Polarization Effect – When elites disagree, the public aligns with pre-existing beliefs.
6. Case Study: Vietnam War and Opinion Polarization
Early 1960s: Bipartisan elite consensus → High public support for intervention.
Late 1960s: Elite divisions & media debates → Public polarization.
Mueller (1973); Zaller (1992):
The most politically informed citizens shifted opinions first.
Public opposition gradually increased over time.
1. Conditions for Public Opinion Activation
Elite debate alone is insufficient to activate public opinion.
Activation occurs when issues have a direct impact on large segments of the public.
Foreign affairs are generally less engaging than domestic issues due to their perceived distance from daily
life.
2. Framing and Public Reception
Framing influences how the public perceives foreign policy issues.
Frames act as organizing ideas, shaping interpretation and evaluation.
Different types of frames:
Human impact (e.g., refugee crises)
Morality (e.g., humanitarian intervention)
Economic concerns (e.g., trade policies)
Political elites strategically use framing to shape public discourse and influence opinion.
3. Public Opinion and the "Attentive Public"
Only 5-10% of the population actively follows foreign policy ("attentive public").
Broader public engagement requires:
Affective (emotional) response to international events.
Elite debate presenting alternative policy approaches.
Without elite debate, the public either:
Accepts the dominant elite narrative, or
Disengages due to perceived powerlessness.
4. Who Influences Public Opinion?
Most influential:
Journalists & experts (viewed as knowledgeable, nonpartisan).
Minimal influence:
 Elected officials (perceived as partisan).
Interest groups (sometimes negative influence).
Limited influence:
Popular presidents (can have some impact but not decisive).
External events (e.g., disasters, economic crises) do not significantly change opinion unless mediated by
elite commentary.
· Elite Discussions & Media Influence
Public distrust of elected officials makes media forums crucial for shaping opinion. Expert commentary on
platforms like PBS and CNN influences public perception more than political debates.
· · Presidential Influence
Popular presidents (approval >57%) can sway public opinion, but effects are limited (rarely exceeding 10%).
Historical cases (Carter, Reagan) show presidential persuasion often fails. Media support is more effective.
· · Media & Agenda-Setting
Media dictates issue awareness (Cohen 1963). Public engagement in foreign policy relies on coverage, as
Americans show low interest. Media choices shape public opinion and leader evaluations (Iyengar & Kinder
1987).
· · When Foreign Policy Becomes Public
· Foreign policy debates become public when widely accessible via mass media, not just because they
occur in public spaces like Congress.
Elite discussions in major media outlets (TV networks, mass-circulation newspapers/magazines) shape
public awareness.
TV news plays a crucial role, as most Americans rely on it for information and trust it more than other
sources.
· Media’s Role in Shaping Public Opinion
· If an issue lacks media attention, public opinion remains latent.
Major news media decide which foreign policy issues gain public visibility, not individual advocates.
Media choices influence what problems activate public opinion.
· Criteria for News Selection (Graber 1997)
· Journalists prioritize stories based on:
Impact on audience lives
Violence, conflict, or scandal
Familiarity
Audience proximity
Timeliness and novelty
These criteria often limit foreign policy coverage
· Government’s Role in Media Coverage
· Journalists prioritize issues that receive strong governmental attention (Gans, 1980).
 Foreign policy reporting is shaped by official sources, relying on government perspectives (Bennett, 1994).
Coverage is structured around key government "beats" (White House, State Department, Defense
Department) (Sigal, 1973; Graber, 1997; Cook, 1994).
Major newspapers rely on government officials, leading to uniformity in reporting (Sigal, 1973; Graber,
1997).
· Indexing and Media Coverage
· Media coverage follows the level of conflict among Washington elites (Bennett, 1990, 1994).
Debates among officials shape what issues gain media attention.
If elite debate continues, media seek additional perspectives, broadening discussion.
· Framing in News Coverage
· Issue framing affects public perception (Manheim, 1987, 1994b).
The Bush administration framed the Gulf War in moral terms to sway public opinion (Dorman &
Livingston, 1994; Entman & Page, 1994).
Media often use "episodic" rather than "thematic" framing, limiting public understanding (Iyengar, 1991;
Iyengar & Simon, 1994).
Conflict-based framing can lead to public disengagement (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Gamson, 1992).
· Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
· The public interprets foreign policy using cognitive shortcuts like schemas and analogies (Khong, 1992).
Policymakers must align messaging with public beliefs to gain support (Wittkopf, 1990).
Poor framing leads to weak public backing and political fallout.
Media’s Role in Foreign Policy Reporting
Journalists prioritize issues based on high-level government attention (Gans, 1980).
Media heavily rely on official sources due to difficulties in finding alternative perspectives (Bennett, 1994).
Foreign policy reporting follows structured "beats" (White House, State Department, Defense Department,
Capitol Hill) (Sigal, 1973; Graber, 1997; Cook, 1994).
Major media outlets use the same official sources, leading to uniform coverage (Graber, 1997).
Limited elite debate in Washington restricts broader discussion and public engagement.
Indexing and Media Framing
"Indexing" ties media coverage to elite conflicts in Washington (Bennett, 1990, 1994).
If elites sustain debate, media broaden coverage, potentially influencing public opinion.
Framing shapes public perception; public activation depends on how stories are framed (Manheim, 1987,
1994b).
Foreign policy news is often presented episodically, lacking broader context (Iyengar, 1991).
Public opinion is shaped through cognitive shortcuts like schemas and analogies (Khong, 1992; Wittkopf,
1990).
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Before Vietnam, public opinion was seen as irrelevant in foreign policymaking (Holsti, 1992).
 After Vietnam, officials recognized the need for public support (Powlick, 1990, 1991).
National interest remains the primary criterion for decisions, with public opinion acting as a constraint
rather than a guide (Cohen, 1963; Powlick, 1991).
Policymakers rarely use polls directly but monitor media and Congress as proxies for public sentiment
(Cohen, 1995; Powlick, 1995b).
Managing Public Opinion
When public involvement is inevitable (e.g., troop deployments), officials focus on shaping support rather
than following opinion trends (Sussman, 1988; Seib, 1997).
White House polling is more common than polling within foreign policy agencies (Graham, 1994).
Public opinion polls guide messaging rather than policy decisions (Katz, 1997).
Policymakers rely on political instincts to anticipate public reactions (Key, 1961; Powlick, 1991).
Leaders frame policies to align with public attitudes, as seen in the Gulf War (Wittkopf, 1990; Holsti,
1996).
Limited Direct Influence of Public Opinion
Policymakers do not heavily rely on public opinion data when making foreign policy decisions.
Before the Vietnam War, public opinion was seen as largely irrelevant.
The Vietnam War led to a "public support norm," where officials recognize public opposition as a
constraint on policy.
Public Opinion as a Constraint, Not a Guide
Public opinion may limit policy choices but does not dictate final decisions.
Policymakers prioritize the "national interest" over public preferences.
Public sentiment acts as a “first filter,” eliminating options that might provoke strong opposition.
Managing Public Opinion
When public reaction is inevitable (e.g., troop deployment), officials focus on shaping perceptions.
Presidents gauge public sentiment through Congress and media rather than direct polling.
White House polling is primarily used for messaging rather than policy-making.
Presidents and Foreign Policy Framing
Presidents emphasize national interest over public pressure in decision-making.
Nixon and Reagan administrations secretly used polling and public relations strategies.
The Clinton administration incorporated public opinion considerations in national security meetings.
Use of Military Force and Public Approval
Presidents may be more inclined to use military force when approval ratings are high.
Some studies suggest leaders use force for political gain, but findings are mixed.
The “diversionary war” theory lacks conclusive support.
Elections and Foreign Policy Decisions
Some argue leaders use foreign policy to boost election chances, but evidence is weak.
Studies show no strong correlation between military action and election timing.
War has often harmed rather than helped incumbents in elections.
Crisis Situations and Public Opinion
Presidents have fewer domestic constraints during international crises.
Congress reacts slowly, partisan divisions decrease, and elite criticism is often limited.
Domestic political factors still play a role, as seen in historical crises like Cuba.
The Reagan Administration’s Nicaragua Policy
Officials claimed public opinion did not influence policy.
However, the administration actively worked to shape public support for its actions in Central America.