Adverse Possession in BP Properties Case
Adverse Possession in BP Properties Case
The Land Registration Act 2002 changed the adverse possession process by requiring adverse possessors of registered land to apply to be registered as proprietors after 10 years of possession, diverging from the old rule requiring 12 years. The Act introduced a notice procedure where the landowner could object, unlike the former process where 12 years of continuous possession automatically extinguished the original title. Thus, the Act aligned adverse possession claims more closely with the principles of land registration .
Factual possession requires evidence of exclusive physical control and use of the land, meaning actions like erecting structures or locking gates. For instance, in Purbrick v Hackney London Borough Council, the occupation and securing of a derelict building with corrugated iron and padlocks demonstrated sufficient control to establish factual possession. Such actions proved more than trivial possession and provided evidence the occupier possessed the land for purposes not aligned with being a mere trespasser .
The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the common law on adverse possession in the case of J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v The United Kingdom was compatible with the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. This ruling affirmed the legality of adverse possession despite challenges based on human rights grounds, reinforcing the principle that factual possession and intention to possess could displace traditional ownership claims .
The concept of implied license was discredited in adverse possession by case law such as Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran and Pye v Graham. Earlier views held that when an adverse possessor's use aligned with the paper owner's future intentions, it implied permission. However, these cases clarified that no legal rule supports such a view, emphasizing the need for explicit rather than implied permissions to interrupt adverse possession's time requirements. Thus aligning possession with implied intentions was rejected as a basis for disrupting the adverse possession process .
Intention to possess in adverse possession cases is crucial as it demonstrates the claimant's desire to exclude others, including the true owner, from the land. This intention is usually inferred from the acts of possession, such as erecting fences or maintaining physical barriers. Actions that signal control, such as regular maintenance or use of the land as an owner would, are indicators of intention. For instance, in Hounslow London Borough Council v Minchinton, a fence was used as evidence of intention to possess .
The Land Registration Act 1925 allowed adverse possessors to automatically gain the right to be registered as the freehold proprietors after 12 years of possession without intervention. In contrast, the Land Registration Act 2002 requires a formal application after 10 years of possession and introduces a notification system that gives registered landowners the opportunity to object. This shift means the original owner's title is not automatically extinguished, representing a significant procedural change aimed at integrating adverse possession more thoroughly into the land registration system .
The three legal regimes regulating adverse possession in England and Wales are: (1) the law prior to the 1925 reforms, applicable to unregistered land; (2) the modifications under the Land Registration Act 1925; and (3) the regulations introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002. The first regime applied traditional common law principles without statutory reforms. The second regime layered modifications on the original laws specifically for registered land, aligning it with the registration system. The Land Registration Act 2002 introduced substantive changes to adverse possession, requiring a formal application for registered land claims after 12 years of possession ending on or after 13th October 2003 .
When a license is granted by the paper owner, possession ceases to be adverse because the permission (license) contradicts the requirement of intention to possess independently. For instance, in BP Properties v Buckler, letters offering life tenancy effectively halted adverse possession by acknowledging possession as license-based. Similarly, unilateral licenses granted without agreement can nullify time requirements for adverse possession by acknowledging possessors as licensees, thus they can't qualify as adverse possessors during the license term .
The case of J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham clarified that to establish adverse possession, there must be factual possession of the land and an intention to possess it. Factual possession is defined as exercising full control over the land as an owner would, which in this case was demonstrated by maintaining physical control (locking a gate). The intention to possess is about excluding the world including the rightful paper owner. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that such possession was compatible with property rights under the European Convention on Human Rights .
The law of adverse possession focuses on possession rather than outright ownership because, traditionally, English common law emphasizes productive use of land over legal technicalities. Ownership in land law is not absolute but relative, with title based on possession rather than outright ownership, which belongs only to the crown. Limitation laws, such as the Limitation Act 1980, ensure that claims are made within certain time frames, thereby promoting certainty and stability in land use and effectively extinguishing the paper owner's title after twelve years in favor of someone who has possessed the land .