See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: [Link]

net/publication/362320300

One God, the Father

Article in TheoLogica An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology · July 2022
DOI: 10.14428/thl.v6i2.67603

CITATIONS READS
7 481

1 author:

Beau Branson
Brescia University
4 PUBLICATIONS 11 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Beau Branson on 21 November 2022.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

2022 TheoLogica
An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
Published Online First: July 28, 2022
DOI: [Link]

One God, the Father:

The Neglected Doctrine of the Monarchy of the
Father, and Its Implications for the Analytic
Debate about the Trinity
BEAU BRANSON
Brescia University
[Link]@[Link]

Abstract: Whether Trinitarianism is coherent depends not only on whether

some account of the Trinity is coherent, but on which accounts of the Trinity
count as "Trinitarian." After all, Arianism and Modalism are both accounts of
the Trinity, but neither counts as Trinitarian (which is why defenses of
Arianism or Modalism don’t count as defenses of Trinitarianism). This raises
the question, if not just any account of the Trinity counts as Trinitarian, which
do? Dale Tuggy is one of very few philosophers to give explicit definitions of
Trinitarian (versus Unitarian) theology. But they are no mere formalities.
They are essential to his central criticisms of both historical and contemporary
forms of Trinitarianism. In this paper, I offer my own definitions of
Trinitarian and Unitarian theology, contrast them with Tuggy’s, and argue
for the superiority of my definitions to Tuggy’s. If Trinitarianism and
Unitarianism are what Tuggy says they are, the outlook for Trinitarianism is
bleak indeed. If they are what I say they are, Tuggy’s central objection to
Trinitarianism fails. To show what is at stake in these pairs of definitions, I
examine a doctrine much neglected in Analytic Theology, but central to
Nicene Trinitarianism—the Monarchy of the Father.

Keywords: Trinity, Monarchy of the Father, Analytic theology, Dale Tuggy,

Eastern Orthodoxy

1. Introduction

Whether or not Trinitarianism is defensible (logically, metaphysically, biblically, or

what have you) depends not only on whether some particular account of the Trinity
is defensible in that sense, but also on which particular accounts of the Trinity count

1
BEAU BRANSON

as Trinitarian. After all, Arianism and Modalism are both accounts of the Trinity, but
neither counts as Trinitarian. This is why defenses of Arianism or Modalism would
not count as defenses of Trinitarianism, and conversely why one way to criticize
accounts of the Trinity is to say that they are forms of Arianism or Modalism. But
this raises the question, if not just any account of the Trinity (however defensible)
would count as Trinitarian, which accounts do count as Trinitarian, so that a defense
of one of them would count as a defense of Trinitarianism?
Much recent analytic theology has been concerned with devising (hopefully
defensible) accounts of the Trinity. But comparatively little attention has been given
to this question of what it takes for an account of the Trinity to count as Trinitarian.
Indeed, to my knowledge, only Dale Tuggy has given an explicit definition of
Trinitarian (versus Unitarian) theology. But Tuggy’s definitions are not given as a
mere formality. They play a substantive role in his evaluations of both contemporary
and historical sources, and they turn out to be essential to what is probably his most
important criticism of Trinitarian theology. 1
In this paper, I will offer my own definitions of Trinitarian and Unitarian theology,
contrast them with Tuggy’s, and (of course) argue for the superiority of my own
definitions over Tuggy’s. We will see that if Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are
what Tuggy says they are, then the outlook for Trinitarianism is bleak indeed,
whereas Unitarianism faces comparatively few difficulties. On the other hand, if
Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are what I say they are, Tuggy’s central objection
to Trinitarianism is without force.
Our competing pairs of definitions might seem at first glance to be roughly
equivalent. What will show how they come apart is the doctrine of the Monarchy of
the Father. This is a doctrine that was accepted by all of the fourth century church
fathers who lie at the source of the “official” formulation of the doctrine of the
Trinity, a doctrine which later became one of the chief causes of the Great Schism,
and a doctrine which continues to be a source of division between the Catholic and
Orthodox churches to this day. It is also a doctrine which has received almost no
attention in analytic theology. 2 More precisely, however, I should say I will be

1 Hence, if, like most logicians, you expect a good definition to be both conservative and eliminable,
you’re in for a disappointment. Tuggy’s definitions play an ineliminable role in the arguments in which
he puts them to use.
2 In describing the doctrine of the Monarchy of the Father as a “neglected” doctrine, then, I by no

means intend to say that it was neglected by theologians during the patristic or medieval periods, or
even within contemporary theology. I do think it’s fair to say that it has not received much attention
from analytic philosophers. And it has been especially ignored by Tuggy, who, I will argue below, has
essentially built a case against Trinitarianism around definitions that force this traditional view about
the Trinity into the category of “Unitarian” rather than “Trinitarian.”

2
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

looking at a certain use or interpretation of the doctrine of the Monarchy of the

Father, one which suggests in some ways a fresh alternative to the standard
approaches of Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI),
an approach I will label “Monarchical Trinitarianism” (MT). We might briefly
describe MT, by way of contrast to ST and RI (perhaps a bit simplistically, but still
usefully) as follows:

ST identifies God with all of the divine persons (taken together).

RI identifies God with each of the divine persons (taken individually).
MT identifies God with one of the divine persons (namely, the Father).

We will see that Monarchical Trinitarianism avoids Tuggy’s most important

criticism of Trinitarianism, but Tuggy does not consider it in his arguments, because
his definitions count it as a form of Unitarianism instead of Trinitarianism. The
definitions I suggest, on the other hand, count it as a form of Trinitarianism. Thus,
whether Trinitarianism can be defended from Tuggy’s criticisms depends in part on
which definition of “Trinitarianism” is correct.
I want to stress in no uncertain terms that it is not my purpose at the moment to
convince anybody that MT is true. Nor even that it’s in some sense a good idea
(although I will devote some space to clearing up some possible misconceptions
about it). My argument does not require MT to be: true, promising, useful,
traditional, popular, an interesting alternative, or anything else other than simply a
form of Trinitarianism. For if MT merely counts as a form of Trinitarianism, then
Tuggy’s definitions incorrectly categorize views as Unitarian that are in fact
Trinitarian, and his argument against Trinitarianism can be shown to be unsound.

2. Two “Logical” Problems for Trinitarianism: The Three Gods Problem and The
“Who Is God?” Problem

So, what is the argument that I take to be Tuggy’s central criticism of Trinitarianism?
One reads or hears about “the” Logical Problem of the Trinity (perhaps following
the title of Cartwright’s seminal paper),3 or of “the” three-ness / one-ness problem.4
This is the fairly obvious problem that it’s difficult to see how God can be “both three
and one”, or how three things can each in some sense “be God” while there is only
one God. We might call this “the Predicative Problem,” since it turns on the question
of how the word “God,” when used as a predicate or count-noun (meaning something

3 Cartwright (1987, 187–200).

4 Plantinga (1988, 37–53).

3
BEAU BRANSON

like “divine” or “a divine thing”), can apply to three distinct individuals, while, as
one assumes, there is supposed to be only a single individual to which it should
apply. This is what is typically thought of as “the” Logical Problem of the Trinity,
and what I’ll refer to as the “Predicative Problem” or the “three gods” problem (3G)
to distinguish it from the “Referential” Problem or “Who Is God?” Problem below.
ST tries to solve 3G by positing an equivocation between “is God” as applied to
the three persons and whatever is meant by saying there is “one God” (typically, the
Trinity). 5 RI tries to solve 3G by eschewing classical identity in favor of various
relative identity relations. On RI, what we can predicate “is God” or “is divine” of
are three counting by persons, but one counting by gods. But while most of the
analytic literature on the Trinity has focused on 3G, this is not the problem that really
motivates Tuggy.
The problem that I think is of much more concern to Tuggy is in fact a logically
quite distinct problem. It may initially seem like a variation on 3G, and indeed I’m
not sure if even Tuggy has recognized that his concern is distinct from 3G.6 But it is.
We could call his concern “the Referential Problem”. More intuitively, one can think
of it as the “Who Is (or Which One Is) God?” problem (WIG). This is the problem of
identifying the referent of the term “God” when used not as a predicate, but as a name (or
at least as a description that, presumably, applies to some particular individual).
Here there are two inter-related problems that form the basis of WIG:7

5 There seems to be cases where the Bible uses the word “God” to refer to a particular subject,
rather than using “God” as a predicate. Jesus is the Son of God, for example, where presumably “God”
just refers to the Father. (It would be ungrammatical to say that Jesus is “the Son of divine,” for
example.) Conversely, there are clear cases where the Bible uses “God” (and sometimes “gods”) as a
predicate. Certainly as a count-noun, for example in, “For the Lord is a great God, and a great King
above all the gods.” (Psalm 95,3). So, the distinction has warrant in the biblical text. “God” is also
arguably used in an essentially adjectival way in some verses as well.
6 It was not clear to me. I used to think that Tuggy was simply working with an inadequate

formulation of 3G. See Branson (2014). p. 50, footnote 24.

7 The formulation(s) of WIG I give are my own, but summarize arguments given by Tuggy in (2019,

201).
“1. Any Trinity doctrine identifies the one true God (Yahweh) with the Trinity. (definition of
“Trinity doctrine”)
2. A central New Testament teaching is the identity of the one true God with the Father
(only). (Premise)
3. It is not true that the Trinity is identical with the Father and vice-versa. (Premise)
4. Therefore, either any Trinity doctrine is false, or a central New Testament teaching is false. (1-
3)
5. If a later catholic teaching contradicts a central New Testament teaching, Christians should reject
the former and accept the latter. (Premise)
6. Therefore, Christians should agree with the New Testament teaching that the Father (alone) just

4
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

1) (Premise) In the New Testament, the terms “God” and “Father” seem to be used
interchangeably, so that they function as names (or at least singular referring terms)
for the same individual. Thus, the individual named “God” seems to be the Father,
and not to the Son or Spirit. A corollary of this is . . .

2) (Corollary to 1) In the New Testament, the term “God” seems to name a single
individual (or “person”). In the New Testament and the early church, the individual
named “God” is not tri-personal, but unipersonal. And finally (and here’s where the
definitions become important) . . .

3) (“By definition”) All forms of Trinitarianism claim that the referent of the term
“God” is tri-personal rather than unipersonal (contrary to (2)), and that the word
“God” (in whatever sense it might be used) applies to each of the persons equally
(contrary to (1)).

Conclusion: No form of Trinitarianism is consistent with the New Testament.

Since both 3G and WIG can be put in terms of problems dealing with the identity of
God, WIG might initially seem to be just a variant on 3G. But it isn’t.
Of course it’s true that we can put 3G in terms of identity. If “is God” means “is
identical to an individual named ‘God’”, then when we say, “the Father is God” and
“the Son is God” and then say the Father and Son are numerically distinct, we have
a logical contradiction (at least, given classical identity). If we instead analyze “is
God” as predicating a nature / kind or a quality (divinity, say) of the Father and Son,
then to get a contradiction we have to add that there is only one God. But the claim
there is only one God can also be analyzed in terms of (classical) identity: Something,
x, is a god (is divine), and anything, y, that is a god (is divine), is identical to x.
However, WIG is not just a variation on 3G. 3G, if successful, would indict
Trinitarianism as internally incoherent. Merely to refer to the Father, Son and Spirit
as each, in whatever sense, “God”, while saying there is only one God, seems to yield
a contradiction—regardless of what one thinks about the Bible, the Creeds, the
Councils and so forth, indeed regardless of whether one believes in any of these at
all. It truly is a purely logical problem. But WIG points not to any internal incoherence,

is God, and deny the later catholic teaching that God just is the Trinity. (4, 5)

5
BEAU BRANSON

but to an external conflict with the Bible (or, if you prefer, a certain interpretation of
the Bible). And indeed, while Tuggy does sometimes criticize the dubious
metaphysics or other theoretical problems of various models of the Trinity, by far
his deeper concern seems to be how these models fit with the Bible.
Proponents of ST and RI accounts have mostly been concerned with 3G. So, it’s
unsurprising that their accounts do a much better job of dealing with 3G compared
with WIG, a problem their creators may not have even had in view. Even if we take
the standard ST equivocation between “is God” used as a predicate that applies to
each of the persons and “is God” used in a way that applies to the Trinity as a whole
to be an adequate solution to 3G, standard versions of ST fail to provide an adequate
response to WIG, since they identify God with the Trinity, rather than the Father as
WIG requires. Likewise, RI takes each of the persons to be god-identical but person-
distinct, and so to count as one God (one when counting by gods) and three persons
(three when counting by persons). Here again, even if we take this to be an adequate
solution to 3G, it at least isn’t obvious whether it solves WIG, or in what way. Since
RI eschews talk of classical identity, it would seem there simply would be no answer
to the question who God is (classically) identical to. Indeed, RI even eschews the use
of singular terms, which “God” is taken to be within WIG (at least as I have
formulated it), so it’s not immediately obvious how we would even translate WIG
into terms a relative identity Trinitarian would find acceptable in the first place. On
the other hand, to the extent that we might translate WIG into relative identity logic,
it would seem likely that the three persons should all have an equally good claim to
being (god-identical to?) God. With respect to (2) above, it’s not immediately
obvious to me whether, on RI, God would turn out to be “tri-personal” or “uni-
personal”. Indeed, it may be that the answer is simply that God would be something
like “Trine when counting by persons, but Une when counting by gods” (or as the
RI-ist might happily put it, “tri-personal but mono-theistic”!) In any case, it does
seem that RI would have a difficulty saying why the God of the New Testament
seems to be unipersonal (if He does so seem), or why the God of the New Testament
seems to just be the Father, but does not seem to be equally the Son or Spirit. The
point here, however, is not to give a thorough analysis of the success or failure of RI
with respect to WIG. The point is just to show that WIG is a distinct problem from 3G.
One might take 3G to be solved by a particular version of RI or ST, while WIG is
either clearly not solved, or at least not clearly solved. Conversely, one can easily
solve WIG without solving 3G by simply identifying God with the Father but
leaving it totally unexplained in what sense the Son and Spirit can be called “God”
or “divine”. Given that either problem can be solved without solving the other, they
are clearly logically distinct issues.

6
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

3. The (Biblical) Unitarian Alternative

So, we can see that 3G and WIG are in fact two distinct problems. And as I’ve said,
WIG, rather than 3G, is the larger concern for Tuggy, who favors the approach of
what is called Biblical Unitarianism (BU). To just barely sketch the view, Biblical
Unitarians (BU’s) take the Son of God, Jesus Christ, to be a creature, not a second
divine hypostasis with the same intrinsic nature as God the Father. Although some
may admit to something like an Arian view of Christ’s pre-existence, most would
say He just came into existence sometime around 4 BC to 1 AD, and is not different
from ordinary humans except in His sinlessness, extraordinary obedience to God,
and so on. Finally, although here again there’s some disagreement, talk about the
Holy Spirit is typically read by BU’s as something like talk about “God in action”,
rather than a third divine person.
While we put WIG as a case against Trinitarianism above, we can reformulate it
as a case for BU as follows:

1) (Premise) In the New Testament, the terms “God” and “Father” seem to be used
interchangeably, so that they function as names (or at least singular referring terms)
for the same individual. Thus, the individual named “God” seems to be the Father,
and not to the Son or Spirit. A corollary of this is . . .

2) (Corollary to 1) In the New Testament, the term “God” seems to name a single
individual (or “person”). In the New Testament and the early church, the individual
named “God” is not tri-personal, but unipersonal. And finally (and here’s where the
definitions become important) . . .

3*) (“By definition”) Any theology that claims that God is uni-personal (in keeping
with (2)) and says that the individual named “God” is the Father (in keeping with
(1)), is Unitarian. (I.e., any theology that solves WIG is Unitarian.)

Conclusion: Any theology that is fully consistent with the New Testament (i.e., any
theology that solves WIG) will be Unitarian.

If Tuggy’s arguments are correct, then the prospects for Trinitarianism seem bleak
indeed. Besides the well-known criticisms that Trinitarian Theologies solve 3G only
by way of revisionary logic, controversial metaphysics, or in some way unacceptable
equivocations on key terms, we have Tuggy’s argument that, even if some account
is successful in dealing with 3G, it will still fail to be Biblical. The resulting picture,
then, is that Trinitarianism has little to recommend it other than the sheer weight of

7
BEAU BRANSON

popularity and tradition—considerations that surely can’t outweigh problems of

potential contradictions or metaphysical implausibility (3G), coupled with a poor fit
with the Bible (WIG). On the other hand (if Tuggy’s arguments are correct), we seem
to have just the opposite picture for BU. It may not be very popular or traditional,
but it seems to accord better with both reason (3G) and revelation (WIG). And if
Trinitarianism has nothing to recommend it over Unitarianism but the weight of
tradition and popularity—well, that’s a pretty sad commentary on any doctrine.
I’ll argue, however, that Tuggy’s picture results from a kind of logical smoke-and-
mirrors, a semantic sleight-of-hand that:

(1) artificially excludes certain legitimate options for Trinitarians, and

(2) re-categorizes those options as “Unitarian” instead of “Trinitarian”, thereby
siphoning off a degree of warrant that ought to accrue to Trinitarianism and illicitly
applying it to Unitarianism instead.

This is because, whereas standard forms of RI and ST either obviously fail, or at least
do not obviously succeed, at addressing WIG, Monarchical Trinitarianism succeeds
at addressing it, but simply gets counted as “Unitarian” by Tuggy’s definitions.

4. Why We Should Be Suspicious of Tuggy’s Definitions

Before examining our competing pairs of definitions, let me note a few practical
results of Tuggy’s definitions when applied to the debate, results that should
immediately give us pause before simply accepting them as uncontroversial
formalities. In at least one (contemporary) case, it will be clear that Tuggy’s
definitions rule out a view that intuitively appears Trinitarian as in fact non-
Trinitarian. In another (historical) case, it becomes clear that Tuggy’s usage of
“Trinitarian” must depart pretty radically from ordinary usage.
The first case I have in mind, which seems intuitively Trinitarian, and yet does
not count as Trinitarian by Tuggy’s definitions, is a contemporary example: Mike
Rea’s and Jeff Brower’s account of the Trinity in terms of Material Constitution,
dubbed “Constitution Trinitarianism” (CT) by Tuggy.8 Tuggy does raise a number
of internal criticisms against CT. But crucially, his first criticism is that it “is not
Trinitarian.”9 According to Tuggy, “a trinitarian theory must affirm the existence of
a triune god,”10 while CT “posits three equally divine persons . . . but not, it seems,

8 Tuggy (2013, 129–162).

9 (Ibid., 135 ff).
10 (Ibid.)

8
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

any triune deity which they compose.” Now while I disagree with some of the
details of Rea’s and Brower’s CT account, it seems like a radical move to claim that
their account simply does not count as Trinitarian, even in a broad sense of the term.
Tuggy points out in a footnote that, “In correspondence Rea suggests that neither
the classic creeds nor the Bible require saying that there is such a being as the
Trinity.” 11 Now Rea is quite right on that historical point. Tuggy, in a previous
footnote, however, states, “In setting out the creedal constraints of trinitarian
theorizing, Rea doesn’t seem to notice that the ‘Athanasian’ creed, unlike the creeds
of 325 and 381, clearly asserts the existence of a triune, tripersonal deity, as do the
body of catholic theologians from the late fourth century on. (Rea 2009, 404-5) In
other words, they identify the one God with the Trinity, and not with the Father
alone, as in earlier creeds.”12 Here, however, it is Tuggy who has been less perceptive
than Rea. Tuggy does not seem to have noticed (or else has simply ignored the fact)
that the so-called “Athanasian” creed in fact is not and never has been an
ecumenically accepted creed, was not written by St. Athanasius, but is rather a
forgery, and was not only not accepted by the vast majority of Trinitarians (i.e., those
who lived in the East), but indeed was unknown in the East before about the
eleventh century.13 Indeed, not only was the Athanasian creed never accepted by, or
even known by, Eastern Christians, but when it finally did become known, it was
for the most part either rejected outright on account of its affirming the filioque, or
else the offending text was deleted in translations into Greek.14 And so, however
influential the so-called “Athanasian” creed may have been among Western
Christians, it can hardly be appealed to as any sort of sine qua non of Trinitarianism
in general (unless one wants to claim that the Christian East, in which the doctrine of
the Trinity came to its mature form, somehow doesn’t count as Trinitarian). As for
Tuggy’s claim that “the body of catholic theologians from the late fourth century on”
also clearly assert “the existence of a triune, tripersonal deity”, he omits any
evidence, but even if the claim could be substantiated, it is not clearly relevant.15

11 (Ibid., 136).
12 (Ibid., 135).
13 Schaff (1919, 35–36).

14 (Ibid).

15 This paper was originally written in 2018, and since then Tuggy has attempted to shore up this

gap in his paper “When and How in the History of Theology Did the Triune God Replace the Father
as the Only True God?” (Tuggy 2020). However, all of the evidence he presents is either (1) not
relevant (for example, his discussions of St. Patrick and later Roman Catholic councils), (2) actually
non-existent (for example, some pronouns in Gregory Nazianzen that are simply artifacts of the
English translation, but don’t exist in the Greek, which Tuggy did not check), or (3) circular (for
example, his interpretation of a long passage from Gregory of Nyssa’s Great Catechism, which, when

9
BEAU BRANSON

What is normative is the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, not the ways in which

later theologians may or may not have interpreted (or misinterpreted) it.
(Furthermore, there is good reason to doubt that there has ever been anything like a
consensus on there being a “tri-personal” God among all later theologians. See the
discussion below in section VII on John of Damascus’ Exact Exposition Book III,
Chapter 8.)
Now I am more optimistic than most (certainly more optimistic than Tuggy
himself) about the idea that the 4th century church fathers (the so-called “pro-
Nicenes”) had at least a rough consensus on a certain core set of views that could be
called “the” doctrine of the Trinity. And I would be willing to criticize Rea’s and
Brower’s account as not being “Trinitarian” in a certain narrow sense—not being “the”
doctrine of the Trinity (or perhaps not being compatible with “the” doctrine of the
Trinity in certain details). But as Tuggy does not believe there is such a thing as “the”
doctrine of the Trinity, he cannot sensibly criticize a view as not being Trinitarian in
this narrower sense. He can only sensibly talk about a view failing to be Trinitarian
in a broad sense, as simply not being the sort of thing that standard usage or common
sense might call “Trinitarian”.16 Thus, we should pause here and ask, even if we say
that CT is in conflict with “the” doctrine of the Trinity, or if we say that it is false, or
that it is not orthodox, or that it is in no sense at all successful as a solution to 3G
(since these are not the relevant considerations here), is it really the case that Rea’s
and Brower’s CT account of the Trinity doesn’t even count as Trinitarian—even in a
very broad sense of “Trinitarian”? It is this last claim that is the crucial question here,
and what is necessary for Tuggy’s overall criticism of Trinitarianism to be fully
successful. But to say that CT simply does not count as Trinitarian, even in a broad
sense of the term, is a fairly radical claim, one that I think most of us would
intuitively reject, and so one that should give us pause before accepting any
definition of “Trinitarianism” that leads to such a conclusion.
The second case I have in mind is a historical example. Tuggy relies on his
definitions to make the case that the doctrine of the Trinity is not a legitimate
articulation of earlier, apostolic, subapostolic, and pre-Nicene Christianity, but only
makes its first appearance in the (possibly late) fourth century. In one paper, he

Tuggy’s own editorial insertions are deleted, no longer gives any obvious support to his
interpretation). Also, the result of the paper is an interpretation of “homoousious” that is explicitly
contradicted by the very authors of the Creed of 381 that he discusses, as well as by later ecumenical
councils and church fathers, and even the Suda (essentially something between a dictionary and
encyclopedia from Byzantine times). I hope at some point to give a fuller discussion of the paper, but
for now one can read some criticisms from Andrew Radde-Gallwitz in (2020).
16 See note 51 below.

10
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

argues that Tertullian himself (and let us remember that this was the man who
coined the term “Trinity”) was “a unitarian, and not at all a trinitarian.”17 Note, this
is not the claim that Tertullian’s theology was less than orthodox, not “fully”
Trinitarian or anything of the sort, but “not at all Trinitarian.” But what is truly
remarkable about Tuggy’s paper on Tertullian is not its sensational conclusion.
Rather, it is the fact that it reaches this sensational conclusion after saying essentially
nothing novel about the actual substance (pardon the pun) of Tertullian’s Trinitarian
theology. Rather, Tuggy simply takes a completely ordinary account of Tertullian’s
theology—something no Tertullian scholar would disagree with, except perhaps in
details—and runs this fairly standard view of Tertullian through his definitions to get
the result that the man who actually coined the term “Trinity” was in no sense a
Trinitarian. And this despite the facts that Tertullian (1) distinguishes between
Father, Son and Holy Spirit (much of what we know of Tertullian’s theology after all
is taken from his anti-modalist writings),18 and (2) thinks of the Son as at least in
some sense divine (even if not in the same way that later orthodox thinkers would
want to claim) indeed thinks of the Son as being sometimes the referent of the titles
“God Almighty”, “the Most High”, “Yahweh Sabaoth”, “the King of Israel”, and
even “Yahweh” (“the One Who is”).19 Tuggy himself notes that Tertullian is normally
taken to be, although not fully orthodox, at least Trinitarian in some sense: proto-
Trinitarian, a Trinitarian with subordinationist leanings, etc. 20 But when we run
Tertullian’s views through Tuggy’s definitions, we get the result that Tertullian is
solidly Unitarian, and not at all Trinitarian. And Tuggy may be right that this is how
Tertullian’s views should be categorized on his definitions. The question is, given that
Tertullian believes that there are three distinct divine persons, but only one God . . .
shouldn’t he count as some sort of Trinitarian, even if not fully orthodox? What we
learn from the paper, then, is nothing novel about Tertullian’s theology. What we learn
is just how radically Tuggy’s understanding of the word “Trinitarian” must differ
from ordinary usage.
Thus, as I said, Tuggy’s definitions are not mere formalities. His conclusions
about particular cases of what appear to be Trinitarian theologies rely heavily on
these definitions and depart sharply from the ordinary intuitions of most of us,
whether philosopher, theologian, or historian. But the arguments he presents
against Trinitarianism in general rely heavily on these definitions as well, definitions

17 Tuggy (2016, 179).

18 See, e.g., Against Praxeas 9 in (Tertullian 1885, 603–604).
19 (Ibid. 17). One can’t help but wonder why Biblical Unitarians so often balk at the idea that Jesus

is Yahweh, if, as Tuggy apparently holds, such a view is consistent with Unitarianism!
20 Tuggy (2016, 179).

11
BEAU BRANSON

which I think we should take a closer look at, given that they rule out accounts
ranging from Tertullian to Rea and Brower, not on the grounds of being internally
defective in some way, but simply on the grounds that, despite appearances, they
don’t really count as Trinitarian. What other accounts of the Trinity might turn out
to be defensible, but simply be getting ruled out by his definitions? And how should
we define Trinitarianism?

5. The Definitions

First, then, let me lay out my own definitions of “Trinitarian” and “Unitarian”,
definitions which I will admit have certain defects, but which might be remedied or
at least not cause many problems, and which I think should sit fairly well with
common sense. (Tuggy’s definitions, I will argue, exhibit defects that do cause
problems and in a way that is unavoidable, because the very defect in the definitions
is what his arguments against the doctrine of the Trinity hinge on.)

Trinitarian Theology according to Branson (TB):

A (Broadly) Trinitarian Theology is any theology that says:
(TB1) there are exactly three divine “persons” (or individuals, etc.).
Nevertheless,
(TB2) there is exactly one God.21

21 Note that essentially the same definition is given by Trinitarian philosophers such as William
Lane Craig and Ryan Mullins, as well as by Trinitarian theologians such as B. B. Warfield.
Craig (2020) says, “The essentials of the doctrine are taught explicitly and clearly in the Bible,
namely, (1) There is only one God, and (2) There are three persons who are divine. All the formal
stuff about substances, natures, begetting, and so on you can leave to the philosophers.”
Mullins (2020, 88) says, “There are several desiderata that are necessary for constructing the
doctrine of the Trinity. The basic claim of this doctrine is that the Christian God is three persons in
one essence. This can be broken down into four desiderata:
T1) There are three divine persons.
T2) The divine persons are not numerically identical to each other.
T3) Homoousios: The divine persons share the same divine essence.
T4) Monotheism: The divine persons are related in such a way that there is only one God, and not
three Gods.
I take these 4 desiderata to be common among Trinitarians of various stripes in the contemporary
analytic discussions.”
Warfield (1915) says, “Through out the whole course of the many efforts to formulate the doctrine
exactly, which have followed one another during the entire history of the church, indeed, the
principle which has ever determined the result has always been determination to do justice in
conceiving the relations of God the Father, God the Son and God the Spirit, on the one hand to the
unity of God, and, on the other, to the true Deity of the Son and Spirit and their distinct personalities.

12
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

Unitarian Theology according to Branson (UB):

A Unitarian Theology is any theology that says:
(UB1) there is exactly one divine “person” or individual. And,
(UB2) there is exactly one God.

Note first that my definitions are, as they should be, logical contraries. There
could not be (not in the same sense and at the same time) both exactly one and
exactly three divine persons.22 Note second, that these definitions would apply to
any religion whatsoever. If it turns out that certain forms of Hinduism, say,
acknowledged three divine persons, but only one God, then that form of Hinduism
might turn out to be Trinitarian in this broad sense. (And people do sometimes speak
of non-Christian religions as “unitarian,” “binitarian,” “trinitarian” and so on.) If
one wants a definition specifically of Christian Trinitarian Theology, I would simply
take whatever the definition of a (broadly) “Christian Theology” turns out to be, and
make a conjunction of the two definitions. Surely the set of Christian Trinitarian
Theologies is just the intersection of the set of Christian Theologies and the set of
Trinitarian Theologies.
Now for the admitted defect in TB. Presumably, each of the divine persons in a
Trinitarian Theology should bear some important relation to God or have some
claim to being called “God” in some sense. And for all my definition says, you could
have three divine persons over here, and God over there, and no interesting or
important relation between them at all. I certainly admit that should be corrected.
But I don’t want, just in the definition, to rule on precisely what the relation should
be between The One God and the three persons. And it’s difficult to spell out when
a relation is “interesting”, “important” and the like. So, for the time being, I leave
out the relation and simply flag my definitions with the caveat that we should, of
course, expect some interesting and/or important relation to hold here, and we
should be on our guard to reject any claim that a theology that posits no such relation

When we have said these three things, then—[1] that there is but one God, [2] that the Father and the
Son and the Spirit is each God, [3] that the Father and the Son and the Spirit is each a distinct person—
we have enunciated the doctrine of the Trinity in its completeness.”
Thus, while Mullins characterizes the doctrine informally in something like the way Tuggy does,
his more precisely statement is essentially the same as my own, as well as Craig’s and Warfield’s.
This seems to suggest that, whatever the particularities of a given theologian’s account of the Trinity
might be, Trinitarians themselves want to characterize the essentials of the doctrine of the Trinity
differently than Tuggy does.
22 Surely the Unitarian will grant this, since the claim that there cannot be both exactly one and

exactly three of something, in the same sense, and at the same time, forms one of their core complaints
against Trinitarianism!

13
BEAU BRANSON

counts as Trinitarian.
Similarly for UB, presumably a Unitarian Theology should say not simply that
there is one divine person and that there is one God, but that these are identical, or
at least “numerically one”, or something to that effect. But again, I won’t rule on that
point just in the definition. If a Unitarian, perhaps for independent reasons, wanted
to reject the existence of classical identity, say, or simply thought there was a more
complicated relation between the one divine person and God, I wouldn’t want to
rule out their theology as not Unitarian.23 So again, I’ll admit this is a shortcoming in
the definition. But I think it should be one that we can work around, so long as we
are on our guard.
Compare my definitions now to Tuggy’s, which I will label “TT” and “UT”,
respectively. In “Tertullian the Unitarian”, Tuggy States:

A ‘trinitarian’ Christian theology says that

[(TT1)] there is one God
[(TT2)] which or who in some sense contains or consists of three ‘persons’,
namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,
[(TT3)] who are equally divine, and
[(TT4)] [(TT1)-(TT3)] are eternally the case.

In contrast, a ‘unitarian’ Christian theology asserts that the [sic]

[(UT1)] there is one God,
[(UT2)] who is numerically identical with the one Jesus called ‘Father’,
[(UT3)] and is not numerically identical with anyone else,
[(UT4)] and [(UT1)-(UT3)] are eternally the case.

Tuggy then claims, “. . . As they are logical contraries, a theologian can’t consistently
hold both views, although one may have a theology which is neither”. I’ll return to
this below, but Tuggy’s definitions are not in fact logical contraries, and that will be
the root of the problem. For now, let’s consider how the competing pairs of
definitions come apart.
At first glance, one might think the two are, if not exactly equivalent, close enough.
First, we could couple my definitions with a definition of “Christian theology” to
get definitions of “Trinitarian Christian Theology” and “Unitarian Christian

23 Suppose that for purely philosophical reasons a Unitarian rejected the existence or intelligibility
of classical, Leibnizian identity, and so held that the relation between God and the Father was one of
constitution, say, or accidental numerical sameness, but that they would say the same thing about
Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens, for example. It doesn’t seem that should disqualify them from
counting as Unitarian, though on Tuggy’s definitions (just below), it would.

14
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

Theology”, bringing the definienda together. Second, all the definitions agree in
claiming that there is only one God, so they all already line up in that regard. Third,
while I don’t mention each divine person by name, surely in this context they would
indeed be the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Fourth, although I don’t build any
particular relation into my definitions, I noted that there ought to be some important
relation there. And while Tuggy does build a relation between The One God and the
Three Persons into TT, his description “in some sense contains or consists of” seems
deliberately designed to be vague enough that it could include just about any
relation a Trinitarian might propose. Fifth, Tuggy builds the relationship of identity
into his talk about God and the Father into UT, while I don’t do that anywhere in
UB. But one might reason that, in this context, if one were to identify God as any of
the Three Persons, surely that would be the Father. And as I myself note, presumably
the relation we want here is identity or something like it. Sixth and finally, it’s likely
not obvious why Tuggy and I would have reason to clash over his proviso that the
propositions in his definitions are “eternally the case”.24 Thus, the definitions may
initially seem to be roughly equivalent for practical purposes. Nevertheless, I’ll
argue they are absolutely not. Mine could be improved, but I think Tuggy’s are
flawed in ways that can’t be fixed. And that is because it is precisely the flaws in his
definitions that make his overall argumentative strategy work. To see why, let’s
move on to the doctrine of the Monarchy of the Father.

6. The Monarchy of the Father

In some contexts, patristic talk about the “monarchy” can mean roughly what it
sounds like in English—a single rule or authority. But in the use we will be
concerned with, “monarchy” is just a conventional translation (almost a
transliteration) of the Greek word “monarchia” (μοναρχία), from the roots “monos”
(μόνος) meaning “one” or “single” or “alone”, and “arche” (ἀρχή) meaning “source”
or “principle”. So in this sense, monarchia means literally “a single first principle”, or
“a single source or beginning”. (Think John 1,1 “In the ἀρχή was the Logos . . .”) The
idea of the Father’s mono-archia, then, is that the Father—and the Father alone— has
the status of being the “Source Without Source” or “First Principle” of all things.
That might seem obvious, uncontroversial, or unimportant at first glance—of
course the Father is the source of all things. But when the church fathers discuss the
monarchia of the Father—and particularly when they discuss it as a way to respond

24 Though I do think this clause is problematic for Tuggy. If taken seriously, it would just entail
the eternal existence, and thus uncreatedness, of the Son, which in turn plausibly entails His divinity.
See below, section 7 on NSMV vs. CSMV in Gregory of Nyssa’s debate with Eunomius.

15
BEAU BRANSON

to the charge of tritheism, it is not only in the context of creation that they assert that
the Father is the “one source”, but in the context of the Trinity itself. Thus, despite
there being a plurality of persons with the same divine nature, as St. Basil puts it (see
section 7 below), there is a single God because there is a single first principle—the
Father.
With that very brief sketch in mind, we might further disambiguate the doctrine
in a number of ways. The fathers tend to associate the Monarchy of the Father with
the one-ness of God in many places. Indeed, Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 42.15) says:
<<Ἕνωσις δὲ, ὁ Πατὴρ, ἐξ οὗ, καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἀνάγεται τὰ ἑξῆς>>,25 “The One-ness is
the Father, from whom, and to whom, those next in order [=the Son and Spirit] are
lead.”26 So, considering the following propositions might help us come to a more
precise understanding of the monarchy of the Father and of the one-ness of God.

(M1) the Father is the sole source, origin, or “cause” of the Son and Spirit.

This is probably the weakest and least controversial thing we can say about the
monarchy. It seems to be implied by the very names of “Father” and “Son”, and the
claim that the Spirit “proceeds out of” the Father (John 15,26). And nearly every
(non-Modalist) model of the Trinity is at least compatible with putting some such
asymmetrical relation between some of the three persons. So I’ll call this this
proposition the “Weak Monarchy View.”27

(M2) The Father is also in some sense the source of the divine nature itself.

This is a stronger and slightly more interesting idea. Discussing the views of the
Greek fathers, Fr. John Meyendorff says, “The Father is the ‘cause’ (aitia) and the

25 Migne (1857–1866, 476).

26 Translation mine.
27 Though it is relatively uncontroversial in a broader historical perspective, the view has recently

come under fire from certain quarters (though by no means all) of Evangelical Protestantism. I will
not have the space to address the arguments here fully except to say that I view it as a theological fad
and I’m unaware of any arguments for the view that were not already adequately addressed in the
fourth century. In particular, the extreme Arian (Eunomian) claim that having the divine essence
entails being absolutely a se, has already been addressed by the Cappadocians in numerous works.
(See section VIII below for a few examples). In any case, for the purposes of this paper, the question
is not which view is true, but whether the more traditional view counts as Trinitarian. If one holds that
to be Trinitarian requires asserting the more recent view that the Son and Spirit are a se in every sense
– just as the Father is – then one would have to count the Nicene Creed, the Athanasian Creed, and
even the Westminster Confession of Faith, as non-Trinitarian. And such a view, as it seems to me, is
its own refutation.

16
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

‘principle’ (archē) of the divine nature, which is in the Son and in the Spirit.” 28
Metropolitan of Pergamum, John Zizioulas, seems to endorse this idea as well, based
on his reading of the Cappadocians, in his landmark book Being As Communion.29

(M3) The Father is “the union” or “the one-ness” or “the principle of unity” within
the Trinity.

This would seem to be, at a minimum, what the Greek Fathers want to claim, and
some do use exactly this language (as we saw with St. Gregory Nazianzen). This
would be as opposed to saying that the principle of God’s one-ness is, say, the divine
nature or the “divine community” of persons, or the like. Presumably this means, at
least, something like, the Father is “the end of explanation for” God’s one-ness. It is
somehow the Father that explains the one-ness of God, or less poetically, the Father
is the explanation for the fact that there is one God, rather than three gods. If a typical
Social Trinitarian says that “The One God” is the divine community or society
formed by the three persons, there’s a clear sense in which it’s the “divine society”
that ultimately explains the one-ness of God, and so a clear sense in which the divine
society is the principle of the unity of God for Social Trinitarians. For example, there
is a clear sense in which the divine nature is the principle of unity in much theology,
since it will be what explains the fact that there is one God.
It would be nice to spell this interpretation out more fully. However, the final and
strongest view we will consider would seem to entail both (M3) and (M1) at least (or
at least would entail them within the scope of some reasonable assumptions) and
will be the interpretation which I think suggests a fresh approach (well, a very
ancient approach, but fresh for analytic theologians) to the Trinity, and which causes
difficulties for Tuggy’s definitions. So I’ll be focusing on this last one.

(M4) Strictly speaking, when used as a singular term,30 the name “God” refers to the
Father (precisely because it is the Father who is the single “source without source”).

Clearly if the individual referred to by the word “God” is the Father, then it
is the one-ness of the Father that explains the one-ness of God. We can call the view
under discussion “the Strong Monarchy View” (SMV). But there is more to it than
simply specifying the referent of a singular term. The idea is that it is because the
Father is the one, ultimate source of everything (including the other two persons of

28 Meyendorff (1983, 183).

29 Zizioulas (1983, see especially pp. 40–41 and 88–89).
30 I.e., used to refer to a single individual, as the subject of a sentence.

17
BEAU BRANSON

the Trinity)—because He is the arche anarchos (“source without source” or “principle

without principle”)—that He is referred to as “the” God, “God” in a very particular
sense. It is the Father’s role as arche anarchos and the aitia of (“cause” or “principle”
of) the Son and Spirit that explains why He is even sometimes called the “God of” the
Son and the Spirit (as in, e.g., Psalm 45,7; Hebrews 1,9; John 20,17 and so on), or “the
God Over All” as St. Gregory of Nyssa’s favorite expression for the Father has it (see
below, section 7).
So, since (M4) is the idea I will be focusing on, let me give a few quick definitions:

“Monarchical model” (of the Trinity): Any model (of the Trinity) that incorporates
SMV, i.e., any model in which:
(1) the Father is the arche anarchos, and
(2) there is a use of “God” as a singular term, such that it refers particularly to
the Father because He is the arche anarchos.31, 32

I’ll group all Monarchical models together under the heading of “Monarchical
Trinitarianism” (MT).

31 Note that within SMV, (1) is just WMV. Hence, the “Strong” Monarchy View is “stronger” than
the “Weak” Monarchy View, not in an ontological sense – not in the sense that it says something more
about the substantive theology – but only in the logical sense that SMV entails WMV, while WMV
does not entail SMV. Note further that while WMV is a substantive metaphysical claim about the role
of the Father within the Trinity, what SMV adds (2) is a semantic claim about the reference of a certain
term. This is important to keep in mind for anyone who wants to criticize SMV, because to do so one
faces a dilemma. To criticize SMV from the point of view of substantive theological or metaphysical
claims one would have to criticize (1), i.e. WMV, which is a matter of dogma in traditional theologies
(Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, the mainstream Reformed tradition, etc.) and indeed
has only begun to be rejected, first within a minority strand of Protestantism, beginning a few
centuries ago with Herman Alexander Röell, and only beginning to gain ground within the last
hundred or so years, starting especially with Princeton theologians like B. B. Warfield, and only
finally becoming very popular within a certain subset of evangelical Christians in the twentieth
century. On the other hand, if the criticism is directed at the other conjunct of SMV (2), it has to be
admitted that the criticism is merely semantic. And it seems absurd to say that the difference between
orthodoxy and heresy hinges on a purely semantic claim. More on criticisms of SMV in section 8
below.
32 Note that the definition of SMV does not say that there is no sense of the word “God” in which it

applies equally to all three persons! Rather, it says only that there is some sense in which it applies
particularly to the Father. To address Tuggy’s point that the word “God” seems to function in the
New Testament as a name equivalent to the Father, and is only applied to the Son comparatively
infrequently, there need be only some use of the word “God” such that it refers to the Father (either
exclusively, or even just more frequently). To claim that there is no sense of the word “God” such that
it could ever refer to the Son or the Spirit would be overkill. See section 8 below for more on how the
Son and Spirit can be called “God.”

18
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

“Egalitarian model” (of the Trinity) or “symmetrical model” (of the Trinity): Any
model (of the Trinity) in which all three persons have an “equal claim” to being
called “God”, in any and every sense. Any model in which any quality or relation that
would be relevant to whether that person can be called “God” (in any sense) is
shared by the other two persons equally.

I’ll group all Egalitarian models together under the heading of “Egalitarian
Trinitarianism” (ET). E.g., standard forms of Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Relative
Identity Trinitarianism (RI) are normally intended to be symmetrical (though perhaps
surprisingly several would actually be compatible with SMV).

“Non-symmetrical model” or “Non-egalitarian model” (of the Trinity): A model (of

the Trinity) in which the above symmetry doesn’t hold. Any model that in some
sense privileges one (or two) person(s) over the other(s) in terms of the semantic
claim to being the referent of the term “God” when it is used as a singular referring
term.

So, all Monarchical models are non-symmetrical, but in principal there could be non-
symmetrical models that aren’t Monarchical. Indeed, as we’ll see below, part of the
filioque controversy essentially revolve around whether the filioque results in a model
of the Trinity that is neither Monarchical nor fully symmetrical, having exactly two
“first principles”—the Father and the Son (though filioquists of course deny they get
this result).
For reasons of space, I will only note in passing that a large and representative
sample of contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians seem to explicitly affirm
SMV, but for considerations of space I’ll have to omit a complete discussion of them.
They include, at least: Metropolitan John Zizioulas,33, 34, 35 Christos Yannaras,36 Boris

33 Zizioulas (1983, 40–41), “Among the Greek Fathers the unity of God, the one God, and the
ontological “principal” or “cause” of the being and life of God does not consist in the one substance
of God but in the hypostasis, that is, the person of the Father. The one God is not the one substance
but the Father, who is the ‘cause’ both of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit.”
34 Zizioulas (1989, 40): “The one God is the Father. Substance is something common to all three

persons of the Trinity, but it is not ontologically primary until Augustine makes it so.”
35 Zizioulas (2022): “The other point relates to the content that the term monarchia finally received

in the Greek Fathers. The one arche in God came to be understood ontologically, i.e. in terms of
origination of being, and was attached to the person of the Father. The one God is the Father, and not
the one substance, as Augustine and medieval Scholasticism would say. This puts the person of the
Father in the place of the one God.”
36 Yannaras (1984, 17): “The one God is not one divine nature or essence, but primarily one person:

19
BEAU BRANSON

Bobrinskoy, 37 Peter Bouteneff, 38 John Manousakis, 39 Philip Kariatlis, 40 Laurent

the person of God the Father.”

37 Bobrinskoy (1999, 264–266, esp. 266). For example, “Thus, the oneness of God is placed not only

on the level of the nature common to the Three, but on the basis of the personal relation or origin
from the Father.”
38 Bouteneff (2008). Beginning at 19:48, “So, the lynchpin of Orthodox Trinitarian theology would

be to say that the One God is the Father, who has with him, according to His very essence, from all
eternity, a Son and a Spirit. And so, there is, in a certain way, a hierarchy in the Trinity. Because only
the Father is ingenerate. Only the Father proceeds from no one, proceeds from nothing. The Father is
not begotten. The Father is not proceeded. The Father is. The Father doesn’t have anything or anyone
that begets or produces him. Whereas, the Son and the Spirit are from the Father. But they are in no
way less than the Father, in no way subordinate to the Father. And that’s because they exist according
to His very nature and being. . .
Interestingly enough, when the Cappadocian fathers read Jesus saying ‘the Father is greater than
I,’ you would expect them to say, well, he’s saying this as man. But actually, he’s saying this as God,
that ‘the Father is greater than I.’ It’s not a subordination. But it’s a recognition that the Father alone
is ingenerate. That the Father alone comes from nothing or no one. So there is a hierarchy, but not a
subordination.
So it would be taught in the Orthodox Church that the Father is the one God. The one God is the
Father. In fact, the formulation goes as follows:
The Father is God
The Son is God, and
The Spirit is God.
But God is the Father.
That’s not always easy to parse out in English grammar. ‘The Father is God.’ Meaning ‘the Father
is divine.’ ‘The Son is God.’ ‘The Son is divine,’ is he is the divine one, as is the Father. ‘The Spirit is
divine,’ as is the Father. But when the word ‘God’ is the subject, you’re speaking about the Father.
God is the Father, who has a Son and a Spirit.”
39 Manoussakis and Panteleimon (2013, 235): “It is well known that what safeguards the oneness

of God and prevents the doctrine of the Holy Trinity from lapsing into tritheism is the person of the
Father. The ‘monarchy of the Father’ indicates neatly that the coincidence and confirmation of unity
and plurality in the Holy Trinity is exercised by a person—the Father. As the symbol of our faith, the
Creed that we recite in every Eucharistic gathering attests, in its first article, the one God we believe
in is a person, the Father [. . . ]. The oneness of God is safeguarded not by some impersonal divine
essence, but by the person of the Father.”
40 Kariatlis (2022): “For the fathers of the Church, the Holy Trinity is a unity not because there is a

unity of substance, as the West has argued, but because of the monarchia of the Father, who is himself
one of the Trinity. Accordingly, the fathers of the Church taught that there is one God because there
is only one Father. Or put another way, it was the monarchia of the Father that was the ground of
koinonia within the Trinity and not any abstract conception of the divine ousia. This was nothing other
than the biblical affirmation that the one God was the Father almighty (cf. 1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:6 and 1
Tim. 2:5).”

20
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

Cleenewerck,41 Nathan Jacobs,42 and three former deans of St. Vladimir’s seminary

41 Cleenewerck (2007, 324): “. . . Paul Owens writes. . . ‘Orthodox Christians believe that God is
one eternal, personal and spiritual divine substance who exists in three modes of subsistence, or three
self-distinctions. . . ’ The Greek Fathers would have written quite a different summary, something
along the lines of: ‘Orthodox Christians believe in one God the Father, whose person is uncaused and
unoriginate, who, because He is love and communion, always exists with His Word and Spirit.”
42 Jacobs, Nathan (2018, 24–25): “Are Christians really monotheists? One way of addressing this

question is to look at the three uses of the word God in Christian theology.
The first and most common reference for the word God is the Father. This is common throughout
the New Testament, and it echoes in the Nicene Creed: ‘I believe in one God, the Father [etc.].’ This
use is certainly singular. For there is only one Father.
The second use is in reference to the divine nature shared by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This
use appears in the prologue to the Gospel of John: ‘and the Word was God’ (John 1:1). John is not
saying the Word was the Father, nor is he saying the Word was the Trinity. He is using God (theos)
in the predicate nominative, identifying the type of thing the Word is—just as I would say, Bob is
human. . .
A third use of the word God is in reference to the entire Trinity. I should warn that this third use
is alien to Greek literature of the first millennium. But because this use is common in Western
literature, I will include it.”

21
BEAU BRANSON

Fr. John Meyendorff,43 Fr. Thomas Hopko,44, 45, 46 and Fr. John Behr.47, 48, 49, 50 I mention

43 Meyendorff (1983, 183). “The same personalistic emphasis appears in the Greek Fathers’
insistence on the “monarchy” of the Father. Contrary to the concept which prevailed in the post-
Augustinian West and in Latin Scholasticism, Greek theology attributes the origin of hypostatic
“subsistence” to the hypostasis of the Father—not to the common essence. The Father is the “cause”
(aitia) and the “principle” (archē) of the divine nature, which is in the Son and in the Spirit. What is
even more striking is the fact that this “monarchy” of the Father is constantly used by the
Cappadocian Fathers against those who accuse them of “tritheism”: “God is one,” writes Basil,
“because the Father is one.”
44 Hopko (1972): “Thus, the Church teaches that while there is only One God, yet there are Three

who are God—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—perfectly united and never divided yet not
merged into one with no proper distinction. How then does the Church defend its doctrine that God
is both One and yet Three?
First of all, it is the Church’s teaching and its deepest experience that there is only one God because
there is only one Father. In the Bible the term “God” with very few exceptions is used primarily as a
name for the Father. Thus, the Son is the “Son of God,” and the Spirit is the “Spirit of God.” The Son
is born from the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father—both in the same timeless and
eternal action of the Father’s own being.
In this view, the Son and the Spirit are both one with God and in no way separated from Him.
Thus, the Divine Unity consists of the Father, with His Son and His Spirit distinct from Himself and
yet perfectly united together in Him.”
45 Fr. Hopko goes into further details in a couple of podcasts on Ancient Faith Radio. (Hopko 2008)

“Now in the Bible, in the creeds, and in the liturgy, it’s very important, really critically important, to
note, and to affirm, and to remember, that the one God, in Whom we believe, strictly speaking, is not
the Holy Trinity. The One God is God the Father. That in the Bible, the One God is the Father of Jesus
Christ. He is God Who sends His only-begotten Son into the world. And Jesus Christ is the Son of
God. And then, of course, in a parallel manner, the Spirit, the Holy Spirit, is the Spirit of God.” The
quote occurs between 12:37 and 13:25.
46 Another quote from the same podcast: “On the other hand, there is another terrible error, and

the other terrible error, usually called ‘Modalism’ in technical theological terminology, is where
people say there is one God Who is the Holy Trinity. There is ‘He Who Is the Trinity’. And we
Orthodox Christians, following scripture, and the creedal statements, and the liturgical prayers, can
never say there is one God who is the Trinity. There is one God who is the Father. And this one God
– Who is the Father – has with Him eternally, Whom He begets timelessly before all ages, His Only-
Begotten Son – who is also His Logos, His Word, and also His Chokhmah, His Sophia, His Wisdom,
also His Eikona, His Ikon, His Image – but this Wisdom and Word and Image and Ikon, is divine
with the same divinity as God, the One True and Living God. . . ” This quote can be found between
15:41 and 16:37. Similar statements can be found in a number of other writings and podcasts by Fr.
Hopko.
47 Behr (2008, 162): “The one God confessed by Christians in the first article of the creeds of Nicaea

and Constantinople is unambiguously the Father.”

48 Behr (1999, 22–23): “So how can Christians believe in and worship the Father, the Son and the

Holy Spirit, and yet claim that there is only one God, not three? How can one reconcile monotheism
with trinitarian faith? . . . The Father alone is the one true God. This keeps to the structure of the New

22
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

this just to point out that what I am calling Monarchical Trinitarianism is not merely
some ad hoc invention of an analytic philosopher, but something that is in fact
represented both in the contemporary and historical sources on the doctrine of the
Trinity. (Though, of course, even if it weren’t, it would be no worse off than any other
contemporary model of the Trinity proposed by any other analytic philosopher).51

Testament language about God, where with only a few exceptions, the world ‘God’ (theos) with an
article (and so being used, in Greek, as a proper noun) is only applied to the one whom Jesus calls
Father, the God spoken of in the scriptures . . . This same fact is preserved in all ancient creeds, which
begin: ‘I believe in one God, the Father . . .’
Such, then, is how the Greek Fathers, following Scripture, maintained that there is but one God,
whose Son and Spirit are equally God, in a unity of essence and of existence, without compromising
the uniqueness of the one true God. . .”
49 Behr (2004, 307–308): “For the Christian faith there is, unequivocally, but one God, and that is

the Father: ‘There is one God and Father.’ For Basil, the one God is not the one divine substance, or a
notion of ‘divinity’ which is ascribed to each person of the Trinity, nor is it some kind of unity or
communion in which they all exist; the one God is the Father. But this ‘monarchy’ of the Father does
not undermine the confession of the true divinity of the Son and the Spirit. Jesus Christ is certainly
‘true God of true God,’ as the Nicene Creed puts it, but he is such as the Son of God, the God who is
thus the Father. If the term ‘God’ (theos) is used of Jesus Christ, not only as a predicate, but also as a
proper noun with an article, this is only done on the prior confession of him as ‘Son of God,’ and so
as other than ‘the one God’ of whom he is the Son; it is necessary to bear in mind this order of
Christian theology, lest it collapse in confusion.”
50 Behr (2018, 320): “. . . [M]y eldest son reported to me an intriguing, and arresting, conversation

he had with his religion instructor at a Jesuit High School. The instructor came in one day and told
the class: ‘Today we are going to explore why we say that the one God is a Trinity.’ My son
immediately put his hand up and said, ‘I don’t, sir.’ Perplexed, the instructor asked, ‘What do you
mean?’ To which he replied (so he says), ‘Well, I don’t know about you, sir, but I follow the Nicene
Creed, which says: I believe in one God the Father.’ I never found out how the discussion went after
that (one can only guess). We have become so used to using the word ‘God’ in all sorts of ways – God
the Father, God the Son, God the Spirit, the one God who is three; the triune God, and so on – that
the simple observation that the Creed does not speak like that, let alone the Scriptures, pulls us up
short. They speak, much more simply, of one God the Father, one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God
(not God the Son), and so on. What is the grammar that lies behind the beguilingly simple confession
of faith in ‘One God Father Almighty,’ and does the difference between that and our habitual patterns
of speech make a difference for how we name God today and what we think we are doing when we
do ‘trinitarian theology’?”
51 I have argued elsewhere that in order to count as Trinitarian, or at least to be known to count as

Trinitarian, a model must indeed bear an important relation to the historical sources of the doctrine
of the Trinity. (Branson 2018) But others may disagree. Take “narrowly Trinitarian” or “Trinitarian
in a narrow sense” to indicate a view consistent with some consensus patrum on the Trinity, and take
“broadly Trinitarian” or “Trinitarian in a broad sense” to indicate any view that counts as Trinitarian
according to whatever looser standard one thinks appropriate – common usage or whatnot. If Tuggy
wants to argue there is no broadly Trinitarian theology that is consistent with the New Testament,
then it’s not relevant whether MT can be found in historical sources or not. He needs to face the model

23
BEAU BRANSON

One might wonder, of course, if Monarchical Trinitarianism is affirmed by all

these Orthodox theologians, 52 where are they all getting this idea? Is it some kind of
theological fad? Doesn’t it go against historical orthodoxy? The answer to both those
questions is no. To see why, we will take a look at some of the patristic sources on
the doctrine of the Trinity that seem both to affirm SMV and to affirm that there are
three fully and equally divine persons. This will also serve to cast further doubt on
the adequacy of Tuggy’s definitions, since it will show us that those definitions count
not only Tertullian as Unitarian, but the likes of Alexander of Alexandria (the bishop
who first excommunicated Arius for his Arianism), St. Athanasius, all three of the
Cappadocian fathers (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzen),
and John of Damascus—in others words, most of the church fathers whose views
we would normally think of as being definitive of the Trinitarian tradition.

“head-on,” so to speak. I include some historical considerations in this paper, because I think it’s
important to be narrowly Trinitarian. But I assume Tuggy does not, as he has not often argued against
analytic philosophers’ models of the Trinity based on their historical credentials. In that case,
however, the fact that a great many modern Orthodox theologians hold to some form of MT shows
that it’s at least broadly Trinitarian. And note here that it needn’t be the case that all Orthodox
theologians hold a form of MT. The point is that if Tuggy wants to hold that MT isn’t even broadly
Trinitarian, he needs to say that nobody who holds MT is a Trinitarian, and thus that, as it would
appear, the Eastern Orthodox Church (of all churches!) does not require Trinitarianism of its
members (including its priests and bishops, and seminary professors!) This is, then, just one more
way in which Tuggy’s use of “Trinitarian” seems at odds with the standard use of the term. I think
most, even of those who think the various Orthodox theologians quoted above are wrong about the
Trinity, would still consider them to be broadly Trinitarian.
52 Lest anyone imagine that I am focusing on Orthodox theologians so as to suggest that it is only

Orthodox theologians who maintain SMV, let me point to a statement of SMV by no less a non-
Orthodox theologian than John Calvin in his Institutes Book I, Chapter 13, section 20. Calvin (2008,
79-80): “When we profess to believe in one God, by the name ‘God’ is understood the one simple
essence, comprehending three persons or hypostases; and, accordingly, whenever the name of ‘God’
is used indefinitely, the Son and Spirit, not less than the Father, is meant. But when the Son is joined
with the Father, relation comes into view, and so we distinguish between the Persons. But as the
Personal subsistence carry an order with them, the principle and origin being in the Father, whenever
mention is made of the Father and Son, or of the Father and Spirit together, the name of ‘God’ is
specially given to the Father. In this way the unity of essence is retained, and respect is had to the
order, which, however derogates in no respect from the divinity of the Son and Spirit.” Thus,
although he begins with a characteristically “Western” focus on the divine essence, in this passage,
Calvin ultimately asserts both parts of SMV: (1) that the “principle and origin” of the Son and Spirit
is the Father, and (2) that there is a use of “God” as a singular term such that it refers to the Father
precisely because He is this principle and origin. (I focus mainly on Orthodox theologians simply
because I am more familiar with them, and they seem to me to be more clear on the issue than many
other modern theologians.)

24
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

7. Patristic Sources on the Monarch of the Father and Monarchical Trinitarianism

The first passage I’d like to examine is from Gregory of Nyssa’s Ad Petrum. This of
course is the locus classicus for the distinction between “person” (hypostasis) and
“substance” (ousia). Here Gregory is describing the various gnorismata of the divine
persons—the individuating qualities by which we can recognize one as
distinguished from the others. Ordinarily, one would go to this text for the
distinction between ousia and hypostasis, or for the gnorismata (essentially the
epistemological equivalent of idiomata) themselves. But I will point out something
else that is quite striking about the text, and that is frequently overlooked:53

᾿Επειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ ῞Αγιον Πνεῦμα, ἀφ’ οὗ Since, then, the Holy Spirit, from Whom
πᾶσα ἐπὶ τὴν κτίσιν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν all the supply of good things for creation
χορηγία πηγάζει, τοῦ Υἱοῦ μὲν ἤρτηται has its source, is attached to the Son, and
ᾧ ἀδιαστάτως συγκαταλαμβάνεται, τῆς is inseparably apprehended with Him,
δὲ τοῦ Πατρὸς αἰτίας ἐξημμένον ἔχει τὸ and has His existence attached to the
εἶναι, ὅθεν καὶ ἐκπορεύεται, τοῦτο Father as cause, from Whom also He
γνωριστικὸν τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν proceeds, He has this gnoristikon of
ἰδιότητος σημεῖον ἔχει, τὸ μετὰ τὸν Υἱὸν peculiarity according to hypostasis: being
καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ known after the Son and together with the
Πατρὸς ὑφεστάναι. Son, and subsisting from the Father.

῾Ο δὲ Υἱὸς ὁ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς The Son, who through Himself and with
ἐκπορευόμενον Πνεῦμα δι’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ Himself reveals the Spirit proceeding from
μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ γνωρίζων, μόνος the Father, who alone shines forth only-
μονογενῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωτὸς begottenly from the unbegotten light, has
ἐκλάμψας, οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον no commonality according to the
τῶν γνωρισμάτων τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει individuating gnorismata, either to the
πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα ἢ πρὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Father or to the Holy Spirit, but alone is
῞Αγιον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις σημείοις known by these mentioned signs.
μόνος γνωρίζεται.
῾Ο δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς ἐξαίρετόν τι And the God over all has a certain
γνώρισμα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσεως τὸ gnorisma of His own hypostasis: that He is
Πατὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας a Father, and that He alone subsists from
ὑποστῆναι μόνος ἔχει, καὶ διὰ τούτου no cause, and by this sign again He is also
πάλιν τοῦ σημείου καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδιαζόντως

53Indeed, I myself overlooked the fact in my dissertation, where I included this very passage, and
simply glossed it with an explanation in brackets that essentially explained away the most striking
feature of the text. See Branson (2014, 162–3).

25
BEAU BRANSON

ἐπιγινώσκεται.54 individually recognized.55

The reader will no doubt notice the explicit claims that the Holy Spirit has the Father
“as cause” and that the Father alone “subsists from no cause.” But what is frequently
overlooked in the above passage, and what I want to draw attention to, is who the
persons of the Trinity are for Gregory. It appears that Gregory’s Trinity consists of the
Holy Spirit, the Son—and God.
Now, one might think that this phrase “the God over all” is just a colorful title for
the Father. In a certain sense that’s right: it’s one of Gregory’s favorite phrases for
the Father throughout his Contra Eunomium for example. But consider what
individuates “the God over all”. It’s the property of being a Father. If we read “the God
over all” as just meaning the Father, then the individuation would be circular.
Now one might argue that people sometimes do give circular criteria of
individuation, and even if we don’t think that’s a satisfying view, maybe Gregory
did, or maybe he’s just making a logical blunder. But the problem is that here he is
using the term gnorisma. For Gregory, the gnorismata seem to be essentially the same
properties as the idiomata, but of course the term “idioma” connotes the metaphysical
issue of individuation, while the term gnorismata carries epistemological connotations.
The gnorismata are the qualities by which one would recognize a given individual as
the individual it is. Perhaps one might hold a metaphysics on which Socrates is
individuated by the property of being Socrates. But it would be bizarre to say that
the property by which you can recognize Socrates, what would allow you to pick him
out of a crowd so to speak, is that “he will be the one who has the property of being
Socrates.” Tell me he’ll be the one wearing a white toga, for example. But that he will
be the one with the property of being Socrates is no help in recognizing him, and
here the problem is too obvious to miss.
Notice also that he doesn’t give circular individuations in the other two cases. The
qualities by which the Holy Spirit is known are “being known after the Son and
together with the Son, and subsisting from the Father”. The qualities by which the
Son is known are that he is the one “who through Himself and with Himself reveals
the Spirit proceeding from the Father, who alone shines forth only-begottenly from
the unbegotten light”. Elsewhere, Gregory gives examples involving the
individuating properties of Job, Paul, etc., and here again he does not appeal to
properties like “Jobicity” or “Paulinity” in listing their gnorismata or idiomata. So it
seems out of place to take it as circular when we read that the quality by which God

54 St. Basil of Caesarea (1957).

55 My translation.

26
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

is known is the quality of “being the Father, and subsisting from no cause”.
Note also that this property, the property of being the Father, is the gnorisma “of
His own hypostasis”. In other words, as Gregory is using the term “God” here, God
is not tri-hypostatic or tri-personal. Rather, God has “his own hypostasis” (person),
while the Son and the Spirit each have their own hypostases (persons). Thus, God is
not the Trinity in this passage. Rather, God is the first person of the Trinity. In other
words, Gregory presupposes SMV.
If you still aren’t convinced that he takes God to be the Father, rather than the
Trinity, here’s a passage from his Refutation of the Confession of Eunomius, where he
uses SMV as a premise to argue against Eunomius’ extreme Arianism.

Ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐφεξῆς λόγους σκεψώμεθα· But let us examine the words that follow
[in the creed composed by Eunomius]:

πάντῃ γὰρ καὶ καθάπαξ ἐστὶν εἷς, κατὰ He is always and absolutely one,
τὰ αὐτά τε καὶ ὡσαύτως διαμένων remaining uniformly and unchangeably
μόνος.56 the only God.57

Now if Gregory was an Egalitarian, I think we would expect his response to be

something like “No, God isn’t one—God is tri-personal!” But that isn’t what he says.
Instead, he says:

εἰ περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς λέγει, τούτῳ καὶ If he is speaking about the Father, we
ἡμεῖς συντιθέμεθα·58 agree with him . . . 59

I don’t know how to read that as an Egalitarian statement. He goes on:

εἷς γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ πατὴρ μόνος . . . for the Father is most truly one, alone
καὶ πάντῃ καθάπαξ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά τε καὶ and always absolutely uniform and
ὡσαύτως ἔχων, καὶ οὐδέποτε, ὅπερ unchangeable, never at any time present
ἐστίν, οὔτε μὴ ὢν οὔτε μὴ ἐσόμενος. εἰ or future ceasing to be what He is. If then
τοίνυν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα βλέπει ἡ such an assertion as this has regard to the
τοιαύτη φωνή, μὴ μαχέσθω τῷ δόγματι Father, let him not contend with the
τῆς εὐσεβείας, συμφωνῶν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ doctrine of godliness, inasmuch as on this

56 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1960, 312–410).

57 English translation appears as Contra Eunomium II,5 in St. Gregory of Nyssa (1893, 106).
58 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1960, 312–410).

59 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1893, 106).

27
BEAU BRANSON

κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος.60 point he is in harmony with the Church.61

Note also that this isn’t just Gregory saying, “OK, say it’s the Father and I’ll stop
posting nasty stuff on your Facebook page”. Gregory ended up having the authority,
by Roman law, to decide whether a person counted as Trinitarian or not. And in at
least one case he was actually called on to interrogate another bishop and make that
decision. What has come down to us as “Book II” of Contra Eunomium was probably
written after the council of 381 and after the passage of Theodosius’ law of 381
proclaiming Gregory one of the legal arbiters of orthodoxy. It seems pretty clear he
wasn’t fond of Eunomius, so it’s very telling that he makes this “offer” to Eunomius.
Clearly, he doesn’t think Eunomius will call his bluff here. Gregory commits to
giving the game away to Eunomius, if Eunomius will only call God “Father”. But
Gregory knows he won’t do that:

ὁ γὰρ ὁμολογῶν τὸν πατέρα πάντοτε For he who confesses that the Father is
<κατὰ τὰ αὐτά τε> καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν always and unchangeably the same, being the
ἕνα καὶ μόνον ὄντα, τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας one and only God, holds fast the word of
κρατύνει λόγον, βλέπων ἐν τῷ πατρὶ τὸν godliness, if in the Father he sees the Son,
υἱόν, οὗ χωρὶς πατὴρ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε without Whom the Father neither exists
λέγεται.62 nor is named [“Father”]. [Emphasis
mine.]63

Gregory’s point (as I’ll elaborate on just below) is that one cannot define God as
“Father” without attributing to Him a Son as a necessary concomitant—something
an extreme Arian like Eunomius clearly can’t do.
Next comes an interesting mention by Gregory of the difference between Jews
and Christians. Egalitarian Trinitarians would probably say that Jews (and Arians)
worship God the Father, whereas Trinitarians worship all three of the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit. Or they may say that Trinitarians worship a (quasi-)individual
named “the Trinity” who is composed out of them. But that’s almost the opposite of
Gregory’s way of distinguishing his views from those of Jews or Arians. Gregory
continues:

60 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1960, 312–410).

61 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1893, 106).
62 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1960, 312–410).

63 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1893, 106).

28
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

εἰ δὲ ἄλλον τινὰ παρὰ τὸν πατέρα θεὸν But if he is inventing some other God,
ἀναπλάσσει, Ἰουδαίοις διαλεγέσθω ἢ besides the Father, let him argue alongside
τοῖς λεγομένοις Ὑψιστιανοῖς, ὧν αὕτη the Jews, or alongside those who are called
ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς διαφορά, ‘Hypsistians,’ [‘Most-High-ists’] between
τὸ θεὸν μὲν αὐτοὺς ὁμολογεῖν εἶναί whom and the Christians there is this
τινα, ὃν ὀνομάζουσιν ὕψιστον ἢ difference: That they [Jews and
παντοκράτορα, πατέρα δὲ αὐτὸν εἶναι Hypsistians] acknowledge that there is a
μὴ παραδέχεσθαι· ὁ δὲ Χριστιανός, εἰ μὴ God (Whom they term ‘the Most High’ or
τῷ πατρὶ πιστεύοι, Χριστιανὸς οὐκ ‘the Almighty.’) But they do not admit that
ἔστιν.64 He is the Father. While a Christian—if he
believe not in the Father—is no Christian
at all.65

Gregory’s point of view, then, is just the opposite of the popular view of our own
day, which says Jews worship the Father alone, whereas Christians worship the
Trinity. Rather, in his point of view, Christians and Jews both worship God, but
Christians worship a God for whom Fatherhood is part of His very identity, whereas
Jews worship a God for whom it is not.
So, what’s the logic here? If we can’t read this passage as Gregory asserting an
Egalitarian view of the Trinity, then how does this argument work from a
Monarchical perspective? Simply put, it’s analytic that a Father must have a Son.
God is a necessary being, and so exists at all times in all possible worlds. So, if
Fatherhood is part of God’s identity, that is, if it is what Gregory would call God’s
idioma (roughly what we in analytic philosophy would call God’s individual essence
or Leibnizian essence), then the Son of God exists and has always existed—indeed,
necessarily exists. But if the Son of God is Himself a necessary being, then He is not a
creature. And if the Son of God is not a creature, then He is divine.66

64 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1960, 312–410).

65 St. Gregory of Nyssa (1893, 106). Emphasis mine.
66 It’s important here not to fall into a confusion regarding terms like “essential” and “necessary.”

There are those qualities that individuate God, what most metaphysicians today would call an
“individual essence” or “Leibnizian essence”, and then there is the “kind-essence” or “Aristotelian
essence”. The latter is what Gregory calls the ousia. And although he often uses “hypostasis” simply
for the subject of qualities, strictly speaking he defines “hypostasis” as what we would call the
individual or Leibnizian essence. Thus, Gregory’s position is not open to the objection that the Father
and Son cannot be homoousios because the Father and Son have different “essential” qualities, any
more than one would be open to the objection that I and my father cannot be of the same species
because we have different “essential” properties. We have different individual essences – i.e., different
identity conditions across possible worlds. That hardly conflicts with our sharing the same
Aristotelian or kind-essence. Thus, if it somehow turned out that there was no possible world in

29
BEAU BRANSON

So it turns out that the central point of disagreement between Gregory and
Eunomius is not whether to identify God with the Trinity or the Father. Rather, what
they disagree about is the sense or manner in which God is the Father. Specifically,
is Fatherhood God’s hypostatic property or idioma (as Gregory maintains), so that
God is eternally, indeed necessarily, a Father? Or, is Fatherhood merely accidental to
God (as Eunomius maintains), so that God is merely accidentally a Father (as
Eunomius maintains)?
Let us call the view that God has the property of Fatherhood necessarily, the
“Necessary Strong Monarchy View” (NSMV), and the view that God has the
property of Fatherhood only accidentally or contingently, the “Contingent Strong
Monarchy View” (CSMV). It turns out, then, that the real disagreement between
Gregory and Eunomius is not about the Monarchy of the Father, nor even about the
Strong Monarchy View (SMV). Both agreed about that. Rather, the disagreement is
actually about, so to speak, how strong of a Strong Monarchy view to take. And
ironically, we find it is actually Gregory, the orthodox Trinitarian, who takes the
stronger view here, NSMV, and Eunomius the extreme Arian who takes the weaker
view, CSMV. That is, Gregory affirms, whereas Eunomius (like Arius) denies, that
God is eternally, indeed necessarily, the Father of Christ.
In fact, if we rewind back to the very beginning of the 4 th-century Trinitarian
controversy, we find that this dynamic (the orthodox affirming NSMV, and the
Arians affirming only CSMV) traces all the way back to the beginning of the dispute.
Today, we tend to think of Arianism primarily as a Christological heresy. After all,
Arius is famous for his slogan, “There was a time when the Son was not”. And
certainly he was condemned for this. But it’s telling to read the actual deposition of
Arius. Surely the claim that the Son didn’t always exist was indeed what was most
important to Arius himself. But was that what seemed most important to Alexander
of Alexandria and the council of presbyters that condemned Arius? Notice what
heresy that council lists first:

ποῖα δὲ παρὰ τὰς γραφὰς ἐφευρόντες And the novelties they have invented and
λαλοῦσιν, ἔστι ταῦτα. put forth contrary to the Scriptures are
these following: –
«Οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἦν ὅτε ὁ
θεὸς πατὴρ οὐκ ἦν. 67 [1] God was not always a Father, but there

which Roger Branson existed but failed to be my father, then fatherhood would be “essential” to him
in the sense in which analytic philosophers typically use that term today. But it would not preclude
our being of the same species – even if there are worlds in which I fail to be a father.
67 St. Athanasius (1940, 1–45).

30
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

was a time when God was not a Father . . .68

Now obviously the negation of the claim that God was not always a Father is not
that God is never strictly speaking the Father, but is really tri-personal, or that God
is the Trinity Itself, or that God “contains” the Father along with the Son and Spirit
equally (indeed, all of these would entail that God was not—and still is not—a
Father). The negation of the claim that God was not always a Father is that God is and
has always been a Father. So this again is not a picture on which God is the Trinity,
but one on which (both sides agree) God is the first person of the Trinity. The debate
was not about SMV, but rather between NSMV and CSMV.
Fast-forwarding now to the conventional end of the patristic era, let’s look at a
few passages from John of Damascus. Just as it’s easy to read through Gregory’s Ad
Petrum without noticing its Monarchical presuppositions, it’s easy to read past this
excerpt from the Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith without noticing a similar
detail.

Πιστεύομεν τοιγαροῦν εἰς ἕνα θεόν, We believe, then, in One God, one
μίαν ἀρχὴν ἄναρχον, ἄκτιστον, beginning, having no beginning, uncreate,
ἀγέννητον ἀνόλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον, unbegotten, imperishable and immortal,
αἰώνιον, ἄπειρον, ἀπερίγραπτον, everlasting, infinite, uncircumscribed,
ἀπεριόριστον, ἀπειροδύναμον, ἁπλῆν, boundless, of infinite power, simple,
ἀσύνθετον, ἀσώματον, ἄρρευστον, uncompound, incorporeal, without flux,
ἀπαθῆ, ἄτρεπτον, ἀναλλοίωτον, passionless, unchangeable, unalterable,
ἀόρατον, πηγὴν ἀγαθότητος καὶ unseen, the fountain of goodness and
δικαιοσύνης, φῶς νοερόν, ἀπρόσιτον, justice, the light of the mind, inaccessible;
δύναμιν οὐδενὶ μέτρῳ γνωριζομένην, a power known by no measure,
μόνῳ δὲ τῷ οἰκείῳ βουλήματι measurable only by His own will alone
μετρουμένην—πάντα γάρ, ὅσα θέλει, (for all things that He wills He can ),
δύναται—, πάντων κτισμάτων ὁρατῶν creator of all created things, seen or
τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητικήν, πάντων unseen, of all the maintainer and
συνεκτικὴν καὶ συντηρητικήν, πάντων preserver, for all the provider, master and
προνοητικήν, πάντων κρατοῦσαν καὶ lord and king over all, with an endless and
ἄρχουσαν καὶ βασιλεύουσαν immortal kingdom: having no contrary,
ἀτελευτήτῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ βασιλείᾳ, filling all, by nothing encompassed, but
μηδὲν ἐναντίον ἔχουσαν, πάντα rather Himself the encompasser and
πληροῦσαν, ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς περιεχομένην, maintainer and original possessor of the
αὐτὴν δὲ μᾶλλον περιέχουσαν τὰ universe, occupying all essences intact

68 St. Athanasius (1892, 70).

31
BEAU BRANSON

σύμπαντα καὶ συνέχουσαν καὶ and extending beyond all things, and
προέχουσαν, ἀχράντως ταῖς ὅλαις being separate from all essence as being
οὐσίαις ἐπιβατεύουσαν καὶ πάντων super-essential and above all things and
ἐπέκεινα καὶ πάσης οὐσίας ἐξῃρημένην absolute God, absolute goodness, and
ὡς ὑπερούσιον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα οὖσαν, absolute fullness: determining all
ὑπέρθεον, ὑπεράγαθον, ὑπερπλήρη, τὰς sovereignties and ranks, being placed
ὅλας ἀρχὰς καὶ τάξεις ἀφορίζουσαν καὶ above all sovereignty and rank, above
πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ τάξεως ὑπεριδρυμένην essence and life and word and thought:
ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ λόγον καὶ being Himself very light and goodness
ἔννοιαν, αὐτοφῶς, αὐτοαγαθότητα, and life and essence, inasmuch as He does
αὐτοζωήν, αὐτοουσίαν ὡς μὴ παρ’ not derive His being from another, that is
ἑτέρου τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν ἤ τι τῶν ὅσα to say, of those things that exist: but being
ἐστίν, αὐτὴν δὲ πηγὴν οὖσαν τοῦ εἶναι Himself the fountain of being to all that is,
τοῖς οὖσι, τοῖς ζῶσι τῆς ζωῆς, τοῖς λόγου of life to the living, of reason to those that
μετέχουσι τοῦ λόγου, τοῖς πᾶσι πάντων have reason; to all the cause of all good:
ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν, πάντα εἰδυῖαν πρὶν perceiving all things even before they have
γενέσεως αὐτῶν, μίαν οὐσίαν, μίαν become: one essence, one divinity, one
θεότητα, μίαν δύναμιν, μίαν θέλησιν, power, one will, one energy, one
μίαν ἐνέργειαν, μίαν ἀρχήν, μίαν beginning, one authority, one dominion,
ἐξουσίαν, μίαν κυριότητα, μίαν one sovereignty, made known in three
βασιλείαν, ἐν τρισὶ τελείαις ὑποστάσεσι perfect subsistences and adored with one
γνωριζομένην τε καὶ προσκυνουμένην adoration, believed in and ministered to
μιᾷ προσκυνήσει πιστευομένην τε καὶ by all rational creation, united without
λατρευομένην ὑπὸ πάσης λογικῆς confusion and divided without separation
κτίσεως ἀσυγχύτως ἡνωμέναις καὶ (which indeed transcends thought). (We
ἀδιαστάτως διαιρουμέναις, ὃ καὶ believe) in Father and Son and Holy Spirit
παράδοξον. Εἰς πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ whereinto also we have been baptized. For
ἅγιον πνεῦμα, εἰς ἃ καὶ so our Lord commanded the Apostles to
βεβαπτίσμεθα· οὕτω γὰρ ὁ κύριος τοῖς baptize, saying, Baptizing them in the
ἀποστόλοις βαπτίζειν name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
ἐνετείλατο· «Βαπτίζοντες αὐτούς», (Matthew 18,19).70
φάσκων, «εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ
τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος».69

It’s easy, if we read this through Egalitarian eyes, to focus on the Egalitarian-
sounding aspects of this statement. For example, he begins by saying “We believe,
then, in One God . . .” and after this one phenomenally long sentence he seems to

69St. John of Damascus (1973, 3–239).

70St. John of Damascus (1898, 6) [page number is from the section on John of Damascus, which
begins the page numbering again after the section on Hilary of Poitiers].

32
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

restate the idea, “We believe in Father and Son and Holy Spirit . . .” This might
suggest that John equates “God” with the whole collection of “Father and Son and
Holy Spirit”. The language toward the end of the long first sentence, read a certain
way, might also suggest a view on which the one God is perhaps the one essence,
“one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, one energy, one beginning, one
authority, one dominion, one sovereignty”, and especially the immediately
following claim that The One God is “made known in three perfect subsistences”.
This Egalitarian sounding language makes it easy to miss the fact that the very first
thing Damascene says about God is that He is
<<ἕνα θεόν, μίαν ἀρχὴν ἄναρχον, ἄκτιστον, ἀγέννητον>>, i.e., “One God, a single
arche anarchos . . . ” i.e., “a single source without source”, a phrase that John only applies
to the Father, followed not only by “uncreated” (a term that would describe any of
the three persons), but immediately after “uncreated” as “unbegotten”. Again, this is
a term that he only applies to the Father. What’s more, it cannot be that John used
<<ἀγέννητον>> or “unbegotten” carelessly to mean <<ἀγένητον>> or “uncreated”,
because he himself devotes some space to explaining the important difference
between the two terms just a few paragraphs later in the same chapter:

Χρὴ γὰρ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ ἀγένητον διὰ τοῦ For one must recognise that the word
ἑνὸς Νῦ γραφόμενον τὸ ἄκτιστον ἤτοι ἀγένητον with only one ‘ν’ signifies
τὸ μὴ γενόμενον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ uncreate or not having been made, while
ἀγέννητον διὰ τῶν δύο Νῦ γραφόμενον ἀγέννητον written with double ‘ν’ means
δηλοῖ τὸ μὴ γεννηθέν. Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ unbegotten. According to the first
πρῶτον σημαινόμενον διαφέρει οὐσία significance [ousia] differs from [ousia]: for
οὐσίας· ἄλλη γὰρ οὐσία ἡ ἄκτιστος ἤτοι one [ousia] is uncreate, or ἀγένητον with
ἀγένητος (διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς Νῦ), καὶ ἄλλη ἡ one ‘ν,’ and another is create or γενητή .
γενητὴ ἤτοι κτιστή. Κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον But in the second significance there is no
σημαινόμενον οὐ διαφέρει οὐσία difference between [ousia] and [ousia]. For
οὐσίας· παντὸς γὰρ εἴδους ζῴων ἡ the first [hypostasis] of all kinds of living
πρώτη ὑπόστασις ἀγέννητός ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ creatures [i.e., Adam] is ἀγέννητος
οὐκ ἀγένητος· ἐκτίσθησαν μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ [unbegotten] but not ἀγένητος
τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ [uncreated]. For they were created by the
παραχθέντα εἰς γένεσιν, οὐ μὴν Creator, being brought into being by His
ἐγεννήθησαν μὴ προϋπάρχοντος Word, but they were not begotten, for
ἑτέρου ὁμοειδοῦς, ἐξ οὗ γεννηθῶσι.71 there was no pre-existing form like
themselves from which they might have
been born.72

71 St. John of Damascus (1973, 3–239).

72 St. John of Damascus (1898, 8).

33
BEAU BRANSON

It’s true that there are passages In John of Damascus that could be read as
identifying God with the Trinity or even with the divine nature. But I would point
out that we have to take into account what John himself says about this usage in
Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book III, Chapter 4.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν ἐστιν οὐσία καὶ Now we have often said already that
ἕτερον ὑπόστασις, πλειστάκις essence [ousia] is one thing and
εἰρήκαμεν, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὐσία τὸ κοινὸν subsistence [hypostasis] another and that
καὶ περιεκτικὸν εἶδος τῶν ὁμοειδῶν essence signifies the common and general
ὑποστάσεων σημαίνει οἷον θεός, form of subsistences of the same kind,
ἄνθρωπος, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις ἄτομον δηλοῖ such as God, man, while subsistence
ἤτοι πατέρα, υἱόν, πνεῦμα ἅγιον, marks the individual, that is to say, Father,
Πέτρον, Παῦλον. Ἰστέον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ Son, Holy Spirit, or Peter, Paul. Observe,
μὲν τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος then, that the names, divinity and
ὄνομα τῶν οὐσιῶν ἤτοι φύσεών ἐστι humanity denote essences or natures
παραστατικόν, τὸ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος while the names, God and man, are
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φύσεως τάττεται, ὁπόταν applied both in connection with natures,
λέγωμεν· Θεός ἐστιν ἀκατάληπτος as when we say that God is
οὐσία, καὶ ὅτι εἷς ἐστι θεός· λαμβάνεται incomprehensible essence, and that God is
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ὡς τοῦ one, and with reference to subsistences,
μερικωτέρου δεχομένου τὸ τοῦ that which is more specific having the
καθολικωτέρου ὄνομα, ὡς ὅταν φησὶν ἡ name of the more general applied to it, as
γραφή· «Διὰ τοῦτο ἔχρισέ σε ὁ θεὸς ὁ when the Scripture says, Therefore God, thy
θεός σου» (ἰδοὺ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν God, hath anointed thee, or again, There was
υἱὸν ἐδήλωσε), καὶ ὡς ὅταν a certain man in the land of Uz, for it was
λέγῃ· «Ἄνθρωπός τις ἦν ἐν χώρᾳ τῇ only to Job that reference was made.74
Αὐσίτιδι» (τὸν γὰρ Ἰὼβ μόνον
ἐδήλωσεν).73

In other words, “humanity” only ever refers to the human nature, and “Paul” just
refers to a particular hypostasis. But “man” can do either one. In a sentence like,
“The man walked down the street,” it refers to a particular human hypostasis. But
in sentences like “Man is a rational animal,” or “What is man that Thou art mindful
of him?” or “Man’s days are as the grass,” it refers to the nature of mankind as a
whole. In that sense of the word “man,” we could say that “Man is a multitude of
hypostases.” John here indicates that he uses the word “God” in both of these ways
as well. In other words, for John, “divinity” only ever refers to the divine nature, and

73 St. John of Damascus (1973, 3–239).

74 St. John of Damascus (1898, 48).

34
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

“Father” and “Son” and “Holy Spirit” refer to particular hypostases. But “God” can
do either one. In a sentence like “God, thy God hath anointed thee,” it refers to two
hypostases—first to the Son, then to the Father. But in sentences like “God is an
incomprehensible essence” it is referring to the divine essence—not referring to the
person named “God” and then bizarrely identifying Him with an essence! It is
presumably in this sense of the word “God,” the sense in which it refers to the
essence, that we can say that “God is tri-hypostatic” or that “God is a Trinity” just
as we could say that “man is a multitude of hypostases” when we use “man” to refer
to the entire species.75
I will leave off my discussion of John of Damascus by returning to Book I, Chapter
8 for a passage that might at first glance be read as identifying God with the Trinity,
but that our discussion of Book III, Chapter 4 illuminates.

Καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἀλλήλαις τὰς τρεῖς And again we speak of the three
ὑποστάσεις λέγομεν, ἵνα μὴ πλῆθος καὶ subsistences [hypostases] as being in each
δῆμον θεῶν εἰσαγάγωμεν. Διὰ μὲν τῶν other, that we may not introduce a crowd
τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὸ ἀσύνθετον καὶ and multitude of Gods. Owing to the three
ἀσύγχυτον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοουσίου καὶ ἐν subsistences [hypostases], there is no
ἀλλήλαις εἶναι τὰς ὑποστάσεις καὶ τῆς compoundness or confusion: while, owing
ταυτότητος τοῦ θελήματός τε καὶ τῆς to their having the same essence and
ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς dwelling in one another, and being the
ἐξουσίας καὶ τῆς κινήσεως, ἵν’ οὕτως same in will, and energy, and power, and
εἴπω, τὸ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἕνα θεὸν authority, and movement, so to speak, we
γνωρίζομεν.76 recognise the indivisibility and the unity
of God.77

“God” here might seem like it must be referring to the Trinity, since all three persons
are in play in the previous part of the sentence. But notice that it takes a turn at the
end . . .

Εἷς γὰρ ὄντως θεὸς ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ λόγος For verily there is one God, and His word

75 It’s interesting to note that even such a paradigmatically “Western” figure as Thomas Aquinas
makes the same point in Summa Theologiae Question 39, article 4. And in article 6, Thomas explains
that, for him, it’s true to say “God is a Trinity” or “God is three persons,” precisely because he thinks
that in that context “God” supposits for the divine nature, and not a divine person. (See St. Thomas
Aquinas, n. d.)
76 St. John of Damascus (1973, 3–239).

77 St. John of Damascus (1898, 10).

35
BEAU BRANSON

καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ.78 and Spirit.79

It seems impossible to read the final sentence as anything other than

presupposing MT. So, in reading the previous part, we either have to read it in light
of Exact Exposition III.4, or else take John to be contradicting himself in back-to-back
sentences. And the latter is not simply uncharitable, but, in reference to John of
Damascus, absurd.
Though there won’t be time to explore it, one finds a similar kind of language in
other authors who wrote just after the rise of Islam, when it again became critical to
respond to the charge of tri-theism. Theodore Abu Qurrah frequently repeats the
phrase, “God, and His Word, and His Spirit, are one God”. So does the anonymous
author of, “On the Nature of the Triune God” (which in fact never mentions
anything about a triune God, but consistently expresses its theology with the
formula “God, and His Word and His Spirit are one God”). Similar language can be
found in the dialogue between Timothy I, Patriarch of the East Syrian (“Nestorian”)
Church and Caliph al-Mahdi.80
Consider also that in the Quran and other early Muslim writings, Christian belief
in the Trinity is depicted not as a belief that God “is composed of three” or “contains
three” (as we might expect an Egalitarian view to be described), but as a belief that
God “is one of three” (as we would expect a Monarchical view to be described). E.g.,
famously, Al-Maa’idah 5,72 describes Christians (Trinitarians) as those who
“associate others with God” (not those who say God “contains” three within
Himself) And 5,73 describes Christians (Trinitarians) as “Those who say that Allah
is one third of a Trinity” (not that God is a Trinity). Western scholars routinely
dismiss this as Muhammed misunderstanding the Trinity. But did he? Or was it
simply that the kind of Trinitarianism Muhammed and his companions were familiar
with (living around the Eastern edge of the empire during the late 6 th / early 7th
century) was Monarchical?
Now it may be true that the author of the Quran, as well as many later Muslims,
misunderstood the Trinity to consist of God, Jesus, and Mary (although it’s not

78 St. John of Damascus (1973, 3–239).

79 St. John of Damascus (1898, 10).
80 For example in Mingana (1928, 22): “As our God-loving King is one King with his word and his

spirit, and not three Kings, and as no one is able to distinguish him, his word and his spirit from
himself and no one calls him King independently of his word and his spirit, so also God is one God
with His Word and His Spirit, and not three Gods, because the Word and the Spirit of God are
inseparable from Him. And as the sun with its light and its heat is not called three suns but one sun,
so also God with His Word and His Spirit is not three Gods but is and is called one God”.

36
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

entirely clear whether or not there could have still been a small group of heretical
Christians—the Collyridians—in that area who did indeed worship Mary). 81 But
even if the early Islamic view of the Trinity mistakenly substitutes Mary for the Holy
Spirit, we need not conclude that its identification of Allah (God) with the first
person of the Trinity (instead of the Trinity as a whole) is a mistake, any more than
we should conclude that its identification of the Son as the second person of the
Trinity is a mistake! Rather, we simply have two interpretive options. The first
option is that the kind of Trinitarianism known by the earliest Muslims was
Monarchical, and the early Muslims got at least that part right, making only a single
mistake about Mary (if it was a mistake). The second option is that the kind of
Trinitarianism known by the earliest Muslims was actually Egalitarian, but early
Muslims made two separate mistakes, and one of those mistakes just happens to have
ended up—by a fortunate coincidence—being the understanding of the Trinity that
(as even Tuggy would agree) actually was the older view of the Trinity among
Christians, and was more faithful to the Ecumenical Creeds. Both the principle of
charity, and simple probability theory, should lead us to prefer the former view over
the latter.
Finally, fast-forwarding out of the early encounter with Islam and its eventually
Arabic-speaking milieu, if we return to the Greek-speaking milieu of Byzantium at
the time of the Great Schism, we see that much of Photios’ reasons for rejecting the
infamous filioque revolved around the Monarchy of the Father. Though the debate
over the filioque is often presented as an abstruse question of metaphysics, and
though Photios does indeed criticize his opponents for not understanding the
Cappadocians’ metaphysics, much of his argument simply boils down to a
perceived incompatibility between the filioque and SMV. For example, in the
Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, after criticizing the metaphysics of the filioque, Photios
argues:

ιαʹ. Χωρὶς δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων, εἰ δύο 11. Leaving aside the aforementioned, if
αἴτια ἐν τῇ θεαρχικῇ καὶ ὑπερουσίῳ one admits of two causes within the
τριάδι καθορᾶται, ποῦ τὸ τῆς thearchic and superessential triad,
μοναρχίας πολυΰμνητον καὶ where then is the much hymned and
θεοπρεπὲς κράτος; Πῶς οὐχὶ τὸ τῆς God-befitting majesty of the monarchy?
πολυθεΐας ἄθεοννῦν ἐπικωμάσει; Will not the godlessness of polytheism
Πῶς δ’ οὐκ ἐν προσχήματι be riotously introduced? Under the
Χριστιανισμοῦ ἡδεισιδαιμονία τῆς guise of Christianity, will not the
Ἑλληνικῆς πλάνης τοῖς ταῦτα λέγειν superstition of Greek error reassert

81 See Epiphanius of Salamis’ Panarion, Sect #59 / #79 in (St. Epiphanius of Salamis 2008).

37
BEAU BRANSON

τολμῶσιν οὐ συνεισελάσει; itself among those who dare to say such

things?
ιβʹ. Πάλιν εἰ δύο αἴτια τῆς 12. Again, if two causes are imposed
μοναρχικῆς τριάδος ἐπαναβέβηκε, upon the monarchic triad, then
πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ τρίτον τῆς αὐτῆς according to the same reasoning, why
συνανακύψει γνώμης should not a third one emerge? For once
προερχόμενον; Ἅπαξ γὰρ τῆς the principle without principle and
ἀνάρχου καὶ ὑπεραρχίου ἀρχῆς τῆς above principle [= the Father], is cast
οἰκείας ἕδρας τοῖς δυσσεβέσι down from its throne by these impious
περιτραπείσης καὶ εἰς δυάδα ones and is cleaved into a duality, the
διατμηθείσης, νεανικώτερον καὶ division of the principle [arche] will
πρὸςτὴν Τριάδα ἡ κατανομὴ τῆς proceed more vehemently into a triad,
ἀρχῆς προελεύσεται, ἐπεὶ κἀν τῇ since in the supersubstantial,
ὑπερφυεῖ καὶ ἀμερεῖκαὶ ἑνιαίᾳ τῆς inseparable, and simple nature of the
Θεότητος φύσει τὸ τριαδικὸν μᾶλλον divinity, the triad is more manifest than
ἢ τὸ δυαδικὸν ἀναφαίνεται, οἷα δὴ the dyad, and indeed also harmonizes
καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν ἁρμοζόμενον. with the idiomata.82

In other words, Photios sees a few different options in interpreting the filioque. On
a straight-forward, perhaps flat-footed reading, there are now two beings that are
coordinately a se and that serve as sources for further beings. If, as Photios does, we
take monotheism to be a matter of how many a se sources there are, then we now
have straight-forward ditheism, which is what Photios accuses the Latins of. So
Photios clearly opposes monarchia and polytheism. And in that case, in Photios’ mind,
monarchia is just the equivalent of monotheism. If in Photios’ mind a denial of the
Monarchy of the Father is a denial of monotheism, then Photios is still operating
within the framework of Monarchical Trinitarianism, as late as the late 9 th century.
What’s more, as far as I’m aware, Photios’ Latin opponents don’t seem to
challenge him on this, even at this late date. Indeed, a typical filioquist response is
to say that the Son is not (or is not “absolutely” or “hypostatically”) a se, so that we
begin with the Father as the sole (absolutely) a se source, Who generates the Son,
then the Father and Son together generate the Spirit. Regardless of who is right in
this argument, the point to note is that the response does not simply accept two a se
principles (nor three), nor does it shift aseity from the Father to the Trinity or the
Divine Nature.
Thus, while there isn’t time to explore these texts fully, to return to my point from
Section 4, we can see that Tuggy has a lot of work to do if he wants to substantiate

82 St. Photios (1983, 74; 156).

38
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

his point against Rea that “the body of catholic theologians from the late fourth
century on” clearly assert “the existence of a triune, tripersonal deity,” rather than
that they are Monarchical Trinitarians.83 On the other hand, if Tuggy simply means
the body of Western theologians from the late fourth century on make this claim (and
even this would be problematic), then he should give up the claim that he is defining,
and then refuting, Trinitarianism in general, and make only the more modest claim
that he is defining, and refuting (at best) a certain kind of Trinitarianism that came
to be dominant much later, mainly in the West, over a very long period of time, and
without ever fully achieving a consensus. That is, at best, Tuggy’s argument would
count as a reason to return to some form of Monarchical Trinitarianism, rather than
a refutation of Trinitarianism in general.84
To conclude this section, there are of course many other passages from various
church fathers one could point to as examples of what looks like Monarchical, rather
than Egalitarian, Trinitarianism. But now that we have a clearer picture of the
patristic witness to Monarchical Trinitarianism and thus the motivation for so many
contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians for holding it, 85 the reader may also
have several questions and objections regarding MT from a Trinitarian perspective.
This is the time to address such concerns, and while it won’t be possible to do full
justice to them all, addressing them (albeit briefly) will at least help us get a clearer
picture of Monarchical Trinitarianism.

8. Some Worries about SMV and Monarchical Trinitarianism

The first concern a Trinitarian might have is this. If the individual named “God”
is the Father, how can the Son and the Holy Spirit in any sense be called “God”? Are
they really “equally” divine? Are they no longer homoousios with the Father? After
all, if Monarchical Trinitarianism is in obvious conflict with the homoousion, then

83 Tuggy has attempted something like this in “When and How. . . ” But as noted above in note 15,
the evidence he presents is in every case either irrelevant, non-existent, or circular.
84 This is not to say that I necessarily agree that Western Trinitarianism underwent the

transformation Tuggy imagines, in just the way and at the time he imagines. Rather, I think the entire
situation is far more complex, as should be clear from texts like Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, Part I,
Question 39, especially articles 4-6 (mentioned above, footnote 75). The point is simply that if tuggy
wants to claim that all mainstream Christian theology took a certain turn, then he needs to show that
for Trinitarians in whatever geographical region. If he can’t make good on that claim, then he needs
to weaken his thesis down to whatever he can make good on.
85 Again, this isn’t to say it’s only Eastern Orthodox theologians who hold such a view, as the

example of Calvin in note 52 above makes clear. But if Tuggy wants to draw conclusions about all
Trinitarian theologies, then he needs to show that his premises are true of all Trinitarian theologies.

39
BEAU BRANSON

perhaps it should be ruled out of court as in no sense Trinitarian after all. To get a
clearer view of how this objection might work, recall that SMV is a conjunction of (1)
WMV (a substantive, ontological claim) and (2) a semantic claim about uses of the
word “God.” Let’s look at how the current objection might be directed against either
conjunct.
In some cases, the criticism really is leveled against the ontological component of
SMV, that is, WMV. The idea is that aseity (in an absolute sense) is part of the divine
nature, so that WMV itself is inconsistent with the claim that the persons are
homoousious. This is just the argument that Eunomius, the extreme Arian gave
against the pro-Nicene Trintiarianism of the Cappadocians. The “Eunomian
Premise,” as I’ll call it, holds that having the divine ousia entails being a se in every
sense (and so, entails being “unbegotten”). As it seems to me, this is highly confused.
After all, it doesn’t seem to hold in any other case. As Nazianzen points out (Oration
31, section XI), Adam is not begotten, Seth is begotten of Adam, and Eve proceeds
from Adam, not by begetting, but in a different way. Yet, we have no problem
thinking they can all be homoousious, i.e., members of the same species. 86 Or, as
Gregory of Nyssa points out (On the Holy Spirit, Against the Macedonians), “It is as if
a man were to see a separate flame burning on three torches (and we will suppose
that the third flame is caused by that of the first being transmitted to the middle, and
then kindling the end torch ), and were to maintain that the heat in the first exceeded
that of the others; that that next it showed a variation from it in the direction of the
less; and that the third could not be called fire at all, though it burnt and shone just
like fire, and did everything that fire does.” 87 It may be true in the loose sense of
“essential” in which we tend to use the word today that individuals’ origins are
“essential” to them (that is, necessary for them). But that’s clearly a matter of their
Leibnizian or individual essence (i.e., their idiomata or hypostatic properties), not their
shared Aristotelian or kind-essence (their ousia).
On the other hand, the objection we’re considering (that MT is inconsistent with
the claim that the persons are homoouious) may be directed at the purely semantic
conjunct. What such an objection would seem to presuppose is the (again semantic,
not metaphysical) claim that “God” can only be used to mean “a thing with the divine
nature” (so that there is no sense of “God” such that it would ever make sense for it
to apply more or less properly to any of the three persons). This assumption seems
to be so dominant today that it normally goes unquestioned. But it’s explicitly
denied by about half or so of the early church fathers, and almost all of the rest, while
not denying it, deliberately refrain from affirming it. As I note in my dissertation,

86
St. Gregory Nazianzen (1894, 321)
87
St. Gregory of Nyssa (1893, 317)

40
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

although Gregory of Nyssa gives a defense of Trinitarianism as monotheistic based

on this semantic assumption, both in Ad Graecos and Ad Ablabium, he explicitly and
vehemently rejects its actual veracity. He only offers, in response to certain
objections to the Trinity, defeater-defeaters that can operate even granting this
assumption, since he thinks it’s a commonly accepted view (especially among
pagans). But he makes clear that it is not his own view88. And in this, he stands in a
long line of earlier fathers who also reject it89. As far as I can tell, among the church
fathers, Augustine seems to have been the first to actually affirm this claim (unless
one counts Marius Victorinus as a “church father”), from whom it seems to have
spread to Boethius and so on, until this originally highly idiosyncratic idea among
Christians eventually became dominant, so that certain responses to the charge of
tritheism that were prevalent in the early church became unusable.
But the idea that a god is a thing with a divine nature seems untenable, at least
from a scriptural point of view, as Gregory points out90. God gave Moses to be “a
god to Pharaoh” (Ex. 7,1). And “the gods of the gentiles are demons” (Psalm
96,5/95,5 LXX, cf. 1 Cor 1:10) (so clearly gods needn’t have the divine nature!) When
the witch of Endor brought up Samuel from Sheol, along with him, she “saw gods”
(1 Sam. 28:13). Did she only mistakenly believe she saw gods? Well, “Yahweh
executed judgment on all the gods of Egypt” (Ex. 12,12; Num. 33,4 and cf. 2 Sam.
7:23). Did Yahweh only mistakenly believe He was executing judgment on the gods of
Egypt? How could He actually execute judgment on them, if they didn’t exist? “God
stands in the midst of the gods” (Psalm 82,1). “Let the gods who have not created
the heavens and the earth perish” (Jer. 10,11). “Though I have said ye are gods, all
of you sons of the Most High, yet shall ye die like men” (Psalm 82,6; John 10,34).
“Who is like Thee among the gods, O Lord”? (Ex. 15,11) “There are many gods and
many lords, yet for us there is One God and One Lord” (1 Cor. 8,5). That there is no
sense in which one can speak of other gods is difficult to reconcile with the Bible.
Rather, the picture that emerges from scripture is that, as St. Paul puts it, there are
indeed many gods and many lords. It is only that there is for us but One God and
One Lord. And in any case, whether one admits their literal existence or not is beside
the point. The point is that it’s clear that the vast majority of the things (whether real
or imagined) that the Bible applies the term “god” to cannot have the same nature
as God. So at least the Bible doesn’t seem to use the term “god” to mean “a thing with
the divine nature.”
To make the view a bit more clear, let’s consider two alternatives. It may be that

88 Branson (2014, 129–151).

89 Ibid (146–148).
90 Ibid. (134–139).

41
BEAU BRANSON

the Greek <<ὁ Θεὸς>> functions as a name, just as in Greek we refer to Socrates and
Plato as <<ὁ Σωκράτης>> and <<ὁ Πλάτων>>, literally “the” Socrates and “the” Plato.
If <<ὁ Θεὸς>> functions as a name, then, at least given a certain view of names, it
refers to some individual not by way of any descriptive content at all.91 It may be
that the reference of that name was fixed at some point via some descriptive content,
but now that it is fixed, it simply refers to that entity. In that case, things are fairly
simple. Suppose <<ὁ Θεὸς>> (with the article) functions, for the New Testament
authors, as a name referring to the Father. Still, <<θεὸς>>, without any article, may
function as a predicate, just as “Adam”, in Hebrew, can function as a name referring
to the first human, but “adam” can also function to simply predicate humanity of a
thing (as in Ezekiel 28,2 and 28,9, “Thou art man [adam] and not God [el]”). Thus,
even though it may look like a description, “God” (capital-G, <<ὁ Θεὸς>> with the
article) may just be the name of an individual, in the same way that the Hebrew
(capital-“A”) “Adam” (sometimes) functions as a name for the first human, despite
the fact that (little-“a”) “adam” literally means “a human”, so that, in that sense, there
are many adams, or many individuals that are adam, but only one individual that is
named “Adam”—and many gods, but only one individual that is named “God.”
Now as I’ve argued, <<θεὸς>> in the sense in which it applies to, say, “the gods of
the gentiles,” “all the gods of Egypt,” and so on, won’t predicate the divine nature.
But what exactly the Bible does mean by <<θεὸς>> needn’t be settled just to get the
logic down.
On the other hand, suppose <<ὁ Θεὸς>> functions not as a name, but as a definite
description—“the single individual that is θεὸς”. If <<ὁ Θεὸς>> (“the” God)
functions as a definite description, then it refers to a single individual by way of
some descriptive content—descriptive content that only it fully satisfies. But in that
case, even the Unitarian will have to admit that there is an equivocation going on
here. Given that, as St. Paul tells us, “there are many gods and many lords”, yet in
some sense there is only “one God” and “one Lord” for us (1 Cor. 8,5), and given that
God is “the God of gods,” (Deut. 10,17) there has to be some distinction between a
sense of <<θεὸς>> (god) such that there is only one (<<ὁ Θεὸς>>, “the” god) and
some other sense of <<θεὸς>> such that there is more than one (the gods). But why
must we assume that the sense of <<θεὸς>> in which there is only one must be
something like “thing that has the divine nature” instead of something like “thing
that is a source without a source”? The sense of <<θεὸς>> in which the gods of the
gentiles are θεοὶ will also not mean “thing with the divine nature,” of course. So, in

91Tuggy seems to take this view in (Tuggy 2013), beginning at 10:35, “the phrase ‘the God’ is a
singular referring term, the function of which is not to describe, but simply to refer.”

42
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

that case, for the Bible to call Jesus θεὸς / god wouldn’t—just by itself—prove that
Jesus has the divine nature. But it wouldn’t be inconsistent with that claim either.92
The important point at present is simply that it isn’t such that only God the Father
can have this predicate applied to Him.
Finally, one might object that, in some cases, it may be that Christ is referred to in
the New Testament not simply as <<θεὸς>> without the article, but as <<ὁ Θεὸς>>
with the article, or with titles that seem to function as singular referring expressions
and seem most apt for the Father, like “King of Kings and Lord of Lords”, or that
His standard title, “Lord” (<<Κύριος>>) is just a conventional Greek translation of
the Hebrew “Yahweh”. But we can certainly still make sense of calling Christ “God”
with a capital G, even if, in fact, the individual named “God” is the first person of
the Trinity, and Christ is the second person, and so numerically distinct from God.
A fairly common strategy for showing this, in the early days of the Arian
controversy, involves a sort of representational view of Christ, on which Christ is, as
St. Paul had put it, “the ikon of the invisible God”. (Col. 1,15) We can see this strategy
at work in various passages from another Monarchical Trinitarian, St. Basil the Great,
passages that seem to reveal (1) that he thinks of God as the “source without source”,
and (2) that he thinks we are licensed in referring to Christ as “God” because of
Christ’s function as the Image (or Representation) of God, and that (3) this
phenomenon of reference-transfer does not increase the “count” of gods. For (1),
consider this passage:

Still you say: ‘He preaches two gods! He proclaims polytheism!’ There are not two
gods because there are not two fathers. Whoever introduces two first principles preaches
two gods.—Adv. Sab. 4 [emphasis mine.]93

Here Basil (as we also saw with Photios) seems to equate mono-theism with mon-
archia, and in general the number of gods with the number of “first principles.” So,
how is it that (2) the term “God” applies to Christ, even though Christ is not the
“source without source”? Consider this passage from St. Basil:

The Father is God; the Son is God. The Father is perfect God; the Son is also perfect
God. The Father is incorporeal; the Son is incorporeal, the representation [Heb 1,3] of
the incorporeal and the incorporeal image [Col 1,15].

92 This is, after all, what we should expect. Arians called Jesus “our god.” So, if the mere
appellation “god” were enough to prove one way or the other whether Jesus had the divine nature,
how could there ever have been a controversy between Arians and Orthodox in the first place?
93 St. Basil of Caesarea (2012, 295).

43
BEAU BRANSON

—Not Three Gods, 3.94

Thus, Christ is the Image or the Representation of “the Invisible God.” (Col. 1,15)
That is what licenses the application of the term “God” to Him (more on that just
below). But how is it that (3) this avoids tritheism? Consider these passages:

[W]hoever gazes at the imperial image in the forum and calls the one on the panel
“emperor” does not confess two emperors, namely, the image and the one whose
image it is. Nor when he points to the depiction on the panel and says, “This is the
emperor”, does he deprive the exemplar of the designation “emperor”.—Adv. Sab.
4.95

We have never to this present day heard of a second God. We worship God from
God, confessing the uniqueness of the persons, while maintaining the unity of the
Monarchy . . . How does one and one not equal two Gods? Because we speak of the
emperor, and the emperor's image - but not two emperors. The power is not divided,
nor the glory separated. One is the dominion and authority over us; we do not send
up glories to God, but glory; the honor given the image passes to the prototype. The
image of the emperor is an image by imitation, but the Son is a natural image . . . (De
Spiritu Sancto 45)96

Consider that, if I show you a picture of my wife, I can point to the picture and
say (quite truly), “This is my wife”. If my actual wife then walks into the room, and
I point to her and say, “This is my wife”, I don’t say anything false, I don’t contradict
myself, and yet I’m not guilty of bigamy, having both a human wife and a merely
photographic one. Rather, I have only my One True Wife (the human one), even
though there is more than one thing to which I can point and say, “This is my wife”.
Indeed, I could even point to the photograph and say, “this is my One True Wife”.
And what I asserted would be true. This is not because I am equivocating on “wife”,
nor on the copula “is”. Rather, it is because representations transfer reference (and
other kinds of intensionality—like worship or glorification, as St. Basil mentions) to
their prototypes.
To see that this phenomenon is not simply an equivocation on “wife” or “my
wife”, consider that I could just as easily replace “my wife” with “Svetlana” (or
indeed any name or any description that picks her out) 97 . I can point to the

94 Ibid. (273).
95 Ibid. (296).
96 St. Basil of Caesarea (1980, 72).

97 I’m indebted to Jean-Baptiste Guillon for pressing me to clarify this and related points.

44
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

photograph and say (truly), “This is Svetlana”. And, although there may be more
than one Svetlana, that is because there are other women with that name. If there
were only one woman in the world named “Svetlana”, there would not come to be
two simply because she had been photographed, so that the name “Svetlana” could
then become ambiguous and a source of equivocation. But does it really seem likely
that literally all names, indeed all descriptions (or at least the names and descriptions
of any things that can be photographed or otherwise represented), are ambiguous?
It seems rather that the application of the sentence, “This is my wife”, to a
photograph is not licensed by an equivocal use of the term “wife” or “my wife”
(likewise for an equivocal use of “Svetlana”). Intuitively, I am not actually speaking
about the photograph and saying there is some strange, mysterious (and hopefully
merely Platonic) sense of “wife” in which it is my wife, or in which I am married to
it. Nor that there is some quality of Svetlana-tude, perhaps similar to my wife’s
actual quality of Svetlana-tude, that is had by the photograph. Rather, intuitively, I
am simply using the photograph as a means of speaking about my wife, and simply
affirming that she is (quite literally) my wife, Svetlana.
Similarly, the application of the sentence, “This is my wife”, to a photograph is
not licensed by an equivocal use of the copula “is”. Again, intuitively, I am not
actually speaking about the photograph and saying that, although it does not literally
instantiate the property of being my wife, there is some mysterious relation that it
bears to the property of being my wife, which is perhaps similar to instantiation.
Rather, intuitively, I am simply using the photograph as a means of speaking about
my wife, and simply affirming that she (literally) instantiates the property of being
my wife. Nor again, if I say, “This is Svetlana” am I saying that the photograph bears
some relation to Svetlana that is not exactly numerical identity, but something
perhaps similar to identity. Rather, intuitively, I am simply using the photograph as
a means of speaking about my wife, and affirming that she (literally) is identical to
Svetlana.
However, one might here imagine that there is a good candidate for a relation
that the photograph does bear to Svetlana, a relation which isn’t identity, but which
we may be expressing with “is”. Namely, one might argue that in this case “is” really
just means “represents”. One problem with this suggestion is that the same
phenomenon of reference transfer occurs with verbs other than the copula as well.
For example, I may ask someone, “Where are you parked?” And they may reply,
“I’m parked right outside, in spot 2A”. And this could happen even when we are not
outside in the parking lot at all, but inside and planning a trip. (And needless to say,
a person can’t be “parked” even if they were outside and, say, standing in spot 2A.)
Does it seem plausible not only that there is an equivocal use of the word “is” which

45
BEAU BRANSON

can just mean “represents”, but also an equivocal use of the verb “to park”, so that
“to park” can mean to park, but can also mean “to be represented by something that
parks”? In the same way that analyzing my “wife” example as an equivocation on a
predicate leads, when generalized, to an innumerable horde of ambiguous
predicates, analyzing it as an equivocation on the copula leads, when generalized,
to an innumerable horde of ambiguous verbs.
There is much more to be said about this phenomenon of reference transfer (really,
transfer of intensionality generally), but we will have to move on. Suffice it to say,
even though my actual, human wife is my “One, True Wife”, if I were to point to her
picture and say, “That’s not my wife”, or even “That’s not my One, True Wife”, I
would be saying something false. By using the picture, I would be asserting that my
wife is not my wife. In fact, even if I said, “Well, this isn’t literally my wife”, I would
be saying something false. And that has nothing to do with fancy metaphysics,
relative identity logic, or whatnot. It’s just the point of using representations. When
the real McCoy isn’t in the room, we can in many ways treat a representation as
though it were the prototype. As a final argument that what we have here is a
transfer of reference affecting the subject term, rather than an equivocation on the
copula or the predicate, consider that, instead of saying “That’s my wife” or “That’s
not my wife” (as I point to the picture), I could just as easily point to the picture and
say, “She’s my wife” or “She’s not my wife.” But if the copula or the predicate were
equivocal while the subject I was referring to was the photograph, I would have to
say, “It’s my wife” or “It’s not my wife” (since my wife is female, whereas a
photograph is not). Thus, it should at least be clear that the reference made to the
photograph transfers to my wife. Thus, equivocations in other parts of the sentence
would be superfluous.
Here let me return to the worry about the homoousion. Namely, if the individual
named “God” is the Father, because only He is the “single source without source,”
and if Christ is referred to as God, not because He is also in some sense the single
source without source, but because He is a representation of God, does this mean
that the Father and Son are not in fact “homoousios” or “of the same nature/essence”?
The confusion here is to think that because the picture I have sketched out does
not require that the Father and Son be of the same essence in order to make the logic
and semantics work out, that it is therefore incompatible with their being of the same
essence. But first, one can still hold the Father and Son to be homoousios, and indeed
can argue (on other grounds) that they must be. Second, it is still critical, within what
we can call the “Representationalist Strategy” we are considering, that the Father
and Son actually have the divine nature in common, at least in the form seen in
figures like St. Athanasius or St. Basil. Things can function as representations either

46
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

by convention (like how words represent things, or how we might stipulate that we
shall use a square in a diagram to represent one person and a squiggle to represent
another person) or by having some relevant features in common (like how an image
represents something). But conventional representations don’t reveal anything about
their prototypes. If you’ve never seen my wife, and I simply stipulate that we will
use a squiggle in a diagram to represent her, I can’t in seriousness point to the
squiggle and ask you whether you think my wife is beautiful. I would have to also
stipulate that my wife is beautiful, or you’d have no way to know. Her image in a
photograph, however, represents her by having something in common with her (in this
case, her visible form). So you can simply read off of the photograph the fact (as I
take it to be) that my wife is beautiful. Because the photograph is beautiful for just
the same reason as my wife is beautiful (i.e., in virtue of having the same visible form
in virtue of which she herself is beautiful).
Part of the debate between the Arians and the Orthodox was over whether Christ
represented the Father merely by convention or by commonality. If Christ is a creature,
and does not share some element in common with God (i.e., the divine nature), then
Christ can only represent God by convention. And so, in Himself, Christ reveals
nothing about the Father. But if Christ has the divine nature in common with the
Father, then we can, so to speak, “read off of” Him the attributes of the Father. Or as
Christ Himself put it to Philip, “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father”. (John
14,9) Similarly, anyone who has seen a photograph of my wife, has seen my wife,
who is “in” the photograph. (cf. John 14,10) If I ask you whether you think my wife
is beautiful, after you’ve seen her (i.e., her image) in a photograph, you couldn’t
legitimately say, “I don’t know; I’ve never seen her”. You could say, “I’ve never seen
her in person. I’ve only seen her ‘in’ a photograph”. But in that case, the correct
response would be, “So what? You’ve seen her in the only sense in which you need
to see her in order to answer the question whether she’s beautiful”.
If Christ represented the Father merely by convention, however, it would be hard
to see how an encounter with Christ would count as a revelation of the Father, who
cannot be seen (Ex. 33,20). It would be hard to reconcile Isaiah’s claim “I saw Yahweh
sitting on a throne” (Is. 6,1) with St. Paul’s claim that the King of Kings and Lord of
Lords (i.e., God the Father) is one “whom no man hath seen, nor can see” (1 Tim.
6,16) or St. John’s repeated claim that “No man has ever yet seen God” (1 John 4,12)
and “No man has ever yet seen God; the only begotten Son . . . he hath declared
him.” (John 1,18) However, if Christ is, by nature, “the ikon of the invisible God,”
(Col 1,15), then it is obvious how He can reveal the Father, and how “he that hath
seen me [Christ] hath seen the Father.” (Joh n 14,9)
Unfortunately, there is not space to go into further detail on the mechanics of

47
BEAU BRANSON

Monarchical Trinitarianism here, nor the important issue of the visible Yahweh vs.
the invisible Yahweh that appears both in late second Temple Judaism and again in
the Arian controversy. But hopefully one will now have a rough idea how it works,
how it might avoid some of the most obvious criticisms, and where to look for it in
patristic sources. In any case, again, the point for present purposes is not to show
that MT is true, that it’s defensible, or even that it’s necessarily a very good or
interesting idea. The point is simply that it can and does count as a form of
Trinitarianism.

9. Conclusion

The point of this discussion of MT was to show us just how different TT and UT
(Tuggy’s definitions) are from TB and UB (my definitions). All Monarchical models
count as Trinitarian on TB (my definition), because the number of divine persons is
exactly three and the number of gods exactly one. And no Monarchical models
would count as Unitarian on UB (my definition), because the number of divine
persons is not exactly one. But all Monarchical models count as Unitarian on UT
(Tuggy’s definition), because the relation between The One God and the Father is
the relation of identity, rather than the relation of “containment” or “consisting of”.
What’s more, Tuggy’s definitions also have the bizarre result that although all
Monarchical models count as Unitarian, some will also count as Trinitarian (while
some others won’t). This will happen in any model in which a thing is allowed to
“contain”, “consist of”, or “constitute” itself. In Rea and Brower’s model the Father
“constitutes” Himself as well as the Son and Spirit, since (just for simplicity’s sake)
they set up their metaphysics up such that things automatically constitute
themselves. And, at least in some of Rea’s iterations of the model, the individual
named “God” is in fact the Father. 98 Thus, although Rea never explicitly asserts
WMV, he asserts the semantic claim that SMV adds to it, and that results in his view
counting as both Unitarian and Trinitarian by Tuggy’s definitions. And since there
is nothing about Rea’s model that conflicts with WMV, it could simply be added in
to get a form of MT, or not, with no obvious logical inconsistency in the model either
way. The existence of such models as Rea’s, models that count as both Unitarian and
Trinitarian on Tuggy’s definitions shows that, despite his claims to the contrary,
Tuggy’s definitions are not in fact logical contraries. They come together whenever

98For example, in Rea (2009, 405), Rea describes the three “central tenets” of the doctrine of the
Trinity as, “(T1) There is exactly one God, the Father almighty. (T2) Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are
not identical. (T3) Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are consubstantial.”

48
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

the One God is the Father, and God the Father bears the “containment / consisting
of” relation (constitution, parthood, trope-sharing, or whatever it turns out to be) to
Himself and the other two persons of the Trinity.
That Tuggy’s definitions of “Unitarian” and “Trinitarian” fail to be logical
contraries raises two problems. First, we must ask “Should it be even logically
possible that a view could count as both Unitarian and Trinitarian at the same time?”
I think even Tuggy ought to find this to be a flaw in his definitions. Thus, we should
reject the definitions in any case.
Second, we should note that WIG ineliminably relies on using these “definitions”
as, in fact, substantive premises. WIG begins with the premise that the New
Testament authors identify the individual named “God” as the Father. It concludes
that the New Testament authors were Unitarian and not (at least not consistently)
Trinitarian. The missing premises, of course, are (1) Tuggy’s definition of “Unitarian,”
from which he concludes the New Testament authors are Unitarian just by
identifying God as the Father, and (2) a presupposition that if one is “Unitarian” in
Tuggy’s sense, then one cannot be “Trinitarian” in his sense. Since (2) is false, at best
Tuggy can conclude that the New Testament authors were “Unitarian” in his sense
of the term. But even on his own assumptions, they could still have been
“Trinitarian,” as he defines the term, just as Rea’s model is both Unitarian and
Trinitarian on Tuggy’s definitions. And note that this point is not a matter of
philosophical or metaphysical debate, nor about biblical exegesis. It is simply a point
of logic that Tuggy’s definitions are not logical contraries. So, his central argument
that the New Testament authors could not have been Trinitarian simply fails, so long
as he sticks to his definitions. (And for similar reasons, so do his arguments that
Rea’s model fails to be Trinitarian and that Tertullian was “not at all a Trinitarian.”)
In conclusion, without keeping “one eye” on history, Tuggy’s definitions may
initially seem reasonable. But his substantive arguments really just amount to a
Biblical case for the Strong Monarchy View (or at least, the semantic component of
it). Coupled with definitions that rule out Monarchical models of the Trinity from
even counting as Trinitarian, and reclassifying them as Unitarian, this obviously
results in a bleak picture for “Trinitarianism” so defined. But when we take a closer
look at the actual history of the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the Monarchy
of the Father—neglected in much of the analytic debate, and certainly by Tuggy—
comes back into focus. Whether we conclude that Monarchical Trinitarianism just is
“the” doctrine of the Trinity (that it is Trinitarian in a “narrow” sense), or whether
we merely acknowledge that it is at least one legitimate form of Trinitarian Theology
(that it is Trinitarian in a “broad” sense), in either case, Tuggy’s central objection to
Trinitarianism loses its force entirely. In sum, if we look at this debate in

49
BEAU BRANSON

philosophical theology from a more historically informed perspective, the landscape

of the debate changes drastically. To sum it up in two words: History matters.

Bibliography

Behr, John. 1999. “The Trinity: Scripture and the Greek Fathers.” The Living Pulpit
(April-June, 1999). New York, The Living Pulpit, Inc.
Behr, John. 2004. The Nicene Faith II. New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Behr, John. 2008. “Calling upon God as Father: Augustine and the Legacy of Nicaea.”
In Orthodox Readings of Augustine, edited by George E. Demacopoulos and
Aristotle Papanikolaou. New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Behr, John. 2018. “One God Father Almighty.” Modern Theology 34, no. 3.
Bobrinskoy, Boris. 1999. The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in
the Biblical and Patristic Tradition. New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Bouteneff, Peter. 2008. The Orthodox Christian Church: history, beliefs and practices.
Now You Know Media.
Branson, Beau. 2014. “The Logical Problem of the Trinity.” PhD diss, University of
Notre Dame, 2014. Available at URL: [Link]
content/uploads/2017/03/BransonDissertation-
[Link]
Branson, Beau. 2018. “Ahistoricity in Analytic Theology.” American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly 91, no. 1.
Calvin, John. 2008. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Henry Beveridge.
Hendrickson.
Cartwright, Richard. 1987. “On the Logical Problem of the Trinity.” In Philosophical
Essays, Richard Cartwright. Boston: MIT Press.
Cleenewerck, Laurent. 2007. His Broken Body: Understanding and Healing the Schism
Between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches. Euclid University Press.
Craig, William Lane. 2020. “#695 A Seeker’s Questions about the Trinity.” Accessed
July 25, 2022. URL: [Link]
seekers-questions-about-the-trinity.
Hopko, Thomas. 1972. The Orthodox Faith Volume I: Doctrine and Scripture. New York,
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Hopko, Thomas. 2008. “The Holy Trinity.” On Speaking the Truth in Love. Accessed
July 25, 2022. URL:
[Link]
Jacobs, Nathan. 2018. “Understanding Nicene Trintiarianism.” In Christian Research
Journal, 41, no. 4.

50
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

Kariatlis, Philip. n.d. “The Mystery of the Trinity.” Accessed July 25, 2022. URL:
[Link] as well as URL:
[Link]
Manoussakis, John Panteleimon. “Primacy and Ecclesiology: The State of the
Question.” In Orthodox Constructions of the West, edited by George E.
Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolau. New York: Fordham University Press,
2013.
Meyendorff, John. 1983. Byzantine Theology, 2nd ed. New York USA, Fordham
University Press.
Migne, Jacques Paul. 1857-1866. Patrologiae Cursus Completus (series Graeca) 36. Paris,
Migne.
Mingana, Alphonse. 1928. Christian Documents in Syriac, Arabic, and Garshuni, Edited
and Translated With a Critical Apparatus, Volume 2, Timothy's Apology For
Christianity. Cambridge, W. Heffer & Sons Limited.
Mullins, Ryan. 2020. “Trinity, Subordination, and Heresy: A Reply to Mark
Edwards.” TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and
Philosophical Theology 4, no. 2. [Link]
Plantinga, Cornelius Jr. 1988. “The Threeness / Oneness Problem of the Trinity.”
Calvin Theological Journal 23, no. 1.
Radde-Gallwitz, Andrew. 2020. “God Is not a Thing: A Response to Dale Tuggy.”
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical
Theology 4, no. 2. [Link]
Rea, Michael C. “The Trinity.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited
by Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
Schaff, Philip. 1919. Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical notes. Volume I.
The History of Creeds. Sixth edition. New York, USA, Harper & Brothers.
St. Athanasius. 1892. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4. Translated
by Archibald Robertson. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. Buffalo, NY,
Christian Literature Publishing Co.
St. Athanasius. 1940. Athanasius Werke, vol. 2.1. Edited by Hans George Opitz. Berlin,
De Gruyter.
St. Basil of Caesarea. 1957-1966. Saint Basile. Lettres, 3 vols. Edited by Yves Courtonne.
Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
St. Basil of Caesarea. 1980. On the Holy Spirit. Translated by David Anderson. St.
Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
St. Basil of Caesarea. 2012. On Christian Doctrine and Practice. Translated by Mark
DelCogliano. St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
St. Epiphanius of Salamis. 2008. The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: De fide. Books II

51
BEAU BRANSON

and III. Volume 2 of The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis. Translated by Frank

Williams. Brill.
St. Gregory Nazianzen. 1894. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 7.
Translated by Charles Gordon Browne and James Edward Swallow. Edited by
Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. Buffalo, NY, Christian Literature Publishing Co.
St. Gregory of Nyssa. 1893. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 5.
Translated by William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson. Edited by Philip Schaff
and Henry Wace. Buffalo, NY, Christian Literature Publishing Co.
St. Gregory of Nyssa. 1960. Gregorii Nysseni opera, vol. 2.2. Edited by Werner Jaeger.
Leiden: Brill.
St. John of Damascus. 1898. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 9.
Translated by Stewart Dingwall Fordyce Salmond. Edited by Philip Schaff and
Henry Wace. Buffalo, NY, Christian Literature Publishing Co.
St. John of Damascus. 1973. Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, herausgegeben
vom Byzantinischen Institut der Abtei Scheyern, II: Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου
πίστεως / Expositio fidei [Patristische Texte und Studien 12]. Edited by Bonifatius
Kotter. Berlin, De Gruyter.
St. Photios. 1983. On the Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit. Studion Publishers.
St. Thomas Aquinas. n. d. Summa Theologiae. Translated by Alfred Freddoso.
Accessed July 25, 2022. URL = [Link]
translation/[Link].
Tertullian. 1885. The Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Fathers down to
A.D. 325, vol. 3. Translated by Peter Holmes. Edited by Alexander Roberts and
James Donaldson. T&T Clark, Edinburgh.
Tuggy, Dale. 2013. “Constitution Trinitarianism: An Appraisal,” in Philosophy &
Theology 25. [Link]
Tuggy, Dale. 2013. “The Lost Early History of Unitarian Christian Theology.”
Accessed July 25, 2022. URL: [Link]
Tuggy, Dale. 2016. “Tertullian the Unitarian.” European Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 8, no. 3.
Tuggy, Dale. “The Unfinished Business of the Reformation.” In Herausforderungen
und Modifikationen des Klassischen Theismus, Band 1: Trinität, edited by Thomas
Marschler and Thomas Schärtl. Aschendorff, 2019.
Tuggy, Dale. 2020. “When and How in the History of Theology Did the Triune God
Replace the Father as the Only True God?” TheoLogica: An International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 4, no. 2.
[Link]
Warfield, Benjamin Breckinridge. 1915. “Trinity.” In The International Standard Bible

52
 ONE GOD, THE FATHER

Encyclopedia, edited by James Orr. Chicago: The Howard-Severance Company.

Yannaras, Christos. 1984. The Freedom of Morality. St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Zizioulas, John. 1983. Being as Communion. London, Darton: Longman & Todd.
Zizioulas, John. 1989. “On Being Persons: Towards an Ontology of Personhood.” In
Persons Divine and Human, edited by Christoph Schwöbel and Colin Gunton.
London: T & T Clark.
Zizioulas, John. 1995. “The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the
Cappadocian Contribution.” In Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being
and Act, edited by Christoph Schwöbel. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

53

View publication stats