INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

PROJECT REPORT

Topic: Statute Should Be Read as a Whole

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Ms. Umang Garg Arushi Chopra
(UILS, Panjab University) 182/21
Semester-6
(Sec-D, [Link] LLB)

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At the outset, I wish to thank the Almighty God for his immense blessings and pray to him to
continue to guide me on the path of my committed calling. I deem it my proud privilege to express
my indebtedness and sincere thanks to all those who have in various ways, helped me in the
successful completion of the project and without their invaluable help this project would not have
been a reality.
I convey my sincere gratitude to my teacher Ms. Umang Garg, University Institute of Legal
Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh who has chosen me for this project on the topic of "Statute
should be read as a whole " and also provided me help with knowledge, inspiration and
information. It would not be possible for me to complete this project without his encouragement,
guidance, valuable suggestions and affectionate help. I owe my regards to the entire faculty of the
University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University from where I have learnt the basics of Law
and whose informal discussions, intellectual support helped me in the entire duration of this work.

Arushi Chopra
182/21

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 INDEX

S. No. Description Page

No.
1. Introduction 4-5
2. Popat Lal Shah V. State Of Madras 6-7
3. Printers (Mysore) Ltd. V. Asstt. Cto 7-8
4. Superintendent And Remembrancer Of Legal Affairs, West Bengal V. 9-11
Abani Maity
5. State Of Gujarat V. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Saikh 11-12
6. S. Gopal Reddy V. State Of Andhra Pradesh 12-14
7. National Insurance Cpy Ltd. V. Gian Chand 14-15
8. M/S Philips India Limited V. Labour Court Madras And Ors 16-17
9. Victim A V. The State Of Madhya Pradesh 18-19
1o. Pandit Ram Narain V. The State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors 20-21
11. Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. V. Union Of India & Ors 21-23
12. Conclusion 24
13. Bibliography 25

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 INTRODUCTION
“It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by
another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth the meaning of the makers.”

Lord Coke 1 Inst. 381

When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute, it is only legitimate
but proper to read that provision in its context. The context here means, the statute as a whole, the
previous state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the
mischief that it was intended to remedy. This rule is now firmly established as evidenced by a
number of cases.1

1) Statute should be read as a whole even when language is clear and explicit

When the language is clear and explicit and words used are plain and unambiguous, the court is
bound to construe them in the ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of the Act, so far as
possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. The intention of the Legislature must
be ascertained by reading the statute as a whole. A statute should be interpreted ex visceribus actus,
that is to say within four corners of the act. The act has to be viewed as a whole and its intention
determined by construing all the constituent parts together and not by taking detached sections or
to take one word here and another there. In order to ascertain the meaning of a clause or a statute,
it is a settled rule or a compelling rule that the entire statute must be read as a whole to make a
harmonious interpretation of the different parts of the statute and reconcile different parts of the
statute even though they apparently appear to be conflicting or contradictory.

2) Textual interpretation should match the contextual

Every clause of a statute has to be construed with reference to the context. Interpretation must
depend on the text and the context. They are the basis of interpretation. One may well say that if
the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
That interpretation is the best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A
statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute
must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and

1
Union of India v. Elphinston Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd.

4
word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may
take color and appear different than when the glasses we must look at the act as a whole and
discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say
as to fit into the scheme of the entire act.

3) Statute be read as a whole-In case of conflict

If there is overlapping or conflict in the statute, then on the settled principles of statutory
interpretation of law, the statute must be read as a whole and the real intention of the Legislature
is to be judged by reading the entire section as a whole. To ascertain the legislative intention, all
the constitutional parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to
be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. Every clause of a
statute should be construed with reference to the context.

Such construction has a merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within the
section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute so that head-on-clash
between two sections of the same act is avoided. 2

2
Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain AIR 1997 SC 1006

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 CASE LAWS
1) POPATLAL SHAH v. STATE OF MADRAS3
FACTS
This is a plea against the order passed by the Division Bench of Madras High Court, against a
criminal plea, which sentenced the plaintiff under Section 15 of the Madras General Sales Tax
Act. The petitioner was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and an imprisonment of 3 months. The
plaintiff, Popatlal Shah, was a partner in a company called the ‘Indo Malayan Trading Company’.
The company was centered in Madras and had its head office there only. The business that the
company had was selling and buying of oil, sago, and Kirana (confectionary) items.

The disagreement arose regarding the non-payment of taxes in Madras under the Madras Sales
Tax Act. They instituted a suit against him. In the development of his business, he used to pay
sales tax in Calcutta. His business dealt with the sale of goods and delivery which were done in
other states. The business was piloted in such a way that the firm at their Madras head office used
to get orders from dealers in Calcutta. Hence, the orders were dispatched to Calcutta by railway
and steamers. All the financial deal was done in Calcutta during the time of delivery of orders to
the agents. He was later found guilty, and sentencing was pronounced.

ISSUE
The scope of the word ‘sale’ was interpreted for paying sales tax.
Scope of Explanation 2 of Madras Act XXV 1947 with respect to what would account for sale?

COURT’S DECISION
It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of
a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light
of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. The title of the Madras Sales Tax Act describes
it to be an Act, the object of which is to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods
in the Province of Madras and the very same words are repeated in the preamble which follows.
The title and preamble, whatever their value might be as aids to the construction of a statute,
undoubtedly throw light on the intent and design of the Legislature and indicate the scope and
purpose of the legislation itself. The title and preamble of the Madras Sales Tax Act clearly show

3
AIR 1953 SC 274

6
that its object is to impose taxes on sales that take place within the province, though these words
do not necessarily mean that the property in the goods sold must pass within the province. The
expression "sale of goods " is a composite expression consisting of various ingredients or elements.

It would be clear from this that these transactions were not considered by the Legislature to
constitute sales within the Province of Madras under the definition itself, but by resort to a legal
fiction they were declared to be so, notwithstanding any provision in the Sale of Goods Act to the
contrary which it was assumed, would otherwise be applicable,.

The Supreme Court held that “the appeal should be allowed and the conviction and sentence passed
by the courts below should be set aside. The fine and sale tax, if actually paid, should be refunded
to the appellant.”

2) PRINTERS (MYSORE) LTD. v. ASSTT. CTO4

FACTS
The first petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of newspapers - one published in
English by the name of "DECCAN HERALD" and the other in Kannada by the name of
"PRAJAVANI". The second petitioner is the governing director of the said company. The
company also produces two magazines in Kannada - one is a weekly called "SUDHA" and the
other a monthly by the name of "MAYURA". The company was registered as a dealer
under section 7 of the Central Sales tax Act and also under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. The
company was permitted to purchase certain goods under C forms at a concessional rate of tax at 4
per cent. as prescribed under section 8(1)(b). But for the C forms, the company has to pay 10 per
cent tax on the sale of those goods. The company has been making use of those goods in the
manufacture of newspapers.

ISSUE
Whether the publisher of newspaper is entitled to the benefit of Section 8(3)(b) read with Section
8(1)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956?

4
1994 SCR (1) 682

7
PROVISIONS MENTIONED
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 2, Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 2(d), Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 8, Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 8(1), Central Sales Tax
Act, 1956 - Section 8(1)(b), Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 8(2), Central Sales Tax Act,
1956 - Section 8(3), Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 8(3)(b), Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 -
Section 8(4)(a), Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 8(l)(b); Constitution Of India - Article 19,
Constitution Of India - Article 19(1)(a); Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Section 8 prescribes the rate of tax on inter-State sales. Sub-section (1) says that "every dealer
who in the course of inter-State trade or commerce ... (b) sells to a registered dealer other than the
Government goods of the description referred to in sub-section (3), shall be liable to pay tax under
this Act which shall be 4% of his turnover".

Section 8 sub-section (3) The goods referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1)-

(b) are goods of the class or classes specified in the certificate of registration of the registered
dealer purchasing the goods as being intended for resale by him or subject to any rules made by
the Central Government in this behalf, for use by him in the manufacture or processing of goods
for sale or in mining or in the generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power;"

COURT’S DECISION
The Supreme Court observed. Section 8, read as a whole, says inter alia: where a dealer purchases
goods (being non-declared goods) required by him for use in the manufacture or processing of
goods for sale and issues Form 'C' to the selling dealer, the selling dealer shall be liable to pay tax
only @ 4% as per Section 8(1) and not 10% as provided in Section 8(2), provided that the
certificate of registration of the purchasing dealer specifies the class of goods purchased by him.
(In case of declared goods, the selling dealer has to pay tax at the rate applicable to sale of such
goods within the appropriate State.)

The supreme court upheld the decision of Madras and Kerala High Court and rejected the
contention of Karnataka High Court and said that the expression “goods” occurring in section
8(3)(b) of the central sales tax act 1956 does take in i.e. does not exclude newspapers. And hence
the publishers of newspapers are entitled to the concessional rate of 4%.

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 3) SUPERINTENDENT AND REMEMBRANCER OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,
WEST BENGAL v. ABANI MAITY5

FACTS

On the night of July 29, 1963, at about 7.30 p.m., the Excise staff intercepted Motor Car No. WBD
8169 at village Rajpur, Police Station Sonarpur. The car was searched and thereupon 199 kgs. 700
grams’ contraband Ganja was recovered from inside the car. The respondent, Abani Maity, who
was the registered owner of the car, and held a driving licence. He was himself on the steering
wheel. Abani Maity and the three other occupants of the car were arrested. After completing the
investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against Abani Maity and his companions in respect of
an offence under Section 46(a) of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909.

After his conviction, on November 16, 1970, Abani Maity made an application to the Magistrate,
praying for return of the car and the other articles seized by the Excise Staff. On the same day, the
Magistrate, without issuing any notice to the prosecution, passed an ex-parte order directing return
of the seized car and other articles to the accused- respondent.

Against that order, dated November 16, 1970, of the Magistrate, the State preferred a Revision in
the High Court, which was finally heard by a Division Bench, who, by an order dated March 5,
1971, affirmed the Magistrate's order relating to the return of the car to the accused- respondent,
but directed confiscation of the Ganja.

PROVISIONS MENTIONED

Section 63(1)- Whenever an offence has been committed which is punishable under this Act, the
(intoxicant) materials, steel, utensils, implement and apparatus in respect of or by means of which
such offence has been committed shall be liable to confiscation.

Section 64(1)- When in any case tried by him, the Magistrate decides that anything is liable to
confiscation under Section 63, he may either order confiscation or give the owner of such an option
to pay, in lieu of confiscation, such fine as the Magistrate thinks fit:

5
AIR 1979 SC 1029

9
Provided that the Magistrate shall in cases order confiscation of the intoxicants decided by him to
be liable to confiscation under Section 63.

ISSUE

It is contended that as soon as Abani Maity, the owner- driver of this car was found guilty of using
this car for transport of contraband Ganja, the Magistrate was bound in addition to the conviction
of Abani Maity for that offence, to pass an order for confiscation of the car, or to give its owner,
Abani Maity, an option to pay in lieu of confiscation a fine, as the Magistrate thought fit. The point
sought to be made out is that the words "shall be liable to confiscation" occurring in Section
63(1) read with sub- section (1) of Section 64, make it obligatory on the Magistrate in the event of
the conditions laid down in these provisions being satisfied, to adopt either of the two alternatives,
namely, to confiscate the car, or, in lieu of confiscation, to impose a fine at the option of its owner.

COURT’S DECISION

The Court held that Exposition ex visceribus actus is a long recognised rule of construction. Words
in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They are therefore,
not to be cons trued in isolation.

The provisions of Sections 63 and 64 of the Act are to be interpreted in the light of this principle.
The language and scheme of the Excise Act, taken as a whole, show that the purpose of this
legislation is not only to raise revenue but also to control and restrict the import, export, transport,
manufacture and sale of intoxicants. Free and unrestricted use of illicit trade in contraband
intoxicants not only means a loss of intoxicants and revenue to the public exchequer but also has
a harmful effect on public health and morals. Moreover, illicit trade and smuggling of intoxicants
is often committed in an organised and clandestine manner, and is difficult to detect.

Keeping in view the purpose, the scheme and the language of the provisions in question, we are of
opinion that as soon as on proof of the conditions necessary under Section 63, a conveyance incurs
the liability to confiscation, the word "may" used in Section 64(1) acquires the force of "must",
and the Magistrate is bound to abide by either of the two alternatives viz., confiscation of the
conveyance or imposition of the fine in lieu thereof in accordance with that Section. Thus, the
discretion of the Magistrate is restricted to choice between these two alternatives. This limited
discretion is to be exercised judicially, in a manner which will not weaken these provisions or

10
hamper their strength as an instrument for suppressing the mischief which the Legislature had in
view. In the circumstances of this case, it was imperative for the Magistrate, to pass, at
the conclusion of the trial, in addition to the conviction of the accused-respondent, an order of
confiscation of the car by means of which the offence was committed.

4) STATE OF GUJARAT v. SALIMBHAI ABDULGAFFAR SAIKH6

FACTS
An incident took place in godhra where a coach of Sabarmati Express was set on fire due to which
59 persons died and several were injured. An FIR was filed. After investigation charge sheet was
filed and it was mentioned that the investigation is still ongoing. The accused filed separate bail
applications but were rejected by Add. Sessions Judge. Then, bail applications were filed before
HC u/s 439 CrPC. After further investigation, prosecution concluded that offences under Section
3(2) & 3 and Section 4 of Prevention of Terrorism Act had been committed and took steps for
including these offences. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the State on 5.3.2003 before
the HC wherein it was averred that further evidence had been collected which revealed commission
of offences under Sections 3 and 4 of POTA and applications had already been moved on for
adding Sections 3(2) and (3) and Section 4 of POTA to the main charge sheet dated 22.5.2002 as
well as the supplementary charge sheets dated 20.9.2002 and 19.12.2002. The accused were also
informed of the addition of charges. It was pleaded in the counter affidavit that the accused-
respondents should first approach the Special Court for grant of bail under POTA and they could
approach the High Court only after decision of the said matter. The High Court, by a detailed order
dated 4.7.2003, allowed all the bail applications and directed that the respondents be released on
bail.

ISSUE
The counsel for the state stated that it was not open to the High Court to directly entertain their
bail applications and grant them bail in the aforesaid offences as in Section 34(2) of POTA only a
bench of two judges of the High Court could grant bail in an offence but a learned Single Judge of
the High Court has granted bail while exercising power under Section 439 read with Section
482 Cr.P.C., the order passed by the High Court is illegal & without jurisdiction. The High Court

6
AIR 2003 SC 3224

11
may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days ."

COURT’S DECISION

It is well settled principle that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the Statute
as a whole. Every clause of Statute should be construed with reference to the context and other
clauses of the Act to make a consistent enactment of the whole Statute. It is also the duty of the
Court to find out the true intention of the legislature and to ascertain the purpose of Statute and
give full meaning to the same. The different provisions in the Statute should not be interpreted in
abstract but should be construed keeping in mind the whole enactment and the dominant purpose
that it may express. Sec 49 cannot be read in isolation, but must be read keeping in mind the scope
of Section 34 an accused can obtain bail from the High Court by preferring an appeal against the
order of the Special Court refusing bail. In view of this specific provision, the scope of special Act
making provision for creation of a Special Court for dealing with offences thereunder and the
application of Cr.P.C in such circumstances has been considered and it has been held that the
procedure in Cr.P.C. gets modified by reason of a special provision in a special enactment. There
being a specific provision for grant of bail, the High Court clearly erred in taking recourse
to Section 482 Cr.P.C. while enlarging the respondents on bail.

5) S. GOPAL REDDY v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 7

Shri G. Narayana Reddy, (PW1) the complainant, was looking for marriage for his daughter Ms.
Vani. A proposal to get Ms. Vani married to the first accused (S. Gopal Reddy) was made by Shri
Lakshma Reddy (P.W.2), a common friend of the appellant and PW1. Later P.W.2 introduced the
second accused to P.W.1, who later on also met Ms Vani and approved of the match. They talked
about giving dowry and the terms were finally agreed on 7.5.1985 at the house of the second
accused. The first accused was not present either on 6.5.1985 or on 7.5.1985. It is alleged that as
per the terms between parties, P.W.1 agreed to give to his daughter (1) house at Hyderabad (2)
jewels, cash and clothes worth about at rupees one lakh and (3) a sum of Rs 50,000/- in cash for
purchasing a car. The date of marriage, however, was to be fixed after consulting the first accused.
PW1 insisted on having an engagement ceremony but the first accused persuaded P.W.1 not to

7
AIR 1996 SC 2184

12
rush as he cannot call his friends at a short notice. It is the prosecution case that the second
accused, on being approached by PW1 for fixing the date of marriage, demanded Rs. 1 lakh instead
of Rs. 50,000/- for purchase of car. The second accused also insisted for payment before marriage.
Prosecution said `Varapuja' was performed by PW1 and his other relatives at the house of the
second accused on 31.10.1985 where PW1 handed over to the first accused, a document,
purporting to settle a house in the name of his daughter Ms. Vani along with a bank pass book
showing a cash balance of Rs. 50,881/- in the name of Ms. Vani. The first accused is reported to
have, after examining the document flared up saying that the settlement was for a Double Storied
House but the house in the name of Ms. Vani was only a single storey building. He threatened to
get the marriage cancelled if P.W.1 failed to comply with the settlement. The first accused then
returned all the articles that had been given to him at the time of `Varapuja'. PW 1 got to know that
the first accused is getting married & he filed a police report. Both the first accused and the second
accused, were thereafter charge sheeted and tried for offences punishable under section 420 I.P.C.
read with section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and convicted and sentenced them to undergo 9
months R.I. and to a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in default to undergo S.I. for four months for the
offence under Section 420 IPC and to R.I. for 6 months and a fine of Rs. 1000/- each and in default
S.I. for six months for the offence under Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

ISSUE

The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the courts below had
committed an error in not correctly interpreting the ambit and scope of section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act read with the definition of `dowry' under section 2 of the said Act. According to
the learned counsel, for "demand" of dowry to become an offence under Section 4 of the Act, it
must be made at the time of marriage and not during the negotiations for marriage. Reliance in this
behalf is placed on the use of the expressions `bride' and `bridegroom' in Section 4 to emphasize
that at the stage of pre-marriage negotiations, the boy and the girl are not `bridegroom' and `bride'
and therefore the `demand' made at that stage cannot be construed as a `demand' of dowry
punishable under Section 4 of the Act.

PROVISIONS MENTIONED
"Section 2- `dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly-

13
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage
or to any other person;

at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not
include dower or mahr in case of person to whom the Muslim Personal law (Shariat) applies.

Section-4: Penalty for demanding dowry-if any person demands directly or indirectly, from the
parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom as the case may be, any dowry, he
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which
may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.

COURT’S DECISION

The SC while holding that the Dowry Prohibition Act prohibits actual receiving of dowry & the
very demand for dowry made even before the marriage, observed that the text and context of the
entire act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The
Courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the
provisions of the Act.

6) NATIONAL INSURANCE CPY LTD. v. GIAN CHAND 8

FACTS
The facts revolved around the insurance policy clause that said relevant medical expenses incurred
during period upto 60 days after hospitalization on disease/illness/injury sustained will be
considered as part of claim. It also mentioned that in the event of any claim/s becoming admissible
under this scheme, the Company will pay to the insured person the amount of such expenses as
would fall under different heads mentioned below and as are reasonably and necessarily incurred
thereof by or on behalf of such insured person, but not exceeding the sum insured in aggregate
mentioned in the scheduled hereto: A) Room, boarding expenses as provided by the
Hospital/Nursing Home. B) Nursing Expenses C) Surgeon, Anaesthetist, Medical Practitioner,
Consultants, Specialists fees. D) Anaesthesia, Blood, Oxygen, Operation Theatre charges, Surgical
appliances, Medicines and Drugs, Diagnostic, Maternal and X-ray, Dialysis, Chemotherapy,

8
LNIND 2008 SCDRCD 771

14
Radiotherapy, cost of pacemaker, Artificial Limbs and cost of organs and similar expenses.
However, the specific device C-PAP was not explicitly mentioned and the insurance company
denied reimbursement for the same leading to the present suit by the aggrieved Petitioner.

ISSUE
Question arising in this appeal is whether expenditure incurred on C-PAP (Continuous Positive
Airway Pressure) Machine is reimbursable against the med claim insurance policy or not?
COURT’S DECISION
While giving its judgement the Court laid emphasis that “It is universal rule of interpretation that
the contract or the statue should be read as a whole and not in isolation and every clause of the
contract and every section of statute should be provided meaning which should be in consonance
with the aim and object of the contract and the statute. It should serve its purpose and promote its
object.

It was widely discussed that the clause 1 does not specifically refer to the device of the type one
in question namely C-PAP but it specifically makes clear that nursing expenses and expenses for
the disease, Anaesthesia, Blood, Oxygen, Operation Theatre charges, Surgical appliances, etc.
Cost of pacemaker, Artificial Limbs and cost of organs and similar expenses, are admissible. They
concluded that it is apparent from this clause that even that equipment is reimbursable which are
essential for treatment of the disease and necessary for saving life, for instance pace maker and
artificial limbs. So far as C-PAP is concerned any patient having the disease the respondent was
having cannot survive long if such system is not used. Applying this rule, we do not find any
escape from the conclusion that the C-PAP system prescribed by the doctor was such instrument
which was essential for life if not curing the disease as some diseases are not curable but
controlling it to such an extent that without which the life of the insured is always at risk.” So, the
respondent was entitled for re-imbursement of the expenses incurred by him towards the purchase
of this equipment.

15
7) M/s PHILIPS INDIA LIMITED v. LABOUR COURT MADRAS AND ORS 9

FACTS

M/s Philips India Ltd-the appellant in the first batch of appeals-a company incorporated under
the Companies Act has an establishment in Tamil Nadu. This establishment is governed by The
Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 ('Act' for short). According to the practice
followed by the company, the employees of the establishment had to render service for 39 hours a
week, made up of 7 hours per day from Monday to Friday and 4 hours on Saturday. Effective from
March 29, 1965, when the company switched over to five days’ week, it still retained the total no.
of working hours per week at 39 by extending the working hours from Monday to Thursday at 7-
3/4 hours and 8 hours on Friday. Thus the total working hours per week remained constant at 39.
The company also introduced the rate of overtime payment at 1.5 times the ordinary wages for
work done over and above the maximum number of working hours per week as well as for working
on holidays. This rate was admissible for overtime work done beyond 39 hours per week but this
was subject to an important condition that whenever the total working hours exceed either 8 hours
per day or 48 hours per week, the employees were entitled to overtime at twice the ordinary wages
as mandated by Sec. 31 of the Act.

State Bank of India ('Bank' for short), the appellant in the second batch of appeals, paid overtime
allowance at the rate as awarded by the National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) popularly
known as Desai Award. The Tribunal fixed the working hours not exceeding 6-1/2 hours a day
from Monday to Friday and not excluding 4 hours a day on Saturday. After thus fixing working
hours at 36-1/2 per week, the Tribunal proceeded to give direction about rate of overtime allowance
admissible to the employees governed by award. Modifying the rates as awarded by the Shastri
Award, the Tribunal directed that the rate of overtime allowance would be 1-1/2 times the wages
as explained in the relevant portion of the award for every quarter of an hour of overtime work
done for which payment has to be made.

9
AIR 1985 SC 1034

16
ISSUE

What is the rate of overtime allowance admissible to the employees of the two appellants working
their establishments situated in the State of Tamil Nadu?

PROVISIONS MENTIONED

Section 4. Daily and weekly hours of work- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no person
employed in any establishment shall be required or allowed to work for more than eight hours in
any day and forty-eight hours in any week:

Provided that any such person may be allowed to work in such establishment for any period in
excess of the limit fixed under this sub-section subject to payment of overtime wages, if the period
of work, including overtime work, does not exceed ten hours in any day and in the aggregate fifty-
four hours in any week."

Section 31. Wages for overtime work -Where any person employed in any establishment is
required to work overtime, he shall be entitled, in respect of such overtime work, to wages at twice
the ordinary rate of wages.

COURT’S DECISION

The SC held that where the employer prescribes working hours per day or total no. of hours of
work per week less than the max. permissible under the Act & work taken in excess of the
prescribed hours of work would be overtime work & the employer would be liable to pay some
compensation but not necessarily the statutory compensation which would be attracted only when
the employer takes work in excess of the max. hours of work prescribed by the statute. No canon
of statutory construction is more firmly established than that the statute must be read as whole.
This is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as
construction ex visceribus actus.

17
8) VICTIM A v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 10

FACTS

It is alleged that on 21.06.2021 Shubham Vishwakarma committed a sexual intercourse with the
petitioner against her will on the basis of false pretext of marriage resulting into pregnancy of
which an FIR bearing Crime No.1176/2021 for offences punishable under Section
376 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) and 3(1)(w)(i) of the Scheduled
Castes/Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was got registered at Police Station
Adhartal, Jabalpur against Shubham Vishwakaram and he was arrested. It is alleged that the MLC
of the victim was conducted and report dated 05.08.2021 was submitted finding petitioner to be
having a pregnancy of 8 weeks. It is submitted that she does not want to continue with her
unwanted pregnancy for which she has filed the present petition seeking leave of this Court to
permit her to get her pregnancy terminated as the same will be having serious consequences in
future life.

ISSUE

The present petition has been filed by the petitioner who is a rape victim, seeking direction from
this Hon'ble Court to get her pregnancy terminated.

PROVISIONS MENTIONED

Section 3- When pregnancies may be terminated by registered medical practitioners. -(1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in the IPC, a registered medical practitioner shall not be guilty
of any offence under that Code or under any other law for the time being in force, if any pregnancy
is terminated by him in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(a) where the length of the pregnancy does not exceed twelve weeks if such medical practitioner
is, or

10
W.P. No. 18940/2021

18
(i) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of
grave injury physical or mental health; or

(ii) there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or
mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.

Explanation 1.-Where any, pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by
rape, the anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the
mental health of the pregnant woman.

Explanation 2.-Where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by
any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children, the anguish
caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental
health of the pregnant woman.

COURT’S DECISION

A statute is to be read as a whole - "It was resolved that the good expositor of an Act of Parliament
should make construction on all the parts together, and not of one part only by itself. Every clause
of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the act, so as, as
far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.11

The court held that on analysis of the judgments and the narrations, one must while interpreting
the provisions of law, bear in mind that the provision as to be interpreted by reading all of its parts
together and it is not permissible to omit any part thereof. The petitioner is a rape victim and is
having a pregnancy of less then 12 weeks. In such circumstances, this Court deems it appropriate
to permit the petitioner to get her pregnancy terminated at the earliest.

11
Per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. R. 1898 Act 735 (Canada).

19
9) PANDIT RAM NARAIN v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS 12
FACTS

The appellant resides in the town of Mainpuri and carries on the business of plying a motor bus on
hire. The appellant's bus plies on alternate days between Etawah and Mainpuri, and the town of
Karhal falls on the route between Etawah and Mainpuri. It is not now disputed that passengers
travelling in the appellant's bus used to get down or get in at a bus stand within the town area of
Karhal; the appellant had a booking office situate within the Town Area and tickets were issued to
passengers and an account of the business was maintained in the said booking office. The Town
Area Committee of Karhal imposed a tax of Rs. 25 on the appellant for the year 1950-51 under the
provisions of section 14(1)(f) of the Act, being a tax on 'circumstances and property' and assessing
the income of the appellant from his business within the Town Area of Karhal at a sum of Rs. 800
for the year. The appellant preferred an appeal against the assessment of the tax under section 18
of the Act, and the grounds taken by the appellant were (1) that he did not reside within the limits
of the Town Area and (2) that he did not carry on any trade or business within that Area. By his
order dated the 20th October 1951' the Appeal Officer held that the appellant carried on his trade
or business within the limits of the Town Area and was therefore rightly assessed to tax under
section 14(1)(f). He dismissed the appeal. It may be stated here that the appellant was asked to
submit an account of his income, but no such account was submitted and the assessing officer
worked out the income of the appellant at about Rs. 67 a month, that is, about Rs. 800 a year.

ISSUE

The appeal raises the question of the validity of the assessment of a tax on the appellant for the
year 1950-51 by the Town Area Committee of Karbal under the provisions of clause (f) of sub-
section (1) of section 14 of the United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914 .

PROVISION MENTIONED

Section 14 (1) Subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government in this behalf,
the taxes which a Committee may impose are the following:

(d) A tax on trades, callings or professions not exceeding such rates as may be prescribed.

12
1956 SCR 664

20
(f) A tax on persons assessed according to their circumstances and property not exceeding such
rate and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed, Provided that such a
person is not already assessed under clauses (a) to (e) above".

COURT’S DECISION
The Supreme Court while rejecting the contention held that while interpreting a particular
enactment of a statute, it is essential to keep the whole scheme of the statute in mind, and so
interpreting it becomes clear that residence within the town area is not an essential condition for
imposition of tax on circumstances and property because circumstances means one’s status and
financial position which includes income from trade.

10) GODAWAT PAN MASALA PRODUCTS I.P. LTD. VS UNION OF INDIA

& ORS13
FACTS
The appellants manufacture gutka within the state of Maharashtra, which is stored in convenient
godowns and sold both within and outside the state of Maharashtra. By a notification dated 23rd
July, 2002 issued by the Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration and Food (Health)
Authority for the State of Maharashtra, the manufacture, sale, storage and distribution of pan
masala and gutka (pan masala containing tobacco) were banned for a period of five years with
effect from 1st August, 2002. The appellants challenged the validity of this notification by a writ
petition No. 2024 of 2002 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. By its judgment dated
18th /19th September, 2002, the division bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed the writ
petition upholding the validity of the notification. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants challenge the
said judgment by the present appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the notification by Maharashtra state government is valid in exercise of its powers
under section 7(iv) of The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954?

13
AIR 2004 SC 4057

21
PROVISION MENTIONED
Section 7 - Prohibitions of manufacture, sale, etc., of certain articles of food. - No person shall
himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale or store, sell or distribute-

(i) any adulterated food;

(ii) any misbranded food;
(iii) any article of food for the sale of which a license is prescribed, except in accordance with the
conditions of the license;

(iv) any article of food the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (Health)
Authority in the interest of public health;

(v) any article of food in contravention of any other provision of this Act or of any rule made
thereunder; or

(vi)any adulterant.

Section 23- Power of the Central Government to make rules. - (1) The Central Government may,
after consultation with the Committee and after previous publication by notification in the Official
Gazette, make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act:

(1-A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may
provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: -…

(f) prohibiting the sale of defining the conditions of sale of any substance which may be injurious
to health when used as food or restricting in any manner its use as an ingredient in the manufacture
of any article of food or regulating by the issue of licenses the manufacture or sale of any article
of food;

COURT’S DECISION

The SC laid special emphasis that “It is an accepted canon of Construction of Statutes that a statute
must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other
provisions of the same act so as to make a consistent, harmonious enactment of the whole statute.
The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the
clauses to be construed, but to the scheme of the entire statute.”

22
The court found that Section 7(iv) is not an independent source of power for the state authority.
The source of power of the state Food (Health) Authority is located only in the valid rules made
in exercise of the power under Section 24 of the Act by the State Government, to the extent
permitted thereunder, also the power of the Food (Health) Authority under the rules is only of
transitory nature and intended to deal with local emergencies and can last only for short period
while such emergency lasts; The power of banning an article of food or an article used as ingredient
of food, on the ground that it is injurious to health, belongs appropriately to the Central
Government to be exercised in accordance with the rules made under Section 23 of the Act,
particularly, sub-section (1A)(f).

The SC held that the impugned notifications are ultra vires the Act and, hence, bad in law also “we
allow the appeals and the writ petition and set aside the impugned judgments of the division
benches of the Bombay High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court and quash the notifications
impugned as bad in law, void, illegal and unenforceable against the appellants/petitioners.”

23
 CONCLUSION

Parliament is the supreme law-making body and is assigned the very important task of drafting
and implementing the law in the country. It is their duty to ensure that the statute is drafted in such
a way that there are no chances of ambiguity and laxity. But when there is some ambiguity in the
statute courts must interpret the statute in such a way as to be consistent with the intention and
purpose of the legislature in passing the Act.

Courts must not cross their limits in the name of judicial review to give very wide or narrow
interpretations of the statute. It must secure the supremacy of Parliament in making laws, and
courts must only act as supervisors of various laws passed by the Legislature. When the Statute
has any absurdity and creates injustice, then only courts should give wide interpretation to only
fulfill the purpose of passing the Statute by legislature.

The principle of interpretation i.e. statute should be read as a whole, helps the courts in fulfilling
this task by helping the judges to specify the purpose of making an act and interpreting its context
in its true sense.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFFERED: -
 Interpretation of Statutes by Prof. T. Bhattacharyya (Central Law Agency)
 Interpretation of Statutes by Prof. DP Mittal (Taxmann)
 Interpretation of Statutes by Prof. Justice GP Singh (Wadhwa & Company Nagpur)
 Interpretation of Statutes by Prof. BM Gandhi (Eastern Book Company)

WEBSITES REFERRED: -
 [Link]
 [Link]
[Link]
 [Link]
 [Link]
 [Link]
adesh

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