Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring

Dimensions, implications and government responses

 Adverse effects
of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications
and government responses

Mark Bray

International Institute for Educational Planning

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

The views and opinions expressed in this booklet are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of UNESCO or of the IIEP. The designations em-
ployed and the presentation of material throughout this review do not imply the
expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO or IIEP concerning the
legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning its
frontiers or boundaries.

The publication costs of this study have been covered through a grant-in-aid offered
by UNESCO and by voluntary contributions made by several Member States of
UNESCO, the list of which will be found at the end of the volume.

Published by:
International Institute for Educational Planning
7-9 rue Eugène Delacroix, 75116 Paris
e-mail: information@[Link]
IIEP web site: [Link]/iiep

Cover design: Corinne Hayworth

Cover photo: UNESCO/E. Barrios
Typesetting: Linéale Production
Printed in IIEP’s printshop
ISBN: 92-803-1240-5
© UNESCO 2003

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Contents

Acknowledgements 7
Presentation of the series 9
Executive summary 13
Introduction 17
Chapter 1. The nature, scale and causes of supplementary private
tutoring 19
Nature 19
Scale 22
Causes 25
Chapter 2. The impact of supplementary private tutoring 29
Impact on mainstream schooling 29
Impact on societies 33
Impact on economies 36
Chapter 3. Government responses: five case studies 39
Mauritius 39
Hong Kong 43
Singapore 49
Taiwan 53
Republic of Korea 58
Chapter 4. Lessons from comparative policy analysis 63
Chapter 5. Conclusion 69
References 75

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]
 Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank people who have assisted in the preparation of
this monograph. First are Jacques Hallak and Muriel Poisson at the
International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). They commissioned
the monograph and encouraged its development, and gave very helpful
guidance at all stages. Second are various people who assisted with factual
input and with other comments on drafts. A full list would be too long, but
specifically deserving mention are Emily Mang, Jason Tan, Yoko Yamato and
Pilnam Yi.

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]
 Presentation of the series

Several studies conducted during the last decade have clearly emphasized
the negative impact of corruption on the economic, social and political
development of countries, due to the fact that they increase transaction costs,
reduce the efficiency of public services, distort the decision-making process,
and undermine social values. They have also showed a strong correlation
between corruption and poverty: statistical regressions suggest that an increase
of the per capita income of a country by US$4,400 will improve its ranking on
the index of corruption (international scale) by two points. Moreover, it has
been observed that corruption tends to contribute to the reinforcement of
inequities, by placing a disproportionate economic burden on the poor, and
limiting their access to public services.

As a consequence, fighting corruption has become a major concern for

policy-makers and actors involved in development. In view of the decrease in
international flows of aid and the more stringent conditions for the provision
of aid – due to growing tensions on public resources within donor countries
and the pressure exerted by tax payers on governments to increase transparency
and accountability in resource management – it is regarded today as a major
priority in the agenda of countries and of international agencies of development
co-operation. The Drafting Committee of the World Education Forum has
expressed concern in the following terms: ‘Corruption is a major drain on the
effective use of resources for education and should be drastically curbed.’1

1. UNESCO, 2000. Dakar framework for action. education for all: meeting our collective
commitments. Adopted by the World Education Forum, Dakar, Senegal, 26-28 April
2000. Extended commentary on the Dakar Action Plan (§ 46).

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

A rapid review of the literature shows that a number of attempts have

already been made to tackle the issue of corruption both globally and sectorally.
In the social sector, for example, several studies have been conducted on
corruption in the provision of health-care services. However, it appears that
the education sector has not been given proper attention by national education
authorities and donors, despite the many grounds for attaching a particular
priority to the challenge of combating corruption in education:

• No public sector reform aiming at improving governance and limiting

corruption phenomena can obtain significant results as long as the case
of education has not been properly addressed – given the importance of
the education sector, which in most countries, is the first or second
largest public sector both in human and financial terms.
• Any attempts to improve the functioning of the education sector in order
to increase access to quality education for all, cannot prove successful
if problems of corruption – which have severe implications for both
efficiency in the use of resources and for quality of education and school
performance – are not being properly dealt with.
• Lack of integrity and unethical behaviour within the education sector is
inconsistent with one of the main purposes of education; that is, to produce
‘good citizens’, respectful of the law, of human rights and fairness (it is
also incompatible with any strategy that considers education as one of
the principle means of fighting corruption).

In this context, IIEP launched a new research project within the

framework of its Medium-Term Plan for 2002–2007 that deals with ethics
and corruption in education. Corruption is defined as ‘the systematic use of
public office for private benefit that results in a reduction in the quality or
availability of public goods and services’. The main objective of this project
is to improve decision-making and the management of educational systems
by integrating governance and corruption concerns in methodologies of
planning and administration of education. More specifically, it seeks to develop

10

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Presentation of the series

methodological approaches for studying and addressing the issue of corruption

in education, and collect and share information on the best approaches for
promoting transparency, accountability and integrity in the management of
educational systems, both in developing and industrialized countries.

The project includes works on topics of relevance (such as teacher

behaviour, school financing, textbook production and distribution, or academic
fraud). It also includes monographs on success stories in improving
management and governance, as well as case studies that facilitate the
development of methodologies for analysing transparency and integrity in
education management.2

Within this framework, IIEP asked Mark Bray to write a study that
examines the adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring on mainstream
education – as well as on the general use of resources (either public or private)
allocated to education. He has successfully analysed the various approaches
developed by a few Asian countries to address these effects. On this basis, he
has drawn a number of conclusions for decision-makers, educational planners
and administrators, which are relevant to different contexts.

IIEP is very grateful to Mark Bray for his valuable insight and
contribution, and would like to thank him accordingly.

Jacques Hallak and Muriel Poisson

2. An information platform, called ETICO, has also been created within the framework of
the project. It is available on IIEP’s web site, at the following address: http://
[Link]/iiep/eng/focus/etico/[Link]

11

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 This study was prepared by Mark Bray, Dean of the Faculty of Education
and a member of the Comparative Education Research Centre at the
University of Hong Kong under the supervision of Muriel Poisson, Programme
Specialist at the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) and
Jacques Hallak, international consultant.

12

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Executive summary

Private supplementary tutoring is defined here as tutoring in academic subjects

(such as languages and mathematics), and is provided by the tutors for financial
gain, and is additional to the provision by mainstream schooling. It does not
include extra-curricular subjects such as soccer and ballet, and it does not
include extra lessons given by teachers or family members on a voluntary
basis.

Private supplementary tutoring has long been a major phenomenon in

some parts of East Asia, particularly Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan.
In recent decades it has grown significantly in both industrialized and less
developed societies. In countries as diverse as Egypt, India, Malta and
Romania, over one-third of pupils regularly receive private supplementary
tutoring; and in some societies the proportion is considerably higher. Indeed
in a few countries tutoring has become an almost universally pervasive
phenomenon.

While private supplementary tutoring may have positive consequences,

e.g. in improving students’ learning, providing constructive activities for pupils
during out-of-school hours, and providing incomes and employment for tutors,
it can also have negative consequences. The problematic side includes distortion
of the mainstream curricula, pressure on young pupils, exacerbation of social
inequalities, and manipulation of clients by tutors. Manipulation is especially
common, and especially problematic, in situations where mainstream teachers
provide paid supplementary tutoring for their own mainstream pupils after
school hours. In the worst cases, a form of blackmail arises in which the
teachers teach only half the curriculum during the school day and then require
their pupils to pay for the other half during private lessons.

13

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

This monograph begins by considering the nature, scale and causes of

private supplementary tutoring. It notes that private tutoring may be undertaken
on a one-to-one basis in the homes of the tutors or the tutees. Alternatively,
tutoring may be in groups, large classes or even huge lecture theatres. Tutoring
may also be provided by mail, telephone or over the Internet. The scale of
tutoring varies in different grades, and demand in some subjects is greater
than in others.

The monograph then turns to the impact of private tutoring. Separate

sections focus on the impact of tutoring on mainstream lessons, on societies,
and on economies. This section again notes that tutoring can have beneficial
outcomes, but observes many problematic features.

The study then analyzes government responses. It does this partly through
broad references to the literature from all parts of the world, and partly through
case studies of Mauritius, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and the Republic
of Korea. Each of the societies on which the case studies focus is different,
and the nature of government responses has varied. The Government of the
Republic of Korea at one time tried to prohibit tutoring, but then found that
this measure was ineffective and unworkable. The Taiwan Government has
been more laissez-faire, but does have regulations and also expects the tutorial
establishments to regulate themselves. The Hong Kong Government has played
an increasingly interventionist role, but the level of intervention may not be
sustainable in the long run. In all of these societies, and also in Singapore,
mainstream teachers are prohibited from receiving payment for tutoring their
own pupils. In Mauritius, however, that practice is long established and difficult
to eradicate. Government intervention in Mauritius has therefore to take a
different approach.

The next section of the monograph elaborates on these comparisons

and presents additional materials from different parts of the world. In each
culture, the monograph stresses, government responses must be different in
order to fit the different circumstances.

14

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Executive summary

Nevertheless, various common themes can be identified from the

comparative analysis. At the basic level, the four main policy responses for
governments are to:

• Ignore the phenomenon (perhaps because the governments feel

unwilling or unable to do anything about it).
• Prohibit private tutoring (though the prospects of doing this successfully
on a sustained basis are not strong)
• Recognize and regulate tutoring (in which case the question is how).
• Actively encourage tutoring (though this response is relatively
uncommon).

The monograph comments on the implications of each of these strategies

and, for policy-makers who decide to recognize and regulate tutoring,
elaborates on ways in which this can be achieved.

The final section recognizes that control of tutoring itself has costs, and
that these costs must be set against the benefits anticipated from the regulatory
efforts. Governments of some societies may decide that the costs of regulation
exceed the benefits; but others are increasingly recognizing that private
supplementary tutoring deserves much closer attention than it has hitherto
received.

15

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]
 Introduction

This monograph has been prepared as a contribution to the IIEP project on

ethics and corruption in education. The initiators of this project noted that the
structures and contents of education systems in several parts of the world
were being distorted by tensions between the motives of the various
participants (Hallak and Poisson, 2002). The project presents examples of
responses by education authorities that have endeavoured to tackle what
they perceive to be corrupting influences.

This starting-point raises some questions about values. Ethical judgements

are to some extent personal decisions based on personal perspectives. What
one individual may describe as the corruption of an education system, another
may consider it to be an entirely appropriate pattern. Changes in education
systems create winners as well as losers, and perspectives are usually shaped
by the ways in which those changes affect the persons and groups making
the judgements. The title of this monograph refers to adverse effects of
supplementary private tutoring. What one person describes as adverse, another
person might consider quite acceptable.

Nevertheless, wide agreement exists that some effects of supplementary

private tutoring are adverse. These effects will be examined in this monograph.
In some countries, supplementary private tutoring has become a major industry
that consumes considerable amounts of parents’ money and pupils’ time; and
although in other countries tutoring is modest in scale, it appears to be growing.
Tutoring has a backwash effect on mainstream schooling, and can contribute
to social tensions. At least from some perspectives, therefore, supplementary
private tutoring may be described in negative terms.

This monograph commences by sketching the nature, scale and causes

of supplementary private tutoring in different parts of the world. It then

17

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

highlights aspects of the impact of such tutoring, addressing in turn the

educational, social and economic dimensions. With this background, the
monograph considers possible responses by governments. Some governments
choose to ignore the phenomenon, arguing that it is beyond their sphere of
responsibility and perhaps also beyond their sphere of control. Other
governments respond more actively with regulations and follow-up measures.
The monograph presents examples from a range of settings, giving particular
attention to regulations in Mauritius, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and the
Republic of Korea. It comments on the goals and impact of these responses,
and identifies the major lessons to be learned.

18

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Chapter 1
The nature, scale and causes
of supplementary private tutoring

Nature
At the outset, some definitions are needed. Private supplementary
tutoring, as defined here, covers tutoring in academic subjects; this is provided
by tutors for financial gain, and is additional to the provision of mainstream
schooling. This definition may be elaborated as follows:

• Academic subjects. This monograph is only concerned with academic

subjects (e.g. languages and mathematics) taught in mainstream schools.
The focus does not include extra-curricular subjects (e.g. soccer and
ballet). It also excludes religious studies (e.g. Sunday School) where
they are not part of school mainstream curricula. These additional forms
of learning are certainly important, but deserve to be focused separately
from the coverage of this monograph.
• Financial gain. This monograph is only concerned with tutoring provided
by tutors (and companies that employ tutors) for financial gain. It is not
concerned with extra lessons that are given by mainstream teachers to
needy pupils, on a voluntary basis, outside school hours. Nor is it
concerned with the voluntary help given by family members to other
family members. Again, such forms of voluntary tutoring are certainly
important, but they raise other issues different from those covered by
this monograph.
• As an addition to the provision of mainstream schooling. The tutoring
covered in this monograph is provided outside school hours, mostly in
the evenings, at week-ends, and during vacations. Most of the tutoring

19

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

is also provided in separate premises, outside the school compounds.

However, some schools permit their classrooms to be used for private
tutoring. This arrangement is included here if the tutoring is received on
a fee-paying basis, and is considered additional to the mainstream work
of the schools.
Also to be noted at the outset are some variations in terminology. In
some English-speaking societies, people refer more commonly to private tuition
than to private tutoring. Entrepreneurs who create formal establishments for
tutoring commonly call them centres, academies or institutes, and sometimes
describe their work as coaching. In Japan, tutoring centres that supplement
the school system are known as juku. These are distinguished from yobiko,
which mainly serve pupils who have left school but who want extra time to
study for examinations, in order to gain higher grades for entrance to university.
A parallel phenomenon exists in the United Kingdom, where such institutions
are called ‘crammers’. Yobiko and ‘crammers’ are mainly outside the scope
of this study since they primarily serve pupils who have left school.
The monograph is mainly concerned with subjects learned in primary
and secondary school. Supplementary tutoring certainly exists at pre-primary
and post-secondary levels. However, it is less vigorous at these levels, and the
mechanics and issues that arise are quite different.
Supplementary private tutoring may be received through many channels.
Some tutoring is provided on a one-to-one basis in the home of either the tutor
or the tutee. Other tutoring is in small groups, in large classes, or even in huge
lecture theatres with overflow rooms in which students watch on a screen
what is happening in the main theatre. Tutoring can also be received by
telephone, by mail and over the Internet. In some countries, supplementary
tutoring is provided by the same teachers that are responsible for the students
in the mainstream classes. In other countries this practice is prohibited on the
grounds that it can breed a form of corruption, with mainstream teachers
deliberately failing students in order to increase the demand for private classes.

20

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The nature, scale and causes of supplementary private tutoring

Focusing on tutorial institutes that operate independently from mainstream

schools, Zeng (1999) compared patterns in Japan, the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan. He observed (p.153) that some of these institutes combined features
of education with features of industry, being governed by assorted principles
relating to cognitive processes, assessment, competition, cost-benefit, and
cost-efficiency. Some tutorial schools are small, and some are old-fashioned;
but others are large, and some are ultramodern. He highlighted one large
juku company with many branches, the shares of which are quoted on the
stock exchange. The Republic of Korea has tutoring companies that are
comparable to those in Japan. These companies, known as hakwon,
commonly have their own multi-storey educational buildings. Large advertising
posters are displayed in the subways, trains and buses, and give potential
customers convenient sketch maps of their branch campuses (Zeng, 1999:
158). In Taiwan, by contrast, large operators are less prominent. In 1995,
11.9 per cent of tutorial centres had twenty-five pupils or less, and 59.2 per
cent had enrolments of 200 or less (Taiwan, 1996: 27). The features in Taiwan
may partly reflect government regulations, but also reflect broader patterns
of economic structure and production that emphasize small enterprises rather
than multi-branch chains.

Box 1. A shadow education system

Supplementary private tutoring may be described as a shadow education
system (see Bray, 1999a). This metaphor fits in several respects. First, private
supplementary tutoring only exists because the mainstream education system
exists. Second, as the shape and size of the mainstream system change, so do
the size and shape of supplementary tutoring. Third, in almost all societies
much more public attention focuses on the mainstream than on its shadow.
Shadows can of course be useful. Just as the shadow cast by a sun-dial
can tell the observer about the passage of time, so the shadow of an education
system can tell the observer about changes in societies. However, in some
countries, parents, educators and politicians are highly critical of the ways in
which private tutoring affects mainstream schooling. Unlike most shadows,
private tutoring is not just a passive entity but may negatively affect even the
body that it imitates.

21

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Not all pupils, even within particular locations, receive tutoring for the
same duration each day or week. Malaysian research reported by Chew and
Leong (1995: 14) indicated that 69.5 per cent of students sampled who were
receiving tutoring did so throughout the year, while the others only received
tutoring prior to important examinations. This was a sample of 4,340 primary
and secondary school students. Over half the students received tutoring in
only one or two subjects, but nearly 20 per cent received tutoring in five or
more subjects.

The intensity of private tutoring may also vary because of other factors.
As one might expect, children in higher socio-economic groups generally
receive more supplementary tutoring than do children in lower socio-economic
groups (Stevenson and Baker, 1992; Foondun, 2002; Montgomery et al., 2000;
Yi, 2002).

Scale
Partly because most supplementary tutoring is unofficial and
unwelcoming of attention, data on the topic are scarce. However, a picture
can be drawn from scattered studies in a range of settings. They include the
following:

• Cambodia: Respondents in 31.2 per cent of 77 primary schools surveyed

in 1997/98 indicated that pupils received tutoring; this consumed 6.6 per
cent of the total cost of primary education (Bray, 1999b: 57, 127).
• Egypt: A 1994 survey of 4,729 households found that 64 per cent of
urban and 52 per cent of rural primary children received supplementary
tutoring (Fergany, 1994: 75). A 1997 study estimated that household
expenditures on supplementary tutoring in preparatory, primary and
secondary levels accounted for 1.6 per cent of Gross Domestic Product
(World Bank, 2002, fig. 15).

22

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The nature, scale and causes of supplementary private tutoring

• Hong Kong: A 1996 survey of 507 students found that 44.7 per cent of
primary, 25.6 per cent of lower secondary, 34.4 per cent of middle
secondary, and 40.5 per cent of upper secondary students were receiving
tutoring (Lee, 1996: 14). A 1998/99 follow-up survey of six secondary
schools, stratified by ability bands, found 35.1 per cent of secondary
Grade 1-3 pupils receiving tutoring. Respective proportions for secondary
4-5 and 6-7 were 46.6 and 70.3 per cent (Bray and Kwok, 2003).
• India: A 1997 survey of 7,879 primary school pupils in Delhi found that
39.2 per cent were receiving tutoring (Aggarwal, 1998: 65). Other reports
have suggested that 70 per cent of urban children receive private tutoring
in one or more subjects (Yasmeen, 1999: 22).
• Japan: A 1993 survey found that 23.6 per cent of elementary pupils and
59.5 per cent of junior high school pupils attended tutorial schools (Japan,
1995: 6). A 1997 survey of pupils receiving other forms of tutoring
found that among primary Grade 5 children, 33 per cent attended tutorial
schools, 5.7 per cent received help from tutors on a one-to-one basis,
24.5 per cent studied on correspondence courses, and 17.9 per cent
received home-delivery study materials (Japan, 1999: 68). In urban areas,
over 90 per cent of children were receiving some sort of tutoring.
• Kenya: A 1997 national sample of 3,233 Standard 6 pupils found that
68.6 per cent received tutoring, ranging from 39 per cent in North Eastern
Province to 74.4 per cent in Nyanza Province (Nzomo et al., 2001: 28).
• Malta: A 1997/98 survey of 1,482 pupils in upper primary and lower
secondary schools found that 50.5 per cent had received private tutoring
at some time (Fenech and Spiteri, 1999: 26). Some had first received
tutoring at the age of 4, though the largest number had commenced at
the age of 10.
• Republic of Korea: A 1997 study indicated that 72.9 per cent of primary
students were receiving private tutoring (I. Kim, 2000: 2). Among middle-
school students the proportion was 56 per cent; among high school
students it was 32 per cent.

23

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

• Romania: A 1994 study of Grade 12 pupils in a national sample found

that 32 per cent in rural and 58 per cent in urban areas received
supplementary private tutoring (UNESCO, 2000: section 4.3).
• Taiwan: Government statistics indicate that in 1998 1,891,096 students
were enrolled in 5,536 tutoring centres (Taiwan, 1999: 136). Other centres
were unregistered, therefore total numbers were even larger. A 1998
survey of 359 students in eight Kaohsiung secondary schools found that
81.2 per cent were receiving tutoring (Tseng, 1998: 86).

These examples give prominence to Asian societies, as the phenomenon

has been particularly strong there for a long time. However, tutoring is growing
in other parts of the world, including Africa, North America and Europe.
Russell (2002), writing about the United Kingdom, titled her article ‘The
secret lessons’, and remarked (p.10) that ‘almost unnoticed, a revolution has
taken place in state education’. She added: ‘In London and other big cities,
private tutoring is booming. It has become one of the most important, yet also
unacknowledged, factors in a child’s performance.’

Mischo and Haag (2002: 264) highlighted expansion of tutoring in

Germany, and Wolf (2002: 335) presented data from national samples in a
number of countries on the percentages of pupils in Grade 7 who reported
receiving tutoring in science. The proportions exceeded 50 per cent in the
Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia. In mathematics, the proportion of Grade
7 pupils receiving tutoring exceeded 50 per cent in the Czech Republic, Hong
Kong, Japan, Latvia, the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Slovenia (Wolf,
2002: 235; Baker et al., 2001: 7).

24

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The nature, scale and causes of supplementary private tutoring

Causes
Private supplementary tutoring is a complex phenomenon with many
causes. Among these causes, cultural factors are particularly important. Other
causes include economic and educational forces.

Among the cultural factors is the perceived role of effort in educational

success. Many Asian cultures, particularly those influenced by Confucian
traditions, place strong emphasis on effort (Rohlen and LeTendre, 1996: 374;
Salili, 1999: 92). In contrast, European and North American cultures are
more likely to emphasize ability. Supplementary tutoring is especially likely
to be widespread in cultures that stress effort.

Related to this is the extent to which individual schools (and, more

broadly, society) are competitive. The 1990s brought a sharp change in the
United Kingdom, for example. The publication of league tables showing school
performance in public examinations was both a symptom and a cause of a
greater competition; this in turn can be associated with the growth of private
tutoring. Similar trends have become evident in Australia.

Competition between schools and between sectors of society is partly

shaped by economic structures that, in turn, influence the economic rewards
from private tutoring. With reference to Singapore, Kwan-Terry (1991: 71)
highlighted research that showed that the average earnings of males with no
schooling were S$583 per month, rising to S$665 for males with primary
education, S$861 for ones with secondary education, S$1,260 for those with
post-secondary education, and reaching S$3,000 for males with tertiary
education. Since the gateway to each level was guarded by examinations, the
rewards for success and the penalties for failure in those examinations were
substantial. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) have summarized other
studies of rates of return that in general show that individuals would be well
advised to stay in education systems as long as they can. If supplementary

25

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

tutoring helps people to stay in education systems longer, then for those people
it may be a very good investment. However, in some societies the differentials
in living standards between individuals with different amounts of education
are greater than in others. Differentials have long been particularly great in
such societies as Singapore and Hong Kong, but less marked in such countries
as the United Kingdom and Australia. This implies that rewards from extra
levels of schooling, and from supplementary tutoring, are greater in these
Asian societies than in the Western European or Australasian ones.

The nature of education systems is also important. Private tutoring seems

to be more evident in systems in which success in examinations can easily be
promoted by investment in private supplementary tutoring; and private
supplementary tutoring becomes more necessary in systems that are teacher-
centred rather than child-centred, and/or are intolerant of slow learners.

In Georgia, a further variant arises from the gate-keeping functions of

university examinations (MacWilliams, 2002). Teachers in the most prestigious
universities are able to command high prices for tutoring because they know,
or are presumed to know, at least the rough content of the entrance examinations
set by their own institutions. Education systems in other countries are less
dependent on the examinations set by individual institutions, and thus are less
dependent on tutoring by individuals who specialize in particular examinations
for particular institutions.

Private tutoring is more common in urban than in rural areas. The

Cambodian study mentioned above referred to private supplementary tutoring
given in pupils’ regular public primary schools. Among the urban schools in
the sample, 60.6 per cent reported that their children received private
supplementary tutoring, whereas the proportion among rural schools was just
9.1 per cent (Bray, 1999b: 57). Urban bias has also been reported elsewhere.
With regard to Malaysia, research reported by Chew and Leong (1995)
recorded 59 per cent of students in urban schools receiving tutoring compared

26

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The nature, scale and causes of supplementary private tutoring

with 28.5 per cent in rural schools. Chew and Leong (1995: 21) observed
that:

“The higher demand for tuition on the part of students in urban areas
may be due to a number of reasons. For one, there is normally a higher
level of competitiveness among urban students that is related to the
very competitive nature of urban life. Secondly, parents in urban society
usually possess higher educational attainment than their rural
counterparts and, by logical extension, have higher achievement
expectation regarding their children’s education ... Also, urban parents
are better off in socio-economic terms to afford tuition for their children,
given that the fees incurred are fairly substantial”.

Finally, the economic circumstances of mainstream teachers may be an

important factor. In some countries, teachers are paid so poorly that they and
their families would be unable to subsist if they had to depend on official
salaries. Teachers, therefore, have to secure additional incomes, with tutoring
becoming a major form of income. This is a major factor behind the rise of
tutoring in Bangladesh and Kenya, for example. Some teachers abuse their
positions by teaching only half the syllabus during official hours and then
declaring that if the students want to receive teaching in the second half, then
they must come to the after-school tutoring classes (Foondun, 2002; Shafiq,
2002). These teachers are able to exert pressure not only because the students
face external competition, but also because the teachers control which pupils
are or are not promoted to higher grades at the end of each academic year.
Parents know that if they do not pay for the tutoring, they may end up paying
more in other ways because their children would probably have to repeat
each academic year.

27

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Box 2. Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

Focusing on the nature and causes of corruption, Klitgaard (1988: 75)
reduced the core elements to a formula:
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
He suggested that illicit behaviour flourishes when agents have monopoly
power over clients, when agents can exercise their discretion, and when the
accountability of agents is weak.
Biswal (1999a: 223) has shown how this concept exposes the parallels
between private tutoring and other forms of corruption, particularly where
mainstream teachers provide private tutoring for their own pupils. These
teachers, Biswal points out, “are the monopoly suppliers of their services to the
students, they have the full discretion in what they supply, and they are hardly
held accountable for their actions. This gives rise to a situation where the
teachers try to extract students’ consumer surplus by shirking at school and
supplying tutoring outside for a fee”.

28

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Chapter 2
The impact of supplementary private tutoring

Supplementary private tutoring may have far-reaching implications. This

section of the monograph comments in turn on its educational, social and
economic impact.

Impact on mainstream schooling

Supplementary tutoring may significantly affect the dynamics of teaching
and learning in mainstream classes. For example, where all students receive
tutoring provided by outside agencies, mainstream teachers may not need to
work so hard. Where some students receive supplementary tutoring but others
do not, mainstream teachers may face greater disparities within their
classrooms than would otherwise be the case. Some teachers may respond to
these disparities by assisting the slower learners; but others may take the
students who receive tutoring as the norm, and permit the gap between students’
learning to increase. In the latter case, all parents are placed under pressure to
invest in private tutoring for their children.

When supplementary tutoring helps students to understand and enjoy

their mainstream lessons, it may be considered beneficial. De Silva (1994: 5)
has observed that supplementary tutoring can enable remedial teaching to be
undertaken according to individual needs:

“Sometimes large gaps in students’ learning are created due to a number

of factors such as student and teacher absence, frequent closure of
school, ineffective teaching and negligence on the part of the teacher. It
is not every school that can boast a full complement of specialist teachers
in crucial areas like mathematics, science and English. Immature,

29

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

inexperienced or unqualified teachers handling these subjects may not

be able to lead the students to a proper understanding of the sections
taught. Effective private tuition may help overcome these gaps or
deficiencies in students’ learning and build their confidence enabling
them to compete with others and experience a happy and pleasant life.”
Supplementary tutoring may also help relatively strong students to get
more out of their mainstream classes. Yiu (1996: 78) reported that Hong
Kong teachers in his study of upper secondary classes were positive about
supplementary tutoring. Among the comments were:
• Since the school used English as the medium of instruction, students
benefited from hearing the content again in Chinese in the tutoring
institute.
• School teachers could cover the main ground, while tutors would help
consolidate.
• Tutors provided extra questions for students because the schoolteachers
were too busy.
• Yiu added (1996: 66) that some teachers gained ideas from the tutors.
One teacher explicitly requested his students to bring materials from the
tutorial institute to school, so that the teacher could use them to improve
his own teaching.

Sometimes, however, tutoring is reported to have a negative effect on

mainstream classes. Writing about India, Yasmeen (1999: 23) has highlighted
the ‘culture of dependency’:

“Most students tend to rely on private tutors for everything including

homework and exam tips. As a result classroom attention tends to dwindle
creating discipline problems for schoolteachers. Supplementary or top-
up teaching is becoming more important than the synergistic classroom
experience.”

30

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The impact of supplementary private tutoring

These remarks echoed those of Hussein (1987: 92), who wrote about
Kuwait and stated that:

“Tutoring has caused a great lack of interest on the part of students.

They have reached the point of thinking that as long as they can pay
someone who will show them how to pass their examinations, they do
not need to attend school classes except when they are required to do
so by school regulations.”

Hussein (1987: 92) reported that in some schools the number of

absentees had risen:

“In particular two months before the school year finally ends [the students]
stay at their homes in the morning and attend tutorial institutes in the
afternoons. This cripples the school system. A second group of pupils
comes to school just to avoid being questioned by the school
administration but shows no interest when there. These two groups affect
the third group, which is small, of those students who attend intending
to learn. This group cannot find a suitable atmosphere to learn because
of the behavior of the class as a whole and also the fact that the teacher
is disturbed by the abnormality of the situation.”

The Japanese data provided by Sawada and Kobayashi (1986: 9) are

also instructive. Many teachers, especially in the lower secondary schools,
reported that pupils who attended juku were good at computational skills.
However, they said that the pupils worked mechanically and without
understanding underlying meanings. Of the secondary Form 1 teachers, 45 per
cent added that the pupils attending juku did not take the mainstream
mathematics classes seriously; between 27 per cent (secondary Form 1) and
50 per cent (primary Grade 5) of teachers indicated that pupils who attended
juku refused to participate in after-school activities.

31

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

For many participants, supplementary tutoring also leads to fatigue. Most

obviously affected are the pupils who go straight from mainstream school to
supplementary class; but also affected are the tutors, especially when they
are also mainstream teachers. With reference to Sri Lanka, de Silva (1994: 5)
has lamented the ‘continuous teaching-learning process going on from morning
until evening on weekdays and during week-ends and school holidays [which]
denies both teachers and students sufficient rest and recreation’. Not only
does this produce fatigue in both teachers and pupils, he states, it makes them
‘relax’ when at school, thereby reducing the productivity of that part of each
day. Similar remarks have been made in Malta by Fenech and Spiteri (1999: 5),
and would be echoed in many other contexts.

The vested interests of private tutors may also be a factor obstructing

reform of education systems. Popa (2003) reports that in Romania, efforts to
make the education system less dependent on examinations were resisted by
the private tutors, including the full-time teachers who undertook
supplementary tutoring. The tutors perceived the examinations as an essential
ingredient to the demand for their services, and were therefore very resistant
to change. Similar remarks have been made about Egypt (Fawzey, 1994;
Hargreaves, 1997). Along the same lines, Kwok (2001: 174) indicated with
reference to Hong Kong that the marketing styles and pedagogic characteristics
of private tutors reinforced examination pressures and encouraged students
to value open examinations in their life careers. Similar patterns have been
evident in the Russian Federation, Taiwan and other countries.

Finally, the curriculum emphasized by tutorial institutions, especially

those of the cramming type, may be contrasted with that in mainstream schools.
In public education systems in particular, schools are expected to achieve a
wide range of goals. The goals may include the development of sporting and
musical, as well as academic interests, and include the promotion of courtesy,
civic awareness and national pride. Mainstream schools may also be required
to keep all students of one grade together, in order to reduce labelling of low

32

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The impact of supplementary private tutoring

achievers. Examination-oriented tutorial institutes, by contrast, cut what they

perceive to be irrelevant content in order to focus on passing examinations,
and may have much less hesitation about grouping students by ability. Many
analysts view this phenomenon negatively, arguing that the tutorial institutes
distort the overall curriculum that has been designed with careful balance by
specialists in that task. Pupils who are faced simultaneously by the two very
different approaches may be confused by the experience. In Taiwan, for
example, government efforts to introduce constructive approaches that enhance
the understanding of mathematics have been undermined by the fact that many
tutors teach students how to secure correct answers through mechanical
implementation of formulae.

Impact on societies
It is obvious that children who attend both mainstream and supplementary
classes are placed under considerable pressure. In Mauritius, one Minister of
Education (quoted by Foondun, 1992: 26) has queried the appropriateness of
social forces which lead children to spend an average of nine hours a day in
private tutoring and regular schooling when adults in that country have
achieved a seven-hour standard day. In effect, he pointed out, children are
made to work for longer hours than their parents.
More positively, it may be argued, pressure may also bring out the best
in students and stretch them to maximize their potential. For example, East
Asian societies influenced by Confucian traditions tend to place great value
on discipline and dedication, and some families see the pressure applied by
supplementary tutoring as generally beneficial. To some extent, therefore, the
degree of pressure that is considered appropriate is determined by social and
cultural norms. Some educators would add that where supplementary tutoring
helps pupils to keep up with their peers, it may protect their self-esteem.
These commentators would therefore assert that although pressure may come
from one side, it may alleviate pressure on a different side.

33

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Much may also depend on the level and type of tutoring. Ukai Russell’s
(1996) analysis of the Kumon approach to teaching mathematics in Japan
(which goes from pre-school to college levels but is most popular in the lower
primary grades), found that most children considered it unthreatening. Ukai
Russell (1996: 259) quoted research that indicated that nearly 40 per cent of
the families who enrolled their children in Kumon classes did so because the
children liked the experience. However, many analysts concerned with other
contexts, including higher levels of education and other forms of tutoring,
consider that the negative aspects outweigh the positive.
Also of considerable importance is the impact of supplementary tutoring
on social inequalities. Like other forms of private education, supplementary
tutoring is more easily available to the rich than to the poor. As such, private
supplementary tutoring seems to be a mechanism that maintains and perhaps
increases social inequalities. In 1998, expenditure on private tutoring by the
richest 10 per cent in a sample of urban households in the Republic of Korea
was twelve times the amount spent by the poorest 10 per cent of households
(Yi, 2002: 14). Where patterns become extreme, they could pose a threat to
overall social stability.
However, the picture is not completely straightforward. Rich families
also have other ways to maintain social superiority, and may use these ways
as well as, or instead of, supplementary tutoring, particularly if decision-
makers in these families perceive supplementary tutoring to involve excessive
mechanical drilling. Moreover, middle-income and even poor families may
choose to invest in supplementary tutoring in order to gain social mobility
through the examination system. Kwan-Terry (1991: 88) indicated that, in
Singapore, the highest demand for tutoring in English was from families that
did not speak English at home and where the father had an education below
university level but had middle-income earnings.

Much also depends on the type of tutoring. While mass tutoring in Japan
and Hong Kong may be relatively inexpensive, it may also be limited in the

34

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The impact of supplementary private tutoring

extent to which it achieves gains in learning. Richer families can more easily
afford one-to-one and small-group tutoring which is more closely tailored to
individual needs, and which may take place in the children’s homes, while
poorer families must tolerate mass-produced forms of tutoring for which the
children may have to travel substantial distances.

Box 3. Drawn like moth to flame

In Sri Lanka, supplementary private tutoring has long been a pervasive
part of many students’ everyday experiences. Wijetunge (1994: 15-17) has
observed that:
Extra-school instruction or ‘private tuition’ has become an inescapable
part of childhood in Sri Lanka. Children of all ages, toddler through adolescent,
are caught up in a vice and drawn to private tuition like moth to flame ... The
expertise and specializations offered by the second system are unmatched;
some [advanced level] students feel compelled to seek out the ‘experts’ for
various sections or topics within a single subject, to the extent that four or
more tutors per subject no longer raises eyebrows ...
Parental obsession with the scholarship examination, the inordinately high
levels of achievement required to make the grade, and in particular to secure a
place in the coveted school, invariably results in the young child being initiated
to tuition at a very young age. Immediately after school the child is rushed to
tuition class after a hasty snack. At tuition, his skills and abilities are relentlessly
pitted against those of his age mates, for competition is the name of the game
and the prowess of the tutor rests on the results he produces. The age appropriate
developmental tasks such as building wholesome attitudes towards oneself,
learning to get along with peers, developing conscience, morality and a scale of
values stand a very poor chance in this climate of cruel competition ...
The denial of childhood and the mutilation visible everywhere – mutilation
of spontaneity, of joy in learning or pleasure in creating or sense of self –
certainly cannot be blamed on private tuition alone ... [Nevertheless, the] malaise
is systematic and pervasive. The remedies have to be sought at the level of root
causes, for as long as the root causes remain, their appendages like the private
tuition system will continue to flourish.

35

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Impact on economies
In general, individuals with higher levels of formal education attract
higher lifetime earnings than individuals with lower levels of education.
Advocates of human capital theory (e.g. OECD, 1999; Tilak, 2001) explain
this by stating that the higher earnings reflect and appropriately reward the
skills and attitudes acquired by the individuals during the educational process.
An alternative view (Groot and Hartog, 1995) is that education acts as a
screening mechanism through which only the individuals with inherent talents
and appropriate attitudes are able to move beyond the various barriers.

To those who accept either of these hypotheses, supplementary tutoring

may be considered in the same light as mainstream schooling. Advocates of
human capital theory might consider supplementary tutoring to be even more
tightly related to economic enhancement because it is closely tied to the
demands of the market place and because enhanced economic return is one of
the chief reasons why pupils and their parents invest in it. Advocates of the
screening hypothesis would approach the issue from a different standpoint
but reach a similar conclusion about the ways in which pupils who have
received greater amounts of tutoring are allocated to more highly remunerated
economic positions.

However, an alternative approach is less positive about supplementary

tutoring. Critics argue that most parts of the sector are parasitic, that they
waste financial and human resources that could be better allocated to other
uses, and that in systems which are dominated by traditional examinations,
tutoring and associated cramming contribute to a stifling of creativity which
can damage the bases of economic production.

These views cannot easily be reconciled. They reflect wider debates on

the nature and impact of mainstream education that rest as much on ideological
principles as on empirical research. The broad literature on the links between

36

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 The impact of supplementary private tutoring

education and development contains many unanswered questions and

ambiguous findings (Adams, 2002; Bray, 2002). No clear formulae can link
certain types and amounts of education to certain types and amounts of
economic development – an observation that applies as much to supplementary
tutoring as to mainstream schooling.

In these circumstances, planners and policy-makers would be unwise to

adopt a rigid stance. Nevertheless, few people would argue that private
supplementary tutoring produces such a strong and unambiguous economic
impact that the phenomenon should encouraged in all its manifestations.

37

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]
 Chapter 3
Government responses: five case studies

The responses by governments to the patterns described above may be diverse.

Much depends on economic, social and cultural contexts, as well as on political
factors. This section presents case studies on Mauritius, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. In a subsequent section,
patterns in these societies will be compared not only with each other but also
with patterns in other societies.

Mauritius
The scale and effects of supplementary private tutoring have been
considered a problem in Mauritius for over a century. Foondun (2002: 488)
cited a 1901 statement by the head of what was then the only state school for
boys, who identified negative dimensions of tutoring but ‘felt helpless’ to
prevent it. Similar remarks were made in 1911 (see Box 4); and three decades
later, the author of a 1941 Report on Education argued that teachers could
not be efficient in their work if they were doing two extra hours of teaching
every night from Monday to Friday. The report (quoted in Mauritius, 1994: 2)
added:
“If the ... working day is not long enough, it can be lengthened. Private
coaching for the mass of the class is unnecessary; and such coaching
for the few backward boys as is necessary should be by the class teacher
as part of the duty for which he is paid a salary.”
Growing concern in the 1980s caused the government to commission a
study of the phenomenon. A team of researchers from the University of
Mauritius found that in 1986 the proportion of primary school children
receiving private tutoring rose from 11.2 per cent in primary Standard I to

39

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

72.7 per cent in Standard VI. The proportion dropped to 37.3 per cent in
secondary Form I, but then rose to 87.2 per cent in Form VI (Joynathsing
et al., 1988: 31, 43). The rise towards the end of primary reflected the
importance of the Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) examination, which
was a gateway to the secondary school system. Once that gateway had
been passed, the proportion of pupils receiving private tutoring dropped until
the School Certificate and Higher School Certificate examinations approached.
Mauritius’ secondary school system was highly stratified, and the intensity of
private tutoring at the primary school level was fuelled by what Foondun
(1992) called “the mad race for a place in a ‘five star’ secondary school.”

Box 4. A long-standing problem

As far back as 1911, the Head of Mauritius’ Royal College at Curepipe
complained that pupils were taking private classes instead of attending regular
class work. In a letter to the Director of Education, the Head wrote:
I forward herewith ... the returns of private lessons by various members of
the staff of the Royal College and its two schools. These returns show
that twelve gentlemen are giving from 13-33 hours private tuition per week
and it seems to me in many cases, the practice is carried to excess ...
“To interdict the practice altogether is impossible unless adequate
compensation is granted, nor do I think such a measure desirable. Gentlemen
have a right to utilise their leisure out of the college hours as they think fit
and I do not see who can stop them. It seems to me equally impossible to
impose a limitation. How could it be enforced? Members may say with
much force that their actions cannot be controlled after office hours. I
quite admit the evil, but I am unable to suggest a satisfactory solution.”
Subsequent generations have endeavoured to address the issue, which
greatly increased in significance as the century progressed. Government policies
have had some success, but have also faced major constraints. Source:
Mauritius, 1994: 12.

40

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

The University of Mauritius study did not make any clear proposals, but
it did raise several policy issues (Joynathsing et al., 1988: 64-66). These
included the following observations:

• The prevalence of private tutoring was part of a self-reinforcing system.

It was widely believed that classroom teaching was insufficient for doing
well in examinations, with the result that pupils sought private tutoring.
But many teachers who assumed that their pupils received tutoring made
less effort in class to ensure that every pupil was adequately prepared
for the examinations. Thus, the need for private tutoring became a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
• Once private tutoring was embedded in the system, powerful vested
interests desired to maintain it. Parents saw tutoring as a road to their
children’s social and economic advancement, teachers saw tutoring as a
source of untaxed income, and the general public saw tutoring as a way
to improve educational performance at no cost to the taxpayer. For all
these reasons, proposals to reduce the extent of tutoring were unlikely to
be effective unless they were accompanied by radical measures to improve
teaching in the schools.
• It might be possible to reduce the demand for private tutoring by changing
the parameters within which the education system worked, e.g. by making
examinations tests of ability rather than of acquired knowledge, or by
encouraging employers to rely more on tests of aptitude and less on
academic qualifications when hiring. However, reform could only succeed
if it was based on social and economic reality. Reform had to be consistent
with the desires of parents and pupils, and with the realities of the job
market. Any imposed solution that ignored these factors would be doomed
to failure.

Following receipt of the University of Mauritius study, the government

organized a National Workshop on Private Tuition. Since Mauritius was a
compact country with a population of only 1 million, the workshop was able

41

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

to have a high degree of representation and strong visibility in society. The

government developed various policies; these included the following
(Mauritius, 1994: 6-7):

• In order to reduce pressure on very young children, private tutoring was

prohibited in Standards I to III.
• To improve the conditions in which tutoring was given, teachers were
permitted to use school premises for private classes on condition that:
(a) tutoring did not exceed 10 hours per week; (b) no tutoring group had
more than forty students; (c) children had a half-hour break between the
end of regular classes and the beginning of private tutoring; and (d) private
tutoring was not provided at the expense of the teachers’ regular lessons.
• Teachers providing tutoring were asked to admit children free of charge
if the children’s parents could not afford to pay.

These measures thus used a combination of regulation, facilitation and

request. The prohibition of tutoring in Standards I to III and the limitation on
the number of weekly hours and class size were part of regulation. The
facilitation lay in the approval of school premises being used for private
tutoring. This measure sought to ensure that children did not suffer from
taking classes in educationally unsuitable environments, and provided venues
in which the authorities would be able to see if the regulations were being
followed. The request contained in the policy was an appeal to teachers not to
discriminate against students from low-income families.

However, all such strategies encounter difficulties. The regulations were

chiefly targeted at teachers who provided supplementary tutoring for the pupils
for which they already had responsibility in mainstream classes. Prohibition
of such practices is easier than preventing any form of tutoring, and ambitious
parents of children in Standards I to III continued to employ independent
tutors. Also, the prohibition in Standards I to III exacerbated the stratification
within schools because, in the words of a Mauritian newspaper (L’Express,

42

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

20 June 1993, quoted by Foondun, 2002: 506), teachers of the lower grades
were ‘denied a share of the juicy cake of private tuition’. The result was
intensification of lobbying within schools on which teachers could take the
higher classes.

Being well aware of such difficulties, policy-makers in Mauritius

undertook some longer-term structural reforms. Among the most important
were efforts to reduce stratification in the education system, and particularly
the extent to which some institutions were considered ‘five-star’ schools while
others were only seen as second or third best. A parallel measure endeavoured
to reduce the disparities in primary schools, so that pupils could be assured of
more equal chances at the CPE examination; and a third measure focused on
public awareness, ‘to impress upon parents and the community the negative
impact of private tuition on our children’ (Mauritius, 1997: 28). In devising
these strategies, however, policy-makers were aware that no quick and simple
solutions could be found for a phenomenon which had a history for over a
century and which had become firmly rooted in the society and its education
system.

Hong Kong
Whereas in Mauritius a great deal of tutoring is provided by teachers
for the mainstream pupils for which those teachers already have formal
responsibility, in Hong Kong this practice is practically unheard of. The
absence of the phenomenon in Hong Kong reflects a combination of traditions
of government control of schooling and social sanctions. Teachers in Hong
Kong have long been prohibited from tutoring their own mainstream pupils;
and if any teachers tried overtly to undertake such tutoring, they would be
sharply sanctioned by the authorities, their peers, the parents, and society at
large. A further supporting factor is that teachers in Hong Kong are relatively

43

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

well paid, and thus cannot argue that they have to take on tutoring simply to
make ends meet.

In some other respects, however, the situation in Hong Kong resembles

that in Mauritius. Large numbers of children receive tutoring, and proportions
increase as key examinations loom. While teachers are prohibited from private
tutoring of their own mainstream pupils, they are not prohibited from private
tutoring of pupils from other schools. Moreover, such teachers may neglect
their mainstream duties in favour of the tutorial work. This problem may be
illustrated by the view of a science teacher who also provided tutoring services.
The teacher (quoted by Tseng, 1998: 59-60) declared that ‘I care about my
performance in the tuition centre because I regard students as customers, not
like in the formal school’.

For most of the twentieth century, the Hong Kong Government adopted
a laissez-faire approach towards the operation of tutorial centres. The
government’s Education Department was primarily concerned with schools
and kindergartens, and considered tutoring to be outside its remit. During the
1990s, however, the Hong Kong Government found itself under pressure to
pay more attention to tutorial institutions (Kwok, 2001: 14-15). This partly
reflected increased activity in the tutoring sector, which in turn raised public
awareness of the economic, social and educational issues. The government
also faced an increasing volume of complaints about the fees and quality of
specific institutions. In 1996 the media focused on the negative impact of one
particular tutorial school that had claimed to have inside knowledge of the
questions on the Advanced Level examination. In the event, the tutorial school
evidently got the question wrong, but 584 students got very low marks for
that question because they appeared to have copied a model essay provided
by the tutorial school (Tseng, 1998: 56).

The following year, public attention escalated for a slightly different

reason. The government’s Education Department found that four of the five

44

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

premises of the prominent ‘A1’ tutorial school were not registered. The
Education Department prosecuted the operator, leading to considerable
publicity. The government’s prosecution was facilitated by simplification of
procedures. Previously, government officers were required to pay two fact-
finding visits and one confirmatory visit, and to issue two warning letters,
before they could consider taking legal action against a school; but under new
rules they only had to visit the school once and issue one warning letter.
Unregistered schools faced the possibility of a fine up to HK$25,000
(US$3,200); and teachers in unregistered schools were liable to fines of
HK$5,000 (US$640) and two years in jail.

The government’s prosecution was based on the Education Ordinance,

which had evolved over many decades but which in its 1996 version (Hong
Kong, 1996: section 3) indicated that all schools had to be registered. It defined
a school as:

“... an institution, organization or establishment which provides for 20 or

more persons during any one day, or 8 or more persons at any one time,
any nursery, kindergarten, primary, secondary or post-secondary
education or any other educational course by any other means, including
correspondence delivered by hand or through the postal services.”

Following this prosecution, the government’s ombudsman decided to

investigate the matter. The ombudsman found that in 1998, about 390 tutorial
schools had registered with the Education Department but that 408 suspected
unregistered tutorial schools existed. The number of suspected unregistered
schools had increased from 81 five years previously (Hong Kong, 1999: 2).
Public complaints were the chief source of information on the existence of
suspected unregistered schools. The majority of complaints focused on potential
fire hazards, high fees, over-enrolment in classes, and poor performance of
tutors. The ombudsman observed that the registration system did offer some
protection to clients of tutorial schools against unsafe premises and/or

45

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

unscrupulous operators. However, some operators were reluctant to invest

large sums of money to meet the safety and sanitation requirements. Since
only a few unregistered tutorial schools had been prosecuted in the mid-1990s,
some operators chose to take chances rather than going through the trouble of
registration.

The ombudsman also noted that many students were unaware that their
interests might be adversely affected if the tutorial schools that they patronized
were not registered. The Education Department was urged to take a more
active role, rather than merely responding to complaints, and to co-ordinate
an interdepartmental working group comprised of representatives from the
Education Department, the Fire Services Department, the Building Department
and other concerned bodies; they were to meet at regular intervals in order to
streamline registration procedures. The ombudsman urged the Education
Department to ensure that registration certificates were displayed, in
accordance with the requirements of the Education Ordinance, and urged the
Education Department to consider arranging regular patrols in all districts to
identify unregistered tutorial schools. The Education Department asserted
that its main responsibility was for formal schools, and highlighted resource
constraints, but did accept the ombudsman’s recommendations.

Partly as a result of this, the Education Department moved to a much

more active role. On the one hand it insisted that tutorial schools should register,
and that the institutions should comply with the registration requirements for
safety, space, etc.; and on the other hand it embarked on a campaign to educate
parents. The department printed a pamphlet entitled How to choose tutorial
schools, and also placed the pamphlet on its web site.1

The web site also presented: (a) a list of registered tutorial schools –
which by 2002 contained approximately 3,500 establishments (counting
branches of institutions as separate establishments); (b) specific details on

1. [Link]

46

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

each of these establishments, including addresses, registration numbers,

maximum permitted class sizes in the registered premises, and fees; and
(c) records of contraventions of the Education Ordinance and convictions in
respect of unregistered schools, and offences by registered institutions.
The records of contraventions named fourteen institutions of which the
owners/managers had been convicted in 2001 of operating unregistered schools.
In nine of these cases, the owners/managers had also been convicted of
employing persons to teach who were not registered or permitted teachers. A
separate document listed fifteen institutions that had been registered but in
which the operators or connected persons had been convicted of offences
during 2000/2001. The offences included permitting more than the maximum
number of pupils to occupy classrooms, charging or accepting payments other
than those that had been approved, and operating in premises other than those
that had been specified in the registration documentation. The purposes of
this publicity were first to warn operators of the penalties, and second to
encourage clients to be more aware both of possible irregularities and of their
rights. Parents and students were urged to check the fees approved by the
Education Department as printed on the Fees Certificate, which should be
exhibited in prominent positions in the schools. Parents and students were
also advised not to pay the annual school fees in one lump sum. Taking these
matters one step further, legislation was prepared in 2001 to allow the
authorities to prosecute tutorial schools that published false or misleading
advertisements.
However, the Education Department defined some activities as beyond its
scope. One part of this definition focused on what would and would not be
considered ‘educational’ in terms of the focus of the ordinance on educational
courses. On this matter, the authorities recognized (Hong Kong, 1995: 1) that:
“From an academic point of view, an activity in the sense of imparting
knowledge or assisting and guiding the development of the mind is
considered as educational in nature.”

47

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

However, the document continued:

“While it is clear from the Ordinance that educational courses are not
limited only to courses within the school curriculum, it is certainly not
the intention of the Education Department to include courses such as
Beauty Therapy, Plumbing, Hair-cutting, Dancing, Ballet, Shadow-
boxing, Acupuncture and Chinese Herbal Medicine under its jurisdiction.
If it goes as far as to define anything that ‘imparts knowledge or assists
and guides the development of the mind’ as ‘educational’ within the
context of the Education Ordinance, then a salesman demonstrating a
vacuum cleaner to a group of 20 or more persons, a class organized by
a vendor of micro-wave ovens to teach customers to use the products or
a course in meditation would be required to be registered.”

Recognizing these examples to be beyond the Education Department’s

remit, the document then indicated that boundaries of concern would be guided
by the purpose and content of courses, and by the nature of operations. Thus,
a music course that taught singing (e.g. karaoke), or the techniques of playing
a guitar, would be considered outside the remit of the Education Department,
but a similar course of which a majority part required the learning of the
history, theories and concepts in music, in addition to learning to play the
instrument, would be considered within the remit.

The boundaries of focus were also reflected in the fact that these
discussions referred only to classes and institutions that could be registered
as tutorial schools. Individual tutors who travelled to their pupils’ homes, or
who taught small groups in their own homes, were not covered. Thus a
considerable domain of tutorial activity remained beyond the scope of the
Education Department’s attention. Also, the income that tutors received from
these activities remained largely beyond the reach of the taxation system.

48

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

Box 5. Huge classes and customer loyalty

What will here be called the S. K. Yeung Memorial Secondary School
serves a predominantly working class population in the northern part of Hong
Kong. One of the teachers, Ms Wong, decided to survey her 126 students in
Forms 6 and 7 to see how many had received private tutoring. She found that
76.2 per cent had attended tutorial schools since the start of Form 5. Two-
thirds of her students were currently receiving tutoring; and among the students
not currently receiving it, one-third indicated that they planned to do so before
the Advanced Level examinations.
Ms Wong also asked the students about the size of their tutorial classes.
Only four students had ever been to private tutors on a one-to-one basis, and
none of them did so at the time of the survey. Among the students currently
receiving tutoring, nearly half attended classes with over 50 students. Indeed,
21.9 per cent attended classes with between 151 and 250 students, and 8.3 per
cent attended classes with over 250 students.
The survey also revealed strong loyalty to particular tutorial centres.
Over 90 per cent of the students currently receiving tutoring had only ever
attended one tutorial centre, and two of these centres accounted for nearly all
the students. ‘This seems to me a rather unhealthy and incestuous situation,’
remarked Ms Wong. ‘The potential for private gain and undue influence is
obvious.’
Source: Wong, 1998.

Singapore
In Singapore, a school is defined by law (Singapore, 1985) as: (a) an
organization for the provision of education for ten or more persons; or (b) a
place where ten or more persons are being or are habitually taught (whether
in one or more classes), or in the case of a correspondence school, the place
or places where instruction is prepared or where answers are examined or
corrected.

49

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

As in Hong Kong, tutorial schools are required to register under this

definition. In 1994 only sixty-two tutorial schools were registered with the
government, but by 2002 the number had reached 178 (Singapore, 2002a: 20).

Also as in Hong Kong, in 2002 the names and addresses of the registered
tutorial schools were listed on the Ministry of Education web site.2 However,
the web site did not provide guidelines to parents on how to select tutorial
schools, and did not contain information on prosecutions of operators who
had not complied with the regulations. In addition, no regulations governed
the work of individual tutors who did not work for formal agencies.

A major thrust of Singapore’s regulations, as in Hong Kong, concerned

urban planning and physical safety. Thus, the Ministry of Education would
only register tutorial schools if they had obtained prior clearance from the
Urban Redevelopment Authority concerning their location, and from the Fire
Safety Bureau and Housing and Development Board concerning construction
standards. An additional regulation, not found in Hong Kong, concerned the
names of the institutions. As explained in the briefing notes (Singapore,
1999: 3):

“‘High-sounding’ terms in school names, such as Academy, College,

Institute, etc are not normally permitted. Names ought to reflect the
curriculum and type of courses to be offered by the proposed school
(e.g. tuition centre named as XYZ Tuition Centre; language school named
as ABC Language School).”

The official guidelines did not indicate any regulations on teachers’

qualifications in tutorial centres, and they were also silent on matters of fees.

The Singapore Government sees some merit in supplementary private

tutoring, particularly for students who are in need of help to keep up with

2. [Link]/privatesch/directory/[Link]

50

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

their peers. In 1993, the government launched an Education Endowment

Scheme that is popularly known as Edusave. It provides annual grants on the
one hand to each school on a per-pupil basis (Singapore, 2002b). These funds
can be used for educational programmes, and many schools now engage private
individuals and/or agencies to conduct courses for groups of students. Some
tutors come to the schools for supplementary lessons, but others come during
school hours. Some parents, however, query why these outside tutors are
being brought into the schools, especially when they take over the classes of
the full-time teachers.

In addition, the Singapore Government has provided specific assistance

to some organizations that were involved in tutoring. One of these was the
Council for the Development of the Singapore Muslim Community, better
known by its abbreviated Malay name, Mendaki. The main rationale for the
creation of this body in 1981 was to help the Malay community catch up with
the Chinese and Indians in educational performance. This, it was argued,
would promote Malay participation in the economy, and avoid the racial
disharmony caused by social imbalances. The government gave Mendaki
financial support, and permitted the organization to use public schools for
after-school tutoring. The government also trained tutors who worked
voluntarily or for low fees. Following the Mendaki lead, other ethnic groups
established associations during the 1990s. The Singapore Indian Development
Association was founded in 1991, and the Chinese Development Assistance
Council in 1992. Also in 1992, the Eurasian Association, which had been
established in the 1980s, launched an endowment fund to finance education
and welfare programmes for the Eurasian community. While most
supplementary tutoring in Singapore was offered on commercial terms, these
community bodies provide significant help to pupils from low-income groups
(Tan, 1995; Gopinathan, 2001).

Nevertheless, a considerable shadow sector operated in parallel to these

initiatives and entirely outside the regulations for tutorial schools laid down

51

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

by the Ministry of Education. At least two organizations in Singapore linked

tutors and clients through the Internet. Filmo Communications Pte3 was a
commercial operation; while Tutorcity4 began as a commercial operation but
was later run as a community service. NextLevel Tutor5 was a third body
operating from Malaysia that included Singapore in its catchment area. Both
aspiring tutors and aspiring clients could register through the sites, and the
systems provided information on tutors’ gender, qualifications, charges,
preferred location for operation, etc. Filmo earned income by charging each
successfully placed tutor 50 per cent of the first month’s tutoring fees. Tutorcity
initially operated a similar system, but in 2000 abolished charges.

Both Filmo and Tutorcity emphasized the importance of clients checking

the qualifications of tutors. Filmo placed particular stress on checking identity
cards, observing that it is a serious offence to employ non-Singaporeans or
non-permanent residents as private tutors. However, a separate branch of
Filmo specialized in recruitment of domestic helpers from the Philippines, Sri
Lanka and Indonesia, and the tutoring section of the Filmo web site invited
readers to ‘Click here to employ a Filipino maid with college degree who may
be able to help with your elementary homework’. The Tutorcity web site did
not have a comparable link to domestic helpers. It had a somewhat minimalist
view of tutors’ qualifications, declaring that ‘anybody who has a genuine
desire to teach, a sense of responsibility and O-level or higher qualification is
welcome to register as a tutor with [Link]’. However, the web site did
propose a code of practice for tutors, and students were encouraged to complete
survey forms to rate the tutors. Both Filmo and Tutorcity left prices to the
negotiation between tutors and clients, though they did suggest some guidelines.

This account of patterns in Singapore shows considerable variation. On

the one hand there are formally registered tutoring centres that are required to

3. [Link]
4. [Link]
5. [Link]

52

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

comply with ministry regulations, and on the other hand there is a market
place operated through the Internet and with almost no regulation. The
Singapore Government seemed content to tolerate this diversity.

Taiwan
The tutorial schools of Taiwan, known as buxiban, have become an
ubiquitous feature of contemporary life. According to Zeng (1999: 156), they
first came to the fore in the 1960s. In those days, competition was modest,
and the operators could live in peace with each other. The two ‘grandfathers’
in the business, Jianguo and Zhicheng buxiban, attracted students to their
campuses without even the help of information brochures; and during the
1970s the government, in a move to encourage private enterprise in education,
provided low-rent facilities (Tong, 2001: 100).

Box 6. Doing more harm than good?

‘Today, Saturday, 50,000 students will meet their private tutors.’ Thus
began a special-focus section of Singapore’s Straits Times newspaper (George,
1992). ‘Private tuition touches more than a quarter of Singapore’s households,’
the article continued, ‘One-third of all students, from kindergarten to university
level, have tuition.’
Does the tuition help the students? Mr Lee Lam Hua, principal of San
Shan Primary School, could see a positive side. ‘If parents are careful in
choosing a good tutor,’ he said, ‘then tuition can be helpful.’ But, like other
principals in Singapore, Mr Lee was concerned that unqualified tutors and
the extra workload might do students more harm than good.
Associate Professor Sim Wong Kooi from the National Institute of
Education agreed that there were possible negative dimensions. ‘Tuition may
undermine the school’s mission,’ he said, ‘While school teachers try to give
students a firm grounding in their subjects, private tutors are employed mainly
to boost examination performance.’ Tutors commonly take short cuts and simply

53

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

drill their students in examination skills. This may well have the immediate effect
of producing ‘exam-smart’ students, but the good scores would be deceptive if
the students lack foundations in the basics. ‘The negative effects will show up
later on,’ observed Associate Professor Sim.
A further problem was that some teachers, knowing that many of their
students received tutoring, were tempted to leave focused coaching to the tutors.
Worse, some teachers preferred to concentrate not on conducting remedial
classes for the students under their charge, but on earning extra incomes through
private tuition. Assoc. Prof. Sim added that the pupils’ attitudes might also be
affected. “They may become less attentive in class because they feel that they
can use tuition to catch up. And because they do not appreciate the broader
mission of their teachers, their tutors’ exam-orientation may seem more useful.”
Despite such observations, tutoring has grown rather than diminished
in Singapore’s competitive and stratified society. Many educators view the
phenomenon with deep misgivings, but they do not see any simple remedies.

However, this benign-looking picture changed markedly. Zeng (1999:

156) explained that the success of the two ‘grandfathers’ stimulated the sector,
and that in due course both management and pedagogy became more
professional. At the same time:

“... a number of middle school teachers joined together and formed the
‘Xue-er’ buxiban. Students were trained here like soldiers. Their heads
were shaved, and they were subjected to caning, if necessary, as
disciplinary punishment. The Spartan and tough cramming style,
however, did work miracles in the university acceptance ratios.”

As time went on, corporal punishment became less acceptable in Taiwan,

and small tutoring classes were considered outmoded. In the next stage, Zeng
(p.156) continues:

“Entrepreneurs vied to upgrade the classrooms and offices in an effort

to make them look grand, amenable and superficially luxurious. The

54

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

new-generation entrepreneurs in the cram business started to expand

classes for younger students ... In an extreme example, a buxiban
rented all the classrooms of an elementary school during the summer
and transported the kids of the first-year middle school there for tutoring
classes. The demand was so high that they had to ‘erect chalkboards in
the hallways to give lectures’ as there were not enough classrooms.”

This frenzy led the authorities in 1985 to tighten regulations. Academic

buxiban were forbidden to enrol primary school students, and secondary school
students were not allowed to have tutoring classes from Monday morning to
Saturday noon (Tseng, 1998: 46). However, these regulations were rarely
observed. One problem was that although tutorial schools were required to
register with the government, the regulations did not give a precise definition
of a tutorial school. Another problem was that the authorities lacked the
resources and the political will to police the system.

In 1992 the government, aiming to reduce the dominance of the

examination system, introduced a new procedure for allocating junior
secondary school students to senior secondary schools. In the new procedure,
the emphasis given to the examination was decreased to 30 per cent with the
remaining 70 per cent dependent on teachers’ assessments (Tseng 1998: 46).
The buxiban complained that this arrangement cut sharply into their business;
but it created another problem because increasing numbers of teachers
embarked on their own private tutoring classes for their mainstream pupils.
Although the intention of the policy had been to reduce the burden on the
junior secondary students, it seemed to have the effect of making students
dependent on the private classes provided by their own teachers.

In parallel with these trends, the 1990s brought ‘enterprization’ in business

management throughout Taiwan. Buxiban strengthened their marketing
operations with web sites, glossy brochures and commercial advertising, which
penetrated inside the schools. This stimulus to market demand caused the

55

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

cram population to reach a record high. According to figures reported by

Zeng (1999: 152), in 1992 the income of Taiwan’s academic buxiban was
equivalent to US$212 million, with a net profit (annual income less annual
expenditure) of over US$13 million. In some cases, the schools directly
collaborated with the buxiban. Tseng (1998: 54) reported an instance in
which a senior high school that wished to improve its reputation in the university
entrance examination engaged in direct collaboration with a buxiban, arranging
to transport all Year 3 students to the buxiban every day after school for
another two to three hours of cramming.
While some observers had major misgivings about buxiban, however,
in some respects government regulations had a positive side. Thus parts of
the regulations published in 1996 were phrased more like instructions and
guidance to buxiban than controlling mechanisms. One clause, moreover,
indicated that buxiban with good results [presumably meaning academic
results, though that was not specified] could be given certificates of
appreciation or medals by city or county governments (Taiwan, 1996: 53).
In 1999, the system of government regulation of tutorial schools was
restructured. Prior to the restructuring, all establishments were required to
register with the Ministry of Education in Taipei. After the restructuring,
they were required to register with the twenty-one county/city bureaux of
education. At least in the short run, however, decentralization did not
significantly change the nature of relations between the authorities and the
tutoring sector.
As in Hong Kong and Singapore, a major element in the registration
procedure in Taiwan concerned building safety. Applicants were also required
to provide information on facilities, management, teacher qualifications,
curriculum, teaching materials, fees and systems for assessing student
performance. In June 1999, prior to decentralization reform, 6,741 tutorial
schools were registered with the Ministry of Education, of which 1,144 were
in Taipei. However, these registrations mostly resulted from initiatives taken

56

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

by the owners of the tutorial schools rather than pressure from the authorities,
and no prosecutions for non-compliance had been undertaken during the
previous five years.

One major difference between Taiwan and Mauritius, Hong Kong and
Singapore is the existence of tutoring school associations, most of which
serve particular geographic regions. Thus, in 1999 Taipei had 1,150 registered
tutorial schools, about half of which were members of the Taipei City
Association for Providers of Tutorial Education. This association was
established in 1981, and served as a self-regulating body within the industry.
The association fields complaints from the public against member tutorial
schools, and negotiates on behalf of the member tutorial schools with the
government. It publishes a regular newsletter containing information of interest
to members, and acted as an instrument for quality assurance. In 1999, fourteen
such associations operated in different parts of Taiwan.

Box 7. Denunciation of rivals

The buxiban in Taiwan take competition very seriously. They work hard
to improve their own image, and they work equally hard to debase their rivals.
This phenomenon may be illustrated by a paragraph from the hard-
covered, glossy brochure of one buxiban in Taipei’s Cram Street, an area near
the railway station in which large numbers of buxiban are clustered:
“Some buxiban fail to improve their students’ score achievement, but
they refuse to learn from the good teaching methods of our Cram Street.
Their administration is sluggish, but they are not willing to adopt our
rules, either. Their campus is surrounded by small motels, game galleries,
dark public houses, and they conceal their places from the parents’ eyes.
What right do they have to criticize our Cram Street? It only serves their
ulterior interest of enrolling more students ...”
A slim publication from a different buxiban has an essay criticizing
categorically its neighbour’s ‘ugly’ activities; these included (a) pretending to
be a student and writing impostor letters to criticize other buxiban; (b) pretending

57

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

to be the administrator of a buxiban and calling parents for immediate payment

for the tuition; (c) inducing students of one buxiban to transfer to theirs;
(d) spreading rumours about the other buxiban’s viability in order to smirch
their image and scare students away; and (e) trying to attract more students into
their schools by the attractive appearance of boys and girls already enrolled in
the buxiban. Many pamphlets in Cram Street contain such denunciations. They
show both the rhetoric and the reality of this competitive world.
Source: Zeng, 1999: 163.

Republic of Korea
As in Taiwan, private tutoring in the Republic of Korea first gained
significant prominence during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the response
by the Republic of Korea authorities was different from that of their
counterparts in Taiwan. In particular, in 1980 the Republic of Korea
Government issued a formal prohibition of supplementary private tutoring.
The ban was ineffective and ultimately had to be abandoned; but the changing
patterns of attempted control are instructive.
In 1980, the scale of private tutoring in the Republic of Korea was
arguably moderate compared with contemporary patterns both in the Republic
of Korea and elsewhere. According to one survey (quoted in Yoon et al.,
1997: 11), in 1980 tutoring was received by 12.9 per cent of elementary
school pupils, 15.3 per cent of middle school pupils, and 26.2 per cent of high
school pupils. Nevertheless, the government perceived private tutoring to have
corrupting elements, and aimed to remove it. The prohibition was aimed both
at teachers who received additional money from giving supplementary tutoring
to their own mainstream pupils and at tutorial institutes which served pupils
from a range of schools. The authorities also wished to discourage one-to-one
and small-group tutoring in the homes of tutors and/or their clients.

58

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

While it was relatively easy to announce such a prohibition, it proved

very difficult to enforce – especially in the face of parental striving to achieve
what parents saw as best for their children in the harshly competitive
environment. Recognizing this fact, the government relaxed the ban by stages
(Yang, 2001). The sequence of events between 1980 and 1996 was as follows:
1980: All tutoring banned.
1981: Coaching permitted in musical, artistic and sporting skills; and lessons
permitted in speech, flower arranging, and other leisure activities.
1984: Senior high school students were allowed to attend private foreign-
language institutes during winter vacations. Students with the lowest
learning achievement (the bottom 20 per cent) were allowed to have
extra lessons in school from teachers.
1988: Extra lessons for every student was permitted in schools, with
mainstream teachers providing such extra lessons to their own pupils
on a fee-paying basis.
1989: University undergraduate students were allowed to tutor students in
primary and secondary schools. Study-aid tapes were allowed to be
produced, purchased, and rented in the market. Primary and secondary
school students were allowed to attend private institutes for academic
lessons during vacations.
1991: Primary and secondary students were allowed to go to private institutes
for academic lessons, even during semesters.
1996: University graduate students allowed to tutor students in primary and
secondary schools.
Reflecting this easing of restrictions, the scale of activity expanded rapidly
in the mid-1990s. In 1993, nation-wide expenditure on private tutoring was
estimated at 3,410 billion won (US$4.3 billion). This figure is said to have
grown to 4,696 billion won in 1994, and 9,320 billion won in 1995 (Yoon
et al., 1997: 1). By 1997, the average annual tutoring fees for elementary,
middle and high school students were estimated to comprise 12 to 16 per
cent of Gross National Product per capita; this was three to four times the

59

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

level in Japan for example (Kwak, 1999). Table 1 presents estimates of the
scale of supplementary tutoring in that year. These figures show tutoring to
have been strongest at the elementary level. It was especially dominant in
the cities, but also significant in rural areas.

Partly because of such escalation, in 1997 the issue of prohibition again

came on to the political agenda. President Kim Dae-Jung went as far as to
announce in his 1998 inauguration address that his government would ‘free
young people from extracurricular activities and relieve parents from the heavy
monetary burden of private tutoring’ (quoted in Yi, 2002: 2). The government
announced in 1998 that extra academic tutoring for secondary students would
be banned by stages: in 1999 for lower secondary school students and freshmen
in high schools, and in 2001 for every secondary school student.

Table 1. Proportion of students receiving supplementary private

tutoring, Republic of Korea, 1997 (%)

Level Seoul 6 metropolitan cities Other cities Rural areas

Elementary 81.5 82.3 74.6 54.1
Middle 65.5 64.2 47.0 45.6
High 59.1 29.3 18.8 12.2

Source: Yim, 1997; quoted by Paik, 1998: 2.

However, this move was greeted with considerable scepticism. Many

critics argued that tutoring could only be tackled effectively by making it
unnecessary, i.e. by reducing the competitive advantages to be gained through
tutoring, and by improving the quality of mainstream schooling. The editorial
in one widely circulated publication (Asiaweek, 1997: 20) expressed the view
that:

“For Korean authorities to address their own shortcomings in primary

and secondary education by banning tutors is a bit like trying to eliminate

60

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Government responses: five case studies

robbery by ensuring that the entire population is poor. In an increasingly

competitive Asia, it makes no sense at all to legislate in favor of the
lowest common denominator.”
In the event, this renewed attempt at prohibition got no further than its
predecessors. In 2000, the courts declared the prohibition unconstitutional as
an infringement of human rights.
Faced with this history, the Korean authorities have decided to take a
broader approach. At one level are efforts to improve the quality of the school
system – to make it less rigid and to widen the types of learning that it promotes.
Since the mid-1990s, schools have been required to offer additional services
in order to make it less necessary for parents to seek these services externally.
As the government explained (Republic of Korea, 1996: 30):
“Such a measure is aimed at deterring the inequity which results when
students from wealthier families seek private tutoring to ensure that
they are able to pass the various entrance examinations and do well in
school. With the measure proposed, quality tutoring will be available to
any student in need [through the school itself] thus lessening the financial
burden now imposed on families.”
In addition, the authorities have expanded their educational broadcasting
services, aiming to provide enrichment lessons to families free of charge,
rather than through the tutorial institutes.
At another level, the authorities have made efforts to reform the college
entrance system to make it less monolithic (Republic of Korea, 2001:158-
159). Under this reform, the College Scholastic Ability Test was administered
only to provide indicators on students’ minimum academic development.
Individual universities and colleges were then encouraged to develop diverse
methods to select students. The government hopes that this will have a
backwash effect on the school system, promoting creativity and diminishing
the forms of rigidity on which private tutoring has flourished.

61

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Box 8. Pressures on both parents and children

In the account below, Kim, Y.B. (2000) comments from a personal
perspective on the forces which underlie the Republic of Korea’s passion for
private tutoring.
“When I was young, there were very few private educational institutions.
But now they have sprung up across the country like so many mushrooms
after the rain. Some institutions educate not only school children, but also
preschool children whose parents want to take advantage of early
education.
One of my neighbors sometimes complains that the cost of educating her
two sons, aged 5 and 11, is excessive. Her husband’s income has been
reduced substantially because of the financial crisis. So it goes without
saying that the large amount of money she spends on private education
creates a heavy financial burden on her household. Sometimes she takes
a part-time job in order to help foot the bill for her children’s education.
She feels that she must send her two sons to private educational
institutions because all the other children in her neighbourhood are also
going to such institutions.
Even though sending both children to private institutions places a heavy
burden on her household, she worries that they would otherwise be lonely
since there are no neighborhood children they can play with. In the past,
children had time to play such games as hide-and-seek or blind-man’s-
bluff. But today’s children have a dreary schedule of all work and no play.
My wife also sends my children to private educational institutions like
other mothers. If my children were spending their time at home after school,
she would feel uneasy. I think many mothers are unhappy with public
education and send their children to the private institutions for a better
education. Many students tend to neglect their studies at public school
because they have already learned the material covered there at the private
institution.”

62

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Chapter 4
Lessons from comparative policy analysis

The five case studies presented above do not represent the full range of
possible policy responses to the phenomenon of supplementary private tutoring.
In all these cases, the governments confronted the phenomenon with active
policy responses. Other governments have been much more passive. Yet
even among the active responses there has been considerable variation. This
permits identification of instructive similarities and contrasts.

At a basic level, four main policy responses to supplementary private

tutoring may be identified. They are:

• Ignore the phenomenon. Some governments have felt unable or unwilling

to do anything about private tutoring, and have therefore chosen to ignore
it.
• Prohibit private tutoring. As indicated above, this has been tried in the
Republic of Korea. It has also been tried in some other countries.
• Recognize and regulate. Governments in this category have been willing
to play some interventionist role, and have sought to regulate the market
in order to limit the negative dimensions of private tutoring. Mauritius
and Hong Kong are in this category.
• Actively encourage. A few governments perceive private tutoring to be
on balance a desirable phenomenon and have actively encouraged it.
The Singapore and Taiwan governments, which recognize problematic
dimensions of tutoring but also see positive sides, are in this category.
Enlarging on these observations, the governments that ignore the
phenomenon may again be divided into two groups. In one group are
governments that are weak and simply do not have the capacity to police
tutorial operations. Many African governments are in this category, including

63

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

those of Nigeria and Kenya. This monograph has distinguished between

(a) situations in which mainstream teachers tutor the students for which they
already have responsibility in their mainstream classes, and (b) situations in
which tutors (who may or may not also teach in mainstream schools) provide
tutoring for pupils for whom they do not otherwise have responsibility. The
former category is arguably especially pernicious because it can lead to a
form of blackmail. Yet some governments are too weak even to regulate this
practice.
In the other group in this category are governments that do have capacity
to monitor and regulate tutoring, but which define it as outside their sphere of
responsibility. They do this either because the sector is small and considered
insignificant, or because they prefer to leave matters to market forces. The
Canadian authorities, for example, neither monitor tutorial operations nor
seek to control them. As explained by one government official in the Province
of Ontario (Hunter, 1999):
“The definition of a school [in Ontario] is ‘the body of pupils that is
organized as a unit for educational purposes under the jurisdiction of the
appropriate board, or in an educational institution operated by the
government’. There is no term ‘tutorial school’ in common usage and no
definition. More common names are ‘tutorial services’ and ‘learning
centres’; but to the best of my knowledge there is no registration system
in any province [in Canada]. None of these services is authorized to
grant government certificates or diplomas, and hence there is no need to
have a registration system. If the parent gets what he/she wants to buy,
all is OK. If not, one stops buying it. There is no structure to complain.
Any remedy for claimed fraud, etc. would be via the courts, not the
government.”
This approach has been possible because for cultural and other reasons
tutoring has not in the past been a major phenomenon in Canada. Instructively,
however, a similar approach has been taken in Japan, which has a long history

64

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Lessons from comparative policy analysis

of juku, and where the role of supplementary tutoring has been very
controversial. Despite this, the Japanese Government has been able to maintain
a ‘hands-off’ stance by insisting that it is only responsible for the mainstream
education system. The Japanese authorities do require juku to be registered,
but only with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry rather than with
the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture. Juku have thus been
required to file tax returns, to meet certain standards of safety in building
construction, and to provide adequate fire escapes, toilets and other facilities.
Yet in this system if clients have complaints over fees or the quality of services,
they take them to the Consumer Council rather than to the Ministry of
Education, Science, Sports and Culture.
Nevertheless, in Canada some observers predicted change as a result
of expansion of the tutoring sector. In 2000, Canada’s Council of Ministers of
Education published a study of science learning that contained some striking
findings. The study was based on a careful sampling of 31,000 students in
2,000 schools throughout Canada. Among the reported findings was that
10.9 per cent of 13-year-old students and 13.3 per cent of 16-year-old students
received one hour or more of extra school lessons or tutoring during a normal
week (Canada, 2000: 53). Among 16 year olds, in no province was the
proportion below 8 per cent, and in one province it reached 20 per cent. These
figures seemed to reflect a significant growth in the sector, and suggested that
perhaps supplementary tutoring would be given more attention at the official
level.
Concerning the second category of possible government responses,
prohibition, a strong case can be made for banning mainstream teachers from
tutoring their own pupils. Yet even this is not straightforward. In poor countries,
teachers may be paid so inadequately that they need supplementary earnings
to achieve even subsistence incomes. In Zanzibar (United Republic of
Tanzania), teachers have been given official permission to provide
supplementary tutoring in their own schools. As explained by a Ministry of
Education document (Zanzibar, 1998: 18):

65

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

“The Government has officially allowed government schools to charge

a small fee for extra tuition provided by teachers after the official working
hours in situations where parents are willing to do so. Though
controversial, the measure offers a rare opportunity for parents to
voluntarily contribute to teachers’ remuneration ... therefore increasing
the motivation of teachers and decreasing their propensity to look for
another job. This measure has a positive impact on access as the number
of teachers to be recruited to cope with the ever-increasing enrolment
becomes fairly stable.”

Such issues are not unique to Zanzibar. From one perspective, in resource-
constrained settings the practice of teachers providing additional tutoring for
their pupils may be a solution rather than a problem (Biswal, 1999b). Yet
Mauritius has a much stronger economy than Zanzibar, and the question arises
why the practice has not been phased out there. The answer lies partly in
traditions built up during the era of greater financial stringency. Once traditions
become entrenched, it is very difficult to change them.

Governments that do wish to regulate supplementary private tutoring

have various tools to help them to achieve the task. The usual starting-point
is the legal framework; this must define supplementary private tutoring and
tutorial schools with sufficient clarity. Governments must then decide what
resources they are prepared to put into monitoring and policing their
regulations. Such work does not have to be done entirely by government agents:
the general public can be encouraged to play a role. The Taiwanese model of
self-regulating associations of tutorial schools, which has parallels in Turkey
(Tansel, 2003), might hold some useful lessons for other societies.

However, certain types of private tutoring are perhaps impossible to

control. Arrangements between individuals for one-to-one tutoring in private
homes would seem to be in that category. Also in that category is Internet

66

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Lessons from comparative policy analysis

tutoring, since it is not even confined to national boundaries. Thus in 2002 the
web site of one such enterprise6 boasted that:

“Whether you are in New York, California or around the world, you will
have the ability to receive tutoring from an expert in whatever course of
math you need, from your home in an Internet-based, two-way virtual
classroom.”

Companies such as this charge for their services on either an hourly or

a monthly basis, and collect their payments world-wide by credit card. Several
such companies offer a 24-hour service. These enterprises seem to be beyond
the control of national governments, especially those outside the countries in
which the web sites are operated.

6. [Link]

67

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]
 Chapter 5
Conclusion

The introductory paragraph to this monograph indicated that it had been

prepared as a contribution to the IIEP project on ethics and corruption in
education. Although the monograph commenced with a definition of
supplementary private tutoring, it did not define corruption. Box 1 referred to
the work of Klitgaard (1988), who has written a widely appreciated book on
corruption. In that book Klitgaard highlighted the difficulty of defining
corruption and, citing Max Weber (1958: 47-48), presented a case for avoiding
the temptation to begin a study with an attempted definition. Rather, Klitgaard
(p. 23), suggested that the definition could usefully come at the end so that it
could be informed by specific examples of the matter under discussion. This
approach has merits for the present study as well as for others.

The Longman dictionary of contemporary English (Procter, 1980:

248) defines the verb ‘to corrupt’ as:

1. to make morally bad; cause to change from good to bad;

2. to influence (a person, especially a public official) improperly;
3. to change the original form of a language, set of teachings, etc. in a bad
way.

The noun ‘corruption’ is then defined as:

1. the act of corrupting;

2. dishonesty; immoral behaviour; the state of being corrupt;
3. decay; impurity;
4. a movement away from the pure original form of a language, set of
teachings, etc.

69

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

In so far as the present study is concerned with corruption, it is only

tangentially focused on the influence of public officials. It is more concerned
with movement away from what at least some people would consider to be a
(relatively) pure form of education to a corrupted one.

The definitions cited above also contain reference to morals, and thus to
ethics. As noted at the beginning of this monograph, one difficulty is that
ethical judgements are, to some extent, personal decisions based on personal
perspectives. These perspectives are commonly influenced by the standpoints
of the observers, and by the question as to whether those observers benefit or
lose from situations. The monograph cannot reach a definitive statement that
would be agreed by all people in all situations on the desirability, or otherwise,
of different forms of supplementary private tutoring. However, the monograph
has pointed out that a significant number of people do consider supplementary
private tutoring to be corrupting. These people convey moral judgements when
making such statements.

To many analysts, the most important element of the corruption is in the

way that private tutoring negatively shapes what those analysts feel should
be an appropriate form of education. As observed in Box 2, the shadow system
of private tutoring is different from many other shadows in that it may affect
the body that it imitates. Thus to repeat the judgements of some commentators
already presented in the main text of this monograph:

“Most students tend to rely on private tutors for everything including

homework and exam tips. As a result classroom attention tends to dwindle
creating discipline problems for school teachers.” (Yasmeen, 1999: 23.)

“Tutoring has caused a great lack of interest on the part of students.

They have reached the point of thinking that as long as they can pay
someone who will show them how to pass examinations, they do not

70

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Conclusion

need to attend school classes except when they are required to do so by

school regulations.” (Hussein, 1987: 92.)

“Extra-school Instruction or ‘private tuition’ has become an inescapable

part of childhood in Sri Lanka ... The age appropriate developmental
tasks such as building wholesome attitudes towards oneself, learning to
get along with peers, developing conscience, morality and a scale of
values stand a very poor chance in this climate of cruel competition.”
(Wijetunge, 1994: 15-16)

“Tuition may undermine the school’s mission. While school teachers try
to give students a firm grounding in their subjects, private tutors are
employed mainly to boost examination performance ... [Pupils] may
become less attentive in class because they feel that they can use tuition
to catch up. And because they do not appreciate the broader mission of
their teachers, their tutors’ exam-orientation may seem more useful.”
(Sim, quoted by George, 1992: 28)

These remarks focus on the impact of tutoring on mainstream education

systems. Other commentators have focused on the wider impact on societies.
When mainstream teachers receive money for tutoring their own mainstream
pupils, a form of blackmail may arise that has a corrosive impact on home-
school relations and on society at large. Tutoring also maintains and
exacerbates social inequalities. With such factors in mind, Sen (2002a: 7)
has spoken eloquently about the ‘evil of private tuition’ in India, which must
be ‘uncompromisingly overcome’. His remarks sparked some controversy
(see, for example, Aiyer, 2002a, 2002b; Sen 2002b); but many commentators
agreed with him that supplementary private tutoring may have major corrupting
effects.

The questions then are what governments (a) can, and (b) should do
about it. This monograph has presented information on a range of responses

71

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

by governments in different countries. Some governments have taken direct

action, and have sometimes (though not always) had some success in this.
Other governments have felt constrained and helpless, and yet other
governments have decided not to take interventionist stances but instead to
leave matters to market forces.

While at first sight the direct action of some governments might seem to
deserve applause, especially when policies have delivered results, this form
of response is not necessarily to be recommended in all situations. Klitgaard
(1988: 24) stressed that ‘the optimal form of corruption is not zero’ (original
italics). This idea, he recognized, could be shocking to some; and he emphasized
that he did not mean that an ideal world would contain corruption, or that if
we could remake a society completely we would want any corruption.
Nevertheless the world is not ideal, he observed, and practically everything
has costs. He explained (pp. 24-25):

“Suppose a certain kind of corruption causes harm to society; it creates

‘social costs’. Suppose, too, that efforts to fight this corruption are costly.
To minimize the combined costs to society, we must balance the two. We
should certainly consider the reduction in social costs that we obtain by
reducing corrupt acts, but we must also take into account the increase in
social costs entailed by our very efforts to fight corruption. And this
leads to the conclusion that, in most cases, the minimum cost solution
will not have corruption equal to zero or anticorruption efforts equal to
the maximum amount.”

In the present context, this implies that before governments make any
response to the nature and scale of private tutoring, or to anticipated
manifestations, they should begin by calculating the costs of any measures
that they might take to control it. In some settings, the costs of control might
outweigh the benefits.

72

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 Conclusion

Moreover, this particular theme is complicated by the fact that under

some circumstances and from some perspectives supplementary private
tutoring, far from being a seen as a corrupting influence, might be seen
positively. Through such tutoring, pupils presumably gain more knowledge;
this in turn can contribute to social and national development. Tutoring can
also help lower achievers to keep up with their peers; this in turn can enhance
self-esteem; and out-of-school classes can help shape attitudes towards
academic study, diligence and social order. In addition, tutoring gives income
to the tutors, and thus promotes employment. Further, while some
commentators are critical of the ways that tutoring increases the diversity of
students’ educational experiences, other commentators applaud such diversity.
A powerful movement at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of
the twenty-first century has advocated decentralization of control over
education and diversification of educational provision to meet the needs of
different groups. Private tutoring is perhaps the most responsive of all forms
of education to the demands of the market place. It is self-evidently providing
what consumers wish to purchase, not only in syllabus but also in style, class
size and location. Some commentators would argue that supplementary private
tutoring is a necessary complement to mainstream education systems, and
that the diversity and free-market dimensions are to be welcomed rather than
controlled.

All these points expose the complexity of the phenomenon and the
challenges that confront policy-makers as they decide how to respond. In
most parts of the world, supplementary private tutoring appears to be
expanding. Because of this, tutoring is likely to be more difficult to ignore,
and governments that do not currently have specific policies on the matter
will find themselves under increasing pressure to devise responses. In this
process, comparative analysis of experiences in different parts of the world
should be of major assistance. This monograph has endeavoured to make a
contribution to the task of devising appropriate policies.

73

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]
 References

Adams, D. 2002. Education and national development: priorities,

policies, and planning. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research
Centre, University of Hong Kong; Manila: Asian Development Bank.

Aggarwal, Y. 1998. Primary education in Delhi: How much do the children

learn? New Delhi: National Institute of Educational Planning and
Administration.

Asiaweek. 1997. “Banning tutors: in education-obsessed Asia, the move is

both wrong and futile” (editorial), 23(17), 2, May.

Aiyer, S. 2002a. “Lion’s looks, rabbit’s liver”. In: Times of India, 2 November.

. 2002b. “Amartya Sen revisited”. In: Times of India, 23 November.

Baker, D.P.; Akiba, M.; LeTendre, G.K.; Wiseman, A.W. 2001. “Worldwide
shadow education: outside-school learning, institutional quality of
schooling, and cross-national mathematics achievement”. In:
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 23(1), 1-17.

Biswal, B.P. 1999a. “Private tutoring and public corruption: a cost-effective

education system for developing countries”. In: The Developing
Economies, XXXVII(2), 222-240.

. 1999b. “The implications of private tutoring on the school education

in LDCs”. In: Policy Reform, 3(1), 53-66.

Bray, M. 1999a. The shadow education system: private tutoring and its
implications for planners. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.

75

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

. 1999b. The private costs of public schooling: household and

community financing of primary education in Cambodia. Paris: IIEP-
UNESCO; UNICEF.

. 2002. The costs and financing of education: trends and policy

implications. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre,
The University of Hong Kong; and Manila: Asian Development Bank.

; Kwok, P. 2003. “Demand for private supplementary tutoring:

conceptual considerations, and socio-economic patterns in Hong Kong”.
In: Economics of Education Review, 23.

Canada. Council of Ministers of Education. 2000. Science learning: The

Canadian context. School achievement indicators program 1999.
Toronto: Council of Ministers of Education.

Chew, S.B.; Leong, Y.C. (Eds.). 1995. Private tutoring in Malaysia and
Sri Lanka: a comparative study. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Social
Foundations in Education, University of Malaya. (Project Directors:
T. Marimuthu and W.A. de Silva.)

De Silva, W.A. 1994. Extra-school tutoring in the Asian context with

special reference to Sri Lanka. Maharagama: Department of
Educational Research, National Institute of Education.

Fawzey, F. 1994. Private tutoring: analysis and foundation. Tanta, Egypt:

Dara Al Kotob. (In Arabic.)

Fenech, N.; Spiteri, C. 1999. Private tuition in Malta. University of Malta.

([Link]. (Hons.) dissertation.)

76

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 References

Fergany, N. 1994. Survey of access to primary education and acquisition

of basic literacy skills in three governorates in Egypt. Cairo:
UNICEF.

Foondun, A.R. 1992 Private tuition in Mauritius: The mad race for a
place in a ‘five star’ secondary school. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
(Monograph No.8, ‘Increasing and improving the quality of basic
education’ series.)

. 2002. “The issue of private tuition: An analysis of the practice in

Mauritius and selected South-East Asian countries”. In: International
Review of Education, 48(6), 485-515.

George, C. 1992. “Time to come out of the shadows”. In: Straits Times,
4 April, p. 28.

Gopinathan, S. 2001. “Globalisation, the state and education policy in

Singapore”. In: M. Bray and W.O. Lee (Eds.), Education and political
transition: themes and experiences in East Asia. pp.21-36. Hong
Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong
Kong.

Groot, M.; Hartog, J. 1995. ‘Screening models and education’. In: M. Carnoy,
(Ed.), International encyclopedia of economics of education. 2nd ed.,
pp. 34-39. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Hallak, J.; Poisson, M. 2002. Ethics and corruption in education: results

from the expert workshop held at the IIEP, Paris, 28-29 November
2001. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.

Hargreaves, E. 1997. “The diploma disease in Egypt: learning, teaching and

the monster of the secondary leaving certificate”. In: Assessment in
Education, 4(1), 161-176.

77

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Hong Kong. Education Department. 1995. Courses which are not required
to be registered under the Education Ordinance. Hong Kong:
Education Department, Registration Section. (Ref. 74 in ED (RB) 58/
81 Pt. 5.)

. Government of. 1996. Education ordinance. Hong Kong:

Government Printer. (Chapter 279 of the Laws of Hong Kong.)

. Office of the Ombudsman. 1999. Investigation report on

registration of tutorial schools. Hong Kong: Office of the
Ombudsman.

Hunter, R. 1999. Ontario, Canada. (Personal communication to Mark Bray.)

Hussein, M.G.A. 1987. “Private tutoring: a hidden educational problem”. In:

Educational Studies in Mathematics, 18(1), 91-96.

Japan. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. 1999.

Committee report from council on lifelong education. Tokyo: Ministry
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. [In Japanese.]

. Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. 1995. Japanese

government policies in education, science and culture: new
directions in school education – fostering strength for life. Tokyo:
Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.

Joynathsing, M.; Mansoor, M.; Nababsing, V.; Pochun, M.; Selwyn, P. 1988.
The private costs of education in Mauritius. University of Mauritius,
School of Administration.

Kim, I. 2000. Private tutoring in Korea: a cultural analysis. (Paper

presented at the Annual Conference of the Comparative and International
Education Society, San Antonio, Texas, 8-12 March.)

78

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 References

Kim, Y.B. 2000. “Children need time to play as well as study”. In: The Korea
Herald, 22 March.

Klitgaard, R. 1988. Controlling corruption. Berkeley: University of

California Press.

Kwak, Y.S. 1999. “Insufficient government spending on education feared to

weaken national competitiveness”. In: The Korea Herald, 24 June.

Kwan-Terry, A. 1991. “The economics of language in Singapore: students’

use of extracurricular language lessons”. In: Journal of Asian Pacific
Communication, 2(1), 69-89.

Kwok, P.L.Y. 2001. A multi-level social analysis of demand for private

supplementary tutoring at secondary level in Hong Kong. (Ph.D.
thesis, University of Hong Kong.)

Lee, C. 1996. Children and private tuition. Hong Kong: Hong Kong
Federation of Youth Groups. (Youth poll series No.34.)

MacWilliams, B. 2002. “In Georgia, professors hand out price lists”. In: The
Chronicle of Higher Education, 2 August, p. A34.

Mauritius. Government of. 1994. Use and abuse of private tuition. Port
Louis: Ministry of Education.

. 1997. Pre-primary, primary and secondary education:

white paper. Port Louis: Ministry of Education and Human Resource
Development.

Mischo, C.; Haag, L. 2002. “Expansion and effectiveness of private tutoring”.

In: European Journal of Psychology of Education, XVII (3), 263-
273.

79

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Montgomery, M.R.; Agyeman, D.K.; Aglobitse, P.B.; Heiland, F. 2000. New

elements of the cost of children: supplementary schooling in Ghana.
New York: The Population Council.

Nzomo, J.; Kariuki, M.; Guantai, L. 2001. The quality of primary education:
some policy suggestions based on a survey of schools – Kenya.
Paris: IIEP-UNESCO. (SACMEQ policy research report No.6.)

OECD. 1999. Human capital investment: an international comparison.

Paris: Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Paik, S.J. 1998. Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute. (Personal

communication to Mark Bray.)

Popa, S. 2003. Redefining professionalism: Romanian teachers and the

private tutoring system. (Paper presented at the Annual Conference
of the Comparative and International Education Society, New Orleans.)

Procter, P. (Editor-in-Chief). 1980. Longman dictionary of contemporary

English. London: Longman.

Psacharopoulos, G.; Patrinos, H.A. 2002. Returns to investment in education:

a further update. Washington, DC: The World Bank. (Policy research
working paper 2881.)

Republic of Korea. Ministry of Education. 1996. The development of

education: national report of the Republic of Korea. Seoul: Ministry of
Education.

. 2001. Education in Korea 1999-2000. Seoul: Ministry

of Education.

80

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 References

Rohlen, T.P.; LeTendre, G.K. 1996. “Conclusion: themes in the Japanese

culture of learning”. In: T.P Rohlen and G.K. LeTendre (Eds.), Teaching
and learning in Japan, pp.369-376. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

Russell, J. 2002. “The secret lessons”. In: New Statesman, 8 April, 10-13.

Salili, F. 1999. “Accepting personal responsibility for learning”. In: D.A.

Watkins and J.B. Biggs (Eds.), The Chinese learner: cultural,
psychological and contextual influences, pp. 85-105. Hong Kong:
Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong.

Sawada, T.; Kobayashi, S. 1986. An analysis of the effect of arithmetic

and mathematics education at Juku. Tokyo: National Institute for
Educational Research. (Translated with an Afterword by Horvath, P.
Compendium 12.)

Sen, A. 2002a. Pratichi education report: an introduction.

[Link]/[Link]

. 2002b. “Disquieting picture: primary problems in education”. In:

Times of India, 19 November.

Shafiq, M.N. 2002. The economic burden of private tutoring expenses on

households in developing countries: the case of Bangladesh. (Paper
presented at the Annual Conference of the Comparative and International
Education Society, Orlando, Florida.)

Singapore. Government of. 1985. Education Act. Cap. 87. Singapore:

Government Printer.

. Ministry of Education. 1999. Information notes: application for

registration of private schools. Singapore: Ministry of Education.

81

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

. 2002a. Education statistics digest 2002. Singapore:

Ministry of Education.

. 2002b. The Edusave Scheme. Singapore: Ministry of

Education. [Link]/[Link]

Stevenson, D.L.; Baker, D.P. 1992. “Shadow education and allocation in

formal schooling: transition to university in Japan”. In: American Journal
of Sociology, 97(6), 1639-1657.

Taiwan. Ministry of Education. 1996. Short-term tutorial classes: survey

and statistical report. Taipei: Ministry of Education. [In Chinese.]

. 1999. Education statistics in the Republic of China.

Taipei: Ministry of Education. [In Chinese.]

Tan, J. 1995. “Joint Government-Malay community efforts to improve Malay

educational achievement in Singapore”. In: Comparative Education,
31(3), 339-353.

Tansel, A. 2003. Middle East Technical University, Turkey. (Personal

communication to Mark Bray.)

Tilak, J.B.G. 2001. Building human capital in East Asia: what others can
learn. Washington DC: The World Bank Institute.

Tong, T.S.L. 2001. Education as a commodity: private tutoring in Hong

Kong and Taipei. ([Link]. dissertation, The University of Hong Kong.)

Tseng, J.L.C. 1998. Private supplementary tutoring at the senior

secondary level in Taiwan and Hong Kong. ([Link]. dissertation, The
University of Hong Kong.)

82

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 References

Ukai Russell, N. 1996. “The Kumon approach to teaching and learning”. In:
T.P Rohlen and G.K. LeTendre (eds.), Teaching and learning in Japan.
pp.248-274. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

UNESCO. 2000. The EFA 2000 assessment: country reports – Romania.

Paris: UNESCO. (Available on [Link]/wef/countryreports/
romania/rapport_1.html)

Weber, M. 1958 [original 1904-05]. The Protestant ethic and the spirit of
capitalism. Trans. by T. Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Wijetunge, S. 1994. “Some psychological aspects of the private tuition system”.

In: Economic Review [The People’s Bank, Colombo], 20(2,3), 15-17.

Wolf, R.M. 2002. ‘Extra-school instruction in mathematics and science.’ In:

D.F. Robitaille and A.E. Beaton (Eds.), Secondary analysis of the
TIMSS data, pp. 331-341. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing.

Wong, A. 1998. Private tutoring in Hong Kong: a case study. Hong Kong:
Faculty of Education, University of Hong Kong. (Unpublished paper.)

World Bank. 2002. Arab Republic of Egypt: education sector review –

progress and priorities for the future. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Yang, S. 2001. Tutoring policy change and reflection on the roles of public
and private education. Seoul: Korean Education Development Institute.
[In Korean.]

Yasmeen, S. 1999. “The spreading private tuitions epidemic”. In: School:

Journal of Educational Excellence [India], May, pp.21-25.

83

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

Adverse effects of private supplementary tutoring
Dimensions, implications and government responses

Yi, P. 2002. Household spending on private tutoring in South Korea.

(Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Comparative and
International Education Society, Orlando, Florida.)

Yim, Y.G. 1997. 1997 survey of current educational issues. Seoul: Korean
Educational Development Institute. [In Korean.]

Yiu, J.M.T. 1996. A study of curriculum change in Hong Kong: the case
of advanced level economics. ([Link]. dissertation, The University of
Hong Kong.)

Yoon, J.I.; Huh, T.J.; Lee, B.G.; Hong, S.P.; Kim, J.R.; Kim, D.Y.; Kang,
T.H.; Kim, E.O. 1997. Research on the actual condition of
extracurricular lessons. Seoul: Korean Educational Staff Association.
[In Korean.]

Zanzibar, Revolutionary Government of. 1998. Prospective stock-taking

review of education in Africa: The Zanzibar case study. Paris:
Association for the Development of Education in Africa; Zanzibar:
Ministry of Education.

Zeng, K. 1999. Dragon gate: competitive examinations and their

consequences. London: Cassell.

84

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

 IIEP publications and documents

More than 1,200 titles on all aspects of educational planning have been published
by the International Institute for Educational Planning. A comprehensive catalogue
is available in the following subject categories:

Educational planning and global issues

General studies – global/developmental issues

Administration and management of education

Decentralization – participation – distance education – school mapping – teachers

Economics of education
Costs and financing – employment – international co-operation

Quality of education
Evaluation – innovation – supervision

Different levels of formal education

Primary to higher education

Alternative strategies for education

Lifelong education – non-formal education – disadvantaged groups – gender education

Copies of the Catalogue may be obtained on request from:

IIEP, Communication and Publications Unit
information@[Link]
Titles of new publications and abstracts may be consulted at the following
web site: [Link]/iiep

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]
 The International Institute for Educational Planning

The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is an international centre

for advanced training and research in the field of educational planning. It was established by
UNESCO in 1963 and is financed by UNESCO and by voluntary contributions from Member
States. In recent years the following Member States have provided voluntary contributions to
the Institute: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland.

The Institute’s aim is to contribute to the development of education throughout the

world, by expanding both knowledge and the supply of competent professionals in the field of
educational planning. In this endeavour the Institute co-operates with interested training and
research organizations in Member States. The Governing Board of the IIEP, which approves
the Institute’s programme and budget, consists of a maximum of eight elected members and
four members designated by the United Nations Organization and certain of its specialized
agencies and institutes.

Chairperson:
Dato’Asiah bt. Abu Samah (Malaysia)
Director, Lang Education, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Designated Members:
Carlos Fortín
Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Geneva, Switzerland.
Edgar Ortegón
Director, Projects and Investment Programming, Latin American and Caribbean
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), Santiago, Chile.
Jean Louis-Sarbib
Senior Vice-President, the World Bank, Washington DC, United States.
Ester Zulberti
Chief, Extension, Education and Communication Service, Research Extension
and Training Division, Sustainable Development Department, FAO.
Elected Members:
José Joaquín Brunner (Chile)
Director, Education Programme, Fundación Chile, Santiago, Chile.
Klaus Hüfner (Germany)
Professor, Free University, Berlin, Germany.
Zeineb Faïza Kefi (Tunisia)
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Tunisia to France and Permanent
Delegate of Tunisia to UNESCO.
Philippe Mehaut (France)
Deputy Director, Centre d’études et de recherches sur les qualifications, (Céreq),
Marseille, France.
Teboho Moja (South Africa)
Professor of Higher Education, Steinhardt School of Education, New York University,
New York, United States.
Teiichi Sato (Japan)
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Permanent Delegate of Japan
to UNESCO.
Tuomas Takala (Finland)
Professor, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland.

Inquiries about the Institute should be addressed to:

The Office of the Director, International Institute for Educational Planning,
7-9 rue Eugène Delacroix, 75116 Paris, France

International Institute for Educational Planning [Link]