THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 247844. July 26, 2023.]

NORMA M. BALEARES and HEIRS OF SANTOS

DECISION

INTING, J p:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated December 21, 2018, and the
Resolution 3 dated June 14, 2019, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 109382.
The assailed Decision and Resolution dismissed the appeal of Norma Baleares
(Norma) and the Heirs of Santos Baleares (Santos) (collectively, petitioners) from the
Orders dated April 25, 2017, 4 and June 19, 2017, 5 issued by Branch 138, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Makati City in Civil Case No. 15-1229 for annulment of title and related
documents and damages. 6 HTcADC
The Antecedents
Petitioners — the widow and the heirs of Santos — are the occupants and
possessors of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-57
(9482) 7 (subject property) registered in the name of Santos, his sibling 8 and his
nephew 9 as co-owners. Sometime in 1988, the Baleares siblings mortgaged the subject
property to Arnold V. Maranan (Arnold). 10 On February 19, 1988, the mortgage was
registered and annotated as Entry No. 47847 11 on the title to the property. 12
On June 17, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint 13 with the RTC of Makati City for
cancellation of Entry No. 47847 on TCT No. RT-57 (9482) grounded on Arnolds's failure to
enforce his mortgage right over the subject property within the 10-year prescriptive
period; the case was raffled to Branch 134 and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1360. 14
In the meantime, Arnold was able to foreclose on the mortgage and, as the
highest bidder in the public auction, was issued a Certificate of Sale dated March 2,
1999. 15
Sometime in April 2000, Felipe B. Espanto (Felipe) and his mother Margarita
Espanto (Margarita) — sister of Santos, also filed a Complaint 16 against Arnold for
nullification of the mortgage and/or foreclosure likewise premised on prescription of the
latter's mortgage right; the case was filed before Branch 135, RTC, Makati City and
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-523. Purportedly, Felipe and Margarita, in their own right,
were also claiming to be co-owners of the subject property.
On July 18, 2003, the RTC rendered a judgment ordering the cancellation of Entry
No. 47847 annotated on TCT No. RT-57 (9482) on the ground that Arnold's right to
foreclose the mortgage had already prescribed. 17 It also declared void Arnold's
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and the auction sale for noncompliance with
the requirements of notice and publication required under Act No. 3135, 18 as
amended. 19 The Decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA 20 and became final and
executory on February 1, 2008. 21
On September 9, 2008, Arnold was able to consolidate the title over the subject
property. TCT No. RT-57 (9482) was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
225363 22 was issued in his name. Subsequently, Arnold sold the subject property to
Felipe. 23 As a consequence, TCT No. 225363 was cancelled and TCT No. 225428 24 was
issued in the name of Felipe on September 25, 2008. 25
On August 17, 2009, Felipe, as the new registered owner of the subject property,
initiated an action 26 for ejectment against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Makati City; the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98995 (Espanto's
ejectment suit).

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 On May 10, 2012, pending proceedings in the ejectment suit before the MeTC,
petitioners filed an Amended Complaint 27 for the nullification of Arnold's extra judicial
foreclosure sale and all subsequent acts executed relative thereto including the
cancellation of TCT No. 225428 in Felipe's name. The case was raffled to Branch 58 of
the RTC of Makati City (RTC-Br. 58) and was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-746 (the First
Case). The RTC, however, dismissed the First Case on October 22, 2013, for failure of
petitioners and their counsel to appear during the mandatory pre-trial conference (First
Dismissal Order). 28 Petitioners failed to appeal the order of dismissal. 29
On August 11, 2014, the MeTC granted Felipe's ejectment suit and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises. 30 The Decision of the MeTC was affirmed in toto by
the RTC 31 and the CA. 32 In a petition for review on certiorari subsequently interposed
by petitioners, the Court reversed the CA's Decision and accordingly
dismissed 33 Felipe's ejectment suit. The Court ruled against Felipe's better right to
possess the subject property as against that of petitioners; at the time Felipe bought the
property from Arnold, he was well aware that TCT No. 225363 in the name of Arnold was
void and inexistent in view of the final and executory Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 98-1360 which established that the mortgage right of Arnold inscribed in TCT No. RT-
57 (9482) as Entry No. 47847 had already prescribed and could no longer be enforced.
On October 29, 2015, shortly after the RTC rendered judgment affirming the
Decision of the MeTC in Felipe's ejectment suit, petitioners filed before Branch 138, RTC,
Makati City (RTC-Br. 138) the present Complaint 34 for Annulment of Title and Related
Documents and Damages against Arnold and Felipe, the Register of Deeds of Makati,
and the City Assessor of Makati; petitioners sought the annulment of TCT Nos. 225363
and 225428 and the corollary reinstatement of TCT No. RT-57 (9482). 35 The Complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 15-1229 (the Present Case).
On September 8, 2016, petitioners amended their complaint in the Present Case
to implead the heirs of Arnold. 36 Meanwhile, instead of filing an Answer, Felipe filed a
Motion to Dismiss 37 on the ground of res judicata.
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 25, 2017, the RTC-Br. 138 issued an Order 38 (the Second Dismissal
Order) dismissing the Present Case on the ground that its filing was barred by a previous
judgment of dismissal in the First Case which involved the same causes of action in the
Present Case. 39 The RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in an
Order 40 dated June 19, 2017.
Petitioners filed before the CA an appeal 41 docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 109382.
They assailed both orders of the RTC dismissing the Present Case and denying their
motion for reconsideration. 42
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 43 dated December 21, 2018, the CA dismissed the appeal. It held
that the issues posed by petitioners involved pure questions of law that should have
been raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the
Court. 44 Petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution 45 dated June 14, 2019.
The Present Petition
Petitioners are now before the Court proffering as grounds the following:
I. The Hon. Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the PETITIONERS' Appeal
filed therewith on the ground of being improper.
II. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
Civil Case No. 15-1229 is not barred by the prior dismissal of Civil
Case No. 09-746. 46
The Issues
The pivotal issues for resolution before the Court are the following: (1) whether
the CA erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction; (2) whether the filing of the
Present Case is barred by the prior dismissal of the First Case; and (3) whether the
petition should be given due course.
Our Ruling
While the CA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal is justified under the factual milieu
of the case, the Court is disposed to grant the petition in the greater interest of
substantial justice.

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The petition in the CA raised
pure questions of law.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the CA did not err in
outrightly dismissing petitioners' appeal. The Court in Park Developers, Inc. v.
Daclan 47 held that:
Under the Rules of Court, there are two modes of appeal from a
decision or final order of the trial court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction: (1) by writ of error under Section 2 (a), Rule 41 if questions of
fact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or (2) appeal
by certiorari under Section 2 (c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only
questions of law are raised or involved. This is glaringly clear from the
provisions of Section 2. Rule 41, viz.: CAIHTE
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. —
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of
law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45.
Thus, this Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing
petitioners' appeal. Since what petitioners raised in their appeal was a
pure question of law, their proper recourse was to file before this Court a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In fact,
the CA's dismissal of petitioners' appeal was the only proper and
unavoidable outcome as Section 2. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of
Appeals. — An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not
being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by
notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the
appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be
dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals
shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright. 48 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
"A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts." 49
Irrefutably, the issue in the appeal below concerns only a question of law. In its
April 25, 2017 Order 50 dismissing the Present Case on the ground of res judicata, the
RTC did not make any findings of fact but merely applied various provisions under
the Rules of Court. 51 As correctly ruled by the CA, the question of whether or not res
judicata serves as a bar to the filing of a case is unquestionably one of law. 52 The CA
thus did not err when it dismissed petitioners' appeal outright. The Rules of Court, using
mandatory language, clearly and unequivocally establish the rule that an appeal raising
pure questions of law and erroneously taken to the CA "shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.'' 53
Despite the absence of error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioners'
appeal for being the wrong mode, the Court finds it imperative nonetheless to
write finis to the issue at fore — the propriety of the dismissal of the Present Case by the
RFC-Br. 138 on the ground of res judicata.
The filing of the Present Case
should not be construed as
barred by res judicata.

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 The focal issue in the present recourse centers on the effect of the First Dismissal
Order issued by the RTC-Br. 138 on the continuance of the proceedings in the Present
Case — whether it operated as res judicata warranting the dismissal of the Present Case.
Res judicata in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" under Section 47 (b) 54 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires the concurrence of the following requisites: "(1)
the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4)
there is, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action." 55
Anent the first, second, and fourth requisites, the parties do not dispute the fact
that RTC-Br. 58 has jurisdiction over the First Case, and the First Dismissal Order has
long become final and executory for petitioners' failure to appeal it. There is also,
between the First Case and the Present Case, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action, viz.: the parties in the Present Case are the same parties in the First
Case; 56 the real property formerly covered by TCT No. RT 57 (9482) is also the same
property subject of the controversy in both cases; 57 and the causes of action in the two
cases are also the same — that is, the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale between
Arnold and Felipe covering the subject property, the consequent annulment of TCT Nos.
225363 and 225428 respectively issued in the names of Arnold and Felipe, and the claim
for damages. 58
With the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in the case, however, the Court
resolves that the First Dismissal Order, which respondents claim constitutes a bar to the
filing of the Present Case, does not comply with the third requisite above — that the
order must be on the merits.
In dismissing the Present Case, the RTC-Br. 138 subscribed to the contention of
respondents that the cause of action in the Present Case was barred by the First
Dismissal Order for failure of the petitioners and their counsel to appear during the
scheduled pre-trial hearing dates in the First Case. The RTC-Br. 138 ruled that the
dismissal, which was a dismissal with prejudice, amounted to an adjudication on the
merits of the case in consonance with Sections 4 59 and 5, 60 Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure (the Rules).
In the present recourse, petitioners aver that the First Dismissal Order should be
deemed to be one without prejudice and should not be considered as an adjudication on
the merits because they were deprived of their family home without due process of
law. 61 Petitioners assert that their failure to attend the mandatory pre-trial hearing was
due to the gross and palpable negligence amounting to bad faith on the part of their
counsel therein, who failed to attend the pre-trial hearings and notify them of the
hearings despite due notice from the court; neither did their counsel inform them of the
First Dismissal Order nor appeal therefrom. 62 They plead that they should not be bound
by the gross negligence of their counsel who practically abandoned their case.
Petitioners, therefore, pray that the Rules of Court be liberally interpreted in their favor;
that their instant petition for review be given due course as to allow them an opportunity
to defend and protect their property through a full-blown trial on the merits rather than
lose their home to technicalities.
Petitioners' supplication holds water and is worthy of solace. Considering the
factual milieu of the case, it behooves the Court to negate the application of res
judicata on the ground that the First Dismissal Order did not operate as an adjudication
on the merits or determination of the rights of the parties in the First Case. The First
Case was dismissed by the RTC-Br. 58 not on the merits but on a technicality — that is,
the failure of the petitioners and their counsel to attend the pre-trial hearing. aScITE
While it has been settled that the consequence of the plaintiff's non-appearance
in the pre-trial is the dismissal of the case with prejudice, 63 the Court deems the
dismissal with prejudice as harsh considering respondents' apparent lack of legal title to
the subject property and their patent indefensible attempt to obtain, in utter bad faith,
registration of the title to the subject property in their names.
From the allegations in petitioners' complaint in the First Case, it bears to note
that after petitioners learned of the mortgage of the subject property to Arnold, they
immediately filed Civil Case No. 98-1360 for the cancellation of the mortgage entry in
the title to the subject property. The RTC in said case nullified Arnold's extrajudicial
foreclosure on the ground of prescription and for noncompliance with the requirements
of notice and publication under Act No. 3135; the Decision was affirmed by the CA and
became final and executory for Arnold's failure to appeal it. Despite the final and
immutable judgment declaring the foreclosure void, Arnold, as the buyer of the subject

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property at the auction sale, caused the issuance in his name of TCT No. 225363 on
September 9, 2008. Eight days later, Arnold sold the property to Felipe, who was well
aware of Arnold's lack of legal title. In fact, the records show that, in a separate
complaint filed by Felipe and his mother, they claimed to be owners of the subject
property in their own right and questioned Felipe's title thereto likewise subscribing to
petitioners' position in Civil Case No. 98-1360 that Arnold's mortgage right had already
prescribed.
Against this background, the Court deems that the First Dismissal Order did not
effectively amount to a prior judgement which would bar the re-litigation of petitioners'
causes of action in the Present Case in view of the fact that petitioners were deprived of
the opportunity to he heard on their cause of action. As it should have been, the said
dismissal should be construed as without prejudice for violating petitioners' right to due
process if only to grant them the opportunity to refile the case to ventilate their cause of
action. Stated thus, the First Dismissal Order did not substantially amount to res
judicata which would warrant the dismissal of the Present Case.
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be rigidly applied where
it will result in injustice. 64 As aptly held by the Court in Salud v. Court of Appeals. 65
There is universal agreement on the principles underlying res
judicata, viz.:
"x x x Two maxims of the English common law best
summarize the general policies underlying this doctrine.
They are: first, that no person should be twice vexed by the
same claim; and second, that it is in the interest of the state
that there be an end to litigation. Thus, principles of res
judicata serve both private and public interests.
The interest of the judicial system in preventing
relitigation of the same dispute recognizes that judicial
resources are finite and the number of cases that can be
heard by the court is limited. Every dispute that is reheard
means that another will be delayed. In modern times when
court dockets are filled to overflowing, this concern is of
critical importance. Res judicata thus conserves scarce
judicial resources and promotes efficiency in the interest of
the public at large.
Once a final judgment has been rendered, the
prevailing party also has an interest in the stability of that
judgment. Parties come to the courts in order to resolve
controversies; a judgment would be of little use in resolving
disputes if the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate
the same claims again and again. Although judicial
determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be
corrected through appeals procedures, not through
repeated suits on the same claim. Further, to allow
relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and
presents the embarrassing problem of determining which of
two conflicting decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no
reason to suppose that the second or third determination of
a claim necessarily is more accurate than the first, the first
should be left undisturbed.
In some cases the public at large also has an interest
in seeing that rights and liabilities once established remain
fixed. If a court quiets title to land for example, everyone
should be able to rely on the finality of that determination.
Otherwise, many business transactions would be clouded by
uncertainty. Thus, the most important purpose of res
judicata is to provide repose for both the party litigants and
the public. As the Supreme Court has observed, 'res
judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars
vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other
disputes.'"
In our age, where courts are harassed by crowded dockets and
complaints against slow foot justice, frequent technical reliance on the
preclusive breadth of res judicata is understandable. The importance of

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 judicial economy and avoidance of repetitive suits are strong norms i[n] a
society in need of swift justice. Be that as it may, there should not be a
mechanical and uncaring reliance on res judicata where more
important societal values deserve protection, So we held in Suarez
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the prior
judgment of dismissal with prejudice was validly
rendered within the lawful discretion of the court and
could be considered as an adjudication on the merits,
nonetheless, the principle of res judicata should be
disregarded if its application would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality x x x. The
application of the said principle, under the particular
facts obtaining, would amount to denial of justice
and/or bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance x
x x.
The case at bench presents an exceptional instance where an
inflexible application of the doctrine of res judicata will not serve oar
constitutional policy favoring fairness, the heart of due process. x x x.
x x x. The demands of due process present a weightier
consideration than the need to bring an end to the parties'
litigation. For more important than the need to write finis to
litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be no justice that
satisfies unless the litigants are given the opportunity to be
heard. x x x. 66 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioners' case merits the
relaxation of procedural rules.
Given the circumstances, the Court cannot but spare a thought for the desperate
plight of petitioners who stand to lose their home to a technicality and to respondents'
elusive schemes. Respondents' repulsive disregard of a final and executory decision and
their unscrupulous manipulation of the technical rules of procedure to suit their ignoble
ends demonstrates a flagrant denigration of justice.
Substantial justice begs that the merits of petitioners' cause be passed upon
considering that no prejudice will result to Felipe who does not stand to lose the subject
property over which he never had title in the first instance. If petitioners' allegations in
their complaint are established during the trial, Arnold and Feline will have no right to
claim a better title to the subject property as against petitioners. Besides, because the
registration of respondents' titles was done in bad faith, it is as if there was no
registration at all. 67 Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such
title for our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he
actually has. 68
The Court applauds the zealousness of the RTC-Br. 138 in upholding the Rules
and in consequently dismissing the Present Case on the ground of res judicata; however,
the application of this principle cannot be made the basis to deny petitioners the
opportunity to a fair trial to prove their claim as against respondents.
Indeed, while procedural rules "are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive
rights," 69 the Court has nonetheless been consistent in its rulings that the law abhors
the technicalities that impede the cause of action. 70 If the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to
suspend the Rules, or except a particular case from its operation. 71 Thus,
in Commissioner of Customs v. PTT Philippines Trading Corp., 72 the Court held that:
Rules of Procedure should not be rigidly applied if it will tend to
obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice. Depending on
the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where strong
considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court
may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of
its equity jurisdiction. 73
In Heirs of Lagon v. Ultramax Healthcare Supplies, Inc., 74 the Court emphasized
that rules of procedure are not so rigid as to frustrate the full adjudication of cases:
x x x. Procedural rules are designed to aid the courts in resolving
cases. They neither create nor take away vested rights, but merely

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 facilitate the trial court's reception and evaluation of all evidence given
the facts and circumstances presented by the parties. They give litigants
the opportunity to establish the merits of their complaint or defense rather
than lose life, liberty, or property on mere technicalities. This Court should
not demand a strict application of these rules when such would exacerbate
the situation rather than promote substantial justice. 75 (Citations
omitted)
From a consideration of the events that transpired in the case, the Court finds
good reason to support petitioners' assertion that the First Dismissal Order should not be
construed as tantamount to an adjudication on the merits considering that, on top of
respondents' wily scheme to mask their lack of legal title over the subject property,
petitioners were denied their right to present their case ostensibly due to the gross
negligence of their counsel whose failure to apprise them of the developments in the
case eventually led to the dismissal of the First Case to the extreme prejudice and
damage of the petitioners. This being so, said dismissal cannot be the basis of res
judicata; it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, the first dismissal order may be
considered as one without prejudice. 76 DETACa
While as a general rule the negligence of the counsel binds the client, one of the
exceptions is when the counsel's actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious
injustice to the client. 77 A lawyer is deemed to be grossly negligent when he or she fails
to exercise even the slightest degree of care or diligence, or entirely omits the same.
Gross negligence examines a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting
any effort to avoid them. 78
As borne by the records, the RTC-Br. 58 finally dismissed 79 the First Case after
both petitioners and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial hearing dates set by the
trial court four times despite due notice. Petitioners' counsel explicated that while the
notices were received by his office staff, they were misplaced and he was not informed
about them. In its Order 80 dated May 2, 2014, the RTC-Br. 58 admonished petitioners'
counsel for his apparent neglect in keeping an orderly system for the receipt of judicial
notices, but nonetheless denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the First
Dismissal Order.
Indeed, a lawyer owes it to himself or herself and to his or her clients to adopt an
efficient and orderly system of receiving and attending promptly to all judicial notices
lest he or she and his or her clients suffer the consequences of one's failure to do so.
However, when the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so
great and the result is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is
prejudiced and denied his or her day in court, the client deserves another chance to
present his or her case. 81 Apparently, petitioners were prevented from fully and fairly
presenting their First Case and ran the risk of losing their home because of the
professional delinquency or infidelity of their counsel. Moreover, where a case was not
tried on the merits and was dismissed due to the negligence of counsel rather than the
plaintiff, in the interest of justice, the dismissal of the case should be decreed to be
without prejudice to the filing of a new action; 82 thus, negating the applicability of res
judicata.
The Court cannot hold to technicalities at the expense of frustrating substantive
rights. The resolve to reinstate the instant complaint and allow petitioners the
opportunity to present their case in court will be more in accord with the Court's duty to
effectively dispense justice. The Court accedes to petitioners' asseveration that their
case falls under the exception to the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
In Tamboa v. People, 83 the Court ruled:
x x x. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-
litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the
mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where
observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client's
liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. 84
The Court reiterates that it is the avowed policy of the law to accord both parties
every opportunity to pursue and defend their cases in the open and relegate technicality
to the background in the interest of substantial justice. 85 Respondents herein cannot be
allowed to engage in a game of technicalities as a convenient subterfuge for causes
which are unjustified and fraudulent; lest the Court tolerate the prostitution of the rules
of procedure to breed injustice.

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 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing pronouncements, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 21, 2018 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 109382 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Order dated April 25, 2017 and the Order dated June 19, 2017 of Branch 138,
Regional Trial Court, Makati City in Civil Case No. 151229 dismissing the complaint for
annulment of title and related documents and damages of Norma Baleares and the Heirs
of Santos Baleares are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In the interest of substantial
justice, the instant case is hereby REMANDED to Branch 138, Regional Trial Court,
Makati City for trial on the merits. HEITAD
SO ORDERED.
Inting, ** Gaerlan and Singh, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, * J., is on leave; Justice Caguioa left his vote of concurrence.
Dimaampao, *** J., is on official business.

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