VIII.

RULE 7 – PARTS OF A
PLEADING
PLEADINGS: FORM AND CONTENTS
RULE 7: PARTS AND CONTENTS OF A PLEADING
Section 1. Caption
• The caption must include:
1. The name of the court.
2. The title of the action.
3. The docket number (if assigned).
• The title of the action must indicate the names of the parties. In the original
complaint or petition, all parties must be named. In subsequent pleadings, it is
sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side, with an appropriate
indication when there are other parties.
• The respective participation of each party in the case must be indicated. (1)

Section 2. The Body

The body of the pleading must contain:

1. Its designation.
2. The allegations of the party’s claims or defenses.
3. The relief prayed for.
4. The date of the pleading.

(a) Paragraphs

• Allegations in the body of the pleading must be divided into numbered

paragraphs, each containing a single set of circumstances as far as convenient.
• Paragraphs may be referred to by their numbers in all subsequent pleadings.

(b) Headings

• When two or more causes of action are joined:

o The first cause of action must be prefaced by the words “first cause of
action”.
o The second by “second cause of action”, and so on.
 • When one or more paragraphs in the answer address one of several causes of
action in the complaint:
They must be prefaced by the words “answer to the first cause of
o
action” or “answer to the second cause of action”, and so on.
• When one or more paragraphs of the answer address several causes of action,
they must be prefaced by words to that effect.

(c) Relief

• The pleading must specify the relief sought.

• It may also include a general prayer for further or other relief deemed just or
equitable.

(d) Date

• Every pleading must be dated. (4)

Section 3. Signature and Address

(a) Signature Requirement

• Every pleading and other written submissions to the court must be signed by the
party or their counsel.

(b) Certification by Counsel

• The signature of counsel constitutes a certification that:

1. They have read the pleading and document.
2. To the best of their knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
a reasonable inquiry:
§ The pleading is not being presented for any improper
purpose (e.g., to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase litigation costs).
§ The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law, jurisprudence, or a non-frivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.
§ The factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after discovery.
 § The denials of factual contentions are warranted by the evidence
or, if specifically identified, are reasonably based on belief or lack of
information.

(c) Sanctions for Violations

• If the court determines, on motion or motu proprio, and after notice and
hearing, that this Rule has been violated:
o It may impose appropriate sanctions or refer the violation to the proper
office for disciplinary action.
o Sanctions may apply to the attorney, law firm, or party responsible for
the violation.
o A law firm may be held jointly and severally liable for violations
committed by its partners, associates, or employees.
o Sanctions may include:
§Non-monetary directives.
§ Payment of a penalty.
§ Payment of the movant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and other
expenses resulting from the violation.
o Lawyers or law firms cannot pass on monetary penalties to the client.
(3a)

Section 4. Verification
• Pleadings generally do not need to be verified, unless specifically required by
law or rule.
• A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign the
verification.
• The authorization of the affiant (e.g., secretary’s certificate or special power of
attorney) must be attached to the pleading.
• The verification must allege:
1. The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on personal
knowledge or authentic documents.
2. The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase litigation costs.
3. The factual allegations have evidentiary support or, if specifically
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after discovery.
• The affiant’s signature serves as a certification of the truthfulness of the
allegations.
 • A pleading requiring verification that contains a verification based
on “information and belief” or lacks proper verification shall be treated as
an unsigned pleading. (4a)

Section 5. Certification Against Forum Shopping

• The plaintiff or principal party must certify under oath in the complaint or
initiatory pleading (or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed) that:
1. They have not commenced any other action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency.
2. To the best of their knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending.
3. If there is a pending action or claim, they must provide a complete
statement of its status.
4. If they later learn that a similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, they must report it within five (5) calendar days to the court
where their pleading was filed.
• The authorization of the affiant (e.g., secretary’s certificate or special power of
attorney) must be attached to the pleading.

Failure to Comply:

• Non-compliance is not curable by amendment of the pleading.

• It is grounds for dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing.
• Submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings
constitutes indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to administrative or
criminal actions.
• Willful and deliberate forum shopping is grounds for summary dismissal with
prejudice, direct contempt, and administrative sanctions. (5a)

Section 6. Contents
• Every pleading stating a party’s claims or defenses must, in addition to the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 7, include:
1. The names of witnesses who will be presented to prove the party’s claim
or defense.
2. A summary of the witnesses’ intended testimonies.
§ The judicial affidavits of these witnesses must be attached to the
pleading and form an integral part of it.
 § Only witnesses whose judicial affidavits are attached may be
presented during trial.
§ No other witnesses or affidavits shall be admitted unless the party
presents meritorious reasons for their inclusion.
3. Documentary and object evidence supporting the allegations in the
pleading. (n)

Parts of a Pleading (SBCA)

A pleading is a formal written statement of a party’s claims or defenses. It has three essential
parts:

1. Caption – This includes:

o The name of the court where the case is filed.
o The title of the action (e.g., "Anna vs. Bob").
o The docket number if already assigned.

🔹 Example:

"IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA

Branch 15
Civil Case No. 12345
Anna, Plaintiff, vs. Bob, Defendant"

2. Body – This contains:

o The designation of the pleading (e.g., "Complaint," "Answer").
o The allegations of the party’s claim or defense.
o The relief prayed for (what the party wants the court to grant).
o The date of the pleading.

🔹 Example:

"Plaintiff Anna, by counsel, respectfully alleges:

That she entered into a loan agreement with Defendant Bob...

That Bob failed to pay the amount due...

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the payment of P1,000,000..."

3. Signature and Address – This includes the lawyer’s details.

II. Required Information Below a Lawyer’s Signature (PIRMA)
The lawyer must include the following details below his signature:

1. P – Address (not a P.O. box).

2. I – PTR (Professional Tax Receipt) number for the current year.
3. R – IBP (Integrated Bar of the Philippines) official receipt number for the current year.
4. M – Roll number.
5. A – MCLE (Mandatory Continuing Legal Education) Certificate number and date of
issue.

🔹 Example:

"ATTY. JUAN DELA CRUZ

Counsel for Plaintiff
Address: 123 St., Manila
PTR No. 123456, issued 2024
IBP No. 654321, issued 2024
Roll No. 78910
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0001234, issued 2024"

III. Effect of Non-Compliance

Failure to Include Effect
PTR, IBP, Roll
The pleading is considered as not signed.
Number
MCLE Compliance The lawyer may be penalized, but the case will not be dismissed. The
Number client can change lawyers and ask for a refund of legal fees.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• SC Resolution (Feb. 17, 2015) – Failure to disclose MCLE details does not cause
dismissal but subjects the lawyer to sanctions.
• People v. Arrojado (2015) – A prosecutor must include MCLE details, but failure to do
so does not dismiss the case.

IV. Rules on Including Party Names in Pleadings

1. All parties must be named in the original complaint.
o In later pleadings, only the first party’s name can be stated, followed by “et al.”
o Example: Instead of listing all plaintiffs in every motion, write "Anna, et al."
2. In a class suit, it is enough to name representative plaintiffs/defendants.
 3. If a defendant's name is unknown, he can be designated as “Unknown Owner” or
similar terms.
o Once his real name is known, the pleading must be amended.
4. If multiple persons form a group without a juridical personality, they can be sued
under their common name.
o They must disclose their individual names in their response.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• Rules of Court, Rule 3, Secs. 12-15

V. Can the Court Award More Than What is Claimed?

• Yes, if:
o The evidence justifies a higher amount.
o The defendant does not object to additional evidence.
o The plaintiff pays additional filing fees for the extra amount, which will be a lien
on the judgment.

🔹 Example:

• The complaint asks for P800,000 in damages.

• During trial, evidence proves the plaintiff is entitled to P1,000,000.
• If the defendant does not object, the court can award P1,000,000.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• Rule 141, Sec. 2 – Additional filing fees must be paid.

• Rule 10, Sec. 5 – If the defendant objects, the court can still admit the evidence and order
an amendment.
• Rule 9, Sec. 3(d) – If the defendant is in default, the court cannot award more than
what was prayed for.

VI. Can the Court Award a Relief Not Alleged in the Pleading?
• Yes, if evidence supports it and no objection is made.
• The plaintiff must pay docket fees on the additional amount.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• Rule 141, Sec. 2 – Docket fees must be paid.

• Rule 10, Sec. 5 – The pleading must be amended if objected to.
VII. Rule on Signing Pleadings
1. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel.
2. The address must not be a P.O. box.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• Rule 7, Sec. 3

Robern Development vs. Judge Quitain – G.R. No.

135042 (1999)
G.R. No. 135042: Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain and
National Power Corporation

Case Background
This case involves an expropriation dispute where the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)
sought to acquire certain parcels of land owned by Robern Development Corporation (Robern).
The legal controversy primarily revolves around procedural defects in NAPOCOR’s
expropriation complaint, particularly concerning compliance with Rule 7 (Parts of a
Pleading) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the substantive requirements of Rule 67
(Expropriation).

Facts
1. Filing of the Complaint:
o NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), seeking to acquire Robern’s land for public use, specifically for power
transmission lines.
o The complaint included a certificate of non-forum shopping but lacked certain
verifications.
2. Robern’s Objection:
o Robern Development Corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that
NAPOCOR’s complaint failed to comply with Rule 7, Section 3, which requires
proper verification and certification against forum shopping.
o Robern also challenged the expropriation’s necessity and the amount of just
compensation.
3. RTC Ruling:
 • The RTC found that the procedural defects in NAPOCOR’s complaint were curable
defects and did not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
• The RTC denied Robern’s motion to dismiss and allowed the expropriation proceedings
to continue.
• Commissioners were appointed to determine just compensation, which was later affirmed
by the RTC.
• Reason for the Decision: The RTC ruled that procedural defects, particularly in the
verification and certification against forum shopping, were not jurisdictional in nature.
The court emphasized that NAPOCOR’s right to expropriate the property for public use
outweighed technical deficiencies in its pleading.

4. Petition Before the Supreme Court:

o Robern filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in allowing a defective complaint to proceed.
o It claimed that failure to strictly comply with Rule 7 invalidated the expropriation
proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner: Robern Development Corporation

• The complaint was defective due to non-compliance with Rule 7, Section 3, which
mandates that a verification must be based on personal knowledge and that a certificate of
non-forum shopping must be properly executed.
• The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by proceeding with an expropriation case
based on a procedurally defective pleading.
• The expropriation was improper, and the determination of just compensation was
prejudiced by procedural irregularities.

Respondents: Judge Quitain and NAPOCOR

• Procedural defects in the complaint did not affect the validity of the expropriation
proceedings as they were mere technicalities that could be cured by amendment.
• The RTC acted within its jurisdiction in proceeding with the case, as substantive
compliance with Rule 67 (Expropriation) was sufficient.
• Dismissal of the case on mere procedural grounds would frustrate the public purpose
behind the expropriation.

Main Legal Issues

1. Whether the expropriation complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
comply with Rule 7 (Parts of a Pleading), particularly regarding verification and
certification against forum shopping.
 2. Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the expropriation
case to proceed despite procedural defects.

Rulings Supreme Court

Supreme Court Ruling:

• On Rule 7 Compliance: The Supreme Court reiterated that verification is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement. A defective verification does not render a pleading fatally
defective, and courts have discretion to allow amendments.
• On Forum Shopping Certification: While strict compliance is required, the omission of
certain details does not automatically warrant dismissal if there is substantial
compliance.
• On RTC’s Exercise of Discretion: The Court held that Judge Quitain did not act with
grave abuse of discretionin denying the motion to dismiss because procedural defects
were curable and did not prejudice the substantive rights of Robern.
• On Just Compensation: The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the RTC and the
commissioners in determining the fair market value of the expropriated property.
• Reason for the Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that procedural rules must be
liberally construed to promote justice and prevent unnecessary delays in cases of public
interest. The Court emphasized that expropriation cases involve matters of public
necessity, and procedural technicalities should not be used to derail government projects
meant for public benefit.

Thus, the petition was denied, and the expropriation proceedings continued.

Disposition
• The Supreme Court upheld the RTC’s ruling allowing the expropriation case to
proceed.
• Procedural deficiencies in the complaint were deemed non-fatal as they could be
remedied without affecting the validity of the expropriation proceedings.
• The ruling emphasized that expropriation cases, being matters of public interest,
should not be hindered by technicalities, provided that substantive rights are preserved.

Key Doctrines and Legal Principles

1. Verification and Forum Shopping Certification Under Rule 7

• Rule 7, Section 3: Requires that every pleading must be verified by an affidavit declaring
that the allegations are true based on personal knowledge.
 • Substantial compliance principle: A defective verification does not automatically
render a pleading invalid.
• Forum shopping certification is mandatory, but dismissal is not automatic if the
omission is not willful or does not mislead the court.

2. Expropriation Proceedings Under Rule 67

• Expropriation must comply with both procedural and substantive requirements, but
procedural lapses may be remedied if they do not impair due process or public interest.
• Just compensation is the central issue, and procedural errors must not defeat the
purpose of determining fair compensation for property owners.

Conclusion
This case highlights the balance between procedural requirements and substantive justice in
expropriation cases. While compliance with Rule 7 is necessary, failure to strictly adhere does
not automatically result in dismissal, especially when public interest is at stake. The ruling
reinforces that substance prevails over technicalities, particularly in cases where national
infrastructure projects are involved.

Disposition
• The Supreme Court upheld the RTC’s ruling allowing the expropriation case to
proceed.
• Procedural deficiencies in the complaint were deemed non-fatal as they could be
remedied without affecting the validity of the expropriation proceedings.
• The ruling emphasized that expropriation cases, being matters of public interest,
should not be hindered by technicalities, provided that substantive rights are preserved.

Key Doctrines and Legal Principles

1. Verification and Forum Shopping Certification Under Rule 7

• Rule 7, Section 3: Requires that every pleading must be verified by an affidavit declaring
that the allegations are true based on personal knowledge.
• Substantial compliance principle: A defective verification does not automatically
render a pleading invalid.
• Forum shopping certification is mandatory, but dismissal is not automatic if the
omission is not willful or does not mislead the court.
2. Expropriation Proceedings Under Rule 67

• Expropriation must comply with both procedural and substantive requirements, but
procedural lapses may be remedied if they do not impair due process or public interest.
• Just compensation is the central issue, and procedural errors must not defeat the
purpose of determining fair compensation for property owners.

Conclusion
This case highlights the balance between procedural requirements and substantive justice in
expropriation cases. While compliance with Rule 7 is necessary, failure to strictly adhere does
not automatically result in dismissal, especially when public interest is at stake. The ruling
reinforces that substance prevails over technicalities, particularly in cases where national
infrastructure projects are involved.

Go vs. CA, Pilar and Henry Lim – G.R. No. 163745

(2007)
G.R. No. 163745
August 24, 2007
FERNANDO GO, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR LIM, and HENRY
LIM, Respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolutions dated January 23, 2004, and
May 26, 2004, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81488, which dismissed
petitioner’s certiorari petition challenging the Department of Justice (DOJ) Resolutions directing
the withdrawal of an estafa through falsification of public document charge against respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Fernando Go filed two complaint-affidavits for estafa and
falsification against his sister Pilar Lim and nephew Henry Lim. The complaints stemmed from a
dispute over a parcel of land in Cotabato City originally possessed by petitioner’s mother,
Laureana Lu. Laureana applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, and since she and Fernando
resided elsewhere, she allowed Pilar to occupy the property.

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-136 was issued to Laureana on March 18, 1976.
Petitioner alleged that Pilar received the title but did not turn it over to Laureana. Instead, Pilar
allegedly manipulated Laureana into executing several documents:
 1. A Waiver of Rights on July 28, 1976, where Laureana waived her right to the
application in favor of Henry.
2. A Waiver executed on August 6, 1976, signed by Fernando and his siblings,
relinquishing any objections to Laureana’s waiver in favor of Henry.
3. A Last Will and Testament on September 14, 1976, bequeathing the property to Henry.
4. A Deed of Absolute Sale on October 4, 1976, transferring ownership to Henry.

Fernando alleged these documents were executed through deceit and manipulation, claiming he
only learned of OCT No. P-136’s issuance on March 2, 1998, when notified of tax arrears. On
January 15, 2001, Henry transferred the title to his name.

RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE

Pilar countered that she occupied the property with Laureana and Fernando’s consent since 1957.
She asserted that Fernando was fully aware of Laureana’s application and had even witnessed the
execution of the Waiver of Rights, notarized by Atty. Edward P. David. Respondents presented:

• An affidavit from Atty. David affirming the due execution of the documents and
Laureana’s mental competence.
• Findings from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) confirming no alterations on
the documents.
• Statements that Laureana voluntarily transferred the property to Henry.

PROSECUTION AND DISMISSAL

After a preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged respondents with
estafa through falsification under Article 171, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-118643 in RTC-Quezon City, Branch 223. Respondents filed
an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation, which was denied, leading to the issuance of arrest
warrants.

Respondents sought reconsideration before the DOJ, arguing that:

1. The crime had prescribed since more than twenty years had elapsed since the documents
were executed in 1976.
2. The documents were notarized and thus presumed genuine.

On October 9, 2003, the DOJ ruled in favor of respondents, directing the withdrawal of the
information. The trial court granted the withdrawal on December 2, 2003.

COURT OF APPEALS RULING

Fernando Go filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed due
to procedural deficiencies:
 1. Petitioner submitted plain photocopies instead of certified true copies of the DOJ
Resolutions and RTC Order.
2. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping did not comply with Rule 7,
Section 4, as it failed to assert that allegations were based on authentic records.
3. No copy of the petition was served on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

SUPREME COURT DECISION

Issue 1: Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition on technical grounds?

• Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that strict adherence to procedural rules is
necessary, especially regarding verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Petitioner’s verification stated that the allegations were based on “personal knowledge
and belief,” which is insufficient under Rule 7, Section 4.
• Service to OSG: Petitioner failed to serve a copy to the OSG, which represents the DOJ
in appeals, violating Rule 65 in relation to Rule 46.
• Certified Copies: The requirement of certified true copies ensures accuracy in judicial
review. Petitioner’s failure to attach them was not excusable.

Issue 2: Was there probable cause for estafa through falsification?

• Ruling: No. The Supreme Court found that:

1. Petitioner was aware of Laureana’s application as early as 1970.
2. The Waiver’s language was clear, and petitioner had ample opportunity to contest
it.
3. The Waiver was notarized, carrying presumptive validity.
4. The DOJ correctly ruled that the crime had prescribed, as more than twenty years
had elapsed since execution of the documents.

LOWER COURT DECISIONS AND RATIONALE

1. City Prosecutor's Office:

• Found probable cause for estafa through falsification and filed charges.

2. RTC Quezon City, Branch 223:

• Initially issued arrest warrants.

• Later granted DOJ's motion to withdraw charges due to lack of probable cause and
prescription of the crime.

3. DOJ:

• Ruled that estafa through falsification had prescribed.

• Stated that notarized documents carry presumptive validity.
• Ordered withdrawal of the information.
 Court of Appeals:

• Dismissed certiorari petition due to procedural deficiencies.

• 5. Supreme Court: Court of Appeals:

o Dismissed Fernando Go's petition for certiorari due to technical deficiencies,
including:
§ The attached copies of the assailed resolutions and order were mere
photocopies.
§ The verification and certification of non-forum shopping did not fully
comply with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. 1

§ No copy of the petition was served on the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
o The court of appeals stated "As filed, the present petition for certiorari is infirmed
with deficiencies, to wit: 1. Copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Department
of Justice dated October 9, 2003 and November 21, 2003 and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated December 2, 2003 attached to the petition are mere
plain photocopies (Sec. 3, Rule 46, Rules of Court). 2. The verification and
certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition does not fully comply
with Section 4 as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, ibid., because it does
not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct
based on authentic records. 3. No copy of the petition has been served on the
Office of the Solicitor General which represents the Secretary of Justice on
appeal. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED."

Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• The primary issue related to Rule 7 was the sufficiency of the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
o Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that the verification did not "fully comply
with Section 4 as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, ibid., because it does
not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct
based on authentic records."
o The Supreme court stated "Under Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, a
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based
on authentic records. Mere belief is insufficient basis and negates the verification
which should be on the basis of personal knowledge or authentic records.
Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition
have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely
speculative."

Supreme Court Decision and Disposition:

 • The Supreme Court denied Fernando Go's petition.
• The Court upheld the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition for certiorari, agreeing
with the technical deficiencies cited by the appellate court.
• The Supreme Court also agreed with the DOJ's finding of no probable cause for estafa
through falsification of public document.
• The Supreme court stated "WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81488 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED."

• Affirmed CA's dismissal.

• Ruled that procedural rules must be followed strictly.
• Declared that estafa through falsification was barred by prescription.

DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition for
certiorari is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Vallacar Transit vs. Catubig – G.R. No. 175512 (2011)

Background:

• Case type: Action for recovery of damages based on quasi-delict (Article 2180, in
relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code).
• Parties: Vallacar Transit, Inc. (Petitioner, bus company) vs. Jocelyn Catubig
(Respondent, wife of deceased Quintin Catubig, Jr.).
• Incident: Vehicular collision between a Ceres Bulilit bus (Vallacar Transit) driven by
Quirino Cabanilla and a motorcycle driven by Quintin Catubig, Jr., resulting in the deaths
of Catubig and his employee, Teddy Emperado.

Claims and Arguments:

• Respondent (Jocelyn Catubig): Claims Vallacar Transit is civilly liable for damages due
to the negligence of its employee driver, Cabanilla, causing the death of her husband.
• Petitioner (Vallacar Transit): Argues the proximate cause was the sole negligence of
Catubig, who imprudently overtook at a curve. Also, claims respondent's complaint
should be dismissed for lack of verification and failure to state a cause of action (no
allegation of negligence in selection/supervision of employee).

Reasons of both parties:

 • Respondent: Based on Article 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, employer's vicarious
liability for employee's negligence.
• Petitioner: Catubig's negligence was the sole cause; no negligence from Cabanilla or
Vallacar Transit in selection/supervision.

Why they filed the case:

• Respondent: To recover damages (actual, moral, exemplary) for the death of her husband
due to alleged negligence of Vallacar Transit's driver.
• Petitioner: To defend against the claim and seek dismissal of the case.

How they filed the case:

• Respondent: Filed a Complaint for Damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Main issue connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• Petitioner argued that respondent's complaint should be dismissed for not being verified
properly, citing Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

Decisions of lower court (RTC):

• RTC Decision: Dismissed respondent's complaint and counterclaim.

• RTC Reason: Proximate cause of collision was Catubig's negligence in overtaking at a
curve. Vallacar Transit exercised due diligence in selection and supervision of drivers.
• RTC Law Wordings: "WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the
[herein petitioner] that the [herein respondent's] husband is the reckless and negligent
driver and not the driver of the [petitioner], the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
dismissed. [Petitioner's] counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit."

Decisions of Court of Appeals (CA):

• CA Decision: Modified RTC decision, ruled Vallacar Transit is equally liable and
awarded P250,000.00 to Catubig's heirs.
• CA Reason: Both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent. Catubig for overtaking at a
curve, Cabanilla for driving at high speed (100 km/h). Rejected Vallacar Transit's due
diligence defense.

Decisions of Supreme Court (SC) and its disposition:

• SC Decision: Granted Vallacar Transit's petition, set aside CA decision, and reinstated
RTC decision dismissing the complaint.
• SC Reason:
o Verification issue: Complaint was valid despite lack of verification. Verification
is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement and not always mandatory for
complaints.
 o Negligence: CA erred in finding Cabanilla negligent. Proximate cause was solely
Catubig's negligence in overtaking at a curve. Evidence for Cabanilla's speeding
was weak/inconsistent. Catubig's reckless overtaking was the direct cause.
o Vicarious Liability: Since Cabanilla was not negligent, Vallacar Transit cannot
be held vicariously liable. No need to assess due diligence.
• SC Disposition: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision SET ASIDE. RTC Decision
REINSTATED (dismissing Civil Case No. 11360).

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Based on the provided Supreme Court decision, here are the facts of the case VALLACAR
TRANSIT, INC. VS. JOCELYN CATUBIG, presented in a detailed manner focusing on your
requested points:

Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Vallacar Transit, Inc. against Jocelyn Catubig. It seeks to review and reverse the
Court of Appeals' (CA) decision which modified the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
decision in a prior case. The original case was a civil action for recovery of damages
based on Article 2180 (vicarious liability of employers) in relation to Article
2176 (quasi-delict - negligence) of the Civil Code.
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioner: Vallacar Transit, Inc., a transportation company and owner of Ceres
Bulilit buses.
o Respondent: Jocelyn Catubig, the wife of the deceased Quintin Catubig, Jr. She
filed the case in her capacity as the surviving spouse to claim damages for her
husband's death.
• Incident: On January 27, 1994, a vehicular collision occurred involving:
o A Ceres Bulilit bus owned by Petitioner Vallacar Transit, Inc., driven by their
employee, Quirino C. Cabanilla.
o A motorcycle driven by Quintin Catubig, Jr., with his employee, Teddy
Emperado, as a passenger in tandem.
o The collision happened around kilometers 59 and 60 as Catubig was trying to
overtake a slow-moving ten-wheeler cargo truck while approaching a curve. In
doing so, Catubig crossed into the opposite lane, colliding with the oncoming
Ceres Bulilit bus.
o Both Quintin Catubig, Jr. and Teddy Emperado died as a result of the collision.

Claims and Arguments:

• Respondent Jocelyn Catubig's Claims:

o Filed a Complaint for Damages against Vallacar Transit, Inc. in the RTC.
 o Sought actual, moral, and exemplary damages totaling ₱484,000.00 for the
death of her husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr.
o Alleged that Vallacar Transit, Inc. was civilly liable because their employee
driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus that collided with
her husband's motorcycle.
o Based her claim on Article 2180 (employer's liability for employee's acts)
and Article 2176 (quasi-delict) of the Civil Code.
• Petitioner Vallacar Transit, Inc.'s Arguments and Defenses:
o In their Answer with Counterclaim, Petitioner argued that the sole and
proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Quintin Catubig,
Jr. Catubig imprudently overtook at a curve and entered the bus's lane.
o As a special and affirmative defense, Petitioner sought dismissal of the
complaint on two grounds:
1. Lack of Verification: Respondent's complaint was allegedly not properly
verified.
2. Failure to State a Cause of Action: The complaint lacked an allegation
that Vallacar Transit, Inc. was negligent in the selection or supervision of
its employee driver, Cabanilla.
o Petitioner presented evidence to show they exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their drivers.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Respondent Jocelyn Catubig: Filed the case to seek financial compensation for the
loss of her husband's life, citing the alleged negligence of Vallacar Transit's employee
driver as the cause of the fatal accident. She aimed to recover damages to address the
financial and emotional impact of her husband's death.
• Petitioner Vallacar Transit, Inc.: Defended the case to avoid liability for damages.
They argued that they were not negligent and that the accident was solely caused by the
deceased, Quintin Catubig, Jr.'s recklessness. They also aimed to dismiss the case on
procedural and legal technicalities (lack of verification, failure to state a cause of action).

How the Case Was Filed:

• Initial Filing: Respondent Jocelyn Catubig initiated the legal action by filing
a Complaint for Damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of
Dumaguete City, docketed as Civil Case No. 11360. This is a civil case, filed to claim
monetary compensation for damages arising from a quasi-delict.
• Appeal to the Court of Appeals: After the RTC dismissed her complaint, Respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
66815. This is an appellate procedure to review and potentially reverse the RTC's
decision.
• Petition to the Supreme Court: After the CA modified the RTC decision in favor of
Respondent, Petitioner Vallacar Transit, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with the Supreme Court (SC) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This is
 the highest level of appeal in the Philippines, seeking to review errors of law made by the
Court of Appeals.

Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• Petitioner's Argument on Verification: Vallacar Transit, Inc. argued that

Respondent's Complaint for Damages should be dismissed because it was not
properly verified. They pointed out that while a "certification against forum shopping"
was attached, it did not substitute for a proper verification. They cited jurisprudence
stating that a pleading lacking proper verification is considered an unsigned pleading,
producing no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
• RULE 7, SECTION 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10):

SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,

pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information

and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

• Supreme Court's Ruling on Verification: The Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's

argument regarding the lack of verification as a ground for dismissal. The SC clarified:
o Verification is generally not mandatory: Unless specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings do not need to be verified. A complaint for damages based on
quasi-delict does not fall under the exceptions requiring mandatory verification.
o Formal, not Jurisdictional: Verification is a formal requirement, not
jurisdictional. Its purpose is to ensure good faith and truthfulness of allegations,
not to confer jurisdiction to the court.
o Substantial Compliance: The complaint was accompanied by a certificate
against forum shopping, and verification defects can be waived by the court in the
interest of justice.
o Distinction between Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping: The SC emphasized that these are distinct requirements, serving
different purposes. A certificate against forum shopping is mandatory for
initiatory pleadings, while verification is only required in specific instances.

Decisions of Lower Courts and Supreme Court:

• Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Dumaguete City (January
26, 2000):
o Decision: Dismissed Respondent's Complaint for Damages and Petitioner's
Counterclaim.
 o Reasoning: The RTC found that based on the evidence, particularly the police
sketch and witness testimonies, the proximate cause of the collision was the
recklessness and negligence of Quintin Catubig, Jr., the driver of the
motorcycle, not the bus driver, Cabanilla.
o The RTC highlighted that Catubig overtook a truck while approaching a curve,
encroaching on the bus's lane, which is a violation of traffic rules and constitutes
reckless driving.
o The RTC also stated it was convinced that Vallacar Transit exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its drivers.
o Law Wordings of RTC Decision:

"WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the [herein

petitioner] that the [herein respondent's] husband is the reckless and negligent
driver and not the driver of the [petitioner], the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered dismissed.

[Petitioner's] counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit."

• Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815 (November 17,
2005):
o Decision: Modified the RTC decision. Ruled that Petitioner Vallacar Transit,
Inc. is equally liable for the accident.
o Award: Awarded ₱250,000.00 as full compensation for the death of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. to his heirs.
o Reasoning: The CA found both Quintin Catubig, Jr. and Quirino Cabanilla to
be negligent.
§ Catubig's Negligence: Failed to exercise care for his safety by overtaking
at a curve.
§ Cabanilla's Negligence: Was driving at a high speed of 100 kilometers
per hour.
§ The CA dismissed Vallacar Transit's defense of due diligence in selection
and supervision, stating that their witness, Maypa, was not in a position to
testify about Cabanilla's hiring procedures as Maypa joined the company
after Cabanilla was already employed.

o Resolution Denying Motion for Reconsideration (November 16, 2006): The

CA denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, upholding their original
decision.
• Decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 176496 (March 5, 2010):
o Decision: Granted the Petition for Review of Vallacar Transit, Inc. Reversed
and Set Aside the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution. Reinstated the
Regional Trial Court's Decision dismissing Civil Case No. 11360.
o Reasoning:
 § Verification Issue: The SC affirmed the validity of the complaint despite
the verification issue, as discussed above.
§ Negligence and Proximate Cause: The SC disagreed with the CA's
finding of contributory negligence. The SC sided with the RTC's
assessment, finding that the proximate cause of the collision was solely
the negligence of Quintin Catubig, Jr. in overtaking at a curve.
§ Lack of Evidence of Cabanilla's Negligence: The SC found the evidence
presented to prove Cabanilla's speeding (testimony of Cadimas and PO2
Elnas) to be unreliable and [Link]'s statement about "very
fast" was vague, and PO2 Elnas's testimony about 100 km/h was based on
hearsay (what Cabanilla allegedly told him) and contradicted his earlier
statements during the criminal preliminary investigation.
§ Catubig's Reckless Act: The SC emphasized that Catubig's act of
overtaking at a curve was a direct violation of traffic rules and a clear act
of recklessness, making it the proximate and decisive cause of the
accident.
§ No Vicarious Liability for Vallacar Transit: Since the SC concluded
that Cabanilla was not negligent, the presumption of employer's
negligence under Article 2180 did not arise. Thus, Vallacar Transit could
not be held vicariously liable. The SC deemed it unnecessary to delve into
Vallacar Transit's due diligence defense.
o Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated November 17, 2005 and Resolution dated November 16, 2006 of the Court
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815 are SET ASIDE and the Decision dated
January 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City,
dismissing Civil Case No. 11360 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

In summary, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Vallacar Transit, Inc., exonerating
them from liability and reaffirming that the tragic accident was caused solely by the negligent
actions of the deceased, Quintin Catubig, Jr. The procedural issue on verification was also
resolved, clarifying the rules on pleading verification in Philippine jurisdiction.

Verification in Vallacar Transit vs. Catubig (G.R. No. 175512, 2011)

1. Petitioner's Argument on Verification (Rule 7, Section 4, Rules of Court)

• Vallacar Transit, Inc. argued that Jocelyn Catubig’s Complaint for Damages should
be dismissed because it was not properly verified.
• They cited Rule 7, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which states that a pleading
requiring verification but lacking it shall be treated as an unsigned pleading,
producing no legal effect.
 • Vallacar Transit claimed that since the complaint was unverified, it was procedurally
defective and should have been dismissed outright.

2. Supreme Court's Ruling on Verification

The Supreme Court rejected Vallacar Transit’s argument and ruled that the lack of verification
did not invalidate the complaint for the following reasons:

✅ Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement

• The purpose of verification is to ensure that the allegations are made in good
faith and not merely speculative or baseless.
• However, failure to verify does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the case.
✅ Verification is not always mandatory

• Under Rule 7, Section 4, not all pleadings require verification—only those specifically
required by law or rule.
• A complaint for damages based on quasi-delict (negligence) does not require
mandatory verification.
✅
Substantial Compliance Doctrine

• The complaint was accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, which is a

separate requirement from verification.
• The Supreme Court allows relaxation of procedural rules when the interests of
justice demand it.
✅
Verification vs. Certification Against Forum Shopping

• The Court emphasized that verification and certification against forum

shopping serve different purposes:
o Verification ensures the allegations are made in good faith.
o Certification Against Forum Shopping ensures that the same case is not filed in
multiple courts.
• Since only the latter is mandatory, the lack of verification was not fatal to the case.

3.🚨Supreme Court's Conclusion

Final Ruling: The lack of verification did not render the complaint void. The
case proceeded on its merits, and the Court dismissed Vallacar Transit’s argument on
procedural grounds.
🔹 Key Takeaway: In civil cases, verification is a procedural formality and not a jurisdictional
requirement. Courts may excuse defects in verification when substantial compliance is shown
and when justice is best served.

Pagadora vs. Ilao – G.R. No. 16576 (2011)

Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Edito Pagadora (Petitioner) against Julieta S. Ilao (Respondent). Petitioner is
challenging the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed his appeal
from the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) judgment. The RTC judgment had reversed the
Metropolitan Trial Court's (MeTC) decision in a forcible entry case originally filed by
Respondent against Petitioner.
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioner: Edito Pagadora, the defendant in the original forcible entry case, and
the petitioner in this Supreme Court case.
o Respondent: Julieta S. Ilao, the plaintiff in the original forcible entry case, and
the respondent in this Supreme Court case.
• Disputed Property: The case concerns a 482-square-meter portion of land in Burgos,
Rodriguez, Rizal. This portion is within the perimeter fence of Petitioner's property but is
claimed by Respondent as part of a larger 5,148 sq m land she purchased.
• Timeline of Events:
o November 1997: Respondent Julieta Ilao purchased a 5,148 sq m land through a
Contract to Sell. A condition of the contract was the relocation of boundaries and
fence construction.
o Post-Purchase (1997-1998): Respondent commissioned a survey of her property.
Petitioner Edito Pagadora, occupant of the adjacent lot, allegedly hindered the
surveyor's work.
o February 16, 1998: Respondent obtained a Fencing Permit.
o March 2, 1998: When Respondent attempted to fence her property, Petitioner
allegedly prevented her workers, threatening them with bodily harm and claiming
ownership of the disputed portion.
o March 24, 1998: Respondent filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against
Petitioner in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Rodriguez, Rizal.
o September 18, 2000: MeTC dismissed Respondent's complaint.
o January 12, 2004: Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC decision,
ruling in favor of Respondent.
o June 8, 2004: Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal on technical
grounds.
o October 20, 2004: CA denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Claims and Arguments:

• Respondent Julieta Ilao's Claims (in MeTC Complaint):

o Filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Petitioner Edito Pagadora in the
MeTC.
o Alleged that Petitioner, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and
stealth, took possession of a 482-square-meter portion of her property by
preventing her survey and fencing activities and erecting galvanized sheets.
o Claimed Petitioner threatened her workers with bodily harm and brandished a
gun.
o Sought to recover possession of the disputed portion and damages.
• Petitioner Edito Pagadora's Arguments/Defenses:
o In MeTC:
§ Denied forcible entry.
§ Asserted open and peaceful possession of the disputed property since 1986
as part of his wife's inheritance.
§ Argued the MeTC lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was
insufficient to constitute forcible entry as it lacked specific dates and did
not allege Respondent's prior physical possession.
o In RTC Appeal: Maintained MeTC lacked jurisdiction and Respondent failed to
prove forcible entry.
o In CA Petition:
§ Argued the CA erred in dismissing his appeal on technicalities (defective
verification, improper service).
§ Reiterated lack of MeTC jurisdiction and Respondent's failure to prove
forcible entry and prior possession.
§ Questioned the validity and consideration of the LRA surveyor's report.
o In SC Petition:
§ Focused on the CA's procedural errors in dismissing his appeal and
advocated for a liberal interpretation of procedural rules.
§ Reiterated substantive arguments about lack of jurisdiction and failure to
prove forcible entry.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Respondent Julieta Ilao: Filed the Forcible Entry case to regain possession of the 482-
square-meter portion of land she believed was part of her purchased property and to stop
Petitioner from preventing her from surveying and fencing it. She sought a summary
ejectment proceeding to quickly resolve the possession issue.
• Petitioner Edito Pagadora: Defended the case to maintain his possession of the
disputed land, which he claimed was part of his family's inherited property. He appealed
the RTC's decision to overturn it and reinstate the MeTC's dismissal, arguing that the case
was improperly filed as forcible entry and that he was the rightful possessor. He further
appealed to the SC when the CA dismissed his petition on technicalities, seeking a ruling
on the merits of the case.
How the Case Was Filed:

• Initial Filing: Respondent filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry in the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Rodriguez, Rizal (Civil Case No. 1083). Forcible entry cases
fall under the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
• Appeal to RTC: Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 (Civil Case No. 1581-01-SM) after the MeTC dismissed her
complaint. Appeals from MeTC decisions in forcible entry cases are taken to the RTC.
• Petition for Review to CA: Petitioner, after losing in the RTC, filed a Petition for
Review with the Court of Appeals (CA) (CA-G.R. SP No. 83933). This was to appeal
the RTC's decision.
• Petition for Review to SC: Petitioner, after the CA dismissed his petition, filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court (SC)
(G.R. No. 165769). This is the final appeal to the highest court, focusing on errors of law
by the CA.

Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• Issue: The Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal due to a defective

verification attached to his Petition for Review. The CA found that the verification did
not comply with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-
2-10-SC.
• RULE 7, SECTION 4 (Verification):

SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,

pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

> A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records. > > A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

• Defect in Petitioner's Verification: The original verification in Petitioner's CA petition

stated that the allegations were "true and correct to the best of [his] personal knowledge
and honest belief," which is considered defective. It should have stated "true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records."
• Petitioner's Rectification: In his Motion for Reconsideration in the CA, Petitioner
attached a corrected verification that complied with Rule 7, Section 4.

Decisions of Lower Courts and Supreme Court:

• Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Rodriguez, Rizal (September

18, 2000):
o Decision: Dismissed Respondent's Complaint for Forcible Entry.
 o Reasoning: The MeTC held that Respondent failed to establish her cause of
action for forcible entry. It found that Respondent did not prove Petitioner had
encroached on her property.
o Law Wordings of MeTC Decision:

"WHEREFORE, x x x the Court below has no choice but to dismiss as it hereby

dismisses, the instant complaint for failure of plaintiff to establish its (sic) cause
of action and prevail with the evidence it (she) had against the defendant.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED."

• Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75
(January 12, 2004):
o Decision: Reversed the MeTC decision and ruled in favor of Respondent.
o Order:
1. Ordered Petitioner to vacate the 482-square-meter portion and surrender
possession to Respondent.
2. Ordered Petitioner to remove galvanized sheets encroaching on
Respondent's property.
3. Ordered Petitioner to pay ₱30,000.00 attorney’s fees.
o Law Wordings of RTC Decision:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court

reversing the Decision of the MeTC of Rodriguez, Rizal dated September 18,
2000 and ordering:

1. the defendant, Edito Pagadora, to immediately vacate the portion of land

that forms part of the property of the plaintiff to the extent of 482 square
meters and surrender possession of the same to the plaintiff;
2. to immediately remove the galvanized sheets on the portion of the
property encroaching on the property of the plaintiff; and >
3. to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED."

• Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83933 (June 8, 2004
and October 20, 2004):
o Decision: Dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Review and denied Motion for
Reconsideration.
o Reasoning: The CA dismissed the petition on technicalities:
1. Defective Verification: The initial verification did not comply with Rule
7, Section 4.
 2. Improper Service: Lack of written explanation for serving the petition by
registered mail instead of personal service, violating Section 11, Rule
13.
• Decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 165769 (December 12, 2011):
o Decision: Granted the Petition for Review. Set Aside the CA Resolutions
and Reinstated the MeTC Decision dismissing the Complaint for Forcible Entry.
o Reasoning of the SC:
§ Liberal Interpretation of Rules: The SC emphasized that procedural
rules should be liberally construed to facilitate justice and that
technicalities should not prevail over the merits of a case.
§ Verification is Formal, Not Jurisdictional: The SC reiterated that
verification is a formal requirement intended to ensure good faith, not
jurisdictional. Defects can be corrected, and courts can even waive strict
compliance. Petitioner's subsequent submission of a proper verification in
his Motion for Reconsideration in the CA constituted substantial
compliance.
§ Sufficient Explanation for Service by Mail: The SC found that
Petitioner did provide an explanation for service by mail ("unavailability
of messenger and distance constraints"), although it was mistakenly
labeled and described the wrong pleading. The CA should have considered
this explanation and exercised discretion liberally.
§ Lack of Cause of Action for Forcible Entry: The SC agreed with
Petitioner that Respondent's complaint failed to establish a cause of
action for forcible entry. The complaint lacked allegations of
Respondent's prior physical possession and did not clearly show that
Petitioner's actions constituted dispossession of Respondent's prior
possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
§ Jurisdiction of MeTC: Because the complaint did not sufficiently allege
forcible entry, the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the case. The dispute
was actually a boundary/ownership dispute beyond the summary
jurisdiction of the MeTC in a forcible entry action. The SC highlighted
that Respondent's actions were attempts to establish possession for
the first time after purchasing the property, not to recover possession
already lost through forcible entry.
§ Summary Nature of Forcible Entry: The SC emphasized that forcible
entry is a summary remedy to protect actual possession and prevent
breaches of peace, not to resolve ownership disputes. The case was not
suitable for summary ejectment proceedings.
o Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83933, dated June 8, 2004 and October 20, 2004,
respectively affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 1581-01-SM, and denying reconsideration,
are SET ASIDE. The September 18, 2000 decision of the Metropolitan Trial
 Court of Rodriguez, Rizal in Civil Case No. 1083, dismissing the complaint for
forcible entry filed by respondent Julieta Ilao, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Explanation for SC Decision:

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MeTC's dismissal primarily
because:

1. Procedural Technicalities Should Not Trump Substantial Justice: The CA erred in

dismissing the case solely on technical grounds (verification and service) without
considering the merits. The SC emphasized that courts should be liberal in applying
procedural rules to ensure cases are decided on their substance rather than on minor
formal defects, especially when there is substantial compliance and a plausible
explanation for any lapse.
2. Lack of Jurisdiction of MeTC in Forcible Entry: More importantly, the SC found that
the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case because Respondent's
complaint failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action for forcible entry. The essential
element of prior physical possession by the Plaintiff and dispossession through FISTS
(Force, Intimidation, Strategy, Threat, Stealth) by the Defendant was missing in the
complaint. The allegations indicated that Respondent was trying to establish possession
for the first time and was prevented by Petitioner who was already in possession,
claiming ownership. This transformed the case into a boundary/ownership dispute, which
is beyond the MeTC's jurisdiction in a summary ejectment proceeding.
3. Nature of Forcible Entry Action: Forcible entry is a summary remedy designed to
protect prior possessors from violent dispossession and maintain peace. It is not meant to
resolve complex ownership disputes. The SC found that the real issue was ownership and
boundaries, which requires a different type of action in a court of proper jurisdiction.

In essence, the SC prioritized substantial justice over procedural technicalities and correctly
identified that the core issue was not forcible entry but a boundary dispute that the MeTC was
not competent to resolve in a summary ejectment proceeding.

How is Rule 7, Section 4 Involved?

Rule 7, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states that a petition must be verified properly—
meaning the person filing it must affirm that the statements are true based on personal
knowledge or authentic records.

• Pagadora's mistake: His verification said the petition was "true to the best of [his]
knowledge and honest belief," which did not meet the legal requirement.
• Because of this mistake, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed his appeal, without even
looking at the merits of his case.
 • Pagadora corrected the mistake later and argued that the CA should have
been lenient instead of dismissing his case over a minor technicality.

What Did the Supreme Court (SC) Decide?

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pagadora and reinstated the MeTC’s original
decision, meaning Ilao’s complaint for Forcible Entry was dismissed.

Reasons:

1. Procedural rules should be applied flexibly – The SC said that courts should focus on
the actual issues, not just technical errors. Pagadora had already corrected the
verification mistake.
2. Verification is a formality, not a requirement for jurisdiction – The verification is
meant to ensure good faith, but a minor defect should not cause automatic dismissal.
3. The case was not really Forcible Entry – The SC found that Ilao never had prior
physical possession of the disputed land. Forcible Entry cases require proving that a
person was forcefully removed from a land they were already occupying, which Ilao
failed to prove. Instead, this was a boundary dispute, which should be settled in a
different legal case.

Final Outcome:

• The Supreme Court reinstated the MeTC's decision dismissing Ilao’s Forcible Entry
complaint.
• The Court of Appeals was wrong to dismiss Pagadora’s appeal just because of a small
mistake in verification.
• Ilao lost the case, and Pagadora kept possession of the disputed land.

Joven vs. Sps. Tulio – G.R. No. 204567 (2021)

Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Emiliano D. Joven and Cicero V. Garcia (Petitioners) assailing
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed their Petition for Review
on technical grounds. The original case was a Forcible Entry case filed by Petitioners
against Spouses Raul L. Tulio and Cristina Panganiban Tulio (Respondents) in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC).
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioners: Emiliano D. Joven and Cicero V. Garcia, lessees of the commercial
property and operators of J-G Shopping Mall.
 o Respondents: Spouses Raul L. Tulio and Cristina Panganiban Tulio, lessors and
registered owners of the commercial land.
• Subject Matter: A parcel of commercial land located in San Fernando, Pampanga,
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 429707-12 in the name of
Respondents.
• Lease Agreement: On August 14, 1997, Respondents leased the subject property to
Petitioners for 15 years, from November 1, 1999, to October 31, 2013. Petitioners built a
two-story commercial building named J-G Shopping Mall on the land.
• Rental Dispute and Eviction:
o Petitioners incurred a rental balance of ₱1,000,000.00 out of a ₱3,000,000.00
obligation for the period of November 1, 1999, to June 30, 2000.
o Respondents claimed Petitioners issued two dishonored checks.
o On June 3, 2000, Respondents, accompanied by a lawyer and security guards,
served a Notice of Eviction to Petitioners' security guards at J-G Shopping Mall.
o Respondents barricaded the mall's administration office and notified tenants of
their repossession of the mall.
o Respondents ordered Petitioners' security guards to leave the premises.

Claims and Arguments:

• Petitioners Joven and Garcia's Claims (in the Forcible Entry Case):
o Filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Respondents in the MTCC.
o Argued that Respondents forcibly evicted them from J-G Shopping Mall on June
3, 2000.
• Respondents Tulio's Arguments (in the Forcible Entry Case):
o Maintained they did not commit forcible entry.
o Argued their repossession was lawful due to Petitioners' unpaid rent.
• Petitioners Joven and Garcia's Arguments (in the CA and SC):
o Assailed the CA's Resolutions dismissing their Petition for Review on
technicalities.
o Claimed the CA's dismissal resulted in manifest injustice.
o Argued their Verification and Certification against forum shopping substantially
complied with procedural rules.
o Contended that the CA was unclear about the required documents and pleadings.
o Advocated for a decision based on the merits of the case, not technicalities.
• Respondents Tulio's Arguments (in the CA and SC):
o Defended the CA's dismissal of Petitioners' Petition for Review.
o Maintained the CA correctly applied procedural rules.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Petitioners Joven and Garcia: Filed the Forcible Entry case to regain possession of J-G
Shopping Mall, claiming they were unlawfully evicted by Respondents. They filed the
Petition for Review in the CA and SC to overturn the RTC decision that was unfavorable
to them and to challenge the CA's dismissal of their petition based on technicalities.
 • Respondents Tulio: Re-entered and took possession of J-G Shopping Mall due to
Petitioners' alleged breach of the lease agreement (unpaid rent). They defended against
the Forcible Entry case to maintain their possession and avoid liability. They defended
the CA's dismissal to uphold the procedural rules and finalize the case in their favor.

How the Case Was Filed:

• Initial Filing: Petitioners filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Respondents in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Branch I of San Fernando,
Pampanga (Civil Case No. 8220).
• Appeal to the RTC: Both parties appealed the MTCC decision to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 43 of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga.
• Petition for Review to the CA: Petitioners, dissatisfied with the RTC's rulings, filed
a Rule 42 Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA) (CA-G.R. SP No.
125036).
• Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC: Petitioners, after the CA dismissed their
petition, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court (SC).

Decisions of Lower Courts:

• Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Branch I of the City of San
Fernando (February 17, 2003):
o Decision: Declared that Respondents did not commit forcible entry and were in
lawful possession. Dismissed the Forcible Entry Complaint.
o Orders:
1. Declared Respondents in lawful possession of the leased premises
effective June 3, 2000.
2. Ordered Respondents to reimburse Petitioners one-half (1/2) of the value
of improvements (to be determined by an independent appraiser).
3. Ordered Respondents to refund Petitioners unused advance rentals of
₱2,250,000.00.
4. Dismissed Respondents' counterclaim.
o Law Wordings of MTCC Decision:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring defendants to be in lawful possession and custody of the leased

premises, effective June 3, 2000;
2. Ordering defendants to reimburse plaintiffs one-half (1/2) of the value of
the improvements at the time of the termination of the lease,
made/introduced on the leased property, to be determined by an
independent appraiser of property chosen by both parties;
3. Ordering defendants to refund to the plaintiffs the advance unused rentals
on the leased premises in the amount of P2,250,000.00; and
4. DISMISSING the counter-claim for lack of merit.
 5. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED."

• Flip-Flopping Rulings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 43 of the City of
San Fernando, Pampanga:
o First RTC Judgment (May 30, 2005):
§ Decision: Affirmed the MTCC decision with modifications favorable to
Respondents.
§ Orders:
1. Declared Respondents in lawful possession.
2. Ordered Respondents to refund only ₱500,000.00 as unused
rentals.
3. Declared that improvements become Respondents' property
without obligation to reimburse Petitioners.
4. Dismissed Respondents' counterclaim.
§ Law Wordings of First RTC Judgment:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the lower court is

AFFIRMED with modification.

1. Declaring the defendants to be in lawful possession and custody of

the leased premises effective June 03, 2000.
2. Ordering the defendants to refund to the plaintiffs the unused rental
on the leased property in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00);
3. The building and permanent improvements existing at the time of
termination of the Contract of Lease shall form part of the leased
property and shall become the property of the defendants free and
clear of any and all liens, encumbrances, charges or claims of
whatever nature, without obligation on the part of the defendants to
pay or refund their value or costs to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
shall execute, sign and deliver any and all documents necessary to
evidence transfer of ownership of the building and improvements
to the defendants;
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendants for lack of merit.
5. No costs.

SO ORDERED."

o Second RTC Judgment (October 6, 2011):

§ Decision: Reconsidered and overturned the first RTC judgment, ruling in
favor of Petitioners.
§ Orders:
1. Declared Respondents guilty of forcible entry.
 2. Ordered Respondents to reimburse Petitioners one-half (1/2) of the
building value (₱12,000,000.00).
3. Ordered Respondents to refund ₱2,250,000.00 advance rentals and
₱300,000.00 VAT.
4. Dismissed Respondents' counterclaim.
§ Law Wordings of Second RTC Judgment:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of May 30, 2005 is

reconsidered.

1. Declaring forcible entry in the repossession of the defendants on

the leased property;
2. Ordering the defendants to reimburse the plaintiffs one-half (1/2)
of the value of the building or P12 Million Pesos;
3. Ordering the defendants to refund P2,250,000.00 to the plaintiffs
as advance rentals, as well as the P300,000.00 for VAT on the 15th
year of the Contract of Lease;
4. Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.
5. No costs.

SO ORDERED."

o Third RTC Order (May 15, 2012):

§ Decision: Partly granted Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration,
modifying the second RTC judgment to be closer to the first RTC
judgment and MTCC decision.
§ Orders (Modified):
1. Declared Respondents in lawful possession.
2. Declared improvements become Respondents' property without
reimbursement.
3. Ordered Respondents to refund ₱250,000.00 as excess payment of
rentals.
4. Dismissed Respondents' counterclaim.
§ Law Wordings of Third RTC Order (Modified Dispositive Portion):

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration

filed by defendants-appellees Spouses Raul L. Tulio and Cristina
Panganiban-Tulio is PARTLY GRANTED.

Par. 1, page 7 of the dispositive portion of the Judgment (Order) dated

October 6, 2011 is modified, thus:

(1) Declaring the defendants to be in lawful possession and custody of the

leased premises effective June 3, 2000;

Par. 2 thereof is modified, thus:

 (2) The building and permanent improvements existing at the time of the
termination of the Contract of Lease to form part of the leased property
and shall become the property of the defendants-appellees free and clear
of any and all encumbrances, charges or claims of whatever nature,
without obligation on the part of the defendants-appellees to pay or refund
their value or costs to the plaintiffs-appellants. The plaintiffs-appellants
upon finality of this Order, shall execute, sign and deliver any and all
documents necessary to evidence transfer of ownership of the
improvements to the defendants-appellees.

Par. 3 thereof is modified, thus:

Ordering the defendants-appellees to refund to plaintiffs-appellants the

sum of P250,000.00, representing the excess of the amount paid to them
by the latter, after applying the amount of P2,000,000.00 as payment for
the rentals of the leased premises from November 1, 1999 to June 2, 2000.

The dismissal of defendants-appellees counter-claim stands, as well as the

non-pronouncement of costs.

Upon finality of this Order, the complete records of this case are ordered
remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED."

• Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125036 (July 24, 2012
and November 13, 2012):
o Decision: Dismissed Petitioners' Rule 42 Petition for Review outright on
technical grounds.
o Reasons for Dismissal (July 24, 2012 Resolution):
1. Defective Affidavit of Service: Notary Public failed to indicate
commission number, place of commission, and office address.
2. Defective Verification and Certification: Signed by only one Petitioner,
and Notary Public had the same defects as in the Affidavit of Service.
3. Non-Attachment of Supporting Documents: No copies of RTC and MTCC
pleadings and documents were attached.
o Resolution Denying Motion for Reconsideration (November 13,
2012): Denied Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
o Law Wordings of CA Resolution (July 24, 2012):

"WHEREFORE, on account thereof, this petition is hereby DISMISSED outright.

SO ORDERED."

Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

 • Issue: Defect in the Verification and Certification against forum shopping attached to the
Petition for Review filed in the Court of Appeals, specifically the notary public's failure
to indicate complete notarial details and that only one petitioner signed the Verification
and Certification. This relates to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING,
particularly Section 4 (Verification) and Section 5 (Certification Against Forum
Shopping) of the Rules of Court.
• Supreme Court's Decision on Rule 7 Issue: The SC held that the CA erred in
dismissing the Petition outright based on these technical defects. The SC ruled that:
o Substantial Compliance on Verification and Certification: The Verification
and Certification, signed by one petitioner, substantially complied with the rules
because both petitioners share a common interest. The signature of one is
sufficient in such cases.
o Defect in Notarization is Formal, Curable: The notary public's omission of
details is a formal defect, not jurisdictional. It is curable and was cured by
Petitioners submitting the Notarial Commission of the notary public.
o Liberal Interpretation of Rules: Technical rules should not be applied rigidly to
defeat substantial justice. Courts can relax rules of procedure when strict
adherence would cause injustice, especially when there is substantial compliance
and the defects are curable.

Full and Detailed Decisions of SC and Explanation:

• Supreme Court's Decision: Granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari, reversed and
set aside the CA Resolutions, and reinstated CA-G.R. SP No. 125036 for resolution on
the merits.
• Reasons for SC Decision:
o Technicalities vs. Substantial Justice: The SC emphasized that procedural rules
are meant to facilitate justice, not to thwart it. Dismissing a case based on minor
technicalities, especially when there is substantial compliance, sacrifices
substantive justice.
o Substantial Compliance with Verification and Certification: The SC applied
the principle of substantial compliance, finding that the verification and
certification were adequate despite the noted defects.
§ Common Interest: Petitioners shared a common interest, justifying one
signature on the certification.
§ Formal Defect in Notarization: The notary's omissions were formal and
curable, and Petitioners promptly rectified them.
o Premature Dismissal by CA: The CA should not have dismissed the petition
outright for lack of attachments without specifying which documents were
missing and considering if the allegations were supported by already attached
documents or rulings of lower courts. The CA failed to conduct a "test of
relevancy" for the missing documents.
o Merits of the Case Should Be Heard: The SC underscored that cases should
ideally be decided on their merits after a full hearing, rather than on procedural
technicalities. If Respondents were confident in their case, they should not have
objected to the CA reviewing the merits.
 • Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

July 24, 2012 and November 13, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
125036 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

CA-G.R. SP No. 125036 is hereby REINSTATED, with instructions for the Court of
Appeals to process and resolve the same with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

In essence, the Supreme Court prioritized substantial justice over strict adherence to procedural
technicalities, ruling that the CA should have considered the Petition for Review on its merits
instead of dismissing it outright due to curable and substantially complied-with procedural
requirements. The SC emphasized that minor defects in verification and certification, and the
lack of unspecified attachments, should not prevent a case from being heard, especially when
there is an attempt to comply and the core allegations are sufficiently presented.

• The Issue with Rule 7 (Court Documents Issue):

• When Joven and Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), they made technical
mistakes in their documents:
o Their affidavit was incomplete.
o Only one of them signed the verification.
o They forgot to attach some documents.
• The CA rejected their case outright because of these mistakes.

• Supreme Court’s Final Decision:

• The SC disagreed with the CA and ruled that:

o The mistakes were minor and could be corrected.
o One signature was enough since both petitioners shared the same interest.
o The case should not be dismissed based on technicalities when there was a
valid issue to decide.
• The SC reinstated the case and ordered the CA to decide it based on its merits.

Torres vs Republic – G.R. No. 247490 (2022)

Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Ma. Luisa Annabelle A. Torres, Rodolfo A. Torres, Jr., and
Richard A. Torres (collectively, Petitioners) against the Republic of the Philippines
(Respondent). Petitioners are assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) Resolutions which
 dismissed their Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The Petition for Annulment of Judgment was filed to challenge an Order issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) during the execution stage of a previous case.
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioners: Ma. Luisa Annabelle A. Torres, Rodolfo A. Torres, Jr., and Richard
A. Torres, registered owners of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) that were
ordered cancelled by the RTC Order.
o Respondents: Republic of the Philippines and the Register of Deeds of Davao
City. The Republic was the original plaintiff in the case before the RTC, seeking
cancellation of titles.
• Underlying Case: The case originated from a Complaint for Cancellation of Titles (Civil
Case No. 20,665-91) filed by the Republic against Spouses Leonora R. Caspar and
Florencio Gaspar in the RTC Branch 8, Davao City. The Republic sought to cancel free
patents and Original Certificates of Titles (OCTs) issued to Spouses Gaspar, alleging
fraud and misrepresentation in their acquisition.
• Chain of Events:
1. Republic's Complaint (Civil Case No. 20,665-91): Filed against Spouses Gaspar for
cancellation of free patents and OCTs.
2. RTC Decision (April 20, 1999): Ruled in favor of the Republic, ordering the
cancellation of Spouses Gaspar's free patents and OCTs and the reversion of the
land to the government. The RTC found fraud and misrepresentation in Spouses
Gaspar's free patent applications.
3. CA Decision (January 5, 2011): Affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
4. SC Resolution (February 6, 2012 & June 27, 2012): Denied Spouses Gaspar's
Petition for Review and Motion for Reconsideration, making the RTC decision
final and executory.
5. Republic's Motion for Execution: Filed a Manifestation and Motion in the RTC
to cancel derivative titles emanating from Spouses Gaspar's cancelled titles.
6. RTC Order (June 30, 2015): Granted the Republic's motion and ordered the
cancellation of derivative titles, including TCTs owned by Petitioners, who were
not parties in the original case.
7. Petition for Annulment of Judgment (CA-G.R. SP No. 08294-
MIN): Petitioners filed in the CA to annul the RTC Order dated June 30, 2015,
arguing lack of jurisdiction and due process. This petition was dismissed by the
CA.
8. Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 247490): Petitioners filed in the
Supreme Court, assailing the CA's dismissal of their Petition for Annulment of
Judgment.

Claims and Arguments:

• Petitioners' Claims and Arguments (in Petition for Annulment of Judgment and
Petition for Review):
o Lack of Jurisdiction and Due Process: Petitioners argued that the RTC Order
dated June 30, 2015, which ordered the cancellation of their TCTs, was issued
without jurisdiction because they were not parties to the original Civil Case No.
 20,665-91. They claimed they were denied due process as they were not notified
or heard in the proceedings leading to the issuance of the RTC Order.
o Order Varied Final Judgment: Petitioners contended that the RTC Order of
June 30, 2015, went beyond the original RTC Decision dated April 20, 1999,
which only ordered the cancellation of Spouses Gaspar's titles and did not
explicitly mention derivative titles. They argued the execution order improperly
expanded the scope of the final judgment.
o Buyers in Good Faith: Petitioners asserted they were buyers in good faith and
for value of the properties and their titles should not be automatically cancelled
due to the defects in the original titles of Spouses Gaspar.
o Inapplicability of Residual Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the RTC's
issuance of the June 30, 2015 Order was not a valid exercise of residual
jurisdiction, as this jurisdiction is only applicable after an appeal has been
perfected, which was not the case for them as non-parties.
• Respondent Republic's Arguments:
o RTC Order is Valid Execution: The Republic argued that the RTC Order dated
June 30, 2015, was a valid execution order issued to enforce the RTC's final and
executory Decision dated April 20, 1999. It was within the RTC's residual
jurisdiction to ensure the reversion of the land to the government, which
necessarily included cancelling derivative titles.
o No Extrinsic Fraud or Lack of Jurisdiction for Annulment: The Republic
pointed out that Petitioners' Petition for Annulment of Judgment did not allege
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the original case, which are the only
grounds for annulment under Rule 47.
o Derivative Titles are Affected: The Republic argued that since the original titles
of Spouses Gaspar were declared void due to fraud, all titles derived from them,
including Petitioners' TCTs, are also void and must be cancelled to fully
implement the reversion order.
o Stare Decisis: The Republic invoked the principle of stare decisis, citing the
similar case of Hsi Pin Liu v. Republic, where the CA dismissed a similar Petition
for Annulment of Judgment against the same RTC Order of June 30, 2015.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Petitioners (Ma. Luisa Annabelle A. Torres, et al.): Filed the Petition for Annulment
of Judgment in the CA and subsequently the Petition for Review in the SC to prevent the
cancellation of their Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs). They wanted to protect
their property rights, arguing that the RTC Order cancelling their titles was issued
without jurisdiction and due process, and improperly expanded the final RTC Decision.
• Respondent Republic of the Philippines: Defended the case to ensure the full
execution of the final RTC Decision which ordered the reversion of the land to the
government. They sought to uphold the cancellation of all titles, including derivative
titles, to recover public land fraudulently acquired by Spouses Gaspar and their
successors-in-interest.

How the Case Was Filed (Procedural History):

 1. Original Complaint (Civil Case No. 20,665-91, RTC Branch 8, Davao
City): Republic filed a Complaint for Cancellation of Titles against Spouses Gaspar.
2. Appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 64921): Spouses Gaspar appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA.
3. Petition for Review (G.R. No. 197918): Leonora Gaspar (alone) filed a Petition for
Review with the Supreme Court.
4. Manifestation and Motion (Civil Case No. 20,665-91, RTC Branch 8, Davao
City): Republic filed a motion for cancellation of derivative titles during execution
stage.
5. Petition for Annulment of Judgment (CA-G.R. SP No. 08294-MIN): Petitioners
Torres, et al. filed in the CA to annul the RTC Order dated June 30, 2015.
6. Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 247490, SC): Petitioners Torres, et al.
filed in the Supreme Court to review the CA's dismissal of their Petition for Annulment
of Judgment.

Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• Procedural Issue Raised by Respondent: The Republic argued that the Petition for
Review on Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court was dismissible outright because the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping were signed by Petitioners'
counsel, not by the Petitioners themselves. This is related to Rule 7 (Parts of a
Pleading), specifically the requirements for verification and certification against forum
shopping.
• RULE 7, SECTION 4 of the Rules of Court (Verification): Requires pleadings to be
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations are
true and correct of their personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
• RULE 7, SECTION 5 of the Rules of Court (Certification Against Forum
Shopping): Requires initiatory pleadings to be accompanied by a certification that the
party has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in other courts or
tribunals. Jurisprudence requires this to be signed by the party-pleader, not counsel.
• Supreme Court's Ruling on Procedural Issue (Verification and Certification): The
Supreme Court found substantial compliance despite the counsel signing the
verification and certification.
o Substantial Compliance on Verification: The SC cited Altres v. Empleo and
stated that defects in verification are not necessarily fatal and can be corrected or
waived. The Court found substantial compliance because Petitioners' counsel, as
attorney-in-fact and after conferring with Petitioners, affirmed the truth and
correctness of the allegations based on his knowledge and authentic records.
o Substantial Compliance on Certification Against Forum Shopping: The SC
acknowledged that certifications should generally be signed by the party, but
recognized exceptions for "reasonable or justifiable reasons." Since Petitioners
were abroad, and they executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) authorizing
their counsel to sign the certification, the SC deemed this as substantial
compliance. The SPAs explicitly granted the counsel "full power and authority to
sign the verification as well as the certification against forum shopping."
 o Liberal Interpretation: The SC emphasized that rules on verification and forum
shopping are meant to facilitate justice and should not be applied with absolute
literalness to defeat their objectives.

Decisions of Lower Courts and Supreme Court:

• Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 8, Davao City (April 20, 1999)
in Civil Case No. 20,665-91:
o Decision: Granted the Republic's Complaint for Cancellation of Titles.
o Order:
1. Cancellation of Free Patents Nos. (X1-1) 4093 and (X1-1) 4362 as well as
the Original Certificate of Title Nos. P-9923 and P-10220 issued in the
name of Leonora Gaspar;
2. Cancellation of Free Patents Nos. (XI-1) 4094 and (XI-1) 4361 as well as
the and [sic] Original Certificate of Title Nos. P-9924 and P-10221 issued
in the name of Florencio Gaspar;
3. Reversion of Lot No. 7793-A, Csd-11-006493, Lot No. 7792-A, Csd-11-
006606, Lot No. 7793-C, Csd-11-006493 and Lot No. 7792-C, Csd-11-
006606 covered by the aforesaid Patents and Certificates of Title to the
government;
4. Defendants Leonora Gaspar and Florencio Gaspar to surrender the owner's
duplicate copies of Original Certificates of Titles Nos. P-10220, P-10221,
P-9923 and P-9924 to the Register of Deeds of Davao City and directing
the latter to cancel said Original Certificates of Title in its books and
records; and,
5. Defendants Leonora Gaspar and Florencio Gaspar to desist from
exercising acts of possession or ownership over the premises.
o Reasoning: Found that the free patent applications of Spouses Gaspar were
tainted with fraud and misrepresentation.
• Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64921 (January 5, 2011):
o Decision: Affirmed in toto the RTC Branch 8 Decision.
• Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 8, Davao City (June 30, 2015) in
Civil Case No. 20,665-91 (Execution Stage):
o Decision: Granted the Republic's Motion to cancel derivative titles.
o Order: Ordered the cancellation of specific TCTs derived from the cancelled
OCTs of Spouses Gaspar, including TCTs of Petitioners, and ordered Spouses
Gaspar and successors-in-interest to desist from acts of ownership.
• Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 08294-MIN (July 27,
2018):
o Decision: Dismissed Petitioners' Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
o Reasoning: The CA held that the RTC Order of June 30, 2015, was not a
judgment, final order, or resolution subject to annulment under Rule 47. It was an
execution order within the RTC's residual authority to enforce its final and
executory Decision of April 20, 1999. The CA invoked stare decisis based on a
similar case, Hsi Pin Liu v. Republic.
 • Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 08294-MIN (April 30,
2019):
o Decision: Denied Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the July 27, 2018
Resolution.
• Decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 247490 (March 02, 2022):
o Decision: Denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari and Affirmed the CA
Resolutions.
o Reasoning:
§ Procedural Issue (Verification & Certification): The SC ruled that there
was substantial compliance with verification and certification rules despite
counsel signing, due to Petitioners being abroad and granting SPA to
counsel, and the purpose of these rules being substantially met.
§ Merits - Annulment of Judgment Improper: The SC agreed with the
CA that the RTC Order of June 30, 2015, was not a judgment or final
order subject to annulment under Rule 47. It was an execution order to
implement the final RTC Decision of April 20, 1999.
§ Residual Jurisdiction: The SC affirmed that the RTC acted within its
residual jurisdiction under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court to
issue orders necessary for the effective execution of its final judgment,
including the cancellation of derivative titles to fully revert the land to the
government.
§ No Deprivation of Due Process: Petitioners were not deprived of due
process because their rights were derivative of Spouses Gaspar's titles,
which were already declared void due to fraud. Since the original titles
were void, Spouses Gaspar had no rights to transfer, and consequently,
Petitioners acquired no indefeasible rights.
§ Stare Decisis Applied: The SC applied the doctrine of stare decisis,
relying on its previous Resolution in Liu v. Republic (G.R. No. 231100),
which involved the same RTC Order of June 30, 2015, and similar
arguments for annulment. The SC emphasized the need for certainty and
stability in judicial decisions.
o Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated July 27, 2018
and April 30, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08294-MIN are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the CA's dismissal of the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment, reinforcing the validity of the RTC Order cancelling the derivative titles of Petitioners
and others similarly situated. The SC emphasized the RTC's residual jurisdiction to enforce its
final judgment and the binding precedent set by the Liu v. Republic case. The procedural issue
related to Rule 7 was resolved in favor of substantial compliance, allowing the Court to address
the substantive merits of the case.
 6C. Certification against forum shopping /
Certification of non-forum shopping
(CNFS)
I. Meaning of Forum Shopping

Forum shopping happens when a party files multiple cases involving the same parties and the
same cause of action, either at the same time or one after another, to try and get a favorable
ruling.

🔹 Example:
Anna files a case in Court A. After receiving an unfavorable ruling, she files the same case in
Court B, hoping for a better outcome.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• Alonso v. Relamida (2010): Forum shopping exists when a party, after an adverse
decision in one court, seeks a favorable ruling in another or files multiple cases based on
the same cause.

II. Three Ways of Committing Forum Shopping

Forum shopping can be done in three ways:

1. Litis Pendentia – Filing multiple cases with the same cause of action and prayer while
the first case is still pending.
o 🔹 Example: Anna sues Bob for damages in Court A, then files the same lawsuit
in Court B while Court A has not yet decided the case.
2. Res Judicata – Filing multiple cases with the same cause of action and prayer even after
a final judgment has been made in the first case.
o 🔹 Example: Court A already dismissed Anna’s case against Bob with finality,
but Anna files the same case in Court B.
3. Splitting Causes of Action – Filing multiple cases with the same cause of action but
with different prayers.
o 🔹 Example: Anna sues Bob for breach of contract in Court A, asking only for
damages. Later, she files another case in Court B based on the same breach of
contract but now asks for specific performance.

🔹 Legal Basis:
 • In re: Ferrer (2016): Forum shopping includes filing multiple cases with identical
causes of action and reliefs or splitting a single cause of action.

III. Test to Determine Forum Shopping

To check if forum shopping exists, these three elements must be present:

1. Same parties or parties representing the same interests.

2. Same rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, based on the same facts.
3. A judgment in one case would amount to res judicata or litis pendentia in the other.

🔹 Example:
Anna sues Bob for breach of contract in Court A and demands damages. She later sues Bob in
Court B for the same breach and asks for reimbursement. Since the same facts and parties are
involved, and a decision in one will affect the other, forum shopping exists.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• PAL Employees Savings & Loan Assoc. v. PAL (2006): If two cases have identical
parties, rights, and causes of action, forum shopping is present.

IV. Certification Against Forum Shopping

A Certification Against Forum Shopping is a sworn statement by the plaintiff (not the lawyer)
confirming:

1. No other case involving the same issues has been filed in any court or tribunal.

Example: Maria files a petition for annulment of contract in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) due to fraud. She includes a Certification Against Forum
Shopping stating that no other case involving the same contract and issues
has been filed in any court, tribunal, or agency.

2. If there is a pending case, its current status is stated.

Juan files a petition for damages in the RTC against XYZ Corporation.
However, he previously filed a similar case before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In his Certification Against Forum Shopping,
he discloses that the HLURB case is still pending and provides the case
number and current status.
 3. If another case is filed later, the court will be informed within 5 days.

Pedro files a petition for reinstatement against his employer in the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Later, he also decides to file a related
case before the Court of Appeals. To comply with the rules, he must inform
the NLRC and the Court of Appeals within 5 days about the new case.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court: Certification must be signed by the party, not just the
lawyer.

🔹 Example of a Defective Certification:

A lawyer signs the certification instead of the plaintiff. The case may be dismissed due to non-
compliance.

V. Effect of Failure to Comply with Certification Against Forum Shopping

Violation Sanction
Failure to submit certification Case dismissal (without prejudice)
Submission of false
Indirect contempt + possible administrative/criminal liability
certification
Willful and deliberate forum Case dismissal (with prejudice) + direct contempt +
shopping administrative sanctions

🔹 Example:
Anna files a case in Court A and does not submit a Certification Against Forum Shopping. The
court dismisses the case.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte (2014): If forum shopping is willful and deliberate, all related
cases will be dismissed with prejudice.

VI. Certification by Corporations and Government Entities

For Corporations:

• Must be signed by an authorized representative with a board resolution or Secretary’s

Certificate.
• The signature of a general manager is acceptable if authority is later proven.
🔹 Legal Basis:

• Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd. (2005): Certification not signed by an authorized

corporate officer makes the petition dismissible.

For Government Entities:

• A representative can sign the verification, but the Certification Against Forum
Shopping must be signed by the principal party, not the lawyer.

🔹 Legal Basis:

• People v. Iroy (2010): The Certification Against Forum Shopping must be signed by the
plaintiff or principal party, not by counsel.

VII. Difference Between Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping

Certification Against Forum
Aspect Verification
Shopping
Confirms truth of allegations in the
Purpose Confirms no other case is pending
pleading
Effect of non- Does not necessarily make the Generally not curable and can lead to
compliance pleading defective case dismissal
Any person with knowledge of the Must be signed by the plaintiff or
Who signs
case principal party

🔹 Example:
If Anna forgets to sign the verification, the court may allow her to correct it. But if she fails to
submit the Certification Against Forum Shopping, her case may be dismissed.

CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

Definition and Requirement

The certification against forum shopping is a statement executed by the plaintiff or the
principal party under oath and must be signed by the party himself/herself, not merely by
his/her attorney. (Sec. 5, Rule 7)

Contents of the Certification

The certification against forum shopping is a sworn statement certifying the following matters:

1. No Prior or Pending Action

o That the party has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his/her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein.
2. Disclosure of Pending Actions
o That if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof.
3. Undertaking to Inform the Court
o That if he/she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he/she shall report that fact within 5
days therefrom to the court where his/her complaint or initiatory pleading was
filed. (Sec. 5, Rule 7)

Authorization to Act on Behalf of a Party

• The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party should be attached together
with the pleading and the certification against forum shopping. (Sec. 5, Rule 7)

Effect of Defective Certification

• A certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective certification,

which is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement and constitutes a valid
cause for the dismissal of the petition. (Ty-De Zuzuarregui v. Villarosa, G.R. No.
183788, 2010)

Mandatory Requirement in Filing Complaints and Initiatory Pleadings

• The certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement in filing

a complaint and other initiatory pleadings asserting a claim or relief. (Sec. 5, Rule 7)

Initiatory Pleadings that Require Certification

Aside from a complaint, an initiatory pleading also includes:

1. Permissive counterclaim
2. Cross-claim
3. Third (fourth, etc.)-Party complaint
4. Complaint-in-intervention
5. Petition or any application in which a party asserts his claim for relief. (A.M. No. 04-
94)
Effect of Failure to Comply with the Certification
Requirement
1. Dismissal of the Case
o Failure to comply with the requirements is not curable by mere amendment of
the pleading but shall be a cause for dismissal of the case, without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided.
o Dismissal shall be upon motion and after hearing. (Sec. 5, Rule 7)
2. Effect of Willful and Deliberate Forum Shopping
o Willful and deliberate forum shopping shall be a ground for summary
dismissal and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions. (Id.)
3. Submission of False Certification or Non-Compliance
o Submission of false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. (Id.)
4. Effect of Willful vs. Non-Willful Forum Shopping
o If the forum shopping is not willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall
be dismissed without prejudice.
o If the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all) actions shall be
dismissed with prejudice. (Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, 2014)

Liability for Willful and Deliberate Forum Shopping

• To be held liable for willful and deliberate forum shopping, there must be:
1. Failure to include the certification in one's initiatory pleading, or
2. Misrepresentation as to the pendency of another case involving the
same issues, parties, and causes of action as the second complaint.
• However, if the plaintiff files a second complaint after the first complaint was
dismissed with finality, he/she cannot be held liable for forum shopping. (Daswani v.
BDO Universal, G.R. No. 190983, 2015)

CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING (Sec. 2, Rule 42)
Prohibition Against Including Lower Courts as Parties

• The lower courts or judges who issued the decision being questioned should not be
included as parties.
• This rule also applies to petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 because these
are appeals, not original actions. (Sec. 2(a), Rule 42)
Example: If a case is being appealed from a Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals
(CA), the RTC judge who issued the decision must not be named as a respondent in the petition.

Consequences of Not Following the Requirements

If any of the following requirements are not met, the petition may be dismissed:

1. Failure to Pay the Required Fees

• The petitioner must pay the docket fees and other legal fees.
• A deposit for costs must also be made.
• The Court of Appeals can extend the deadline for filing the petition by 15 days, but
only if all required fees are fully paid before the original deadline. (Heirs of Esplana
vs. CA, G.R. No. 155758, 2008)

Example: If Juan files an appeal but forgets to pay the docket fee on time, the court may dismiss
his case unless he pays the fees within the allowed extension period.

2. Failure to Prove That the Petition Was Served to the Other Party

• The reckoning point for determining whether the appeal is filed on time is the date
when the judgment was served to the petitioner. (Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage vs.
CA, G.R. No. 163286, 2012)

Example: In Teh vs. People (G.R. No. 141180, 2005), the Court of Appeals dismissed a
petition because:

1. The petitioner did not submit a duplicate original or certified true copy of key
documents.
2. The petitioner did not explain why the petition was not served personally to the opposing
party.

3. Failure to Submit the Required Documents

• The petitioner must attach all necessary supporting documents to the petition. (Rule 42,
Sec. 3)
• It is the petitioner's responsibility to ensure that all documents are complete and
relevant.
• However, the Court of Appeals will still assess whether the submitted documents
are sufficient.
Why is this important? Properly submitted documents help the Court of Appeals quickly
determine if the case has merit. If important documents are missing, the petition may be
dismissed. (Canton vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 152898, 2007)

Example: In Quintin Lee vs. CA (G.R. No. 165918, 2008), the Court of Appeals dismissed the
case because:

1. The petitioner used the wrong appeal procedure.

2. Instead of certified copies, the petitioner submitted plain photocopies of the lower
court’s decision.
3. The petitioner failed to submit essential pleadings and supporting records.

Heirs of Mampo vs. Morada – G.R. No. 214526 (2020)

Case Background

The case involves a dispute over five parcels of land in Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur, covered
by Emancipation Patents (EPs). The petitioners, Heirs of Inocentes Mampo and Raymundo A.
Mampo, represented by Azucena C. Mampo, filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possessionagainst Nelida and Alex Severo before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD). The PARAD dismissed the complaint, but the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed the decision, ruling in favor of the
Heirs of Mampos and ordering the Severos to vacate the land and restore possession to the
petitioners.

The DARAB decision became final and executory, and a Writ of Execution was issued.
However, Josefina Morada, the respondent, filed a Third-Party Claim, asserting that she was
the actual tiller of the land. The PARAD granted her claim, recalled the Writ of Execution, and
ordered the parties to respect Morada's possession.

The Heirs of Mampos filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed
a Manifestation with Motion for Implementation of the DARAB decision, but the DARAB
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Later, the DARAB reversed itself, granted the Heirs' motion,
and ordered the revival of the Writ of Execution.

Claims and Arguments

1. Heirs of Mampos:
o They claimed ownership and possession of the land based on the DARAB
decision, which ruled in their favor.
o They argued that Morada's Third-Party Claim was a protest against their
qualification as beneficiaries, which should have been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
 o They sought the implementation of the DARAB decision and the revival of the
Writ of Execution.
2. Josefina Morada:
o She claimed to be the actual tiller of the land and argued that she should be
awarded possession.
o She filed a Third-Party Claim to assert her rights over the land.
o She challenged the DARAB's decision through a Petition for Certiorari (Rule
65) and a Petition for Review (Rule 43) before the Court of Appeals (CA).
Procedural History
1. DARAB Decision (2008):
o The DARAB ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampos, ordering the Severos to
vacate the land and restore possession to the petitioners.
2. Third-Party Claim by Morada (2009):
o Morada filed a Third-Party Claim, which was granted by the PARAD, leading to
the recall of the Writ of Execution.
3. DARAB Reversal (2011):
o The DARAB reversed its earlier decision, granted the Heirs' motion, and ordered
the revival of the Writ of Execution.
4. CA Proceedings:
o Morada filed two petitions before the CA:
§ Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 123033): Challenging
the DARAB's decision for grave abuse of discretion.
§ Rule 43 Petition for Review (CA-G.R. SP No. 123523): Seeking to
reverse the DARAB decision and affirm the PARAD's order granting her
Third-Party Claim.
o The CA Sixth Division dismissed the Rule 65 petition for forum shopping, as it
found that the two petitions involved the same facts, issues, and reliefs.
o The CA 12th Division, however, granted the Rule 43 petition, nullifying the
DARAB decision and reinstating the PARAD's order.
Main Issue

The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the CA erred in failing to dismiss
the Rule 43 Petition for forum shopping, given that the CA Sixth Division had already
dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for the same reason.

Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampos, holding that the CA erred in failing
to dismiss the Rule 43 Petition for forum shopping. The Court found that Morada had
committed willful and deliberate forum shopping by filing two petitions (Rule 65 and Rule 43)
before different divisions of the CA, seeking identical reliefs based on the same facts and issues.

1. Forum Shopping:
 o Forum shopping occurs when a party files multiple cases involving the same
parties, facts, and issues in different courts to increase the chances of a favorable
decision.
o The Court emphasized that the test for forum shopping is whether the elements
of litis pendentia (pending litigation) or res judicata (final judgment) are
present.
o In this case, the two petitions filed by Morada involved the same parties, facts,
and reliefs, and a decision in one would have constituted res judicata in the other.
2. Willful and Deliberate Forum Shopping:
o The Court found that Morada's actions were willful and deliberate, as she filed
two petitions seeking the same reliefs in different divisions of the CA.
o She also submitted false certifications of non-forum shopping and failed to
disclose the pendency of the Rule 65 action in her Rule 43 petition.
3. Penalty for Forum Shopping:
o The Court held that the penalty for forum shopping is the dismissal of all related
cases, not just one. This is a punitive measure to prevent litigants from abusing
the judicial process.
o The CA 12th Division erred in failing to dismiss the Rule 43 Petition, especially
after the CA Sixth Division had already dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for forum
shopping.
4. Reinstatement of DARAB Decision:
o The Supreme Court reinstated the DARAB's September 19, 2011 Resolution,
which had ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampos and ordered the revival of the
Writ of Execution.
5. Sanctions:
o The Court directed Atty. Godofredo B. Guzman(Morada's counsel) and Morada
to show cause why they should not be cited for direct contempt for committing
willful and deliberate forum shopping.
Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the CA's Decision and Resolution,
and reinstated the DARAB's September 19, 2011 Resolution. The Court also directed Morada
and her counsel to explain why they should not be cited for direct contempt for forum shopping.

Key Legal Principle

The case underscores the importance of the rule against forum shopping under Rule 7, Section
5 of the Rules of Court. The Court emphasized that forum shopping is a serious offense that
undermines the integrity of the judicial system, and the penalty for willful and deliberate forum
shopping is the dismissal of all related cases, as well as potential sanctions for the parties and
their counsel.
 1. Morada did not accept this decision, so she filed two petitions in the Court of Appeals
(CA):
o A Rule 65 (Certiorari) Petition (asking the court to review the DARAB decision
because of alleged grave abuse of discretion).
o A Rule 43 (Petition for Review) (asking the court to overturn the DARAB
decision and keep the PARAD's ruling in her favor).
2. The CA Sixth Division dismissed the Rule 65 petition because it found that Morada
was forum shopping (filing multiple cases about the same issue in different courts to get
a favorable ruling).
3. However, the CA 12th Division ruled in favor of Morada in the Rule 43 petition,
reversing the DARAB decision and reinstating the PARAD’s ruling in her favor.

What Did the Supreme Court Decide?

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampo and said that the CA 12th Division
made a mistake in not dismissing Morada's Rule 43 petition.

1. Morada Committed Forum Shopping

o Forum shopping happens when someone files multiple cases involving the same
issue in different courts to increase the chances of winning.
o Since both Rule 65 and Rule 43 petitions were about the same issue, Morada
should not have filed both.
o She also failed to disclose the first case when filing the second one, which was
dishonest.
2. Penalty for Forum Shopping
o If someone willfully commits forum shopping, the penalty is the dismissal of all
related cases.
o The Supreme Court ruled that the CA 12th Division should have dismissed
Morada’s Rule 43 case, just like the CA Sixth Division dismissed the Rule 65
case.
3. Reinstatement of the DARAB Decision
o The Supreme Court reinstated the 2011 DARAB decision, which favored
the Heirs of Mampo and ordered the enforcement of the Writ of Execution.
4. Sanctions on Morada and Her Lawyer
o The Supreme Court ordered Morada and her lawyer to explain why they
should not be punished for forum shopping. They could be held in direct
contempt for abusing the legal process.

Key Lesson from the Case

Under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, forum shopping is strictly prohibited. If a
party deliberately files multiple cases on the same issue to manipulate the legal system, all their
cases can be dismissed, and they may face penalties.
In this case, Morada tried to get around an unfavorable ruling by filing two separate cases in
different divisions of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court did not allow this and upheld
the principle that the legal process must not be abused.

Joven vs. Sps. Tulio – G.R. No. 204567 (2021)

Case Background

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of commercial land in San Fernando, Pampanga,
registered under the names of respondents Spouses Raul L. Tulio and Cristina Panganiban Tulio.
The petitioners, Emiliano D. Joven and Cicero V. Garcia, entered into a 15-year lease agreement
with the respondents, commencing on November 1, 1999, and ending on October 31, 2013.
During the lease, petitioners constructed a two-storey commercial building, the J-G Shopping
Mall, at a cost of P22 million.

Claims and Arguments

1. Petitioners' Claims:
o Petitioners alleged that respondents forcibly repossessed the leased property on
June 3, 2000, by serving a Notice of Eviction and barricading the mall's entrance.
They claimed that respondents' actions constituted forcible entry, as they were not
in default of their rental obligations.
o Petitioners sought reimbursement for the advance rentals and one-half of the cost
of the improvements they made on the property.
2. Respondents' Claims:
o Respondents argued that petitioners were in default of their rental obligations,
having paid only P2,000,000 out of the P3,000,000 due for the period from
November 1, 1999, to June 30, 2000. They also presented two dishonored checks
issued by petitioners.
o Respondents contended that their repossession of the property was lawful, as
petitioners had voluntarily vacated the premises after being served the Notice of
Eviction.
Lower Court Decisions
1. Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC):
o The MTCC ruled that respondents did not commit forcible entry, as petitioners'
representatives voluntarily left the premises after the Notice of Eviction was
served. However, the court ordered respondents to reimburse petitioners for
advance rentals (P2,250,000) and one-half of the cost of the improvements made
on the property.
2. Regional Trial Court (RTC):
o The RTC initially modified the MTCC's decision, ruling that respondents were
not obligated to reimburse petitioners for the improvements, citing a clause in the
 lease agreement. It also reduced the amount of advance rentals to be refunded to
P500,000.
o Upon reconsideration, the RTC reversed its decision, finding that petitioners were
not in default due to a verbal extension of payment. The court ruled that
respondents committed forcible entry and ordered them to reimburse petitioners
for one-half of the cost of the improvements (P12 million) and advance rentals
(P2,250,000).
o In a subsequent order, the RTC partly granted respondents' motion for
reconsideration, ruling that the improvements on the property would belong to
respondents without obligation to reimburse petitioners, and ordered respondents
to refund only P250,000 to petitioners.
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
• The CA dismissed petitioners' Rule 42 Petition for Review on technical grounds:
1. The affidavit of service lacked the notary public's commission number,
province/city of commission, and office address.
2. The Verification and Certification against forum shopping was defective, as it was
signed by only one petitioner and lacked the notary public's details.
3. Petitioners failed to attach copies of documents and pleadings filed before the
MTCC and RTC.
Supreme Court (SC) Decision

The SC reversed the CA's dismissal of the petition, ruling as follows:

1. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping:

o The SC held that the verification and certification substantially complied with
procedural requirements. Since both petitioners shared a common interest, the
signature of one petitioner was sufficient. The failure of the notary public to
include certain details was not fatal, as verification is a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement.
2. Failure to Attach Documents:
o The SC ruled that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure to attach
documents without specifying which documents were missing. The material
allegations in the case were already summarized in the lower courts' decisions,
making the attachment of additional documents unnecessary.
3. Substantial Justice Over Technicalities:
o The SC emphasized that procedural rules should not hinder the dispensation of
justice. The case should be decided on its merits rather than dismissed on
technical grounds.
Disposition

The SC granted the petition, reinstated CA-G.R. SP No. 125036, and directed the CA to process
and resolve the case promptly.
Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main procedural issue in this case relates to Rule 7, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which
requires that a pleading be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.
The CA dismissed the petition due to defects in the verification and certification, as well as the
failure to attach certain documents. The SC, however, ruled that the verification and certification
substantially complied with the rules, and the failure to attach documents did not warrant
outright dismissal.

Why the SC Made These Decisions

1. Substantial Compliance with Procedural Rules:
o The SC relaxed the strict application of procedural rules to prevent a miscarriage
of justice. It emphasized that technicalities should not override substantive rights,
especially when the defects were not jurisdictional and could be cured.
2. Common Interest of Petitioners:
o Since both petitioners shared a common interest in the case, the signature of one
petitioner in the verification and certification was deemed sufficient.
3. Material Allegations Already Summarized:
o The SC found that the material allegations and relevant documents were already
summarized in the lower courts' decisions, making the attachment of additional
documents unnecessary.
4. Interest of Justice:
o The SC prioritized the resolution of the case on its merits, emphasizing that cases
should be decided based on substantive rights rather than procedural
technicalities.
Conclusion

The SC's decision underscores the principle that procedural rules should serve as tools to
facilitate justice, not as barriers to its attainment. By reversing the CA's dismissal, the SC
ensured that the case would be decided on its merits, promoting fairness and substantial justice.

What Did the Court of Appeals (CA) Do?

• The CA dismissed the petition on technical grounds because the petitioners did not
follow procedural rules in filing their appeal.
• The problems included:
1. Affidavit of Service was missing important details from the notary public.
2. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping was incomplete
because only one petitioner signed it.
3. Missing documents from the MTCC and RTC were not attached.
What Did the Supreme Court (SC) Decide?

The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision, saying the petition should not have been
dismissed just because of technical errors. The SC ordered the CA to review the case properly.

The SC gave the following reasons:

1. Substantial Compliance with Rules

o The petitioners mostly followed the rules, and the missing details were not
serious enough to dismiss the case.
2. One Petitioner’s Signature Was Enough
o Since both petitioners had the same interest in the case, the signature of one
person was acceptable.
3. The Missing Documents Were Not Necessary
o The lower courts’ decisions already summarized the important details, so the
CA should have considered that.
4. Justice Over Technicalities
o The SC said cases should be decided based on the facts and not be
dismissed because of small procedural mistakes.

How Does This Relate to Rule 7?

Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a pleading (legal document) must have:

1. A proper verification (to confirm that statements are true).

2. A Certification Against Forum Shopping (to avoid filing multiple cases on the same
issue).

The CA dismissed the case because these requirements had errors. However, the SC ruled that
the mistakes were minorand that the case should not have been dismissed just because of them.

Final Decision

• The SC granted the petition and told the CA to review the case properly instead of
dismissing it for minor technicalities.
• This decision shows that substance is more important than strict technical
compliance in legal cases.

Torres vs Republic – G.R. No. 247490 (2022)

Case Background and Facts

The case involves a dispute over land titles in Davao City, Philippines. The Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed a complaint on April 5, 1991, against spouses Leonora R. Gaspar
and Florencio Gaspar (Spouses Gaspar) and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, seeking the
cancellation of free patents and original certificates of title (OCTs) issued in the names of the
Spouses Gaspar. The Republic alleged that the free patents were obtained through fraud and
misrepresentation, and thus, the titles should be canceled, and the lands reverted to the
government.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 8 of Davao City ruled in favor of the Republic on April
20, 1999, ordering the cancellation of the free patents and OCTs issued to the Spouses Gaspar
and the reversion of the lands to the government. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this
decision on January 5, 2011, and the Supreme Court (SC) denied the Spouses Gaspar's petition
for review on February 6, 2012, making the RTC decision final and executory.

During the execution stage, the Republic moved for the cancellation of all derivative titles
emanating from the canceled OCTs. On June 30, 2015, the RTC issued an order canceling the
derivative titles, including those held by petitioners Ma. Luisa Annabelle A. Torres, Rodolfo A.
Torres, Jr., and Richard A. Torres (petitioners), who were not parties to the original case. The
petitioners, who were registered owners of some of the derivative titles, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, arguing that they were denied due
process and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over them.

Claims and Arguments

1. Petitioners' Claims:
o They were not parties to the original case (Civil Case No. 20,665-91) and were
not given notice or opportunity to be heard.
o The RTC's order canceling their titles was issued without jurisdiction and violated
their right to due process.
o They are buyers in good faith and should not be prejudiced by the cancellation of
the titles.
o The CA erred in dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment, as the
RTC's order was not a final judgment or order under Rule 47.
2. Republic's Arguments:
o The RTC's order was issued during the execution stage of a final and executory
decision, and the RTC had residual authority to enforce its judgment.
o The cancellation of the derivative titles was necessary to fully effect the reversion
of the lands to the government.
o The petitioners' rights are derived from the void titles of the Spouses Gaspar, and
thus, they have no valid claim to the lands.
Lower Court Decisions
1. RTC Decision (April 20, 1999):
 The RTC ruled in favor of the Republic, canceling the free patents and OCTs
o
issued to the Spouses Gaspar due to fraud and misrepresentation.
o The court ordered the reversion of the lands to the government and directed the
Spouses Gaspar to surrender the titles to the Register of Deeds.
2. CA Decision (January 5, 2011):
o The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto, finding no reversible error in the
lower court's ruling.
3. RTC Order (June 30, 2015):
o During the execution stage, the RTC ordered the cancellation of all derivative
titles, including those held by the petitioners, who were not parties to the original
case.
4. CA Resolution (July 27, 2018):
o The CA dismissed the petitioners' petition for annulment of judgment, ruling that
the RTC's order was not a final judgment or order under Rule 47 but was issued
during the execution stage to enforce a final and executory decision.
Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main issue in this case is whether the RTC's order canceling the petitioners' derivative titles,
issued during the execution stage of a final and executory judgment, can be annulled under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court. Rule 47 governs the annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions of the RTC when ordinary remedies (such as appeal or new trial) are no longer
available.

The petitioners argued that the RTC's order was a final order that could be annulled under Rule
47, as they were not parties to the original case and were denied due process. However, the CA
and the Supreme Court ruled that the order was not a final judgment or order but was issued to
enforce the RTC's final decision. Thus, Rule 47 did not apply.

Supreme Court Decision and Reasoning

The Supreme Court denied the petitioners' petition for review on certiorari, affirming the CA's
dismissal of their petition for annulment of judgment. The Court held:

1. The RTC's order was not a final judgment or order under Rule 47:
o The order was issued during the execution stage to enforce the RTC's final and
executory decision. It was not a new judgment or final order but a means to carry
out the court's earlier ruling.
2. The petitioners were not deprived of due process:
o The petitioners' titles were derived from the void titles of the Spouses Gaspar,
which were obtained through fraud. Since the original titles were void, the
petitioners had no valid claim to the lands.
3. Doctrine of stare decisis applies:
o The Court applied the doctrine of stare decisis, citing its earlier decision in Hsi
Pin Liu v. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 231100), which involved the
 same RTC order and similar facts. In that case, the Court ruled that the RTC's
order was not a final judgment and that the cancellation of derivative titles was
necessary to effect the reversion of the lands to the government.
4. Residual authority of the RTC:
o The RTC had residual authority under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court
to issue orders necessary to enforce its final judgment, including the cancellation
of derivative titles.
Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's Resolutions dated July 27, 2018,
and April 30, 2019. The Court held that the RTC's order canceling the petitioners' titles was valid
and necessary to enforce the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 20,665-91. The
petitioners were not entitled to relief under Rule 47, as the order was not a final judgment or
order subject to annulment.

Conclusion

The case underscores the principle that derivative titles emanating from void original titles are
also void and can be canceled by the court to effect the reversion of lands to the government. The
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis and the RTC's residual
authority to enforce its judgments, even against non-parties to the original case. The petitioners,
as buyers of derivative titles, could not claim good faith or due process violations, as their rights
were derived from void titles.

C.1. When required

Ponciano vs. Judge Parantela, Jr. – G.R. No. 133284
(2000)
Case Background and Facts

The case involves a dispute between two parties: Spouses Claro and Gloria Ponciano
(petitioners) and Spouses Ildefonso and Leonora Clamosa (private respondents). The private
respondents filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioners in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Trece Martires City, Branch 23, docketed as Civil Case
No. TM-601. The complaint alleged that the petitioners failed to pay for labor and materials used
in the renovation of their house in San Roque, Cavite.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it failed to state a cause of
action. However, the trial court denied the motion in its Order dated September 21, 1995.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim on October 18,
1995, claiming that they had already paid the total contract price, but the private respondents'
work was defective and incomplete. They sought P250,000 in damages to complete the
renovation.

Claims and Arguments

1. Private Respondents' Claims:
o They sought payment for labor and materials used in the renovation of the
petitioners' house.
o They alleged that the petitioners failed to pay the agreed amount.
2. Petitioners' Counterclaim:
o They argued that they had already paid the total contract price.
o They claimed that the private respondents' work was defective and incomplete.
o They sought P250,000 in damages to complete the renovation.

Procedural History
• August 23, 1996: The trial court, upon motion by the private respondents, ordered
the striking off of the petitioners' counterclaim from the record for failure to comply
with Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which requires a certificate of non-forum
shoppingfor all initiatory pleadings.
• September 17, 1996: The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
their counterclaim was compulsory and therefore not an initiatory pleading, and thus not
subject to the requirements of Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
• October 17, 1996: The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
• February 10, 1997: The petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 127701. The Supreme Court denied
the petition, holding that the trial court did not err in striking off the counterclaim for
non-compliance with Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
• July 9, 1997: The petitioners filed an Answer with Amended Compulsory
Counterclaim, this time including a certification of non-forum shopping. The trial
court initially admitted the amended counterclaim but later reconsidered and expunged
it from the records in its Order dated December 9, 1997.
• March 17, 1998: The trial court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
December 9, 1997 Order.
• May 9, 2000: The petitioners filed the present special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the trial court's orders denying admission of their
amended compulsory counterclaim.
Main Issue

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether a compulsory counterclaim must be
accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. Additionally, the Court had to determine whether the dismissal of such a
counterclaim for failure to comply with the circular would bar the party from re-filing it.
Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that a compulsory
counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because it is not
an initiatory pleading. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Santo Tomas University
Hospital v. Surla, which held that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 applies only to initiatory
pleadings and not to compulsory counterclaims, which are auxiliary to the main action and
derive their jurisdictional support from the main case.

The Court emphasized that the purpose of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is to
prevent forum-shopping, which occurs when a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum
after receiving an adverse judgment in one. Since a compulsory counterclaim is inextricably
linked to the main action and cannot be independently filed, it does not fall within the scope of
the circular.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the December 9, 1997 and March 17, 1998 Orders of the RTC of
Trece Martires City, Branch 23, and ordered the trial court to admit the petitioners' Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim. The Court made no pronouncement as to costs.

Key Legal Principle

The case established that compulsory counterclaims are not subject to the requirement of
a certificate of non-forum shopping under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 because they
are not initiatory pleadings. This ruling clarified the scope of the circular and reinforced the
distinction between initiatory pleadings and compulsory counterclaims, which are ancillary to
the main action.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 133284underscores the importance of distinguishing
between initiatory pleadings and compulsory counterclaims in the context of Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. By ruling that compulsory counterclaims do not require a certificate of non-
forum shopping, the Court ensured that such claims, which are inherently tied to the main action,
are not unjustly dismissed for procedural reasons. This decision provides clarity on the
application of the anti-forum shopping rule and safeguards the rights of parties to assert their
claims in the appropriate forum.

C.2. Statements that must be included

C.3. Defective CNFS
C.3.a. Defective or missing CNFS
Uy vs. Landbank – G.R. No. 136100 (2000)
Case Background

The case involves a dispute over the possession of two parcels of land and a two-story house
located in Quezon Street, Iloilo City. The properties were originally owned by Tia Yu, who
authorized Gold Motors Parts Corporation to mortgage them as security for a loan from Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP). On August 19, 1980, Gold Motors mortgaged the properties to
LBP. However, Gold Motors defaulted on the loan, leading LBP to initiate foreclosure
proceedings. LBP emerged as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale and was issued
a certificate of sale. The titles to the properties were consolidated in LBP's name in October
1986.

Felipe Uy, the petitioner, claimed that he had supplied materials for the construction of the house
on the land but was not fully paid by Tia Yu. As a result, in February 1980, Uy and Tia Yu
agreed that Uy would occupy the house and apply the rent toward the unpaid balance of
₱400,000. This agreement was formalized in a Lease Contract dated June 6, 1982.

Claims and Arguments

1. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP):
o LBP filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Felipe Uy, claiming
ownership of the properties and seeking to eject Uy from the premises.
o LBP argued that it had acquired the properties through a valid foreclosure process
and that Uy had no right to remain on the premises.
2. Felipe Uy:
o Uy contended that he had a valid lease agreement with Tia Yu, which predated
the mortgage and foreclosure.
o He argued that LBP was aware of the lease agreement at the time of the mortgage
and foreclosure, and therefore, LBP was bound by the terms of the lease.
Lower Court Decisions
1. Metropolitan Trial Circuit Court (MTCC) of Iloilo City:
o The MTCC ruled in favor of Uy, finding that LBP was aware of the lease
agreement when it accepted the mortgage.
o The court dismissed LBP's complaint, confirmed Uy's right to continue possession
under the lease agreement, and ordered LBP to pay Uy ₱10,000 in attorney’s fees
and ₱5,000 in litigation expenses.
2. Regional Trial Court (RTC):
o The RTC affirmed the MTCC's decision in its entirety.
o The RTC also noted that the mortgage between Gold Motors and LBP was void
under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, which requires the mortgagor to be the
absolute owner of the property. However, this finding was not reflected in the
dispositive portion of the RTC's decision.
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
• The CA reversed the RTC's decision, ruling that LBP had a superior right to the property
because it held the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
• The CA also held that the RTC erred in declaring the mortgage void, as the validity of the
mortgage was not an issue in the MTCC proceedings.
• The CA ordered Uy to surrender possession of the property to LBP.
Supreme Court (SC) Decision

The Supreme Court addressed several key issues:

1. Timeliness of LBP's Petition:

o Uy argued that LBP's petition to the CA was filed beyond the extension granted
by the court.
o The SC ruled that while the CA could have dismissed the petition for being filed
late, it was within the CA's discretion to admit the petition, especially given the
merits of the case.
2. Validity of the Lease Agreement:
o The SC upheld the MTCC's finding that LBP was aware of the lease agreement at
the time of the mortgage and foreclosure.
o Under Article 1676 of the Civil Code, a buyer at a foreclosure sale cannot
terminate an unregistered lease if the buyer knew of the lease's existence.
o The SC concluded that LBP, having knowledge of the lease, could not terminate it
and was bound by its terms.
3. Jurisdiction of the RTC:
o The SC agreed with the CA that the RTC erred in declaring the mortgage void, as
this issue was not raised by the parties and was unnecessary for resolving the
possession dispute.
Disposition
• The SC set aside the CA's decision ordering Uy to surrender possession of the property
to LBP.
• The SC reinstated the MTCC's decision, confirming Uy's right to continue possession
under the lease agreement.
Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main issue connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleadingwas the lack of verification and
certification against forum shopping in Uy's petition to the SC. The SC initially dismissed the
petition for these deficiencies but later reinstated it, citing the following reasons:

1. Verification:
o The SC noted that the requirement for verification is formal, not jurisdictional.
The lack of verification does not necessarily render a pleading fatally defective.
o The court may allow the correction of the pleading or act on it even if it is not
verified, especially if the ends of justice would be served.
 2. Certification Against Forum Shopping:
o The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by its
belated submission. However, the SC has, in some cases, allowed the belated
filing of the certification as substantial compliance, particularly when there
are special circumstances or compelling reasons.
o In this case, the SC found that the merits of the substantive aspects of the
case constituted a special circumstance justifying the reinstatement of the petition.
Conclusion

The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Felipe Uy, reinstating the MTCC's decision and
confirming his right to continue possession of the property under the lease agreement. The Court
emphasized that LBP, having knowledge of the lease at the time of the mortgage and foreclosure,
was bound by its terms and could not terminate it. The decision underscores the importance of
adhering to procedural rules while also allowing for flexibility in the interest of justice.

Sps. Estares vs. CA – G.R. No. 144755 (2005)

Case Background:

The case involves Spouses Eliseo F. Estares and Rosenda P. Estares (petitioners) who filed a
complaint for Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction against Prominent Lending
& Credit Corporation (PLCC)(private respondent) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna. The spouses sought to nullify a promissory note and real estate
mortgage they executed in favor of PLCC, claiming that the documents were falsified and did
not reflect the true terms of their loan agreement. They also requested a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure and auction of
their mortgaged property.

Claims and Arguments:

1. Petitioners' Claims:
o They obtained a loan of ₱800,000.00 from PLCC on January 12, 1998, secured
by a real estate mortgage over their property in Santa Rosa, Laguna.
o They alleged that the promissory note and real estate mortgage were falsified
because they signed blank documents, and the terms, including the interest
rate and penalties, were different from what they agreed upon.
o They claimed that the monthly interest of 3.5%and 3% penalty on delayed
payments were not part of their agreement, which was supposed to have an 18%
annual interest rate.
o They argued that PLCC filed for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and
the Sheriff of Laguna scheduled an auction sale of their property on July 13,
1999.
o They sought to nullify the promissory note and real estate mortgage and requested
a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the foreclosure and
auction.
 2. Respondents' Arguments:
o PLCC countered that the Estares spouses were fully informed of the terms and
conditions of the loan, including the interest rate and penalties, in compliance
with the Truth in Lending Act (Republic Act No. 3765).
o PLCC argued that the Estares spouses failed to pay their obligation despite
repeated demands, justifying the foreclosure of the mortgage.
o PLCC opposed the issuance of a TRO or injunction, claiming that the Estares
spouses’ fear of eviction was unfounded.
Lower Court Proceedings:
• On July 12, 1999, the RTC issued a TRO in favor of the Estares spouses, temporarily
halting the auction sale.
• On August 18, 1999, the RTC denied the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, ruling that they failed to establish the necessary facts for the
issuance of an injunction.
• The Estares spouses filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the
RTC on October 1, 1999.
• On December 7, 1999, the Estares spouses filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA), challenging the RTC’s denial of their
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
• On January 5, 2000, the Sheriff of Lagunaconducted an auction sale of the mortgaged
property, with PLCC as the highest bidder for ₱1,500,000.00.
• On April 17, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in denying the writ of preliminary injunction.
• The Estares spouses filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
on July 7, 2000.
Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading:

The main issue connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleadingis the sufficiency of the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping in the petition filed by the Estares spouses. The
respondents argued that the petition was procedurally deficient because:

• The verification referred to a "Pre-Trial Brief" instead of the petition.

• The certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by Rosenda Estares, not by
both spouses.

The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that while the verification contained a minor error, it was not
fatal. However, the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by both
petitioners. Nonetheless, the SC considered the circumstances (Eliseo being an overseas worker)
and deemed the certification by Rosenda as substantial compliance with the rules.

Supreme Court Decision:

The SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Estares spouses,
affirming the CA’s decision. The Court held that:
 1. Injunction Requirements Not Met:
o The Estares spouses failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the
injunctive relief they sought.
o They did not deny their indebtedness to PLCC but only questioned
the amount and terms of the loan, which were matters to be resolved during
the trial on the merits.
o The RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the writ of preliminary
injunction, as the Estares spouses failed to prove the necessity for such relief.
2. Auction Sale Not Nullified:
o The auction sale conducted on January 5, 2000was not nullified because
the CA’s Resolution of December 14, 1999 did not explicitly enjoin the sale.
o The issue of whether the auction sale was properly conducted (e.g., lack of
republication of the notice) was a factual matter best addressed by the trial
court during the main case.
3. No Denial of Due Process:
o The RTC’s refusal to allow Eliseo Estares to testify during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration did not constitute a denial of due process.
o Eliseo would have the opportunity to testify during the trial on the merits of the
case.
Disposition:

The SC dismissed the petition, affirmed the CA’s decision, and lifted the temporary
restraining order it had previously issued. The Court ruled that the CA did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition, as the Estares spouses failed to prove
their entitlement to the injunctive relief they sought.

Key Legal Principles:

1. Injunction as a Provisional Remedy:
o An injunction is a provisional remedy meant to protect rights pending the
resolution of the main case. It is not a cause of action in itself.
o To be entitled to an injunction, the petitioner must show a clear and
unmistakable right and an urgent necessity to prevent irreparable injury.
2. Certiorari Under Rule 65:
o A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action and not a
substitute for a lost appeal.
o It is proper only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedyavailable.
3. Substantial Compliance with Procedural Rules:
o While the rules on verification and certification of non-forum shopping are
mandatory, substantial compliance may be accepted under justifiable
circumstances.
4. Due Process:
o The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party is
given the chance to present their case, there is no denial of due process.
Conclusion:

The SC upheld the CA’s decision, ruling that the Estares spouses failed to prove their
entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court emphasized that the RTC did not
abuse its discretion in denying the injunction and that the auction sale was not improperly
conducted. The case highlights the importance of proving the necessity for injunctive
relief and the strict compliancerequired with procedural rules, even as the Court may
allow substantial compliance under certain circumstances.

Go vs. Rico – G.R. No. 140862 (2006)

Background of the Case
1. Parties Involved:
o Petitioners: Wilson Go and Peter Go, registered owners of a property in Quezon
City.
o Respondent: Anita Rico, substituting her late mother, Pilar Rico, who was one of
the defendants in the ejectment case.
2. Property in Dispute:
o The property is located at Retiro corner Kanlaon Streets, Quezon City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 170475.
o The property includes a building with several units leased to individual
defendants, including Pilar Rico.
3. Initial Complaint:
o On August 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint for Ejectment (Civil Case
No. 18315) with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 40, Quezon City,
against Pilar Rico and other defendants.
o Petitioners claimed they were the registered owners of the property and that the
lease contracts with the defendants had expired. They demanded that the
defendants vacate the premises by July 15, 1997, but the defendants refused.
4. Defendants' Defense:
o The defendants argued that the property was part of the estate of the late Felisa
Tamio de Buenaventura, which was under probate proceedings (SP Proc. No.
Q94-20661) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 95, Quezon City.
o They claimed that their lease contracts were with Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura
and were later renewed by the new administratrix, Resurrecion Bihis, after the
previous administratrix, Bella Guerrero, was removed for allegedly conspiring
with the petitioners to sell the property unlawfully.
o They contended that the petitioners had no right to evict them since the ownership
of the property was still in dispute.
Lower Court Decisions
1. Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Decision (July 10, 1998):
o The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering the defendants to vacate the
property and pay attorney’s fees.
o The court held that the petitioners were the registered owners of the property, and
the defendants were mere possessors by tolerance. The court emphasized that the
only issue in an ejectment case is physical possession, not ownership.
2. Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision (July 10, 1998):
o Only Anita Rico appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, Branch 222, Quezon
City.
o The RTC reversed the MeTC decision, dismissing the ejectment complaint.
o The RTC ruled that the issue of possession could not be resolved without
addressing the issue of ownership, which was still pending in the probate court.
The RTC found that the lease contracts between the defendants and the estate of
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura were valid and that the petitioners' claim of
ownership was still under dispute.

Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions:

1. First Resolution (August 16, 1999):
o The CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal for failure to comply with the Rule on
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
o The certification against forum shopping was signed by the petitioners' counsel,
not by the petitioners themselves, which violated the rules.
2. Second Resolution (November 25, 1999):
o The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, reiterating that the
certification against forum shopping must be signed by the petitioners themselves,
not their counsel.

Supreme Court (SC) Decision:

1. Main Issue:
o The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred
in dismissing the petition for failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2. Rule 7, Section 5 – Certification Against Forum Shopping:
o The rule requires that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by
the plaintiff or principal party, not by their counsel.
o The purpose of this rule is to ensure that the party has actual knowledge of
whether similar actions have been filed in other courts or agencies.
3. Petitioners' Arguments:
 o Petitioners argued that their counsel signed the certification because they were out
of town (Wilson Go was in the U.S., and Peter Go was in Cebu) and that they
later submitted a certification signed by Wilson Go.
o They also claimed that their counsel had a Special Power of Attorney to
represent them in the ejectment case, but the SC noted that this did not extend to
signing the certification against forum shopping.
4. Supreme Court's Ruling:
o The SC upheld the CA's decision, emphasizing that the certification against forum
shopping is a mandatory requirement and must be signed by the principal party,
not their counsel.
o The SC rejected the petitioners' plea for leniency, stating that the belated
submission of the certification did not cure the defect, as it should have been filed
simultaneously with the petition.
o The SC also noted that the petitioners failed to provide a justifiable reason for
their failure to sign the certification personally.
5. Disposition:
o The SC denied the petition for review and affirmed the CA's Resolutions
dismissing the petition for failure to comply with the certification against forum
shopping.

Key Legal Principles:

1. Certification Against Forum Shopping:
o Under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the certification
against forum shopping must be signed by the principal party, not their counsel.
This is to ensure that the party has actual knowledge of any similar actions filed in
other courts or agencies.
2. Strict Compliance with Procedural Rules:
o The SC emphasized that while procedural rules may be relaxed in certain cases,
strict compliance is generally required to ensure the orderly administration of
justice.
3. Ejectment Cases:
o In ejectment cases, the primary issue is physical possession, not ownership.
However, if the issue of possession is inseparable from the issue of ownership, the
court may address both issues.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court denied the petitioners' appeal, affirming the Court of Appeals' dismissal of
their petition for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of signing the certification
against forum shopping. The case highlights the importance of strict adherence to procedural
rules, particularly the certification against forum shopping, which must be signed by the
principal party and not their counsel.
SO ORDERED.

Abaigar vs. Abaigar – G.R. No. 167003 (2006)

Case Background

The case involves a dispute between two brothers, Panfilo A. Abaigar (petitioner) and Jesus A.
Abaigar (respondent), over a parcel of land in Calbiga, Samar. The petitioner filed a complaint
for Forcible Entry against the respondent before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) on July 5, 2000, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-2000. The petitioner alleged that the
respondent forcibly entered the land in December 1999, preventing his tenants from cultivating
it. The petitioner further claimed that when he returned from the United States in April 2000, he
hired a laborer to cultivate the land, but the respondent again forcibly ousted the laborer on June
29, 2000.

Claims and Arguments

1. Petitioner's Claims:
o The petitioner claimed that he was in prior physical possession of the land and
that the respondent forcibly entered the land in December 1999, preventing his
tenants from cultivating it.
o He argued that the respondent used force, threat, and intimidation to oust his
laborer from the land in June 2000.
o The petitioner sought to recover possession of the land and damages.
2. Respondent's Arguments:
o The respondent argued that he was the rightful owner of the land, as evidenced by
a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. CC-92-0045, which declared
him the owner of the land.
o He claimed that the petitioner's tenants had failed to pay rentals, leading to their
eviction in December 1998.
o The respondent denied using force, intimidation, or threat to gain possession of
the land.

Lower Court Decisions

1. MCTC Decision (March 19, 2004):

o The MCTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that he was in prior physical
possession of the land and that the respondent had forcibly entered the land.
2. RTC Decision (July 16, 2004):
o The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MCTC's decision, finding that the
petitioner was not in actual possession of the land as early as 1992 and that the
respondent was the rightful owner and possessor of the land.
o The RTC dismissed the petitioner's complaint and ordered him to pay the
respondent litigation expenses, attorney's fees, moral damages, and costs.
Court of Appeals Resolutions

1. First Resolution (November 30, 2004):

o The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioner's Petition for
Review because the certification against forum shopping was signed by his
counsel, not by the petitioner himself, as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Second Resolution (February 4, 2005):
o The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, reiterating that the
certification against forum shopping was defective.

Main Issue: Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main issue in this case revolves around Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that the certification against forum shoppingmust be signed by the
plaintiff or principal party, not just by their counsel. The petitioner's failure to personally sign the
certification led to the dismissal of his petition by the Court of Appeals.

Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court (SC) upheld the dismissal of the petition, emphasizing the importance of
the certification against forum shopping. The Court ruled that:

1. Strict Compliance with Rule 7, Section 5:

o The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the petitioner, not just
by their counsel. A certification signed by counsel is considered defective and
tantamount to non-compliance with the Rules of Court.
o The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition due to the defective
certification.
2. Relaxation of the Rule:
o The SC acknowledged that there have been instances where the rule was relaxed,
such as in Donato v. Court of Appeals, where the petitioner was residing in the
United States and it was physically impossible for him to sign the certification
within the reglementary period.
o However, in this case, the petitioner did not provide sufficient justification for
relaxing the rule. The petitioner did not specify any compelling circumstances or
demonstrate that he had a meritorious case that would warrant setting aside the
procedural lapse.
3. Interest of Substantial Justice:
o The SC emphasized that while the rule may be relaxed in the interest of
substantial justice, the petitioner failed to show that such relaxation was warranted
in this case.
o The Court found no compelling reason to excuse the petitioner's failure to comply
with the certification requirement.
Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the case
due to the petitioner's failure to comply with the certification against forum shopping
requirement under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Conclusion

The case highlights the importance of strict compliance with procedural rules, particularly the
requirement for the certification against forum shopping to be signed by the petitioner. While the
Supreme Court has relaxed this rule in certain cases where substantial justice demands it, the
petitioner in this case failed to provide sufficient justification for such relaxation. As a result, the
Court upheld the dismissal of the petition, emphasizing that procedural rules must be followed to
ensure the orderly administration of justice.

Eastland Const. and Devt. Corp. vs. Mortel – G.R. No.

165648
(2006)
Case Background

The case involves Eastland Construction & Development Corporation

(Eastland) and Benedicta Mortel. In 1996, Eastland announced the development of a
subdivision in Mabini, Batangas, known as "Evergreen Anilao Estate." Mortel entered into a
contract with Eastland to purchase Lot No. 9, Block 2, with an area of 125 square meters, for a
total price of P168,750.00. Mortel made several payments, totaling P183,679.00, which
exceeded the agreed contract price. Despite full payment, Eastland failed to deliver the title to
the property.

Mortel later discovered that the property had been mortgaged to Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation (Orient Bank) in 1994 to secure a loan of P2,000,000.00. The mortgage was
annotated on the title, but Eastland did not disclose this to Mortel. Additionally, Eastland did not
obtain a Certificate of Registration and License to Sell (CR/LS) from the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) until September 15, 1998, two years after Mortel had entered
into the contract.

Claims and Arguments

1. Mortel's Claims:
o Eastland failed to deliver the title to the property despite full payment.
o Eastland concealed the fact that the property was mortgaged, which constituted
fraud.
o Eastland violated Presidential Decree No. 957 (PD 957), which regulates the
sale of subdivision lots and condominiums, by selling the property without a
 CR/LS and by selling at a price higher than the maximum allowed under the
license.
2. Eastland's Defense:
o The title was not mortgaged but merely pledged to Orient Bank, and thus, the
transaction was not covered by PD 957.
o Eastland could not deliver the title because the owner's duplicate copy was in the
possession of Orient Bank, which had closed and was under the receivership of
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
o Mortel had constructive notice of the mortgage since it was annotated on the title.
3. PDIC's Defense:
o Mortel was constructively notified of the mortgage, as it was duly registered and
annotated on the title.
o The mortgage was valid and should be respected.

Lower Court Decisions

1. Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLURB):
o Declared the real estate mortgage over the property null and void.
o Ordered Eastland and PDIC to execute and deliver the Deed of Absolute Sale and
the title to Mortel, free from liens and encumbrances.
o Ordered Eastland and PDIC to pay Mortel P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
o Ordered Eastland and PDIC to pay P40,000.00 for violating PD 957 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 220.
The Arbiter ruled that Eastland had a duty to ensure that the property was free from liens
and encumbrances and that its failure to disclose the mortgage constituted fraud. The
Arbiter also found that Eastland violated PD 957 by engaging in pre-selling activities
without a CR/LS.
2. HLURB Board of Commissioners:
o Affirmed the decision of the Housing and Land Use Arbiter.
3. Office of the President:
o Dismissed the appeal filed by PDIC and Orient Bank, affirming the HLURB
decision.
Court of Appeals (CA):
• Dismissed Eastland's petition for review for failure to append material portions of the
record, including the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
• Denied Eastland's motion for reconsideration.
Supreme Court (SC) Decision

The Supreme Court denied Eastland's petition for the following reasons:

1. Failure to Comply with Procedural Requirements:

o Eastland failed to attach the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping and other
required documents when it filed its petition with the Court of Appeals. The SC
 emphasized that the requirement for a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping is
mandatory and cannot be excused. The subsequent submission of the certificate in
a motion for reconsideration does not cure the defect.
2. Finality of the HLURB Decision:
o The decision of the Housing and Land Use Arbiter had become final and
executory as to Eastland because Eastland did not file a petition for review with
the HLURB Board of Commissioners within the 30-day period. Only PDIC and
Orient Bank appealed the decision, and their appeal did not benefit Eastland.
3. Substantive Issues:
o The SC agreed with the HLURB's findings that Eastland failed to perform its
obligations under the Contract to Sell. Despite Mortel's full payment, Eastland did
not redeem and deliver the title within six months, violating its License to Sell
and Section 25 of PD 957.
o The SC also upheld the finding that Eastland acted fraudulently by concealing the
mortgage from Mortel.
4. Immutable Final Judgments:
o The SC reiterated the principle that once a judgment becomes final and executory,
it cannot be altered or modified. This is grounded in public policy and the need
for finality in judicial decisions.
Disposition

The Supreme Court denied Eastland's petition, affirming the dismissal by the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Housing and Land Use Arbiter, which had become final and executory, was
upheld. Costs were imposed against Eastland.

Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main procedural issue in this case was Eastland's failure to comply with Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the submission of a Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping. The SC emphasized that this requirement is mandatory and that failure to
comply with it is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The Court also noted that
the subsequent submission of the certificate in a motion for reconsideration does not cure the
defect.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in this case underscores the importance of strict compliance with
procedural rules, particularly the requirement of a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. It also
highlights the principle of finality of judgments, which ensures that judicial decisions become
immutable once they have attained finality. The substantive issues in the case, including
Eastland's failure to deliver the title and its fraudulent concealment of the mortgage, were also
addressed, with the SC affirming the lower courts' findings.
Altres vs. Empleo – G.R. No. 180986 (2008)
Background:
1. Parties Involved:
o Petitioners: Norberto Altres and 58 other individuals who were appointed to
various positions in the Iligan City government by then Mayor Franklin M.
Quijano.
o Respondents: Camilo G. Empleo (City Accountant of Iligan City) and other city
officials, including Franklin Maata, Livey Villaren, Raides Caga, Franco
Badelles, Ernesto Balat, Grace Saquilabon, Marina Jumalon, and George Dacup.
2. Key Events:
o In July 2003, Mayor Quijano notified the Civil Service Commission (CSC) of
numerous vacant career positions in the Iligan City government.
o Petitioners applied for these positions and were issued appointments by Mayor
Quijano on May 27, June 1, and June 24, 2004, toward the end of his term.
o The Sangguniang Panglungsod (City Council) issued Resolution No. 04-
242 requesting the CSC to suspend the processing of appointments until a new
budget was enacted.
o The Sangguniang Panglungsod also issued Resolution No. 04-266, which
directed the City Human Resource Management Office to hold in abeyance the
transmission of all appointments signed by the incumbent mayor, citing a policy
against "midnight appointments."
o As a result, respondent Camilo G. Empleo, the city accountant, refused to issue a
certification of availability of funds for the payment of petitioners' salaries, a
requirement under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, Series of 1998.
o The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the
appointments due to the lack of certification of availability of funds.
o Mayor Quijano appealed the disapproval, but the CSC Regional Office dismissed
the appeal, stating that its function in approving appointments is ministerial and
that it could not approve appointments lacking required documents.
Claims and Arguments:
• Petitioners' Claims:
o Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iligan City, seeking to compel respondent Empleo (or his successor) to issue a
certification of availability of funds for their salaries and to compel other
respondents to sign their position description forms.
o They argued that the city accountant has a ministerial duty under Section
474(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991 to certify the availability of
budgetary allotment for their appointments.
o They also contended that the Sangguniang Panglungsod's resolutions unduly
interfered with the mayor's power to appoint and that the prohibition against
"midnight appointments" applies only to presidential appointments, not local
government appointments.
• Respondents' Arguments:
 o Respondents argued that the certification of availability of funds for disbursement
is the duty of the city treasurer, not the city accountant, under Section 344 of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
o They also claimed that the case had become moot and academic because the
CSC had already disapproved the appointments.
o Respondents further argued that the petition raised questions of fact, which are
not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
Lower Court Decision:
• The RTC of Iligan City denied the petition for mandamus, ruling that the certification of
availability of funds for disbursement is the duty of the city treasurer under Section 344
of the Local Government Code of 1991, not the city accountant.
• The RTC also held that the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue the certification
because it is not within his ministerial duty.
Main Issue:
• The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 474(b)(4) or Section 344
of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to the requirement of certification of
availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, Series of 1998.
Supreme Court Decision:
Technical Issues:
• Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping:
o Respondents argued that the verification and certification against forum shopping
attached to the petition was defective because it was signed by only 11 out of 59
petitioners.
o The Supreme Court ruled that the verification and certification were
in substantial compliance with the rules, citing previous cases where the Court
allowed relaxation of the requirements under justifiable circumstances.
o The Court held that the 11 signatories were sufficient to assure the Court that the
allegations were true and correct, and that the non-signing petitioners could be
dropped from the case.
Merits of the Case:
• Mootness:
o The Court acknowledged that the case had become moot and academic because
the CSC had already disapproved the appointments.
o However, the Court decided to rule on the merits because the issue was capable
of repetition and needed to be settled for future guidance.
• Applicability of Section 474(b)(4) vs. Section 344:
o The Court held that Section 474(b)(4) applies to the certification of availability of
funds for appointments, while Section 344 applies to the certification of
availability of funds for actual disbursements (e.g., payment of salaries after
services have been rendered).
o The Court clarified that the city accountant has the ministerial duty to certify the
availability of budgetary allotment for appointments under Section 474(b)(4),
 while the city treasurer certifies the availability of funds for disbursement
under Section 344.
o The Court emphasized that the certification required under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule
V of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 is for the purpose of
approving appointments, not for actual payment of salaries, and thus falls
under Section 474(b)(4).
Disposition:
• The Supreme Court reversed the RTC decision and declared that Section 474(b)(4) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to the requirement of certification of
availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, Series of 1998.
• The Court held that it is the city accountant, not the city treasurer, who has the
ministerial duty to issue the certification of availability of funds for appointments.
Key Legal Principles:
1. Ministerial Duty of the City Accountant:
o Under Section 474(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991, the city
accountant has the duty to certify the availability of budgetary allotment for
appointments.
o This certification is required before the CSC can approve appointments.
2. Distinction Between Section 474(b)(4) and Section 344:
o Section 474(b)(4) applies to certifications for appointments and other obligations
that do not involve actual disbursement of funds.
o Section 344 applies to certifications for actual disbursements of funds, such as
payment of salaries after services have been rendered.
3. Substantial Compliance with Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping:
o The Court may allow substantial compliance with the requirements for
verification and certification against forum shopping under justifiable
circumstances, especially when the signatories are real parties-in-interest and the
allegations are made in good faith.
4. Mootness:
o Even if a case becomes moot and academic, the Court may still rule on its merits
if the issue is capable of repetition and needs to be settled for future guidance.
Conclusion:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that the city accountant has the
ministerial duty to issue the certification of availability of funds for appointments under Section
474(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court clarified the distinction between
the roles of the city accountant and the city treasurer in certifying the availability of funds and
emphasized the importance of settling the issue for future cases.
Mandaue vs. Isidto – G.R. No. 181051 (2010)
Background:
• Petitioners: Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc. and Gamallosons Traders, Inc., represented by
Fausto B. Gamallo.
• Respondents: Bienvenido Isidto, Erwin Ba-ay, Victoriano Bendanilla, Eduvigis Gutib,
Julito Gutib, Gregorio Ordenisa, Damian Rabanal, Rosita Rabanal, Eustaquia Siglos,
Primitivo Siglos, and Rodolfo Torres.
• Nature of the Case: The respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave
pay against the petitioners before the Regional Arbitration Branch VII, Cebu City of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
• Industry: Petitioners are engaged in the manufacture of rattan furniture in Mandaue City.
Claims and Arguments:
• Respondents' Claims:
o They were employees of the petitioners, starting their employment in 1977 and
1978 under the firm name "Gamallo Sons, Inc."
o The firm name changed to "Gamallosons Traders, Inc." in 1980 and later to
"Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc." They alleged that these changes were intended to
subvert their labor rights and benefits.
o They were provided loans to build houses in the petitioners' compound to ensure
their availability for 24-hour service.
o On July 22, 1978, the company offered a voluntary retrenchment plan, but they
did not avail of it.
o On March 5, 2001, they were dismissed without just cause and without due
process.
• Petitioners' Defense:
o Respondents were independent contractors, not employees, and they received
orders from multiple furniture manufacturers.
o The houses and workplaces were constructed in a compound owned by another
corporation, Galleon Agro Realty Development Corporation.
Lower Court Decisions:
1. Labor Arbiter (April 3, 2002):
o Ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring them as employees of the petitioners
and finding them illegally dismissed.
o Ordered petitioners to pay the respondents a total of P917,700.00 as separation
pay.
o Dismissed the claims against Manuel Jose Oyson III and Simonette C. Abao for
lack of merit.
2. NLRC (December 4, 2003):
o Petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision but failed to attach a certificate
of non-forum shopping as required by Section 4, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure.
o The NLRC dismissed the appeal for being fatally defective and affirmed the
Labor Arbiter's decision.
 oPetitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on May 27, 2004.
oAn Entry of Judgment was issued on March 15, 2005, declaring the NLRC
decision final and executory.
3. Court of Appeals (January 31, 2007):
o Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
o The CA dismissed the petition, affirming the NLRC's decision.
o Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on December 14, 2007.
Main Issue:
• Whether the Court of Appeals committed a grave and reversible error in affirming the
NLRC's decision to deny petitioners' appeal on a technicality (failure to file a certificate
of non-forum shopping) despite the existence of a meritorious case.
Supreme Court Decision:
• The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, holding that the filing of a certificate of
non-forum shopping is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
• Petitioners failed to comply with this requirement, and their belated submission of the
certificate did not cure the defect.
• The Court emphasized that procedural rules must be followed, and non-compliance
cannot be excused without special circumstances or compelling reasons.
• The Court found no valid justification for petitioners' failure to comply with the
requirement.
Disposition:
• The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the CA's decision, with costs
against the petitioners.

Key Legal Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading:

• The main issue in this case revolves around the certificate of non-forum shopping,
which is a requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• The Court reiterated that the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping
is mandatory and that failure to comply with this requirement is generally fatal to the
appeal.
• The Court also emphasized that while litigation is not a game of technicalities, procedural
rules must be followed to ensure the orderly administration of justice.
Detailed Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decision:
1. Mandatory Nature of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping:
o The Court cited Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which requires the
submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping in all initiatory pleadings.
o The purpose of this requirement is to prevent forum shopping, a practice where a
party files multiple cases involving the same issues in different courts to increase
the chances of a favorable decision.
2. Failure to Comply with the Requirement:
o Petitioners failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping to their notice of
appeal before the NLRC.
 oThe Court ruled that this failure was fatal to their appeal, as the requirement is not
merely procedural but is intended to ensure the integrity of the judicial process.
3. No Valid Justification for Non-Compliance:
o Petitioners did not provide any special circumstances or compelling reasons to
justify their failure to comply with the requirement.
o The Court noted that while there are cases where non-compliance was excused,
such cases involved unique circumstances that made strict application of the rule
unjust.
4. Procedural Rules Must Be Followed:
o The Court emphasized that while the rules of procedure should not be used to
deny substantial justice, they must still be followed to ensure the orderly
presentation and resolution of cases.
o The Court rejected petitioners' argument that their case should be decided on the
merits despite their procedural lapse.
Conclusion:
• The Supreme Court's decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with
procedural rules, particularly the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping.
• The Court's ruling also highlights the principle that while technicalities should not
override substantial justice, parties must still adhere to procedural requirements to
maintain the integrity of the judicial process.
• The dismissal of the petition was based on the petitioners' failure to comply with a
mandatory procedural requirement, and the Court found no compelling reason to relax
the rule in this case.

Dizon vs. Matti, Jr. – G.R. No. 215614 (2019)

Case Background and Facts

The case involves a dispute over the sale of a townhouse located at Block 2, Lot 48, Veraville
Allegria Townhomes, San Antonio Road, Talon IV, Las Piñas City. The respondent, Jose Luis
K. Matti, Jr. (Matti, Jr.), filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against the
petitioner, Carmelita V. Dizon (Dizon), alleging that he purchased the property from her
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 24, 2000. Matti, Jr. claimed that he paid the full
purchase price and was given the original Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title (TCT No. T-
58674). However, he later discovered that the title and tax receipts were falsified, and the
Register of Deeds (RD) confirmed that the title in his possession was fake. Despite demands,
Dizon failed to deliver the authentic title, prompting Matti, Jr. to file the case.

Dizon, on the other hand, denied the allegations. She claimed that she did not execute the Deed
of Absolute Sale, did not know Matti, Jr., and was not in the Philippines during the alleged
transaction. She presented evidence, including immigration records, to prove that she was
working in London during February 2000.

Claims and Arguments

1. Matti, Jr.'s Claims:
 o He entered into a valid contract of sale with Dizon on February 24, 2000.
o He paid the full purchase price and was given the original title.
o The title and tax receipts were later found to be fake.
o He demanded the delivery of the authentic title, but Dizon failed to comply.
2. Dizon's Defense:
o She did not execute the Deed of Absolute Sale.
o She was not in the Philippines during the alleged transaction (she was in London).
o She did not know Matti, Jr. or the real estate agents involved.
o The signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.

Lower Court Decisions

1. Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision (October 25, 2011):
o The RTC dismissed Matti, Jr.'s complaint, ruling that Dizon was not in the
Philippines during the alleged transaction. The court found that Dizon's signature
on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged, and the contract was invalid due to lack
of consent.
2. Court of Appeals (CA) Decision (July 25, 2014):
o The CA reversed the RTC's decision, ruling that the notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale enjoys the presumption of regularity. The CA held that Dizon failed to
present clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, such as expert
testimony on the alleged forgery.
Supreme Court (SC) Decision

The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision and reinstated the RTC's ruling. The SC held
that:

1. Procedural Issues:
o The SC addressed the procedural defects raised by Matti, Jr., including the
defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping, and the unsigned
motion for reconsideration. The SC ruled that these defects were cured by
subsequent submissions and did not warrant dismissal of the case.
2. Substantive Issues:
o The SC agreed with the RTC that Dizon was not in the Philippines during the
alleged transaction. The evidence, including immigration records and employment
certifications, conclusively proved that Dizon was in London in February 2000.
o The SC found that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was not valid because
Dizon did not execute it. The notarization of a document does not guarantee its
validity if the parties did not intend to be bound by it.
o The SC also noted that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged, as
it was physically impossible for Dizon to have signed it. The SC conducted its
own comparison of the signatures and found them to be dissimilar.
o The SC emphasized that Matti, Jr. failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
his claims. His testimony was uncorroborated and inconsistent, and he failed to
present key witnesses, such as the notary public and the real estate agents
involved in the transaction.
Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main procedural issue connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading was the defective
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The SC ruled that while the certification
was initially defective because it was signed by Dizon's brother instead of Dizon herself, the
defect was cured by the subsequent submission of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing her
brother to act on her behalf. The SC emphasized that procedural rules should be liberally
construed to promote substantial justice.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted Dizon's petition, reversed the CA's decision, and reinstated the
RTC's ruling. The Deed of Absolute Sale was declared null and void, and Matti, Jr.'s complaint
for specific performance was dismissed.

Key Takeaways
1. Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Documents:
o While notarized documents enjoy a presumption of regularity, this presumption
can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, such as proof of forgery or lack
of consent.
2. Burden of Proof:
o The plaintiff (Matti, Jr.) failed to meet his burden of proving the validity of the
sale. His uncorroborated testimony and failure to present key witnesses weakened
his case.
3. Forgery and Lack of Consent:
o The SC found that Dizon's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged,
and she did not consent to the sale. The contract was therefore void.
4. Procedural Defects:
o Procedural defects, such as defective verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, can be cured by subsequent submissions. The SC emphasized that
procedural rules should not override substantial justice.
5. Importance of Evidence:
o The SC gave weight to the immigration records, employment certifications, and
other documentary evidence presented by Dizon, which conclusively proved that
she was not in the Philippines during the alleged transaction.
Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in this case underscores the importance of substantial evidence in
proving the validity of a contract, especially when allegations of forgery and lack of consent are
raised. The Court also demonstrated a liberal approach to procedural rules to ensure that
justice is served. Ultimately, the SC ruled in favor of Dizon, declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale
null and void due to forgery and lack of consent.
Involving juridical persons
BPI Leasing vs. CA – G.R. No. 127624 (2003)
Facts of the Case:
1. Background:
o Petitioner: BPI Leasing Corporation (BLC), a corporation engaged in the
business of leasing properties.
o Respondents: The Honorable Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
o Issue: BLC sought a tax refund for overpaid "contractor’s percentage tax" under
Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) for the calendar year
1986. BLC claimed that it should have been subject to the "gross receipts tax"
under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC, as provided by Revenue
Regulation 19-86, which was issued on November 10, 1986.
2. Claims and Arguments:
o BLC’s Claim: BLC paid P1,139,041.49 as "contractor’s percentage tax" for 1986
based on gross rentals of P27,783,725.42. After Revenue Regulation 19-86 was
issued, BLC recomputed its tax liability under the "gross receipts tax" and
determined that it should have paid only P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a
refund of P777,117.05, representing the difference between the two amounts.
o CIR and CTA’s Argument: Revenue Regulation 19-86, as amended, applies
prospectively and only to leases written on or after January 1, 1987. Since BLC’s
rental income was received prior to 1986, it was not covered by the regulation,
and thus, BLC was not entitled to a refund.
3. Procedural History:
o April 11, 1988: BLC filed a claim for refund with the CIR.
o April 15, 1988: BLC filed a petition for review with the CTA to stop the running
of the prescriptive period for refunds.
o May 13, 1994: The CTA dismissed BLC’s petition, ruling that Revenue
Regulation 19-86 applies prospectively and does not cover BLC’s 1986
transactions.
o July 26, 1995: The CTA denied BLC’s motion for reconsideration.
o Court of Appeals: Affirmed the CTA’s decision.
o Supreme Court: BLC filed a petition for review on certiorari.
4. Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading:
o The main procedural issue was whether BLC’s petition complied with Supreme
Court Circular 28-91 (now incorporated as Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court), which requires that the certification of non-forum shopping must be
signed by the petitioner or a duly authorized representative. In this case, the
certification was signed by BLC’s counsel, who was not specifically authorized
by BLC to sign the certification. The Supreme Court ruled that this was a fatal
procedural defect.
5. Substantive Issues:
 o Whether Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative or interpretative in nature.
o Whether Revenue Regulation 19-86 applies prospectively or retroactively.
o Whether BLC met the quantum of evidence required in refund cases.
o Whether BLC is estopped from claiming the refund.

Decisions of the Courts:

1. Court of Tax Appeals (CTA):
o The CTA denied BLC’s claim for a refund, holding that Revenue Regulation 19-
86 applies prospectively and only to leases written on or after January 1, 1987.
Since BLC’s rental income was derived from leases prior to 1987, it was not
covered by the regulation.
2. Court of Appeals:
o The Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA’s decision, agreeing that Revenue
Regulation 19-86 applies prospectively and that BLC’s claim for a refund was not
justified.
3. Supreme Court:
o The Supreme Court denied BLC’s petition for review and affirmed the decisions
of the lower courts. The Court held that:
§ Procedural Issue: The petition failed to comply with Supreme Court
Circular 28-91 because the certification of non-forum shopping was
signed by BLC’s counsel without specific authorization from BLC. This
was a fatal defect that warranted dismissal of the petition.
§ Substantive Issues:
§ Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative in nature, as it was issued
pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Secretary of Finance
under Section 277 of the NIRC.
§ The regulation applies prospectively, as explicitly stated in
Section 7 of the regulation, which provides that it shall take effect
on January 1, 1987, and applies to leases written on or after that
date.
§ Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and must be
strictly construed against the claimant. BLC failed to justify its
claim by the clearest grant of law.
§ The Court did not rule on the remaining issues (quantum of
evidence and estoppel) as the petition was already dismissed on
procedural and substantive grounds.

Reasoning of the Supreme Court:

1. Procedural Defect:
o The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping must
be signed by the petitioner or a duly authorized representative. In this case, BLC’s
counsel signed the certification without specific authorization from BLC. The
 Court ruled that this was a fatal procedural defect, and the petition should be
dismissed outright.
2. Nature of Revenue Regulation 19-86:
o The Court held that Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative in nature because it
was issued pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Secretary of Finance
under Section 277 of the NIRC. It was not merely interpretative but was designed
to implement the law by providing details.
3. Prospective Application:
o The Court ruled that Revenue Regulation 19-86 applies prospectively, as
explicitly stated in Section 7 of the regulation. The regulation clearly provides
that it shall take effect on January 1, 1987, and applies to leases written on or after
that date. Since BLC’s rental income was derived from leases prior to 1987, the
regulation did not apply to its 1986 transactions.
4. Tax Refunds as Tax Exemptions:
o The Court reiterated that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and must
be strictly construed against the claimant. BLC failed to justify its claim by the
clearest grant of law, and thus, it was not entitled to a refund.

Disposition:
• The Supreme Court denied BLC’s petition for review and affirmed the decisions of the
Court of Appeals and the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court held that BLC’s petition was
procedurally defective and that Revenue Regulation 19-86 applies prospectively, barring
BLC’s claim for a refund. No costs were awarded.

Key Takeaways:
1. Procedural Compliance: The Supreme Court strictly enforces procedural rules,
particularly the requirement that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the petitioner or a duly authorized representative. Failure to comply with this
requirement can result in the dismissal of the petition.
2. Legislative vs. Interpretative Regulations: The Court distinguished between legislative
and interpretative regulations, holding that Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative in
nature because it was issued pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Secretary of
Finance.
3. Prospective Application of Regulations: The Court emphasized that administrative
regulations, like statutes, generally operate prospectively unless there is a clear legislative
intent to the contrary. In this case, the regulation explicitly stated that it applied to leases
written on or after January 1, 1987.
4. Strict Construction of Tax Refunds: The Court reiterated that tax refunds are in the
nature of tax exemptions and must be strictly construed against the claimant. The burden
of proof is on the claimant to justify the refund by the clearest grant of law.
PAL vs. FASAP – G.R. No. 143088 (2006)
I. Background
1. Parties Involved:
o Petitioners: Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), Manolo Aquino (Executive VP),
Jorge Ma. Cui, Jr. (Manager), Patricia Chiong (Assistant VP).
o Respondents: Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines
(FASAP) and Leonardo Bhagwani.
2. Origins of the Case:
o On May 14, 1997, FASAP and Bhagwani filed a complaint before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against PAL for unfair labor practice,
illegal suspension, and illegal dismissal.
o Labor Arbiter Decision (1997): Ruled in favor of FASAP/Bhagwani, finding
PAL guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, ordering damages.
o NLRC Modification (Later): Affirmed illegal dismissal but set aside the unfair
labor practice finding.
3. Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA):
o PAL filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to challenge the NLRC decision.
o Certification of Non-Forum Shopping Issue:
§ The petition included a certification signed by Cesar R. Lamberte (VP-
Human Resources) and Susan Del Carmen (Assistant VP-Cabin
Services), without proof of authority to act for PAL.
§ Other petitioners (Aquino, Cui, Chiong) did not sign the certification.

II. Claims and Arguments

1. Petitioners (PAL):
o Argued that the CA erred in dismissing their petition for lack of authority of
Lamberte/Del Carmen.
o Submitted a Secretary’s Certificate (dated February 15, 2000) via motion for
reconsideration, showing Board Resolution No. 00-02-03 authorizing
Lamberte/Del Carmen to file labor-related cases.
o Contended that Aquino, Cui, and Chiong were nominal parties, so their failure to
sign the certification was excusable.
2. Respondents (FASAP/Bhagwani):
o Maintained that the certification was defective due to lack of authority at the time
of filing.
o Argued that the belated submission of the Secretary’s Certificate (granting
authority after the petition’s filing) did not cure the defect.

III. Lower Court Decisions

1. Court of Appeals (CA):
o January 31, 2000 Resolution: Dismissed the petition because:
 § Lamberte/Del Carmen lacked proof of authority to sign the certification
for PAL.
§ Other petitioners (Aquino, Cui, Chiong) failed to join the certification.
o May 11, 2000 Resolution: Denied reconsideration despite the Secretary’s
Certificate, ruling that authority must exist at the time of filing.

IV. Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 (Parts of a Pleading)

Rule 7, Section 5 requires a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to be signed by the

petitioner(s). For corporations, this must be executed by a duly authorized representative
with proof of authority (e.g., board resolution).

Key Issue:

• Whether the belated submission of a Secretary’s Certificate (authorizing Lamberte/Del

Carmen after the petition was filed) cured the defective certification.

V. Supreme Court Decision and Reasoning

The SC denied PAL’s petition, upholding the CA’s dismissal.

Legal Analysis:

1. Requirement of Valid Certification:

o Under Rule 65 (Certiorari) and Rule 46 (Original Cases Before the CA), a
certification must be executed by petitioners themselves or authorized
representatives.
o For corporations, authority to sign must be granted via board resolution or
corporate by-laws.
2. Timing of Authority:
o The Secretary’s Certificate (February 15, 2000) granted authority after the
petition was filed (January 24, 2000).
o SC Precedent: While belated submission of authority is allowed if authority
existed at the time of filing, here, Lamberte/Del Carmen had no authority when
the petition was filed.
3. Nominal Parties Argument:
o The SC rejected PAL’s claim that Aquino, Cui, and Chiong were nominal parties.
All petitioners must sign the certification unless excused by law.

Rationale:

• A certification invalid at the time of filing cannot be retroactively cured. To hold

otherwise would undermine the rule’s purpose: to prevent forum-shopping and ensure
accountability.
VI. Disposition
• SC Ruling: Denied PAL’s petition. The CA’s dismissal of the case for defective
certification was affirmed.
• Costs: No costs awarded.

Key Takeaway

This case underscores the strict compliance required for certifications of non-forum shopping
under Rule 7. For corporations, authority to sign must exist at the time of filing, and belated
proof of authority (granted post-filing) is insufficient. The decision reinforces procedural rigor to
uphold judicial integrity and prevent forum-shopping.

Tible vs. Royal – G.R. No. 155806 (2008)

Case Background

The case involves Tible & Tible Company, Inc. (TTCI) and the Heirs of Emilio G. Tible,
Jr. (petitioners) against Royal Savings and Loan Association (RSLA) (now assigned
to Comsavings Bank) and Godofredo E. Quiling, Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Calamba,
Laguna (respondents). The dispute arose from a loan agreement between TTCI and RSLA,
secured by chattel mortgages, which TTCI failed to repay. The case went through several legal
proceedings, including a compromise agreement, execution of judgment, and subsequent
attempts by petitioners to annul the execution sale and recover properties.

Claims and Arguments

Petitioners' Claims:
1. Annulment of Execution Sale: Petitioners sought to annul the public auction sale of 23
parcels of land conducted by the sheriff, arguing that the sale was irregular and that they
were not properly notified of the execution proceedings.
2. Reconveyance of Real Property: Petitioners requested the reconveyance of the
properties sold at auction, claiming that the sale was invalid and that they were deprived
of their rights.
3. Damages: Petitioners sought damages for the alleged wrongful execution and sale of
their properties.
Respondents' Arguments:
1. Validity of the Compromise Agreement: Respondents argued that the compromise
agreement, which was approved by the court, was valid and binding. TTCI had admitted
its indebtedness and agreed to a payment schedule, which it failed to comply with.
2. Proper Execution of Judgment: Respondents contended that the execution of the
judgment was lawful and that petitioners were given ample opportunity to comply with
the terms of the compromise agreement.
3. Lack of Jurisdiction: Respondents argued that the petitioners' complaint should have
been filed in Cavite City, where the original case was decided, rather than in Naga City.

Reasons for Filing the Case

Petitioners' Reasons:
• Petitioners believed that the execution sale was conducted without proper notice and that
the properties were sold at a price significantly lower than their actual value.
• They claimed that the sheriff and RSLA acted in bad faith by proceeding with the sale
despite their efforts to settle the debt.
Respondents' Reasons:
• Respondents filed for execution of the judgment after petitioners defaulted on the
payment schedule outlined in the compromise agreement.
• They argued that the sale was conducted in accordance with the law and that petitioners
had no valid grounds to annul the sale.

How the Case Was Filed

1. Initial Complaint: Petitioners filed a complaint for "Annulment of Execution Sale, and
TCT Nos. 27994, 24002, 24003, 24004, 24005 and other related Documents, and/or
Reconveyance of Real Property with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining
Order with Damages" in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City (Civil Case No.
RTC-96-3626).
2. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction: The RTC in Naga City dismissed the complaint,
suggesting that it should have been filed in Cavite City, where the original case (Civil
Case No. N-2893) was decided.
3. Refiling in Cavite City: Petitioners refiled the complaint in the RTC of Cavite
City (Civil Case No. N-6619), which was raffled to the same branch (Branch 16) that
handled the original case.
4. Motion to Dismiss: Instead of filing an answer, respondent Comsavings Bank filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that petitioners' claims had been waived, abandoned, or
extinguished.
5. Dismissal by RTC: The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of proof and denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
6. Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA): Petitioners initially filed a petition for review
under Rule 42 but later withdrew it and filed a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65.
7. Dismissal by CA: The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on procedural grounds,
including defective verification and lack of a written explanation for service by mail.
Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main procedural issue in this case relates to Rule 7, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that a pleading must be verified and accompanied by a certificate of
non-forum shopping. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari because:

• The verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping were signed by only one petitioner
(Almabella Menla Vda. de Tible) without a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Board
Resolution, or Secretary's Certificateauthorizing her to sign on behalf of the other
petitioners.
• Petitioners failed to provide a written explanation for serving the petition by mail instead
of personally, as required by Rule 13, Section 11.

Decisions of the Lower Courts

RTC Decision (Cavite City):
• The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of proof and denied the motion for
reconsideration, stating that the issues had already been adequately addressed.
CA Decision:
• The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on procedural grounds, citing:
1. Defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
2. Lack of a written explanation for service by mail.
3. The improper use of certiorari as a remedy when an ordinary appeal under Rule
41 was available.

Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court (SC) denied the petition for review on certiorari, affirming the CA's
dismissal. The SC held:

1. Certiorari is Not the Proper Remedy: The SC emphasized that certiorari under Rule
65 is an extraordinary remedy and cannot be used as a substitute for an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41. Since the RTC's decision was a final judgment, the proper remedy
was an appeal, not certiorari.
2. Strict Compliance with Procedural Rules: The SC reiterated that certiorari, being an
extraordinary remedy, requires strict compliance with procedural rules. Petitioners'
failure to comply with the requirements for verification, certification of non-forum
shopping, and service by mail was fatal to their petition.
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion: The SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC or the CA. The RTC's dismissal was based on factual considerations, and the
CA correctly dismissed the petition for procedural flaws.
4. Liberal Application of Rules Not Warranted: The SC rejected petitioners' plea for a
liberal application of procedural rules, noting that they failed to provide a justifiable
cause for non-compliance or a compelling reason to relax the rules.
Disposition

The SC denied the petition for lack of merit, upholding the CA's dismissal of the petition for
certiorari. The Court emphasized the importance of strict compliance with procedural rules,
especially in extraordinary remedies like certiorari, and found no compelling reason to relax the
rules in this case.

Key Takeaways
1. Certiorari vs. Appeal: Certiorari is not a substitute for an ordinary appeal. When a final
judgment is rendered, the proper remedy is an appeal, not certiorari.
2. Strict Compliance with Procedural Rules: Failure to comply with procedural
requirements, such as verification, certification of non-forum shopping, and proper
service, can lead to the dismissal of a petition.
3. Liberal Application of Rules: Courts may relax procedural rules only in exceptional
cases where there is a justifiable cause for non-compliance and a compelling reason to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. In this case, petitioners failed to meet these conditions.

The case underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules and choosing the correct
remedy in legal proceedings.

Societe Des Produits, Nestle vs. Puregold – G.R. No.

217194 (2017)
Case Background

The case involves a trademark dispute between Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle), a
Swiss corporation engaged in the marketing and sale of various food products, and Puregold
Price Club, Inc. (Puregold), a Philippine corporation engaged in the wholesale and retail
trading of consumer goods. The dispute arose when Puregold filed an application for the
registration of the trademark "COFFEE MATCH" with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO)
on 14 June 2007. The application was for use on coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, artificial coffee, flour,
cereals, bread, pastry, confectionery, and honey under Class 30 of the International
Classification of Goods.

Nestle, the owner of the well-known trademark "COFFEE-MATE", opposed Puregold's

application on 5 December 2008, alleging that the two marks were confusingly similar. Nestle
argued that the similarity would likely mislead the public into believing that Puregold's products
were connected to or originated from Nestle, thereby causing damage to Nestle's reputation and
business.

Claims and Arguments

 1. Nestle's Claims:
o Nestle claimed exclusive ownership of the "COFFEE-MATE" trademark, which
it argued was internationally well-known.
o Nestle contended that Puregold's "COFFEE MATCH" mark was confusingly
similar to its own, both visually and phonetically, and would likely cause
confusion among consumers.
o Nestle argued that the registration of Puregold's mark would dilute the
distinctiveness of its "COFFEE-MATE" trademark and cause irreparable harm
to its business.
2. Puregold's Position:
o Puregold argued that its "COFFEE MATCH" mark was distinct and not
confusingly similar to Nestle's "COFFEE-MATE".
o Puregold contended that the word "COFFEE" is generic and cannot be
exclusively appropriated by any party, and that the addition of "MATCH" made
its mark sufficiently distinct from Nestle's "COFFEE-MATE".

Procedural History

1. Bureau of Legal Affairs-Intellectual Property Office (BLA-IPO):

o On 16 April 2012, the BLA-IPO dismissed Nestle's opposition, ruling that
Nestle's opposition was defective because the verification and certification against
forum shopping attached to Nestle's opposition did not include a board resolution
or secretary's certificate authorizing Dennis Jose R. Barot to act on Nestle's
behalf.
o The BLA-IPO also found that the marks were not confusingly similar, as the
word "COFFEE" is generic, and the addition of "MATCH" in Puregold's mark
made it visually and aurally distinct from Nestle's "COFFEE-MATE".
2. Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office (ODG-IPO):
o On 7 February 2014, the ODG-IPO dismissed Nestle's appeal, reiterating that
Barot's authority to sign the certification against forum shopping was not
sufficiently proven.
o The ODG-IPO also ruled that the marks were not confusingly similar, as the
word "COFFEE" is generic, and the differences between "MATCH"and "-
MATE" were sufficient to distinguish the two marks.
3. Court of Appeals (CA):
o On 15 May 2014, the CA dismissed Nestle's petition for review on procedural
grounds, citing the following defects:
§ The petition did not include the name of the respondent (Puregold) in the
title.
§ There was no board resolution or secretary's certificate proving Barot's
authority to file the petition and sign the verification/certification against
forum shopping.
§ Certified true copies of material portions of the record were not attached.
 o On 14 October 2014, the CA denied Nestle's motion for reconsideration, ruling
that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The main procedural issue in this case was Nestle's failure to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court, which requires a certification against forum shopping. Specifically,
Nestle failed to provide a board resolution or secretary's certificate authorizing Dennis Jose R.
Barot to sign the certification against forum shopping on behalf of the corporation. The Supreme
Court emphasized that for corporations, the authority to sign such certifications must be granted
by the board of directors through a board resolution or secretary's certificate. Nestle's failure to
provide this documentation rendered its petition defective and subject to dismissal.

Supreme Court's Decision

1. Procedural Issues:
o The Supreme Court held that the CA erred in ruling that Nestle's petition was
filed beyond the reglementary period. Nestle had filed a motion for extension
within the 15-day period, and the petition was filed within the extended period
granted by the CA.
o However, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA that Nestle's failure to comply
with the certification against forum shopping requirement under Section 5, Rule
7 was a fatal defect. The absence of a board resolution or secretary's certificate
authorizing Barot to sign the certification was sufficient ground for dismissal.
2. Substantive Issues:
o The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the BLA-IPO and ODG-IPO that the
marks "COFFEE-MATE"and "COFFEE MATCH" were not confusingly
similar.
o The Court applied the dominancy test, which focuses on the similarity of the
prevalent features of the competing trademarks. It found that while both marks
contained the word "COFFEE", which is generic and cannot be exclusively
appropriated, the addition of "MATCH" in Puregold's mark made it visually and
aurally distinct from Nestle's "COFFEE-MATE".
o The Court also noted that the capitalization of the letters "C" and "M" in
Puregold's mark further distinguished it from Nestle's mark, which uses a
hyphenated small letter "-m".
o The Court concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two
marks and upheld the registration of Puregold's "COFFEE MATCH"trademark.

Disposition
The Supreme Court denied Nestle's petition and affirmedthe CA's 15 May 2014 and 14
October 2014 Resolutions, thereby upholding the dismissal of Nestle's opposition to Puregold's
trademark application. The Court ruled that Puregold's "COFFEE MATCH" mark was
registrable and not confusingly similar to Nestle's "COFFEE-MATE"trademark.

Key Takeaways

1. Procedural Compliance: The case highlights the importance of strict compliance with
procedural rules, particularly the requirement for a certification against forum shopping.
For corporations, this includes providing a board resolution or secretary's certificate
authorizing the signatory to act on behalf of the corporation.
2. Trademark Distinctiveness: The case underscores the principle that generic or
descriptive words (e.g., "COFFEE") cannot be exclusively appropriated. The
distinctiveness of a trademark lies in the combination of elements, and the addition of
unique features (e.g., "MATCH") can render a mark registrable even if it shares a
common generic term with another mark.
3. Likelihood of Confusion: The Court's application of the dominancy test and its
emphasis on visual and aural distinctions between marks provide guidance on how to
assess the likelihood of confusion in trademark disputes.

C.3.b. False CNFS

Rudecon Mngt vs. Singson – G.R. No. 150798 (2000)
Background:
1. Ownership of Condominium Units:
o The spouses Pablo and Ma. Theresa P. Tolentino owned Room 302 in Tempus
Place I Condominium, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No.
8876.
o Rudecon Management Corporation (RMC)owned Room 404 in the same
condominium, covered by CCT No. 3295.
o Sisenando S. Singson owned two condominium units in Tempus Place II
Condominium: Unit A (CCT No. 5013) and Unit B (CCT No. 5014).
2. Deed of Exchange:
o On April 18, 1997, the spouses Tolentino and Singson executed a Deed of
Exchange, where Singson transferred his units (A and B) to the Tolentinos in
exchange for Rooms 302 and 404.
3. Unlawful Detainer Case:
o In September 1987, RMC filed an unlawful detainer case against Ramon
Veluz (Singson’s lessee) in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City,
seeking to evict Veluz from Room 404. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
 18436 and was later appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as Civil Case
No. 35326.
4. Reconveyance Case:
o On September 3, 1998, Singson filed a complaint for reconveyance against
RMC in the RTC, seeking to compel RMC to transfer CCT No. 3295(Room 404)
to his name. He alleged that he acquired ownership of Room 404 through the
Deed of Exchange with the Tolentinos. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
98-35444.
o Singson later filed an amended complaint, alleging that RMC had mortgaged
Room 404 to Allied Banking Corporation without his knowledge, causing him
damages.
5. Annulment of Sheriff’s Sale:
o Singson filed another complaint in the RTC against Allied Banking
Corporation and the Sheriff’s Office of Quezon City, seeking to annul the
sheriff’s sale of Room 302 (covered by CCT No. 8876) at a public auction. He
alleged that the foreclosure and sale were illegal due to lack of notice and
publication. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39794.
Claims and Arguments:
• Singson’s Claims:
o He acquired ownership of Rooms 302 and 404 through the Deed of Exchange
with the Tolentinos.
o RMC refused to transfer CCT No. 3295 (Room 404) to his name despite his
ownership.
o RMC mortgaged Room 404 to Allied Banking Corporation without his consent,
causing him damages.
o The foreclosure and sale of Room 302 by Allied Banking Corporation were
illegal.
• RMC’s Arguments:
o Singson’s complaint should be dismissed because:
1. The Deed of Exchange was not binding on RMC, as it was not a party to
the agreement.
2. Singson was not a real party in interest and had no legal personality to
enforce the unnotarized Deed of Sale between RMC and the Tolentinos.
3. Singson had not transferred ownership of his units (A and B) to the
Tolentinos, so he could not claim ownership of Room 404.
4. Reconveyance was not a proper remedy since there was no allegation of
wrongful or erroneous registration of CCT No. 3295.
Lower Court Decisions:
• The RTC granted RMC’s motion to dismiss Singson’s complaint in Civil Case No. 98-
35444 on April 7, 1999. Singson filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
on June 30, 1999.
• Singson appealed the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 64281.
Court of Appeals Resolutions:
• The CA denied RMC’s omnibus motion to dismissSingson’s appeal, ruling that there
was no forum shopping because:
1. There was no identity of parties and causes of action between Civil Case No. 98-
35444 and Civil Case No. Q-00-39794.
2. The subject matter in the two cases was different (Room 404 vs. Room 302).
3. The reliefs sought in the two cases were vastly different.
Main Issue Connected to Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading:

The main issue in this case revolves around forum shopping, particularly the certification
against forum shopping required under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court. RMC
alleged that Singson engaged in forum shopping by:

1. Failing to report the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 in Civil Case No. 98-
35444.
2. Submitting a false certification of non-forum shopping in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794 by
not disclosing the pendency of Civil Case No. 98-35444.
Supreme Court Decision:

The Supreme Court (SC) denied RMC’s petition and affirmed the CA’s resolutions. The SC
held:

1. Interlocutory Nature of CA Resolutions:

o The CA’s resolutions denying RMC’s omnibus motion were interlocutory and
not appealable under Rule 45. The proper remedy was a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, but RMC failed to allege grave abuse of discretion
by the CA.
2. No Forum Shopping:
o The SC agreed with the CA that there was no forum shopping because:
§ The two cases involved different subject matters (Room 404 vs. Room
302).
§ The causes of action and reliefs sought were different.
§ The issues in the two cases were not identical.
3. Certification Against Forum Shopping:
o The SC ruled that Singson did not violate the certification against forum shopping
because the two cases did not involve the same issues, parties, or reliefs.
Therefore, Singson was not required to report the pendency of one case in the
other.
Disposition:

The SC denied RMC’s petition and affirmed the CA’s resolutions. No costs were awarded.
Key Takeaways:
• Forum Shopping: Forum shopping exists when a party files multiple cases involving the
same issues, parties, and reliefs in different courts to increase the chances of a favorable
decision. In this case, the SC found no forum shopping because the two cases filed by
Singson involved different subject matters, causes of action, and reliefs.
• Certification Against Forum Shopping: Under Rule 7, Section 5, parties are required
to certify that they have not filed any other action involving the same issues. Failure to
comply can result in dismissal of the case and contempt charges. However, in this case,
the SC found that Singson did not violate this rule because the two cases were not
similar.
• Interlocutory Orders: Interlocutory orders, which do not finally dispose of a case, are
not appealable under Rule 45. The proper remedy is a petition for certiorariunder Rule
65 if there is grave abuse of discretion.

Heirs of Mampo vs. Morada – G.R. No. 214526 (2020)

Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, filed by the Heirs of Inocentes Mampo and Raymundo A. Mampo,
assailing the Decision dated December 20, 2013, and Resolution dated September 1,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123523. The CA's decision had
granted Josefina Morada's Petition for Review and nullified the DARAB Resolution,
reinstating the PARAD Order.
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioners: The Heirs of Inocentes Mampo and Raymundo A. Mampo,
represented by Azucena C. Mampo, Jra., the surviving wives and children of
deceased Inocentes and Raymundo Mampo.
o Respondent: Josefina Mampo Morada, claiming to be the actual tiller of the land
in dispute.
• Subject Matter: Five parcels of land in Baras, Canaman, Camarines Sur (subject lots)
covered by Emancipation Patents (EPs).
• Prior Agrarian Dispute: Inocentes and Raymundo Mampo initially filed a Complaint
against Nelida and Alex Severo for Recovery of Possession of the subject lots before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The DARAB Central Office
eventually ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampos, ordering Nelida and Alex Severo to
vacate and restore possession of the land to the Heirs of Mampos. This DARAB decision
became final and executory.

Claims and Arguments:

• Petitioners (Heirs of Mampos) Claims and Arguments:

o They are the rightful possessors of the subject landholdings based on the final and
executory DARAB Decision dated January 16, 2008, which ordered Nelida and
Alex Severo to vacate and restore possession to them.
 o They sought the implementation of the DARAB Decision through a Writ of
Execution.
o They argued that Respondent Josefina Morada committed forum shopping by
filing two separate petitions (Rule 65 and Rule 43) in the Court of Appeals, both
seeking to overturn the DARAB Resolution and reinstate the PARAD Order that
favored Morada.
o They contended that the CA should have dismissed Morada's Rule 43 action due
to forum shopping, especially since the CA's Sixth Division had already
dismissed Morada's Rule 65 action on the same grounds, and this dismissal
became final.
• Respondent (Josefina Morada) Claims and Arguments:
o She filed a Third-Party Claim asserting her right to possess and cultivate the
subject landholdings as the actual tiller.
o She argued that the PARAD Order dated February 26, 2010, which granted her
Third-Party Claim and recalled the Writ of Execution, should be upheld.
o In response to the forum shopping allegations, she claimed that her Rule 65 and
Rule 43 actions in the CA involved different issues and remedies, and that she had
informed the CA 12th Division about the dismissal of the Rule 65 action and her
intention to proceed with the Rule 43 action. She maintained she did not violate
forum shopping rules.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Petitioners (Heirs of Mampos): Filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari to the
Supreme Court to challenge the CA Decision that reinstated the PARAD Order favoring
Morada. They believed the CA erred in not dismissing Morada's Rule 43 action, given
her forum shopping violation and the final dismissal of her Rule 65 action on the same
grounds. They wanted to enforce the original DARAB Decision that awarded them
possession of the land.
• Respondent (Josefina Morada): Filed a Third-Party Claim to protect her alleged right to
possess and cultivate the subject landholdings. She believed that as the actual tiller, she
had a better right to the land than the Heirs of Mampos. She pursued legal actions (Rule
65 and Rule 43 petitions in the CA) to overturn the DARAB Resolution that favored the
Heirs of Mampos and to uphold the PARAD Order that recognized her claim.

How the Case Was Filed:

1. Complaint before PARAD: Inocentes and Raymundo Mampo initially filed a Complaint
for Recovery of Possession against Nelida and Alex Severo before the PARAD.
2. Appeal to DARAB Central Office: The initial PARAD decision was appealed to the
DARAB Central Office, which ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampos in its Decision
dated January 16, 2008.
3. Writ of Execution: The Heirs of Mampos moved for a Writ of Execution with the
PARAD, which was issued on November 14, 2008.
 4. Third-Party Claim by Morada: Josefina Morada filed a Third-Party Claim with the
PARAD, which was granted in an Order dated February 26, 2010, recalling the Writ of
Execution and recognizing Morada's possession.
5. Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation with Motion for
Implementation: The Heirs of Mampos' Motion for Reconsideration of the PARAD
Order was denied. They then filed a Manifestation with Motion for Implementation of the
DARAB Decision with the DARAB.
6. DARAB Resolution Reviving Writ of Execution: The DARAB granted the Heirs of
Mampos' Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the revival of the Writ of Execution in
its Resolution dated September 19, 2011.
7. Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) to CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 123033): Morada filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA Sixth Division, seeking to annul the DARAB
Resolution.
8. Petition for Review (Rule 43) to CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 123523): Morada also filed a
Petition for Review with the CA 12th Division, seeking to reverse the DARAB
Resolution and affirm the PARAD Order.
9. Motion to Dismiss for Forum Shopping (in Rule 65 case): The Heirs of Mampos filed
a Motion to Dismiss the Rule 65 action for forum shopping.
10. CA Sixth Division Resolution (dismissing Rule 65 case): The CA Sixth Division
granted the Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the Rule 65 action for forum shopping in its
Resolution dated September 28, 2012. This dismissal became final.
11. Manifestations in Rule 43 case: Morada and the Heirs of Mampos filed Manifestations
in the Rule 43 action, informing the CA 12th Division about the dismissal of the Rule 65
action and their respective positions.
12. CA 12th Division Decision (granting Rule 43 Petition): Despite the forum shopping
issue, the CA 12th Division granted Morada's Rule 43 Petition in its Decision dated
December 20, 2013, nullifying the DARAB Resolution and reinstating the PARAD
Order.
13. Motion for Reconsideration (to CA 12th Division): The Heirs of Mampos' Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the CA 12th Division.
14. Petition for Review on Certiorari to SC (G.R. No. 214526): The Heirs of Mampos
filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court, assailing the CA 12th
Division's Decision and Resolution in the Rule 43 action.

Decisions of Lower Courts:

• Decision of the PARAD (February 26, 2010):

o Decision: Granted Josefina Morada's Third-Party Claim and recalled the Writ of
Execution.
o Law Wordings of PARAD Decision:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding merit to the instant third party

claim, the same is hereby GRANTED. Parties are hereby ordered to respect third
party claimant Josefina Mampo Morada in her peaceful possession and cultivation
of the subject premises. The prayer to stay the enforcement of the decision
 rendered in the above-entitled case is GRANTED, the Writ of Execution dated
November 14, 2008 is hereby ordered RECALLED.

SO ORDERED."

• Resolution of the DARAB (September 19, 2011):

o Decision: Granted the Heirs of Mampos' Motion for Reconsideration, revived the
Writ of Execution, and ordered its immediate implementation. Reversed the
PARAD Order.
o Reasoning: DARAB found that Morada's Third-Party Claim was essentially a
protest against the beneficiary identification, which falls under the DAR
Secretary's jurisdiction, not the DARAB.
• Resolution of the CA Sixth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 123033 (September 28,
2012):
o Decision: Granted the Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Morada's Rule 65
Petition for forum shopping.
o Law Wordings of CA Sixth Division Resolution:

"WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the petition,

DISMISSED, for violation against the rule on forum shopping.

SO ORDERED."

• Decision of the CA 12th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 123523 (December 20, 2013):
o Decision: Granted Morada's Rule 43 Petition, nullified the DARAB Resolution,
and reinstated the PARAD Order.
o Law Wordings of CA 12th Division Decision:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is

GRANTED. The assailed September 19, 2011 Resolution is hereby NULLIFIED
and the February 26,2010 Order of the PARAD STANDS.

SO ORDERED."

o Reasoning: The CA 12th Division upheld Morada's Third-Party Claim as valid

under Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court and stated that the PARAD Order
granting it had become final and executory because the Heirs of Mampos did not
appeal it, but instead filed a Manifestation with Motion for Implementation with
the DARAB. The CA Decision was silent on the forum shopping issue.

Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• Main Issue: Forum Shopping, specifically related to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court - Certification against forum shopping.
• Violation: The Supreme Court found that Morada violated the rule against forum
shopping by:
 1. Filing multiple suits seeking identical reliefs: She filed both a Rule 65
(Certiorari) and a Rule 43 (Petition for Review) action in the Court of Appeals,
both challenging the DARAB Resolution and seeking to reinstate the PARAD
Order.
2. Submitting false certifications of non-forum shopping and not observing
undertakings: She falsely certified in her Rule 43 action that she had not
commenced a similar action and failed to disclose the pending Rule 65 action. She
also did not report the filing of the Rule 43 action to the court where her Rule 65
action was pending.
• RULE 7, SECTION 5 of the Rules of Court:

SEC 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions. (n)

Decisions of the Supreme Court and Explanation:

• Decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 214526 (November 03, 2020):
o Decision: Granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari. Reversed and set aside
the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 123523. Dismissed Josefina
Morada's Petition for Review (Rule 43 action) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123523 with
prejudice due to forum shopping.
o Reasoning of the Supreme Court:
§ Forum Shopping Exists: The SC agreed with the CA Sixth Division's
finding that Morada committed forum shopping. The SC reiterated the test
for forum shopping: identity of parties, rights asserted, reliefs sought, and
the principle of res judicata.
§ Identity of Parties and Reliefs: The SC found that the parties were
substantially the same and that both the Rule 65 and Rule 43 petitions
 sought the same relief: the reversal of the DARAB Resolution to prevent
the execution of the DARAB Decision favoring the Heirs of Mampos, and
to reinstate the PARAD Order favoring Morada.
§ Relevance of CA Sixth Division Resolution: The CA Sixth Division had
already conclusively ruled that forum shopping existed in dismissing the
Rule 65 action, and this resolution became final and executory. The
principle of res judicata (specifically, conclusiveness of judgment)
applied, preventing the relitigation of the forum shopping issue in the Rule
43 action.
§ Willful and Deliberate Forum Shopping: The SC emphasized that
Morada's forum shopping was willful and deliberate because she filed two
actions seeking identical reliefs in different CA divisions and submitted
false certifications of non-forum shopping, violating Rule 7, Section 5.
§ Penalty for Forum Shopping: The penalty for forum shopping is the
dismissal of both actions. The SC clarified that it is not up to the litigant to
choose which case to maintain when forum shopping is found. Twin
dismissal is a punitive measure to prevent abuse of court processes and
ensure orderly administration of justice. The SC cited precedents where
both actions involved in forum shopping were dismissed.
§ Error of CA 12th Division: The CA 12th Division erred in not
dismissing the Rule 43 action for forum shopping, especially after the CA
Sixth Division had already dismissed the Rule 65 action on this ground.
• Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

WHEREFORE, the petition is meritorious. The Decision dated December 20, 2013 and
Resolution dated September 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123523
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No.
123523 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE on the ground of forum shopping.

SO ORDERED.

In summary, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampos, finding that Josefina
Morada committed forum shopping by filing two petitions in the Court of Appeals seeking the
same relief. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision in the Rule 43 action and
ordered the dismissal of that case with prejudice, reinforcing the penalty for forum shopping as
the dismissal of all related actions.
C.3.c. Forum Shopping
Land car vs. Bachelor Express – G.R. No. 154377
(2003)
Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Land Car, Inc. against Bachelor Express, Inc. and Vallacar
Transit, Inc. Petitioner seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision which
granted a Petition for Certiorari filed by Respondents and ordered the dismissal of
Petitioner's appeal before the Office of the President (OP). The core issue revolves
around forum shopping and the jurisdiction of the Office of the President to review
decisions of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioner: Land Car, Inc., a transportation company that applied for a Certificate
of Public Convenience to operate a public utility bus service.
o Respondents:
§ Bachelor Express, Inc., a grantee of a Certificate of Public Convenience
already operating in the route applied for by Petitioner.
§ Vallacar Transit, Inc., also a grantee of a Certificate of Public
Convenience operating in the same route.
• Application and Opposition at LTFRB: On May 21, 1999, Petitioner Land Car, Inc.
applied to the Regional Office of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB), Region XII, for a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a public
utility bus service from Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City via Butuan City.
Respondents Bachelor Express, Inc. and Vallacar Transit, Inc., who were already
operating in the same route, opposed Petitioner's application. They argued that the route
was already sufficiently served and that allowing Petitioner to operate would result in
"cutthroat competition."

Claims and Arguments:

• Petitioner Land Car, Inc.'s Claims and Arguments:

o Before LTFRB: Applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a new
bus service route, implying a need for additional service or believing they could
offer a better service.
o Appeal to the Office of the President (OP): Filed a letter-appeal seeking to set
aside the DOTC Secretary's reversal of the LTFRB decision, arguing for the
validity of the original LTFRB decision granting their application.
o Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
61159): Initially filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA questioning the same
DOTC Secretary's resolution and order, indicating an intent to seek judicial
review of the DOTC decision. However, this was later withdrawn.
 o Before the Supreme Court (SC): Argued that the CA erred in finding forum
shopping and in ordering the dismissal of their appeal before the Office of the
President. Petitioner contended that the Office of the President had valid
jurisdiction to review the DOTC Secretary's decision and that the CA should not
have interfered with this administrative process.
• Respondents Bachelor Express, Inc. and Vallacar Transit, Inc.'s Claims and
Arguments:
o Before LTFRB: Opposed Petitioner's application, arguing that the route was
already adequately served and that new operators would lead to "cutthroat
competition," negatively impacting existing services.
o Appeal to the DOTC Secretary: Appealed the LTFRB decision to the DOTC
Secretary, successfully arguing against Petitioner's application and leading to the
reversal of the LTFRB decision.
o Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
62619): Filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA against the Office of the
President's Memorandum Order which stayed the execution of the DOTC
Secretary's decision. They argued that the OP had no jurisdiction to review DOTC
decisions and that Petitioner was guilty of forum shopping by appealing to the OP
after filing a Petition for Certiorari in the CA.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Petitioner Land Car, Inc.: Filed the initial application to expand their business by
operating a new public utility bus service route, likely seeing a business opportunity in
the Davao City to Cagayan de Oro City via Butuan City route. They pursued appeals to
overturn decisions unfavorable to their application and to ultimately obtain the Certificate
of Public Convenience.
• Respondents Bachelor Express, Inc. and Vallacar Transit, Inc.: Opposed Petitioner's
application to protect their existing businesses and market share in the route. They
argued against increased competition and sought to uphold the DOTC Secretary's
decision that favored their existing operations and challenged the OP's jurisdiction to
intervene.

How the Case Was Filed:

1. Application to LTFRB Region XII: Petitioner Land Car, Inc. initiated the process by
filing a verified applicationwith the LTFRB for a Certificate of Public Convenience.
2. Opposition by Respondents at LTFRB: Respondents Bachelor Express, Inc. and
Vallacar Transit, Inc. formally opposed the application before the LTFRB.
3. Appeal to DOTC Secretary: Respondents appealed the LTFRB's decision granting
Petitioner's application to the Office of the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
4. Motion for Implementation at LTFRB: Respondents moved for the LTFRB to
implement the DOTC Secretary's decision.
5. Letter-Appeal to the Office of the President (OP): Petitioner filed a letter-appeal to
the Office of the President seeking to overturn the DOTC Secretary's decision.
 6. Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
61159): Petitioner also filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA questioning the DOTC
Secretary's decision. This was later withdrawn.
7. Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
62619): Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA against the Office of the
President's Memorandum Order.
8. Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court (SC) (G.R. No.
154377): Petitioner Land Car, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court, appealing the CA decision that favored Respondents.

Decisions of Lower Courts and Supreme Court:

• Decision of the LTFRB (October 29, 1999):

o Decision: Granted Petitioner Land Car, Inc.'s application for a Certificate of
Public Convenience.
o Law Wordings (from text): The LTFRB rendered its decision granting
petitioner’s application and directing the issuance of the corresponding
Certificate of Public Convenience.
• Resolution of the DOTC Secretary (June 5, 2000):
o Decision: Reversed the decision of the LTFRB and denied Petitioner's
application.
o Law Wordings (from text): On 05 June 2000, the DOTC Secretary reversed the
decision of the LTFRB.
• Resolution of the DOTC Secretary (August 30, 2000):
o Decision: Denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the June 5, 2000
Resolution.
o Law Wordings (from text): The motion, however, was denied by the DOTC
Secretary in his order of 30 August 2000.
• Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 62619 (June 18, 2001):
o Decision: Granted Respondents' Petition for Certiorari, ordering the dismissal of
Petitioner's appeal to the Office of the President and reinstating the DOTC
Secretary's decision enjoining Petitioner from operating its buses.
o Reasoning: The CA found Petitioner guilty of forum shopping by
simultaneously pursuing a letter-appeal to the Office of the President and a
Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (even though the latter was
withdrawn, the filing constituted forum shopping).
• Decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 154377 (December 8, 2003):
o Decision: Granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari, and Set Aside the CA's
decision.
o Law Wordings of SC Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision is SET

ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• Forum Shopping and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping: The central procedural

issue was forum shopping. While Rule 7 is not explicitly mentioned by section number
in the CA or SC decisions provided, the Supreme Court decision references Circular 28-
91 and Administrative Circular 04-94, which eventually became Section 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule mandates a certification of non-forum
shopping be included in petitions filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and
lower courts/quasi-judicial agencies.
• Violation: The Court of Appeals found that by filing both a letter-appeal with the Office
of the President and a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. SP No.
61159) questioning the same DOTC decision, Petitioner engaged in forum shopping.
Although Petitioner withdrew the CA petition, the act of filing both was considered a
violation.

Detailed Decisions of SC and Explanation:

• Supreme Court's Reasoning for Reversing CA:

o Forum Shopping Misapplication: The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA's
application of forum shopping in this context. While acknowledging that
Petitioner did pursue remedies in both the Office of the President and the Court of
Appeals simultaneously, the SC focused on the jurisdiction of the Office of the
President.
o Jurisdiction of the Office of the President: The SC emphasized the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the President's power of control over
executive departments. It stated that the Office of the President validly acquired
jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal from the DOTC Secretary's decision.
o OP as Proper Forum for Appeal: The SC reasoned that the proper
administrative recourse was to appeal to the Office of the President before seeking
judicial review. The administrative remedy should be exhausted first.
o CA Intrusion: The SC found the CA's order to dismiss the appeal pending before
the Office of the President to be a "flawed" and an "undue intrusion into a
valid exercise of jurisdiction by the President." The CA should have allowed
the administrative process before the OP to run its course.
o Comity and Convenience: The SC highlighted principles of "comity and
convenience," suggesting that courts should generally defer to the administrative
process and allow administrative bodies the opportunity to correct their own
errors before judicial intervention.
o Focus on Administrative Exhaustion, Not Forum Shopping: The SC's decision
implicitly prioritizes the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies over a
strict interpretation of forum shopping in this specific situation where an appeal
was made to the Office of the President within the executive branch. The issue
was not so much about seeking multiple judicial remedies, but about exhausting
the administrativeappeal process.

Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

 • The Supreme Court granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
• The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals' decision.
• No costs were awarded.

Essentially, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing Petitioner
Land Car, Inc.'s appeal before the Office of the President to proceed. The SC emphasized the
Office of the President's jurisdiction in the administrative appeal process and found that the CA
erred in dismissing the OP appeal based on forum shopping. The case highlights the importance
of exhausting administrative remedies before resorting to judicial review and the hierarchical
structure within the executive branch where the Office of the President has oversight over
department heads.

HSBC vs. Catalan – G.R. No. 159590 (2004)

Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This case involves two consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed separately by Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBANK) and HSBC International Trustee
Limited (HSBC TRUSTEE). They are challenging the consolidated Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which dismissed their petitions for certiorari against the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) that denied their motions to dismiss the amended complaint
of respondent Cecilia Diez Catalan. The original case in the RTC was a civil action for a
sum of money with damages.
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioners:
§ Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBANK)
§ HSBC International Trustee Limited (HSBC TRUSTEE)
o Respondent: Cecilia Diez Catalan
• Incident: The dispute arose from five HSBANK checks issued by Frederick Arthur
Thomson (Thomson) to Cecilia Diez Catalan totaling HK$3,200,000.00. When Catalan
deposited these checks, HSBANK returned them with the reason "payment stopped"
pending confirmation, despite the checks being allegedly funded. Despite Thomson's
letters confirming the checks and instructing HSBANK to clear them, and subsequent
demands from Catalan, HSBANK and later HSBC TRUSTEE refused to honor the
checks.

Claims and Arguments:

• Respondent Cecilia Diez Catalan's Claims (Amended Complaint):

o Filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against HSBANK and later
amended it to include HSBC TRUSTEE.
 o Claimed that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE, doing business in the Philippines,
unjustly refused to pay the value of five checks issued by Thomson, violating the
abuse of rights principle under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
o Alleged that HSBANK's refusal to honor the checks, despite Thomson's
instructions and sufficient funds, was in bad faith and intended to injure her.
o Argued that HSBC TRUSTEE deceptively requested the original checks under the
guise of facilitating payment but then summarily disapproved her claim without
explanation after receiving them.
o Sought to recover ₱20,864,000.00, representing the value of the checks, plus
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
• Petitioner HSBANK's Arguments:
o Motion to Dismiss (Original Complaint):
§ RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.
§ RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of HSBANK.
§ Incorrect docket fees were paid.
§ Complaint does not state a cause of action.
§ Forum shopping.
o Motion to Dismiss (Amended Complaint):
§ RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter as it was a money claim
against Thomson's estate, which should be filed in probate proceedings.
§ Forum shopping (due to probate proceedings).
§ Amended complaint states no cause of action against HSBANK because
HSBANK, as drawee bank, has no obligation to pay until acceptance or
certification, which did not occur.
§ RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of HSBANK due to improper
service of summons.
§ Filing a motion for extension did not constitute submission to jurisdiction.
• Petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE's Arguments:
o Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss (Amended Complaint):
§ RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of HSBC TRUSTEE due to
improper service of summons.
§ HSBC TRUSTEE is a separate entity from HSBANK.
§ HSBC TRUSTEE does not do business in the Philippines, has no office
there, and did not authorize HSBANK Makati to receive summons on its
behalf.
o Common Arguments with HSBANK:
§ Complaint does not state a cause of action for abuse of rights under Article
19.
§ Forum shopping.
§ RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Respondent Cecilia Diez Catalan: Filed the case to recover the value of the checks and
damages from HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE due to their alleged unjust refusal to
honor the checks issued to her by Thomson, causing her financial and emotional distress.
 She believed their actions constituted an abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil
Code.
• Petitioners HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE: Filed motions to dismiss and subsequent
petitions for certiorari to avoid liability. They argued that the RTC lacked jurisdiction,
Catalan had no cause of action against them, and she was engaged in forum
shopping. HSBC TRUSTEE specifically contested the jurisdiction over its person due to
improper service of summons.

How the Case Was Filed:

• Initial Filing: Cecilia Diez Catalan filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages against HSBANK in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Bacolod
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-11372.
• Amended Complaint: Catalan filed an Amended Complaint, impleading HSBC
TRUSTEE as co-defendant.
• Motions to Dismiss: HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate Motions to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
• Petitions for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals: After the RTC denied their Motions
to Dismiss and Motions for Reconsideration, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed
separate Petitions for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 75756 and 75757, respectively.
• Petitions for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court: After the CA dismissed
their petitions, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate Petitions for Review on
Certiorari with the Supreme Court (SC) under Rule 45of the Rules of Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 159590 (for HSBANK) and G.R. No. 159591 (for HSBC TRUSTEE).

Decisions of Lower Courts:

• Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Bacolod City (Order dated
May 15, 2002):
o Decision: Denied the Motions to Dismiss filed by HSBANK and HSBC
TRUSTEE.
o Law Wordings and Reasoning:

The RTC held that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter because it is an
action for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code for the acts of unjustly
refusing to honor the checks issued by Thomson and not a money claim against
the estate of Thomson; that Catalan did not engage in forum-shopping because the
elements thereof are not attendant in the case; that the question of cause of action
should be threshed out or ventilated during the proceedings in the main action and
after the plaintiff and defendants have adduced evidence in their favor; that it
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendants because the question of
whether a foreign corporation is doing business or not in the Philippines cannot be
a subject of a Motion to Dismiss but should be ventilated in the trial on the merits;
and defendants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC setting up in
their Motions to Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction.
 o The RTC also denied their Motions for Reconsideration in an Order dated
December 20, 2002.
• Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 75756 and 75757
(Consolidated Decision dated August 14, 2003):
o Decision: Dismissed the Petitions for Certiorari filed by HSBANK and HSBC
TRUSTEE.
o Law Wordings and Reasoning:

The CA held that the filing of petitioners’ answers before the RTC rendered moot
and academic the issue of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners; that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter since it is one for
damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code for the alleged unjust acts of
petitioners and not a money claim against the estate of Thomson; and, that the
amended complaint states a cause of action under Article 19 of the Civil Code
which could merit a favorable judgment if found to be true. The CA noted that
Catalan may have prayed for payment of the value of the checks but ratiocinated
that she merely used the value as basis for the computation of the damages.

Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

While Rule 7 is not explicitly the central issue, the question of whether the Amended Complaint
states a cause of actionis related to the sufficiency of the pleading itself, which is a concern of
Rule 7. Specifically, Rule 7 deals with the parts of a pleading and implicitly requires that a
pleading must contain sufficient allegations to establish a cause of action.

• Petitioners' Argument on Cause of Action: HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE argued

that the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action for abuse of rights under
Article 19 of the Civil Code. They claimed that Catalan's suit was essentially a money
claim against Thomson's estate disguised as a damages claim. HSBANK further argued
that as a drawee bank, it had no obligation to pay the checks until acceptance or
certification, which did not occur.
• Supreme Court's Ruling on Cause of Action: The Supreme Court rejected the
petitioners' argument. The SC held that the Amended Complaint did state a cause of
action under Article 19. The SC reasoned that Catalan was suing for damages based on
the unjustified and willful refusal to pay the checks, not merely to enforce payment of the
checks themselves. The allegations of HSBANK's inaction despite Thomson's
instructions and HSBC TRUSTEE's baseless rejection of Catalan's claim were deemed
sufficient to establish a potential abuse of rights. The SC emphasized that the test for
cause of action is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, not the veracity or
likelihood of success.

Full and Detailed Decisions of SC and Explanation:

• Decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 159590 and G.R. No. 159591
(Decision dated October 18, 2004):
o Decision:
 §G.R. No. 159590 (HSBANK): Denied. Affirmed the CA Decision
dismissing HSBANK's Petition for Certiorari.
§ G.R. No. 159591 (HSBC TRUSTEE): Granted. Reversed and Set Aside
the CA Decision dismissing HSBC TRUSTEE's Petition for Certiorari.
Declared the RTC without jurisdiction over HSBC TRUSTEE and
annulled all RTC orders related to HSBC TRUSTEE. Ordered the RTC to
desist from further proceedings against HSBC TRUSTEE.
o Reasoning and Explanation:
§ Cause of Action: The SC agreed with the CA that the Amended
Complaint stated a cause of action under Article 19 of the Civil Code. The
action was for damages due to abuse of rights, not merely a money claim
on the checks. The allegations of unjustified refusal to pay and deceptive
conduct were sufficient.
§ Forum Shopping: The SC concurred with the lower courts that Catalan
did not engage in forum shopping. The probate proceeding and the
damages case had different parties, rights asserted, reliefs sought, and
supporting evidence. A judgment in one would not bar the other.
§ Jurisdiction over HSBANK: The SC affirmed the CA's finding that the
RTC acquired jurisdiction over HSBANK. HSBANK voluntarily
submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Answer or Motion to Dismiss, which sought affirmative
relief. This constituted voluntary appearance and estoppel from later
challenging jurisdiction. The SC clarified that while Section 20 of Rule 14
allows inclusion of jurisdictional objections with other grounds in a
motion to dismiss without voluntary appearance, HSBANK's prior motion
for extension was the key factor establishing voluntary submission.
§ Jurisdiction over HSBC TRUSTEE: The SC reversed the CA and RTC
regarding jurisdiction over HSBC TRUSTEE. The SC found that the
Amended Complaint failed to sufficiently allege that HSBC TRUSTEE
was doing business in the Philippines. The mere allegation that it was
"doing business in the Philippines" was insufficient. Further, service of
summons on HSBC TRUSTEE through HSBANK Makati was improper
as there was no allegation or evidence that HSBANK was HSBC
TRUSTEE's resident agent. Therefore, there was no valid service of
summons on HSBC TRUSTEE, and the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over its person. The RTC proceedings against HSBC TRUSTEE were thus
null and void. The SC clarified that filing an Answer ad cautelam by
HSBC TRUSTEE while challenging jurisdiction did not constitute
voluntary submission.

Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

• G.R. No. 159590 (HSBANK):

 WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 159590 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757 dismissing the petition for
certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED.

• G.R. No. 159591 (HSBC TRUSTEE):

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75756 dismissing the
petition for certiorari of the HSBC International Trustee Limited is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City is declared without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 01-11372 against the HSBC
International Trustee Limited, and all its orders and issuances with respect to the latter
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is
hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining further proceedings against the
HSBC International Trustee Limited in the case aforestated.

SO ORDERED.

In summary, the Supreme Court upheld the CA and RTC decisions regarding HSBANK, finding
that the RTC had jurisdiction and the complaint stated a cause of action. However, the SC
reversed the lower courts regarding HSBC TRUSTEE, ruling that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over HSBC TRUSTEE due to improper service of summons and insufficient
allegations of doing business in the Philippines, thus dismissing the case against HSBC
TRUSTEE.

Levis Strauss Phil vs. Vogue Traders – G.R. No. 132993

(2006)
Case Background:

• Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Levi Strauss
(Phils.), Inc. seeking to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
decision had annulled and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which
favored Levi Strauss, and instead directed the RTC to halt proceedings in a civil case
until the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) resolved two
inter partes cases. The original case in the RTC was a complaint for damages filed by
Vogue Traders Clothing Company against Levi Strauss, which then led to a counterclaim
for infringement by Levi Strauss.
• Parties Involved:
o Petitioner: Levi Strauss (Phils.), Inc. (Levi Strauss Phils.), a Philippine
corporation licensed to use the LEVI’S trademark.
o Respondent: Vogue Traders Clothing Company (Vogue Traders), a clothing
company that registered the trademark "LIVE’S."
 • Trademarks in Question:
o Levi Strauss (Phils.): Holds a non-exclusive license to use "LEVI’S" and related
trademarks (like "501," "Two Horse Design," "Arcuate Design," etc.) from Levi
Strauss & Co.
o Vogue Traders: Registered the trademarks "LIVE’S" and "LIVE’S LABEL
MARK."
• Initial Dispute: Levi Strauss Phils. believed Vogue Traders' "LIVE’S" trademarks were
confusingly similar to their "LEVI’S" trademarks.
• BPTTT Cases: Levi Strauss Phils. initiated two inter partes cases before the BPTTT
seeking cancellation of Vogue Traders’ trademark registrations:
o Inter Partes Case No. 4216: Cancellation of Registration No. 53918 (for
"LIVE’S").
o Inter Partes Case No. 4217: Cancellation of Registration No. SR 8868 (for
"LIVE’S LABEL MARK").
• Search Warrants and Seizure: Levi Strauss Phils. applied for search warrants in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 3, alleging violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
The RTC issued Search Warrant Nos. 95-757 and 95-758, leading to the seizure of goods
from Vogue Traders. Criminal charges against Vogue Traders' owner were later
dismissed, and the search warrants were quashed.

Claims and Arguments:

• Respondent Vogue Traders' Claims (as Plaintiff in RTC Civil Case No. 96-76944):
o Filed a complaint for damages against Levi Strauss Phils. in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 50.
o Claimed to be the lawful assignee and authorized user of the trademarks
"LIVE’S" and "LIVE’S LABEL MARK" and copyright registrations for "LIVE’S
ORIGINAL JEANS" and related designs.
o Argued that the seized goods were legitimately manufactured and did not
deceptively resemble Levi Strauss' trademarks.
o Sought recovery of seized goods or their value, compensatory damages (₱320,000
plus ₱11,000 daily), exemplary damages (₱2,000,000), attorney’s fees (₱100,000
plus additional fees for appeal and court appearances), and costs of suit.
• Petitioner Levi Strauss (Phils.)' Arguments (as Defendant/Counterclaimant in RTC
Civil Case No. 96-76944):
o Filed an amended answer with counterclaim, asserting that Vogue Traders'
"LIVE’S" brand infringed upon their "LEVI’S" brand.
o Sought cancellation of Vogue Traders’ Copyright Registration No. I-3838.
o Requested an injunction to stop Vogue Traders from manufacturing, selling, or
advertising jeans using designs similar to Levi Strauss' trademarks.
o Applied for a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC of Manila, Branch 1.

Reasons for Filing the Case:

• Respondent Vogue Traders: Filed the damages case to seek compensation for losses
incurred due to the search and seizure operations conducted by Levi Strauss Phils.,
 arguing that their "LIVE’S" trademarks were legitimately registered and did not infringe
on "LEVI’S."
• Petitioner Levi Strauss (Phils.): Filed a counterclaim for infringement to protect its
"LEVI’S" trademarks from what it perceived as confusingly similar "LIVE’S"
trademarks being used by Vogue Traders. They sought to prevent Vogue Traders from
further using the allegedly infringing trademarks and designs.

How the Case Was Filed:

• Initial Filing (Civil Case No. 96-76944 in RTC Branch 50): Vogue Traders initiated
the legal action by filing a Complaint for Damages against Levi Strauss Phils. in the RTC
of Manila, Branch 50.
• Re-raffle to Special Court (RTC Branch 1): Upon Levi Strauss Phils.' motion, the case
was re-raffled to RTC Branch 1, a designated Special Court for Intellectual Property
Rights cases, as per Administrative Order No. 113-95.
• Petition for Certiorari to CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 83933): After the RTC Branch 1 issued
orders favoring Levi Strauss Phils. (preliminary injunction), Vogue Traders filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, questioning the RTC orders.
• Petition for Review on Certiorari to SC (G.R. No. 132993): Levi Strauss Phils. filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court after the CA ruled in favor of
Vogue Traders and annulled the RTC orders.

Decisions of Lower Courts and Supreme Court:

• Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1 (Orders dated
December 10, 1996 and April 11, 1997):
o Decision: Granted Levi Strauss Phils.' application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and denied Vogue Traders' motion for reconsideration.
o Law Wordings of RTC Decision (Order dated December 10, 1996):

"WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED

THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00), let a writ of preliminary injunction issue
restraining plaintiff, its officers, employees, agents, representatives, dealers,
retailers or assigns from manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale,
advertising or otherwise using denims or jeans with a design which is
substantially, if not exactly similar to defendant’s trademarks."

o Reasoning: The RTC found that Vogue Traders intended to imitate LEVI’s jeans
and pass off its "LIVE’S" jeans as genuine "LEVI’S" jeans. It highlighted the
established goodwill of "LEVI’S" trademarks and the need for equity to prevent
irreparable harm. The RTC deemed Vogue Traders to have waived its right to
present evidence by failing to appear at the hearing.
• Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83933 (Decision dated
August 13, 1997):
 o Decision: Granted Vogue Traders' Petition for Certiorari, annulling and setting
aside the RTC orders. Ordered the RTC to desist from proceeding with Civil Case
No. 96-76944 until the BPTTT resolved Inter Partes Cases Nos. 4216 and 4217.
o Law Wordings of CA Decision:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated December

10, 1996 and April 11, 1997 are annulled and set aside for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction. Respondent court is
ordered to desist from proceeding with Civil Case No. 96-76944, entitled "Vogue
Traders Clothing Company, Plaintiff, versus Levi Strauss (Phil.), Inc.,
Defendant.", until the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
has finally resolved Inter Partes Cases Nos. 4216 and 4217."

o Reasoning: The CA applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, stating that the
RTC should have deferred to the BPTTT to resolve the trademark cancellation
cases first. The CA also questioned the certification against forum shopping in
Levi Strauss Phils.' petition and deemed Vogue Traders to have been denied due
process by the RTC.
• Decision of the Supreme Court (SC) in G.R. No. 132993 (Decision dated June 29,
2005):
o Decision: Granted Levi Strauss Phils.' Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Annulled and set aside the CA decision. Reinstated the RTC Orders dated
December 10, 1996 and April 11, 1997.
o Law Wordings of SC Decision:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals, dated August 13, 1997, and its resolution, dated March 5, 1998, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Manila, dated December 10, 1996 and April 11, 1997, are hereby
REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED."

One Main Issue Connected to RULE 7 – PARTS OF A PLEADING:

• Defective Certification of Non-Forum Shopping: Petitioner Levi Strauss Phils. argued

that Vogue Traders' Petition for Certiorari in the CA should have been dismissed outright
because the certification against forum shopping was signed by Vogue Traders' counsel,
Atty. Danilo A. Soriano, not by a duly authorized officer of the company,
violating Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
• RULE 7, SECTION 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
 relief... (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein...

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice...

• Supreme Court's Ruling on Certification: The Supreme Court agreed with Levi
Strauss Phils., holding that the certification was indeed defective. The SC emphasized
that the rule requires the principal party to execute the certification because they have
personal knowledge of related actions, not necessarily their counsel. The certification by
Vogue Traders’ counsel, without proof of authorization, was deemed insufficient and a
valid ground for dismissal of the CA petition.

Full and Detailed Decisions of SC and Explanation:

• On Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The SC found that the CA erred in applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction to suspend the RTC proceedings. The SC clarified that
while the BPTTT (now Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office) has
jurisdiction over administrative cancellation of trademarks, the RTC has jurisdiction over
infringement and damages cases. These actions can proceed independently. The filing of
cancellation cases in the BPTTT does not prevent the RTC from hearing an infringement
counterclaim and issuing a preliminary injunction. The SC cited Republic Act No. 8293
(Intellectual Property Code) and its provisions affirming the courts' jurisdiction in
infringement cases, even allowing courts to decide on trademark registration rights and
order cancellations. Rule 8, Section 7 of the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, was
also cited, which explicitly states that a prior cancellation petition in the Bureau does not
preclude an enforcement action in court.
• On Defective Certification Against Forum Shopping: The SC agreed with Petitioner
that the CA should have dismissed Vogue Traders' petition due to the defective
certification. Citing Digital Microwave Corp. v. CA, the SC reiterated that the
certification must be executed by the party with actual knowledge of related cases,
usually the petitioner or a duly authorized officer in the case of corporations, not merely
the counsel. Vogue Traders’ certification by counsel, without proof of authorization, was
deemed a procedural defect warranting dismissal.
• On Denial of Due Process: The SC found that the CA erred in concluding that Vogue
Traders was denied due process by the RTC. The records showed Vogue Traders’
counsel was notified of the hearing but failed to appear without valid reason. The RTC
was justified in considering Vogue Traders to have waived its right to present evidence
and to resolve the preliminary injunction issue based on the evidence presented by Levi
Strauss Phils. Vogue Traders' excuse of "honest mistake" about the hearing date was
deemed negligent and insufficient.
• On Prejudgment: The SC disagreed with Vogue Traders’ claim that the RTC’s
preliminary injunction order prejudged the case. The SC clarified that a preliminary
injunction is based on initial evidence and is provisional. It does not decide the case on its
 merits. The RTC’s order merely aimed to maintain the status quo and prevent further
potential damage to Levi Strauss Phils.' goodwill pending a full trial. The RTC's order
denying reconsideration explicitly stated it was not a prejudgment.

Disposition (Supreme Court's Final Order):

• The Supreme Court GRANTED the Petition for Review on Certiorari of Levi Strauss
Phils.
• The CA's Decision dated August 13, 1997, and Resolution dated March 5, 1998,
were REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
• The RTC Orders dated December 10, 1996, and April 11, 1997, were REINSTATED.

In essence, the Supreme Court sided with Levi Strauss Phils., upholding the RTC's grant of
preliminary injunction and emphasizing that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction and in overlooking the procedural defects in Vogue Traders' petition, particularly the
defective certification against forum shopping. The SC underscored the independence of court
actions for infringement from administrative cancellation proceedings and reinforced the
importance of proper certification against forum shopping.

Heirs of Mampo vs. Morada – G.R. No. 214526 (2020)

20)

Case Background

The case involves a dispute over the possession of five parcels of land in Baras, Canaman,
Camarines Sur, covered by Emancipation Patents (EPs). The petitioners are the heirs of
Inocentes Mampo and Raymundo Mampo (collectively referred to as the Heirs of Mampos),
represented by Azucena C. Mampo, Jr. The respondent is Josefina Morada.

The Heirs of Mampos filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession against Nelida and Alex
Severo before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The PARAD
dismissed the complaint, but the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the Heirs of Mampos, ordering the Severos
to vacate the land and restore possession to the Heirs of Mampos. This decision became final and
executory on August 9, 2008.

Subsequently, a Writ of Execution was issued on November 14, 2008, to enforce the DARAB
decision. However, on May 7, 2009, Josefina Morada filed a Third-Party Claim, asserting that
she was the actual tiller of the land and had a better right to possession. The PARAD granted
Morada’s claim, recalling the Writ of Execution and ordering the parties to respect her
possession.
The Heirs of Mampos filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed
a Manifestation with Motion for Implementation of the DARAB decision, but the DARAB
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Later, the DARAB reversed its stance and granted the Heirs
of Mampos' motion, reviving the Writ of Execution and ordering its immediate implementation.
The DARAB ruled that Morada’s Third-Party Claim was, in essence, a protest against the
identification of the Heirs of Mampos as beneficiaries, which fell under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary.

Morada filed two separate actions before the Court of Appeals (CA):

1. A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (CA-G.R. SP No. 123033), seeking to annul the
DARAB decision for grave abuse of discretion.
2. A Petition for Review under Rule 43 (CA-G.R. SP No. 123523), seeking to reverse the
DARAB decision and affirm the PARAD’s order granting her Third-Party Claim.

The CA Sixth Division dismissed the Rule 65 petition for forum shopping, finding that the two
petitions involved the same facts, issues, and reliefs. The dismissal became final and executory
on November 15, 2012. However, the CA 12th Division, in the Rule 43 action, granted
Morada’s petition, nullifying the DARAB decision and reinstating the PARAD’s order in her
favor.

The Heirs of Mampos filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme
Court, arguing that the CA erred in not dismissing the Rule 43 action for forum shopping, given
that the Rule 65 action had already been dismissed for the same reason.

Claims and Arguments

1. Petitioners (Heirs of Mampos):
o Argued that Morada committed forum shoppingby filing two separate petitions
(Rule 65 and Rule 43) before different divisions of the CA, seeking the same
reliefs.
o Contended that the CA 12th Division should have dismissed the Rule 43 action,
as the CA Sixth Division had already dismissed the Rule 65 action for forum
shopping.
o Asserted that the DARAB decision in their favor should be implemented, as
Morada’s Third-Party Claim was invalid and should have been dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.
2. Respondent (Josefina Morada):
o Denied committing forum shopping, arguing that the two petitions involved
different issues:
§ The Rule 65 petition questioned the DARAB’s alleged grave abuse of
discretion.
§ The Rule 43 petition raised questions of fact and law regarding the
DARAB decision.
 o Claimed that the Rule 43 action was a valid legal remedy, and the dismissal of the
Rule 65 action did not preclude her from pursuing the Rule 43 action.

Main Issue

The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the CA erred in failing to dismiss the
Rule 43 action for forum shopping, given that the Rule 65 action had already been dismissed
for the same reason.

Rule 7 – Parts of a Pleading

The case is connected to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, which governs
the Certification Against Forum Shopping. The rule requires that a party must certify under
oath that:

1. They have not filed any other action involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or
quasi-judicial agency.
2. If there is a pending action, they must disclose its status.
3. If they later learn of a similar action, they must report it within five days.

Failure to comply with these requirements can result in the dismissal of the case and may
constitute indirect contempt of court. If the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, it can lead
to summary dismissal with prejudice, direct contempt, and administrative sanctions.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that Morada committed forum
shopping by filing two petitions (Rule 65 and Rule 43) that involved the same facts, issues, and
reliefs. The Court emphasized that the test for forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia (pending litigation) or res judicata (final judgment) are present. In this case, both
petitions sought to reverse the DARAB decision and prevent the implementation of the Writ of
Execution in favor of the Heirs of Mampos.

The Court also found that Morada submitted false certifications of non-forum shopping and
failed to disclose the pendency of the Rule 65 action in her Rule 43 petition, violating the
undertakings mandated by Rule 7, Section 5.

The Court held that the CA 12th Division erred in not dismissing the Rule 43 action for forum
shopping, especially since the CA Sixth Division had already dismissed the Rule 65 action for
the same reason. The Court reiterated that forum shopping is a ground for the summary
dismissal of all related cases, as it undermines the orderly administration of justice and creates
the risk of conflicting decisions.
The Court reinstated the DARAB decision dated September 19, 2011, which had ruled in favor
of the Heirs of Mampos and ordered the implementation of the Writ of Execution.

Disposition
1. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the CA’s Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 123523.
2. The DARAB Resolution dated September 19, 2011, was reinstated.
3. The Court directed Atty. Godofredo B. Guzman(Morada’s counsel) and Josefina
Morada to show cause why they should not be cited for direct contempt for committing
willful and deliberate forum shopping.

Key Takeaways
1. Forum Shopping: Filing multiple cases involving the same issues, facts, and reliefs in
different courts or divisions is prohibited. It is considered an abuse of the judicial process
and can lead to the dismissal of all related cases.
2. Rule 7, Section 5: The certification against forum shopping is a critical requirement in
pleadings. Failure to comply can result in severe penalties, including dismissal of the case
and contempt charges.
3. Res Judicata: A final judgment in one case (e.g., the dismissal of the Rule 65 action for
forum shopping) can bar the re-litigation of the same issues in another case (e.g., the Rule
43 action).
4. Multiple Dismissals: When forum shopping is found, all related cases are subject to
dismissal, not just one. This is a punitive measure to deter litigants from abusing the
judicial system.

The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules and
the serious consequences of forum shopping, which undermines the integrity of the judicial
process.