RULE 44

Cruz vs. Manila International Airport Authority

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee’s role in the appeal
process is confined only to the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the
appellant.―Jurisprudence dictates that the appellee’s role in the appeal process is confined only to
the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the
party who instituted the appeal and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed
therefor, he merely assumes a defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of
the judgment appealed from. Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in
character, it is highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error or seek any affirmative
relief or modification of the lower court’s judgment without interposing its own appeal.

Mercado vs. Espina

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to
the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.―It is well established that issues raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic
considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule.

Maricalum Mining Corporation vs. Remington Industrial Sales Corporation

Appeals; Parties; While one party’s appeal from a judgment will not inure to the benefit of a co-party
who failed to appeal— and as against the latter, the judgment will continue to run its course until it
becomes final and executory—to this general rule, however, one exception stands out, i.e., where
both parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be the vicarious appeal
of the other.—One party’s appeal from a judgment will not inure to the benefit of a co-party who
failed to appeal; and as against the latter, the judgment will continue to run its course until it
becomes final and executory. To this general rule, however, one exception stands out: where both
parties have a commonality of interests, the appeal of one is deemed to be the vicarious appeal of
the other. As the Court held in John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 473 SCRA 177 (2005): The
modification made by this Court to the judgment of the Court of Appeals must operate as against
Yoro, for as fittingly held by the court a quo: While it is settled that a party who did not appeal from
the decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from,
nevertheless, when the rights and liability of the defendants are so interwoven and dependent as to
be inseparable, in which case, the modification of the appealed judgment in favor of appellant
operates as a modification to Gen. Yoro who did not appeal. In this case, the liabilities of Gen. Yoro
and appellant being solidary, the above exception applies. In Director of Lands v. Reyes, 69 SCRA 415
(1976), the Court identified the circumstances indicative of a commonality in the interests of the
parties, such as when: a) their rights and liabilities originate from only one source or title; b)
homogeneous evidence establishes the existence of their rights and liabilities; and c) whatever
judgment is rendered in the case or appeal, their rights and liabilities will be affected, even if to
varying extents.
RULE 45

Panganiban vs. Tara Trading Shipmanagement, Inc.

Remedial Law; Appeals; Decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, regardless of the
nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to the Court through a petition for
review.—Considering the grounds raised by petitioner, it appears that he denominated this petition
as one under Rule 45, but he filed it as both a petition for review under Rule 45 and a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The applicable rule is Rule 45, which clearly provides
that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, regardless of the nature of the action
or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court through a petition for review. This remedy is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Recourse under Rule 65 cannot be
allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal.

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Berenguer

The CA did not err in treating the petition for certiorari as a petition for review. There are precedents
in that regard. In Department of Education v. Cuanan, 11 this Court ruled that the petition for
certiorari filed by therein respondent Cuanan with the CA within the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a petition for review could be treated as a petition for review, for that would be in accord with
the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice. The Court had
occasion to expound on the exceptions to the rule that a recourse to a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 rendered the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy, thus: “The remedy of an
aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless,
there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public
policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are
null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present case.

Nuñez vs. GSIS Family Bank

Actions; Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.—Clarification on petitioners’ mode of appeal
is in order. Petitioners and counsel confuse their petition as one Petition for Review under Rule 45
with a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. For while they treat it as one for Review on Certiorari,
they manifest that it is filed “pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to
Rule 45 of the New Rules of Court.” In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner
described her petition as “an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,” this Court, in frowning over what it described as a
“chimera,” reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative nor successive. To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide.
However, the most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for
review under Rule 45.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades
the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed
under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review.—This Court, however, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court
and in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having filed under Rule 45, more so
if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. The records show
that the petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65. Following Delsan Transport, the
petition, stripped of allegations of “grave abuse of discretion,” actually avers errors of judgment
which are the subject of a petition for review.

Appeals; The failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere technicality,
for it is jurisdictional.—The failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere
technicality, for it is jurisdictional. Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality
must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the
appeal. The failure to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period is akin to the failure to
pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period. In both cases, the appeal is not perfected in due
time. As we held in Pedrosa v. Hill, the requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement without which the decision appealed
from would become final and executory. The same can be said about the late filing of a notice of
appeal.

China Road and Bridge Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Remedial Law; Actions; Appeals; Certiorari; Questions of law and questions of fact distinguished.—A
question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of facts, or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of the situation. Ordinarily, the
determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact
is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will be
resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by a party raising the same but whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a
question of law, otherwise it is a question of fact.—The test of whether a question is one of law or of
fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether
the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. Applying the test to the instant
case, it is clear that private respondent raises pure questions of law which are not proper in an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause
of action, the issue is passed upon on the basis of the allegations assuming them to be true; Court
does not inquire into the truth of the allegations and declare them to be false.—The ground for
dismissal invoked by petitioner is that the complaint of JADEBANK before the trial court stated no
cause of action, under Sec. 1, par. (g), Rule 16, the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is well
settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the issue is passed upon on the
basis of the allegations assuming them to be true. The court does not inquire into the truth of the
allegations and declare them to be false, otherwise it would be a procedural error and a denial of
due process to the plaintiff. Only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered, and
the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their
existence. To put it simply, the test for determining whether a complaint states or does not state a
cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the
allegations of fact made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the
complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause
of action, necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact.—In a motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or “doubt or
difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts,” simply because there are no findings of fact in the
first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the
complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only
raise questions of law or “doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.”
Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily
precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite of
the other.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the
trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on
record.—We agree with private respondent that in a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause
of action, the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the
evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such
documents. It merely includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding
of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative
value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was
properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably
arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.
RULE 46 – ORIGINAL CASES

Zapanta vs. Co King Ki

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.—While it is true that when an appeal is filed, the
approval of a notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of the court or tribunal which rendered the
decision, it is required, however, that said appeal must have been filed on time. It bears reiterating
that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to
avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly
discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court
final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble
purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such
purpose.—Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to
disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural
rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience
of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly
and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial
procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a
conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.

Guy vs. Court of Appeals

Courts; Court of Appeals; Jurisdictions; In cases covered by Rule 46, the Court of Appeals acquires
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents by the service upon them of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petitions or by their voluntary submission to such jurisdiction, the
reason for this being that, aside from the fact that no summons or other coercive process is served
on respondents, their response to the petitions will depend on the initial action of the court thereon.
—It is thus clear that in cases covered by Rule 46, the Court of Appeals acquires jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondents by the service upon them of its order or resolution indicating its initial
action on the petitions or by their voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. The reason for this is
that, aside from the fact that no summons or other coercive process is served on respondents, their
response to the petitions will depend on the initial action of the court thereon. Under Section 5, the
court may dismiss the petitions outright, hence, no reaction is expected from respondents and under
the policy adopted by Rule 46, they are not deemed to have been brought within the court’s
jurisdiction until after service on them of the dismissal order or resolution.

NYK International Knitwear Corporation Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; “Certified True Copy,” Explained.—
Section 1 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition shall be accompanied
by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The precursor of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which took effect on June 1, 1996, instructs us what a
“certified true copy” is: 1. . . . The “certified true copy” thereof shall be such other copy furnished to
a party at his instance or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or
representatives of the issuing entity as hereinbefore specified. x x x 3. The certified true copy must
further comply with all the regulations therefor of the issuing entity and it is the authenticated
original of such certified true copy, and not a mere xerox copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an
annex to the petition or other initiatory pleading. (Emphasis supplied.) x x x

Same; Same; Same; A “xerox” copy even if stamped as “certified true copy,” is not an authenticated
original of such certified true copy.—Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the
disputed document although stamped as “certified true copy” is not an authenticated original of
such certified true copy, but only a xerox copy thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3 of the above-
quoted guidelines. Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition
for certiorari outright pursuant to paragraph 5 of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.

Molina vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court mandates that rules of
procedure shall be liberally interpreted; Rule 131 Section 3 (ff) of the Rules of Court lays the
presumption in petitioner’s favor that they followed the pertinent rules on attaching certified copies
of the orders subject of their petition below.—A litigation is a contest in which each contending party
fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities, asks that justice be done on the merits. Hence,
Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court mandates that rules of procedure shall be liberally interpreted.
In the instant case, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in stressing too much
petitioners’ failure to comply with technicalities. We cannot attribute to petitioners the perceived
defects on the attached copies of the trial court’s orders because petitioners did not have control
over their preparation. Moreover, Rule 131, Section 3 (ff)of the Rules of Court lays the presumption
in petitioners’ favor that they followed the pertinent rules on attaching certified copies of the orders
subject of their petition below. As private respondent failed to show evidence to rebut this
presumption, the presumption must stand.

Same; Same; Same; Alleged failure to attach all pleadings and documents not a sufficient ground to
dismiss the petition; Lapses in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be overlooked when
they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident,
when they have not prejudiced the adverse party nor deprived the court of its authority.—We
likewise rule that in the present case, the alleged failure to attach all pleadings and documents is not
a sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. In appropriate cases, the courts may liberally construe
procedural rules in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. We have held that
lapses in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be overlooked when they do not involve
public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, when they have not
prejudiced the adverse party, nor deprived the court of its authority.

Shipside Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is
formal, not jurisdictional— verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.—The Court has consistently held that the
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v. LandBank, G.R. No.
136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419). Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of
the pleading, noncompliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading
is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act
on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served.

Same; Same; Certification on Non-Forum Shopping; The rule that the lack of certification against
forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition
applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the
corporation.—On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not
curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that
should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping
signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory
is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation. In certain exceptional circumstances,
however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing
of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14
days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. LandBank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s
petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it
subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-
forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling
reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum
shopping

Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules; While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable
objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.—It must also be kept in
mind that while the requirement of the certificate of nonforum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless
the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing
the undesirable practice of forum-shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly,
technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more
urgent ideal.
Vanguard Assurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Appeal; Appeal is frivolous where on the face of the record there is no prospect of
decision appealed from being reversed or modified.—We could not see any prospect of the decision
appealed from being reversed or modified, in view of the clear and unequivocal provisions of
Sections 12 and 17 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court regarding the liability of a surety (n a counter-
bond in attachment proceedings. To entertain the instant appeal by remanding the case to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings would entail too much time and effort which would impair the
speedy administration of justice. The instant appeal is manifestly frivolous and completely devoid of
merit.

RULE 47 - ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS

Genato Investments, Inc. vs. Barrientos

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Relief from Judgment; Under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, when a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.— Under Rule 38,
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party
in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. The verified
petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final
order was entered. However, it is uncontested that petitioner learned about the proceedings in LRC-
Case No. C-5748 more than six (6) months after the Order dated 31 August 2011 had become final
and executory on 11 October 2011. Thus, this remedy under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was clearly
unavailing.

Same; Same; Annulment of Judgment; A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault
on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies.—We have repeatedly ruled that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where
a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. The same petition is not available as a substitute for
a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. There is
here no attempted substitution; annulment of judgment is the only remedy available to petitioner.
Bulawan vs. Aquende

Remedial Law; Annulment of Judgments; In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may
be annulled on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction; When fraud is considered
extrinsic; What is lack of jurisdiction; Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the
ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void.—In
a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court. On the other hand, lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case the
judgment or final order and resolution are void. Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either
on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered
void.

Same; Same; Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered; An action for annulment of judgment may be availed
of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.

Same; Same; A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled; What is essential
is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and that he would be adversely affected thereby.— However, even if Aquende were not an
indispensable party, he could still file a petition for annulment of judgment. We have consistently
held that a person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is
that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and that he would be adversely affected thereby.

Same; Same; A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision
rendered therein for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.— Moreover,
a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered
therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger. In National Housing
Authority v. Evangelista, 458 SCRA 469 (2005), we said: x x x It will be the height of inequity to allow
respondent’s title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in
support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of
the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of
law. Clearly, the trial court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is
concerned.
Arcenas vs. City Development Bank

Judgments; Rule 47 does not allow a recourse to annulment of judgment if other appropriate
remedies are available, such as petition for new trial, appeal or petition for relief.—Section 1, Rule 47
provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment if other
appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If
petitioner fails to avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the
action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction
or negligence.

Same; Case at Bar.—The Spouses Arcenas were declared non- suited for failure to appear at the pre-
trial conference of Civil Case No. 072-07-2002 on November 11, 2003, and respondent bank was
allowed to present evidence on its counterclaim on January 8, 2004. Such Order was received by the
secretary of petitioner’s counsel on November 17, 2003. Petitioner did not move to set aside the
RTC’s order of non-suit. While petitioner’s counsel claimed that he only learned of such Order of
non-suit on December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift the order of non-suit was filed. Notably, from
December 4, 2003 to the scheduled hearing on January 8, 2004, petitioner did not take any remedial
action to lift the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do so. In fact, petitioner and her
counsel did not also appear on the scheduled January 8, 2004 hearing wherein respondent bank
presented evidence on its counterclaim and submitted the case for decision.

Same; Extrinsic fraud not a valid ground for annulment of an order if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, by a question for new trial or petition for relief.—Since petitioner claimed that there
was extrinsic fraud committed by respondent bank’s counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief
under Rule 38 within the period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule
47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment of order if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic
fraud is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.
Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of settlement.
However, such promise was not an excuse for petitioner’s counsel not to lift the order of non-suit
and to file a petition for relief.
Diona vs. Balangue

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; A Petition for Annulment of Judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where
a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies.—A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party,
without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a
substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the
same. “The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against
the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it
is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue
or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.”

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.—While
under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based
only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due
process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20
(1997), this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere
inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for
lack of due process of law.

Same; Same; Courts; Courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof
Llamas vs. Court of Appeals

Actions; Criminal Law; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Appeals; Procedural
Rules and Technicalities; The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal
cases.—In People v. Bitanga (525 SCRA 623 [2007]), the Court explained that the remedy of
annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases, thus—Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the following: Section 1.
Coverage.— This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner. The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was
rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit
such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124
thereof, provides: Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.—The
provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they
are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of
the court.—Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. In this
case, at the time of the filing of the information, the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
approved on August 14, 1981.

Lopez vs. Esquivel, Jr.

Actions; Annulment of Judgment; An action for annulment of the judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered—the purpose is to
have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation; A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove
his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.—An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of
the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to
have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is
resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner,
and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he
can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he
would be adversely affected thereby. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies
only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents
a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The
overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

Same; Same; If the judgment sought to be annulled is still on appeal or under review by a higher
court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the litigation
is actually still open and on-going.—It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. If the judgment sought to be annulled, as in this case, is still on appeal or under review by a
higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the
litigation is actually still open and ongoing. In this light, the arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar
that the judgments or final orders need not be final and executory for it to be annulled must fail.

Orbeta vs. Sendiong

Same; Judgments; Annulment of Judgments; Prescription; Considering that a petition for annulment
of judgment based on extrinsic fraud may be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, a
similar petition based on lack of jurisdiction is generally not barred by laches or estoppel if the
petition is filed within one year after petitioner learns of the questioned decision.—Neither laches
nor estoppel serves as a bar. The petition for annulment alleges that respondent learned of the
existence of Civil Case No. 10173 only in 1999, or one year after the decision therein had been
rendered. Since he was not impleaded in Civil Case No. 10173, there is no basis to presume that
respondent was aware of the civil case during its pendency before the RTC. Moreover, at the time
respondent according to petitioners learned of the civil case, there was no pending appeal from the
RTC decision therein, the Notice of Appeal having been earlier denied. Under these circumstances, it
would be difficult to discern how in 1999 respondent could have still participated in Civil Case No.
10173. There was no pending appeal to speak of which he could have involved himself. Nor could
have he participated in the special civil action for certiorari, an original action, then pending before
the Court of Appeals. Indeed, a petition for annulment of judgment was, at that point, the only
viable remedy for respondent to avail of, and it was utilized only one year after respondent learned
of the existence of Civil Case No. 10173. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier— negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Considering that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud may be filed within
four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, a similar petition based on lack of jurisdiction is generally
not barred by laches or estoppel if the petition is filed within one year after petitioner learns of the
questioned decision. This moreover holds true, as in this case, since respondent is a foreign resident
restrained by time and distance to undertake an immediate and proximate response, such as judicial
recourse.

Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata; It is the height of sophistry to argue that res judicata would bar a
petition for annulment of judgment whose prior judgment happens to be that which is sought to be
annulled—the action for annulment of judgment precludes the defense of res judicata.—To begin
with, it is the height of sophistry to argue that res judicata would bar a petition for annulment of
judgment whose, as in this case, prior judgment happens to be that which is sought to be annulled.
The petition for annulment of judgment precisely challenges the validity of the“first judgment,” and
to adopt petitioners’ argument would lead to permanent preclusion of annulment of judgment as a
remedy. Significantly, the reverse is true for the rationale underlying annulment of judgment is
incongruent with the concept of res judicata. Hence, the action for annulment of judgment precludes
the defense of res judicata. The grounds for annulment of judgment are either lack of jurisdiction or
the presence of extrinsic fraud in the rendition of the judgment sought to be annulled. On the other
hand, among the requisites of res judicata are jurisdiction on the part of the court rendering the first
judgment over the parties and identity of causes of action between the first and the second actions.
Ineluctably, said requisites are absent. The first judgment, in Civil Case No. 10173, pertains to the
merits of the action for recovery of possession, quieting of title, and recovery of damages, whereas
the cause of action in the petition for annulment relates to the lack of jurisdiction that marred the
rendition of the first judgment. The element of identity of parties is likewise not present. Respondent
was not a party to either Civil Case No. 10173 or CA-G.R. SP No. 48943.
Alaban vs. Court of Appeals

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Motions; A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a
petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the
assailed judgment is rendered

Same; Same; Same; Annulment of Judgment; An action for an-nulment of judgment is a remedy in
law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered; It is resorted
to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner and is based on
only two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.—An action for
annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment
set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are
nolonger available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic
fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the judgment
sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was
obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the
fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.—An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of
fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

Ceruila vs. Delantar

Same; Same; Same; Petition for Annulment of Judgment; The function of a petition for annulment of
judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial court’s decision sought to be
annulled—the Rules do not allow the Court of Appeals to resolve the merits of the petition for the
amendment and cancellation of birth certificate and to substitute its own findings thereon.—The
function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to
replace the trial court’s decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said
Rule, to wit: “Section 1. Coverage.—This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment.—The annulment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not
be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief. Sec. 7. Effect of judgment.—A judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void, without
prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or
final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order
the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.” is merely
for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing
more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and
cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.

Tortal vs. Taniguchi

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Summons; If indeed summons was not
properly served on petitioner, then his remedy was to file a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An action for the annulment of judgment is an
equitable recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases, such as
when there is no more available or other adequate remedy. —Petitioner claims that he failed to
participate in the proceedings for the nullity of his marriage with respondent before Branch 260,
Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City because summons was never served on him, either personally or
by substitution. If indeed summons was not properly served on petitioner, then his remedy was to
file a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An action for
the annulment of judgment is an equitable recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed
only in exceptional cases, such as when there is no more available or other adequate remedy. A
petition for the annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts may be given due course if it is
sufficiently proven that the “ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.” Furthermore, Rule
47, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two (2) grounds for an action for
annulment or judgment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud cannot
be considered a valid ground in an action under Rule 47 “if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.”

Same; Same; Same; Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if
based on extrinsic fraud, should be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, or if based
on lack of jurisdiction, then before the action is barred by laches or estoppel.—Rule 47, Section 3
then provides that an action for annulment of judgment, if based on extrinsic fraud, should be filed
within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction, then before the
action is barred by laches or estoppel.

Frias vs. Alcayde

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the
plaintiff or petitioner once the complaint or petition is filed. On the other hand, there are two (2)
ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is acquired through coercive
process — either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance
in [Link];

Action in Personam; Words and Phrases; An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court (SC) -
An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the
person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. Its purpose is to impose, through the judgment of a
court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability
on him. The following are some of the examples of actions in personam: action for collection of sum
of money and damages; action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry; action for specific
performance; action to enforce a foreign judgment in a complaint for a breach of contract.

Same; Actions in Rem; Words and Phrases; Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They
are binding upon the whole world.—Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are
binding upon the whole world. The phrase, “against the thing,” to describe in rem actions is a
metaphor. It is not the “thing” that is the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may
be parties even in in rem actions. The following are some of the examples of actions in rem: petitions
directed against the “thing” itself or the res which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for
adoption, correction of entries in the birth certificate; or annulment of marriage; nullity of marriage;
petition to establish illegitimate filiation; registration of land under the Torrens system; and forfeiture
proceedings

Same; Action Quasi in Rem; Words and Phrases; A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.— A
proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such
persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. But,
unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties. The following are
some of the examples of actions quasi in rem: suits to quiet title; actions for foreclosure; and
attachment proceedings.

Same; Actions in Personam; Actions in Rem; Actions Quasi in Rem; In actions in personam, the
judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties is required in actionsin
personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person. In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite
to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Annulment of judgment, as provided for in
Rule 47, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence,
however, recognizes lack of due process as an additional ground to annul a judgment.—Annulment
of judgment, as provided for in Rule 47, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes lack of due process as an additional ground to annul
a judgment. It is a recourse that presupposes the filing of a separate and original action for the
purpose of annulling or avoiding a decision in another case. Annulment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. It is unlike a motion
for reconsideration, appeal or even a petition for relief from judgment, because annulment is not a
continuation or progression of the same case, as in fact the case it seeks to annul is already final and
executory. Rather, it is an extraordinary remedy that is equitable in character and is permitted only in
exceptional cases. Annulment of judgment involves the exercise of original jurisdiction, as expressly
conferred on the CA by Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, Section 9(2). It also implies power by a
superior court over a subordinate one, as provided for in Rule 47, wherein the appellate court may
annul a decision of the regional trial court, or the latter court may annul a decision of the municipal
or metropolitan trial court. For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition
for annulment of judgment is in personam.

Actions; Actions in Personam; Service of Summons; Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted
service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14.—Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, as in this case, the service of summons may be done by personal or
substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14. Indeed, the preferred mode of service
of summons is personal service. To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the
complaint, (or, as in this case, the petition for annulment of judgment), the serving officer must first
attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service
has become impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service.

Same; Same; Annulment of Judgments; An action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.—A principle almost repeated to satiety is that an action for
annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Its obvious
rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Same; Same;
Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments; It is doctrinal that when a decision has acquired finality,
the same becomes immutable and unalterable.—In this case, it is evident that respondent failed to
interpose an appeal, let alone a motion for new trial or a petition for relief from the MeTC July 26,
2006 Decision rendering the same final and executory. Hence, the October 30, 2007 Order granting
its execution was properly issued. It is doctrinal that when a decision has acquired finality, the same
becomes immutable and unalterable. By this principle of immutability of judgments, the RTC is now
precluded from further examining the MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner’s perceived
errors therein, i.e., that petitioners’ complaint has no cause of action for failure to make a prior
demand to pay and to vacate; and, that petitioner failed to refer the case before the barangay.

RULE 50

Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

By Resolution 18 of June 13, 2000, the CA, finding that the petition was filed three (3) days late,
dismissed it pursuant to Section 1(A), Rule 50 19 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner herein claims that this petition has been filed within the reglementary period since the last
day of filing happens to be May 13, 2000 which is a Saturday, and the same was mailed on May 15,
2000, Monday, the next working day. However, a careful consideration of the said reglementary
period would readily reveal that this petition was filed three (3) days late. It is admitted in the
petition that the court a quo’s order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was received by
them on March 13, 2000. Hence, petitioner has sixty (60) days from that date to file this petition.
Since March has 31 days, then necessarily the last day for the filing is May 12, 2000, a Friday,which is
the 60th day from March 13, 2000, and not May 13, 2000 as erroneously claimed by petitioner.

Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio-Yap

Thus, we have no recourse but to affirm the Order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Erlinda’s
appeal. Pursuant toAppeals, on its own motion or that of the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on
the ground that appellant failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.16 Pertinently, this Court’s
ruling in Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals17 is instructive:

“With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate [court] docket fees was
belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that
the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal except to order its dismissal, as it
rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and
became executory by operation of law.” (Stress supplied.)

Finally, we hold that the RTC erred in giving due course to the notice of appeal, supposedly in the
interest of substantial justice. The bare invocation of the phrase, “the interest of substantial justice,”
is not a magic spell that will automatically allow the Court to suspend procedural rules, despite the
jurisdictional bar. The rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.19 In this case, the
messenger’s alleged inadvertence to secure a postal money order for the appellate court docket
fees20 is not a meritorious reason to justify an exception in our jurisprudence.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Royal Ferry Services,

Inc.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Judgment on the Merits; It is judicial policy to determine
a case based on the merits so that the parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and
defenses.—The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the merits. The
term “may” in Rule 50, Section 1 of the Rules of Court means that the Court of Appeals has
discretion to dismiss an appeal based on the enumerated grounds. The Court of Appeals exercised its
discretion when it decided that the interest of justice would be better served by overlooking the
pleading’s technical defects. Time and again, this Court has declared that dismissal on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon. It is judicial policy to determine a case based on the merits so
that the parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and defenses. The Court of Appeals did
not err in taking cognizance of the appeal.

Beatingco vs. Gasis

In this case, we find no reason to disturb the appellate court’s exercise of sound discretion in
dismissing the appeal. We must emphasize that the right to appeal is not a natural right but a
statutory privilege, and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law.23 The Court cannot say that the issues being raised by petitioner are of such importance that
would justify the appellate court to exempt her from the general rule, and give due course to her
appeal despite the late filing of her Appellant’s Brief.

Suib vs. Ebbah

On 10 May 2006, the Court of Appeals ordered Suib, among others, to submit a legible copy of the
DARAB Decision pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43 in relation to Section 1(g), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. However, Suib was able to submit a copy of the DARAB Decision to the Court of Appeals only
after filing two (2) Compliances or only after almost two (2) months since Suib filed the petition.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is limited to correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In order to
constitute grave abuse of discretion, Suib must prove that the lower court acted in a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. “Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.”28 Evidently, the Court of Appeals acted within the bounds of law as
the dismissal of the appeal was based on Section 1(g), Rule 50in relation to Section 7, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Although the decision of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition, did not
mention Suib’s failure to file the present petition within the reglementary period pursuant to Rule 43,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court, still, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the same based
on Section 1(g), Rule 50 in relation to Section 7, Rule 43 of the same Rule. Far from it, the dismissal
of Suib’s appeal was neither arbitrary nor despotic.

The rules of procedure serve a noble purpose of orderly and speedy administration of justice. Suib’s
attempt to persuade this Court to liberally interpret the technical rules must fail. This Court shall not
depart from rules of procedure only in the guise of liberal construction, which would render such
noble purpose nugatory
Zamboanga Forest Managers Corp. vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply

Same; Same; A party’s failure to comply with the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) directive without justifiable
cause is also a ground for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(h), Rule 50 of the Rules.—Still
insisting on the superfluity of the submission of said pleadings in its 28 July 2004 motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, ZFMC had, of course, requested for reasonable time
within which to comply with the CA’s earlier directive. In the twenty-two months which elapsed from
the filing of said motion up to the denial thereof in CA’s resolution dated 21 June 2006, however, the
record shows that ZFMC miserably failed to submit the pleadings filed by the parties before the MNR
and the Office of the President. To our mind, ZFMC’s omission was fatal when viewed in the light of
the above-discussed deficiencies of its petition and its added failure to submit copies of the very
orders it sought to be affirmed by the CA, i.e., the BFD Director’s orders dated 8 May 1974 and 11
November 1974. By and of itself, a party’s failure to comply with the CA’s directive without justifiable
cause is also a ground for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (h), Rule 50 of the Rules.
Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals

[T]his Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment. That that was
the intention of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), cited
in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court held that an order denying a
motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not appealable. The rationale behind the rule
proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is to prevent undue delay, useless
appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The appropriate remedy is
thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an
error of the court on appeal. The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of
a complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular
matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial
court to do other than to execute the order. Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the
order of dismissal itself.

If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied to any
order, then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections of
the Rules “final orders or judgments” as subject of appeal. In other words, from the entire provisions
of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.”
Valderama vs. Arguelles

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Dismissal of Actions; Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules provides
that an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising only questions of law shall be dismissed outright.
—Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are three modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, viz.: Section 2. Modes of appeal.—(a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in
special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (b) Petition for
review.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42. (c)
Appeal by certiorari.—In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall
be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with the Rule
[Link], Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules provides that an appeal to the CA raising only questions
of law shall be dismissed outright, thus: Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of
Appeals.—An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate
judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed. An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.

Same; Same; Same; Questions of Law; For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely
on what the law provides on the given set of facts.—A question of law arises when there is doubt as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must
rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues
require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not
the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can
resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is a question of fact.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Questions of Fact; The determination of whether an appeal involves only
questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. —No other than
the petitioner raised the issue on the cancellation of the adverse claim as the sole issue in her appeal
before the CA. As such, the CA correctly concluded that the said issue involved a pure question of law
as its resolution would not involve an examination of the evidence but only an application of the law
on a particular set of facts. At any rate, the determination of whether an appeal involves only
questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All doubts as to
the correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it
commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporations vs. Bureau of Customs

Taxation; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—
The CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the RTC. In
the instant case, the CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any
action on the same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the
guise of furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be
corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, 688 SCRA 8 (2013), the Court held that the invocation of substantial
justice is not a magic wand that would readily dispel the application of procedural rules.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period set by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to
perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from final and
executory.—In view of respondent’s availment of a wrong mode of appeal via notice of appeal
stating that it was elevating the case to the CA — instead of appealing by way of a petition for review
to the CTA within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of the RTC’s August 3, 2012 Order, as
required by Section 11 of RA 1125, as amended by Section 9 of RA 9282 — the Court is constrained
to deem the RTC’s dismissal of respondent’s collection case against petitioner final and executory. It
is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by
law renders the judgment appealed from final and executory

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Nippon Express (Phils.)

Corporation

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Withdrawal of Appeals; When the case is deemed submitted
for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of the appellee’s brief may still be allowed
in the discretion of the court.—A perusal of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA)
reveals the lack of provisions governing the procedure for the withdrawal of pending appeals before
the CTA. Hence, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA, the Rules of Court shall suppletorily
apply: Sec. 3. Applicability of the Rules of Court.—The Rules of Court in the Philippines shall apply
suppletorily to these Rules. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court — an adjunct rule to the appellate
procedure in the CA under Rules 42, 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court which are equally adopted
in the RRCTA — states that when the case is deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals
made after the filing of the appellee’s brief may still be allowed in the discretion of the court.
RULE 51

Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Tan Lee

Same; The Court of Appeals is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.—Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 8.
Questions that may be decided.—No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered
unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors. Philippine
National Bank v. Rabat, 344 SCRA 706 (2000) cited the book of Justice Florenz D. Regalado to explain
the section above, thus: In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section,
thus: 1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes some
substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule is that only errors
claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors affecting the
validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein. Also, even if the error
complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the same is
closely578 related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in his brief, such error
may now be considered by the court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin. 2. The procedure in
the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample authority
to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely
related to an error properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which the
determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by
the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error ( Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German
Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983). It may also
be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is authorized to consider a plain error,
although it was not specifically assigned by the appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil.
649), otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for technicalities.

Limkaichong vs. Commission on Elections

Judgments; Pleadings and Practice; The Court in Belac v. Commission on Elections (408 Phil. 511
[2001] or 356 SCRA 394 [2001]) , held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who
took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a decision.—The Court
in Belac v. Commision on Elections, 356 SCRA 394, 408 (2001), held that a decision must not only be
signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be
considered a Decision, to wit: [A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and
duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the
Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is always
understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be
promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose
of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to
preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that
they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature
reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and
promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court,
remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of
course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is andfor
designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding
unless and until signed and promulgated. We add that at any time before promulgation, the
ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already
signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a qualification or dissent as
long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the date it was
made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it.

Same; Same; A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.—An unpromulgated
decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal deliberations
of the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is
validly promulgated. Until such operative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if
some or all of the Justices have already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening
period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the
deliberation and had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one’s vote, thereby
preserving one’s freedom of action.

Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Remedial Law; Judgments; Execution; When a court’s judgment or order becomes final and
executory, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the
judgment or order.—The general rule is when a court’s judgment or order becomes final and
executory, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the
judgment or order. In this case, because of the innumerable delays, the enforcement of the final
orders and decision has been long overdue. Same; Same; Same; Distinction between the jurisdiction
of a court to modify its judgment and its jurisdiction to enforce its judgment.—There is a distinction
between the jurisdiction of a court to modify its judgment and its jurisdiction to enforce its
judgment. The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates when the
judgment becomes final. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to only
few exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court
to execute its judgment continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Well settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court cannot impede the execution
of the decision of a higher court.—Judge Caballes’ refusal to enforce the final orders and decision
was not only in total disregard of his ministerial duty, it was also in blatant defiance of the February
6, 1995 Resolution ofthe Court of Appeals that has also long been final and executory. Judge Caballes
also disobeyed the June 27, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals directing Judge Querubin to
enforce the orders listed in the Resolution. Well settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court
cannot impede the execution of the decision of a higher court. For the sole purpose of enforcing its
final order, the Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction to command Judge Caballes to comply with its
order and to cite him in contempt in case he refused to do so. The Court of Appeals retained the
jurisdiction to enforce its final orders.

Same; Same; Same; One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the
existence of supervening events; Meaning of supervening events; The ruling in Natalia Realty vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform is evidently not a supervening event.— One of the exceptions to the
principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening
events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new
circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the
parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.
Before an event can be considered a supervening event, justifying the modification or alteration of a
final judgment, the event must have transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.
The decision of the Court in Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform was promulgated on
August 12, 1993. True, this decision was issued after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 359-A became
final. However, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 30787 became final and executory on October 20,
1993 while the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 44915 was issued on February 21, 1995. The
ruling in Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform is evidently not a supervening event. It
was already in existence even before the decisions in the two appealed cases attained finality
RULE 52 and 53

Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Administrative decisions in matters within the
executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or
error of law.—The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the
executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or
error of law. In the instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing
on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP’s conclusion
that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of
betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner’s offenses, as they factually appear, weigh
heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of the
legislature’s intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special
Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations
that justify the removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.

Laya, Jr. vs. Philippine Veterans Bank

Remedial Law; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, second and subsequent
motions for reconsideration are forbidden. —As a general rule, second and subsequent
motions for reconsideration are forbidden. Nevertheless, there are situations in which
exceptional circumstances warrant allowing such motions for reconsideration, and for that
reason the Court has recognized several exceptions to the general rule. We have extensively
expounded on the exceptions in McBurnie v. Ganzon, 707 SCRA 646 (2013), where we
observed: At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for
reconsideration are, as a general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[n]o second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained.” The rule rests on the basic tenet of immutability of
judgments. “At some point, a decision becomes final and executory and, consequently, all
litigations must come to an end.” The general rule, however, against second and subsequent
motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions. For one, the present Internal Rules
of the Supreme Court, particularly Section 3, Rule 15 thereof, provides: Sec. 3. Second
motion for reconsideration.—The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of
justice by the Court En Banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership.
There is reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not
only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes
final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) may entertain second and subsequent motions for
reconsideration when the assailed decision is legally erroneous, patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
—The Court may entertain second and subsequent motions for reconsideration when the
assailed decision is legally erroneous, patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. Under these circumstances,
even final and executory judgments may be set aside because of the existence of compelling
reasons.

Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers vs. Lim

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion for Reconsideration; As succinctly put by then Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa in Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco, 254 SCRA 234 (1996) on the
effect and disposition of a motion for reconsideration: The filing of a motion for reconsideration,
authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal
individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way that the
Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and submitted for decision.—As
succinctly put by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Judge
Velasco, 254 SCRA 234 (1996), on the effect and disposition of a motion for reconsideration: The
filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose
on the Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor,
in much the same way that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised
and submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a
reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments
advanced by the movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the
first time, these being, as above stated, deemed waived because not asserted at the first
opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with the motion for
reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e.,
the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to and
pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed
upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration
or modification of the judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial
to require consideration, etc.

RULE 56

SM Land, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion and Development Authority

The instant recourse partakes the nature of a second motion for reconsideration, a prohibited
pleading under Section 2, Rule 56,4 in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. The
rule categorically states: “no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained.” The rationale behind the rule is explained
in Manila Electric Company v. Barlis, thusly:

The propriety or acceptability of such a second motion for reconsideration is not contingent
upon the averment of “new” grounds to assail the judgment, i.e., grounds other than those
theretofore presented and rejected. Otherwise, attainment of finality of a judgment might be
staved off indefinitely, depending on the party’s ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving
and formulating “additional flaws” or “newly discovered errors” therein, or thinking up
some injury or prejudice to the rights of the movant for reconsideration. “Piece-meal”
impugnation of a judgment by successive motions for reconsideration is anathema, being
precluded by the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act or
proceeding must set out in his motion all the grounds therefor, and those not so included are
deemed waived and cease to be available for subsequent motions.

Succinctly put, the concurrence of the following elements are required for a second motion
for reconsideration to be entertained: 1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why
granting the same would be in the higher interest of justice; 2. The motion must be made
before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality; 3. If the ruling sought to be
reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at least three (3)
members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and 4.
The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc’s actual membership must be
mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted. Unfortunately for
respondent-movants, the foregoing requirements do not obtain in the case at bench. To
beginwith, there are no extraordinarily persuasive reasons “in the higher interest of justice”
on which the instant second motion for reconsideration is anchored on.

Dela Cruz vs. People

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be differentiated from appeals under Rule 124,
Section 13 involving cases where the lower court imposed on the accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or, previously, death.—The present criminal case was
brought to this court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The penalty imposed on petitioner
by the trial court is material in determining the mode of appeal to this court. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be differentiated from appeals under Rule 124,
Section 13 involving cases where the lower court imposed on the accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or, previously, death.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only
questions of law are reviewed by this court.—It is settled that in petitions for review on
certiorari, only questions of law are reviewed by this court. The rule that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 is based on sound and practical
policy considerations stemming from the differing natures of a question of law and a question
of fact: A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation

Ola vs. People

In the present case, the Court agrees with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are interlocutory orders, as they do not dispose
of the case completely but leave something to be decided upon.19 What has been denied by
the CA was a mere motion to amend petitioner’s appeal brief and the appellate court has yet
to finally dispose of petitioner’s appeal by determining the main issue of whether or not she is
indeed guilty of estafa. As such, petitioner’s resort to the present petition for review on
certiorari is erroneous. Thus, on this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible as the
Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the rule on dismissal of appeals under Section 5,20
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner’s argument that
the CA Resolution which denied her motion to amend her brief is appealable. Petitioner’s
reliance on the case of Constantino, et al. v. Hon. Reyes, et al.,21 is misplaced. In the said
case, petitioner Constantino wanted to amend his complaint after the same was dismissed by
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of
action. However, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s motion to admit the amended
complaint. Petitioner sought to appeal the case but the trial court disapproved the record on
appeal on the ground that the appeal had been filed out of time. In granting the petition for
mandamus filed before this Court to compel the CFI judge to approve the record on appeal,
this Court held that “[e]ven after an order dismissing his complaint is issued, an amendment
may still be allowed. The motion to amend should be filed before the order of dismissal
becomes final and unappealable, because thereafter there would be nothing to amend. If the
amendment is denied, the order of denial is appealable and the time within which to appeal is
counted from the order of denial — not from the order dismissing the original complaint.”22
From the above factual and procedural antecedents, it is clear that petitioner has taken the
Court’s ruling in Constantino out of context. In the said case, the complaint which the
petitioner therein sought to amend was already dismissed. The order which denied
petitioner’s motion to amend the complaint is, therefore, final, and not interlocutory, as there
is nothing else to be done by the trial court after such denial other than to execute the order of
dismissal. Thus, the order denying the motion to amend the complaint is appealable. On the
other hand, what is sought to be amended in the present case is not a complaint but an appeal
brief which was not dismissed by the CA. More importantly, the denial of petitioner’s motion
to amend her appeal brief does not end the task of the CA in adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. Substantial
proceedings are yet to be conducted in connection with the controversy, thus barring resort to
an appeal.

Rule 57

Lorenzo Shipping Corporation vs. Villarin

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Attachment; A writ of preliminary

attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending
to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held
thereafter by the Sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be
secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.—A writ of preliminary
attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending
to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held
thereafter by the Sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be
secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant. It is governed by Rule
57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order
that the defendant may not dispose of his property attached, and thus secure the satisfaction
of any judgment that may be secured by plaintiff from defendant. The purpose and function
of an attachment or garnishment is two- fold. First, it seizes upon property of an alleged
debtor in advance of final judgment and holds it subject to appropriation thus preventing the
loss or dissipation of the property by fraud or otherwise. Second, it subjects to the payment of
a creditor’s claim property of the debtor in those cases where personal service cannot be
obtained upon the debtor.

Same; Same; Same; The provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous
for it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.—The Court, speaking through
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, reiterated the long-standing doctrine that
“[t]he provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the
debtor to humiliation and annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are, therefore, strictly
construed against the applicant, such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all
present, the court shall refrain from issuing it, for, otherwise, the court which issues it acts in
excess of its jurisdiction.” This standard of construction of the rules on preliminary
attachment is reiterated in the 2015 case of Watercraft Venture Corporation v. Wolfe, 770
SCRA 179 (2015).

Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any assignment of rights to Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation (LSC), the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) can only bind the parties thereto.
Not being a party to the MOA, LSC cannot be subjected to an attachment writ on the basis of
Section 1(d).