City of Bacolod v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., G.R. No.

L-25134
Bacolod v. San Miguel Brewery
G.R. No. L-25134 (October 30, 1969)
The Supreme Court dismissed Bacolod's surcharge claim against San Miguel, ruling that the City had "split"
its cause of action.

Facts:
This case concerns a dispute between the City of Bacolod (plaintiff-appellee) and San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
(defendant-appellant) over the payment of surcharges on bottling taxes. In 1949, the Bacolod City Council
passed Ordinance No. 66, imposing a fee on manufacturers and bottlers of soft drinks, along with a
surcharge for late payments. This ordinance was amended in 1959 by Ordinance No. 150, which raised
the fee per case of soft drinks.
San Miguel Brewery, operating a Coca-Cola plant in Bacolod, initially complied with the ordinance by
paying the original fee of P0.01 per case. However, after the fee increase, the brewery continued paying
the original fee and refused to pay the new surcharge of P0.03 per case. This led to a lawsuit by the City
of Bacolod in 1960 (Civil Case No. 5693), in which the court ruled in favor of the City, ordering the brewery
to pay the increased taxes, but did not address the surcharges.
The City then sought to collect the surcharges through a second action (Civil Case No. 7355) after the first
judgment had become final. The brewery contested this, arguing that the second action was barred by
the prior judgment, claiming that the City had improperly split its cause of action by not including the
surcharges in the initial complaint.

Legal Issues:
Whether the second action filed by the City of Bacolod to collect surcharges is barred by the prior
judgment in Civil Case No. 5693.
Whether the City split its cause of action by filing separate complaints for the bottling taxes and
surcharges.

Arguments:
Appellee (City of Bacolod): The City argued that the surcharges were not part of the initial complaint and
could therefore be pursued in a separate action. They contended that the first judgment did not bar the
collection of surcharges as they were not raised as an issue in the previous case.
Appellant (San Miguel Brewery): The brewery argued that the City had split its cause of action by filing
two separate complaints for the same underlying violation of rights. They maintained that the failure to
pay both the bottling taxes and the surcharges was part of a single cause of action, and the first judgment
should preclude any further claims for the surcharges.

Court's Decision and Legal Reasoning:

The court ruled in favor of San Miguel Brewery, reversing the lower court’s decision and dismissing the
City’s complaint for surcharges. The court concluded that the City had improperly split its cause of action
by filing separate complaints for the bottling taxes and the surcharges. The court emphasized that a single
cause of action cannot be divided into multiple lawsuits, as this would lead to unnecessary litigation and
burden the defendant multiple times for the same issue.
The court referenced provisions of the Rules of Court that prohibit the splitting of a cause of action, stating
that a judgment on the merits in one complaint bars subsequent actions involving the same cause. Since
the City had not included the surcharges in the first complaint, they were precluded from pursuing a
second action to collect them.
Significant Legal Principles:
Splitting a Cause of Action: A cause of action cannot be divided into multiple complaints. Filing separate
complaints for different aspects of the same cause of action results in the first judgment barring future
claims on the same issue.
Res Judicata and Litis Pendentia: A final judgment on the merits in one case precludes subsequent actions
involving the same cause of action, even if the case is resolved or still pending.
Legal Obligations and Rights: The obligation to pay surcharges arises from the same violation of rights as
the obligation to pay the underlying taxes, making them part of a single cause of action.

The case involves an appeal by San Miguel Brewery, Inc. against the City of Bacolod's demand
for ₱36,519.10 in surcharges, based on Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949, as amended by
Ordinance No. 150, Series of 1959, which imposed a bottling fee and surcharges for late payment.
The City had previously sued the brewery in 1960 for unpaid bottling fees, and the court ruled in
favor of the City, but the surcharges were not included.

Later, the City filed a second lawsuit to recover the surcharges, which the brewery contested,
arguing that the second lawsuit was barred due to res judicata (a prior judgment) and splitting a
cause of action. The Supreme Court agreed with the brewery, ruling that the City had improperly
split its cause of action into two lawsuits—one for the bottling fees and one for the surcharges—
when they should have been included in a single complaint.

The Court reversed the lower court's decision and dismissed the second lawsuit, reinforcing the
principle that a single cause of action cannot be divided into multiple lawsuits.

RULE 2
CAUSE OF ACTION

Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of - Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.
Section 2. Cause of action, defined. - A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.

Elements:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff
2. An obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or not to violate such right
3. An act or omission on the part of the defendant constitution a violation of a plaintiff’s right
Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. - A party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action.

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of - If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in anyone is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others.

What is splitting – splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action
into several parts or claims. This is PROHIBITED by the Rules. – It violates the policy against multiplicity of
suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening dockets of the court.
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF SPLITTING?
Filing one case or obtaining a judgment on its merits can serve as grounds for dismissing the other case.

If the defendant facing a complaint which is infirm due to the plaintiff splitting causes of action may either
allege the infirmity as an affirmative defense in his answer or file a motion to dismiss on the grounds,
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause or the cause off action is
barred by a prior judgment

If a defendant receives a complaint that improperly splits causes of action, he can either assert this as an
affirmative defense in his answer or file a motion to dismiss. He can argue that either another case is
already pending between the same parties for the same issue, or that a previous judgment bars the claim.

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of
an action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be
severed and proceeded with separately. (6)

People v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-40527, [June 30, 1976]

People of the Philippines vs. Hermogenes Mariano and Hon. Ambrosio M. Geraldez: A Jurisdictional
Examination of Civil and Military Court Authority in Estafa Cases

Facts:
The case involves the People of the Philippines as the petitioner and Hermogenes Mariano, along with
Hon. Ambrosio M. Geraldez, the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, as
respondents. The events leading to this case began on December 18, 1974, when the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan filed an Information (Criminal Case No. SM-649) against Hermogenes Mariano for the crime of
estafa. The allegations stated that between May 11 and June 8, 1971, Mariano, who was appointed as a
Liaison Officer by the then Municipal Mayor Constantino Nolasco, received various items from USAID/NEC
intended for the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The items included electric cables valued at
a total of P4,797.35. Mariano was accused of misappropriating these items for his personal use, despite
being obligated to deliver them to the Municipal Mayor.

On February 19, 1975, Mariano, through his counsel, filed a motion to quash the Information, arguing that
the court lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the criminal liability had been extinguished.
He contended that the items in question were also involved in a separate case against Mayor Nolasco,
who had already been convicted by a Military Commission for malversation of public property. On March
14, 1975, the respondent Judge granted Mariano's motion to quash, citing a lack of jurisdiction due to the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Military Commission, which had already decided on the matter involving
the same subject property. The People of the Philippines sought a review of this order, focusing on the
jurisdictional issue.

Issues:
Does the Court of First Instance (CFI) have original jurisdiction over the estafa case against Hermogenes
Mariano, despite a related malversation case involving the same properties having been previously
adjudicated by a Military Commission?

Can concurrent jurisdiction be claimed between civil courts and military commissions in cases of estafa,
barring the CFI of Bulacan from proceeding with the case against Mariano?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the estafa case
against Hermogenes Mariano. The order of the respondent Judge granting the motion to quash was set
aside, and the Judge was directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. SM-649 without further
delay.

The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdiction is a fundamental aspect of judicial proceedings, defined
as the power granted by law to a court to hear and determine specific controversies. The Court clarified
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statutes in force at the time the action is commenced.
In this case, the Judiciary Act of 1948 provided that Courts of First Instance have original jurisdiction over
criminal cases where the penalty exceeds six months of imprisonment. The estafa charge against Mariano,
which could result in imprisonment exceeding six months, fell within this jurisdiction.

The Court rejected the respondent Judge's assertion that concurrent jurisdiction existed between the civil
court and the Military Commission. It noted that the Military Commission did not have jurisdiction over
the crime of estafa, as it was not included in the offenses defined under General Order No. 49, which
delineated the jurisdiction of military tribunals. The Court concluded that estafa and malversation are
distinct offenses, and the jurisdiction over the estafa case remained exclusively with the civil courts.
Therefore, the ruling of the respondent Judge was erroneous, and the case should proceed in the Court
of First Instance.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s ruling, asserting that civil courts possess original and exclusive
jurisdiction over estafa cases, thus ordering the trial court to proceed with Mariano’s case. The Court
emphasized that jurisdiction is based on constitutional or statutory authority, and at the time the criminal
case was filed, the Judiciary Act of 1948 vested jurisdiction over estafa offenses in civilian courts. The
Court clarified that estafa and malversation are distinct crimes involving different accused parties, making
the notion of concurrent jurisdiction between civil courts and military tribunals inapplicable. Moreover,
the Supreme Court invalidated the lower court’s rationale on concurrent jurisdiction, noting that the
Military Commission did not have the authority to hear the estafa charge against Mariano.

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court reinforced the principle that a court’s jurisdiction is determined by the law in effect
at the time an action is filed. Civil courts, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, have original jurisdiction over
estafa cases, and military commissions do not share concurrent jurisdiction over such offenses.
Class Notes:
Jurisdiction: Refers to the authority granted to a court or tribunal by law to hear and decide on specific
legal matters.
Concurrent Jurisdiction: Occurs when more than one court has the authority to hear the same case. In
this case, the Supreme Court clarified that military tribunals and civil courts do not share concurrent
jurisdiction over estafa cases.
Estafa Penalties: Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is punishable with arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if the amount involved exceeds PHP 200
but does not exceed PHP 6,000.
Military vs. Civil Court Jurisdiction: This case highlights the distinction between military and civil court
jurisdictions, emphasizing that military tribunals do not have authority over civilian offenses like estafa,
even under martial law conditions.
Historical Background:
Set during the martial law era in the Philippines, this case underscores the tension between military
tribunals and civil judicial systems under the regime. The attempt by a military commission to assume
jurisdiction over a civilian crime illustrates the challenges and complexities in maintaining the separation
of powers and judicial authority during this period in Philippine history.

RTCs were formerly called as the Court of First Instance since the Spanish era. It was only in the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 that its name was changed from being called the Court of First Instance to
Regional Trial Court.

Original jurisdiction – court’s power to hear and decide a matter before any other court can review the
matter
Original jurisdiction is the power of a court to take cognizance of a case at its inception, to hear the case
in the first instance, and to conduct a trial on the facts and the law.

Concurrent jurisdiction exists when two or more courts or tribunals are each authorized to hear and
decide the same type of case. A party may choose which among the courts with concurrent jurisdiction to
invoke, subject to the hierarchy of courts and rules against forum shopping.