INT364- War and Strategy in the Contemporary World

Thanmai N Sanan
IRGS
2210110624

The Evolving Landscape of Proxy Wars: How has the UN Security Council addressed the
challenges of proxy wars in the 21st century?

1. Proxy Wars: An Instrument of Power Politics

A proxy war is a military confrontation in which one or more third parties aid one or more state
or nonstate fighters with the aim of influencing the result and advancing their own strategic
objectives or undermining those of their adversaries. In a proxy war, the external parties are
mostly excluded from the actual battle so as to progress through a risk-free approach to achieve
their objectives. Major nations that vie for influence and resources can avoid direct conflict by
engaging in proxy warfare. This way, the external actors will not have to go through the same
financial and human costs that occur when they are directly involved. Third parties can provide
support in the form of financial aid, military training and aid, and occasionally small-scale
military actions using proxies.

The end of the Cold War has seen proxy wars move from superpower-driven conflicts to those
driven by regional powers with multiple militia groups and local tensions, including political and
religious tensions. As a result, the transitional period has involved the development of
regionalized interventionism driven by intra and interstate competition for power and resources
rather than ideological contestation. Moreover, there has been a trend towards multilateral proxy
warfare in coalitions of states supporting a common proxy rather than unilateral proxy support by
a single superpower.
Since the end of the Cold War, governments around the globe have cut their armies due to a
combination of financial constraints, the decline in the perceived need for large standing armies
and the rise of privatized security solutions. The end of the Cold War opened power vacuums
and introduced a new way of warfare, making security functions increasingly dependent on
Private Military Companies. Also, the global financial downturn and public aversion to military
casualties have further incentivized these reductions. These conflicts typically take place in a
setting of existing local tensions, among which external actors can take advantage of them for
their own strategic goals. Proxy warfare is now becoming increasingly important in
contemporary conflict dynamics.

Risks in proxy wars are akin to Napoleon Bonaparte’s central position strategy, which the
General used significantly during the Napoleonic Wars. According to Bonaparte’s strategy, an
actor (C) seeks to separate two aligned actors (A and B) along the seam in which those forces are
co-joined or where they are attempting to link up. Actor C attacks this position to make the battle
more manageable by facing each combatant separately. In those cases, in which two (or more)
actors have not yet joined, Bonaparte’s strategy seeks to prevent their unification by Actor C
thrusting itself between the convergence of Actors B and C, thus denying those two actors’
ability to reap the benefits of unification. This still dramatically applies to modern proxy wars.

2. Strategic motivations and objectives:

The most common reasons that states that local proxies tend to be motivated are geopolitical
factors such as security and diplomatic concerns. Sometimes, significant powers start to become
involved in what is really proxy warfare as a reaction to a feeling of prediction of acute threat by
the actions of other states. However, as they develop their capabilities for this form of
competition, they may start to engage in proxy warfare on a much broader basis and draw
themselves and other states into yet more such conflicts. In addition, ideological factors, such as
shared ethnic or religious identities, may serve as a motive for that kind of competition and may
also provide ready-made local allies.
Provision of security for economic interests and investments, and sometimes the protection of
trade, both directly, such as the costs of conflict and indirectly, such as the potential loss from
economic damage to the power itself, usually have a restraining effect, all the more when the
economic fortunes of these powers are threatened by conflict.

3. The UNSC’s Flawed Response to Proxy Wars

The UNSC is severely biased when it comes to proxy wars. The countries participating in the
decisions on whether to intervene or not are strategically opinionated, and the vetoes of some
countries could heavily influence the decision of the UNSC. They have differed in many stands
when it came to humanitarian intervention. A lack of consensus among the members and
tensions among them have been significant reasons for inaction where the UNSC has
unsuccessfully tried to deal with proxy wars. Now, it is being questioned and asked if it is still
relevant in today's world as conflicts grow more complex.

When powerful countries use civil unrest as a means to acquire what they want, the UNSC
cannot intervene in these conflicts unless the countries involved are permanent members. The
increasing number of international actors and their interconnectedness have made it even harder
to resolve conflicts, as consensus amongst these actors is proving to be complicated. As a result,
there has been debate about whether the international community may interfere in a country’s
internal affairs, especially in the protection of human rights. Terrorism has significantly
contributed to the issue by limiting the extent to which the UNSC can facilitate a ceasefire and
peace agreements in a proxy war.

3.1. The case of Syria:

The ongoing civil war in Syria is evolving into a proxy war, in which both the Baathist regime
and its adversaries are becoming reliant upon support from external powers. The presence of
several opposition groups, militias, and terrorist groups further complicates the issues of peace in
Syria.
Political tensions and differing interests of member states are the main reasons for the European
Union's inaction in humanitarian intervention in Syria. Political affiliation was seen as more
important than humanitarian intervention, and the actions of powerful states have escalated the
crisis further. The severity of the crisis also indicates that efforts should have been made to
mitigate the underlying causes that were present prior to the conflict.

However, the P-5’s veto power has effectively paralyzed the UNSC’s response to the Syrian
crisis, leaving them gridlocked and inactive. Many a time, Russia and China have used their
vetoes to block resolutions disagreeing with the Assad regime and to address human rights
violations, blocking any firm action from being taken. The fact that the UNSC has been rendered
ineffective in its ability to stop the conflict and deal with the humanitarian disaster in Syria has
been driven by this deadlock.

The uneven interests and priorities of EU member states due to political tensions have prevented
a unified humanitarian response to the Syrian conflict. This has resulted in a lack of consensus
on intervention strategies and resource distribution that often leads to the delay or prevention of
the necessary action. However, this demonstrates the difficulty of balancing national interests
and collective humanitarian responsibilities, which the EU has failed to react to.

Why Libya, and not Syria? : The UNSC intervening in Libya’s affairs was seen as successful in
the international arena. In 2011, the international community nearly intervened on a military
basis in Libya on the basis of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and in
association with regional organizations. But in response to the Syrian crisis, Russia and China
vetoed multiple UN resolutions condemning the Assad regime, or authorizing military
intervention.

The Libya intervention had the broad backing of regional organizations and intense player
members, whereas the Syria intervention response was divisive and without consensus, mostly
because of geopolitical interests. The Libyan conflict was a clear case of government repression
of civilians viewed by the international community, and Russia and China saw the Syrian
violence as a legitimate government response to armed opposition, each interpretation and
response leading to differing ones.

However, while considerable Russian investments and contracts with Syria’s Assad regime
played a major role in Russia's decision to veto international military action in Syria, Syria and
Russia are also tied by strong economic and military ties. Also vital were Russia's own strategic
interests, such as keeping its naval base in Tartus, which would be lost if Assad were to go.
Shaped in the end by Russia’s long tradition of opposing regime change and preferring the use of
diplomacy instead of the use of military intervention, Russia took a stand against action in Syria.

4. Internationalizing the Syrian Conflict: Contradictions and Dilemmas

“Is the Syrian Conflict an Internationalized Armed Conflict?” Lasse Heckmann poses the
question in the title of her master thesis, “The Syrian Conflict as an Internationalized Armed
Conflict? Proxy Wars and the Process of Internationalization Under International Humanitarian
Law”. She cites the processes of internationalization under different means:
1) Internationalization through direct military intervention by outside States,
2) Internationalization as a consequence of the lack of consent for the use of force on a State’s
territory, and
3) Internationalization through the indirect intervention by outside States.

In contrast to prevailing scholarly discourse, some components of the Syrian conflict have been
said to have internationalized. In particular, supporting Syrian rebel groups through indirect
intervention (by internationalizing those aspects of the conflict) is what the US is doing, but it’s
not what the US is doing directly. Yet, the Syrian conflict cannot be conclusively characterized
as internationalized by direct military intervention or the lack of consent to using force for either
path does not clearly materialize.

In the 1980s, when Syrian forces shot down a U.S. airplane over Syria and captured an American
pilot, President Reagan publicly denied the existence of an IAC(International Armed Conflict)
between the two nations, but behind the scenes, the U.S. State Department insisted in their
communications with Syria that the incident amounted to an armed conflict and demanded that
the pilot be treated as a Prisoner of War.

In 1986, the ICJ famously opined on proxy wars:

“It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question
should have been perfect […] If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized
rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule
itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance
of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule. This dictum should work equally in
reverse: if States publicly refuse to acknowledge a low-intensity incident as amounting to an
armed conflict but at the same time applies the laws of war to that same incident, then that
practice serves to confirm, rather than deny, the existence of a low threshold for the triggering of
IACs.” (Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, International Court of Justice, 27 June 1986)

It is implied here that even though states don’t consider an incident to be an armed conflict, they
may still apply the laws of war to that incident. This practice proves that the laws mentioned
exist, even when they do not seem directly applicable. A state's actions, no matter how seemingly
contradictory, frequently confirm the principles of international law. This is because when states
seek to justify their own actions, they tend to acknowledge these laws even if they do not exist.

5. Criticisms and conclusion:

According to Stein, in her article “Proxy Wars: How Superpowers End Them”, she has cited the
conditions necessary for war to end:

1. Both the winner and loser must recognize their respective victory or defeat simultaneously and
understand that the other party is aware of this.
2. Rational calculations by all parties must align, which is often complicated by differing
perceptions of what is 'rational' for each side.
3. Effective communication between adversaries is essential, yet it can be challenging even when
both sides are rational.

The Syrian conflict, till now, does not have a clear victor or loser. The government and
opposition groups, as well as external groups, have kept on fighting, and neither side is prepared
to give up completely. Mutual recognition has proven elusive, in part, to the detriment of long-
standing peace. Agreement between the various actors engaged in the Syrian conflict have
different interests and priorities making it impossible to get an agreed rational calculation. This
can be because the Syrian government prefers to keep power and the opposition parties try to
bring about regime change. With such divergent goals, it’s hard to come to an agreement. Most
of all, it is the breakdown of communication between the Syrian government and opposition
groups that always stood in the way of peace negotiations. The violence and the humanitarian
crisis have been turned into a hostile environment where it's been hard to find a way to have any
sort of dialogue.

With the Secretary General of the United Nations António Guterres calling the Syrian Civil War
“the most serious threat to international peace and security” today, it is apparent that the conflict
presents detrimental consequences for the global community.

Reforms that would make the UN Security Council more practical, such as expanding permanent
membership to more effectively reflect regional powers, as well as making the work better
transparent and less prone to voting fiascos, have been suggested by scholars. The lack of
representation has led Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria and South Africa to call for a larger
council or permanent seats. Further, it is suggested that permanent members be prevented from
exercising veto power excessively, especially in cases of mass atrocities, to enable quicker and
more decisive action over proxy wars. Similarly, it calls for reinforcing the responsibility to
protect mandate and reinforcing commitments to human security in global affairs for dealing
with 21st-century conflicts.
If possible, states should abstain from direct military involvement in proxy conflicts. The most
probable response should be indirect, such as sanctions and diplomatic isolation of powers
practising proxy warfare. States should assist countries in danger by diplomatic, economic, and
military support to prevent them from getting into proxy conflicts. And it should also set absolute
limits with other powers to lower the risk of escalation. The state can effectively operate
successfully in counter-proxy warfare by investing in intelligence and monitoring military
capabilities.

Controversial as it may be, the extent of international involvement in the business of a nation's
internal affairs is restricted; however, the human rights abuses that occur within any given
country must be stopped. Reforming the UNSC and reasserting a universal commitment to
human security could provide the UN with resources to act in advance instead of only after the
conflict has taken a deadly turn. Critics have outlined several demands for UNSC reform:
Accountability, representativeness, legitimacy, democracy, transparency, effectiveness, fairness
and impartiality. The purpose of these changes is to make the UN proactive rather than reactive
so that it can act to maintain international peace and security properly.
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Spread of Proxy Conflicts. Just Security
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