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The Ethics of Subversive Operations Abroad

Goorjian A. Ferrell
INTL 200: Introduction to Intelligence
15/01/2024
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The United States (U.S.) has long practiced its foreign policy through the actions of

covert and clandestine activities from its intelligence agencies, using their methodologies to

interfere in the affairs of foreign countries. Should the U.S. practice these ‘special’ activities and,

if so, can it do so by maintaining its own morals? Or are these secretive actions an exemption

when done in furtherance of national security? The Intelligence Community (IC) performs a

necessary function and have evolved accordingly over the years, the purpose of this paper is to

argue that these covert and clandestine activities are necessary, that they are neither malicious

nor evil, and can abide by the United States laws.

Before we can debate whether clandestine and covert actions can be considered ethical or

in line with U.S. laws, they must be defined. Covert action, by its definition of the 1948 National

Security directive was as stated, “an activity or activities of the United States Government to

influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of

the [government] will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include…

traditional counter-intelligence, diplomatic, military, or law enforcement activities.” Covert

actions, coined by Eisenhower as ‘special activities’, are commonly committed overseas,

however other governments operate differently, an example being the KGB within the Soviet

Union during the Cold War conducting operations within their soil to detain dissidents and

poison oppositionists. (Scott, 2010) Operations conducted covertly are intended to be strategic in

nature, focusing on a larger goal beyond that of a single activity, to influence a location overseas

without the need of a large military force and with the targeted goal to further foreign policy

objectives. (DeVine, 2022) Covert actions are designed to alter foreign political, economic, and

military realities, their very nature is controversial compared to any other intelligence activity as
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they sometimes require lethal force. What differentiates covert from clandestine is that it requires

presidential findings, a notification to Congress.

Clandestine operations are defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as “an

operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to

assure secrecy or concealment.” Usually passive in nature, their role is tactical and their methods

which involve classified sources and methods of military operations and intelligence collection,

if disclosed without authorization, would pose a significant risk to the lives of operational

personnel but also national security. Examples of clandestine operations would be intelligence

recruitment of foreign agents, the collection of intelligence from foreign assets, operations in

cyberspace, and surveillance of facilities in denied areas. (DeVine, 2022)

An important factor to consider with covert and clandestine operations is the lack of

knowledge around the activities themselves, aside from those who fail, most of these actions are

never known to the wider public and this intervenes with the crucial element of understanding

and evaluating them. The means by which covert actions are learned about is often through

authorized and unauthorized disclosure of the subject; such as unclassified documents from

agency archives, memoirs, journals, released bibliographies of defectors, or whistle-blowers.

While any released documentation is circumspect, as the veracity of the source must come unto

question, nevertheless it allows us pertinent insight into the methodologies and actions that could

be undertaken within them. (Scott, 2010)

Covert action, much as clandestine, presents a wrinkle within the congressional method

of oversight and how it handles its investigations, primarily it is that covert actions are not

visible to the wider population and the awareness of lawmakers on the ethical and operational

methods conducted within the activity will be limited unless it fails or a significant scandal is
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uncovered, (Haas, 2022) as can be seen during the Iran-Contra Affair in which senior

administration officials covertly facilitated the sale of armaments to Iran to fund the rebel

Contras in Nicaragua. This event, along with previous actions within the IC such as the infamous

uncovering of unethical and unlawful behaviors during the Pike, Church, and Rockefeller

Committee’s cemented a level of distrust among the population to the unsupervised actions of

covert and clandestine actions committed by federal agencies. It is important to point out that

numerous revisions, inquiries, and modifications by legislators following the 1974 hearings

(known as the Year of Intelligence) has ensured that special activities within these organizations

follow the countries laws and its ethical values, providing guidance to prevent future scandals,

and ensuring that the president notifies Congress of any covert actions that are deemed of high

importance to the goals of the country. Committees such as the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

(SPSCI) reviews of the intelligence communities capabilities frequently through hearings and

internal debates of its members, these officials who are given a seat without a term limit, can use

their knowledge of intelligence operations to address national security concerns, what agencies

would need to evolve their capabilities, and ultimately through their scrutiny prevent the

likelihood of unlawful actions. (Haas, 2022)

Having addressed the definitions and the U.S. Congressional view on covert and

clandestine actions, I would address a final important category, which is the ethics of intelligence

and how these plays into the secret actions conducted agencies such as the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). For as long as there have been

countries and there have been governments, the act of spying and collecting information on

friends and foes has existed, the acts of intelligence itself is inherent benign as it involves the
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actions of information and its gathering, it is not however the action of committing to an action.

Clandestine activities operate around this exchange and collection of information, with the intent

of never being public noticed and tactically obscured from government and military entities due

to its intelligence sensitive nature. While it could be argued that snooping and prying into the

business affairs of allies and enemies alike is unethical and beneath a secular society, one should

be aware that information allows policymakers to conduct essential work in maintaining an

effective foreign policy strategy. Covert actions, in contrast to clandestine operations, are

actionable by inception and due to lying out of the scrutiny of public view, it often pulls into

question their ethical and legal constraints. This is a valid concern by the public, and one

underscored by a history of scandal, however it would be remiss to not point out that covert

actions are used as preventative measures to forestall or neutralize a threat before it can grow.

Compared to the earliest days of the ICs existence, specifically within the CIA and FBI, who

were left to conduct these activities using their own judgement and with little supervision, there

is more supervision on covert activities as there had ever been in the past. Knowing that covert

actions are actionable, controversial, and by this extension questionable, it does beg the question,

if there is to be a free society, should it be able to engage in covert action and still maintain its

fundamental values? (Strait, 1989)

As mentioned earlier in this paper, covert action includes any operation that seeks to

influence foreign political, economic, or military conditions, while remaining entirely unnoticed

or unidentifiable. It could be argued that covert action is, if not entirely unethical, then it is

certainly unlawful as it violates the Vienna Convention’s diplomatic injunctions on interference

within domestic affairs of a host country. (Stempel, 2007) However, not all covert activities

actively interfere with domestic affairs; covert collection activities, while much harder to conceal
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now than in previous decades, have proven effective in creating stronger bonds between

countries and their governments by sharing intelligence required to overcome emerging threats

and even the locating of dangerous criminals. The truth is, that covert actions fall between the

lines of being ethical and non-ethical, as stated by the Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray

says:

“…the gulf between individual and collective morality: The private life is governed by

the will of God as stated in the Scriptures. It is to bear the stamp of…patience, gentleness,

sacrifice, forbearance, trust, compassion, humility, forgiveness of injuries and, supremely and

inclusively, love. On the other hand, it is the plainest of historical fact that the public life of the

nation-state is not governed by these values. Hardly less plain is the fact that it cannot be.”

To bring it into context, those sanctioned to act in the defense and betterment of society

and the state, their view of ethics is pragmatic and separate from that of individual-tiered

morality, for they are confronted by the political and social state of reality itself and must

confront the threats that face the state as well as meet the goals laid down by the countries

founding values. A countries use of covert action to fulfill its concern for security, does not itself

raise a moral or ethical concern if the action itself meets the requirements of the sacred duty

entrusted to the public official. This does not mean, that an unrestrained pursuit of immoral and

unlawful actions is justifiable, which would violate the core values of the United States which

emphasize justice and freedom. (Strait, 1998)

Covert actions are deliberate, cautious, and highly involved activities, they are not done

on a whim, often invoked as a last resort when all other options have become exhausted. While

Covert actions are discouraged and unacceptable within international law, there is no denying

that it persists, however there are moments in history within the United States in which covert
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activities often pursued a more vigorous covert action policy. Throughout the Cold War, it was

determined by General James Doolittle and a select panel of appointees that because the Soviet

Union’s policy of pursuing victory at all costs and its proliferation of Communist ideals within

foreign policy, the U.S. should reconsider its concept of ‘fair play’ and seek to actively subvert,

sabotage, and destroy its enemies. While this was not a recommendation to use the aggressive

tactics of the KGB and the ‘realpolitik’ (a pragmatists approach to governance) as it was so

prevalent in the Soviet Union during its time, it nevertheless was far too aggressive and left open

the option for misuse and disregard for national values. (Stempel, 2007)

Examples of these more aggressive covert action tactics such as the 1953 coup in Iran

where U.S. and British backed forces overthrew the elected leader Mohammad Mosaddegh and

placed a pro-western monarch in place to secure access to the country’s vast oil reserves, or the

1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by CIA-backed exiles on Cuban soil to dispose of Fidel Castro which

ultimately led in failure. The disclosed history of covert action is filled with mixed results, some

entirely unexpected victories and others crushing defeats due to unforeseen circumstances. The

raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 2011 highlights one of the few public examples of a

resounding success. (DeVine, 2022)

As the IC has matured over time and the global conflicts waxed, there has slowly been a

shift in which covert actions are conducted. When done properly, covert actions are neither

unethical nor immoral as they are performed within the United States best interest in mind and

accordance with its laws. (Strait, 1989) It is often personal ethics and biases during the planning

and approval stages of covert operations that lead to problems, for their ethical or moral

standards lower that of the countries which, as it becomes routine, would taint its foundation.

Considering the adversaries the United States faces, there may be times in which deception in
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foreign operations is a necessity, even if it conflicts with the public forum of U.S. democracy,

and could prove necessary at times. However, they must meet the standards of the agency by

rigorously examining its feasibility, proportionality, and its decency of means so that it does not

damage the reputation of the United States if revealed.

Bibliography

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Community: Selected Definitions”. Congressional Research Service. Updated November

29, 2022. [Link]

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1297-1318. Published September 28, 2022. [Link]

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[Link]

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