Trans-Pacific Partnership

versus Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership: Control
of Membership and Agenda
Setting
Shintaro Hamanaka

NO. 146 adb Working paper Series on

December 2014 Regional Economic Integration

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

 ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration

Trans-Pacific Partnership versus Comprehensive

Economic Partnership: Control of Membership
and Agenda Setting

Shintaro Hamanaka Office of Regional Economic Integration,

Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila,
No. 146 | December 2014 Philippines + 63 2 632 5844 (tel); + 63 2 636 2183 (fax)
shamanaka@[Link]

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

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© 2014 by Asian Development Bank

December 2014
ISSN: 2313-5999 (Print), 2313-6006 (e-ISSN)
Publication Stock No.: WPS147015-2
Contents Abstract iv

1. Introduction 1

2. Pitfall of Balance-of-Power Theory 1

3. Analytical Framework: Quest for Exclusive Leadership 2

1. Power-agenda paradox 2
2. The two games: Control of membership and agenda 3
3. Accession conditionality 4

4. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 5

1. Is the United States a latecomer? 5
2. Treatment of latecomers 6
3. Treatment of future participants and accession modality 8

[Link] Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 9

1. Disagreement between People’s Republic of China
and Japan: Control of membership and agenda 9
2. Temporary agreement? 11
3. Future participation in RCEP 12

[Link] of Strategies of Key Players 13

1. United States and the People’s Republic of China 12
2. Japan 13
3. Other Important Players: ASEAN, the Republic of Korea,
and India 14

7. Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) 15

8. Conclusion 16

References 18
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration 20
iv | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

Abstract
This paper argues that the formation of regional integration frameworks can be best understood
as a dominant state’s attempt to create a preferred regional framework in which it can exercise
exclusive influence. In this context, it is important to observe not only which countries are
included in a regional framework, but also which countries are excluded from it. For example, the
distinct feature of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is its exclusion of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), and that of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is its
exclusion of the United States. An exclusion of a particular country does not mean that the
excluded country will perpetually remain outside the framework. In fact, TPP may someday
include , resulting from a policy of the United States “engaging” or “socializing” the PRC rather
than “balancing” against it. However, the first step of such a policy is to establish a regional
framework from which the target country of engagement is excluded.

Keywords: free trade agreements (FTAs), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Regional

Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), membership, exclusion, agenda setting

JEL Code: F13, F15, F53

 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 1

1. Introduction
Traditional theorists explain regional integration efforts as a “balancing” phenomenon. For them,
the United States leadership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations is related to its
attempt to balance against a rising the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Likewise, they would
argue that PRC’s policy to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
can be best understood as a counter-proposal for a regional economic coalition vis-à-vis the
United States-led TPP. However, direct application of security-centric theory, which implicitly
assumes wars as the ultimate tool of external policy, to the economic field is problematic, given
the low probability of wars.

This paper argues that the formation of regional integration and cooperation frameworks can
be best understood as a dominant state’s attempt to create its own regional framework where it
can exercise some exclusive influence. In this context, it is important to observe not only which
economies are included in a regional framework, but also which economies are excluded from
it. The distinct feature of TPP is that the PRC is excluded, and that of RCEP is that the United
States is excluded (Azis 2013, p. 31; Petri 2013, p. 340). While economists tend to emphasize
membership, namely who is in the group, what is politically more important in understanding
group formation is exclusion. This is because the exclusion of rival states is necessary for
countries seeking to assume leadership. This paper puts special emphasis on exclusion, rather
than inclusion, in analyzing trade regionalism, which is an approach adopted by some political
science literature.1

This paper is structured as follows. First, the paper explains the analytical framework: the control
of membership and agenda of regional economic integration groupings. It then reviews the
development of TPP and RCEP from the standpoint of membership (especially exclusion) and
agenda setting. The rivalry between the United States and the PRC that manifests itself in the
competing TPP and RCEP proposals is at the heart of the discussion. In addition, the rivalry
between the PRC and Japan in East Asia will also be discussed. The final section concludes.

2. Pitfall of Balance-of-Power Theory

Some may consider that the logic behind the formation of regional security groupings is similar
to that in the formation of regional economic groupings. The so-called balance-of-power
usually takes the form of competition between one alliance and another or one nation, rather
than the equilibrium of two isolated nations. “Alliance vs. counter-alliance” (Morgenthau 1973,

1
Political scientists have long acknowledged the significance of exclusion in understanding institution building. Neo-
liberal institutionalists such as Robert Koehane argue that institutions produce benefit for insiders at the expense
of outsiders (Keohane 1984, p. 79). Some political science research on regionalism also analyzes regionalism from
the angle of exclusion. Wesley (1997) argues that a region is sometimes determined by the logic of “politics of
exclusion,” based on the case study of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). Hamanaka (2009) provides a
theoretical framework about the boundary of a region, which distinguishes insiders and outsiders. There is also a
study that analyzes the evolution of membership in regional institutions using game theories (Hamanaka 2011).
2 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

p. 196) is the most spectacular of the configurations of balance-of-power. For such theorists, the
creation of regional cooperation frameworks can be explained by the logic of alliance formation.
For example, the formation of the Soviet Union-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) should be interpreted as a counter-alliance against the United States-led North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
can be interpreted as a collation against Iran (Hurrell 1995). In this context, United States
leadership in the TPP negotiations is related to its attempt to balance against a rising PRC.
Likewise, balance-of-power theorists would argue that the PRC’s policy to establish RCEP can
be best understood as a counter-proposal to the United States-led TPP.

However, the traditional balance-of-power framework entails several inherent weaknesses in

explaining economic cooperation frameworks. First, an importation of security-centric theory,
which implicitly assumes wars as the ultimate tool of external policy, into the economic field is
problematic, given the low probability of wars. Unlike in a security alliance where the coalition
automatically gives security to member economies, it is not easy to foresee the impact of
economic cooperation among partner economies. Moreover, overlapped membership in
economic groupings implies that economic cooperation and security alliances are two different
things (It would be unusual for an economy to sign a security alliance with two economies
competing with each other).

Nonetheless, balance is an important concept in understanding economic cooperation. But what

economies attempt to balance (or more precisely, supersede) is not their power, but rather their
influence. Then, the question is how to increase influence on other states, especially regional
states.

3. Analytical Framework: Quest for Exclusive Leadership

3.1 Power-agenda paradox

For an economy that wants to increase its influence, establishing a regional group where it can
be the most powerful state—dominating other members in terms of material capacity—is
convenient. The most powerful state is likely to be influential in the group because it can easily
assume so-called “structural leadership,” which is based on material resources (Young 1991,
p. 288). While other factors such as knowledge can also be a source of power, the exercise of
power based on non-material resources is uncertain. Thus, having the largest resources in a
regional grouping is important to increase the likelihood of attaining leadership. By assuming
leadership, an economy can set a favorable agenda and establish convenient rules. In addition,
the most powerful state can increase influence through prestige2 and asymmetric economic
interdependence with others.3

2
Showing a presence in a region is useful to show “who has power,” which is usually called policy of prestige
(Morgenthau 1973, p. 85). Establishing a regional framework is a typical way to show presence.
3
Deeper economic interdependence among members of a regional framework will lead to increased influence,
especially when interdependence is asymmetrical.
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 3

Which economy is more powerful than others? While we have some rough idea about who has
power (e.g., the United States is the most powerful economy in North America), it is not easy
to precisely assess the size of power. For example, which is more powerful: Japan or the PRC?
It depends on the specific issue area. When the issue is trade in goods, the PRC seems to be
more powerful, given that its domestic market is larger than Japan’s. In contrast, when the issue
is intellectual property protection, it is likely that Japan leads the discussions or negotiations. In
short, power depends on the issue area to a certain degree. Power also depends on rules. If the
set of rules established is convenient to some countries but not to others, it is likely that countries
which find the rules convenient can assume leadership. For example, the military capabilities of
France and Germany may be comparable, but their influence at the United Nations (UN) is far
different. France, by holding a permanent Security Council seat, is much more powerful than
Germany because of rules. (This paper will use the term “agenda setting” to cover the concepts
of rule setting.)

The two issues discussed above seem to be contradictory with each other, however. The question
is how the cyclical problem, or the chicken-and-egg problem, can be settled.

● Powerful states set the agenda

● Power depends on the agenda

3.2 The two games: Control of membership and agenda

In the “old” world, the cyclical problem was solved easily because power essentially meant
military power. In other words, power did not depend on the agenda since the agenda ultimately
was always determined by military issues. Moreover, countries formed alliances to survive in a
dangerous world, rather than by playing a diplomatic game of membership and agenda-setting
politics, which will be discussed below.

However, the formation of economic groupings in the contemporary world is different.

The cyclical problem cannot be solved easily. A typical example is the case of World Trade
Organization (WTO) negotiations. If the issue is economic liberalization, the United States is
likely to be the leader. If economic development is the issue, developing economies like India
or the PRC are likely to be the leader. The two sides cannot agree upon the agenda. Since the
agenda is uncertain, it is unclear who the leader is. At the same time, the agenda cannot be
decided by the leader because it is unclear who the leader is.

At the regional level, the story is even more complicated. What is important to note is that
there is no definitive definition of region. Each economy, especially those that want to assume
leadership in a region, can define it freely. Thus, the question is not, for example, which country,
the PRC or the US—becomes the leader in the region. The two economies may insist upon
regional cooperation in different geographical areas so that each one can assume leadership
and increase influence in a region they define. This means that, at the regional level, the cyclical
problem can be solved to a degree by limiting membership. As discussed above, the case of
4 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

WTO negotiations is difficult because both leader and agenda are unclear, but this is because
the WTO is a global institution in which membership control is difficult. In contrast with the
WTO, at the regional setting and from the United States perspective, for example, if its rivals
such as India and the PRC are excluded it can easily be the leader and agenda setter.

While the determination of membership (or exclusion of rivals) is critical, the significance of
agenda setting also should not be overlooked. It is wrong to assume that membership comes
first and a leader decides everything related to the agenda even at the regional level. Agenda
setting is important because power still depends on the agenda to a degree. This is especially
true for heterogeneous economies, as illustrated by the examples of Japan and the PRC above.
Accordingly, economies are playing two games simultaneously: control of membership and
control of the agenda. The core of the first game is the exclusion of rivals. The essence of the
second game is to set the agenda that is convenient to the leader. Neither comes before the
other; both are determined at the stage of forming the institution or group.

3.3 Accession conditionality

However, the above argument that the exclusion of rivals is important does not necessarily mean
that the excluded parties perpetually remain outsiders. There is a possibility that very powerful
rivals are kept outside, especially if the incumbent leader is not confident and fears that its
leadership role would be ruined by a powerful newcomer. However, the more likely scenario is that
incumbent leaders try to invite rivals as latecomers and put them in a relatively disadvantageous
position vis-à-vis incumbents. Latecomers can be put in a disadvantageous position in two ways.
While both types of policies outlined below are usually implemented in the form of accession
conditionality, the two are different in nature. The first one is de facto discrimination while the
second is de jure discrimination:

Latecomers should accept the agenda and rules set by incumbents. Even if the agenda and rules
are equally applied to all parties, they are not always neutral. Incumbents can set agenda and
rules convenient to them, but not necessarily to others.

Latecomers should satisfy additional requirements that were not required from incumbents.
They should endure disadvantageous conditions in order to be accepted.4 Incumbents use
additional requirements to tame newcomers and reduce the rival’s capability to assume
leadership. Additional requirements may include items outside the scope of the agreement.5

The openness of accession rules determines whether accession procedures can be used as a
tool to socialize or tame new applicants. Merely having an accession clause does not make an
agreement truly open. Agreements can be classified into four types in terms of accession rules

4
For example, latecomers are usually required to offer more liberal market access than incumbents. It is widely
known that new WTO Members’ concessions are very ambitious.
5
It is said that in the case of Mexico signing the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was a precondition
for participating in the TPP. See Section V for more detail.
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 5

(Hamanaka 2012a). The first possibility is that an agreement does not have any accession clause
(closed agreement).6 Second, there is a semi-closed type of agreement in which acceptance
of a new member requires the unanimous approval of the current signatory states. Third, in a
semi-open agreement, acceptance of a new member depends on the approval by the majority
of the existing signatory states. Finally, there is a (truly) open agreement in which all states that
are willing to agree to the terms of the treaty can join.7 The more discretion the incumbents have
in deciding whether or not to accept newcomers, the higher the likelihood that they use the
accession process as a chance of taming newcomers (Hamanaka 2012b).

4. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

4.1 Is the United States a latecomer?

The genesis of TPP dates back to the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Chile and New Zealand held two
rounds of negotiations to conclude a free trade agreement (FTA), though they ultimately decided
not to pursue it (Salazar 2005). Meanwhile, New Zealand and Singapore signed an FTA in 2000,
leading to the idea of a “P3” grouping—comprising New Zealand, Singapore, and Chile—which
was formally raised at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in 2000
in Brunei Darussalam. While the New Zealand–Singapore FTA has an accession clause, the three
parties decided to negotiate a new agreement. The negotiations among the P3 were formally
launched at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in 2002 in Los Cabos, partly because concerned parties
considered that the competing idea of a “P5” grouping—comprising the P3 plus Australia and
the United States—would not materialize in the near future. Brunei Darussalam joined the
P3 negotiations during the second round, and an agreement among the P4, the Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP), was signed in 2005 and entered into force in 2006.

TPSEP does not have chapters on investment and financial services, but Articles 20.1 and
20.2 stipulate that negotiations on those outstanding issues should start within 2 years of the
agreement coming into force. Accordingly, the negotiations on investment and financial services
were planned to start in March 2008 (Lewis 2009, p. 407). A month before this start date, on
8 February 2008, the United States expressed interest in joining the negotiations, participating
with the expectation that it would eventually join TPP (Lewis 2011, p. 34). In September 2008,
President George W. Bush notified Congress of his administration’s intention to start negotiations
with the P4, and the negotiation process including United States participation was launched
thereafter.

6
Note, however, that this scenario does not exclude the possibility of accession, which may be achieved by amending
the original agreement.
7
An Open Trade Agreement (OTA) as proposed by Garnaut (2004) has a real open accession clause. The three
conditions for becoming a member of OTA are: (i) members should offer, at least, the same preferences as
the preferences in their (most favorable) existing FTAs; (ii) members should accept any new members on the
same terms as they treat other incumbents, provided new applicants also satisfy these three conditions; and
(iii) members should accept common rules of origin (ROOs) of the OTA. Thus, the accession of new members
will not be subject to case-by-case negotiations.
6 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

It is unclear whether the current negotiations are about the accession of non-P4 countries into
TPSEP, or about a new agreement among the 12 concerned parties, as TPSEP has an accession
clause, Article 20.6, which states:

This Agreement is open to accession on terms to be agreed among the Parties,

by any APEC Economy or other State. The terms of such accession shall take
into account the circumstances of that APEC Economy or other State, in
particular with respect to timetables for liberalisation.

The position of the United States on this issue is clear; it wants the current negotiations to lead
to a new agreement, rather than TPSEP accepting the United States as a latecomer. In fact, a
United States Trade Representative (USTR) official made it clear in remarks at the American
Society of International Laws Annual Meeting that the United States was not acceding to the
P4 agreement, but rather a new agreement was being negotiated (Lewis 2011, p. 34). Ron Kirk,
the USTR official, also pointed out that Congress would be more receptive to creating a new
agreement from scratch (James 2010, pp. 2–3). For the United States to assume leadership,
negotiations should lead to a new agreement instead of US accession to TPSEP.

The United States is also attempting to lower the level of ambition of the agreement so that it
can assume leadership. For example, while the original vision of P4 was high-standard, whether
the TPP will eventually become high-standard is uncertain (Lewis 2013, p. 367; Lewis 2011). The
United States does not seem to be a strong supporter of the “no exclusion” policy and in fact it
has been attempting to exclude sugar from the agreement’s coverage on the ground that this is
an issue already solved in the bilateral context, such as the Australia–United States FTA. Thus,
United States policy has two aspects. On the one hand, it is participating in TPP negotiations
as a latecomer and uses the high standards set by P4 members whenever convenient; on the
other hand, when necessary, it is lowering the level of ambition to a comfortable level using its
bargaining position as the most powerful party.

4.2 Treatment of latecomers

Shortly after the United States began its participation in TPP negotiations in late 2008, Australia
and Peru announced their respective interest in joining the negotiations. They were soon
followed by Viet Nam. The Bush administration notified Congress in December 2008 of its
negotiations with these three economies. The original plan was that the first formal negotiations
were to be held in March 2009 with Australia and Peru, and Viet Nam as observers, though
this meeting was postponed because the new administration of Barack Obama needed time
to review the United States FTA policy before engaging in actual negotiations. At an address in
Japan on 14 November 2009, President Obama announced that the United States would join
TPP. The negotiations among eight parties (P4 plus the United States, Australia, Peru, and Viet
Nam) started at the Melbourne meeting in March 2010.
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 7

Since then, several other economies have expressed interest in TPP membership. However, there
are some distinctions between incumbents and newcomers. While it is not written, it is said
that economies who want to participate in TPP negotiations should be “approved” by existing
members. Thus, it is wrong to suggest that all concerned economies are negotiating on perfectly
equal footing. In this sense, Viet Nam was strategic because it expressed interest in joining TPP
immediately after the United States did and successfully avoided being treated as a latecomer. In
contrast, Malaysia decided to join TPP negotiations in July 2010—mainly because there was no
hope to finalize the United States–Malaysia FTA whose negotiations were launched in 2006—
but its participation was subject to approval by the other eight members. However, Malaysia
joined the second round of negotiations in October 2010 without prolonged pre-approval
procedures. It can be said that Malaysia jumped on the bus just before the door was closed.8
TPP parties up to and including Malaysia are called the TPP9. At the APEC Leaders’ Meeting on
11–12 November 2011, Canada, Mexico, and Japan each expressed interest in TPP participation.

Incumbents have attempted to put latecomers in a disadvantageous position in two ways. First,
they try to limit the latecomers’ ability to influence the agenda. Latecomers are required to
agree upon two negotiation modalities: (i) they must accept terms already agreed upon among
incumbents, and (ii) they do not have veto power on any chapter if the current negotiating
partners (incumbents) reach an agreement on a chapter.9 Thus, latecomers should accept not
only what has been agreed upon by TPP9 but also what will be agreed upon by TPP9. It seems
that TPP9 parties will try to decide as much as possible before more economies come in. In fact,
the Outline of TPP Negotiations was released on 12 November 2011 at the TPP summit among
the nine parties, which was held back-to-back with the APEC Leaders Meeting wherein Japan,
Canada, and Mexico formally expressed interest in TPP membership. The Outline implies that
the room for negotiations for newcomers is very limited.10 Of particular importance was a limit
on Japan’s negotiating power because it would have had the ability to affect the agenda if it had
been included at an early stage. Kelsey (2013) argues that “the New Zealand government won’t
actually want Japan at the table until all the critical issues are solved.” Such considerations are
common to others to a degree. In fact, while the three economies expressed their interest in TPP
membership at the same time, Japan’s participation negotiations were the most prolonged.11 The
involvement of Canada was also controversial (but not as much as that of Japan) because the
economy is also capable of complicating the TPP negotiation agenda (Stephens 2013).12

8
The United States administration should notify Congress of the intention of negotiating a trade agreement 90 days
before the actual launch of negotiations. Because the US followed this procedure when it started negotiations for
the United States–Malaysia FTA in 2006 (negotiations were suspended in 2008), 90-day prior notice was not
required for Malaysia’s participation in TPP negotiations.
9
In addition, latecomers are not allowed to view the negotiation text until they are accepted (Inside US Trade. 2012.
18 June).
10
See the section on Legal Texts, which says “the negotiating groups have developed consolidated legal text in
virtually all negotiating groups. In some areas, text is almost complete; in others, further work is needed to finalize
text on specific issues. The texts contain brackets to indicate where differences remain.”
11
Mexico and Canada’s application was approved by incumbents in June 2012 and they participated in the
15th meeting in Auckland in December 2012. Japan’s application was approved only in March 2013 and it
participated in the 18th meeting in Kota Kinabalu in July 2013.
12
It has been reported that Canada’s first application for TPP membership was rejected in October 2009 (Elms 2013,
p. 379). Note that this is incident would have occurred before the first round of TPP negotiations in March 2010.
8 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

The second way to put latecomers in a disadvantageous position is by imposing additional

requirements. While there have been no formal accession procedures to TPP (because it has not
been signed yet), it seems that incumbents are attempting to tame latecomers by introducing a
similar mechanism to accession conditionality: bilateral negotiations. For example, in the case of
Mexico, signing of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was the precondition for
its TPP participation set by the United States as its participation in negotiations was secured the
day after its signing of ACTA.13 For Canada, it seems that the phase-out of supply management
control of dairy and agricultural products was a precondition for its TPP membership. In the case
of Japan, lifting (bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)-related restrictions on the United
States beef is one of the preconditions.14 In addition, it is reported that the United States has a
long list of preconditions, which may restrict Japan’s bargaining power in the actual negotiations:
agriculture, insurance, drugs and medical devices, and automobiles, among others (Kelsey 2011).

If the United States sets the agenda and attempts to control membership, does this mean that
other participants should be obedient followers? Fundamentally, TPP is a United States-led
mechanism and others are expected to follow it as far as staying within the framework. One
exception would be a country that can set up an alternative to TPP. This means that an economy
posing a threat to the United States by indicating a possible withdrawal from TPP negotiations
and participation in another group that is not led by the United States could have some bargaining
power. (See Section VI for further discussion of this topic.)

4.3 Treatment of future participants and accession modality

While TPSEP has an accession clause, it is unclear what type of accession clause will be included
in the final TPP text. It is likely that participation will be subject to the approval of all TPP
member economies, which would thus be a semi-closed agreement rather than an open one.
While the current negotiating parties seem to have the option of not undertaking any part of the
agreement (e.g., it seems that Australia will not undertake the investor-state dispute section),
it is likely that future applicants (after the conclusion of TPP negotiations) will be required to
accept everything in the agreement. Otherwise, an incumbent may block their application. Of
particular importance is that TPP will have little development considerations. While capacity
building is included in TPP, all parties, including both developed and developing economies,
are expected to offer more or less similar levels of commitment. In other words, it is wrong to
consider that the terms of accession for developing economies are differentiated from those for
developed economies.15

The distinctive institutional feature of TPP that has huge implications for the terms of accession
for future applicants is that TPP is not a real regional agreement. TPP is likely to become a
bundle of bilateral deals, not a true region-wide FTA. The bundle of bilateral deals means that

13
[Link]
14
[Link]
15
Unlike the Guiding Principles and Objectives of RCEP (see Section V for details), the Outlines of TPP do not
include the term “flexibility” for developing members.
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 9

tariff concessions and schedules will be determined on a bilateral basis and without having a
common single tariff schedule. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–India
FTA is an example of an agreement that includes non-unified tariff schedules (Fukunaga and
Isono 2013).16 While the bundle of bilateral agreements may be slightly better than perfectly
unrelated bilaterals if regional cumulation is allowed, this is essentially a bilateral agreement,
rather than a regional one. The position of the United States, on this point is obvious; it does
not want to re-open issues already settled in existing FTAs and it wants to have different tariff
schedules for different TPP partners.

If TPP will be a bundle of bilateral agreements, rather than a true region-wide agreement, the
important implication for accession is that new applicants need to negotiate not only their
concession but also existing members’ concession on a bilateral basis. If there were a unified
single concession among members, then the negotiations of a new participant would be able
to focus on its concession to be exchanged with existing members’ concession stipulated
in the unified schedule. Without unified concessions, it is unclear what type of concession a
new member can obtain from existing members. Thus, while TPP has an accession clause, it is
reasonable to assume that accession will not be easy. Rather, the United States intention is to
tame future participants through bilateral accession negotiations.

5. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

5.1 Disagreement between the People’s Republic of China and Japan: Control of
membership and agenda

The PRC and Japan have different ideas on the most appropriate regional economic architecture
in terms of both membership and agenda. The competition between the two over regional
dominance dates back to soon after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. It is widely known
that Japan attempted to establish the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) but the United States
successfully blocked it (Rapkin 2001). The PRC was wary of the Japanese proposal because it
feared that Japan’s dominant position in the region would be locked-in by the establishment of
AMF (Hamanaka 2008).

In the area of trade, in November 2000, the PRC proposed conducting a joint study on an ASEAN–
PRC FTA, which was accepted by ASEAN. At the ASEAN–PRC Summit in November 2001,
the two parties agreed to establish an ASEAN–PRC FTA by 2010. After this, the reaction of
the Government of Japan was swift. Prime Minister Koizumi visited Southeast Asia in January
2002 and proposed a Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership. It is important to
note that the Chinese proposal emphasized an FTA, namely covering trade in goods, while the
Japanese proposal was more comprehensive. However, at this stage, the rivalry took the form of
direct competition between the PRC and Japan over ASEAN.

16
Unlike other “ASEAN plus” FTAs, India’s offer to the Philippines and other ASEAN economies were different
under the ASEAN–India FTA.
10 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

Around the mid-2000s, the rivalry between the two economies moved into membership and
agenda politics. In November 2004, the PRC proposed conducting a study on an East Asia Free
Trade Agreement (EAFTA) and the study was started in April 2005. The study’s Phase I results
were reported to the ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers Meeting (EMM) in August 2006, and the
members subsequently agreed to conduct a Phase II study.17 Meanwhile, Japan proposed a study
on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) at the ASEAN+6 EMM,
which was held back-to-back with the ASEAN+3 EMM.18 After this, Japan sped up the study
on CEPEA so that its proposal would not fall behind EAFTA. Both Phase I and Phase II of the
CEPEA study were finalized by July 2009 (Phase I: June 2007–June 2008; Phase II: November
2008–July 2009), which is only 1 month after the completion of Phase II of the EAFTA study.
The results of the CEPEA study were reported to the ASEAN+6 EMM and those of the EAFTA
study to the ASEAN+3 EMM in August 2009.

The two proposals are very different from each other. First, EAFTA is a project among ASEAN+3
members while CEPEA comprises ASEAN+6. The PRC thought a narrower membership that
excludes Australia (a United States ally) and India would make it more convenient for the PRC to
assume leadership. Japan considered adding Australia and India as being necessary to dilute the
PRC’s influence, which is a necessary condition for its leadership of the group. Second, the PRC
proposal emphasizes liberalization of trade in goods, while the Japanese proposal emphasizes
non-goods issues such as investment and intellectual property. While the membership politics
have attracted attention, the agenda setting politics are equally important. If the agreement is
limited to trade in goods, the PRC would be the dominant player in negotiations, given the size
of its domestic market. If investment and intellectual property are included, Japan would be the
dominant player and the PRC would only have defensive interests.

ASEAN was unable to decide which proposal to support so it attempted to bridge the two. The
disagreement between the PRC and Japan regarding the appropriate membership and agenda
was a serious one as evidenced by the two different studies on EAFTA and CEPEA that were
reported to different forums. ASEAN proposed to establish the so-called “ASEAN Plus Working
Groups”, where both ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 frameworks could be discussed, and several
such meetings were held in 2010 and 2011. Four Working Groups were established covering
(i) rules of origin (ROOs); (ii) tariff nomenclature; (iii) customs procedures; and (iv) economic
cooperation. However, the ASEAN proposal was not successful because, from the Chinese
perspective, it seemed to support the Japanese preference for membership to include all of
ASEAN+6, though it would theoretically not be impossible for the Working Groups to discuss
ASEAN+3 cooperation. From the Japanese perspective, the four topics selected seemed to
support Chinese preferences by excluding investment and intellectual property.

17
ASEAN+3 refers to the 10 members of ASEAN plus the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
18
ASEAN+6 refers to the 10 members of ASEAN plus Australia, the PRC, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
New Zealand.
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 11

5.2 Temporary agreement?

The PRC and Japan made a joint proposal on East Asian economic cooperation in August 2011.
They suggested the establishment of Working Groups, where both EAFTA and CEPEA could be
discussed, before the end of 2011 to cover the following topics: (i) trade in goods, (ii) trade in
services, and (iii) investment. They also proposed submitting the study results to ministers and
leaders in 2012. The proposal clearly stated that the participants would be limited to ASEAN and
ASEAN’s FTA partners, and that ASEAN would chair this initiative. At the 19th ASEAN Summit
in Bali on 17 November 2011, ASEAN decided to endorce RCEP. The East Asia Summit (EAS),
which was held 2 days later, simply “noted” the ASEAN decision since EAS includes the United
States, which might seek to block the progress of RCEP.

In August 2012, the first ASEAN Economic Ministers Plus FTA Partners consultations were held.
This was a symbolic event because it was the first ministerial meeting that included only ASEAN
and its FTA partners, hence the United States was not included. Before this, a substantial
discussion on RCEP was conducted at ASEAN forums. EAS, which includes the United States,
simply took note of the progress being made. The newly created forum among ASEAN and its
FTA partners was thereafter used to discuss RCEP.

In November 2012, ASEAN and its FTA partners formally agreed to launch RCEP negotiations. At
the same time, ASEAN and its FTA partners decided upon the Guiding Principles and Objectives
for Negotiating the RCEP. It is important to note that economies without an FTA with ASEAN
(such as the United States) cannot participate in RCEP negotiations.19 In other words, having
signed an FTA with ASEAN is the precondition for participation in RCEP negotiations. Thus,
participation in RCEP negotiations is not open. The Guiding Principle and Objectives state:

Any ASEAN FTA Partner that did not participate in the RCEP negotiations at the
outset would be allowed to join the negotiations, subject to terms and conditions
that would be agreed with all other participating countries (Principle 6).

The progress made in 2011 regarding the trilateral PRC–Japan–Republic of Korea FTA, known
as the CJK FTA, also deserves attention. At the trilateral summit in October 2009, the three
economies agreed to launch a study on the CJK FTA with an original completion date before the
end of 2012. However, at the trilateral summit in May 2011, the leaders of the three economies
agreed to speed up the study so that it could be finished before the end of 2011. (The final study
group was held in December 2011.) Then, at the trilateral summit meeting in Bali on 19 November
2011, which was held before the completion of the accelerated study, the three leaders agreed to
start CJK FTA negotiations as soon as possible.20

19
Any other ASEAN economic partner can participate in RCEP only after the completion of RCEP negotiations,
using the accession clause to be included in the RCEP agreement (Principle 6).
20
The launch of negotiations for the CJK FTA was formally announced at the trilateral summit in November 2012.
12 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

The question is why the PRC and Japan suddenly pursued this cooperative effort, especially
in 2011. It is plausible that the PRC wanted to speed up the processes of CJK FTA and RCEP
negotiations to compete with TPP. For the PRC, control of membership (the establishment of an
East Asian framework without the United States) is a higher priority than control of the agenda.
In fact, it agreed to include investment in the RCEP negotiations. It seems that the PRC has
become more confident about its economic power compared to when it proposed EAFTA in
2004, no longer believing that the inclusion of investment and services would ruin its leadership
status vis-à-vis Japan. At the same time, Japan’s principal goal in supporting RCEP was to
effectively use the “PRC card” with the United States when its participation in TPP was at stake.

It is unclear if these joint efforts between the PRC and Japan are a temporary phenomenon.
Both parties wanted the launch of RCEP negotiations at a critical stage of TPP negotiations. It is
likely that the PRC will continue to make efforts to establish RCEP as soon as possible in order
to compete with TPP. However, for Japan, it was necessary to use the “PRC card” to get informal
the United States approval for its participation in TPP. But now, Japan is already participating in
TPP negotiations (For further analysis of Japan’s strategy regarding RCEP, see Section VI).

5.3 Future participation in RCEP

What type of accession rule will be employed in the final RCEP text remains to be seen. While the
guiding principles and objectives for RCEP state that it will have an accession clause, it is naive
to expect that RCEP will follow open accession rules. As mentioned above, even participation in
ongoing RCEP negotiations is fairly exclusive; unless economies have an FTA with ASEAN, they
are not allowed to participate in the negotiations.

One important feature of RCEP is its emphasis on developmental issues. The Guiding Principles
state:

“Taking into consideration the different levels of development of the participating

countries, the RCEP will include appropriate forms of flexibility including
provision for special and differential treatment, plus additional flexibility to the
least-developed ASEAN Member States.” This implies that developing, but
not developed, country latecomers will receive some favorable treatment upon
accession.

6. Analysis of Strategies of Key Players

6.1 The United States and the People’s Republic of China

The United States strategy in the Asia-Pacific is to establish an ambitious regional framework
that reflects its interests and includes an accession clause. TPP is likely to become such a device.
It is reasonable to conclude that the United States is attempting to tame latecomers, especially
the PRC, through the accession process. As a Financial Times editorial suggests, from the United
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 13

States perspective, “TPP is a club for anyone but [the People’s Republic of] China” and “[the
People’s Republic of] China will feel obliged to mend its errant (behavior)” if it wants to become
a member. However, whether the PRC decides to join TPP is a separate issue.

The PRC’s strategy is to establish a regional framework that does not include the United States
so it can hold a dominant position. While it also preferred to exclude India from the ASEAN+6
framework (Panda 2014), India’s involvement is not as problematic as the involvement of the
United States in terms of competition for leadership. Japan is another rival within RCEP; it
seems that the PRC attempted to supersede Japan by controlling the (goods-centric) agenda.
RCEP is an attempt to establish an alternative trade forum to TPP, one that emphasizes flexibility
for developing economies and that is less ambitious than TPP. For developing economies,
participation in RCEP may be easier than in TPP. Since the PRC wants RCEP to materialize as
soon as possible in order to compete with the United States-led TPP, and Japanese participation
is key to the success of RCEP, the PRC agreed to include issues for negotiation that Japan has
a strong interest in such as investment and intellectual property. It is not known if the PRC will
invite the United States to join RCEP, but it is likely that it will insist that RCEP is open to any
economy, including the United States , only after the details of RCEP are determined. Regarding
TPP, while participation in it may accelerate domestic economic reforms, it is unlikely that big
developing economies like the PRC will decide to be “socialized” through the TPP accession
process.

6.2 Japan

Japan’s strategy regarding TPP and RCEP is interesting. It seems that Japan is using the “PRC
card” to improve its TPP negotiation position vis-à-vis the United States . In August 2011, when
Japan’s participation in TPP was in question, Japan and the PRC jointly proposed a modality for
East Asian cooperation that paved the way for the proposal of RCEP. Japan formally expressed
its interest in TPP at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Honolulu on 13 November 2011. Four days
later, RCEP was proposed at the ASEAN Summit, and such progress was noted at the East Asia
Summit (which includes the United States ) on 19 November 2011. This implies that despite
their past disagreements the PRC and Japan agreed on the value of launching RCEP at a critical
stage of TPP negotiations. In addition, at the meeting in Bali on 19 November 2011, leaders
from the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea agreed to launch negotiations on the CJK
FTA as soon as possible. What is interesting is that this agreement was made even before the
scheduled completion of the study on CJK FTA in December 2011. (This scheduled completion
date was already moved up from December 2012.) Moreover, on 20 November 2012, RCEP
negotiations were formally launched. On the same day, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
met President Obama and asked the United States to support Japan’s TPP participation. These
are examples of Japan’s effective use of the “PRC card” with the United States . The unspoken
message is: “if you make Japan’s participation in TPP difficult, we will resort to partnering with
the PRC.” Furthermore, in February 2014, the Japanese minister in charge of TPP negotiations
expressed his view that Japan had the option of withdrawing from negotiations if the United
States continued making demanding requests for tariff reductions on sensitive products.
14 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

After Japan secured a seat at the TPP negotiating table, it seems to have resumed playing the
agenda-setting game vis-à-vis the PRC and RCEP negotiations. In fact, at the third RCEP meeting
in January 2014, it was decided that new Working Groups on competition, intellectual property,
economic and technical cooperation, and dispute settlement would be established. These are
issues that Japan, not the PRC, had been insisting be included in RCEP negotiations. Japan wants
strong discipline enforced in the areas of investment and intellectual property, with violations
subject to dispute settlement rather than case-by-case political bargaining. In short, Japan is
using the “TPP card” to strengthen its RCEP negotiating position vis-à-vis the PRC.

6.3 Other Important Players: ASEAN, the Republic of Korea, and India

TPP and RCEP are likely to have a variety of impacts on ASEAN. On the one hand, the rivalry
between the PRC-led RCEP and the United States-led TPP makes ASEAN more important
as a regional institution. In particular, RCEP recognizes “ASEAN centrality,”21 though this is
conveniently interpreted by the PRC to exclude the United States since it does not have an
FTA with ASEAN. On the other hand, ASEAN’s centrality would not be assured inside RCEP,
where it could possibly be sidelined by larger and more powerful economies such as the PRC
and Japan (Kassim 2012, Cheong and Tongzon 2013). In the case of TPP, little attention is paid
to ASEAN centrality and only some ASEAN members are involved in TPP negotiations at this
stage. Second, ASEAN solidarity would be affected. The two competing proposals could divide
ASEAN. Although it is unlikely that ASEAN will become divided into pro-RCEP and pro-TPP
groups, some economies will have dual membership (e.g. Singapore and Malaysia), while others
are only a member of one. In addition, some ASEAN members view the two projects from an
economic perspective, while others see them from a security angle, given ongoing maritime
disputes with the PRC (Panda 2014).

The Republic of Korea is in a unique position as it has FTAs with many RCEP and TPP members,
including the United States, but not with Japan. Thus, the economic impacts of RCEP and TPP
may not be very significant for the Republic of Korea, but it can play an important catalytic
role in shaping the outcome of the two projects (Petri 2013). Regarding RCEP, its membership
preference is similar to the PRC’s: the Republic of Korea wants an agreement among ASEAN+3
first with others joining only after institutions have been set up (Cheong 2013). It is reasonable to
conclude that the Republic of Korea’s interests would be better served if the negotiating parties
were limited. However, an RCEP among ASEAN+3, which is likely to be goods-centric, might not
be that beneficial to the Republic of Korea. Regarding TPP, it seems that the economy’s position
changed after Japan began participating in TPP negotiations. While it is unclear if an FTA with
Japan in the form of TPP would be beneficial to the Republic of Korea, the government feels
it is necessary to participate in TPP negotiations in order to maintain a level playing field for
Korean industries vis-à-vis those of Japan. An ambitious TPP that is rules-based and offers little

21
Despite casual usage, the exact meaning of “ASEAN centrality” is unclear. Petri and Plummer (2013) made an
important contribution to identifying this concept.
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 15

flexibility to members would seem to be a beneficial outcome for the Republic of Korea, given
the level of sophistication of its industries (Petri 2013). However, even if the Republic of Korea
decides to join TPP, it is very unlikely that it could influence the agenda.22

India is a part of the RCEP negotiating process and it has supported the idea of RCEP from the
beginning. It sees three major benefits of getting involved in RCEP: (i) an increased presence
in Southeast and East Asian markets, (ii) closer relations with ASEAN as an institution, and
(iii) increased connectivity with North Asia and Oceania (Panda 2014). India is unlikely to join
TPP in its current form because it compels members to amend their rules and norms with regard
to climate change, the environment, and human rights (ibid). Therefore, India would not be
comfortable being “socialized” by TPP accession.

7. Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)

The idea of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) originally came from the APEC
Business Advisory Council (ABAC), which submitted a proposal to the APEC Leaders’ Meeting
in November 2004 in Santiago. The proposal failed to win support because some leaders
expressed concerns over it.23 However, the United States shifted its position to support FTAAP
in 2006 and the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in November 2006 in Ha Noi supported the idea of
FTAAP as a long-term project.24 The tone of the statement was weakened because of concerns
expressed by Asian economies, including the PRC, despite US enthusiasm for FTAAP (Sagawara
2007). This implies that the PRC was careful to avoid a situation in which the United States
could tame Asian economies through FTAAP. The United States soon discovered that the
realization of FTAAP would be difficult and instead decided in 2008 to pursue TPP (Aggarwal
and Koo 2013, p. 12), suggesting that the exclude-and-invite strategy of TPP would be easier for
the United States to manage than potential FTAAP negotiations that would include the PRC
from the outset.

On the other hand, both TPP and RCEP (whether as ASEAN+3 or +6) are recognized as steps
toward FTAAP. The APEC Leader’s Declaration in 2010 states:

We will take concrete steps toward realization of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP), which is a major instrument to further APEC’s regional economic
integration agenda. An FTAAP should be pursued as a comprehensive free trade

22
This may not be a serious problem because the Republic of Korea–United States FTA is the template for the TPP.
However, the Republic of Korea’s non-involvement in substantial stages of negotiations and its acceptance of what
has been agreed upon by TPP12 could lead to political criticism of the government.
23
The Santiago Declaration simply states that ABAC proposed FTAAP to APEC.
24
The Ha Noi Declaration states “we shared the [ABAC’s] views that while there are practical difficulties in
negotiating [FTAAP] at this time, it would nonetheless be timely for APEC to seriously consider more effective
avenues towards trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore … we instructed Officials
to undertake further studies on ways and means to promote regional economic integration, including [FTAAP] as
a long-term prospect, and report to the 2007 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Australia.”
16 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

agreement by developing and building on ongoing regional undertakings, such

as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others.

At this stage, the relationship between TPP and RCEP in the context of FTAAP is unclear. There
are at least three possibilities to consider (Hamanaka 2012b, Petri 2013):

(i) Consolidation. A new FTAAP is eventually created and existing agreements signed by
subsets of FTAAP members (including TPP and RCEP) will eventually be suspended.

(ii) Expansion. Either TPP or RCEP evolves into FTAAP that covers all APEC members through
accession, which dominates the other integration project.

(iii) Co-existence. Both TPP and RCEP continue to exist and each becomes a component of
FTAAP.25 Neither dominates the other.

Consolidation is simply not a realistic idea at this stage. In particular, the suspension of existing
agreements, which is the final stage of the consolidation process, seems to be problematic
(Hamanaka 2012b). Expansion through an accession clause is what both the United States
and the PRC are attempting to achieve through TPP and RCEP. However, whether others want
to join and apply for membership is beyond the control of the two economies. Since other
economies have the chance to choose their “boss,” the two candidates are expected to behave
benevolently so that their preferred mechanism is chosen. If there is no boss supported by the
majority of countries in the region, then TPP and RCEP will continue to co-exist. In this case,
both the United States and the PRC would become the boss in a smaller group, with neither as
the leader of FTAAP.

8. Conclusion
The formation of regional economic groupings can be best understood as a competition for
control of both membership and the agenda. The control of membership, especially the exclusion
of rival states, is important for a potential leader seeking to assume leadership of a group. Control
of the agenda is necessary for a potential leader to assume leadership in negotiations because
power depends on the issue areas included to a certain degree.

It seems relevant to consider regionalism as a project led by an economy that seeks some
exclusive influence. Neither TPP nor RCEP are exceptions. The United States and the PRC
seek to exclude one another from TPP and RCEP, respectively, so that a convenient agenda can
be set. Thus, it is wrong to overemphasize the openness of these proposed agreements. Even
participation in ongoing TPP negotiations is not easy; it is subject to prior bilateral negotiations
with incumbents and their approval. Latecomers also need to accept disadvantageous
negotiation modalities and endure unfavorable requests set by incumbents. Since TPP is likely

25
There is also a possibility that another new integration project other than TPP and RCEP will become FTAAP.
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 17

to be a bundle of bilateral agreements rather than a real plurilateral agreement (there will be
no common concession that is applicable to all TPP partners), future applicants will need to
negotiate their terms of participation on a case-by-case basis, not only in terms of what to offer
incumbents but also what is to be offered by incumbents. The high level of ambition of TPP and
the lack of developmental considerations will make it difficult for developing economies to join.
And while the future RCEP agreement is likely to have an accession clause, it seems it will be a
relatively closed club as participation in ongoing RCEP negotiations is open only to countries
that have an FTA with ASEAN.

The perspective of exclusion explains the actual development of TPP and RCEP to a degree. The
United States and the PRC both attempt to exclude each other from their preferred regional
framework so that asserting control of the regional agenda becomes easier. However, at the same
time, their initiatives need the support of other countries: the United States and the PRC need
to be chosen by others as the boss in order for their preferred regional initiative to prosper and
dominate the other. In particular, Japan’s support is critical for TPP and RCEP to be successful,
which is exactly the source of Japan’s bargaining power. Japan is using the “PRC card” in TPP
negotiations vis-à-vis the US and the “TPP card” in RCEP negotiations vis-à-vis the PRC.

The most likely future scenario is one of co-existence between TPP and RCEP. Neither can
dominate the other for two reasons. First, neither the United States nor the PRC seem willing to
give up the chance to tame latecomers through accession, though RCEP is likely to treat latecomer
developing countries better than TPP will. Developing countries that feel uncomfortable with the
socialization process of either agreement are unlikely to apply for membership. This is especially
true for TPP, which is a device of the US to tame latecomers. Second, the country whose
initiative wins less support than the other is subsequently likely to behave more benevolently to
win additional support.
18 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

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 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 21

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by Michael G. Plummer

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by Pradumna B. Rana

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Monetary Future” by Michael G. Plummer and Ganeshan Wignaraja

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by Charles Adams

17. “Real and Financial Integration in East Asia” by Soyoung Kim and Jong-Wha Lee

18. “Global Financial Turmoil: Impact and Challenges for Asia’s Financial Systems”
by Jong-Wha Lee and Cyn-Young Park

19. “Cambodia’s Persistent Dollarization: Causes and Policy Options” by Jayant Menon

20. “Welfare Implications of International Financial Integration” by Jong-Wha Lee

and Kwanho Shin

21. “Is the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) an Optimal Free Trade Area?”
by Donghyun Park, Innwon Park, and Gemma Esther B. Estrada

22. “India’s Bond Market—Developments and Challenges Ahead” by Stephen Wells

and Lotte Schou- Zibell

23. “Commodity Prices and Monetary Policy in Emerging East Asia” by Hsiao Chink Tang

24. “Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?” by Jong-Wha Lee and Ju Hyun Pyun

25. “Aging in Asia: Trends, Impacts, and Responses” by Jayant Menon and
Anna Melendez-Nakamura

26. “Re-considering Asian Financial Regionalism in the 1990s” by Shintaro Hamanaka

27. “Managing Success in Viet Nam: Macroeconomic Consequences of Large Capital Inflows
with Limited Policy Tools” by Jayant Menon

28. “The Building Block versus Stumbling Block Debate of Regionalism: From the Perspective
of Service Trade Liberalization in Asia” by Shintaro Hamanaka

29. “East Asian and European Economic Integration: A Comparative Analysis”

by Giovanni Capannelli and Carlo Filippini

30. “Promoting Trade and Investment in India’s Northeastern Region” by M. Govinda Rao
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 23

31. “Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling” by Soyoung Kim, Jong-Wha Lee,

and Cyn-Young Park

32. “India’s Role in South Asia Trade and Investment Integration” by Rajiv Kumar
and Manjeeta Singh

33. “Developing Indicators for Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation”

by Giovanni Capannelli, Jong-Wha Lee, and Peter Petri

34. “Beyond the Crisis: Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Asia” by Chee Sung Lee
and Cyn-Young Park

35. “Regional Economic Impacts of Cross-Border Infrastructure: A General Equilibrium

Application to Thailand and Lao People’s Democratic Republic” by Peter Warr,
Jayant Menon, and Arief Anshory Yusuf

36. “Exchange Rate Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Global Financial Crisis”
by Warwick J. McKibbin and Waranya Pim Chanthapun

37. “Roads for Asian Integration: Measuring ADB’s Contribution to the Asian Highway
Network” by Srinivasa Madhur, Ganeshan Wignaraja, and Peter Darjes

38. “The Financial Crisis and Money Markets in Emerging Asia” by Robert Rigg and Lotte
Schou-Zibell

39. “Complements or Substitutes? Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization at the

Sectoral Level” by Mitsuyo Ando, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Christian Volpe Martincus

40. “Regulatory Reforms for Improving the Business Environment in Selected Asian
Economies—How Monitoring and Comparative Benchmarking can Provide Incentive for
Reform” by Lotte Schou-Zibell and Srinivasa Madhur

41. “Global Production Sharing, Trade Patterns, and Determinants of Trade Flows in East Asia”
by Prema-chandra Athukorala and Jayant Menon

42. “Regionalism Cycle in Asia (-Pacific): A Game Theory Approach to the Rise and Fall of
Asian Regional Institutions” by Shintaro Hamanaka

43. “A Macroprudential Framework for Monitoring and Examining Financial Soundness”

by Lotte Schou-Zibell, Jose Ramon Albert, and Lei Lei Song

44. “A Macroprudential Framework for the Early Detection of Banking Problems in Emerging
Economies” by Claudio Loser, Miguel Kiguel, and David Mermelstein
24 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

45. “The 2008 Financial Crisis and Potential Output in Asia: Impact and Policy Implications”
by Cyn-Young Park, Ruperto Majuca, and Josef Yap

46. “Do Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Agreements Increase Trade? A Panel Data Analysis”
by Jung Hur, Joseph Alba, and Donghyun Park

47. “Does a Leapfrogging Growth Strategy Raise Growth Rate? Some International Evidence”
by Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, and Anna Wong

48. “Crises in Asia: Recovery and Policy Responses” by Kiseok Hong and Hsiao Chink Tang

49. “A New Multi-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Regional Integration: Regional

Integration Evaluation (RIE) Methodology” by Donghyun Park and Mario Arturo Ruiz
Estrada

50. “Regional Surveillance for East Asia: How Can It Be Designed to Complement Global
Surveillance?” by Shinji Takagi

51. “Poverty Impacts of Government Expenditure from Natural Resource Revenues”

by Peter Warr, Jayant Menon, and Arief Anshory Yusuf

52. “Methods for Ex Ante Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements” by David Cheong

53. “The Role of Membership Rules in Regional Organizations” by Judith Kelley

54. “The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia” by V.V. Desai

55. “Trade Facilitation Measures under Free Trade Agreements: Are They Discriminatory
against Non-Members?” by Shintaro Hamanaka, Aiken Tafgar, and Dorothea Lazaro

56. “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia: Regionalization or Globalization?”
by Prema-chandra Athukorala

57. “Global Financial Regulatory Reforms: Implications for Developing Asia”

by Douglas W. Arner and Cyn-Young Park

58. “Asia’s Contribution to Global Rebalancing” by Charles Adams, Hoe Yun Jeong, and Cyn-
Young Park

59. “Methods for Ex Post Economic Evaluation of Free Trade Agreements” by David Cheong

60. “Responding to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Meeting the Challenges in Asia”
by Douglas W. Arner and Lotte Schou-Zibell
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 25

61. “Shaping New Regionalism in the Pacific Islands: Back to the Future?” by Satish Chand

62. “Organizing the Wider East Asia Region” by Christopher M. Dent

63. “Labour and Grassroots Civic Interests In Regional Institutions” by Helen E.S. Nesadurai

64. “Institutional Design of Regional Integration: Balancing Delegation and Representation”

by Simon Hix

65. “Regional Judicial Institutions and Economic Cooperation: Lessons for Asia?”
by Erik Voeten

66. “The Awakening Chinese Economy: Macro and Terms of Trade Impacts on 10 Major Asia-
Pacific Countries” by Yin Hua Mai, Philip Adams, Peter Dixon, and Jayant Menon

67. “Institutional Parameters of a Region-Wide Economic Agreement in Asia: Examination of

Trans-Pacific Partnership and ASEAN+a Free Trade Agreement Approaches”
by Shintaro Hamanaka

68. “Evolving Asian Power Balances and Alternate Conceptions for Building Regional
Institutions” by Yong Wang

69. “ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures, and the Future”
by Hal Hill and Jayant Menon

70. “Changing Impact of Fiscal Policy on Selected ASEAN Countries”

by Hsiao Chink Tang, Philip Liu, and Eddie C. Cheung

71. “The Organizational Architecture of the Asia-Pacific: Insights from the New
Institutionalism” by Stephan Haggard

72. “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Financial Markets in Small Open Economies:
More or Less Effective During the Global Financial Crisis?”
by Steven Pennings, Arief Ramayandi, and Hsiao Chink Tang

73. “What do Asian Countries Want the Seat at the High Table for? G20 as a New Global
Economic Governance Forum and the Role of Asia” by Yoon Je Cho

74. “Asia’s Strategic Participation in the Group of 20 for Global Economic Governance
Reform: From the Perspective of International Trade” by Taeho Bark and Moonsung Kang

75. “ASEAN’s Free Trade Agreements with the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis” by Gemma Estrada,
Donghyun Park, Innwon Park, and Soonchan Park
26 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

76. “ASEAN-5 Macroeconomic Forecasting Using a GVAR Model”

by Fei Han and Thiam Hee Ng

77. “Early Warning Systems in the Republic of Korea: Experiences, Lessons, and Future Steps”
by Hyungmin Jung and Hoe Yun Jeong

78. “Trade and Investment in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Remaining Challenges and the
Unfinished Policy Agenda” by Jayant Menon and Anna Cassandra Melendez

79. “Financial Integration in Emerging Asia: Challenges and Prospects” by Cyn-Young Park
and Jong-Wha Lee

80. “Sequencing Regionalism: Theory, European Practice, and Lessons for Asia”
by Richard E. Baldwin

81. “Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation”

by C. Randall Henning

82. “Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States”
by Amitav Acharya

83. “The People’s Republic of China and India: Commercial Policies in the Giants”
by Ganeshan Wignaraja

84. “What Drives Different Types of Capital Flows and Their Volatilities?”
by Rogelio Mercado and Cyn-Young Park

85. “Institution Building for African Regionalism” by Gilbert M. Khadiagala

86. “Impediments to Growth of the Garment and Food Industries in Cambodia:

Exploring Potential Benefits of the ASEAN-PRC FTA” by Vannarith Chheang
and Shintaro Hamanaka

87. “The Role of the People’s Republic of China in International Fragmentation and
Production Networks: An Empirical Investigation” by Hyun-Hoon Lee, Donghyun Park,
and Jing Wang

88. “Utilizing the Multiple Mirror Technique to Assess the Quality of Cambodian Trade
Statistics” by Shintaro Hamanaka

89. “Is Technical Assistance under Free Trade Agreements WTO-Plus?” A Review of Japan–
ASEAN Economic Partnership Agreements” by Shintaro Hamanaka
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 27

90. “Intra-Asia Exchange Rate Volatility and Intra-Asia Trade: Evidence by Type of Goods”
by Hsiao Chink Tang

91. “Is Trade in Asia Really Integrating?” by Shintaro Hamanaka

92. “The PRC’s Free Trade Agreements with ASEAN, Japan, and the Republic of Korea:
A Comparative Analysis” by Gemma Estrada, Donghyun Park, Innwon Park,
and Soonchan Park

93. “Assessing the Resilience of ASEAN Banking Systems: The Case of the Philippines”
by Jose Ramon Albert and Thiam Hee Ng

94. “Strengthening the Financial System and Mobilizing Savings to Support More Balanced
Growth in ASEAN+3” by A. Noy Siackhachanh

95. ”Measuring Commodity-Level Trade Costs in Asia: The Basis for Effective Trade
Facilitation Policies in the Region” by Shintaro Hamanaka and Romana Domingo

96. “Why do Imports Fall More than Exports Especially During Crises? Evidence from Selected
Asian Economies” by Hsiao Chink Tang

97. “Determinants of Local Currency Bonds and Foreign Holdings: Implications for Bond
Market Development in the People’s Republic of China” by Kee-Hong Bae

98. “ASEAN–China Free Trade Area and the Competitiveness of Local Industries: A Case
Study of Major Industries in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic” by Leebeer
Leebouapao, Sthabandith Insisienmay, and Vanthana Nolintha

99. “The Impact of ACFTA on People’s Republic of China-ASEAN Trade: Estimates Based
on an Extended Gravity Model for Component Trade” by Yu Sheng, Hsiao Chink Tang,
and Xinpeng Xu

100. “Narrowing the Development Divide in ASEAN: The Role of Policy” by Jayant Menon

101. “Different Types of Firms, Products, and Directions of Trade: The Case of the People’s
Republic of China” by Hyun-Hoon Lee, Donghyun Park, and Jing Wang

102. “Anatomy of South–South FTAs in Asia: Comparisons with Africa, Latin America, and the
Pacific Islands” by Shintaro Hamanaka

103. “Japan’s Education Services Imports: Branch Campus or Subsidiary Campus?”

by Shintaro Hamanaka
28 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

104. “A New Regime of SME Finance in Emerging Asia: Empowering Growth-Oriented SMEs to
Build Resilient National Economies” by Shigehiro Shinozaki

105. “Critical Review of East Asia – South America Trade ” by Shintaro Hamanaka
and Aiken Tafgar

106. “The Threat of Financial Contagion to Emerging Asia’s Local Bond Markets: Spillovers
from Global Crises” by Iwan J. Azis, Sabyasachi Mitra, Anthony Baluga, and Roselle Dime

107. “Hot Money Flows, Commodity Price Cycles, and Financial Repression in the US and
the People’s Republic of China: The Consequences of Near Zero US Interest Rates”
by Ronald McKinnon and Zhao Liu

108. “Cross-Regional Comparison of Trade Integration: The Case of Services”

by Shintaro Hamanaka

109. “Preferential and Non-Preferential Approaches to Trade Liberalization in East Asia:

What Differences Do Utilization Rates and Reciprocity Make?” by Jayant Menon

110. “Can Global Value Chains Effectively Serve Regional Economic Development in Asia?”
by Hans-Peter Brunner

111. “Exporting and Innovation: Theory and Firm-Level Evidence from the People’s Republic of
China” by Faqin Lin and Hsiao Chink Tang

112. “Supporting the Growth and Spread of International Production Networks in Asia: How
Can Trade Policy Help?” by Jayant Menon

113. “On the Use of FTAs: A Review of Research Methodologies” by Shintaro Hamanaka

114. “The People’s Republic of China’s Financial Policy and Regional Cooperation in the Midst
of Global Headwinds” by Iwan J. Azis

115. “The Role of International Trade in Employment Growth in Micro- and Small Enterprises:
Evidence from Developing Asia” by Jens Krüger

116. “Impact of Euro Zone Financial Shocks on Southeast Asian Economies”

by Jayant Menon and Thiam Hee Ng

117. “What is Economic Corridor Development and What Can It Achieve in Asia’s
Subregions?” by Hans-Peter Brunner
 TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting | 29

118. “The Financial Role of East Asian Economies in Global Imbalances: An Econometric
Assessment of Developments after the Global Financial Crisis” by Hyun-Hoon Lee
and Donghyun Park

119. “Learning by Exporting: Evidence from India” by Apoorva Gupta, Ila Patnaik, and Ajay Shah

120. “FDI Technology Spillovers and Spatial Diffusion in the People’s Republic of China”
by Mi Lin and Yum K. Kwan

121. “Capital Market Financing for SMEs: A Growing Need in Emerging Asia”
by Shigehiro Shinozaki

122. “Terms of Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Development: A Case of Intra-Asian
Kicking Away the Ladder?” by Konstantin M. Wacker, Philipp Grosskurth,
and Tabea Lakemann

123. “Can Low Interest Rates be Harmful: An Assessment of the Bank Risk-Taking Channel in
Asia” by Arief Ramayandi, Umang Rawat, and Hsiao Chink Tang

124. “Explaining Foreign Holdings of Asia’s Debt Securities” by Charles Yuji Horioka, Takaaki
Nomoto, and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara

125. “South Caucasus–People’s Republic of China Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: Why It
Matters” by Hasmik Hovhanesian and Heghine Manasyan

126. “Enlargement of Economic Framework in Southeast Asia and Trade Flows in Lao PDR”
by Sithanonxay Suvannaphakdy, Hsiao Chink Tang, and Alisa DiCaprio

127. “The End of Grand Expectations: Monetary and Financial Integration After the Crisis in
Europe” by Heribert Dieter

128. “The Investment Version of the Asian Noodle Bowl: The Proliferation of International
Investment Agreements (IIAs)” by Julien Chaisse and Shintaro Hamanaka

129. “Why Do Countries Enter into Preferential Agreements on Trade in Services?: Assessing
the Potential for Negotiated Regulatory Convergence in Asian Services Markets”
by Pierre Sauvé and Anirudh Shingal

130. “Analysis of Informal Obstacles to Cross-Border Economic Activity between Kazakhstan

and Uzbekistan” by Roman Vakulchuk and Farrrukh Irnazarov

131. “The Nexus between Anti-Dumping Petitions and Exports during the Global Financial
Crisis: Evidence on the People’s Republic of China” by Faqin Lin, Hsiao Chink Tang,
and Lin Wang
30 | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146

132. “Study of Non-Notified Trade Agreements to WTO: The Case of Asia-Pacific”

by Shintaro Hamanaka

133. “Equity Home Bias Financial Integration and Regulatory Reforms” by Cyn-Young Park
and Rogelio V. Mercado, Jr.

134. “Financial Monitoring in New ASEAN5 Countries” by Se Hee Lim and Noel G. Reyes

135. “Has Regional Integration Led to Greater Risk-Sharing in Asia?” by Thiam Hee Ng
and Damaris Lee Yarcia

136. “How Capital Flows Affect Economy-Wide Vulnerability and Inequality: Flow-of-Funds
Analysis of Selected Asian Economies” by Iwan J. Azis and Damaris Yarcia

137. “The Progress of Paperless Trade in Asia and the Pacific: Enabling International Supply
Chain Integration” by Sung Heun Ha and Sang Won Lim

138. “ World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Facilitation: Assessing the Level of
Ambition and Likely Impacts” by Shintaro Hamanaka

139. “ Business Cycle Synchronization in Asia: The Role of Financial and Trade Linkages” by
Yuwen Dai

140. “ From Spaghetti Bowl to Jigsaw Puzzle? Addressing the Disarray in the World Trade
System” by Jayant Menon

141. “Trade Policy Challenges in a Small, Open, Fragile, Postconflict Economy: Cambodia”
by Hil Hill and Jayant Menon

142. “Global Value-Chains and Connectivity in Developing Asia with Application to the Central
and West Asian Region” by Richard Pomfret and Patricia Sourdin

143. “Modern Services Export Performances among Emerging and Developed Asian
Economies” by Shahbaz Nasir and Kaliappa Kalirajan

144. “ASEAN Commercial Policy: A Rare Case of Outward-Looking Regional Integration”

by Hal Hill and Jayant Menon

145. “The ASEAN Economy in the Regional Context: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy
Options” by Giovanni Capannelli

*These papers can be downloaded from

(ARIC) [Link] section=0&subsection=workingpapers or
(ADB) [Link]
Trans-Pacific Partnership versus Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership:
Control of Membership and Agenda Setting

The distinct feature of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is its exclusion of the People’s Republic of
China, and that of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is its exclusion of the
US. This paper analyzes TPP and RCEP from two angles: (i) control of membership and (ii) control
of agenda.

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ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing
member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the
region’s many successes, it remains home to approximately two-thirds of the world’s poor:
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sustainable growth, and regional integration.

Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main instruments
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guarantees, grants, and technical assistance.

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