CASE STUDY
TOFAN SINGH VERSUS STATE OF TAMIL
NADU,[2020] 12 S.C.R. 583
BHARTIYA SAKSHAYA ADHINIYAM
SUBMITTED TO- SUBMITTED BY-
PROFESSOR SABINA SALIM. PRIYANKA DHIR
UILS, PANJAB UNIVERSITY ROLL NO.- 128/21
SECTION-C
SEMESTER- 7
[Link](HONS)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my warm gratitude towards the almighty who provided
me with such a fortunate opportunity to study this respective course at UILS, PU.
I will thank my Professor SABINA SALIM who guided me to make this project
report on such a knowledgeable topic. Secondly, I would thank my parents who
provided me with the resources required to complete this project report I will also
thank my siblings and friends who helped me in completing the said project on
time.
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INDEX
SNO. TOPIC PAGE NUMBER
1 INTRODUCTION 5
2 FACTS OF THE CASE 6
3 JUDGMENT BY THE 7
TRIAL COURT
4 JUDGMENT BY THE 8
HIGH COURT
5 JUDGMENT BY THE 8-17
SUPREME COURT
6 CASE REFERRED TO 11-16
LARGER BENCH
7 DISSENTING 16-17
OPINION
8 ANALYSIS OF THE 17
JUDGMENT
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INTRODUCTION
The case of Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu1, deals with provisions of the Indian Evidence
Act/Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,2023 and Narcotics Drugs And Psychotropic
Substances,1985. The Judgment explains about the Police officer or it actually defines about
the police officers. The judgment was given in 2020 as it arises out of many other cases which
demanded the police officer to be defined as per the Narcotics Drugs And Psychotropic
Substances Act,1985. The case was heard by the three judge bench comprising of Justices.
[Link], Naveen Sinha and Indira Banerjee. The majority judgment was given by the
Justices R.F. Nariman and Naveen Sinha, whereas the dissenting opinion was given by the
Justice Indira Banerjee. This case can be said as one of the important judgment delivered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, because it goes on explaining about “whether the officer
who is investigating under the Narcotics Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act,1985, is a
police officer or not, and admissibility of the confession given to him.
1
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 583
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FACTS OF THE CASE
Mr. L.S. Aruldoss, NCB officer received information on 23 October 2004 that a resident of
Nanganallur Chennai, namely Prem alias Kannan alias Sudeshwaran was procuring narcotics
from Guddusingh a Rajasthan resident, with the assistance of Bapulal from Chennai, at about
9:00 pm. Bapulal and Kannan were supposed to leave in a white ambassador automobile and
when they arrived in Chennai. Kannan was supposed to transfer heroin to Sri Lanka. Mr L.S.
discussed the intelligence with his superiors and proceeded with the case after receiving the
green signal Mr. L.S., together with the other cops, one sepoy and a driver left for the area of
the incident on October 24, 2004, and intercepted the aforementioned white ambassador car.
There were a total of 6 passengers and 2 drivers and the appellant was in the front with Bapulal,
Guddusingh and Kannan in the back.
Following a police investigation, people at the backhanded out a green bag containing 5 kg of
heroin. The drivers were permitted to leave, but the remainder were all arrested for violating
the NDPS Act. Mr Murugam took down the statement of the apprehended accused and the
appellant admitted to the crime.
After the Investigation was completed, the charges against the accused were made under
sections – 8(c), 21(c), 28 ,29, 27A of the NDPS Act.
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JUDGMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court, after considering all the facts pronounced the judgments on December 18 2009.
The trial court held that the contraband which was apprehended by the officers in the middle
of the operation indicated that the trafficking was not successful and that the accused were
acquitted of charges under section 282 of the NDPS act. The Trial Court stated - . “In so far as
the charge under Section 28 of the NDPS Act is concerned, the trial court held that the said
charge was not proved against the accused persons, in as much as at the stage of preparation
to commit the offence of illegal export of contraband, the car was intercepted and search and
seizure conducted which resulted in the recovery of the contraband. As such, the accused
persons were apprehended in the middle of the operation and since the attempt to commit the
offence of export had not yet begun, it could not be said that the accused persons had committed
any act which could be considered as a step towards the commission of offence of export of the
contraband. The accused persons were, thus, acquitted of the charge under Section 28 of the
NDPS Act.”3
The trial court also acquitted the accused from the charge of section 27A of the NDPS Act4, as
the there was no oral and documentary evidences against the accused to convict him under this
section.
However, after convicting the accused persons under section 8(c), 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS
act, the court sentenced them to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of rupees 1 lakhs,
as well as another year of harsh imprisonment of the appellant all of which were to be served
consecutively.
2
Punishment for attempts to commit offences- Whoever attempts to commit any offence punishable under this
Chapter or to cause such offence to be committed and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of
the offence shall be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence.
3
TOFAN SINGH V STATE OF TAMIL NADU, (2013) 9 S.C.R 962
4
Punishment for financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders- Whoever indulges in financing, directly or
indirectly, any, of the activities specified in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of 2[ clause (viiib) of section 2] or harbours any
person engaged in any of the aforementioned activities, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine
which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:
Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh
rupees.]
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JUDGMENT BY THE HIGH COURT
The appellant who was unhappy and offended by the trial court’s decision filed an appeal in
the Madras High Court, which was dismissed on June 18, 2012.
The High Court framed six questions and answered on it in the judgment which are as follows:
(i)Whether Section 50 of NDPS Act is complied with or not?
(ii) Whether the provision of Section 42 of NDPS Act is complied with or not?
(iii) Whether non-examination of drivers and non seizure of vehicle/ car are fatal to the case of
the prosecution?
(iv) Whether Section 675 statement of the accused is reliable?
(v) Whether Accused No. 2 is entitled to invoke Section 30 of NDPS Act?
(vi) Whether conviction and sentence passed by the trial court is sustainable.
The high court held against the appellants and the punishment given by the trial court was
continued by the High Court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the high court the appellants
challenged the said judgment in the Supreme Court.
JUDGMENT BY THE SUPREME COURT
The appeal was admitted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and a division bench of [Link]
and [Link] took up the case for hearing.
Arguments by the Appellant:
There was no mention of the appellant in the intelligence Mr. Aruldoss received and his name
was not revealed anywhere.
5
Power to call for information, etc.-Any officer referred to in section 42 who is authorised in this behalf by the
Central Government or a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the
contravention of any provision of this Act,--
(a) call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any
contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder;
(b) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry;
(c) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
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The appellant was located seated in front, not in the back, with the other defendants on the day
of occurrence.
The narcotics were passed over to Mr Aruldoss by people in the back, thus neither the appellant
nor the respondent had them.
The raiding party discovered rupees 680 in the custody of the appellants herein, together with
two second-class train tickets from Shamgarh to Chennai.
There was no evidence of a phone connection between the other accused and the appellant.
The prosecution case is based primarily on the appellant's confessional statement, which was
reportedly recorded by Mr Murugam, who also served as the case’s investigating officer.
The NDPS Act section 67 gives no authority to record confessions or significant evidence that
could lead to a conviction.
Arguments by the Respondents:
The appellant made a voluntary confession admitting to his role in the crime commission. He
admitted to transporting 5.25 kilogram of heroine from Rajasthan to Chennai with co-accused
Badrilal Sharma who was dressed in an RPF uniform until they arrived in Nelore. Andhra
Pradesh. Following that Guddu Singh and Bapulal Jain drive them to Chennai in the car.
However, they were apprehended by officials along the route.
The NDPS Act sections 42, 53 and 67 do not prevent an officer authorised by the act from
conducting a search, seizure, investigation or enquiry into the matter.
Badrilal Sharma, who travelled with the accused/appellant, made a confessional statement that
was recorded.
Badrilal Sharma’s ID card and the appellant’s and Badrilal Sharma’s Railway tickets were both
on record because they travelled together. All of the data demonstrates that the appellant had
5.25 kg of heroin in his hands and was transporting it from Rajasthan to Chennai and then to
Sri Lanka.
After hearing the arguments of both the sides the court concluded that the appellants challenged
the conviction on the grounds which are as follows:
The conviction is based solely on the purported confessional statement recorded under Section
67 of the NDPS Act which has no evidentiary value in as much as:
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• The statement was given to and recorded by an officer who is to be treated as "Police
Officer" and is thus, hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.
• No such confessional statement could be recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
This provision empowers to call for information and not to record such confessional
statements. Thus, the statement recorded under this provision is akin to the statement
under Section 161 [Link]/180BNSS
• In any case, the said statement having been retracted, it could not have been the basis
of conviction and could be used only to corroborate other evidence.
• There was absence of fair investigation and noncompliance of the provisions of Section
52(3) of the NDPS Act. This submission is primarily based on the argument that same
person cannot be an officer under Section 42 of the NDPS Act as well as investigating
officer under Section 52 of the said Act.
• Non-compliance of Section 57 of the NDPS Act was also challenged.
After going through the grounds the court framed certain issues and pronounced the verdict on
it. The issues are as follows:
ISSUES-
1. Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act section 67 would
qualify as a police officer or not?
2. Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement under Section 161/180 BNSS of
the Code or it partakes the character of statement under Section 164 of the Code/183
BNSS?
The division judge bench heard arguments on the both the issues but they could not reach to
the final conclusion after the arguments were completed because there were various aspects
related to the question whether the officer investigating is the police officer or not? The bench
discusses about the test to determine whether an officer is a police officer for the purpose of
section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act/ 23 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam6 viz the influence
6
Confession to police officer- (1) No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person
accused of any offence
(2) No confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate shall be proved against him:
Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, may be proved.
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or authority that an officer is capable of exercising over a person from whom the confession
has been obtained. So, finally the bench stated in paragraph 34 of the judgement-
“The term "police officer" has not been defined under the Code or in the Evidence Act and,
therefore, the meaning ought to assessed not by equating the powers of the officer sought to be
equated with a police officer but from the power he possesses from the perception of the
common public to assess his capacity to influence, pressure or coercion on persons who are
searched, detained or arrested. The influence exercised has to be, assessed from the
consequences that a person is likely to suffer in view of the provisions of the Act under which
he is being booked. It, therefore, follows that a police officer is one who:-
(i} is considered to be a police officer in "common parlance" keeping into focus the
consequences provided under the Act.
(ii} is capable of exercising influence or authority over a person from whom a confession is
obtained.”7
But the bench did not find the answer to its question that whether the investigating officer will
be the police officer or not? So, the judges decided to refer the matter before the larger bench
which could adjudicate upon this issue along with the second issue. The bench along with this
also granted the bail to the accused as he has already undergone the sentence of more than 9
years out of the sentence of 10 years which was given to him. The appellant was released on
bail after furnishing the security of 50,000 rupees.
CASE REFERRED TO LARGER BENCH
The case was referred to the larger bench and a three judge bench consisting of Justices R.F.
NARMIAN, NAVEEN SINHA AND INDIRA BANARJEE, was constituted to hear the matter
and adjudicate upon the issues. The Hon’ble Bench delivered the verdict in 2:1 in which J.
INDIRA BANARJEE gave the dissenting opinion.
The bench framed three issues to adjudicate upon which were as follows:
1. What are the provisions for the protection of Fundamental Rights of an accused held
under the NDPS act?
7
TOFAN SINGH V STATE OF TAMIL NADU, (2013) 9 S.C.R 962
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2. Whether an officer who is empowered under the NDPS Act is a police officer or not
according to the S.25 Indian Evidence Act/ S.23 Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam?
3. What is the Scope of the power conferred on these officers under section 67 of the
NDPS Act? Does the power to collect information under section 67 extend the power
to record a confession?
ISSUE 1
What are the provisions for the protection of Fundamental Rights of an accused held
under the NDPS act?
The judgment authored by J. R.F. Nariman, in paragraph 27 stated the acts like NDPS
has several sections which are extremely drastic and draconian in nature. The judgment
also stated that the interpretation of such statutes must be in conformity and in tune with
the spirit of the fundamental rights, it should not incriminate oneself, and right to
privacy of the person. The articles 20(3) and 21 are given pride place in the constitution.
The court highlighted the importance of privacy referring to foreign landmark cases
like
Semayne case8-is that it decided that every man’s home is his castle and fortress for his
defence against injury and violence, as well as for his repose
Huckle v. Money9- in which it was held that Magistrates cannot exercise arbitrary
powers which violated the Magna Carta (signed by King John, conceding certain rights
to his barons in 1215), and if they did, exemplary damages must be given for the same
Entick v. Carrington10- Lord Camden held that an illegal search warrant was
“subversive of all the comforts of society” and the issuance of such a warrant for the
seizure of all of a man’s papers, and not only those alleged to be criminal in nature,
was “contrary to the genius of the law of England”
The court also referred to landmark Indian Judgments related to privacy and article 20(3)11
such KS Puttuswamy and Selvi etc.
8
[ 77 ER 194]
9
[Huckle v. Money 95 ER 768]
10
[Entick v. Carrington 95 ER 807]
11
No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
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In the judgment of Justice KS Puttaswamy and Anothers v Union of India12, the court while
explaining the right to privacy according to Indian context stated that it covers three aspects-
Privacy that involves the person i.e. when there is some invasion by the State of a person's
rights relatable to his physical body, such as the right to move freely;
• Informational privacy which does not deal with a person's body but deals with a person's
mind, and therefore recognises that an individual may have control over the dissemination of
material that is personal to him. Unauthorised use of such information may, therefore lead to
infringement of this right; and
• The privacy of choice, which protects an individual's autonomy over fundamental personal
choices.
The court also referred to the judgment of Selvi vs state of Karnataka13 which broadened the
scope of article 20(3) and privacy. The court noted through the judgment that the results
obtained through involuntary narco analysis test or polygraph test attracts the protective shield
of article 20(3).
Confessions under section 25 of the INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT/ 23 OF THE BHARTIYA
SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM.
Interpretation of Accused in Section 25 of Evidence Act is different from that in Art 20(3). The
case of Deoman Upadhaya14 and Agnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar15 and were referred to
highlight the difference which showed that:
PARA 33 A formal accusation is necessary for invoking the protection under Article 20(3), the
same would be irrelevant for invoking the protection under section 25 of the Evidence Act.
PARA 34 Section 26 of the Evidence Act extends the protection to confessional statements
made by persons while “in the custody” of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate
presence of a Magistrate. “Custody” is not synonymous with “arrest”, as has been held in a
number of judgments of this Court custody could refer to a situation pre-arrest, as was the case
in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Dinesh Kumar16.
12
(2017) 10 SCC 1
13
(2010) 7 SCC 263
14
State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1961) 1 SCR 14.
15
(1966) 1 SCR 134
16
(2008) 3 SCC 222
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ISSUE 2
Whether an officer who is empowered under the NDPS Act is a police officer or not
according to the S.25 Indian Evidence Act/ S.23 Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam?
In this case the court held extending this analysis to the officers under the NDPS Act, the Court
held that officers appointed under/for purposes stated in S.42 and 53 of the Act are indeed
police officers. The language of S. 53(1) is crystal clear, and invests the officers with the powers
of “an officer-in-charge of a police station for the investigation of the offences under this Act”.
Such an officer can, by a legal fiction, be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station,
or can be given the powers of an officer in charge of a police station to investigate the offences
under the NDPS Act. If such officers were not deemed to be police officers, it would infringe
on the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution as the accused would be subjected
to a differential and unfair treatment during their trial and conviction, as compared to persons
accused under other legislations.
Who is a Police officer?
Subba Rao, J. in Thomas Dana’s case17 had the dissenting opinion but made a neat division
of “police officer” into three categories which is still followed.
(i) A police officer who is a member of the police force constituted under the Police
Act;
(ii) Though not a member of the police force constituted under the Police Act, an
officer who by statutory fiction is deemed to be a police officer in charge of a police
station under the Code of Criminal Procedure; and
(iii) An officer on whom a statute confers powers and imposes duties of a police officer
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, without describing him as a police officer
or equating him by fiction to such an officer.
The golden thread running through all these decisions – some of these being decisions of five-
Judge Benches which are binding upon us – beginning with Barkat Ram18 is that where limited
powers of investigation are given to officers primarily or predominantly for some purpose other
than the prevention and detection of crime, such persons cannot be said to be police officers
under section 25 of the Evidence Act. What must be remembered is the discussion in Barkat
Ram that a “police officer” does not have to be a police officer in the narrow sense of being
17
[(1959) Supp (1) SCR 274, 289]
18
State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (1962) 3 SCR 338
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a person who is a police officer so designated attached to a police station. The broad view has
been accepted, and never dissented from, in all the aforesaid judgments, namely, that where a
person who is not a police officer properly so-called is invested with all powers of investigation,
which culminates in the filing of a police report, such officers can be said to be police officers
within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as when they prevent and detect crime,
they are in a position to extort confessions, and thus are able to achieve their object through a
shortcut method of extracting involuntary confessions.”
After referring to sections 41, 42, 43, 44, 52, 52A and 57 of the NDPS Act, the Court concluded
that these powers are more or less similar to the powers conferred on customs officers under
the Customs Act, 1962. The Court then concluded:
The investigation which so commences must be concluded, without unnecessary delay, by the
submission of a report under Section 173 of the Code/193 BNSS to the concerned Magistrate
in the prescribed form. Any person on whom power to investigate under Chapter XII is
conferred can be said to be a ‘police officer’, no matter by what name he is called. The
nomenclature is not important, the content of the power he exercises is the determinative
factor.”
Section (36-A of NDPS Act) makes it clear that if the investigation is conducted by the police,
it would conclude in a police report but if the investigation is made by an officer of any other
department including the DRI, the Special Court would take cognizance of the offence upon a
formal complaint made by such authorised officer of the concerned government.
The Hon’ble Justice writing the judgment highlighted that it is important to state that we do
not accept the submission of Shri S.K. Jain that the “complaint” referred to in section 36A(1)(d)
refers only to section 59 of the NDPS Act. A complaint can be made by a designated officer
qua offences which arise under the NDPS Act – it is not circumscribed by a provision which
requires previous sanction for an offence committed under section 58, as that would do violence
to the plain language of section 36A(1)(d).
Lastly, when it is clear that the expression “police officers” does not only mean a police officer
who belongs to the State police force, but includes officers who may belong to other
departments, such as the Department of Excise in Raja Ram Jaiswal19, who are otherwise
invested with all powers of investigation so as to attract the provisions of section 25 of the
Evidence Act. Further, if the distinction between police officer as narrowly defined and the
officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau is something that is to be stressed, then any
19
RAJA RAM JAISWAL V STATE OF BIHAR (1964) 2 SCR 752.
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interpretation which would whittle down the fundamental rights of an accused based solely on
the designation of a particular officer, would fall foul of Article 14, as the classification between
the two types of officers would have no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question, which is the prevention and detection of crime.
ISSUE 3
What is the Scope of the power conferred on these officers under section 67 of the NDPS
Act? Does the power to collect information under section 67 extend the power to record
a confession?
Since the officers who are invested with powers under S. 53 of the NDPS Act are “police
officers” within the meaning of S. 25 of the Evidence Act, any confessional statement made to
them would be barred under the provisions of S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken
into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act. Corollary to the above, any
statement recorded under S.67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in
the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.
For the said reasons, the Court in its majority opinion arrived at the conclusion that a
confessional statement made before an officer designated under S. 42 or 53 cannot be used to
convict a person under the NDPS Act as they will be hit by S. 25 of the Evidence Act.
Furthermore, using them as substantive evidence would be a direct infringement of the
constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21of the Constitution of India.
DISSENTING OPINION
The Dissenting Opinion of the Judgment was given Hon’ble Justice Indira Banerjee. She in her
judgment stated that she is unable to persuade herself to agree that officers who are invested
with the powers of the investigation under the NDPS are Police Officers within the meaning of
the section 25 of The Indian Evidence Act/section 23 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam.
According to her any confessional statement made to them would not be barred under the
section 25/26 of the Evidence act/23(1)/23(2) of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam. She also
made observation that “Police Reports made after completing an investigation under section
173 of the [Link]/193 BNSS, will be applicable to inquiries and investigations under the
statute.” However, in the case of Statute like NDPS where the provisions of the CRPC/BNSS
do not apply to any inquiry/investigation, except as provided therein, it cannot be held that the
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officer has the powers of the police officers to file report under 173CRPC/[Link] NDPS
act does not contain the provison for filing a report in a court of law which is similar to the
Police Report under section 173CRPC/193BNSS. She also noted that while right to fair trial
by an impartial court/tribunal is the human right under Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and an essential part of the Fundamental Rights at the same time.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT
The judgment Tofan Singh is one of the judgment which can protect the person accused under
NDPS Act. It defines about the “Police Officer” which was the need of the hour under this act.
In the statutes like this sometimes authorities tends to misuse their powers which goes against
the accused even if he is innocent. The judgment states that the investigating officer under the
act comes under the category of police officer which means that any confession recorded by
him is not admissible in the court which is great sigh of relief for the person who are accused
under this act because the confession recorded by the police is admitted tends to go against the
accused. The judgment can also be appreciated because it protects the right to life of a person
as it protects the person from undergoing the tortures which are committed by the police upon
them to record their confession. The judgment also upheld the essence of article 20(3) of the
Indian Constitution because it protects the person from the self-incrimination against
himself/herself. The judgment put the grip on the powers of the authorities which they might
use in a wrong manner violating the right of fair trial of the accused. The court also overruled
two of its previous judgments which were- Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India20, in this case, the
Supreme Court had previously held that statements made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act
were admissible as confessions, even without corroboration. The Tofan Singh ruling rejected
this approach, emphasizing that these statements should not be treated as confessions due to
the protections under Section 25 of the Evidence Act/23 Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam .Raj
Kumar Karwal v. Union of India21, the Court in this case held that NDPS officers were not
considered "police officers" under the Evidence Act, making confessions to them admissible.
The Tofan Singh judgment overruled this, affirming that NDPS officers should indeed be
considered police officers for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act/23 Bhartiya
Sakshya Adhiniyam, and gave new interpretation to the law as per the time and the need.
20
(2008) 4 SCC 668
21
(1990) 2 SCC 409
17 | P a g e
CONCLUSION
The judgment in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020) is a landmark decision by the
Supreme Court of India, with profound implications for the enforcement of the Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). It addressed the admissibility of
confessions made to officers empowered under the NDPS Act and clarified the role of
constitutional safeguards in criminal proceedings.
The central issue in this case was whether a statement recorded by an officer under Section 67 of
the NDPS Act could be treated as a "confession" and used as substantive evidence to convict an
accused. The Court concluded that officers empowered under the NDPS Act are "police
officers" for the purposes of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Consequently, any
confession made to such officers is inadmissible as evidence in a court of law.
This ruling is anchored in the constitutional protection against self-incrimination guaranteed
under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. It emphasizes that no individual should be
compelled to be a witness against themselves and that the right to silence is fundamental to a fair
trial. By extending these protections to proceedings under the NDPS Act, the judgment
underscores that the severity of the offence cannot justify a compromise on fundamental rights.
The decision has had a significant impact on the prosecution of drug-related offences. Until this
judgment, confessions recorded by officers under Section 67 were often the primary basis for
convictions. The Court's ruling mandates that guilt must now be established through
independent and corroborative evidence, ensuring that convictions are based on a fair evaluation
of admissible evidence rather than solely on self-incriminatory statements.
While the NDPS Act is a stringent law aimed at combating the menace of drug trafficking and
abuse, the Court recognized that its enforcement must not come at the cost of individual liberties
and constitutional guarantees. The judgment strikes a crucial balance, ensuring that the
procedural safeguards inherent in a fair trial are not undermined by the aggressive enforcement
of special laws.
Critics have raised concerns that the decision could make it more challenging for law
enforcement agencies to secure convictions under the NDPS Act. However, the judgment does
not weaken the law but strengthens its implementation by demanding a higher standard of
evidence and ensuring the rights of the accused are protected. It aligns with the principle that the
ends of justice cannot justify unconstitutional means.
In conclusion, the Tofan Singh judgment is a milestone in Indian jurisprudence. It reinforces the
foundational values of the justice system, where fairness, due process, and protection of
constitutional rights take precedence, even in the face of serious crimes. By invalidating the use
of confessions to NDPS officers as evidence, the Court has reasserted the importance of human
rights and the rule of law, setting a precedent that will guide future interpretations of similar
statutory provisions. This decision serves as a reminder that even the most stringent laws must
operate within the framework of constitutional morality and justice.
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