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Mind-Body Problem: Dualism vs. Physicalism

The document discusses the 'Mind-Body Problem', focusing on dualism and physicalism, with a group consensus that physicalism is the least plausible theory. It highlights thought experiments like 'Philosophical Zombies' and 'Mary’s Room', exploring the implications of consciousness and subjective experiences. The author expresses a desire to further explore the concept of Qualia and its impact on understanding experience and reality.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
8 views3 pages

Mind-Body Problem: Dualism vs. Physicalism

The document discusses the 'Mind-Body Problem', focusing on dualism and physicalism, with a group consensus that physicalism is the least plausible theory. It highlights thought experiments like 'Philosophical Zombies' and 'Mary’s Room', exploring the implications of consciousness and subjective experiences. The author expresses a desire to further explore the concept of Qualia and its impact on understanding experience and reality.

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dmzorilla2006
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We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Reflective Task

The Topic:

This week's topic was the ‘Mind-Body Problem’ acknowledging the nature of mental

substances. In the lecture, we looked at the burning question of “what is meant by

‘mental’ and ‘physical’?”, which we developed into the argument of dualism and

physicalism. Dualism explores that the mind and body are two separate substances

and that our minds cannot be fully explained in physical terms. In contrast,

physicalism states that minds and bodies are fully explainable in physical terms.

In our table groups, we discussed which theory of mind was more or least plausible,

and why. We all had different opinions; some had concluded that neither was more

or less plausible due to the argument of interaction whereas, in Descartes’s

Cartesian dualism, mental events cannot cause/are not connected to physical

events. This became a large influence on my decision as I originally sided with

dualism in the lecture when the concepts were first introduced to us. Others in my

group sided with functionalism as it considers how the body's conscious mind and

behaviour interact and how cognitive processes imply that mental states, as opposed

to bodily functions, govern an individual's behaviour.

However, something we all agreed on was that physicalism was the least plausible

theory of the mind, simply because we all believed that not all characteristics and

aspects of the conscious mind can be fully explained in physical terms, which is

highlighted in the thought experiment of ‘Philosophical Zombies’.


The discussion:

In the lecture, the thought experiments ‘Philosophical Zombies’ (Chalmers, 2017)

and ‘Mary’s Room’ (Jackson, 1986) were introduced to us. My group took a

particular interest in Mary’s Room (Jackson, 1986) as we simply could not

comprehend how Mary could specialise in the neurophysiology of vision and all the

physical information on how the body reacts to colour and more, when she herself

hasn’t experienced it. We discussed how the process of learning requires an

individual to have experienced the concept themselves to truly understand and

become an expert on the topic. We strongly agreed with the question, “If Mary was

given a coloured television or ripe tomato, would she learn anything?” as it allows

her to have her own practical experiences of her theoretical studies.

On the contrary, the class had some initial disagreements in terms of Philosophical

Zombies (Chalmers, 2017). Some believed that a clone of every inch and atom of

themselves would create a human being despite its lack of experience or Qualia

(Chalmers, 2017). Others disagreed and expressed that experience and Qualia are

actually what creates a human, because without experience how does a human

learn and become an individual? This topic piqued my interest the most as the

possibility of pretending to have Qualia while acting out physical experiences and

processes (Chalmers, 2017) made me sit and think to myself about my

consciousness and individualism. Without separate experiences, in theory, we would

all just… be the same. Our experiences allow us as individuals to be individual and

differ from each other. In conclusion, it was decided that, as humans, we simply

cannot comprehend these Zombies for the reason that we cannot comprehend not

being conscious.
Reflection and extension:

I would have liked to explore the concept of Qualia further as Qualia raised the

question of consciousness itself to me as I do not truly understand the theory. This

question is interesting to me and allows me to get a greater understanding of the

concept of Qualia itself and general questions of subjective experiences and reality.

“What implications does Qualia have for our understanding of experience and

reality?”. This question explores the ideas philosophers have been consistently

interested in, for instance, consciousness. I think this question could also be really

interesting if it was brought up when we discussed Philosophical Zombies

(Chalmers, 2017) as we could compare Chalmers's idea and the concept of Qualia,

piquing interest about the role of our experiences and reality in our answers. Both

Qualia and Philosophical Zombies (Chalmers, 2017) challenge a physicist's

interpretation of consciousness, examining these concepts together confronts the

limited physical explanations of consciousness, allowing us to also question the

importance Qualia has on our experience and reality, no matter which theory of mind

we side with.

Word count: 704

Chalmers, D. (2017). Zombies On the Web [Link]

Jackson. F. (1986). The Journal of Philosophy: What Mary Didn’t Know Journal of

Philosophy [Link]

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