1

ECONOMICS
PROJECT

IMPACT OF
REFUGEES ON THE
ECONOMY

JOHANNA LIZA BINU

12 I

2024-25

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ACKNOWLEDEGEME
NT

I would like to express my sincere

gratitude to all those who have
contributed to the successful completion
of this project.
My deepest thanks to Ms. Renuka for
their invaluable guidance, support, and
encouragement throughout this
endeavor.
I also wish to extend my appreciation to
my classmates and colleagues for their
constructive feedback and collaboration.
Special thanks to my family and friends
for their unwavering support and
understanding. This project would not
have been possible without the
collective effort and assistance of
everyone involved.

Last but not least I would like to

thank God for his blessings and
protection.

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INDEX
[Link] Topic
1. Aim of the Project
2. Introduction
3. Concept (Positive & Negative Impact)
4. I. The Synthetic Model: Estimations
and Findings
5. Figures
6. II. Descriptive Analysis
7. 2.1 Data on the Locals
8. 2.2 general assessment of the findings
pertaining to locals
9. 2.3 data on the Syrians
10. 2.4 general assessment of the findings
pertaining to the Syrians
11. Conclusion
12. Bibliography

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AIM OF THE
PROJECT
1. Analyze the economic effects of
Syrian refugees in Turkey.

2. Measure and assess the locals’

perceptions regarding the effects of
refugees on various variables.

3. Examine the socio-economic impact

of Covid-19 on Syrian refugees in
Turkey.

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INTRODUCTION
Refugees pose a massive moral, political and
economic challenge for potential host countries.
The scale of the challenge is larger than ever, with
more than 120 million people being forcibly
displaced worldwide as a result of persecution,
conflict, violence or human rights violations. War
in Syria has produced more refugees than any
other conflict of the past two decades: around 4.6
million have fled the country, with an additional
7.6 million internally displaced. About 2.5 million
Syrians have
found refuge in Turkey, making it the largest
refugee-hosting country worldwide.
This project aims to analyze the effects of Syrian
refugees on economic and social variables such as
unemployment, wages, inflation (specifically food
prices and rent), health,
and education services in Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis
and Şanlıurfa.
Firstly, the project estimates the time paths of the
variables in all of the nine cities if Syrian refugees
had not come to Turkey and compares it with the
actual time paths on the basis of a synthetic
model. The difference between estimated and
actual time paths reflects the effects of the Syrian
refugees.
Secondly, the project analyzes the economic and
social effects of the Syrian refugees descriptively
on the basis of questionnaires conducted with

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locals and refugees in Gaziantep,

Hatay, Kilis and Şanlıurfa.

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CONCEPT
From an economic perspective, we should expect
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and household
incomes of the host country to grow because of
the refugee inflow. In the short-term, inhabited
areas that are suddenly populated with refugees,
such as refugee camps, experience GDP growth
because the refugees receive aid and consume
goods and services in a place that previously had
no income or consumption. In already-populated
areas, like urban areas, GDP will also grow as
income and consumption grow with the arrival of
the new population. This is simply a statistical
outcome resulting from the fact that there are
more people (refugees and aid workers) and more
money (international aid and government
spending) in a particular geographical area.
In the medium-term, we should also see local
household incomes grow. With the population
increase and the aid and government spending,
local consumption will rise, leading to a boost in
local production and sales of goods and services.
The presence of refugees in the labor market
could potentially reduce labor costs for employers,
particularly if they work informally. As a
result, local landlords, entrepreneurs, producers,
and suppliers of goods and services are likely to
experience a surge in income, which can lead to
an expansion of their businesses and an overall
growth in household income. In economic terms,
these are referred to as “expansionary effects”
of the economy.

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What about any negative effects?

In the short-term, areas that suddenly become
home to refugees may experience resource strain
and environmental degradation, which can derail
local development. In urban areas, the influx of
refugees may lead to water and electricity
shortages, causing higher costs for both the
refugees and the host community, overcrowding of
services such as health and education, increased
traffic and pollution, and competition for jobs and
housing. These factors can result in
unemployment, a surge in inflation, create
tension, and increase social and economic
disparities.

In the medium-term, the negative distributional

effects may become evident. While some locals
may experience economic gains, others may be
displaced or lose their jobs due to increased

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competition. These negative impacts are likely to

affect the most vulnerable members of the
community, including women, youth, low-skilled
and informal workers, and those living in
degraded and marginal areas.

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I. THE SYNTHETIC MODEL:

ESTIMATION AND
FINDINGS

The synthetic control method provides a

systematic way to estimate the “counter factual.” 1
In this section, we investigate the application of
the synthetic control method to estimate the
economic effects of Syrian refugees in Gaziantep,
Hatay, Kilis, Şanlıurfa and Adana.

1.1. The Model

Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)2, we
utilize the synthetic control method to estimate
selected economic
variables in five Turkish provinces.
We try to answer the following counter factual
question: What would have happened to the
economy in these nine provinces if there had been
no Syrian refugees in Turkey and if there had
been no civil war in Syria?

1
thinking about what did not happen but could
have happened, or relating to this kind of thinking

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2
Two economists who conducted a study using the
synthetic model method. ’The Economic Costs of Conflict:
A Case Study of the Basque Country’

1.2. The Findings

1.2.1. Gaziantep

The empirical findings of the model for Gaziantep

can be summarized as follows:
• Net migration rate would, on average, be 0,4
percentage points higher (per year) if there were
no Syrian refugees. This finding implies that
Gaziantep has attracted less people than it would
have if there were no Syrian refugees. It also
implies that there might have been a significant
level of emigration from Gaziantep.
• Imports would, on average, be 10 % lower (per
year) if there were no Syrian refugees.

• Exports would, on average, be 18 % lower (per

year) if there were no Syrian refugees.

• These findings about imports and exports

indicate that Gaziantep has been positively
affected from Syrian refugees
in terms of both exports and trade balance
(export- import).

• Number of students per teacher would, on

average, be 19 % lower (per year) if there were no
Syrian refugees. This
result implies that class sizes have increased (on
average from 3-5 students) after Syrian refugee
entry.

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• Total house sales would, on average, be 12 %

lower (per year) if there were no Syrian refugees.
This result implies that house sales have increased
after Syrian refugee influx.
• Inflation would, on average, be 2,1 percentage
points lower (per year) if there were no Syrian
refugees. This finding
implies that prices (on average) have increased
significantly in Gaziantep.
1.2.2. Hatay

The empirical findings of the model for Hatay can

be summarized as follows:

• Net migration rate would, on average, be 0,25

percentage points higher (per year) if there were
no Syrian refugees.
This finding implies that Hatay has also attracted
less people than it would have if there were no
Syrian refugees. It also implies that there might
have been a substantial level of emigration from
Hatay.
• Imports would, on average, be same if there
were no Syrian refugees.
• Exports would, on average, be 24 % higher (per
year) if there were no Syrian refugees.

• Hatay has been adversely affected from Syrian

refugees in terms of both exports and trade
balance.
• Number of students per teacher would, on
average, be 5 % lower (per year) if there were no
Syrian refugees. This

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result implies that class sizes have increased (on

average 1 students per class) after Syrian refugee
entry.

• No significant change has occurred in total

house sales in Hatay.

• Inflation would, on average, be 1,8 percentage

points lower (per year) if there were no Syrian
refugees. This finding implies that prices (on
average) have
increased significantly in Hatay similar to
Gaziantep.

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1.2.3. Şanlıurfa
The empirical findings of the model for Şanlıurfa
can be summarized as follows:

• Net migration rate would, on average, be 0,52

percentage points higher (per year) if there were
no Syrian refugees. Similar to Hatay and
Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa has also attracted less people
than it would have if there were no Syrian
refugees. Also, it implies the existence of
emigration from Şanlıurfa.

• Imports would, on average, be 39 % higher (per

year) if there were no Syrian refugees.

• Exports would, on average, be 45 % higher (per

year) if there were no Syrian refugees.

• Similar to Hatay, Şanlıurfa has been adversely

affected from Syrian refugees in terms of both
exports and trade balance. The negative effect on
exports is highly
significant in percentage terms (45 %).

• Number of students per teacher would, on

average, be 14 % lower (per year) if there were no
Syrian refugees. This
result implies that class sizes have increased (on
average 2-3 students per class) after Syrian
refugee entry.

• Total house sales would, on average, be 11 %

lower (per year) if there were no Syrian refugees.
This result implies that house sales have increased
after Syrian refugees’ influx.

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• Inflation would, on average, be 1,4 percentage

points lower (per year) if there were no Syrian
refugees. This finding implies that, similar to
Gaziantep and Hatay prices (on average) have
increased significantly in Şanlıurfa.

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1.2.4. Kilis

The empirical findings of the model for Kilis can

be summarized as follows:
• Net migration rate would, on average, be 0,51
percentage points higher (per year) if there were
no Syrian refugees.
Kilis has also attracted less people than it would
have if there were no Syrian refugees, and there
might have been a
considerable level of emigration from Kilis.

• Imports would, on average, be 55 % higher (per

year) if there were no Syrian refugees.

• Exports would, on average, be 68 % higher (per

year) if there were no Syrian refugees.

• Similar to Şanlıurfa, Kilis has adversely been

affected from Syrian refugees in terms of both
exports and trade balance.
The negative effect on exports is very high in
percentage terms (68 %).

• Number of students per teacher would, on

average, be 13 % lower (per year) if there were no
Syrian refugees. This
result implies that class sizes have increased (on
average 2 to 3 students per class) due to Syrian
refugees.

• Total house sales would, on average, be 6 %

lower (per year) if there were no Syrian refugees.
That is, total house
sales have increased after Syrian refugee entry.

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• Inflation would, on average, be 1 percentage

points lower (per year) if there were no Syrian
refugees. This finding
implies that prices (on average) have increased
significantly in Kilis.

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1.3. General Assessment

Table 1 provides the results of the synthetic
control method for 5 provinces.
Table 1. Comparison of the Model Results across
Provinces

Net Impor Expor No. Of Total Inflatio

Migrati ts ts Student Hous n
on Rate s/ e
Teacher Sales
Gaziant +0.40% -10% -18% -19% -12% -2.1%
ep
Hatay +0.25% 0% +24% -5% 0% -1.8%
Şanlıurf +0.52% +39% +45% -14% -11% -1.4%
a
Kilis +0.51% +55% +68% -13% -6% -1.0%

Note: “+” sign implies that related variable would

be higher if there were no Syrian refugee entry to
Turkey.
Similarly, “-“ sign implies that related variable
would be lower if there were no Syrian refugee
entry to Turkey.
“0%” implies that there would be no significant
change if there were no Syrian refugee entry to
Turkey.
Figures 1 to 6 also depict the effects of Syrian
refugees on the net migration rate, imports,
exports, number of students per teacher, total
house sales, and inflation,
respectively. Similar to the Table 1, positive
(negative) values in the figures imply that related
variable would be higher (lower) if there were no

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Syrian refugee entry to Turkey. Zero value implies

that there would be no change.

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FIGURES

Figure 1. Net Migration Rate (%)

Figure 2. Imports (%)

Figure 3. Exports (%)

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Figure 4. Number of Students per Teacher (%)

Figure 5. Total House Sales (%)

Figure 6. Inflation (%)

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II. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

In order to understand better the dynamics and

findings of the synthetic model, the study also
looked at the economic impact of the refugees in
selected provinces.

The first step in this part of the study was to

conduct face to face interviews with locals to
evaluate the economic, security, social, and
cultural effects of Syrian refugees in Gaziantep,
Hatay, Kilis, and Şanlıurfa. Questionnaires
included 24 questions on economic, security,
social, and cultural factors. Sample sizes were
63 interviewees in Gaziantep, 94 in Hatay, 35 in
Kilis, and 101 in Şanlıurfa.

In this section of the report we analyze sixteen

questions assembled to assess the effects of
refugees on labor market, food prices, rents,
health services, education services,
and emigration in each of the four cities
considered.

We also conducted face to face interviews with

Syrians outside the cam-sin (camps in?) order to
collect information about their education level,
work status, wage rate, expenditures on food and
rent, and if their children get education.

In case of Syrians, our sample includes 46

interviewees in Gaziantep, 68 in Hatay, 31 in Kilis,
and 49 in Şanlıurfa. The
questionnaire we conducted with Syrians includes
18 questions.

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It must be emphasized that although the

descriptive statistics are very important to
present the data in a more meaningful way,
descriptive statistics do not allow us to make
conclusions beyond the data we have
gathered, or reach definite conclusions.

Descriptive analysis basically summarizes data

and enables us to visualize patterns that might
emerge from the data. It also helps us to present
distribution or spread of the variables under
investigation.

It must also be mentioned that our sampling

processes in cases of both locals and refugees
are likely to be biased, considering the usual
problems inherent in this kind of statistical
research that is based on a small sample size.
In what follows we present our findings for locals
and
Syrians, respectively.

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2.1. Data on the Locals

1. One of the most important effects of refugees

occurs in the labor market in terms of job loss.
Graph 1A and Graph 1B show the percentage of
job loss and if those who lost their jobs blame
refugees for their job loss.

Graph 1A. Job Loss Rate (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 91, Kilis: 35, and Urfa: 101

Graph 1B. Job Loss-Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 5, Hatay: 15, Kilis: 2, and Urfa: 14

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As it can be seen from the graphs, job loss rate is

lowest in Kilis, however, both of the respondents
who lost their jobs blame refugees for losing their
jobs. In cases of the other three cities, as the rate
of losing jobs increases, the blame on refugees
also intensifies. Because the latest data on
provincial unemployment rate announced by TSI is
for 2011, it is not possible to substantiate the
perceptions of the interviewees with the data.

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2. A second effect of refugees on labor market is

the decline in wage rate.
Graph 2A and Graph 2B represent the perceptions
of the rate of decline in wages and the link
between decline in wage rate and existence of
refugees in the labor market, respectively.

Graph 2A. Decline in Wage Rate (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 47, Hatay: 65, Kilis: 19, and Urfa: 83

Graph 2B. Wage decline - Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 93, Kilis: 35, and Urfa: 101

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As it can be seen from Graphs 2A and 2B,

approximately half of the interviewees in all four
cities believe that the decline in wage rate is
between 26-50%. In addition,
nearly one-third in Urfa and Hatay, 40% in
Gaziantep, and over 50% of interviewees in Kilis
perceive the rate of decline as 1 to 25%. On the
other hand, while approximately four-fifths of
interviewees in Urfa, Hatay, and Gaziantep link
the decline to refugees, only half of them in Kilis
blame
refugees for the decline. Because we do not have
data on provincial wage rates by TSI, it is not
possible to substantiate the perceptions of the
interviewees with the
data. On the other hand, since refugees have
increased the labor supply, and they work
informally, we can argue that there might have
been a significant wage rate decline, especially in
informal sectors.

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3. A third consequence of refugees on labor

market is the rising risk of losing jobs for locals.
Graph 3 reflects to what extent locals link the rise
in risk of losing jobs to refugees.

Graph 3. Risk of Losing Job - Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 44, Hatay: 72, Kilis: 33, and Urfa: 82
Although the job loss rate in Gaziantep is not as
high as it is in Hatay and Urfa, half of interviewees
who have not lost their jobs since the refugees’
influx started to think that risk of losing their job
increased. In Hatay and Urfa where the job loss
rate is the highest, only about one-fourth of
interviewees believe that there is a rise in the risk
of losing their jobs. While the job loss rate is the
lowest in Kilis, about 40% of those who have not
lost their jobs believe that the risk of losing their
jobs has risen. The risk of losing job increases as
the unemployment rate increases. Therefore, to be
able to substantiate the perceived increase in the
risk of losing job by the locals, we need
unemployment data. Since we claim that
unemployment rate in informal sectors might have
increased, we can also argue that the risk of losing

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jobs might have increased in those sectors where

it is possible for the Syrians to get informal jobs.

4. Increase in food prices is taken as another

important effect of refugees on the locals.
Graph 4A and Graph 4B reflect the perception of
the rate of increase in food prices and the link
between rise in food prices and the existence of
refugees.

Graph 4A. Increase in Food Prices (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 44, Hatay: 63, Kilis: 26, and Urfa: 62

Graph 4B. Food Price Increase - Refugees Link (%)

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Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 93, Kilis: 35, and Urfa: 101

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In Gaziantep, about one-third of interviewees

think that the rate of increase in food prices is less
than 25%, approximately 40% believe it is
between 26 and 50%, and
one-fourth consider the rise as over 50%.
Perception on food price increase in Hatay is
similar to Gaziantep. In Urfa, nearly half of
interviewees think that the rise is less than 25%.
About 40% of interviewees take the rise as
between 26 and 50%, while 14% consider the rise
as over 50%. On the other hand, in Kilis more than
half of interviewees think that the rise in food
prices is between 26 and 50%. One-third believe it
is less than 25%, while 15% think that it
is over 50%. In all four cities, over 60% of
interviewees blame refugees for the perceived rise
in food prices. Although we do not have actual
provincial data for food price rise, according to
TSI data, annual inflation rate in Gaziantep rose
from 6.8% in 2010 to 8.8% in 2013. Average
annual inflation rate for Turkey in 2013 was 7.4%,
denoting that inflation rate in Gaziantep was 1.4
percentage point over Turkey’s average inflation
rate in 2013. Furthermore,
Gaziantep’s ranking in Turkey in terms of the rate
of inflation rose from 18th in 2010 to 1st in 2013.
These figures imply that the perceived increase in
food prices by locals
appears to be based on real observation, at least
in Gaziantep.

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5. Another important consequence of refugees’

influx for locals is their effect on rents. Graph 5A
and Graph 5B reflect the perception of the rate of
increase in rents and to what extent the locals
link the rise to the existence of refugees.

Graph 5A. Increase in Rents (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 61, Hatay: 93, Kilis: 31, Urfa: 99
Graph 5B. Rent Increase - Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 93, Kilis: 35, Urfa: 101

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As it can be seen from Graph 5A, the most

remarkable effect of refugees seems to be on the
rents. More than half of the interviewees perceive
rent increase as being over 100%. Most strikingly,
as it can be seen from Graph 5B, almost all of the
interviewees believe that the reason behind the
rise in rents is the refugees’ influx.

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6. One other consequence of refugee influx

occurs in the health sector.
Graph 6A, Graph 6B, and Graph 6C display the
impact of refugees’ influx on health sector.

Graph 6A. Decline the Quality of Health Services -

Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 93, Kilis: 35, Urfa: 99

Graph 6B. Increase in the Date of Appointment in

Hospitals - Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 93, Kilis: 35, and Urfa: 99

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Graph 6C. Increase in the Private Doctor Fees -

Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 62, Hatay: 92, Kilis: 35, Urfa: 98

As it can be seen from Graph 6A, in Gaziantep,

Hatay, and Urfa, over two-third of the
interviewees think that the existence of refugees
lowers the quality of health services. On the other
hand, less than half of the interviewees believe
that the existence of refugees decrease the quality
of health services. We observe similar perceptions
regarding the effect of refugees on the length of
appointment date. As it can be seen from Graph
6B, in Gaziantep, Hatay, and Urfa, over two-third
of interviewees claim that the existence of
refugees increased the date of appointments in
hospitals. Once again, the perception regarding
the effect of refugees of appointment date in Kilis
differs from the other three cities; less than half of
the interviewees believe
that the existence of refugees lengthen date of
appointments in hospitals. Finally, over half of the
interviewees in Gaziantep, Hatay, and Urfa assert
that the existence of refugees increased the
private doctor fees,
while about one-fourth of interviews hold the same
opinion.

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7. Education is another sector where the effects

of refugees are likely to be observed.
Graph 7A and Graph 7B reflect the effects of
refugees’ influx on the quality of education and
the spending on education.

Graph 7A. Decline the Quality of Education

Services - Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 92, Kilis: 35, and Urfa: 101

Graph 7B. Increase in the Education Spending -

Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 92, Kilis: 35, and Urfa: 99

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As it can be observed from Graph 7A, in Kilis over

two-third of interviewees think that the quality of
education services declined due to the existence of
Syrian refugees. Approximately half of the
interviewees in Gaziantep think that the quality of
education declined. The segments of interviewees
who think that education quality has declined in
Urfa and Hatay are 35 and 42 percent,
respectively. This finding reflects the fact that the
rise in the intensity of refugees puts a pressure on
education services. On the other hand, as can be
seen from Graph 7B, significantly less than half of
the interviewees think that education spending
has not increased. This finding is believed to be
due to the fact that most of the education in
Turkey is free.

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8. Another consequence of refugees’ influx we

consider is if it led to significant emigration from
the affected cities. Graph 8A shows if the
interviewees link emigration
from their city to the refugees. On the other hand,
we asked those who think that there was
emigration due to the existence of refugees what
they believe is the most
important reason behind emigration.
Graph 8B reflects the beliefs of interviewees about
the reasons for emigration.

Graph 8A. Emigration - Refugees Link (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 63, Hatay: 92, Kilis: 35, and Urfa: 101

Graph 8B. Causes of Emigration (%)

Number of respondents:

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Gaziantep: 60, Hatay: 86, Kilis: 5, and Urfa: 83

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As it can be seen from Graph 8A, the findings

regarding the link between emigration and
refugees differ significantly among the four cities
studied. While over two-third of interviewees in
Hatay link emigration to refugees, merely 14% in
Kilis where the emigration intensity is the highest,
think the same way. Again, while over half of the
interviewees link emigration to refugees in Urfa,
that ratio is less than half in Gaziantep. On the
other hand, as reflected in Graph 8B, the
interviews see economic and security conditions
as the most important two reasons behind the
emigration.

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2.2. General Assessment of the Findings

Pertaining to Locals

According to the survey results, the greatest labor

market effect of refugees seems to occur in Hatay
and Şanlıurfa with 18% and 16% job loss rates,
respectively. Although the job loss rate is the
lowest in Kilis, all of those who lost their jobs see
refugees as the cause of their job loss. In Hatay,
87% of those who lost their jobs blame refugees
for losing their jobs.

Approximately two-thirds of interviewees in all

four cities think that wage rate decline was less
than 50%. On the other hand, except for Kilis,
more than three thirds of interviewees blame
refugees for wage rate decline. Only half of
interviewees in Kilis blame refugees for wage rate
decline. On the other hand, since refugees have
increased the labor supply, and they work
informally, we can argue that there might have
been a significant wage rate decline, especially in
informal sectors.

Although Gaziantep has the second lowest job loss

rate, 50% of those who have not lost their job
believe that existence of refugees increased the
risk of losing their jobs. On the other hand, even
though Hatay and Şanlıurfa have the highest job
loss rates, only one-fourth of those who have not
lost their jobs in these two cities think that the
risk of losing their jobs has increased. Kilis has the
lowest job loss, nevertheless approximately 40% of
those who have not lost their jobs think that the
risk of losing their jobs increased. The risk of
losing job increases as the unemployment rate
increases. Since we claim that unemployment rate

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in informal sectors might have increased, we can

also argue that the risk of losing jobs might have
increased in those sectors where it is possible for
the Syrians to get informal jobs.

Although the perception of the rate of increase

varies in four cities, approximately two-thirds of
interviewees blame refugees for the rise in food
prices. In Gaziantep, Hatay, and Şanlıurfa
approximately one-third of interviewees think the
rise is between 26% and 50%, while half of
interviewees in Kilis believe it is between 26% and
50%. In Gaziantep and Hatay, one-fourth of
interviewees believes that the rise is over 50%,
while in Kilis and Şanlıurfa only 15% think that
the rise is over 50%. Although we do not have
actual provincial data for food price rise,
according to TSI data, annual inflation rate in
Gaziantep rose from 6.8% in 2010 to 8.8% in
2013. These figures imply that the perceived
increase in food prices by locals appears to be
based on real observation at least in Gaziantep.

Another important effect for especially low income

segments of the population is the rise in rents. In
all of the four cities, approximately half of the
interviewees believes that the rise in rents is over
100%.
What is more, in all cities almost all of the
interviewees blame refugee influx for the rise in
rents.

While in Kilis less than half of the interviewees

think the quality of health services worsened, in
all other three cities
more than 70% argue that health service quality
deteriorated.

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The perceptions about the rise in spending on

education seem to be similar in all four cities;
more than half of the interviewees argue that
education spending has not risen.

Emigration, if it is taking place, is not only an

important economic but also social consequence of
the refugee influx into Turkey. The findings
regarding the link between emigration and
refugees differ significantly among the four cities.
Furthermore, a significant portion of the
interviewees in all cities sees economic and
security conditions as the most important two
reasons behind the emigration. These findings are
supported by actual data on provincial
immigration in Turkey.

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2.3. Data on the Syrians

1. Education level of refugees is crucially
important for the prospect of their economic,
social, and cultural integration into the societies
they live. Graph 9 reflects refugees’ education
levels in the sample.
Graph 9. Education Level (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 46, Hatay: 60, Kilis: 31, and Urfa: 48
As it can be seen from Graph 9, in Gaziantep
about 60% of Syrian refugees have an education
level at the lowest spectrum of the schooling
system. In Hatay, about 40% of Syrian refugees
have an education level at the lowest spectrum of
the schooling system. On the other hand, a
significant portion (40%) has a university degree.
Education level of Syrians in Kilis is outstandingly
lower than it is in the other three cities. About
two-thirds of Syrian refuges in Kilis have an
education level at the lowest spectrum of the

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schooling system. In addition, the share of

university graduates in Kilis is considerably lower
than it is in the other three cities. In Şanlıurfa, a
strikingly high proportion of refugees claim to
have a university degree compared to other
education levels.
2. Lack of productive habits results in persistent
poverty. Graph 10 reflects the shares of refugees
who have jobs in the four cities under
investigation.

Graph 10. Do you currently work? (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 46, Hatay: 66, Kilis: 31, and Urfa: 50

As Graph 10 shows, the employment rate is the

highest in Gaziantep where over 50% of working
age refugees interviewed has a job. Considering
the industrial development level of Gaziantep, this
finding is understandable. On the other hand, only
one-third in Hatay, one-fourth in Şanlıurfa, and
13% in Kilis have a job.

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3. Long term unemployment and living on aid

has major economic and social
consequences. Therefore, it is important
that refugees can earn minimum wage. The
minimum wage in Turkey is 891 [Link]
take the refugees’ earning between 850 and
950 TL as the minimum wage group. Graph
11 represents Syrians who declare to have
a job in wage groups. Since none of the
interviewees answered the wage question,
we do not have wage data for Syrians in
Kilis.

Graph 11. Monthly Wage (TL, %)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 25, Hatay: 18, Kilis: 0, and Urfa: 8
As it can be seen from the Graph 11, while
approximately half of working Syrians in
Gaziantep earn a wage close to the minimum
wage, one-third earn more than minimum wage

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group and one-fifth earn less than minimum wage

group. In Hatay, 28% of working Syrians earn less
than the
minimum wage group, while another 28% earn
close to minimum wage. Strikingly, 44% claim to
earn over minimum wage. In Şanlıurfa, about one-
fourth earn over
minimum wage group, while 38% earn less than
minimum age group. Approximately one-third earn
close to minimum wage. 3Turkish lira
4. Graph 12 and Graph 13 show shares of
expenditures of the minimum wage groups
in Şanlıurfa, Hatay, and Gaziantep on food
and rent.

Graph 12. Food Expenditure/Income for 850-950

Income Group (%)

Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 13, Hatay: 5, Kilis: 0, and Urfa: 3

Graph 13. Rent/Income for 850-950 Income Group

(%)

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Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 5, Hatay: 5, Kilis: 0, Urfa: 3

As it can be seen from Graph 12 and Graph 13,

there are significant differences between cities in
terms of the shares on food and rent in
expenditures. In Gaziantep, the share of food is
the highest, while the share of rent is the lowest.
This finding suggests that refugee influx’s
pressure on housing is the lowest in Gaziantep,
though, it is the most expensive city in terms of
food cost. In Şanlıurfa, wage
earners appear to spend half of their earning to
food and the other half to rent. On the other hand,
on average, the shares of food and rent are the
lowest in Hatay. This
finding may point to the fact that Syrians have
more relatives in Hatay than they do in other
cities, and therefore, receive more help in terms of
food and housing.

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5. Probably the most important issue for

refugees is if their children are able to get
education.
Graph 14 represents the shares of refugees who
declare that their children receive education.

Graph 14. Do you have children getting education

(%)

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Number of respondents:
Gaziantep: 44, Hatay: 66, Kilis: 31, and Urfa: 47

As it can be seen from Graph 14, slightly over half

of Syrians states that their children receive
education. On the other
hand, only one-fifth of the Syrians in Şanlıurfa and
Kilis confirms that their children receive
education. The low level of education service for
Syrian children in Kilis can be explained by the
intensity of refugees. In Şanlıurfa, it may point to
the lack of organization.

2.4. General Assessment of the Findings

Pertaining to the Syrians
1. The data reveal that over half of Syrians in
Gaziantep and Kilis have an education level at the
lowest spectrum of the schooling system. On the

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other hand, significant portions of Syrians in

Hatay and Kilis have high school or university
degrees.
2. The employment rates of Syrians differ
significantly from one city to the other. While over
50% of working age refugees interviewed in
Gaziantep has a job, the employment rate is only
one-third in Hatay, one-fourth in Şanlıurfa, and
13% in Kilis.
3. While approximately half of working Syrians in
Gaziantep and one-third in Hatay earn a wage
close to the minimum wage, over 40% in Şanlıurfa
claim to earn over minimum wage.
4. There are significant differences between cities
in terms of the shares on food and rent in
expenditures. In Gaziantep, the share of food is
the highest, while the share of rent is the lowest.
This finding suggests that refugee influx’s
pressure on housing is the lowest in Gaziantep,
though, it is the most expensive city in terms of
food cost. In Şanlıurfa, wage earners appear to
spend half of their earnings on food and the other
half on rent. On the other hand, on average the
shares of food and rent is the lowest in Hatay. This
finding may point to the fact that Syrians have
more relatives in Hatay than they do in other
cities, and therefore, receive more help in terms of
food and housing.
[Link] over half of Syrians in Gaziantep and Hatay
state that their children receive education. On the
other hand, only one-fifth of Syrians in Şanlıurfa and
Kilis confirm that their children receive education.
The low level of education service for Syrian children
in Kilis can be explained by the intensity of refugees.
In Şanlıurfa, it may point to the lack of organization.

CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT

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The purpose of this study was to assess the effects

of Syrian refugees on economic variables such as
migration and its causes, international trade,
unemployment rate, wage rate, inflation (food
prices and rent inflation), house sales, education
services and cost of education, and health services
and its costs in Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis and
Şanlıurfa.

In the first section, thus, the project constructed a

synthetic model to estimate what the time paths of
these variables would be if there were no Syrian
refugees and compare them with actual time
paths.
In the second section, the project analyzed the
economic effects of Syrian refugees descriptively
on the basis of face to face interviews with locals
in Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, and
Şanlıurfa. In the second section, we also analyzed
data gathered through face to face interviews with
the Syrian refugees outside the camps in order to
understand their economic and social
characteristics.

The basic findings of the study can be summarized

as follows:

1. All cities attract less immigration than they

would if there were no Syrian refugees. Bearing in
mind the perception in Turkey that unemployment
has risen, cost of living has increased, and
security condition has worsened in the provinces
where there have been intense refugee’s influxes,
this finding is intuitive. And we can see this impact
due to the fact that these cities are near to Syria.

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2. The effects of refugees on international trade

differs across provinces depending on the
province’s industrial
development and the level of international trade
before the refugee influx started. For instance, in
Gaziantep, we observe an improvement in both
export and trade balance (export minus import).
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has become
a focus point in Turkey’s foreign economic policy.
Economic relations have accompanied good
political relations, and MENA has started having
an ever-rising share in Turkey’s international
trade. In this framework it is safe to assume
that,specifically through the intermediary of the
Syrians of merchant origin, those provinces with
an industrial base to produce the goods needed in
MENA countries can have a deepening economic
integration with the region in the long run.

3. Turkey has achieved a noteworthy improvement

in education. An important dimension of that
improvement was the drop in the number of
students per teacher
(that is, the decrease in the class size). However,
the class sizes have risen (on average, 1-5
students) in the provinces under investigation. On
the other hand, since the education services are
mostly free in Turkey, especially
because education materials at primary, middle,
and high school levels are provided by the
government free of charge, the existence of Syrian
refugees does not seem to increase in the
education expenditures for the locals.

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4. According to our findings, one of the most

important economic effects of Syrians has
occurred in the labor
market. In the provinces with intense refugee
influxes, and specifically in the informal sectors,
there have been job losses for the locals.

5. Another economic effect has occurred through a

reduction in the wage rates. Since the refugees
have increased labor supply and they mostly work
informally, a significant wage rate decline is likely
especially in the
informal sectors. The completion of legal
framework may lessen the negative wage effect,
even if it does not reduce job losses.
6. On the other hand, it must also remind the
possible dynamic expansionary effects due to
additional demand
of Syrian refugees, and investment and aid into
the region, which has the potential to create new
jobs. Moreover, because Syrians generally work in
low skill and low wage sectors, locals can switch
to high skill and high wage
sectors. Therefore, in order to evaluate the effects
of Syrians on labor market, we need a wider
perspective that includes these dynamic effects.
Perhaps the most important economic effect of
Syrian refugees is the observed increase in food
prices and rent inflation.

7. Another effect of refugees on locals’ daily lives

occurs in the quality and availability of health
services. According to the findings of our study,
locals complain about the deterioration of the
health services. Furthermore, they argue that it

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has become harder for them to receive health

services in a timely manner.

As mentioned above, face to face interviews was

conducted with the Syrian refugees outside the
camps to gather information about their economic
and social characteristics. The findings can be
summarized as follows:

1. According to our findings, Syrian refugees

mostly have a low level of education. This
information must be considered in the planning
process to integrate Syrians into the labor market.
2. Employment status of refugees varies
significantly across the provinces. The level of
industrial development and the characteristics of
labor market in the province determines the
possibility for the refugees to find a job. For
instance, while about half of Syrians interviewed
in Gaziantep have jobs, this ratio is very low in
Kilis.

3. An important finding of the study is that a

significant segment of those refugees who have a
job earn a wage
rate close to minimum wage.

4. The shares of Syrians’ food and rent

expenditure in their incomes vary significantly
across provinces. For example, in Gaziantep, while

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the share of food expenditure is the highest, the

share of rent is the lowest. This finding suggests
that although Gaziantep is the most expensive
province in terms of food costs, the pressure of
refugees on the housing sector is the lowest. On
the other hand, the shares of food expenditure and
rent are the lowest in Hatay. This finding may be
due to the fact that Hatay is the province where
refugees have more relatives and
therefore, receive more aid in terms of food and
rent.

5. About half of refugees are children, and for

them education is as crucial as nutrition and
shelter. The education status of children varies
across provinces. One of the reasons for this
variation is the lack of legal frame
work and a coordinated organization, which has to
be addressed in the coming months.

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57

Bibliography
[Link]
[Link]
refugees-in-turkey-between-heaven-and-hell/
[Link]
and-evidence-impact-refugees-host-communities

THANK YOU

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