FREEDOM

Freedom in Restriction

JANUARY 1, 2025
STEPHEN A. AULIN
How freedom can coexist with confinement. This notion belongs to a tradition in existentialism,
law and even psychological research, and it is therefore a ripe area for research. To grasp the
core of a free prisoner status, we need to go at its philosophical basis, to think about the historical
and current contexts, and consider the consequences for human freedom and agency.

Free prisoner" at its simplest is an oxymoron, merging two concepts of which one would be
expected and the other would be hoped to be relieved of. Freedom denotes autonomy, self-
determination and the capacity to act in accordance with a person's intention. In contrast,
imprisonment is synonymous with, and means, limitation, control, and the cessation of such
liberties. However, historically and philosophically, across the centuries, these ideas have
profoundly overlapped.

Existentialist thought, represented by the likes of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir,
offers the environment in which this paradox can be considered. Sartre’s dictum, "Man is
condemned to be free," highlights the inescapable nature of freedom. Despite conditions of direly
severe constraint (e.g., imprisonment), people still have the capacity to make choices about their
attitudes and responses. As an instance, Viktor Frankl, a Holocaust victim and psychiatrist,
reported in Man’s Search for Meaning how, despite the extreme limitations of a concentration
camp, humans could claim freedom by searching for purpose and meaning when facing suffering
(Frankl, 2006).

Epictetus, a Stoico, claimed that though the body be bound by external circumstances, mind is
free of such restraint. This dichotomy of external and internal liberation is central to explaining
how it is possible to be a prisoner but a truly liberated person. Epictetus asserted, “No man is free
who is not master of himself, emphasizing self-control and perspective as the essence of freedom
(Epictetus, 1983). In this view, a prisoner can achieve freedom by mastering their thoughts,
emotions, and reactions to external circumstances.

The notion of a free prisoner is more than philosophical thought, it resonated in historical and
social conditions. Political prisoners, for instance, often embody this paradox. Nelson Mandela
and Mahatma Gandhi were jailed physically, yet maintained that belief in freedom due to their
steadfastness in their missions.

Nelson Mandela’s 27 years of imprisonment on Robben Island illustrate the concept of a free
prisoner. Ruled by difficult circumstances, Mandela preserved his composure, cultivated his
mind, and ignited a revolution. His statement, "I was not born with a hunger to be free. I was
born free, reflects his belief that freedom transcends physical liberty and resides in the mind and
spirit (Mandela, 1994). Mandela’s ability to transform his confinement into a space for reflection
and strategy exemplifies how purpose can liberate even those in chains.

Psychological research on incarceration in contemporary settings also sheds light on the free
prisoner. Research on the "pains of imprisonment" highlights how inmates often create mental
and emotional coping mechanisms to reclaim a sense of agency. These approaches, such as
pursuing interests, developing social ties, or practicing introspection, reflect the plasticity of the
human spirit in the context of confinement (Clemmer, 1958).
The idea of the free prisoner is not restricted to the literal prison, but rather it is metaphorical to
the contemporary life. There is a large group of individuals, often suffering the burden of social,
economic, and psychological confinement, and yet they search for a way to proclaim freedom
within such limitations, which form a paradox or contradiction.

Let us focus on the workplace, which is seen as "wage slavery," in a Marxist framework.
Employees may be held captive by economic need, but also be free to be creative by looking for
life in the work itself, by engaging in activities it passion time (and time spent building
friendships with colleagues), etc. This shows the processes that individuals use to work around
the systemic barriers to maintain the illusion of autonomy.

The digital age presents another form of metaphorical imprisonment. Algorithms, surveillance
and social media can have a reinforcing effect by, in turn, creating echo chambers and fostering
the restriction of free thought. However, people exercise their freedom by deciding how they are
going to use technology, by building their digital worlds, and into campaigning for digital rights.
To defeat or redefine these limits represents the mentality of a free man in prison.

The journey of becoming a truly independent prisoner also prompts deep issues of freedom and
agency. Can freedom exist without constraint? Is true autonomy an illusion? These questions
challenge us to reconsider traditional conceptions of liberty.

A philosophical consequence is that freedom should not be seen as the most absolute, but as
relational. It is at odds with constraint, requiring the imposed boundaries to be meaningful. Isaiah
Berlin's concept of "positive" and "negative" liberty is relevant here. Negative liberty, the
absence of external interference, is often limited by circumstances, while positive liberty, the
ability to act on one’s own will, can flourish even within constraints (Berlin, 1969). Thus, the
concept of a free prisoner challenges us to expand our understanding of what it means to be free.

Another implication concerns the relationship between autonomy and responsibility. The free
convict is a personification of the existentialist concept of freedom as a matter of responsibility.
The ability to decide how to react to the constraints, to either defy, adapt, or transform them,
demands active participate and responsibility. This point of view redefines liberty not only as a
right but as a deep duty.

the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances”
(Frankl, 2006). This universal statement confirms the human possibility to be free, in any of the
most restricted conditions.
 Bibliography

• Berlin, I. (1969). Two Concepts of Liberty. Oxford University Press.