Evolution and Dimension of Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Theory
Assignment 2
Shehroz Nadeem
BS-IR-8TH B
Chapter 10
An overview of Chinese thinking about Deterrence.
Summary
Weishe is a Chinese word that refers to both coercion and persuasion. A strategy of deterrence,
or weishe zhanlue, is defined as "a military strategy of displaying or threatening the use of armed
power, in order to compel an opponent to submit," according to the 2011 PLA volume on
military terminology. The Chinese definition does not differentiate between coercion and
dissuasion. This gives rise to the Chinese concept of nuclear deterrence which also revolves
around the same word, Weishe. Chinese analyses claim that while capabilities and will are
essential components of deterrence in times of peace, signaling one's intention to use those
capabilities in times of crisis is crucial. 20 Conflict can only be limited if an enemy has no doubt
that the PRC is ready to use its capabilities. Because of their inherent destructiveness, nuclear
weapons can be used to sway an enemy's risk and cost assessments while also serving as a
tangible demonstration of Chinese capability. China has framed its deterrence activities based on
following elements;
i. Public opinion pressure
ii. Evaluating weapons readiness
iii. Displays of actual capability
iv. Manipulating tensions and creating impressions and misimpressions
v. Demonstration launches
vi. Demonstration launches near an adversary’s forces or territory
vii. Announcing the lowering of the nuclear threshold
The Chinese believe that in order for deterrence to be effective, the PLA must be able to signal
resolve, and one of those signals can be the use of actual force. Furthermore, the need to take
into account other countries makes China's deterrence efforts more difficult. Additionally,
Chinese leaders must intimidate Russia, India, and perhaps Japan. Thus, it can be argued that
China has more nuclear weapons on hand than is necessary for a "minimal" deterrent. However,
it is still unknown how many nuclear weapons the Chinese government believes to be necessary
or sufficient to deter potential enemies.
Just like nuclear deterrence, since 1990s, China has also showed ambitions for space domination
and domination in the field of IT and has their own concept of space deterrence and information
deterrence. According to Chinese writings, space deterrence refers to the use of space forces and
capabilities to coerce or deter an adversary, prevent conflict from starting, or reduce the severity
of it if it does. The PLA hoped to create doubt and fear in an opponent so they would either
abandon their goals or limit the scope, intensity, and types of operations by show casing their
own space capabilities and proving their resolve and will. Chinese studies claim that the world's
socioeconomic situation has fundamentally changed as a result of the rapid advancements in
information technology and globalization. We now live in an era where information is the main
medium of exchange for global power: "For major powers interested in advancing their
economies and bolstering their all-encompassing national power, outer space, information space,
network space, and electromagnetic space have emerged as the new primary focal points. It is
now considered the new "high ground" for ensuring security respectively.
Other than this, China has also been focusing on other deterrence activities, such as,
mobilization, conventional deterrence, non-military deterrence, deterrence by punishment or
denial. The author concludes the chapter with the remark that the history of China's strategic
culture spans several millennia. It evolved in a setting that is very dissimilar from the West. In a
way that hasn't been seen in the West since the Roman Empire, China has long been the
dominant hegemon of the Asia. It follows that it has evolved a unique understanding of
deterrence as a result of its particular circumstances.