THE TURCO - ARMENIAN 'ADANA INCIDENTS'

IN THE LIGHT OF SECRET BRITISH DOCUMENTS

(July, 1908 - December, ~ gog)
Dr. SALAHI R. SONYEL
Introduction
For almost six centuries the position of the Armenian nation (millet)
within the Ottoman Empire, was one of relative peace, order, security and
prosperity until the genesis, in the 187os, of the so-called "Eastern
Question". The Turco-Russian war of 1877 had resulted in the abortive
Treaty of San Stefano, and had brought about the signature of the Cyprus
Convention and the Treaty of Berlin. These treaties were supposed to
procure more privileges for the Ottoman Armenians, but they were actually
intended to enable the Great Powers, in particular Britain and Russia, to
interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire with the hope of
snatching a greater share of the spoils when the Empire ultimately collapsed.
From 1878 onwards various efibrts were made by the Great Powers,
particularly by the British Conservative and Liberal Governments, for the
introduction of reforms in the Ottoman Empire to benefit the Christians,
especially the Armenians, who were dispersed throughout Anatolia. One of their
earliest unsuccessful attempts was directed towards the establishment of an
autonomous Armenian province, which encouraged the Armenian
extremists to provoke rebellions that almost led to an armed intervention by
the Great Powers. When, in April 1880, the Liberal Party came to power in
London, the new British Prime Minister, William Ewart Gladstone, showed
greater zeal than his predecessors, Lords Beaconsfield (Benjamin Disraeli)
and Salisbury, in inducing the Great Powers to put joint pressure on the
Ottoman Government so that it might succumb to their demands and
introduce wide-ranging reforms in Eastern Anatolia. This danger to the
very existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to that of his throne, forced
Sultan Abdülhamit II to concentrate all power in his hands. It also
encouraged the Armenian extremists to set up secret societies, and to prepare
for revolt, in order to procure an autonomous, or semi-independent,
Armenian province in Eastern Anatolia where the Armenians were
hopelessly outnumbered by the Muslims to the tune of four to one.
I 292 SALAH! R. SONYEL

With the financial collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 188os
the so-called "Armenian Question" became more acute. This led to a
deterioration in Turco-Armenian and Anglo-Turkish relations, and to the
disillusionment of the Armenians both with Britain and Russia who were
vying with each other for Turkish favours in order to cater to their own
interests rather than on behalf of the interests of the Armenians. Admittedly,
both Salisbury and Gladstone did their utmost to procure the joint
intervention of the Great Powers in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman
Empire, but without success, as the interests of those Powers, which included
Britain and Russia, were at conflict.
Following the establishment, by the Armenian extremists abroad, of
secret revolutionary and terrorist societies such as the Hintchak and the
Dashnaktsoutioun, which indulged indiscriminately, within and without
the Ottoman territories, in a campaign of terror, assassinations, sabotage,
arson, abductions and forced levies, inflicted even on ordinary Armenians,
and the resulting suppression by Ottoman authorities, who had hurriedly set
up the Hamidiye regiments to encounter Armenian terrorism, a period of
bloody incidents ensued which lasted from 1894 to 1896.
The first full-scale armed conflict between the Armenians and the Turks
took place in the summer of 1895 at Sasun, where the Armenian insurgents
had provoked a revolt. This was followed by other incidents al! over Anatolia
where practically a state of civil war had been provoked between the
ordinary Armenian and Turkish people, resulting in the death of many
victims on both sides and in the destruction of much property. The
Armenian Patriarch, meanwhile, appealed to the Great Powers to
intervene, which caused the Liberal Government in London to prepare for
armed intervention and to resort to gunboat diplomacy. But the divisions
among the Powers, in particular between Britain and Russia, made these
British attempts, later espoused by Salisbury, ineffective. The Powers were
reluctant to intervene and thus risk their favoured position in ~stanbul, and
Abdülhamit was quick to make full use of these divisions among the Powers
to his advantage. He also tried to arrive at a modus vivendi with the Armenian
insurgents and the Young Turks revolutionaries, with some inital success.

After the 1894-6 incidents many efforts were made to reconcile the
Turks and the Armenians. From 1896 to 1908, although the so-called
"Armenian Question" flared up intermittently with every major crisis or
event such as the Turco-Greek war of 1897, the German Emperor's visit to
 ADANA INCIDENTS ~~293

Istanbul, the eruption of the "Cretan and Macedonian Questions", and the
attempt by the Armenians to assassinate Abdülhamit in 1905, nevertheless it
simmered on and brought about a rapprochement between the Armenian
revolutionaries and the Young Turks, who cooperated together with other
malcontent elements of the Ottoman Empire in bringing about the Young
Turk Revolution of July, 1908.

Turco-Armenian relations after the Young Turk Revolution

Following the restoration of constitutional order in the Ottoman
Empire as a result of the Young Turk Revolution 1, the Turks and the
Armenians, dazzled for the time being by the slogans of the revolution such
as "liberty, fraternity and equality", began to show hopeful signs of
rapprochement. In August 1938, M. Sabahgoulian, a Caucasian Armenian
and president of the Hintchak Society of Turkey, declared at the Sourp
Yervartioun Church of Pera (Beyo~lu) that henceforth the Hintchakists
would terminate their revolutionary activities and do their utmost "for the
development and prosperity of our country". At the same time M. Aknouni,
another Russian Armenian and spokesman of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation, the Dashnaktsutiun, announced:

"One of the primary duties of the Dashnaktzagans will be to

protect, or defend, the Ottoman constitutional regime, to work for
the unification of the Ottoman nationalities, and to cooperate with
the Committee of Union and Progress" 2 .

Despite these efforts to ameliorate the situation, the British ambassador

in Istanbul, Sir Gerard Lowther, was, in the middle of August, stili receiving
alarming reports from Captain Bertram Dickson, the British vice-consul at
Van, claiming that fighting was still going on between the tribal Muslims
and the Armenians at Tiari, and near ~atak, of the Bitlis Province, and that
there was a state of lawlessness in the area. This report caused the British
Foreign Office to see such incidents as "the beginning of reaction after the

Düstur (Laws), 2. tertip, v. 1, pp. 1-2; Ali Cevat and Faik Re~it Unat: Ikinci Me~rutiyetin
ildn~~ otuzbir Mart hadisesi (The declaration of the Second Constitution and the 31 March
ve
incident), Ankara, TTK, 1960, pp. 108-9.
2 Ismet Parmaks~zoglu, Ermeni kemiklerinin ihtildl hareketleri ve besledikleri emeller (The
revolutionary activities and aspirations of Armenian committees), Ankara 1981, p. 34.
1294 SALAHI R. SONYEL

recent protestations of brotherhood" 3 . Yet, by the beginning of September

the situation had completely calmed down.
If we are to believe A. S. Safrastian, the Armenian dragoman of British
Vice-Consul Shipley, public security having been assured "more than it
might be expected, unprecedented peace and tranquillity" prevailed all
over the Province of Bitlis where the dragoman was based. The Armenian
revolutionary leaders in Mu~~- Roupen, Karmen and others, had
surrendered to the authorities with their bands consisting of 150 fedais
(guerrillas), and had been received with military honorurs. Ferik (Marshal)
Salih Pasha had sent a military band to meet the Armenian leaders who,
followed by soldiers, were frantically cheered by a huge crowd of Armenians
and Muslims. Those leaders had pledged to work for the economic, moral
and intellectual revival of the Armenian people. Meanwhile, hundreds of
fugitive Armenians were returning home from Russia, and were being very
well received by the Muslims on the road 4.
These developments, which J. A. Tilley of the British Foreign Office
found to be "incredibly satisfactory", were conf~ rmed by British
Ambassador Lowther, who wrote to Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in
September, that there was a complete change in the situation of the Eastern
Provinces of Turkey. At Harput the reaction had subsided, although there
was still a slight feeling of uneasiness among the Armenians. The C. U. P., or
its sympathisers, had taken the matters into their own hands and had
procured the dismissal of many of the "most corrupt and inefficient"
officials, including the Armenian bishop whose resignation was demanded
by the crowd. That prelate, however, had already departed with a
considerable sum of money.

The constitution was warmly received and celebrated at Malatya. At

Diyarbak~ r the reactionary party seemed to have disappeared: a meeting of
all the creeds was held in the Armenian church to celebrate the constitution;
order was maintined perfectly, and all religious groups were living in
complete harmony with one another. A local committee was set up which
supervised the actions of government officials, though it did not unduly

3 Public Record Office, Foreign Office documents (hereafter to be referred to as FO) FO

371/533/28405: Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, confidential telegram, Istanbul,

16.8.1908.
Ibid.: Acting Vice-Consul A.S. Safrastian to Consul Shipley, despatch, Bitlis, 1.93908.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1295

interfere in administrative details. I ts members, which consisted of 8

Muslims, 3 Armenians and 3 Catholics, were respectable men of good
standing.
At the beginning of September a service was conducted by the
Armenian archbishop of Erzurum for the "repose of the souls" of those who
had perished in the incidents of 1895. A large crowd of Muslims
attended, and some of their leaders subsequently made speeches in honour of
those who, they said, had fallen "in the cause of liberty". They expressed the
hope that the past would be forgotten, and that henceforth Turks and
Armenians would work together like brothers for the good to their country 5.
Similar news was coming in from al! over Anatolia, and was well received by
some of the Great Powers, particularly by Britain 6.
Turco-Armenian relations had improved so much that this prompted
the British vice-consul at Van, Captain Bertram Dickson, to report to
Ambassador Lowther on 3oth September that it would be difficult to find a
parallel for a reversal of the situation, the regime and the policy "so complete
as that which has come to pass in this province during the last three months".
In July the Armenian quarters in Van were blockaded by troops; "severe"
searches were conducted in houses; the prisons were "full of Armenianfedai",
and others were being pursued. Then came the bloodless Young Turk revolt,
the granting of the constitution, and the order for the release of all political
prisoners. It was some time before the people could understand the meaning
of such a change, but as they came to realise it, the effect upon them had been
extraordinary. "From being a down-trodden, cringing outcast who dared
not show his face outside the Armenian quarter", remarked Captain
Dickson, "the Armenian has become a noisy, blatant, over-bearing, and
insolent imitation of the worst type of politician".

Armenian intrigues and clandestine arm imports continue

The two parties of the Armenians at Van, the Dashnaks and the
Armenists, had utilised their revoulitonary organisation for electioneering.
The Dashnaks, with whom the Hintchaks were now allied, formed a
powerful party, led by the "fedai" chiefs Aram, the "Doctor" (Varhad

FO 371/533/33230: Lowther to Grey, despatch, Therapia (Trabya), 20.9.1908.

6The Times, 8, 9, 14 and 24.8.1908; see also Ismail Hami Dani~ment: ha/t/t Osrnanh Tarihi
Kronokisi (Annotated Chronology of Ottoman History), v. 4, Istanbul 1961, p. 366.
1296 SALMI~~R. SONYEL

Papazian), Sarkis and Ishkhan. They presented the "Doctor" as their

candidate for deputy, and in their first campaign to have their delegates
elected to the electoral college, in oppositon to the Armenist or Muslim
delegates, they had been completely successful by having secured the
election of all their candidates. This result was due partly to threats and to
other methods which they had not hesitated to use. The Armenists, whose
candidate for deputy was Terzibashian, "an intelligent and respectable
merchant", as described by Captain Dickson, had not had the least chance
against their rivals, although they comprised the more respectable and quiet
portion of the Armenian population, and were supported by the
Muslims and the Government.
The Dashnaks were also intriguing with various aghas (aga) to secure
the tribal Muslim vote, and had reduced the Armenian bishop ( Murahhas)
to the position of a mere tool. Their attitude and actions had caused a friction
which culminated in a fight in the Armenian Council between the
bishop and Terzibashian. The Dashnakists then ingeniously used the
resulting scandal to damage the Armenist cause. They were trying to secure
the exile or imprisonment of Terzibashian, who was their ablest opponent.
In fact their "fedai" chiefs who, two months earlier, were either in prison or
fugitives, had now become the self-elected masters of the situation, and even
attempted to dictate to the acting governor-general ( vali). With
"magnificent impudence", they claimed that the grant of the constitution
was due entirely to their own efforts, and in this they were believed not only
by most Armenians but also by many local Muslims.
Thus this Dashnak "fedai" organisation, as a political body, had
increased its power in the Province of Van. At that particular moment it was
practically blindly followed by the whole Armenian population of the
province. Its chiefs - Aram, Papazian, Sarkis and Ishkhan - were Russian
Armenians whose ideas, according to British Vice-Consul Dickson, were
those of "advanced socialism, amounting to anarchy", current among
certain classes in the Caucasus who used terrorism as a means of attaining
this end. These men, in the words of Dickson, "with their uppishness and
insolence, and their habit of dictating to all and sundry",
were not likely by their leadership to make the Armenians more popular
among the Muslims under the new regime. A proof of this had just occurred
at Saray. A band of Armenia "fedai" from Russia had come over the frontier,
fully armed and in broad daylight, and had swaggered through Muslim
tribal country into the town of Saray and on to Van. This had greatly
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1297

incensed the Turks at Saray, and a quarrel erupted in the market as a result
of an Armenian's insolence to a Turk. Following this incident, the Armenian
men of Saray left their families and went to Van en bloc to complain, not to
the Government, but to the "fedai".
The insolent way in which these Dashnak leaders had been trying to
dictate to the Government and to Muslim tribal chiefs, with threats to get
them punished if their orders were not obeyed, had further irritated all the
Muslims, and led to many ominous threats by the latter who even placed
posters on the walls in Van, warning the Armenians and their Russian
leaders. The attitude of the Armenians was also deplored by British Vice-
Consul Captain Dickson, who wrote to Ambassador Lowther on 3oth
September as folows:

"... The Armenian in subjection , such as I have seen him, is an

unsympathetic, mean, cringing, unscrupulous, lying, thieving curd;
giyen his freedom, he loses none of these bad qualities, but in
addition becomes insolent, domineering, despotic. He is endowed
with a sort of sneak-thief sharpness, which among ignorant people
in these parts passes for intelligence".

The Muslims in the Province of Van, on the other hand, whom Captain
Dickson described as "very uncivilised, retrograde, and entirely
uneducated", had a contempt for the Armenians whom they ruled for
centuries, and would not, in Dickson's words, easily submit (at least in that
generation) to being led and dictated to by the Armenians, more especially
as the Armenian policy, Dickson believed, was, had been, and probably
always would be, "an entirely selfish one", with no thoughts of an united
Ottoman Empire, but only their own nationality, "if not of their own
profit".
The British vice-consul was also informed that the Armenians were stili
bringing arms and ammunition surreptitiously into the country. Lately
many Armenian "fedais" were coming to Van from Russia and Persia, and
many were going to those countries from Van.

"Supposing the new regime continues", declared Captain Dickson,

"then the Turkish Armenians will enjoy an unheard-of liberty,
while the Russian Armenians have only a half freedom. Formerly
the Turkish Armenians intrigued to become Russians; it seems
Belleten C. LI, 82
1298 SALAFII R. SONYEL

reasonable to suppose that now the Russians will intrigue to be

come Turkish. The Russian Moslems have always wished to
become Turkish. Thus Russia will be placed in an awkward
predicament with her Caucasian subjects. It appears to me that she
may have the choice of two ways of remedying this: she may grant
the Caucasus a more liberal constitution, or she may make the
Turkish Armenians discontented with the Turks and their new
regime by intriguing and stirring up dissension in Turkey. It is too
early to say if Russia intends to take either of the two courses, but the
fact that the Armenians here are entirely controled by these Russian
who have socialistic ideas very unpalatable to the Moslems,
may be worth bearing in mind" 7.

These pertinent remarks of a British vice-consul on the spot were only

prophesying what plans Russia was preparing for the Ottoman Empire in
order to destabilise its Eastern Provinces, and indicated how a handful of
Armenian revolutionary leaders were ready to help Russia put this plan into
execution.
Even British Ambassador Lowther confirmed that the attitude of the
Armenians since the re-establishment of the constitution had been "arrogant
and provocative, while the Turks are sullen, subdued and suspicious". The
Armenians were also taking advantage of the abolition of the former "drastic
and violent system" of collecting taxes to refuse to pay them. Their general
attitude seemed calculated to call forth a reaction, but "it cannot be denied
that the present state of affairs is a great improvement, ifonly temporary and
surrounded by dangers, on that which prevailed three months ago",
Lowther informed Grey 8 . Reports from the asiatic provinces of Turkey
continued to show, on the whole, a satisfactory state of affairs 9 .

A new Armenian agitation

Taking advantage of the new situation in the Ottoman Empire, a

number of Armenians and Armenophils abroad began to put pressure on
their governments to intervene on behalf of the Armenians. Ambrose O.
Hopkins wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, on 24th

FO 371/560/37689: Captain Bertram Dickson to Sir Gerard Lowther, despatch, Van,

343.9.1908.
8 Ibid.: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Therapia, 24.103908.
FO 371/560/36112: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Therapia, 9.10.1908.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1299

September, enclosing a resolution passed "at a large public meeting", held

at the High Street Babtist Chapel, at Abensychan, expressing sorrow that
nothing had yet been done by the European Powers for the "suffering"
Armenians, and declaring its conviction that the solution of the problem lay
not in the direction of the Young Turk movement, but rather in the
"separation of Armenia from the authority and influence of the Cruel
Turk". Hopkins, too, poured out his hatred of the Muslim Turks by
declaring that he had no faith in the Young Turk movement, and that
reformation would not come from that quarter.

"The Turk is a Mohammedan and a Mohammedan will not

tolerate a Christian if he can help it", he claimed. "Not only so, the
Turk is steeped in sin. Every imagination of the thought of his heart
is only evil, continually. The Young Turk is no exception..." ~°

Such religious fanaticism of some English Armenophils blinded them to

what was actually happening in the Ottoman Empire, whilst their bigotry
and prejudice would not even give a chance to the Young Turks, who were
not yet firmly in the saddle, to implement their promised policies.
In October, the situation began to deteriorate as a result of Bulgaria's
announcement of her independence on 5th October, and of Austria's
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the following day, whilst the Cretans
had declared their union with Greece I 1. These new developments activated
some of the Armenian agitators abroad to strive again for the fulfilment of
Armenian aspirations. Garabet Hagopian, an Armenian agitator living in
Britain, wrote to Sir Edward Grey on 7th and 23rd October that, in
consequence of Prince Ferdinand unexpectedly proclaiming the indepen-
dence of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, with himself as king, without
obtaning the prior consent of the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin,
and the annexations by the Emperor of Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a new situation had been brought about which was deeply
engaging the attention of Britain, France and Russia who were said to be
convoking a congress to reconsider the relevant articles of the Treaty of
Berlin.

10 FO 371/533/33333: Ambrose O. Hopkins to Grey, letter dated 24.9.1908.

ii Sina Ak~in: 31 Mart Olay: (The 31st March Event), Ankara 1972, p. 24; Dani~ment:
Kronoloji, pp. 367-8.
1300 SALAH! R. SONYEL

Hagopian then emphasised the point that "the only moral and legal
protection" which the Armenians had in Europe, or in international law,
was under Article 6 t of the Treaty of Berlin. In trying to obtain the adequate
fulfilment of that article, which was drafted by the Marquis of Salisbury at
the Berlin Congress, his countrymen had made "wast sacrifices of blood and
treasure". He therefore called upon Sir Edward Grey, should the Treaty of
Berlin come under the revision of the Powers, to ensure not only that Article
6 ~~ was maintained, but also to insist upon its being made more binding and
stringent for the future.
He also requested that, in giving full consideration to, and adequately
safeguarding, the interests and the status of Turkey in any revision of the
Treaty of Berlin, the British Government would, by virtue of the 61st Article,
and of the Cyprus Convention, continue to exercise "a friendly and watchful
supervision" over the Ottoman administration in Eastern Anatolia. In the
British Foreign Ofilce, J. A. Tilley found this rather "an unpleasant letter to
answer".

"We do not want to hold out hopes of further interference on behalf

of the Armenians", he declared. "If the Turks get into trouble
again, there will be no solution but force on the part of Russia. On
the other hand we still have Cyprus" 12 .

Hagopian was supported by another Armenian agitator, Bishop K.

U tidjian, who wrote to Sir Edward Grey on 29th October from Manchester,
observing that the Turkish constitution having caused a new situation in the
Balkans, Britain was trying to bring about a conference of the Powers to
ensure peace. He was informed that the Turkish Government wished to
prevent Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin from being discussed as the
Armenians would, under the new constitution, enjoy liberty, equality and
justice. He declared, however, that three months had passed since the Young
Turk revolution but that the situation in Eastern Anatolia was as bad as
ever; the lofty sentiments of the Young Turks were difficult to implant in the
heads of the tribal Muslims. If the Armenians enjoyed equality, then Article
6 ~~ would lapse of its own accord. But it could not do any harm by remaining
until the Armenians were assured of such treatment, since able ofilcials were
scarce in Eastern Anatolia, and the tribal Muslims were numerous. He

12 FO 371/560/36965: Garabet Hagopian to Grey, letters, London, 7 and 23.10.1938.

 1301
ADANA INCIDENTS

acknowledged that the Young Turks were eager for the Armenians,
freedom, and that in their hands the Armenians should be eafe if they were
secure throughout the Turkish Empire. He prayed that "every blessing"
might attend Sir Edward Grey's strenuous efforts for peace and concord in
the Balkans, and that through his instrumentality, the "sorely afflicted"
Armenian nation might attain "lasting peace" 13 .
The Reverend Krikor Behesmilian of the British Armenian Mission
followed with a letter dated 5th November declaring that he did not see any
change in Turkey where the reactionary party were making the work of the
Young Turks and the Armenians hard for them. However, his Armenian
compatriots, he claimed, were loyal to their Muslim co-workers, and
according to a latest letter from his own friends at Mara~, Armenians,
Muslims and Christians were working hand in hand for the common
welfare. He trusted that, through the efforts of Sir Edward Grey, Asiatic
Turkey would not suffer from the political dispute in Turkey-in-Europe.
Claiming to know Turkey intimately, he stated that the Asiatic provinces
would soon enjoy peace if the dispute in European Turkey was dealt
separately. The Armenians rejoiced that the British Government were "in
deep sympathy with the new regime", and he trusted that the other Powers
would be in harmony with Britain for the establishment of peace in the
Ottoman Empire 14.

The election of a new Armenian Patriarch

In August 1908 it had become evident that the Armenian Patriarch,

Malachia Ormanian, who had resigned during the Young Turk revolution,
was to be replaced by Matheos Ismirlian. The latter was Patriarch of the
Armenians at the time of the 894-5 incidents, and was exiled to Jerusalem
by Abdülhamit because of his relations with the British Embassy and his
machinations with the Armenian terrorist organisations. On his return to
Istanbul after the revival of the Constitution, he was giyen an enthusiastic
reception in which the Turks had taken part. At first the Armenians thought
of appointing him to the vacant See of Etchmiadzin near Erivan (Yerevan),
as Catholicos, or Ecclesiastical Head of all the Armenians, but the conviction
that the Russian Government would refuse to sanction the appointment

13 FO 371/533/37734: Bishop K. Utidjian to Grey, letter, West Didsbury, Manchester,

29. c~.19o8.
14 FO 371/533/38633: Rey. Krikor Behesmilian to Grey, letter, Newport, 5.11.1908.
 1302 SALAHI R. SONYEI,

because of his reported nationalist tendencies convinced them to elec t him as

Patriarch of ~stanbul instead.

Nevertheless on 14th November Ismirlian was elected Catholicos of

Etchmiadzin to succeed the late Catholicos Migirditch I, by a conclave of 73
out of 78 delegates, who had travelled there from all parts of the world. The
governor of Erivan, M. Tissenhausen, had watched the proceedings on
behalf of the Russian Government. As the election was subject to imperial
confirmation, the new Catholicos could not take up his duties as Head of the
Armenian Church until the appointment was acknowledged by the Tsar. In
fact the election was later confirmed 15 , but meanwhile Ismirlian was
unanimously elected Patriarch of the Gregorian Armenians by the General
Council of the Armenian Gregorian Church.
On 28th November he was officially received by the Sultan at the Y~ld~z
Palace, and by the Grand Vizier and other Ministers at the Sublime Porte
( Bab-~~ Ali) 16 . During the usual ceremonies, Ismirlian addressed the Sultan,
expressing the great joy of the Armenian people and the hope that he would
receive the support of the Sultan and his Ministers in the task that lay before
him. The Sultan showed Ismirlian great cordiality and expressed
satisfaction at his re-election and at the cordial relations existing between the
Turks and the Armenians. He assured the new Patriarch that he and his
ministers would do all in their power to secure prosperity for the Armenians.
At the Porte, and along the route, the new Patriarch was cheered by both the
Muslims and Armenians 17 .
Two days later, Ismirlian received a visit from G. Fitzmaurice, the first
dragoman of the British Embassy, who went to congratulate him on behalf of
Ambassador Lowther. After general conversation, Ismirlian remarked that
the changed conditions in Turkey implied that the Armenians had ceased to
exist as a separate national entity and were merged in the Ottoman whole;
that consequently it was his duty to avoid discussing "politics" with
foreigners, but that, as Fitzmaurice had been closely connected with
Armenian matters, and as the British Embassy and Government had, during

15 FO 37 ~~/519/41393: Consul P. Stevens to Foreign Office, despatch, Batum, 16.11.1908.

16 Sublime Porte ( Bab-: Ali) is the name giyen to the Ottoman Government as Whitehall is
the name giyen to the British Government.
17 FO 371 / 4 24/217: Further correspondance respecting the affairs of Asiatic Turkey and

Arabia, confidential, 9482, October to December 1968; No. 6o: Lowther to Grey, confidential
despatch, Pera (Beyo~lu), 1.12.1908, p. 1 12.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1303

the old regime, shown special sympathy and interest in the lot of his
community, he felt impelled to ask Fitzmaurice to convey to Ambassador
Lowther, "in absolute confidence", his views on the existing situation in so
far as it concerned his people.
He felt, he said, that the reestablishment of the constitution was a most
delicate experiment in view of the backward condition of the masses of the
population especially in Asia Minor, and the total, lack of men and money as
a result of thirty years of "misgovernment and tyranny". Internal
tranquillity and the resultant confidence of the foreigners in the new regime
were essential to its success, and any serious mishap would be fraught with
"most disastrous consequences" to his people. He was therefore firmly
convinced that the only safe course for the Armenians, their only chance of
pulling themselves together and making good their losses during the old
Palace regime, lay in working in loyal union with the Turks on the lines of
prudence and moderation, and eschewing all extremist ideas in the way of
autonomy, etc. He was counselling his flock in this sense, and had let it be
distinctly understood that he would resign the Patriarchate rather than
countenance any advanced tendencies on the part of the Hintchak,
Droschak, or other Armenian societies.
He was consequently deeply anxious and preoccupied at the rumours
that the Powers, at the proposed conference (on Balkan affairs) intended to
abrogate the 6 ~~st Article of the Treaty of Berlin. Such a course, he feared,
would render his positon untenable, as most of the Armenians, and
especially the extremists, would certainly, either silently or overtly, protest
on the grounds that liberty, equality and justice promised by the constitution
were not yet applied, and the eventual success of the new movement was not
yet assured. These protests would endanger the mistrust of the Turks and
reawaken their suspicion that the Armenians were secretly harbouring what
used to be called "seditious and subversive ideas", whereas perfect mutual
confidence and solidarity between the Turks and the Armenians were
absolutely essential to secure for the latter a chance of repairing the disasters
of the past, and an existence of tolerable freedom for the "predatory and
oppressive tendencies" of their tribal Muslim and other neighbours. The
task he had set himself of working out the "salvation" of his people in the
outlying districts like Mu~, etc., by a policy of harmonious cooperation with
the Turks would thus be jeopardized.
Ismirlian went on to remark that the Turkish Government and people
were "frankly and honestly" disposed to treat the Armenians fairly, and that
1304 SALAHT R. SONYEI,

be was doing his utmost to ensure that his people met them more than half
way, but the abrogation of the 6 I st Article of the Treaty of Berlin would
impair the harmony then so happily existing between the two creeds. He
therefore implored Ambassador Lowther to use his influence to prevent
what be thought was a premature discussion of the article in question. He
and his people were deeply grateful to England for its sympathy and help in
the past, and be felt be might rely on the wisdom of the British Government
in this matter. He again begged that this communication should be
considered strictly confidential, and that the Ottoman Government should
not hear that he had made this appeal to the British ambassador.
Fitzmaurice later wrote a confidential memorandum in which he
observed that consular reports from Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and other places
showed that, though the authorities were on the whole animated by good
intentions, they had not yet the means of coping effectively with the
situation. It would be some considerable time before the forces of disorder in
the country abandoned their "Lawless" habits of the past. The central
Government was about to despatch a special commission composed of Turks
and Armenians to deal with the situation in Eastern Anatolia, but this
commission could only remedy the most crying abuses, and that some time
must elapse before anything approaching normal conditions were
established there 18 .
When Ambassador Lowther sent to Sir Edward Grey a copy of the
confidential memorandum drawn up by Fitzmaurice, he observed that the
Armenian Patriarch had taken the opportunity to discuss the outlook of
his community under the new regime, and of conveying "a most secret
communication" to himself (the ambassador) on the subject of the rumoured
proposal to abrogate Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin at the impending
Conference of Powers. Harmonious cooperation with the Turks was now the
last chance for the salvation of the Armenian race, and the protests that
would inevitably be raised by a discussion of the said article would be certain
to arouse once more the hostile suspicion of the Turks, and perhaps lead to a
final Turco-Armenian showdown. The Patriarch had implored the
ambassador to use his influence to prevent what he considered a premature
discussion of the article, and relied on the assistance of the British
Government in the matter. Under the circumstances Lowther believed that

18 FO 37 1 /557/42608: Confidential memorandum by G. H. Fitzmaurice, dated

30.11.1908.
 1305
ADANA INCIDENTS

the Patriarch's views about Article 6 ~~were worthy of serious consideration

by the British Government.
In the Foreign Office this appeal recived some attention. J. A. Tilley,
one of the officials, commented that this was one of the questions which would
be considered if the conference fell through, but in any case, the Turks were
not anxious to have it raised, so that it might be eliminated without
difficulty. Any interference by Britain between the Turkish Armenians,
believed Tilley, got the Armenians into trouble sooner or later. Another
official declared that, even if desirable, that was not the moment to deal with
the problem. Article 61 had proved "an absolute dead letter", and British
interference had usually made matters worse. It was doubtful whether its
maintenance was, in any case, desirable, but if it were abrogated, it would be
easy to introduce some saving clause making its disappearance coincide with
the introduction of reforms. Public opinion in Britain might demand this,
but personally he thought it was an opportunity which should not be missed
of getting rid of a "useless and at the same time inconvenient article" 19 . But
no action was taken.
The first general election under the new regime
Throughout the autumn of 1908Ottoman citizens were busy electing
their deputies to the new Ottoman parliament, which was officially opened
on ~~ 7th December 20 . The day before, Sultan Abdülhamit had announced
the names of the newly appointed 39 senators. Of a total of 288 deputies, 147
were Turks, 6o were Arabs, 27 were Albanians, 26 were Greeks, 14 were
Armenians, 10 were Slavs and 4 were Jews 21 . In 1913 Armenian
representation was increased to 16 22 .
The opening of the second Ottoman parliament coincided with a
marked improvement in the situation all over Anatolia, which was improving
long before that major event. Thus, acting British Consul Safrastian
(of Armenian origin) had reported from Bitlis on ~~st September that there
had been fraternisation in Mu~, and that hundreds of Armenians were
returning from Russia 23 . In succeeding despatches he had stressed the

19 FO 371/557/42608: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Pera, 2.123908.

20 Takvim-i Vekayi, 3.1.1324 (old style).
21 Feroz Ahmad: The Young Turks, Oxford 1969, p. 145.
London 1980, p. 182.
22 Christopher J. Walker: Armenia, the survival of a nation,
23 Turkey No. t (19139), p. 89.
 1306 SALM-II R. SONYEL

security that prevailed in the Eastern Provinces, and his hopes for
prosperity 24 . The local authorities were doing their best, with the means at
their disposal, to ameliorate the situation in those provinces. The old abuses
complained of had greatly ceased.
Meanwhile, some of the extreme Dashnakists at Van insisted on the
complete restoration to the Armenians of the property which they claimed
was seized from them in the past; but the British vice-consul there used his
influence to dissuade them from a course which was not only impossible to
realize, but which might provoke the tribal Muslims against them.
Nevertheless, following representations by the Armenian Patriarchate at
Istanbul, the Porte decided to appoint and despatch a special commission to
deal with this delicate matter. The commission would also have the power to
dismiss dishonest or incompetent officials; to ensure that the Hamidiye
officers did not hold civil employement; to prevent the chiefs of tribal
Muslims from exacting a tribute from the minorities; and to relieve the
famine-stricken districts, if necessary, by the remission of arrears of taxes.
The members of the commission soon resigned because the country had been
under snow for 5 months, and it had been impossible for them to do any
serious work. British Ambassador Lowther, however, believed that they had
resigned because they were convinced of the hopelessness of attempting to
remedy, in a short time, the accumulated problems of the past 30 years.
The Armenian Patriarch had been insisting on the immediate
departure of the commission, arguing that, even if it only got as far as
Erzurum, its rumoured approach would exercise a calming effect in the
southern regions like Bitlis, Van, etc., and that when it reached Erzurum, it
would be able to see to, or report on, the urgent steps necessary for the relief of
the areas suffering from famine. The most affected districts were Kinis, Mu~,
other parts of the Bitlis Vilayet (Province), Hacin and Zeytun in the north of
the Provinces ofAleppo and Adana, and the regions round Kayseri. Many of
the Armenian and Muslim villages were equally affected. Charitable
organisations all over the world were raising money in order to help the
afflicted people, particularly the Christians 25 .

Armenian extremism perpetuated

Despite the economic situation in some parts of the Empire, there was
no doubt that the revival of the constitution had greatly ameliorated the

24 Walker, op. cit., p. 182.

25 FO 371/762 / 327: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Pera, 27.12.1908.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1307

position of the Armenians, as confirmed by the British vice-consul at Van,

Captain Dickson. The attitude of the notorious revolutionary Dashnak
Society had altered. That society had now begun to exercise its influence
more in Russian territory than in Turkey, as it opposed the Russian
Government more than the Turkish one. The restoration by the Russian
Government to the Armenian Church of its lands was attributed to its
activity.
At the time when the leaders of the Young Turk movement were stili in
exile, trying to form every kind of combination through which to overthrow
the misrule of the Palace, the chief of the Armenian revolutionaries had
imbided the hope that, in return for any assistance they might render in
attaining this end, they would obtain some measure of decentralisation that
would go far to establish one or two purely "Armenian provinces", but, as
the regenerated Ottoman Government was aiming at the establishment of a
united Ottoman nationality without distinction of race or religion, their
disappointment was great.
Even British Vice-Consul Captain Dickson believed that the aims of the
Dashnak Society were "preposterously ambitious", and that they hoped for
the establishment of an Armenian republic, formed out of portions of
Turkish, Russian, and Persian provinces, from which the non-Armenian
elements would gradually be excluded. Dickson informed Lowther that the
Armenian clergy were exhorting their flocks to marry young and to beget
large families so as to swamp these other elements. Moreover, the Dashnaks
were trying to get all the disputes referred to themselves for arbitration and
not to Turkish courts; they were stili levying money contributions on their
fellow nationals; and they were discouraging foreign missions as injurious to
the maintenance of the national spirit. This was reflected in a printed
programme of the Dashnak Society which Captain Dickson had sent to the
British ambassador, and which, in the main, substantiated his statements. It
embodied, in a crude form, the most extreme of the socialistic tendencies of
Western Europe.
Meanwhile, although negotiations between the delegates of the C.U.P.
and the Armenians of Bitlis about future measures to be adopted in Eastern
Anatolia had been suddenly broken off, yet the possibility of eventually
arriving at an understanding was by no means excluded. The leading
Armenians of the Bitlis district were gradually coming round to the view,
which was very much that of the Armenian Patriarch, that it would be to
their best interests to work together with the Young Turk Party, and while
1308 SALAH~~R. SONYEL

insisting on adequate protection for their lives and property, not to

embarrass the authorities by persisting with extravagant demands. The
Dashnakists in Erzurum, too, were strongly urging their compatriots to
conduct themselves on these lines, whilst from Harput came the news that
there was a considerable amount of unrest among the people. The Turks of
the district were increasingly jealous of the preferential treatment accorded
to the Armenians, and suspicious of the local branch of the C.U.P. They had
formed a rival "Committee of Islam" there. In the Adana Vilayet, however,
the situation was quiet 26 .
Since the election, the Armenians in general, and the Dashnakists in
particular, had been more subdued than previously, though their relations
with the local Turks, particularly in the Van Province, had never been really
warm. The native Muslims of Van detested the Armenians for their past
deeds, and resented to see them enjoying privileges giyen by the new regime.
Their animosity, which was easily excited, was directed principally against
the Dashnakists and their Russian leaders, Vramian, Aram and Ishkhan, as
it was they who were striving to procure the punishment of the tribal and
other Muslims for what they claimed to be past ofrences. At one of the
numerous public meetings that the Armenians delighted to hold, some
Dashnakists had spoken, advocating atheism. The population was furious,
and a small not ensued, while the Armenist and the Hintchakist sections,
jealous of the prestige of their Dashnakist rivals, had fanned the excitement
of the people. There was, for a time, real danger of a serious faction fight in
the Armenian quarter; but this was averted, mainly by the efiörts of
Vramian, the Dashnak leader. This situation and its cause served as a
pretext to increase the dislike of the local Muslims for the Dashnakists. The
uneasiness had increased by the known fact that the Armenians, according
to British Vice-Consul Captain Dickson, had been receiving revolvers by the
hundred through the post 27 .
The Province of Erzurum, on the other hand, had enjoyed a
remarkable freedom from disorder. The Armenians had contributed their
fair share towards the maintenance of order, and had shown a commendable
desire to avoid offending the susceptibilities of their Muslim fellow-
countrymen, with the result that the good relations between the two

26 FO 371/762/3123: Lowther to Grey, conf~ dential despatch, Pera, 18.1.1909.

27 FO 371/774/15584: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, ~stanbul, 204. 1 909,
enclosing copy of despatch from Captain Bertram Dickson, Van, 31.3.1909.
 ADANA INCIDENTS I 309

communities, inaugurated by the celebrations of August and September

908, had been satisfactorily maintained. In this respect the Gregorian
bishop of Erzurum, M. Sempad, had rendered valuable service by using his
influence over his flock in the interests of order and tranquillity.
The British consul there, Colonel H.S. Shipley, reported that he
regarded the situation as fairly encouraging for the future, but an
unfavourable impression was produced among the Muslims, for some time
past, because arms were being imported into the Armenian villages from
across the frontier. Shipley believed that this gun running was perhaps
exaggerated. He had been assured by certin leading members of the local
Dashnak organisation, with whom he had spoken on the matter, that in no
case was a systematic arming of the population being attempted, nor did it
form part of their programme. Nevertheless, any importation of arms was a
doubtful expediency as they might be made use of by the enemies of the new
regime for their own purpose. This also formed an obstacle to the attainment
of complete understanding between the two nationalities as a local C.U.P.
leader had more than once pointed out to Consul Shipley.
There was a further source of misunderstanding between the two
communities, and this was caused by the indiscreet utterances, indulged in
from time to time, by the younger members of the Dashnak organisation,
about a future policy to be adopted by the Armenians. Shipley had, on a
number of occasions, received complaints from prominent Tuks about the
bad effect these utterances had had on the Muslims. It was difficult to
persuade the latter that such clamours need not be taken too seriously. In
conversations which Shipley had had with the leading local Armenians, he
had invariably found that they strongly deprecated any adventurous policy,
and expressed the view that their condition as a nation had vastly improved
as compared with what it was only a few years earlier, and that their best
chance of making full use of the opportunity now afforded them for
recuperation was to remain quiet, and to prove to the Turks that the interests
of the two peoples were not antagonistic. The matter was well put to Shipley
by one of the Armenian leaders, who observed:
"In case of trouble the army would be for us, or against us. In the
former event we have nothing to fear, while in the latter
contingency such arms as we could import would be entirely
useless" 28 .

28 FO 371/774415573: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Istanbul, 184.1909,

enclosing copy of despatch from Consul H.S. Shipley, Erzurum, 5.4.1909.
~ po SALAIII R. SONYEL

But, unfortunately, as the Adana incidents would prove later, evil counsels
prevailed upon some Armenians and forced them into a position of
internecine confrontation with their Turkish compatriots.

The counter revolution of ~3th April ~gog (31 Mart Vak'as~)

The Kamil Pasha Cabinet, which had replaced that of Sait Pasha in
was considered to be an Anglophil administration, so much so
August 1908,
that, King Edward VII is believed to have ignored the rules of international
protocol by sending a telegram to Sultan Abdülhamit, congratulating him
for having brought Kamil Pasha to the Grand Vizierate. In view of this, the
C.U.P., which had masterminded the Young Turk Revolution, although
not in favour of the new Grand Vizier, had hesitated in having him ousted
from power 29 .
In the autumn of 1908,as the general election results began to be
announced, on 3oth November Kamil Pasha made a number of changes in
his Cabinet in order to placate the C.U.P. Despite some attempts to oust
him from power, he nevertheless managed to receive an unanimous vote of
conf~dence in parliament on t 3th January I gog after having promised, it was
said, to respect the wishes of the C.U.P.
Early in February, making use of his enhanced authority, he strove to
undermine the influence of the C.U.P., but this resulted in an internecine
struggle between him and that organisation. At the same time there was a
Cabinet crisis. On ~~oth February, the resignation of Arif Hikmet Pasha, the
Navy Minister, which was tendered earlier, was accepted, and he was
provisionally succeeded by Marshal Hüsnü Pasha. When Ali R~za Pasha,
the Minister of War, was appointed Commissioner for Egypt, he was
succeeded by Naz~m Pasha, commander of the Second Army Corps. This
latter appointment, however, was effected without consulting with the
C.U.P. and the other members of the Cabinet, and as a result many Cabinet
Ministers resigned in protest.

29 Tahsin Pasa: Abdülhamit ve Tdd~z Hain-alan (Abdülhamit and Y~ld~z Memories), Istanbul
1931, p. 45; Ali Haydar Mithat: Hahralanm, 1872-1946 (My Reminiscences, 1872-1946),
Istanbul 1946, p. 199; Hilmi Kamil Bayur: Sadrazam Klima Pala (Kamil Pasha, the Grand
Vizier), Ankara 1954, p. 244. The British first dragoman was reported to have described Kamil
Pasha as "madly pro-British": see G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley: British documents on the
origin of the War, London 1928, pp. 256-7; Sina Alqin: 31 Mart Olay~, (The 31st March Event),
Ankara 1972, p. 31.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1311

On ~~ th February an interpellation was submitted to the Chamber of

Deputies against Kamil Pasha 30, who began to foster rumours in the press
that the C.U.P. intended to remove Abdülhamit from the throne and to
replace him by Yusuf Izzettin Efendi, by-passing Re~at Efendi 31 . Two days
later, however, the Cabinet denied these rumours 32 . Meanwhile the Grand
Vizier was doing his utmost to remove the army from the influence of, and
weaken further, the C.U.P., 33 but without success. His attempts, however,
resulted in a vote of no confidence in his Cabinet, which was carried on I 3th
February 34 . He was ousted from power and replaced by Hüseyin Hilmi
Pasha, the C.U.P. favourite.
It is interesting to note here the German version of the weaknesses of the
Kamil Pasha Cabinet as narrated in a cipher telegram which M. Marschall,
the German ambassador, sent to Berlin on 29th April 1909. According to the
German ambassador, Britain had made the mistake of interfering too much
in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the Grand
Vizierate of Kamil Pasha, when she was claimed to have practically run the
affairs of the Empire. Ambassador Marschall also reported on 3rd June that,
according to Ferit Pasha, a bill was prepared by Kamil Pasha, authorising
the appointment of a commission with extraordinary powers to inspect the
Eastern Provinces of Turkey where the Armenians lived; and this had caused
much opposition among the Muslims. When Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, who was
Minister of the Interior, at the time had pointed out the disadvantages of this
bill, Kamil Pasha had admitted that he himself had prepared the bill
together with British Ambassador, Sir Gerard Lowther, to whom he had
giyen an assurance that parliament would approve it 35 .
After the appointment of Hilmi Pasha as Grand Vizier, the C.U.P. sent
Mehmet Arslan to assure the British Embassy that the new Cabinet would
continue to follow a pro-British policy 36 . But the British became cool
towards the C.U.P. 37. From then onwards the political situation

30 Dcdam newspaper, Istanbul, 12.2. ~ gog.

31 Ak~in p. 33; Yan in newspaper, Istanbul, 15.2.1909; ~lcdam, 19.2.1 909.
32 Tanin, 14.2. ~ gog.
33 The Times, 6.2.1909; Ikinci Abdülhamit'in Hat~ra Defteri (The Book of Memories of
Abdülhamit II), Istanbul 1960, pp• 1 34-5; Ak~ in p• 35.
34 Ak~in p. 36.
35 Dit GTOSSe Politik, no. 9600/132; Ak~in pp. 290-1.
36 Tanin, 15.2.1 909.
37 Ak~in p. 38.
1312 SALAH! R. SONYEL

deteriorated. The opposition never accepted the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet, and
began to incite the religious circles against it and against the C.U.P. There
was also much displeasure among army ranks, in particular among a
number of displaced officers 38 .
By the ~~ 2th of April the situation became worse, although attempts were
being made to calm the people. The first attempt came from the Armenian
Dashnaktsutiun Society which published a circular calling upon all political
parties and societies to meet and terminate their "illegal fights", and to
cooperate on points of mutual accord. The Adam newspaper, on the other
hand, suggested the establishment of a coalition (national) government 39 .
But nothing came out of these attempts.
On the night of I2 / I 3th April, soldiers of the Fourth Expeditionary
Force stationed at Ta~k~~ la mutinied, tied up their officers and besieged the
Chamber of Deputies. They were carrying white, red and green flags, the
last mentioned being the emblem of the ~ttihad-~~Muhammediye
(Mohammedan Unity), an extremist Muslim organisation set up by Dervi~~
Vahdeti, a Turkish Cypriot preacher ". Soon the rebellion spread to the
other units in the capital 41 . Many young oflicers and other adherents of the
constitutional movemet were killed, parliament was raided and several
deputies murdered. The leading members of the C.U.P. went into hiding.
Talat Bey, the future Minister of the Interior and formerly a telegraph clerk,
was said to have been sheltered by Aknouni, the leader of the Istanbul
Dashnak Armenians 42 .
The police and the army joined forces in guarding the embassies and
key positions. But soon fighting broke out between them and the loyalist
troops under Mahmut Muhtar Pasha. The rebels were joined by softas
(theological students). They demanded an end to the corruption of
government based on Western and secular ideas, and a return to the
principles of ~eriat (Sharia - Sacred Law of Islam). They also demanded an
amnesty, the replacement of army officers, who should be expelled from the

bid., pp. 46-7.

38
Tanin and ~kdam, 9.4.1909; Ak~in p. 50.
39
40 Volkan, 16.4.1 909.
41 Mevlanzade Rifat: Osmaniden bir yaprak (A leaf from Ottoman Reform), Cairo
1329 (old style), pp. 80-90.
42 Some Armenian writers claim without any evidence that Aknouni was one of the first
Armenian notables whose death warrant was signed by Talat Pasha latter; see Stephen C.
Savjian: A trip through historic Armenia, New York 1977, p. 401.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1313

capital, and the construction of a navy 43 . The Volkan newspaper whipped

up enthusiasm in the devout with references to the blind imitation of the
West, and an "epoch of devils". The Sultan unwisely aligned himself with
the counter-revolutionaries, ordering the Chamber to respect the ~eriat, and
pardoning the rebels-although some Turkish historians admit that it is
difficult to estimate his role in the reaction. Ismail Kemal says that he had no
role 44; others argue to the contrary.
When Grand Vizier Hilmi Pasha learned the demands of the rebels
from the ~eyhülisldm (Sheikh-ul-Islam - Muslim Religious Dignitary), he
tendered his resignation which was accepted by the Sultan, who then called
upon Ahmet Tevfik Pasha to form the new Cabinet. Tevfik Pasha was
considered to be an Anglophil, despite the fact that his wife was German 45.
In his Cabinet which took office on 14th April, Rifat Pasha, then Turkish
ambassador in London, became Minister of Foreign Affairs, whilst Gabriel
Noradounkian, an Armenian, was appointed Minister of Commerce and
Public Works. The new Grand Vizier then sent telegrams to the provinces
advising "harmony between the difkrent nationalities" 46 . But despite this
advice, bloody incidents erupted at Adana on ~~4th April, the day after the
counter-revolution in Istanbul. These events are dealt with extensively
below. Here we must follow the course of events that led to the f~ nal collapse
of the counter-revolution.
In Salonica, Mahmut ~evket Pasha, the Young Turk general in
command of the Third Army, decided to send troops to crush the movement.
The troops arrived at Çatalça on ~~ 6th April, and frantic attempts were made
to prevent their entry into Istanbul where a bloodbath between the opposing
factions would have been inevitable; but these attempts were not successful.
This Army of Operations ( Hareket Ordusu), as it was called, carried on its
advance and arrived at Ye~ilköy (San Stefano) where it was received by a
parliamentary delegation. On 2oth April the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun
party sent a delegation to Ye~ilköy, and announced that it supported the
Army of Operations 47 . This delegation consisted of women, who presented

43 Ak~in, p. 6g.
44 See Ikdam, 15.4.1909.
45 Gooch and Temperley p. ii.

46 Ak~in pp. 89-go.

47 Yunus Nadi: Ihti11 ve Ink~lab-: Osmani (Revolution and Ottoman Reform), Istanbul 1325

(old style), pp. 144 and 157; ~kdam, 22.4.1909; Ak~in p• 234-
Bellek,: C. LI, 83
1314 SALM-1f R. SONYEL

to that army a white flag and a bouquet of flowers, while Vartkes Efendi, an
Armenian deputy, made a speech. The Armenian Hintchak party also sent a
delegation offering volunteers. The Armenians were thanked and told that
volunteers were not necessary 48 .
Meanwhile the Dashnaks persisted in their at-tempts to procure joint
action against Abdülhamit and the reactionaries 4°. An inter-party
committee was set up, which met on 23rd April under the presidency of Dr.
Ibrahim Temo. At that meeting, which was not attended by the C.U.P.,
Maloumian Efendi, the Dashnak leader, suggested that a seven-member
delegation should be sent to parliament and the Government in order to
inform them about the aims and duties of the committee, to inculcate in
them the necessity of solidarity among all the parties and groups for the
safety of the country and for the defence of the constitution, and to suggest
that inter-party strife and inter-racial conflicts should be terminated. These
suggestions should also be published in the press. The army should be
thanked for its action in favour of the constitution, and security should be
provided throughout the country 50.
Parliament met on 23rd April 51 and passed a resolution emphasising
the importance of the constitution, and of defending the unity and
tranquillity of the different races. Hagop Babikian, an Armenian deputy,
had tried unsuccessfully to make the wording of this resolution much
stricter 52. On the following day (24th April) the Army of Operations
entered Istanbul and besieged the Y~ld~z Palace. It was claimed that the
ambassador of one of the Great Powers (Russia was suspected) had sent an
emissary to the Palace who saw Ali Cevat and asked him if the Sultan had a
wish (in the sense of escaping in order to save himself). Ali Cevat claims that
he had brought this to the notice of the Sultan who had replied that he was
pleased to hear of this interest shown in him, but he did not wish to take up
the offer 53.
According to another Turkish writer, Ali Haydar, a few days before the
dethronement of Sultan Abdülhamit, the Russian ambassador had

49 Ak~in p. 249.
49 ~ bid., p. 264; lkdam, 234. 1 909.
5° Adam, 26.4.1909; Mizan, 11.43909; Ak~in p. 265-6.
51 Takvim-i Vekayi, 199, 20.4.1325.
52 ~kdam, 23.4.1909.
53 Ali Cevat and Faik Re~it Unat: Ikinci Me~rutiyetin Utku ve Otuzbir Mart Hadis~si (The
declaration of the Second Constitution and the 3Ist March Event), Ankara 1960, P- 74.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1315

suggested to him (the Sultan) to leave Turkey on a Russian ship. The

German Emperor was said to have made a similar offer 54 . It was also
claimed that the British King had sent Dragoman Fitzmaurice to the Palace
to ask Abdülhamit if he wished Britain to send the Mediterranean fleet to
Istanbul. Abdülhamit was said to have politely turned down the ()Her 55 .
On 27th April the Ottoman Parliament decided to dethrone
Abdülhamit II and to offer the throne to his brother, Mehmet Re~at, who
became Mehmet V. In the fetva (bul!) issued by the ~eyhülisldm (religious
dignitary), Ziyaettin Efendi and the Fetva Emini (issuer of the bul!), Hac~~
Nuri Efendi, Abdülhamit was accused of deletions from the books of ~eri
(Shaira) and of forbidding and burning of some of these books; of wasting
public resources, of killing people without Shariatic reason, of imprisoning
and banishing them, of wavering from the path of righteousness despite his
promise not to do so, and of being involved in sedition and "massacres".
Among the delegation who went to inform him officially about his
dethronement was Aram Efendi, an Armenian Catholic 56. Esat Pasha
(Toptani) was authorised to tell Abdülhamit that he was dethroned. "Sire,
we have been authorised by the national Parliament to inform you about its
decision of today", he remarked, and went on: "the nation, with afetva, has
dethroned Your Majesty. The nation also guarantees your property and life
and those of your children and family". Abdülhamit was flabbergasted and
did not say anything for a minute; then he murmured: "This is my fate! I
have served my nation for so many years. My value has not been
appreciated. But everything will soon be found out. God is great. One day
justice will be done" 57.
Abdülhamit was exiled to Salonika (Selanik) and lingered on until
1 918 when he died peacefully in his bed in Istanbul where he was brought
after the loss of the former city during the First World War 58 . The fate of his
Grand Vizier, Tevfik Pasha, followed a slightly difrerent course. He was

54 Mithat: Hat~ralar~m, p. 226.

55 Hasan Amca: Do~mayan Hürriyet (Unborn Liberty), Istanbul 1958, p. 72; Ak~in pp. 265-7
and 284.
56 ikdam, 284. 1 909.
57 Tahsin Uzer: Makedonya E~kiyal~k Tarihi ve Son Osmanl: Yönetimi (History of Macedonian
Cuerrilla Warfare and the Last Ottoman Government), Ankara 1979, pp. 245 and 298-300.
58 See also Public Record Office, Foreign Office documents: FO 37 ~~ / 7 ~~ 15921: Lowther

to Grey, Istanbul, telegram dated 27.4.1909.

1316 SALAH! R. SONYEL

asked by the new Sultan to stay on in a Cabinet reconstructed on ~~ st May;

but that Cabinet lasted only four days. Tevfik Pasha was forced by the
C.U.P. to resign on 5th May, and was replaced by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha.

The Adana incidents

The winter of 908-9 had passed quietly in the Anatolian provinces,
although the population suffered from the result of a bad harvest, and in
many parts of the country subscriptions had to be opened to carry the needy
people through the cold season. According to British reports, the restoration
of the constitutional regime had so far produced little improvement in the
situation: the Muslims were becoming discontented with the new order
which had hardly brought them any advantage. In the words of British
Ambassador Lowther, "the ancient unquestioned dominance of the Turks"
had been shaken - at all events in appearance - by ideas of liberty, equality
and fraternity about which there had been so much talk since the restoration
of the constitution 59 . The Christians, on the other hand, and particularly
the Armenians, were benefiting in many ways 13¥ the greater liberty allowed
to them, and were easily importing arms and ammunition, "in the first
instance for self defence", claimed Lowther, and later on in an "aggressive
and self assertive vein of enthusiasm", which led them to discourse on "the
great destinies of the Armenian race, and on the eventual establishment of an
Armenian principality".
The Armenians, points out Telford Waugh, showed themselves
arrogant and boastful over their new equality, as was seen in Adana 60.
Moreover, their constitution and national assembly had worsened the
arrogance of the Armenian intellectuals. Even Armenian writers admit that
their coreligionists were allowed to sing previously prohibited patriotic,
national and folk songs that hailed the independence of an imagined
Armenian state in Cilicia, i.e., the Adana Province 61 , where, according to
British sources, they constituted 75,000 of a total population of 393,000 of
whom 290,000 were Muslims 62 , and according to Turkish sources, they

59 FO 371/772/17612: Lowther to Grey, Istanbul, confidential despatch dated 4.5.1909.

60 Sir Telford Waugh: Turkey, resterday, Today and Tommorrow, London 1930, p. 129.
61 David Kherdian: The road from home: the story of an Armenian girl,
London 1980, p. X.
62 FO 371/4239/160318: W. Childs, Geographical Section, PID, Foreign Office,
10.2.1920.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 131 7

constituted 57,686 of a total population of 4138,563 of whom 341, 903 were

Muslims 63 .
Any Armenian who could write, began to publish odes, poetry, stories,
etc., which had little to do with the truth. Particularly on the anniversaries
of the establishment of their national assembly they acted provocatively, and
in their speeches, asserted their "grea t ideal". They also staged
revolutionary plays and recited national marches inciting the Turks 64.
They sang revolutionary songs loudly almost every day, in the streets and in
Armenian houses and schools, whilst Armenian artists painted pictures
that would arouse the national sentiments of the Armenian people. These
pictures were used on post-cards, stamps, cigarette packets, curtains in
theatres, and on pillows. Thus the Armenian intelligentsia tried their best to
provoke the Armenian people to revolt, whilst the Ottoman Government,
true to the spirit of the new order preferred to adhere to its principle of non-
interference in the freedom of conscience, and allowed the growing anarchy
to go on unchecked. It has been suggested that this was considered to be the
greatest weakness of the Ottoman Government 65 .
The more the Armenians talked and recited poetry, and the more they
armed themselves, the more they aroused the anxiety and alarm of the
Turkish people, who detected in the aspirations of the Armenians, and in the
gospel preached by their Hintchak and Dashnak societies, which did much
to stir them, an intention to take vengeance on the Turks and "to wipe their
race off the face of the earth" 66 . The Turks were also alarmed by the
exhortations of the Armenians to arm themselves delivered by Mgr.
Mousheg, the Gregorian bishop of Mersin, throughout the country
particularly in Adana and its region where the bishop had a commercial
interest in the sale of f~ rearms. British Ambassador Lowther believed that the
Armenian bishop was largely responsible for inflaming the passions of the
Armenian people and the fears of the Turks. The British vice-consul at

63 FO 371/4229/86552: Admiral Calthorpe to Lord Curzon, despatch, Istanbul,

24.5.1919, enclosing a pamphlet from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on population
statistics, dated 14.3.1914.
64 Parmaks~ zoglu p. 26; Sadi Koça~: Tarih boyunca Ermeniler ve Türk-Ermeni Ili
~kileri
(Armenians and Turco -Armenian relations throughout history) Ankara 1967, pp. 142-4.
65 Koça~~pp. 139 and 145.
66 FO 371/772/17612: Lowther to Grey, .confidential despatch, Pera, 4.5.1909; see also
Christopher J. Walker: Armenia: the survival of a nation, London 1980, p. 183.
1318 SALAHI R. SONYEL

Mersin, Major Doughty Wylie, recognised this to such an extent that he

later prevented the bishop's landing at Mersin on his return to his diocese, in
the interests of public order 67.
According to a British Embassy report, under the constitution all men
could bear arms. From the "delightful novelty of the thing", thousands of
revolvers were purchased. Even schoolboys had them and, boy-like,
flourished them about. But worse followed: the swagger of the arm-bearing
Armenian and his ready tongue irritated the "ignorant" Turks. Threats and
insults passed on both sides. Certain Armenian leaders, delegates from
Istanbul, and priests ("an Armenian priest is in his way an autocrat") urged
their congregations to buy arms. It was done openly, indiscreetly, and, in
some cases, it might be said wickedly. What can be thought of a preacher, a
Russian Armenian, wondered the report, who, in a church in Adana where
there had never been a "massacre", preached revenge for the "martyrs of
1895"? "Revenge", Bishop Mousheg said, "murder for murder. Buy arms. A
Turk for every Armenian of 1895". An American missionary who was
present got up and left the church. Bishop Mousheg toured the province
preaching that he who had a coat should seli it and buy guns 68 .
According to Cemal Pasha, who was appointed to Adana following the
incidents there 69 this "young and ambitious Armenian priest", was also one
of the Hintchakist leaders. He imported guns and revolvers from Europe in
order to arm his own men. He boasted that the Armenians who were then
armed, would never again be afraid of incidents such as those of 1894; if a
single Armenian was hurt, ten Turks would pay in return. Because of the
weakness of the local government, his wicked incitements went on unabated,
and soon began to bear fruit.
The relations of the two peoples grew more strained as the whisperings
of fanatics and reactionary agents added to the tension. The strain and
tension of the situation had become so unbearable, the sense of insecurity and
nervousness throughout the province had reached such a pitch that only a
spark was needed to set alight the conflagration. Even the reform
commission, set up by the Government at the instance of the Armenian
Patriarch in the autumn of 1908 to make a tour of inspection, to remove

67 FO 371/772 / 1 7612: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Pera, 4.5.1909.

68 FO 424/220, no. 48, enclosure; see also Kâmuran Gürün: Ermeni Dosyas~~ (Armenian
File), Ankara 1983, pp. 167-8.
69 Hattralar (Memoirs), Istanbul 1959, pp. 345-6.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1319

corrupt officials, to restore any land "illegally seized", and to introduce

various administrative reforms, had resigned in a body before they had even
started, having realised the hopelessness of the task before them.
Nevertheless the situation at Konya and Ayd~ n in early April 19439 was
perfectly quiet to all outward appearances, despite the report sent to British
Ambassador Lowther by his vice-consul at Mersin, Major Doughty Wylie,
that there were disturbing elements before the surface, such as the large
importation of arms, and the dangerous weakness of the local authorities.
40,000 guns, revolvers and automatic pistols had been imported into the
province since the restoration of the constitution, reported the British vice-
consul. The judicial authorities had refused to condemn the quilty parties,
however overwhelming the proofs of their guilt might be, for fear of
incurring unpopularity, whilst the vali (governor-general) of Adana was
being strongly attacked in the local paper, which observed that he was a
good clerk but a bad governor; an honest man but one who was incapable of
action, and recommended him to return to Istanbul and resume his
occupation there as a secretary. Major Doughty Wylie's account indicated a
general spread of lawlessness, but he believed that there was nothing that a
small show of force would not at once put down, and the force, though small,
at the disposal of the authorities, was sufficient, if they would only use it
On ~~ 3th and 14th April reports were already spreading through the
provinces of the startling events which were then occurring in the capital.
On the night of the ~~4th an incident took place at Adana when an Armenian
shot down two Turks who were said to be trying to abduct his wife, and
immediately the whole town was in an uproar 71 . The British dragoman,
Athanasios Tripanis (of Greek origin), had reported the Adana incidents to
Major Doughty Wylie immediately. At the time there were more than the
normal number of Armenians in Adana and its surrounding villages, as it
was the time of the seasonal migration of Armenian workers from Mara~~to
gather in the barley harvest 72 .
As soon as Doughty Wylie received Tripanis's message, he decided to go
to Adana in person, and boarded the afternoon train on the ~~ 4th. He saw no
reason for exceptional precautions and took his wife with him. From the
train he began to suspect that things might be rather worse than he had

7° FO 371/771/26538: Lowther to Grey, despatch, Pera, 27.4.1909.

71 See also FO 371/772/ 17612: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Pera, 4.5.1909.
72 FO 371/242/219, p. 80.
1320 SALAH' R. SONYEL

anticipated: he saw the odd dead body near the track, and refugees running
panic-stricken towards the train. On I sth April he telegraphed Ambassador
Lowther, reporting that disorders had broken out at Adana in which a
number of persons had been killed, but British subjects were in no danger. So
far the Armenian quarter, which was armed, had not been attacked.
Nevertheless he thought that the trouble was spreading, and the situation at
Mersin and Tarsus appeared to him to be anxious 73. He had gone from
Mersin to Adana, having heard that the situation was very critical, and had
found "many people murdered on the way."
Meanwhile Ambassador Lowther was assured by the Porte that they
were doing all that was possible. Lowther, who was surprised by the news of
the incidents, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey on the following day that a
warship should be sent to Mersin. The situation at Adana had not improve.
He also suggested that a vessel should be present at Piraeus to await orders
owing to disorders anticipated at Bettut 74.
During the whole of the ~~sth, 16th and ~~7th April Adana became the
scene of wide disorders. At the first sound of firing, the Armenians rushed to
their own quarter, where they barricaded themselves and began to shoot at
the Turks, who, Major Doughty Wylie reported, hunted them out from
every corner and house-top, goaded on by hodjas (hocas - Muslim clerics)
and reactionaries. The vali, Cevat Bey, who was a man of good character,
but incapable of administering the province, and the ferik (local army
commandant), who was Mustafa Remzi Pasha, an old man 75, were
paralysed with shock, and retired to the shelter of the Konak (Government
House), making no effort to call out the soldiers who could easily have
quelled the mob, or to calm the storm. Major Doughty Wylie, the British
vice-consul, however, after his arrival at Adana, went straight to Tripanis's
house, which was near the station. There he changed into his uniform,
secured an escort, and set off to the Konak. He found himself in the midst of a
furious Turco-Armenian carnage 76. With about so Turkish soldiers, whom
he got the authorities to place at his disposal, and the commandant of
the gendarmerie, Major Doughty Wylie paraded up and down throughout
the city with bugles blowing, rescuing foreigners, placing guards over foreign
schools and missions and putting a stop to the fighting wherever he went.

73 FO 424/219 confidential 9532, no. 25: Lowther to Grey, telegram, Istanbul, 1 5.4-1909.
74 Ibid., no. 29: Lowther to Grey, telegram, Istanbul, 16.4.1909.
73 Cemal Pa~a Hattralar (Memoirs), Istanbul 1959, pp. 345-6.
76 FO 424/ 21
9/P. 80.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1321

"Wherever we went the fighting ceased", he later reported to Lowther.

"We cleared the streets sometimes by charging with the bayonet and
sometimes by firing over the head of the crowd" 77 . Alternatively, Doughty
Wylie had a crier (de/tat) ordering everyone to go home, warning them that
he intended to fire down the street. But this proved only partially effective,
since the city was large and impossible for one group of men to control at all
times.
By midday the city's main bazaar was on fire, whilst the Turks and the
Armenians were engaged in house-to-house fighting, which was almost
impossible to control. An urgent message came to Major Doughty Wylie to
go down to the Tobacco Regie factory, where there were many wounded.
While there, he was shot by an Armenian at close range, and his arm was
broken. Doughty Wylie later commented on this incident as follows: "He
was probably deceived by my military uniform into thinking I was a Turkish
Officer, or else too wild with terror or despair to know what he was doing".
His injury did not prevent him thinking fast: suppose the Turks learnt that
the British vice-consul had been wounded by an Armenian? Would this not
be a signal for a general storm on the Armenian quarter?
He sent the commandant of the gendarmerie back to the Konak with an
urgent message to the two officials there that, if they stopped the incidents,
he would not demand any indemnity or punishment. He backed up this
request with a reminder to them that he had already telegraphed for a
British warship, and that if the outbreak continued he would hold them
responsible. As a partical solution he suggested that the Armenian quarter
be sealed off with regular troops and good officers; no one should be allowed
in or out; and the rest of the town should be patrolled, with people being
driven indoors, by shooting if necessary. Having despatched the
commandant of the gendarmerie he returned home to tend to his wound. It
was mainly owing to his courage and bravery that, wherever he appeared at
the head of a body of Turkish soldiers, bloodshed ceased - at all events
temporarily 78 . Major Doughty Wylie, whom Lang erroneously bases at
Konya instead of Mersin, and who never even mentions that he was shot by
an Armenian 79 , was later awarded the CMG and the Turkish Order of the
Mecidiye for his bravery 8°.

77 Ibid., p. 81.
78 FO 371/772/17612: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Pera, 4.5.1909.
79 David Marshall Lang: The Armenians, a people in Exile,
London 1981, p. 14.
80 H.V.F. Winstone: Gertrude Beli, London 1978, pp. ~~19-20. C.H.M. Doughty Wylie was a
close friend of Gertrude Beli; he died at Gallipoli in 1915.
1322 SALikl-II R. SONYEL

Meanwhile the local authorities were paralysed with shock. According

to Doughty Wylie, the reserves who were called up by the commandant, and
who were roaming the streets, "did an infinite amount of harm". Much
damage was also done by the looting villagers and by the "frenzied
population" 81 . The Muslim leaders were divided, some trying to quieten
the crowd, other taking rifles and joining in the mel. By the morning of the
~~ 6th the outbreak had died down, for the time being - not least because HMS
Swiftsure and other foreign warships were cruising off the Cilician coast.
Aday earlier (on the ~~ 5th) the Ottoman Parliament at San Stefano had
met to deal, inter alia, with telegrams from Adana describing the serious
situation there, and decided to advise the people by telegram, and to ask the
local authorities about the measures taken to quell the incidents. Vartkes
Efendi, an Armenian deputy, declared that the real culprits were the anti-
constitutional officials who should be warned strictly and even be punished
in an exemplary way 82 .
It was only on the t 7th April that the vali and Major Doughty Wylie
could prevail on the Muslim notables and hodjas to agree to make peace
with the Armenian priests and civilians. From the morning of that day the
work of rescue and relief began. By the ~~gth April, when ~~oo troops had
arrived from Beirut, the town of Adana was quiet again, but the situation
remained serious for some time longer. The fighting was still going on, and
martiallaw was declared in Adana. Troops were being rushed there from
everywhere.
In Istanbul an Armenian delegation went to the Porte to see the Grand
Vizier, whilst the Ottoman Government, at its meeting attended by Naz~ m
and Izzet Pashas, took a number of important decisions about Adana 83 . It
dismissed the Governor-General Cevat Bey and replaced him by Mustafa
Zihni Pasha, the mutasarr~f (governor) of Burdur. The same fate was shared
by the local commandant, Ferik Mustafa Remzi Pasha 84 . It declared that
henceforth the governor-general could directly demand from the army
commanders the despatch of troops and then notify the Ministry of War
instead of going in a round-about way of asking the Porte, then the Minister

81 FO 424/219, p. 82.
82 Ak~in, p. 191.
83 Meclis-i Vükelâ ~nazbatas~~ (Minutes of the Council of Ministers), yol. 127, 19.4.1325
(1909).
84 Adam, 19.4.19o9; Ak~in p. 268.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1323

of War and then the commanders 85 . The Ottoman War Office announced,
on the evening of 18th April, that no incident had occurred for the past 24
hours. Nevertheless the Government decided to send a cruiser and a number
of armed sailors to Adana 86 .
The ~'eyhülislâm (Sheikh-ul-Islam), in a telegram to the Multü of Adana,
reminded him that massacres were against the ~eriat and against the law of
humanity. Ohannes Efendi, the Armenian Patriarchal Vicar, in a telegram
to the Armenian Murahhas (Delegate) of Adana, asked for the cessation of the
fighting, and expressed his surprise about the causes of such "anti-
constitutional actions at a time of liberty" 87 . On 23rd April, Maloumian,
the Dashnak leader, suggested at an inter-party meeting that the Adana and
Mara~~incidents should be terminated, and that those responsible should be
punished 88 . On that day Parliament examined a telegram from the
Catholicos of Cilicia, Mgr. Sehak, who had resigned, complaining that for
the past two days Haccin was under fire from the neighbouring Muslim
people and from the army, and asking for an end to the situation. Parliament
decided to send a telegram to Adana again calling upon the officials there to
carry out their duties, and reminding them of their responsibilities 89 .
The arrival, on or about the 25th April, of several British and other
foreign warships at Mersin and Iskenderun (Alexandretta), including
French and Russian vessels which had received orders to go to Turkish
waters, did much towards restoring the confidence of the non-Muslim
population 90 . German, Austrian and American ships joined them in order
to protect their nationals 91 . Russia also was reported to have sent warships
to Burgaz 92 and Akp~ nar, but the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Isvolski,
assured Turkish Ambassador Turhan Pasha that no Russian ship had left
port 93 . Apparently Russia was trying to procure the support of the other
Great Powers in order to stage a naval demonstration. Austria and
Germany, however, were not in favour as this would give Russia the right of

85 Ak~in p. 250.
86 Meclis-i Vükeld mazbatas~, yol. 126, 6.4.1329 (1909); Ak~in p. 205.
87 Ikdam, 20.4.1909.
88 Ibid., 26.43909.
89 Takvim-i Vekayi, no. 200-1, 21-2, April 1325 (1909); Ak~ in p. 287.
9° lkdam, 17.4.1909; Yunus Nadi pp. 68-9; Ali Cevat and Unat, p. 55.
91 Die Grosse Politik, 27 I , no. 9588/37.
92 Ibid., no. 9584/ 24.
93 Hariciye (Foreign Ministry), carton no. 594/6, no. 191.
1 324 SALM-11 R. SONYEL

access to the Straits. Austria, therefore, was very late in sending her
warships, whilst Germany had reluctantly decided to send ships in order to
satisfy the demands of her nationals and as a counterpoise to the actions of
the other Powers 94. The only countries that were keen in sending warships
to Turkish waters were France and Greece 95 . The visit of the captains of the
French, German and British men-of-war to the vali had produced a good
effect 96.
Meanwhile, the movement which had begun in Adana was spreading
far and wide over the neighbouring districts 97 . Simultaneously with the
outbreaks at Adana, there were terrible scenes between the Turks and the
Armenians at Bahçe, Mara~, Hamidiye, Antakya, Tarsus, Payas, Hacin,
Erzin, Dörtyol, etc 98 . It was not only on the Cilician plain that the Turks
and the Armenians were killing one another, the whole of the coastline
round the gulf of Iskenderun was affected. Many Turks and Armenians lost
their lives 99 .
The vali of Aleppo had declared himself unable to restore tranquillity,
but had sent instructions for the protection of British subjects, who were
collected in the British Vice-Consulate. It was believed that the influence of
the ~eyhülisMm and the Armenian Patriarch alone was likely to avail, and
Ambassador Lowther proposed that the former should attempt to exercise
such influence with the Muftus of the Vilayets of Diyarbak~r and Aleppo, and
that similar action should be taken by the latter. In this connection it was
suggested at the British Foreign Office that perhaps a message from the
British Government might spur on the ~eyhülislân~. "The Armenians are our
special care, and I think we should say something", commented an official,
while Sir Edward Grey added: "We should do all we can with the
Constantinople (Istanbul) authorities" loo. The Armenian Patriarch and
the ~eyhülislâm did not hesitate to send instructions to the religious authorities
of Konya, where there were fears of disorders, and repeated their previous
orders to the Vilayets of Diyarbak~r and Aleppo 1".

94 Die Grosse Politik, 9582123, 9588137, 9589113 and 9591/17.

95 Ibid, 9590142; Ak~in pp. 147-8.
96 FO 371 / 771 / 15398: Lowther to Grey, telegram, Istanbul, 24.4.1909.
97 See also FO 37 1 /771 / 1 4851: Lowther to Grey, cipher telegram, Istanbul, 20.4. 1 909.
98 G.F. Abbott: Turkey in Transition, London 1909, p. 304; H. Charles Woods: The Danger
Zone of Europe, London 1911,pp. 155-7.
99 Woods, p. 16o.
i°° FO 371/ 771 / 150 ~~3: Lowther to Grey, confidential telegram, Istanbul, 21.4.1909.
101 Ibid., doc. no. 15155: Lowther to Grey, telegram, Istanbul, 22.43309; ~kdam,19.4.1909.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1325

There was much panic at Aleppo (Halep), Antep, and other nearby
towns, and at Konya, Kayseri and even Beirut, where periods of grave alarm
were recorded; but in most cases the local authorities, and notably the
mutasarr~f (governor) of Mersin among them, by vigorous measures and show
of determination, were able to prevent excesses or outbreaks until the arrival
of fresh troops, or of detachments from foreign warships, or until the news
reached the provinces of the deposition of the Sultan and the ultimate
victory of the constitutional party and the Young Turk regime.
By 25th April the ferocity of the incidents began to abate, and just as in
the capital the period of suspense and uncertainty had come to an end with
the entry of the army, so too in the provinces the reign of anarchy was abruptly
ended upon the restoration of some kind of authority in ~stanbul. Fresh troops
were despatched from the Roumelian Army, and the local authorities began
to face the grave and pressing problem of relief and shelter for the homeless
and orphaned refugees. But suddenly, on the evening of the 25th, soon after
the arrival of the new forces at Adana, fresh shots were heard in the
Armenian quarter, where some Armenian youths fired at the soldiers 102,
although pro-Armenian authors claim that it was the Turks who began the
firing 1°3.
The town was again in a blaze. Ali night long incidents went on, and by
the time Major Doughty Wylie had obtained assistance from the vali the next
day, under menace of foreign intervention, half of the town, including
hospitals, churches, mosques and misson buildings, had been burnt down.
Doughty Wylie stated that his impression while going around Adana at this
time was of a great number of cartridges exploding in burning houses, and of
wreckage falling across the street 104. Woods believed that many of the fires
were started "deliberately" 1°3.
The outbreak of these second incidents at Adana had giyen rise at the
time to ugly stories of complicity of the Roumelian troops, but British
Ambassador Lowther found no truth in these reports. They were in reality
started by some desperate Hintchakist terrorists, who, in the wild hope of
provoking foreign intervention, had attacked and killed 15 newly arrived
Roumelian soldiers who were picketed in the Armenian quarter. Lowther

102Cemal Pa~a pp. 345-6.

103Walker p. 185.
1" FO 42 4/ 219, P. 93-
105 woods p. 138; Abbott p. 305.
1326 SALAH! R. SONYEL

could give no def~ nite figures of the dead and wounded, but in Adana 2,000
bodies were buried of whom 600 were stated to be Muslims. The Turkish
Government subsequently issued an official estimate of 5,400 casualties for
the whole district; but Lowther found this was "grossly under-estimated",
and believed that the figure should probably be somewhere between 15,000
and 20,000 with ~~ 5,000 destitute Armenians 106. Cemal Pasha claims that
~~ 7,000 Armenians and 1,850 Muslims were killed 1°7. The Armenian deputy
for Edirne (Adrianople), Hagop Babikian, in a report he prepared for the
Ottoman Parliament, which was not discussed as he had passed away, gaye
the number as 2 1,00 ~~ 108. Cemal Pasha's figures are nearer the truth 1°9.
The Ottoman Government made an initial grant of TL 30.000 for relief
work, and subsequently the Turkish Parliament voted two further sums of
TL ~~ oo,000 each for rebuilding the burnt quarter 11°.

Who was responsible for the incidents?

According to British Ambassador Lowther, to lay the responsibility at
the door of Abdülhamit, as was at first done, was impossible; no evidence of
any kind had been produced to incriminate him. In fact, Charles Marling,
the British Charge d'Affaires at Istanbul, believed as late as July 1912 that by
far the most probable theory was that the incidents were brought about with
the special purpose of discrediting Abdülhamit "At all events, the worst of
His Majesty's enemies could not accuse him seriously of an act which he was
astute enough to recognise as calculated to justify his deposition", Marling
remarked 111 . Nor was there any evidence against Izzet Pasha, the vali,
though there could be no doubt that a number of hodjas and reactionaries
had done all they could to fan the flame of the Muslim excitables.
Lowther did not believe that there was any ground to assume that the
Armenians were planning an insurrection, or that the Muslims had been

106 FO 371/771/15394: Lowther to Grey, telegram, Istanbul, 23.4.1909, and doc. no.
15478: Lowther to Grey, telegram, Istanbul, 25.4.1909; see also FO 37 1 /4974/E 2404:
Memorandum by R. McDonell, 25.3.1920, which confirms that 15,000 Armenians were killed;
but the number of Muslims killed is not mentioned.
107 The Shaws support this view; see: Sj. Shaw and E.K. Shaw: History of the Ottoman Empire
and Modern Turkey, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 281.
108 United States National Archives, 353/43, no. 87, 4016/ 13.
109 Gürün p. 176; Ak~in p. 123.
1 " FO 371/1002/4235; see also FO 424/220, no. 48: Turkey Annual Report for 1909,
Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Istanbul, 31.1.1910.
I " FO 371/1496/32933: Marling to Grey, despatch, Istanbul, 29.7.1912.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1327

preparing a carefully premeditated "massacre". The causes of the incidents

were, according to him, rather to be found in the vainglorious talk of
equality on the part of the young Armenians, who were all "in theory"
revolutionaries and advocates of home rule; in the fear which their attitude
had inspired among the Muslims of some definite act of aggression, a fear
which was somewhat justifled by the constant stream of arms which flowed
into the country for the use of the non-Muslim population; in the
extravagance of the orators on both sides; and in the lamentable weakness of
government authority. Through these causes had come the events of 13th
April in the capital, and the murder of the two Turks by an Armenian as a
pretext for the outbreak at that particular time. Once the incidents had
begun, the "cowardice of the vali" and "the ferik's action in arming the
reserves", had caused the Muslims to believe that "the Government were
encouraging them to punish the Armenians", reported Lowther. And yet, R.
McDonell of the British Foreign Office, commenting on these incidents
eleyen years tater, observed that the Adana incidents "were undoubtedly the
result of Society (Dashnaktsutiun) propaganda, and of urging the
Armenians to armed resistance" 112
Cemal Pasha, on the other hand, puts all the blame on Mgr. Mousheg,
the Armenian bishop of Adana, and on the local government, who did not
prevent his "evi! work" "3. According to British documents, Mgr. Mousheg
had taken b~-ibes from Bahri Pasha; had encouraged the Armenians to buy
arms; and had sold to them faulty weapons thus making a great deal of money. He
had made provocative speeches; had paraded around with arms and
bandoliers, and had his picture taken in dress worn by former Armenian
leaders. The British ambassador, too, admits, in his despatch of 4th May
gog that, Mousheg had great responsibility in the outburst of the
incidents 114 .
According to Turkish writer Re~at ~leri, Mgr. Mousheg had set up an
organisation under the name of "p~-ivate school of agriculture". In an
inaugural speech opening the school, he even prayed for the Ottoman
Empire and declared that the aim of the school was to educate the Armenian
youth in modern agricultural methods, but not so in reality as the school was
actually used in training Armenian guerrillas and terrorists. The Armenian

112 FO 371/4974/E 2404: Memorandum by R. McDonell, 25.3.1920.

' 13 Hatz~alar (Memoirs), Istanbul 1959, p. 345.
114
FO 424/219, no. 83.
1328 SALAHT R. SONYEL

youth enrolled in this school were indoctrinated against the Turks and
taught how to use weapons and methods of sabotage 1".
Mousheg himself reveals in a book he published in Cairo in 1909 on the
Adana incidents and their culprits, entitled Les Veçpres Ciliciennes, that the
Armenian committees in the Adana province had giyen importance to the
arming of the Armenian people, and that he himself, and other Armenian
leaders, used to travel round the villages, inciting the Armenian people "in
the name of defending the constitution". According to an American missionary
Krillman 116, as quoted by the Armenian Goshnak newspaper, a number of
hotheaded and emotional Armenians went around in Adana and Mersin,
singing old Armenian songs. They were supported by the "young and
inexperienced Armenian Bishop Mousheg", who perambulated round the
villages in the Adana plain, urging the Armenians to eat less, to seli their
belongings and buy weapons. Bishop Mousheg having thus prepared the
ground, left for Egypt, and as soon as he departed, the Adana incidents
began 1".
Another leader of the Armenian extremists at Adana was Garabet
Gokderelian, who, for many years, had served as a judge in Turkish courts of
law. Moreover, the Armenian Church in the Kozan sub-province played an
important role in the Armenian rebellion at Adana. This Armenian church
was one of the most important religious establishments frequently visited by
the Armenians, some of whom used to come from the U.S.A. When the
revolt was being prepared, these visits became more frequent. Many
Armenian terrorists were accommodated in the church, waiting for the day
of the revolt 118.
The local authorities, on the other hand, acted rather recklessly in
calling upon the Muslims to get their arms and suppress the rebellion. The
governor of the Kozan Sancak (sub-province), Asaf Bey, who did not dare
leave Government House, sent alarming telgrams in all directions, inviting
the Muslims to come to the aid of their brethren because he had received
information that armed Armenians from Dörtyol were marching to Erzin,
the capital of the sub-province, which was also known as Cebelibereket 119.

~~15 "Ermeni Dosyas~" (Armenian File), Hürriyet newspaper, Istanbul, 24.9.1982.

116 i~rew rork Times, 23.1o.1 909.
117 Koça~~p. ~~ 68.
118 Hürriyet, 24.9.1982.

118 See also Mehmet Asaf: 1999 Adana Ermeni olaylar~~ve an~lar~m (The Armenian incidents of

1909 of Adana and my reminiscences), edited by Ismet Parmaks~zo~lu, Ankara 1982; see also
Gürün p. 176; Cemal Pa~a p. 168.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1329

Many Turkish historiographers insist that, after the restoration of the

constitution the Armenians did not remain idle; on the contrary, they
mobilised their resources in order to achieve their "holy aspiration" -the
establishment of an Armenian state in Cilicia (Çukurova). According to
Re~at Ileri, this independent Armenian state was to be set up on territory
including Adana, Içel, Hatay (Alexandretta) and Mara~. In this venture the
Armenians were assisted not only by the French but also by the British and
the Americans. The writer goes on to claim, without evidence however, that
American transport ships, laden with arms, under the protection of French
warships, were clandestinely landing weapons for the Armenian terrorists.
The British also were bringing arms and ammunition from Cyprus to be
distributed to Armenian bands. Moreover, the Armenians had set up an
arsenal at Saimbeyli, where they manufactured guns, revolvers and
ammunition. The greatest support, however, came from Russia who wished
to gain access to the Mediterranean.
The Armenian Church at Adana and its bishops were the chief
instigators of this movement. The Turks also believe that in April 1909
Armenian bands had attacked Turkish quarters and had begun to massacre
the people in accordance with a vow of vengeance that they had taken
earlier. Those Turks who had managed to procure arms had retaliated.
These incidents were echoed to the European press as the extermination of
the Armenians by the Turks 120.
It is interesting to note here that David Kherdian, an Armenian writer,
attributes the following statement in connection with the I gog incidents in
Adana, to his father:
"At the entrance of a coffee house I saw something that made the
blood rush to my temples. Tacked to the wall was a small card on
which was printed a map of Cilicia, with writing in Armenian.
Above the card, which was charcoal-smeared, and written over in a
crude hand were the words: 'What Armenia, infidel dog?' I turned
the card over and read, in Armenian: 'The future Armenian
Kingdom of Cilicia' ".
Kherdian then goes on to relate that a mullah had said to his father:

120 See also Mithat Serto~iu: "Türk-Ermeni dostlu~u dü~manl~~a nas~l dönü~türüldü"
(How Turco-Armenian friendship was transformed into enmity), Hürriyet, 17.11.1981; Sezai
Orkunt: "Güçlülerin oyunca~~~Ermeniler" (Arn-~enians, toys of the Powerfull), Milliyet,
5.10.1981.
Belleten C. LI, 84
1330 SALAIII R. SONYEL

"That dates from the 1909 troubles. As you know, when

Abdülhamit was dethroned in 1909, the new government of the
Young Turks promised certain freedoms to the Armenians and
other subject races. The Armenians, in a burst of riotous folly,
foolish even for them, began shouting from their clubs and meeting
chambers of the freedom that would soon be theirs. It was then that
they sent those unfortunate cards you ask about through the mails,
and marched through the streets bearing banners of 'Lesser
Armenia'. They even began speaking of a royalist army hiding in
the mountain fasts of Hadjin and Zeitun, which was of course
bl uff....
It is most regrettable. Christian and Moslem have always been
neighbours, if not always friends. The accusation that the Turk is
persecuting the Armenians on religious grounds is the work of
Western journalism. Until now not a single act of desecration had
been committed against the Armenian church... I have analyzed
the problem. The Armenians began to align with the West-first
slowly through the missionaries, and then through the instigation of
their intellectuals who had gone off to France to be educated. They
returned with notions of autonomy and other nihilistic ideas about
Treedom', so that when the war came to our country, they were the
natural dupes for the Western powers, who began using these poor,
uneducated Christians as their excuse to heap invective on our
heads, and to rouse their own masses against us, should they feel it
necessary to go to war with our country. So much of it is outright
lies. We have never been granted a fair hearing before the great
tribunal of humanity"... 121
And this hardly needs any comment.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Adana incidents

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, which was reeling
under the unexpected blow of the ~~3th April events in the capital, met early
in May and decided to investigate the causes and development of the
incidents at Adana. During a stormy session, Zohrab Efendi, a well-known
Armenian deputy, criticised the Government for the "criminal carelessness"

121
Kherdian, pp. 65-8.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1 331

of the local authorities in not taking early and effective s'teps to check the
disorders. In the end Parliament decided to send a court-martial to Adana as
soon as possible 122 , and proceeded to appoint a commission of inquiry from
amongst its members, including Hagop Babikian, the Armenian deputy for
Tekirda~, Yusuf Kemal, the Turkish deputy for Kastamonu and two
members appointed by the Government, namely Arif Bey (Turkish), the
chiefclerk of the Council of State, and judge Musdikian Efendi (Armenian).
The commission was asked to proceed to Adana and to carry out a through
investigation in Sitil 123.
The commission arrived at Adana soon after, but its members refused to
be accommodated by the local officials as they declared that they would also
investigate the activities of those officials. Their first job was to visit the
wounded, and to extent help to the needy. There was already a commission
charged wtih the latter duty, but many complaints had been made against it.
Yusuf Kemal, who was already appointed a member of the aid commission,
which was set up in Istanbul to help the Adana victims, invited the leaders of
the local Armenians and Greeks together with the consuls of France and
Britain to attend the meetings of the commission.
At their first meeting at Government House, Yusuf Kemal told those
present that he had abolished the existing membership of the commission,
and asked the Armenians and the Muslim to select three new members
each, which they duly did. He then turned to British Vice-Consul Major
Doughty Wylie, who was present, and invited him to become the honorary
president of the commission, which he accepted gladly. Yusuf Kemal had
already been informed of the good work done by Doughty Wylie during the
disturbances, and that he was even wounded in the arm by an Armenian.
Thereafter their relationship became friendly 124.
By the second week in May there were indications that the new
governor general of Adana, Mustafa Zihni Pasha, father of Ismail Hakk~,
member of Parliament for Bagdad and editor of Tanin newspaper, was
disposed to attribute all the blame to the Armenians. He had telegraphed to
Istanbul that the total casualties were as follows: Mussulmans: 1,924 killed,

122 FO 371/772/17775: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Istanbul, 4.53 9o9;

Turkish press of 4.5.1909.
123 Yusuf Kemal Tengir~enk: Vatan Hizmetinde (In the Fatherland's Service), Istanbul 1967,
p. 120.
124 Ibid., p. 120.
1332 SALAHI R. SONYEL

533 wounded; Christians: 1,455 killed, 382 wounded. This presumably

referred to the whole province, but did not correspond with the information
furnished by Major Doughty Wylie to Ambassador Lowther, who hastened
to inform Sir Edward Grey on ii th May that this could only be regarded as a
reflex of the belief held by the local Turks that the Armenians had united in a
great plot to annihilate their Muslim neighbours. This was a belief to which
the activities of the Hintchakists, and of Bishop Mousheg, seemed to have
giyen some verisimilitude. The fear among the Turkish population was
evidently genuine, "however ill-founded", claimed Lowther, and the
apprehensions of the Armenians were not as yet being lulled by the action of
the Government.
In Adana the authorities had arrested 104 Muslims and 89 Christians
on charge of being implicated in the incidents 125 . Asa result of these arrests,
the situation in the town was gradually beginning to senle down. The
court-martial appeared to be determined to bring the culprits to justice,
which gives the lie to Christopher Walker's that claim the military tribunal "did
little except frame Armenians" 126 . There is no evidence to indicate that "at
all stages the attempts of the men (commission) to reach the truth were
thwarted apperantly by orders from Constantinople (sic Istanbul)", as
claimed by Walker 127 .
British witnesses such as M. Gibbons and M. Chambers, who had giyen
evidence before the military commisson, were convinced of the existence of
an Armenian "nationalist" plot. Moreover, the American diplomatic
representative in Istanbul had furnished British Ambassador Lowther with a
report from one of "the most experienced" American missionaries in
Anatolia, the Reverend Dr. Christie, which gaye an account of the very
origin of the incident. He declared that the young Armenians of Adana were
nearly all revolution aries; that arms and ammunition had been on sale for
months, and that both sides had been laying in store of them. He also
attributed a large share in the events to the "evli counsels" of the Armenian
bishop, whom he described as "a very bad man". These comments of Dr.
Christie went far to show that, among a number of Armenians headed by
their bishop, the idea of a revolutionary plot did exist 128.

125 FO 371 /772/19552: Lowther to Grey, telegram, Istanbul, 245. 1909.

128 Walker p. 186.
127 Ibid., p. 187.
128 Ibid., doc. no. 21190: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Pera, 1.6. t9og.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1 333

Whilst inquiries were continuing in Adana, on 3oth June, the Christian

leaders of the city, including Gregorians, Protestants, Catholics, Syrians,
Greek Catholics and Chaldeans, issued a declaration pledging loyalty to the
constitution and the state, and denying that they ever had any intention of
provoking a rebellion there. The declaration was presented to the various
government departments. On the other hand, the court-martial and Yusuf
Kemal had asked the British Vice-Consul, Major Doughty Wylie, for an
account of what he had seen of the incidents. They had also urged him to give
his views on the causes and the general politics of the affair. He gaye them an
account in which he tried, as far as possible, to eliminate anything which
might cause a controversy. It appeared to him to be far more important to
bring about, if possible, a better feeling between the two races than to
uselessly dispute over who had fired the first shot. He also suggested to the
new delegation from the Armenian Patriarchate, who seemed, at least the
lay members, reasonable people, that they might bring influence to bear on
"disreputable Armenian witnesses", who made a scandalous living by giving
false evidence against their own people 129.
Meanwhile Hagop Babikian, the Armenian member of the commission
of inquiry, left for ~ stanbul after a short period, having complained that the
weather in Adana was too hot for him. Yusuf Kemal, however, remained for
three more weeks, and having finished his investigation, handed over all the
documents to the British vice-consul, with a plea that he should read it and
make any amendments he thought necessary in his own report. Yusuf Kemal
then returned to ~ stanbul where he saw Hagop Babikian at the Chamber of
Deputies, and suggested to him that they should rewrite and submit their
joint report to Parliament, but each time he approached Babikian, the latter
evaded the issue. On the morning of ~~st August, in the presence of Halil Bey,
deputy for Mente~ e, and his friends, Yusuf Kemal gaye Babikian the copy of
Doughty Wylie's report, which was in French. He pointed to its conclusion
and suggested to Babikian that they should translate it into Turkish, both
sign and submit it to the president of the Chamber. Babikian expressed the
wish to read the report, and took it from Yusuf Kemal.
The following day he brought it in an envelope, and in the presence of
the same people, returned it to Yusuf Kemal. The report consisted of eight
typed pages; seven of the pages related to the incidents, whilst the eighth

129 FO 424/ 22o: No. 24: Lowther to Grey despatch, Istanbul, 14.7.1909, enclosing copy of

despatch from Major C.H.M. Doughty Wylie, Adana, 6.7.1909.

1 334 SALM-I~~R. SONYEL

page included the conclusion on the events. When Yusuf Kemal opened the
envelope, the eighth page, which carried the signature of the British Vice-
Consul, Doughty Wylie, was missing. In his conclusion, the vice-consul had
declared rather naively that he never believed in an Armenian insurrection
which aimed at the establishment of a separate kingdom with foreign
assistance. If the Armenians had such aspirations, they could have
withdrawn en masse to the mountains where they could easily have defended
themselves, and would never have left defenceless thousands of unarmed
farmers in the fields, most of whom were their brethren or relatives.
Apparently he did not know, or pretended that he did not know, about the
methods which Armenian terrorists used in the t 8gos in order to attract the
attention of the powers. It was also foolishness, Doughty Wylie believed, to
imagine that the Armenians, who were only armed with revolvers and
shotguns, would resist the Ottoman army. As for foreign intervention, such
an idea was useless.
He had also declared that the majority of the Muslims really believed
that their government, their life and religion were in danger. Their
ignorance was too much for them to understand that this "could not be
possible". Many of them were provoked by the inflammatory speeches of the
Armenians, as such speeches were related to them in an exaggerated
manner; moreover, many "bandits" were attracted by the prospects of
looting. Nevetheless the Government was mainly responsible for not having
discovered the incident beforehand and taken effective steps to suppress it.
Those making inflammatory speeches could have been arrested quickly, and
the first indications of the rebellion could have been stamped out by the
troops, claimed Doughty Wylie.
When Yusuf Kemal discovered that the eighth page of the report was
missing, he asked Babikian what happened to it. "Didn't you give it to me
like that?" the latter exclaimed. He then admitted the existence of page 8,
and explained that, whilst dining at the Tokatlian, he was also perusing the
report: he must have dropped it there. They decided to visit the restaurant
that evening and to look for it. Yusuf Kemal arrived there long before
Babikian, who came shortly after together with Mouradian, the president of
the Hintchak Committee. Babikian, we are told by Yusuf Kemal, then
begged the latter confidentially to have mercy on his children, meaning that
he deliberately had to lose the last page of Doughty Wylie's report. Yusuf
Kemal consoled him, and told him that he would telegraph the president of
the court-martial, who already had the report, and ask for a copy. Babikian
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1 335

then left for his home at Ye~ilköy (San Stefano) where he died of a heart
attack that same night.
Shortly afterwards Yusuf Kemal submitted his report to the Chamber
of Deputies, but it was not discussed as Babikian could not sign it 130. We
learn from a despatch which British Ambassador Lowther sent to Sir
Edward Grey on 4th August that Babikian had been receiving threatening
letters (probably from Armenian extremists), and although there were
suspicions of foul play in his death (possibly poisoning), they were
groundless as shown by the post-mortem 131 . Before he died, however,
Babikian had giyen an interview to the Tasvir-i Efld~r newspaper of gth July,
accusing a number of local oflicials, and making some wild and exaggerated
remarks which exasperated the members of the court-martial 132. As a first
result, the officers of the court-martial resigned in a body, whilst British Vice-
Consul Doughty Wylie thought that the majority of Babikian's statements
would be contradicted by his colleague Yusuf Kemal.
Babikian had said that the Armenians had giyen no cause for the
incidents. If by this he meant, as he seemed to have meant, that there were no
faults on the Armenian side, he went too far, declared Doughty Wylie.
Considering the country and the people, there was certainly provocation in
violent and insulting language, which was still too common. There
remained, too, the propaganda for the buying of arms. As to Bishop
Mousheg, whom Babikian declared to be innocent and a much maligned
man, he could be proved to have toured his province, exhorting his flock and
others to buy arms at any price, and if he was not a dangerous man, why did
his own people ask the British vice-consul to keep him away from Adana?
Babikian's interview had thus, to the last degree, disgusted the Turks
and accentuated the deep-seated dislike of the Armenians, which had
already made a sympathetic treatment of the province so extremely difflcult.
It had been represented by the itidal newspaper as a slanderous attack on the
Turks and on the religion of the state. Doughty Wylie believed that
Babikian's facts were in some cases wrong, which was to the last degree
unfortunate 133 . As a result of his statements the Armenian Patriarch

130 Tengir~enk, pp. 120-5.

131 FO 424/220, no. 43: Lowther to Grey, confidential despaieh, Therapia, 4.8.1909;
Walker p. 187.
132 See also FO 371/777/28694: Garabet Hagopian's letter to Sir Edward Grey, London,
28.7. igog, about the Adana incidents from the Armenian point of view.
133 FO 424 /22o: Major Doughty Wylie to Lowther, despatches, Adana, 19.7.1909, pp. 63-5.
1336 SALM-II R. SONYEL

threatened to resign unless the Government retracted its original contention

that the incidents were the result of an Armenian plot to found an
independent principality 134.
In Istanbul where the Government had passed the Law of Associations
forbidding all political organisations based on ethnic or national groups, the
Grand Vizier and the Minister of War succeeded in inducing the court-
martial, which had resigned en masse on account of the appointment of a new
president and the strictures of Hagop Babikian, to withdraw their
resignation 135 ; whilst the new vali in Adana addressed for several hours a
meeting of the heads of the Armenian and Syrian Churches, held in M.
Chambers's house one evening. He spoke tactfully and frankly on matters
concerning them, and succeeded in leaving a good impression on all his
hearers. The acting British Vice-Consul, R.E.W. Chafy believed that this
should contribute tremendously to the success of the governor-general's
reforming efrorts. The vali had also announced his intention of supressing
various Armenian source of rumour and the so-called "reports" in Adana,
which was welcomed by Chafy, as "absurdly inaccurate" reports and
newspaper stories had emanated from Adana which had the most harmful
results 136 .
Considerable sensation was aroused early in September 1909 by a
statement in the press on the subject of the condemnation to death of various
Turks and Armenians at Adana. The number of Armenians condemned to
death was giyen variously from four to nine; but British acting Vice-Consul
Chafy informed Ambassador Lowther that none of the Armenians was
condemned by the Adana court-martial under the presidency of Kenan
Pasha. He believed it to be true that about forty Muslims had been sentenced
to death. The sensation was greatly increased by the action of Mgr. Tourian,
the Armenian Patriarch, who sent in his resignation to the Grand Vizier on
7th September. The Patriarch took up the line that, as the Government had
officially admitted the innocence of the Armenians in connection with the
accusation of having caused the incidents, the presumption was that any
Armenians who had killed Muslims had done so in self-defence, and that
consequently it was not equitable to condemn them to death; that it would

134 Ibid., no. 43: Lowther to Grey, despatch, Therapia 4.8.1909.

135 Ibid., same despatch.
136 FO 371/774/34994: Lowther to Grey, conf~ dential despatch, Istanbul, 8.9.1909,
enclosing copy of despatch from acting Vice-Consul R.E.W. Chafy, Adana, 1.9.19o9.
 ADANA INCIDENTS 1 337

be fairer and more politic to severely punish the ex-vali and the others who
were responsible for the disorders, and pardon even the individual Muslims
who had taken part in the incidents; and that the sentences decreed against
the ex- vali and the others were quite inadequate.
The situation became more acute as the Armenian National Council
threatened to follow the example of their chief, and negotiations were
opened between the Porte, represented by Talat Bey, the Minister of the
Interior, and Necmettin Bey, the Minister of Justice, and Mgr. Tourian,
with a view to arriving at a compromise which should satisfy the demands of
the latter. Talat Bey's attitude at the outset was unconciliatory, and he told a
press representative that the sentences passed by the court-martial would all
be carried out on Christians and Muslims alike with impartiality. Talat Bey
states in his memoirs that he investigated the report about the Adana
incidents with great care. Those incidents were started by the Armenians, as
stated by an Armenian witness. Even Hagop Babikian, claims Talat Bey,
who was one of the delegates sent to investigate the incidents, had clearly
explained it to him. The purpose of the incidents was to provoke the people
to not, to attract European attention and to establish an autonomous
Armenian state at Cilicia (Çukurova) 137.
Despite Talat Bey's firm stand, it was announced a few days later that
the death sentences passed on 29 of the Armenians found guilty had been
commuted to penal servitude for life 138; whilst the capital punishment
passed on about 40 Muslims was carried out 139. According to Cemal Pasha,
who was appointed to Adana after the incidents:

"Four months after my arrival at Adana I had thirty Muslims, •

convicted by the court-martial, hanged in Adana itself, and two
months later, seventeen Muslims hanged in the town of Erzin. Only
one Armenian was executed. Among the Muslims hanged was... the
Müftü of the Bahçe district... I regret that I could not capture Mgr.
Mousheg, who had escaped to Alexandria on a foreign ship on the

137 Talât Pa~a: Talât Pa~a'n~n Hat~ralar~~ (Memoirs of Talat Pasha), Istanbul 1958, pp. 14 ff.
138
FO 371/774/358os: Lowther to Grey, confidential despatch, Therapia, 16.9.1909.
138
Ibid., docs. nos. 45105 and 46733: Marling to Grey, cipher telegram, Istanbul,
12.12.1909; see also FO 242/219, p. 195, and despatch, 21.12.1909, enclosing copy of despatch
from R.E.W. Chafy, Adana, 15.123909.
1338 SALAH~~R. SONYEL

second day of the incidents. This person, too, was rightly

condemned to death in absentia by court-martial, I would hanged
opposite to the müftü of Bahçe" 140.

It was announced in the middle of December that four Armenians,

Kirkor, Nazaret, Bedros and Mihran, with Bishop Sahak, who had been
condemned by the court-martial to hard labour for life and perpetual
banishment, had been pardoned by the Sultan, and that further sentences to
death of the culprits of the incidents should be commuted to hard labour for
~de 141.
Yet the Armenians of Adana were not the innocent passive sufferers
that they have sometimes been portrayed. They were insufferably and
tactlessly loquacious, and their bishop, Mousheg, was "a foolish f~ rebrand"
who was seeking to force the foreign Powers to intervene, with the ultimate
end of declaring himself "King of Cilicia", as confirmed by secret British
documents 142

140 Gürün p. 176.

141
FO 371/774/46068: Marling to Grey, confidential despatch, Istanbul 15.12.1909.
142 FO 424/220, p. 70; Walker p. 187.