UNSC

Study Guide
Annual World Summit 2023
Agenda: Addressing the Insurgency and Terrorism Crisis
in Africa, focusing on Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram.
Table of Contents:

1. Letter from the Executive Board

2. Introduction
3. Key Definitions
4. Background Information
5. Major Countries and Organisations Involved
6. Timeline of Events
7. Relevant UN Treaties and Events
8. Previous Attempts to Solve this Issue
9. Possible Solutions
10. Bibliography
Letter from the Executive Board

Dear Delegates, The Executive Board of UNSC welcomes you to the Annual World
Summit,[Link] Annual World Summit is an amazing platform where young
leaders get to express their ideas,make new friends and solve nerve racking situations
which have global implications. While this can be quite the daunting experience for
first timers we here at Jamnabai Narsee School ensure that there is maximum
participation and that everyone comes out of the conference having learnt
something. This is the perfect platform for amatuers as well as experienced debaters.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a vital organ of the United Nations,
responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Composed of 15
member states, including five permanent members with veto power, the UNSC plays
a crucial role in global affairs. The UNSC serves as a platform for diplomatic
negotiations, conflict resolution, and the promotion of international cooperation,
making it an essential body for addressing various global challenges.

The agenda for UNSC is one of great importance it being addressing the insurgency
and terrorism crisis in Africa focusing on Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. While this
agenda gives the delegates a certain framework as to what research is needed to be
done, it also explores the key conundrum here, terrorism. This allows smaller nations
to pose their issues and finding a global consensus when it comes to finding a
solution. This issue is extremely volatile and requires the best of minds when it comes
to resolving it. Hence we aim to give equal opportunity to every delegate present and
hope for two days of heated debate.

Yours faithfully,
The UNSC Executive Board

1
Introduction

Unfortunately, in recent years, an amalgamation of widespread poverty, poor

institutional quality, and ineffectual governance has rendered the African
subcontinent prey to terrorism and increased violence. As such, maintaining peace in
this region is becoming increasingly difficult, especially due to the Harakat Al-Shabaab
al-Mujahideen, commonly known as Al-Shabaab: a religious militant group that is
steadily gaining power and influence in Somalia.
Concentrated in the ‘Horn of Africa’ region, Al-Shabaab’s primary motive is to
establish an Islamic state with a Somali caliphate in the subcontinent. An Islamic
State refers to a state governed on the basis of Al-Shabaab’s interpretation of Sharia
(Islamic law), which is rigidly orthodox and oppressive, with practices such as the
censorship of entertainment and punishments including stonings and amputations.
An expert on Al-Shabaab explains, “the unifying idea of Al-Shabaab is opposition to
the Western-backed government.”
1) Therefore, to advance their jihadist policy, Al-Shabaab constantly attacks civilians,
peacekeeping forces, and members of the Somali government, exponentially
increasing instability in the region. It is estimated by the United States Africa
Command (AFRICOM) that Al-Shabaab commands around 10,000 members across
Somalia and Kenya.
2) The Al-Shabaab are organised in separate divisions based on their tasks being:
gathering intelligence, obtaining funding at taxation points, carrying out targeted
assassinations, and preventing aid. Al-Shabaab conducts attacks through various
methods, including the use of suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
and assassinations. This conflict has resulted in numerous civilian casualties. One
notable attack took place in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia in 2019, close to a
university, where an IED resulted in 94 deaths and 147 injuries, many of which were
students and professors.
3) Further examples of these attacks include the truck bombing in Mogadishu on 28th
December

2
“Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations:
[Link]
“Examining Extremism: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab).”
Examining Extremism: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) | Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 28 Oct. 2021,
Examining Extremism: Harakat Al-Shabaab al Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) | Examining
Extremism | CSIS
Warner, Jason; Chapin. “Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of Al-Shabaab.”
Homeland Security Digital Library, Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.), 1 Feb. 2018,
[Link] | Homeland Security Digital Library at NPS
In 2019, killing more than 90 civilians and injuring over 130 others, 4 and, more
recently, the attack on an African Union (AU) base in Somalia on Tuesday 5th August
2022, ensuing in a firefight that killed an estimated 30 soldiers. 5 In recent years, the
frequency of attacks by Al-Shabaab has seen a spike, drawing global attention and
becoming a cause for concern.

Historically, numerous extremist organisations have been active in Somalia as a

consequence of political instability in the nation. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), the
antecedent to Al-Shabaab, reached the peak of its power in the 1990s, with funding
and arms partly contributed by Osama bin Laden (chief of al-Qaeda). Soon after, a
division occurred between younger members and older members regarding whether
the existing political structure should be maintained or re-formed to create an Islamic
state. The younger members joined forces with the Islamic Courts Union (an
association of sharia courts) and took over Mogadishu in early 2006. Ethiopia, fearful
of how the jihadi violence could affect them, invaded Somalia and regained the capital
in December of 2006. This was the catalyst for the formation of Al-Shabaab (which
literally means ‘the youth’ in Somali): it caused the younger members to retreat to
southern Somalia, where they began to grow in strength and number, planning
assassinations and bombings against the Ethiopian military. Since then, Al-Shabaab’s
power has grown through its 2012 alliance with al-Qaeda, an extremist network with
similar orthodox ideologies.

3
A key objective of Al-Shabaab is to increase its geographic reach. Since the group’s
formation, a constant struggle has ensued between the Somali government and Al-
Shabaab, with no entity gaining complete power. For example, in 2011 Al-Shabaab
occupied many parts of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, as well as important trading
centres such as the port city of Kismayo and Barawe. Soon after, the African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), a peacekeeping mission approved by the UN and
operated by the AU (African Union), successfully regained a majority of the territory
including both Mogadishu and the trading centres. However,even now, Al-Shabaab
controls a large portion of southern Somalia. Thus, clashes between AU organisations
working with the Somali military and Al-Shabaab have, unfortunately, continued into
the country’s present political environment, and the militant group remains a
constant threat to the security of the region.
This conflict between the government and Al-Shabaab is further exacerbated by
multiple power transitions occurring. First, the 2021 elections were delayed by more
than a year, due to an ‘electoral impasse” as the former president and the leaders of
the Federal Member States within Somalia were unable to come to an agreement on
the method of conducting elections. This resulted in a majority of power being with
AMISOM, which was subsequently reconfigured to the African Union Transition
Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on 1st April 2022, after the elections were sure to be held
soon. The long-drawn-out elections were held on May 15th, 2022. Post
reconfiguration, the transition of power from ATMIS to the Somalian government led
by newly elected president H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (whose ideological stance
promotes peaceful dialogue and increased assistance from international partners) is
currently ongoing; this allows a window for the Al-Shabaab to take advantage of the
power vacuums created and extend their operations to gain territory and influence,
making it a matter of urgency.

A combination of the aforementioned aspects of the conflict has led to tragic

consequences for civilians in the region, including severe violations of human rights.
Regrettably, the political instability and conflict, the rampant droughts and floods in

4
 the region, and the terror of Al-Shabaab have caused the internal displacement of 2.9
million 8 people in Somalia. Moreover, Al-Shabaab terrorizes civilians through
mutilation, sexual violence and the recruitment of children. These infringements of
the international humanitarian law are only worsened by the blockades to
humanitarian access for civilians; Al-Shabaab targets organisations working towards
the betterment of people, as it views them as fronts for Western intelligence services.
For example, during the food crisis in 2010, an estimated 3.64 million people required
food aid. However, Al-Shabaab enforced 11 conditions on aid organisations, including
a jiyaza (tax) of 20,000 dollars every six months, for them to operate in the country.
The violent extortions and attacks by the extremist group caused the World Food
Programme (WFP) and other organisations to suspend operations in southern
Somalia,rendering the Somali population vulnerable. Al-Shabaab’s actions are not
solely concentrated within Somalia, extending to Kenya, and some parts of Uganda.
For instance, in 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the 74 casualties that
occurred as a result of bomb blasts in Kampala, Uganda, as a result of Ugandan
support of AMISOM forces. As such, Al-Shabaab not only poses a risk to the Horn of
Africa region but could also compromise international security through its affiliation
with larger terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda in 2012.
Mohamed, Hamza. “What Is Delaying Somalia's Elections?” Elections News | Al
Jazeera, AlJazeera,10thFeb,2021.
[Link]
“Somalia: New President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Promises Peace.” Return to
Frontpage, Frontline,18thMay,2022.
[Link]
mohamud-pr omises
“OperationalDataPortal.”Situation,CCCMSomaliaOverview
[Link]
COVID%2D19
&text=Given%20the%20conflict%2C%20insecurity%2C%20drought,urban%20are
as%2 0ac
Uganda: One Killed in Bomb Attack at Kampala Bar.” BBC News, BBC, 25 Oct. 2021.
[Link]
5
 Furthermore, Somalia borders geostrategically important trading routes, such as the
Bab-el-Mandeb strait (a maritime choke point). If Al-Shabaab gains influence over
this strait, goods going to Europe and USA would have to travel around the African
subcontinent, thus disrupting global trade and having worldwide economic
implications.
The United Nations has taken several actions to mitigate this conflict, including the
creation of UNSOM, a peacekeeping force which supports AMISOM. It has also made
several attempts to cut off Al-Shabaab’s funding, including the imposition of
sanctions on Eritrea (which was allegedly funding Al-Shabaab). However, the
pervasive political instability due to the absence of a strong government has rendered
these actions largely ineffective. Thus, despite measures implemented by the UN and
its subsidiaries, Al-Shabaab maintains a formidable presence in Somalia, causing
death, destruction and instability in the region. Hence, in the face of the increasing
threat of Al-Shabaab, it is imperative for the global community to collaborate and
resolve the conflict in Somalia before further escalation.

KEY DEFINITIONS

Horn of Africa: A region in eastern Africa comprising Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia,

Djibouti, and Eritrea. This region is susceptible to droughts and food shortages, due
to both its geographic location and the unstable political and economic situations
within the countries.
Jihadism: A newly-coined expression referring to militant Islamic movements that
are perceived as existentially threatening to the world. This is used to discuss
organisations and individuals engaging in conflict on the ideological basis of Islamic
Law.
Peacekeeping forces: Forces employed to maintain or re-establish peace in an area of
armed conflict. The struggles they seek to mitigate could be between states as well as
within states.

6
Economic sanctions: As defined by the Council of Foreign Relations, economic
sanctions refer to actions taken by a country or organisation against the economy of
another country, such as travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargoes, and trade
restrictions, in order to alter the strategic decisions of state and nonstate actors that
threaten their interests or violate international norms of behaviour.
Improvised explosive devices: An improvised explosive device (IED) refers to a
homemade explosive weapon, made using any available equipment. It is frequently
used by insurgent groups and other non-state actors against a conventional military
force.
★ Sharia law: The fundamental basis of Islam, which dictates the duties and
necessary conduct of all followers. In addition to laying down the religious practices,
prayers and rituals, Sharia law also includes harsh penalties for crimes such as
adultery. Consequently, it can be misused to spread violence in the name of religion.
Maritime choke point: These are naturally narrow, strategically located trade routes
with high traffic.

Maritime choke point: These are naturally narrow, strategically located trade routes
with high traffic.
“Horn of Africa (Somalia,Ethiopia,Kenya).”
[Link]
Firestone, Reuven. “Jihadism' as a New Religious Movement.” The Cambridge
Companion to New Religious Movements, 29 May 2014
[Link] The
Nobel Peace Prize 1988.”
[Link]
“What Are Economic Sanctions?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign
Relations.
[Link]
“Improvised Explosive Device.”
[Link]
“What Is Sharia Law? What Does It Mean for Women in Afghanistan?
”[Link]
7
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Power vacuums:
In Somalia, both regional and national politics have contributed to the creation of
several power vacuums, leading to violent conflict and creating potential pathways for
the Al-Shabaab to gain more influence in the region.

Political instability during the transition period:

Historically, the weakness of the Central Somalian government has enabled the Al-
Shabaab to gain power by seizing control over territory that is inefficiently controlled
by the government. Such administrative limitations were evidenced when, as
previously mentioned, parts of the capital Mogadishu and the port of Kismayo were
under the control of Al-Shabaab in 2010, as the government did not have a stronghold
in these regions, facilitating Al-Shabaab's rise in power. These advances were set back
by Kenyan forces under AMISOM, who successfully “pushed Al-Shabaab out of many
of their strongholds” as they recognised the threat to their national security. However,
currently, Somalia once again finds itself in a fragile state due to its political
framework- a governance crisis that stems from the inability of leaders to organise
elections after the expiration of the four-year term of President H.E. Mohamed
Abdullahi “Farmaajo”. This has caused violent clashes between the Somali army
(supported by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)) and the forces of states
opposed to the detainment of the elections, such as those of Jubbaland. As Jubbaland’s
minister Abdi Hussein Sheikh Mohamed said, “If the Somali government continues
fighting the Somali states, then Al-Shabaab will get the chance to capture Somalia”
due to the fragility of the political system. Moreover, another power vacuum emerges
as a result of the decision to reconfigure African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)
into African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in Resolution 2628 of the
Security Council on 31st March 2022, wherein a phased transfer of power to the
government of Somalia has been encouraged. The AMISOM is an important bulwark
against the Al-Shabab, and the transition phase is one in which its authority will be

8
weaker because of the number of changes that are expected to take place.
Furthermore, its power is transferred to the politically fragile Somali government.
Both aforementioned aspects create a significant power vacuum that Al-Shabaab can
exploit, which is a significant threat that delegates must consider.

Absence of U.S. airstrikes and militia:

Foreign assistance from the US through its division AFRICOM plays a significant role
in promoting military and political stability in Somalia. In recent years, AFRICOM has
been very effective in limiting the power of the Al-Shabaab through drone strikes,
such as the drone strike on 31st October, 2017, which killed more than 100 Al-Shabaab
militants in the Bay region of Somalia. At the end of the Trump administration an
order was issued to AFRICOM, calling for a decrease in direct US military support in
[Link] troops were marginally decreased and forces were instructed to operate
on an ad-hoc basis. Consequently, there was a sharp drop in the number of
counterterrorism operations performed by the US, with only 11 strikes in 2021,
compared to 64 strikes in 2019. This reduction, as displayed on the graph below,
provided an opening for Al-Shabaab to extend its activities- attacks increased by 17%
in the year after U.S. forces were withdrawn, rising from 1,771 to 2,072. A recent
change in policy was made when the Pentagon announced that a small, persistent
presence in Somalia would be resumed, taking into account the risks of operating on
an ad-hoc basis.
However, the U.S. forces will provide “advise-and-assist support but will not be
directly involved in conflict.” This reduction of U.S. military aid thus enables the Al-
Shabaab to capitalise on lowered resistance and expand their military activities by
conducting more terrorist attacks, even extending them to neighbouring countries
such as Kenya and Uganda. This displays the importance of the USA in curbing the
influence of Al-Shabaab, and the potential for its rise in power in the absence of its
military presence.

“Conflict with Al-Shabab in Somalia | Global Conflict Tracker.”

[Link]

9
Hassan, Abdiqani. “Somali Forces, Supposed to Unite against Islamists, Fight Each
Other .”[Link]
“America's Counterterrorism Wars.” New America,
[Link]/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-
wars/the-war-i n-somalia/ .
“Surge in Militant Islamist Violence in the Sahel Dominates Africa's Fight against
Extremists.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 11 May 2022,
[Link]
sahel-dominate s-africa-fight-extremists/
“U.S. to Resume Small, Persistent Presence in Somalia.” U.S. Department of
Defense, [Link]
resume-small-per sistent-presence-in-somalia/

Humanitarian crisis:
Somalia is plagued by a plethora of humanitarian conflicts as a result of its fragile
political state, consistent attacks by the Al-Shabaab, and natural disasters like
drought. Recently, internal conflicts, the COVID-19 pandemic, and food shortages
with 2.2 million Somalis at the risk of starvation 24 have culminated in one of the
worst humanitarian crises the world has witnessed.

Violation of human rights by the Al-Shabaab:

Increasing violence, brutality, and a degradation of human life in the affected Somali
regions (especially southern Somalia) are reasons for constant violations of
international humanitarian law by the Al-Shabaab, whose strict extremist ideologies
align with a harsh interpretation of the Sharia Law. Subsequently, the militant
organisation authorises violent persecution of non-Muslims; punishments such as
amputations, beheadings, and stonings; and continued gender-based violence. These
issues have been exacerbated by the suspension of trials for sexual crimes by the
Attorney General’s Office of the FGS due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first 6
months of 2020 alone, the task force on monitoring and reporting in Somalia

10
identified an 80% increase in sexual violence compared to 2019,with cases “involving
139 girls as victims of sexual and gender-based violence”. A suspension of these trials
means that these girls do not receive justice or peace. Thus, attempting a resolution of
these violations is integral to maintaining peace in the region. Moreover, Al-Shabaab
has also continuously engaged in the forced recruitment and abduction of
children according to the United Nations Country Task Force on Monitoring and
Reporting, “535 children were recruited between January and June 2020, some as
young as 13 years old.” These infringements by the Al-Shabaab violate all the ‘six grave
violations against children in times of war’ as identified and condemned by the UNSC:
killing and maiming of children, recruitment or use of children in armed forces and
armed groups, attacks on schools or hospitals, rape or other grave sexual violence,
abduction of children, and denial of humanitarian access for children. As can be seen,
the rise of Al-Shabaab’s power is paving the way for humanitarian conflict within the
nation, making it crucial to resolve this issue.
“Somalia: Call for Urgent Action Following 'Alarming' 80 per Cent Rise in Sexual
Violence [Link]
“Letter Dated 28 September 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee
Pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992) Concerning Somalia Addressed to the President of
the Security Council.”
[Link]
“Six Grave Violations against Children in Times of War.” UNICEF, 28 June 2022,
[Link]/stories/children-under-attack-six-grave-violations-against-
children-times-war.

Blockades to humanitarian access:

The widespread food shortages due to regular droughts in Somalia alongside the
activities of Al-Shabaab necessitate national and international humanitarian aid,
access to which is hampered by Al-Shabaab’s active presence throughout Somalia. The
extremist group engages in extortions and targeted killings and abductions of aid
workers that prevent them from effectively assisting civilians. For instance, In 2013,

11
iMedecins San Frontieres, a non-governmental organisation that provides medical
assistance in conflict zones, decided to leave Somalia, where they had been treating
50,000 people a month for undernourishment, disease and injury. This decision was
finalised in response to the “violence against health workers,” as 16 members of the
international humanitarian group were abducted and killed. Violence and killings
such as these leave Somalia without crucial aid to support their citizens. Moreover,
despite the food insecurity faced by citizens in southern Somalia, several important
aid agencies have been banned by the Al-Shabaab, including the World Food
Programme, Mercy Corps, Med-Aid, Horn Relief, World Vision and ADRA. This ban,
enforced during the 2010 famine, is still in effect today, preventing the estimated
1.625 million Somalis who require emergency assistance and live in Al-Shabaab-
controlled territory from receiving aid. Additionally, threats have been issued to
NGOs advocating for social freedoms such as those promoting women’s rights
because such ideologies go against Al-Shabaab’s extremist outlook. In fact, between
1st January 2020 and 31st July 2020, the Panel of Experts on Somalia recorded 11
separate incidents wherein non-governmental organisations were targeted by the Al-
Shabaab, resulting in 8 deaths and 20 abductions of humanitarian workers.
Therefore, the inability to access humanitarian assistance due to Al-Shabaab’s
influence has led to further deterioration of humanitarian conditions for the people of
Somalia.

Civilian casualties and displacement of people:

According to reports from the UNSOM in 2021, an increase in civilian casualties from
previous years is indicative of an increase in the Al-Shabaab's power and
[Link] were an estimated 899 civilian casualties between November 2020
and July 2021 as a result of violent schemes by the Al-Shabaab, including the use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), shellings, suicide bombings, and
[Link], casualties due to an inefficient COVID-19 pandemic
response and food shortages, with 3.5 million people estimated to require food aid,
further decrease the standard of living for civilians- this contributes to the poor life
expectancy of 56 years, compared to 83 years in Australia.

12
“Why MSF Decided to Leave Somalia: MSF.” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
International [Link]/why-msf-decided-leave-somalia.
“Al-Shabaab's History with Humanitarian Assistance.”
[Link]
assistance
“World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Somalia.” Human Rights Watch, 13 Jan. 2021,
[Link]/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia.

Additionally, both the unstable political climate in Somalia and the threat of the Al-
Shabaab have led to over 2.6 million Somalis being internally displaced. The
aforementioned political turmoil caused by the extension of the presidential term led
to armed conflict between security forces supporting opposing political parties,
causing the displacement of around 60,000 to 100,000 people. Al-Shabaab has also
utilised threats, destruction of property, and confiscation of land to target civilians
who refused to comply with their ideology, causing extensive displacement especially
in the regions of Bay, Lower Shabelle and northern Somalia. For instance, in June
2020, an occupation of mosques and madrasas in the Markad, Sanaag region by the
Al-Shabaab caused the community to relocate 90 kilometres away in fear. An
increased intensity of both droughts and flooding has further caused the number of
displaced people to drastically increase, as reported by the UNHCR in 2021. It stated
that “Between January and June, 68,000 people were displaced by drought and
another 56,500 by floods.” Currently, there are around 2,000 Camps for IDPs in
Somalia, including those in Mogadishu and the Afgoi Corridor; however, most are
makeshift settlements with a lack of sanitation, clean food and water.
Likewise, the severity of conflict in Somalia causes displaced citizens to seek refuge in
neighbouring countries on a daily basis, an estimated 1,500 people arrive at Kenya’s
Dadaab refugee camp, and 300 refugees arrive at Ethiopia’s Dolo Ado camp.
However, the freedom of movement of Somalis is hindered by armed militias like the
Al-Shabaab who set up roadblocks and taxation points at primary routes out of the
country such as Dhobley, a town near the Kenyan border. The primary intent of these
obstacles is to prevent Somalis from leaving Al-Shabaab territory and accessing

13
external aid because this reduces Al-Shabaab’s influence. Ameliorating this crisis
requires a focus on methods to reduce the number of internally displaced people
(IDPs), improving the conditions for the existing IDPs, and helping ensure safe
passage for refugees leaving the country.
“World Report 2022: Rights Trends in Somalia.” Human Rights Watch, 13 Jan. 2022,
[Link]/world-report/2022/country-chapters/somalia.
“Life Expectancy at Birth, Male (Years) - Somalia.”
[Link] “Al-
Shabaab's History with Humanitarian Assistance.” Critical Threats
,[Link]
assistance

Threat to the entire ‘Horn of Africa’ region:

The ‘horn of Africa’ region includes primarily Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and
parts of Uganda. Certainly, the threat of Al-Shabaab is not solely limited to Somalia.
The militant group already has pervasive influence in Kenya, and is seeking to extend
it throughout the region. In 2014, a maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia
(that was resolved by the ICJ in 2021) for control over the Indian ocean provided an
opening for Al-Shabaab to increase its influence across both countries, and further its
objective of establishing an Islamic state, with a Somali caliphate in the entire nation.
Further, instances of Al-Shabaab attacks in countries neighbouring Somalia,
especially Kenya and Uganda, are increasing rapidly. Several countries face the threat
of increasing conflict and deteriorating humanitarian conditions; they will all be
doomed to the same fate as Somalia should the Al-Shabaab extend its operations.

Threat to international security and trade:

The emergence of Al-Shabaab as a growing power is not only a threat to Somalia and
the Horn of Africa region, but also to the international community. This growing
influence has the potential to hinder trade, having negative economic ramifications
throughout the world. Its affiliation with terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda is
therefore a matter of global concern.

14
Affiliation with Al-Qaeda:
Al-Qaeda is a militant extremist network, founded by Osama bin Laden with the
objective of ‘waging global jihad.’ On 1st February 2012, Al-Shabaab formally
announced its alignment with Al-Qaeda in an attempt to expand its network and
receive additional arms and funding, subsequently increasing the threat of Somalia
acting as a refuge for international terrorist organisations. An example of operations
extending far outside the Somali region was in December 2020, when a member of Al-
Shabaab was charged with the planning of an attack in the US similar to 9/11. In a
January 2022 interview, General Stephen Townsend, an AFRICOM commander, said
“Al-Shabaab remains Al Qaeda’s largest, wealthiest, and most kinetically active arm.”
As such, Al-Shabaab is not solely a threat to Somalia, but could have negative
ramifications globally. Furthermore, this affiliation allows larger organisations Al-
Qaeda to exert influence over trading routes around Somalia, such as the Gulf of Aden
and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, which, as previously mentioned, is geostrategically
important for US and European trade. Considering that Europe is the largest export
market for over 80 countries and the US is the world’s largest importer and exporter
of goods, any disruption to trade by Al-Shabaab could be detrimental to the global
economy.

Al-Shabaab: The Threat to Kenya and the Horn of Africa - DTIC.

[Link]
“Al-Qaeda.” Counter Extremism Project,
[Link]/threat/al-qaeda .
“Africa File: Al-Shabaab Surges Bombings amid Somali Political Crisis.”
[Link]
bombings-amid-somali-political-crisis

Terrorist financing:
A significant contributing factor to Al-Shabaab’s growth is the various channels of
funding it has. According to the UN, in 2019, “Al-Shabaab spent upward of $21 million
on fighters, weapons, and intelligence”. This large budget is a product of the Al-

15
Shabaab’s influence in southern Somalia where they control a large area spanning
several rural areas, borders of the capital and ports. They thus have control over
several routes of both internal and external trade. Consequently, their primary source
of funding is the taxation of the production and export of charcoal to the Arab states
of the Persian Gulf, especially the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman,
where it is used in shisha pipes. Additionally, the Al-Shabaab gains revenue through
charcoal trade, which is central to the Somali economy, by charging a jiyaza (tax) for
passing vehicles at taxation points. Despite several bans, reports by the UN indicate
that illicit charcoal trading continues, creating an important revenue stream for the
Al-Shabaab as they capitalise on taxing these exports. Former deputy Somalia
National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) chief Ismail Osman believes “the
group is now in a stronger financial position than ever before, allowing it to purchase
more bomb making materials and weapons.” This is a result of Al-Shabaab’s effective
utilisation of “taxation” to obtain funding; evidence for the same is in ‘Zakat’, an
annual religious tax. Moreover, findings of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia
implicate several countries including Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, and
Yemen, indicating that they provided assistance to the Al-Shabaab through funding
or provision of arms; however, none of these claims have sufficient proof. In this way,
an important aspect of resolving the Somali crisis is identifying and stopping their
source of income, without harming Somalia’s own economy or degrading aid
received.

“EU Position in World Trade.” Trade,

[Link]
position-world -trade_en.
The U.S. Economy and the World - World Bank.
[Link]
Lederer, Edith M. “US Focused on Disrupting Finances for Somalia's Al-Shabab.”
[Link]
3a7b0dbdf009596374179249ee b62d36 . a stemmed instrument for heating and then
smoking tobacco or other drugs.

16
Hassan, Mohamed Olad. “Al-Shabab Surge in Somalia's Suicide Attacks 'Change of
Tactics,
[Link]/a/al-shabab-surge-in-somalia-s-suicide-attacks-change-of-
tactics-expert s-say/[Link].

MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED

AFRICOM (United States Africa Command):

The mission of AFRICOM, a unified combatant command of the United States
Department of Defence, is to “counter transnational threats and malignant actors,
strengthen security forces, and respond to crises in order to advance U.S. national
interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.” It is an essential
entity in suppressing the threat of Al-Shabaab through its airstrikes and ground raids
on Al-Shabaab strongholds, often in cooperation with the FGS. For instance, in 2020
alone, 46 airstrikes against the Al-Shabaab were conducted by AFRICOM. During
Trump's administration, a total of 202 counterterrorism operations were conducted
by AFRICOM in Somalia, which proved extremely effective in weakening the
extremist network, eliminating over 1000 Al-Shabaab militants. However, unlawful,
preventable civilian deaths are often a by-product of their missions, an important
aspect for the AFRICOM to consider while planning future operations. Recently, the
aforementioned US foreign policy change entailing lowered military involvement
means the AFRICOM forces will provide “advise-and-assist support but will not be
directly involved in conflict,” leading to a power vacuum that can be exploited by Al-
Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab:
Ḥarakat Al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn, known as Al-Shabaab or ‘the youth’ in Somali, is a
religious extremist group based primarily in southern Somalia with its activities
extending to the Horn of Africa region. Founded in 2006, it has, since, exploited the
political instability in Somalia by conducting acts of terrorism through targeted
killings, suicide bombings, and the use of IEDs. After the demise of ex-leader emir

17
Ahmed Abdi Godane in a U.S. airstrike on 1st September 2014, the current leader of
Al-Shabaab is Ahmed Umar, who was listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
in April 2015 by the U.S. State Department. Al-Shabaab reached its pinnacle in 2010,
where it controlled the Somali capital Mogadishu. Although it has since retreated
from major cities and the capital, Al-Shabaab remains extremely active, controlling
large rural areas and performing a myriad of attacks with high casualty rates.
Recently, the power of the Al-Shabaab has witnessed a substantial rise as a result of
the US withdrawal and tumultuous Somalian government transition. Overall, Al-
Shabaab has demonstrated that it will work towards obtaining its objective of an
Islamic state by any means, including terrorist activity, making it a threat which must
be resolved.

United States Africa Command

[Link]/.
“Al-Shabaab Terrorist Network: The Nature of This Enemy.”
[Link]/pressrelease/33101/Al-Shabaab-terrorist-network-the-nature-of-
th.
“America's Counterterrorism Wars.”
[Link]/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-
wars/the-war-i n-somalia/ .
“U.S. to Resume Small, Persistent Presence in Somalia.”
[Link]
small-per sistent-presence-in-somalia/
“The Federal Register.” Federal Register
[Link]
of-the-desi gnation-of-ahmed-diriye-also-known-as-ahmad-umar-abu-ubaidah-
also-known-as

AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia) and (later) ATMIS (African Union
Transition Mission in Somalia):
AMISOM is a regional peacekeeping mission, which has received approval from the

18
UN and is operated primarily by the AU. It was initially established on 19th January
2007 with a six-month mandate to promote prolonged peace within Somalia, a
timespan which has then been extended through UNSC resolutions. The AMISOM
police has 1040 personnel across Somalia, mandated to “to train, mentor and advise
the Somali Police Force (SPF).” The military component of AMISOM assists in
stabilising the country to ensure safe conditions for humanitarian access by
combatting organisations like the Al-Shabaab. It consists of various troops from
Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia distributed across “six sectors
covering south and central Somalia.” It is important to note that, with effect from 1st
April, 2022, AMISOM was officially reconfigured and replaced by ATMIS to facilitate
the transition of power to the newly elected government of Somalia and ensure the
power vacuums created will not be exploited by the Al-Shabaab by maintaining a
strong military presence in the region.

Ethiopia:
While large-scale violent action by the extremist group Al-Shabaab is not as prevalent
in Ethiopia as it is in Somalia and Kenya, the country remains in a precarious
position. Since it shares a large border with Somalia, Al-Shabaab remains a constant
threat, necessitating border vigilance by Ethiopian forces. The continued threat of Al-
Shabaab has facilitated collaboration between the Government of Ethiopia and its ally
the US, on counterterrorism measures, such as sharing information and access to
witnesses on cases related to Al-Shabaab, which have improved the efficiency of both
countries’ counterterrorism operations in Somalia. Furthermore, Ethiopia has
contributed approximately 4500 soldiers to ATMIS, and thus is at an increased risk of
retaliation by the Al-Shabaab; for instance, on 23rd April, 2022, the Ethiopia National
Intelligence and Security Service arrested 34 suspected members of Al-Shabaab, who
were "conspiring and preparing to conduct severe terror attacks in Ethiopia's capital
Addis Ababa.” This recent example highlights the importance of suppressing the
militant group to reduce the instability in the Horn of Africa region.
“In Pursuit of Peace; AMISOM Helps Somalia Make Steady Progress - Somalia.”

19
[Link]/report/somalia/pursuit-peace-amisom-helps-somalia-make-
steady-progres s.
“AMISOM Military Component.” AMISOM,
[Link]/mission-profile/military-component/.
“Ethiopia Foils Infiltration Attempt by Terror Group Al-Shabab.”
[Link]/english/africa/2021-07/30/c_1310095631.htm.
Kenya:
Kenya has always been deeply linked to the issue as it shares a border with southern
Somalia. In 2004, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in
exile in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Historically, Kenya has been a key country in
Somalia’s defence; its troops (Kenya Defence Forces) invaded southern Somalia in
‘Operation Linda Nchi’ in 2011, as a response to the cross-border raids carried out by
Al-Shabaab. Soon after, Kenya’s forces were integrated into AMISOM, and in October
2012, they played an integral role in ousting Al-Shabaab from their key stronghold of
the port city of Kismayo. Though the Al-Shabaab is mainly located in Somalia, many
of its activities, such as the aforementioned attack on Garissa university in 2015,
which killed 148 people, continue to extend to Kenya, as retaliation against their
support for the Somali government. In this way, maintaining national security within
Kenya requires the effective suppression of the Al-Shabaab, and, so, makes this
nation especially relevant to the agenda.

Somalia:
Since its formation in 1960, Somalia has been the subject of major political instability
and extremism. This facilitated the rise of Al-Shabaab, which is now the largest threat
in the region and conducts a plethora of activities including direct attacks on civilians,
extortions and blockades to humanitarian access. In the past, the Somalian
government and military have taken several actions to combat Al-Shabaab, such as
the 2014 Operation Indian Ocean, which was a joint endeavour supported by AMISOM
and the US forces. Despite these actions, the group continued to gain power and
maintain a prominent presence in the region due to the political instability of the

20
region. The current situation in Somalia is extremely fragile, as a direct result of the
aforementioned electoral impasse and subsequent ongoing transition of power from
ATMIS to the Somalian government. The increasing power of Al-Shabaab, especially
in Mogadishu, is evidenced by increasing the number of attacks; between January 1st
to 18th itself, four suicide bombings were conducted by the group. It is thus in
Somalia’s best interests to ensure the transition of power occurs smoothly while
combating Al-Shabaab’s increased attacks.
“Timeline: Al Shabab (2004–2020).”
[Link]/timeline/al-shabab.
Background Report Al-Shabaab Attack on Garissa.
[Link]/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabGarissaU_April2015.
pdf.
“Somali Capital Gunfire amid Election Protests.”
[Link]/news/world-africa-56123481.
“Africa File: Al-Shabaab Surges Bombings amid Somali Political Crisis.”
[Link]
bombings-amid-s omali-political-crisis

UNSOM (United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia):

Established in 2013, UNSOM, a UN-facilitated organisation, assists in the ‘prevention
and countering of violent extremism’ as performed by Al-Shabaab. It primarily
focuses on strengthening the government and the political structure of Somalia as
well as protecting the rights of vulnerable groups such as women and children.
UNSOM’s Child Protection Unit
(CPU) is tasked with supporting the FGS in implementing provisions to assist
vulnerable children and “monitor and report on the six grave child rights violations.”
It has been fairly effective in that it has rescued 102 defected or captured children
(who were fighting alongside armed groups) and airlifted them to a rehabilitation
centre in Mogadishu. UNSOM also works towards the empowerment of women by
implementing the First National Gender Policy in 2016, which focuses on methods to
reduce the prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence. Furthermore, its mandate

21
includes supporting and advising both the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) and the FGS on counterterrorism and humanitarian operations, making it
a significant organisation in combating the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.

United States of America:

The United States has a vested interest in the welfare of Somalia as its northern coast
borders the Gulf of Aden, which leads to Bab el-Mandeb, a maritime choke point.
Goods pass through it from both the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, thus
making it an integral trade route for the US, as aforementioned. Furthermore, the
Gulf of Aden is a strategic location for the US navy to project power onto the Arabian
Peninsula. Acknowledging this, the US has provided assistance to the FGS in
combating the threat posed by the jihadist group. The US counterterrorism
operations against AFRICOM have been highly effective in suppressing Al-Shabaab.
For example, a US airstrike as part of an operation launched by the Somali
government in 2014 killed Ahmed Abdi Godane, co-founder and important leader of
Al-Shabaab. The US has also provided over $3 billion in humanitarian assistance to
Somalia since 2006. This mitigated the threat of the Al-Shabaab and further provided
humanitarian aid during periods of droughts, floods, and famine that are prevalent in
[Link], the future of the United States’ involvement in Somalia remains
ambiguous, without any clear indication of whether they will once again increase
their forces and counterterrorism strikes against Al-Shabaab, or maintain a less active
presence. Since the United States has been an integral entity in suppressing the Al-
Shabaab, their actions could dictate the progression of this issue.
“U.S. Relations with Somalia - United States Department of State.”
[Link]/u-s-relations-with-somalia/.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Date Description of event:

2006 Al-Shabaab was formally established January 2010 Al-Shabaab took control over
many parts of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and important trading centres such as

22
 ➡️
the port city of Kismayo and Barawe. 1st August 2010 AMISOM and Transitional
FGS forces regain control of the major urban centres including Mogashidu from Al-
➡️
Shabaab 11th July 2010 Multiple suicide bombings occurred in Kampala, Uganda,
with 74 casualties and 85 injured. This was Al-Shabaab’s first full-fledged foreign
terrorist attack, as a retaliation against the Ugandan troops in Somalia as a part of
➡️
AMISOM. 5th December 2011 Sanctions were imposed on Eritrea to prevent it
➡️
providing support to Al-Shabaab by the UNSC. 1st February 2012 Al-Shabaab's
alignment with al-Qaeda formally announced, raising global concerns for
➡️
international security. 1st September 2014 15th January 2016 6th November 2020
Leader of Al-Shabaab, known as the ‘emir,’ Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in an
AFRICOM airstrike performed in cooperation with Somali forces. Al-Shabaab
launches an attack against the Somali National Army (SNA) camp which is in close
proximity to the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) camp. Al-Shabaab fighters detonate a
car bomb that kills an officer of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and four Somali
➡️
intelligence officers in Gendershe in retaliation to American involvement. 27th
May 2020 AMISOM and regional security forces launch an operation in Dinsor town
combatting Al-Shabaab and killing 5 extremists. The day of Biden's inauguration;
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan issues a mandate that would limit
➡️
counterterrorism drone strikes outside of Afghanistan and Syria. 20th January 2021
To hinder the election process, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber used an IED on a bus
➡️
full of delegates travelling to the president’s office, killing 6 people. 3rd May 2022
An estimated 450 Al-Shabaab militants ambushed the ATMIS base in El Baraf, killing
30 soldiers. The camp was eventually overrun by these militants.

“Kampala Blasts: Suicide Bombers Target Ugandan Capital.,

[Link]/news/world-africa-59302917
. “Al-Shabab.”
[Link]/backgrounder/al-shabab.

23
RELEVANT UN TREATIES AND EVENTS

Resolution 2036, 22 February 2012 (S/RES/2036): This resolution imposed a ban

on the import of charcoal from Somalia in an attempt to cut off a source of
funding of Al-Shabaab. This was overall ineffective as it is estimated that 3 million
bags of this commodity leave Somalia even after the ban.
Resolution 2102, 2nd May 2013 (S/RES/2102): This resolution established the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) with a mandate to
support and advise both the FGS and the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). This organisation was fairly effective, as it mentored members of the
SPF in methods to combat armed militants.
Resolution 2385, 14th November 2017 (S/RES/2385): A resolution discussing
sanctions on Somalia and Eritrea. It extended the partial arms embargo on the
countries. These sanctions were imposed to reduce the funding to Al-Shabaab,
consequently reducing their arms. This was effective in the case of Eritrea, as
there was no evidence of any further support to Al-Shabaab, leading to a lifting of
the sanctions on November 14, 2018.
Resolution 2614, 21st December 2021 (S/RES/2614): This reauthorised AMISOM’s
mandate without substantive changes until 31 March, 2022. It ensured AMISOM
could ‘take all necessary measures, in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its current
mandate’. This reauthorisation addressed the growing risk of attacks by the Al-
Shabaab due to factors including the delayed elections, subsequent unstable
political structure, and reduction of US support.
Resolution 2628, 31st March 2022 (S/RES/2628): UNSC makes decision to
reconfigure African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) into African Union
Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). This promoted a transition of power to
Somalia in a phased manner. This was done to ensure the stability of the
parliamentary structure before they assume complete power, and to prevent the
Al-Shabaab from exploiting potential power vacuums and parliamentary
structure before they assume complete power, and to prevent the Al-Shabaab
from exploiting potential power vacuums.

24
PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THIS ISSUE

In addition to the UN events mentioned above, several efforts to curb the threat of Al-
Shabaab in Somalia have been undertaken by both international organisations and
the FGS. However, none of them have been completely effective in diminishing the
threat of Al-Shabaab. Thus, its lethal insurgency continues. In order to successfully
comprehend future steps that need to be taken, it is essential to analyse previous
attempts made to resolve the issue.
A number of peaceful measures have been attempted by the Somali government to
resolve conflict with the al-Shabab throughout the years. The first notable one was
when President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed organised a meeting in 2009 with Al-Shabaab
leaders to discuss ways to end the conflict. These talks failed as no compromise was
found suitable to both parties. Considering these futile attempts, in 2012, President
Hassan Sheikh Mohammed took a different approach: targeting individual Al-
Shabaab commanders for defection or arrest. This strategy was partially successful,
with Somali forces causing high-ranking Al-Shabaab officials, Mohamed Said Atom
and Zakariya Ahmed Hersi, to defect. Unfortunately, the measures were extremely
small-scale, and did not have a very significant effect on Al-Shabaab’s strength. More
recently, it has been reported that Fahad Yasin, former NISA chief, attempted to
explore opportunities for dialogue with Al-Shabaab in 2020 and 2021, but was
unsuccessful.
The international community, recognising the urgency of reducing Al-Shabaab’s
power, has also attempted several measures in collaboration with the FGS. As
previously mentioned, the United States has played a large role in attempting to
suppress Al-Shabaab, through drone-strikes and military support. An estimated 269
total counterterrorism strikes have been performed by the United States, with
support of Somalia, which have been highly effective against Al-Shabaab, causing
1900 deaths. Furthermore, the United States of America has partnered with the FGS
to improve the quality of the Somali Police Force, thereby enabling Somalia to
strengthen itself against Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, several organisations supported

25
by the UN and other nations have attempted to work towards resolving the Somali
crisis, through methods such as stabilising Somalia’s political structure, providing
assistance through troops, and funding. Examples of this include organisations like
the UNSOM, AFRICOM, AMISOM and ATMIS, operations and aims of which have
been previously detailed, as well as Kenya and Ethiopia, which provide assistance by
sending troops. However, even with these organisations and countries lending
assistance, the threat of Al-Shabaab remains due to the fragile political structure of
Somalia and potential power vacuums. To subdue Al-Shabaab and maintain
international stability, increased collaboration and cooperation is required.
“Considering Political Engagement with Al-Shabaab in Somalia.”
[Link]/africa/horn-africa/somalia/309-considering-political-
engagement-Al-Shabaab-somalia.
“America's Counterterrorism Wars.”
[Link]/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-
wars/the-war-in-somalia/.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The question of Somalia, especially with respect to Al-Shabaab and its violent
activities, is one that has not been addressed effectively by the international
community. This, therefore, necessitates collaboration between countries to devise
solutions that address the political, humanitarian and economic intricacies of this
agenda.
Firstly, increasing the efficacy of current peacekeeping missions, keeping in mind the
reduction in US forces, is imperative. This can be done through methods such as
improving training of both the SPF and the Somali Armed Forces, with a special
emphasis on counterterrorism strikes. Furthermore, promoting effective
collaboration between different organisations present, such as NISA and ATMIS, for
the collection and evaluation of data, such as locations of Al-Shabaab bases and
predicted further activities, could improve their efficiency.
Secondly, an important aspect of the issue to consider is limiting the funding of Al-

26
Shabaab. This can be done by promoting the cooperation of intelligence agencies
across all nations, especially Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, so that any sources of
funding may be identified. Furthermore, it is important to increase the efficiency of
the charcoal ban to limit the funding of Al-Shabaab through the monitoring and
imposition of fines for illegal charcoal trade, by organisations within Somalia such as
AMISOM. If any other country, entity or group is identified to be funding Al-Shabaab,
economic sanctions could be imposed under the jurisdiction of the UN, similar to the
ones on Eritrea. Additionally, UNSOM should evaluate structures that currently fund
government effort in Somalia to detect any loopholes. This will assist in identifying
and blocking sources of funding of the Al-Shabaab.
Thirdly, it is vital to prevent the exploitation of power vacuums by Al-Shabaab and
increase the efficiency of the political transition. This can be done through
strengthening the political structure and FGS and through regular reports on the
situation by ATMIS. Furthermore, ATMIS could encourage the Somali government to
adopt legislative reforms to reduce the prevalence of sexual and gender-based
violence and abuse, for example criminalising child marriage and sex-trafficking.
Lastly, providing refugees and IDPs with basic human rights through the
construction of shelters in regions of Somalia with large numbers of IDPs is
imperative. Such relocation efforts must be taken where it is safe to do so, with the
assistance of UNHRC. Additionally, working in collaboration with the SOCHUM to
provide vocational training and education for IDPs and refugees to successfully
integrate them within their relocated community could augment the humanitarian
situation in Somalia. Overall, solutions should address the various facets to the issue
of Al-Shabaab in Somalia, take into account the urgency and depth of this problem,
and work towards maintaining peace and stability in all affected regions.

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