HAZARD AND OPERABILITY
STUDIES (HAZOP)
Dr. Pradeep Kumar
Department of Chemical
Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology
(BHU), Varanasi - 221005
Hazard and Operability Studies
Originated as a hazard identification technique for
process plants
commonly applied in petrochemical, nuclear and
food processing industries
Described as a system of imaginative anticipation of
hazards
Hazard and Operability Studies
HAZOP
always a team activity
concentrates on deviations in flows between
components
uses well-defined guide words to steer analysis
considers both appreciable causes and possible
consequences of deviations.
Hazard Evaluation Techniques
HAZOP is a technique which provides opportunities for people to
let their imaginations go free and think of all possible ways in
which hazards or operating problems might arise, but to reduce the
chance that something is missed it is done in a systematic way.
HAZOP – technical approach
Before HAZOP study is started, detailed information on the process
must be available. This includes process flow diagrams (PFD), piping
and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), detailed equipment
specification, materials of construction, mass and energy balances
Scope of study clearly extends to cover unusual circumstances such as
startup, shutdown and plant maintenance
Scope of study does not include making detailed design changes,
although recommendations and follow-up questions should be produced
HAZOP results are recorded in a tabular format
HAZOP procedures are adopted fully or partly by many companies
around the world.
HAZOP
Identifying potential hazards and operability problems caused by
deviations from the design intent of both new and existing process
plants
HAZOP studies are carried out by an experienced, multidisciplinary
team.
Review all physical aspects of a process (lines, equipment,
instrumentation) to discover potential hazards.
HAZOP will identify hazards: do not give insight into the probability
that they will occur or cause harm.
HAZOP Team Members
Leader User(s)
planning and preparation may be site representative,
act as chairman for operator, maintenance crew
meeting supply information about the
ensure follow-up work context in which the system will
is completed be used, e.g. site facilities
Recorder ask questions, and help decide
document the analysis which issues affect safety
Designer(s), process / Expert(s)
project engineers key function is to explore
understand and explain suggest deviations / causes /
the plant design effects
answer questions about need good knowledge of process
the plant and process chemistry, or experience of
similar plant
technical specialist
HAZOP - Procedure
A HAZOP Guideword is combined with a Process
Parameter to Identify
Deviation from intended design / operation
Causes of those deviation
Consequences of those deviations
Safeguard to prevent causes and mitigate
Actions ( recommendations ) for design or operation
changes to avoid deviation
HAZOP – Procedure in Detail
Begin with a detailed flow sheet. Break the flow sheet into
a number of process units. e.g. reactor area might be one,
storage tank another. Select a unit for study
Choose a study node (vessel, line, operating instruction)
Describe the design intent of the study node. e.g. vessel V-1
is designed to store benzene feedstock and provide to the
reactor on demand
Pick a process parameter: flow, level, temperature, etc.
HAZOP – Procedure in Detail
Apply a guide word to the process parameter to suggest
possible deviation
If the deviation is applicable, determine possible cause and
note any protective systems
Evaluation of consequences of the deviation (if any)
Recommend action (what? by whom? by when?)
Record all information.
Repeat steps 5 through 9 until all applicable guide
words have been applied to the chosen process
parameter.
Repeat steps 4 through 10 until all applicable process
parameters have been considered for the given study
node.
Repeat steps 2 through 11 until all study nodes have
been considered for the given section and proceed to
the next section on the flow sheet.
Common HAZOP Analysis Terminology
Term Definition
Process Sections (or Sections of equipment with definite boundaries
Study Nodes) (e.g., a line between two vessels) within which
process parameters are investigated for
deviations. The locations on P&IDs at which
the process parameters are investigated for
deviations (e.g., reactor)
Intention Definition of how the plant is expected to
operate in the absence of deviations. Takes a
number of forms and can be either descriptive
or diagrammatic (e.g., process description,
flow-sheets, line diagrams, P&IDs)
Common HAZOP Analysis Terminology
Guide Words Simple words that are used to qualify or
quantify the design intention and to guide and
simulate the brainstorming process for
identifying process hazards
Process Parameter Physical or chemical property associated with
the process. Includes general items such as
reaction, mixing, concentration, pH, and
specific items such as temperature, pressure,
phase, and flow
Common HAZOP Analysis Terminology
Deviations Departures from the design intention that are
discovered by systematically applying the
guidewords to process parameters (flow, pressure,
etc.) resulting in a list for the team to review (no
flow, high pressure, etc.) for each process section.
Teams often supplement their list of deviations
with ad hoc items
Causes Reasons why deviations might occur. Once a
deviation has been shown to have a credible cause,
it can be treated as a meaningful deviation. These
causes can be hardware failures, unanticipated
process states (e.g., change of composition),
external disruptions (e.g., loss of power), etc.
HAZOP - Procedure
HAZOP Guidewords
Guide words Meaning Comments
NO, NOT, The complete negation of the No part of the design intention is
NONE achieved, but nothing else
intention
happens.
MORE, Quantitative increase Applies to quantities such as
HIGHER, flow rate and temperature and to
GREATER
activities such as heating and
reaction.
LESS, Quantitative decrease Applies to quantities such as
LOWER flow rate and temperature and to
activities such as heating and
reaction.
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase All the design and operating
intentions are achieved along
with some additional activity,
such as contamination of
process streams.
Guide words Meaning Comments
OTHER Complete substitution No part of the original
THAN intention is achieved – the
original intention is replaced
by something else.
SOONER Too early or in the wrong Applies to process steps or
THAN order actions.
LATER Too late or in the wrong Applies to process steps or
THAN order actions.
WHERE In additional locations Applies to process
ELSE locations, or locations in
operating procedures.
Guide words Meaning Comments
PART OF Qualitative decrease Only some of the design
intentions are achieved,
some are not.
REVERSE The logical opposite of Most applicable to
activities such as flow or
chemical reaction. Also
applicable to substances,
for example: poison instead
of antidote.
Common HAZOP Parameters
Flow Frequency
Pressure Viscosity
Temperature Voltage
Level Information
Time Mixing
Composition Addition
pH Separation
Speed Reaction
Guide word and process parameter combination
Process No More Less As well as Part of
parameters Not Higher Lower
None greater
χ χ χ χ χ
Flow
χ χ
Temperature
χ χ χ
Pressure
χ χ χ χ χ
Concentration
χ χ
pH
χ χ
Viscosity
χ
State
χ represent valid combination
Process Reverse Other than Sooner Later Where else
parameters Faster Slower
Flow χ χ χ χ
Temperature χ χ
Pressure χ χ
Concentration χ χ χ
pH χ χ
Viscosity χ χ
State χ χ
Valid Guide Word and Process Parameter Combinations for Process
Vessels (x's represent valid combinations)
HAZOP Example – a P&ID
HAZOP Example – output
HAZOP Example – Reactor
HAZOP study is performed on this unit to improve the safety of the
process. Using study nodes as the cooling coil (process parameter:
flow and temperature) and the stirrer (Process parameter: agitation)
Hazard and operability study report
HAZOP Action Sheet
The potential process modifications resulting from this study are the
following:
Install a high-temperature alarm to alert the operator in the
event of cooling function loss
Install a high-temperature shutdown system (this system
would automatically shut down the process in the event of a
high reactor temperature; the shutdown temperature would
be higher than the alarm temperature to provide the operator
with the opportunity to restore cooling before the reactor is
shutdown)
Install a check valve in the cooling line to prevent reverse
flow (a check valve could be installed both before and after
the reactor to prevent the reactor contents from flowing
upstream and to prevent the backflow in the event of a leak
in the coils)
Periodically inspect the cooling coil to ensure its integrity
Study the cooling water source to consider possible
contamination and interruption of supply
Install a cooling water flow meter and low-flow alarm
(which will provide an immediate indication of cooling
loss).
HAZOP Advantages
Meets regulatory requirements
Plant operates better
Less down time
Product quality improved
Employees are happier
HAZOP Weakness
HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a tendency
for boredom for analysts.
It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although the
technique should be amenable to human error application.
It tends to generate many failure events with insignificance
consequences and generate many failure events which have the same
consequences.
It stifles brainstorming although this is not required at the late stage of
design when it is normally applied.
HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore omits
many scenarios.
HAZOP Weakness
It takes little account of the probabilities of events or consequences, although
quantitative assessment are sometime added. The group generally let their
collective experiences decide whether deviations are meaningful.
HAZOP is poor where multiple-combination events can have severe effects.
It tends to assume defects or deterioration of materials of construction will not arise.
When identifying consequences, HAZOP tends to encourage listing these as
resulting in action by emergency control measures without considering that such
action might fail. It tends to ignore the contribution which can be made by operator
interventions.
HAZOP Purpose
It emphasizes upon the operating integrity of a system, thereby leading
methodically to most potential and detectable deviations which could
conceivably arise in the course of normal operating routine
Including "start-up " and "shut-down" procedures as well as steady-
state operations.
It is important to remember at all times that HAZOP is an identifying
technique and not intended as a means of solving problems nor is the
method intended to be used solely as an undisciplined means of
searching for hazardous scenarios.
Other Methods:
Other methods that are available for identifying hazards are the
following:
1. "What if" analysis: This less formal method of identifying hazards
applies the words "what if" to a number of areas of investigation. For
instance, the question might be, What if the flow stops? The analysis
team then decides what the potential consequences might be and how
to solve any problems.
2. Human error analysis: This method is used to identify the parts and
the procedures of a process that have a higher than normal probability
of human error. Control panel layout is an excellent application for
human error analysis because a control panel can be designed in such
a fashion that human error is inevitable.
3. Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA): This
method tabulates a list of equipment in the process along with all the
possible failure modes for each item. The effect of a particular failure
is considered with respect to the process.