Module 9

Article 14
 Introduction
• The Constitution of India guarantees the Right to Equality through Articles 14 to 18.
• Equality is one of the magnificent corner-stones of Indian democracy.
• The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of Law which pervades the Indian
Constitution
• Article 14 outlaws discrimination in a general way and guarantees equality before law to all persons. In
view of a certain amount of indefiniteness attached to the general principle of equality enunciated in
Article 14, separate provisions to cover specific discriminatory situations have been made by
subsequent Articles.
• Thus, Art. 15 prohibits discrimination against citizens on such specific grounds as religion, race, caste,
sex or place of birth. Art. 16 guarantees to the citizens of India equality of opportunity in matters of
public employment. Art. 17 abolishes untouchability, and Art. 18 abolishes titles, other than a military
or academic distinction.
• Thus, the Supreme Court has said that the Constitution lays down provisions both for protective
discrimination as also affirmative action.
EQUALITY BEFORE LAW : ART. 14

• A negative concept
• It ensures that there is no special privilege in favour of any one, that all are equally
subject to the ordinary law of the land and that no person, whatever be his rank or
condition, is above the law
• This is equivalent to the second corollary of the DICEAN concept of the Rule of
Law in Britain.
• This, however, is not an absolute rule and there are a number of exceptions to it,e.g.,
foreign diplomats enjoy immunity from the country’s judicial process; Art.361 extends
immunity to the President of India and the State Governors;24 public officers and
judges also enjoy some protection, and some special groups and interests,like the
trade unions, have been accorded special privileges by law.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS : ART 14

• A positive right in content.

• It does not mean that identically the same law should apply to all persons, or
that every law must have a universal application within the country irrespective
of differences of circumstances.
• Equal Protection of the laws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons
without distinction. What it postulates is the application of the same laws
alike and without discrimination to all persons similarly situated. It
denotes equality of treatment in equal circumstances.
• It implies that among equals the law should be equal and equally
administered, that the like should be treated alike without distinction of race,
religion, wealth, social status or political influence
 Classification Test
• Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable classification
of persons, objects and transactions by the Legislature for the purpose of
achieving specific ends. Classification to be reasonable should fulfil the
following two tests:
(1) It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based on an
intelligible differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which
distinguishes persons or things grouped together in the class from others left
out of it.
(2) The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational
or reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in
question
 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar
• The case involved a Bengal law permitting setting up of special courts for the
‘speedier trial’ of such ‘offences’, or ‘classes of offences’ or ‘cases’, or ‘classes of
cases’, as the State Government might direct by a general or special order.
• These courts were to follow a procedure less advantageous to the accused in
defending himself than the procedure followed by the ordinary criminal courts.
• The Act was held invalid as it made no reasonable classification, laid down “no
yardstick or measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offences”
so as to distinguish them from others outside the purview of the Act.
• The government had the power to pick out a case of a person and hand it over to
the special tribunal while leaving the case of another person similarly situated to be
tried by the ordinary criminal courts. It gave ‘uncontrolled authority’ to the
executive ‘to discriminate’.
• The necessity of ‘speedier trial’ was held to be too vague, uncertain and indefinite
criterion to form the basis of a valid and reasonable classification.
 Kathi Raning Rawat v. Saurashtra

• A provision practically similar to the one involved in the Anwar Ali case was held
valid because the Court found that a policy was stated in the preamble to the Act,
and that the government was expected to select such offences, classes of offences
and classes of cases for trial in special courts as were calculated to affect
public safety, maintenance of public order, etc.
• The main difference in the terms of the statutes, which resulted in different
judicial verdicts as to their validity, was that the preamble to the Saurashtra Act
was more elaborately worded than that to the Bengal Act.
• While the term ‘speedier trial’ used in the Bengal Act to set up special courts was
held to be indefinite, the words ‘public safety, etc.’ in the preamble to the
Saurashtra Act were held to be more definite and as giving a guiding principle to
control administrative discretion
 [Link] v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1974 SC 555

• E.P. Royappa had challenged the validity of his transfer from the post of
Chief Secretary, first to the post of Deputy Chairman, State Planning
Commission and thereafter as Officer on Special Duty as violative of his
Articles 14 and 16 rights.
• The petition rested on mala fide exercise of power by the State with an
inferior officer being appointed to the position of Chief Secretary,
overlooking the seniority of petitioner Royappa therein.
• Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., “a
way of life”, and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any
attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude.
• Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined”
within traditional and doctrinaire limits.
• From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the
whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
• Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is
therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16.
Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment.
• They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must
not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality.
• Equality vis-à-vis arbitrariness was further polished and fleshed out in the
celebrated judgment of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978
SC 597 the Supreme Court held that the trinity of three articles i.e.
Articles 14, 19 and 21 fertilise and cultivate each other mutually. The
Court correlated the principle of reasonableness under Art 19 with
non-arbitrariness under Art 14 with substantive due procedure u/a Art
21
• In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi AIR 1981 SC 487
• The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court (five Judges) in no
uncertain terms, held the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness
to be applicable even to executive actions.
• Bhagwati, J. held thus: “Wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in
State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of
an “authority” under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into
action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional
scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the
fabric of the Constitution”
 • Air India v. Nergesh Mirza, AIR 1981 SC 1829
• By virtue of section 3 of the Air Corporation Act, 1953 the Central Government
created two corporations known as Air
• India International and Indian Air Lines. A.I. Operating international flights and
the I.A.C. Operating domestic flights within the country. Air Hostesses
employed by Air India were governed by Regulations 46 and 47 of Air India
Employees Service Regulations and the Air Hostesses employed by l.A.C. were
governed by the Indian Airlines Service, Regulation No. 12.
• A.H. under A.I. was retired from service in the following contingencies:
(a) On attaining the age of 35 years;
(b) On marriage if it took place within four years of the service; and
(c) On first pregnancy.
• Thus, from a detailed analysis and close examination of the eases of this Court starting from 1952 till
today, the following propositions emerge :-
• In considering the fundamental right of equality of Opportunity a technical, pedantic or doctrinaire
approach should not be made and the doctrine should not be invoked even if different scales of pay,
service terms, leave, etc., are introduced in different or dissimilar posts.
• Thus, where the class or categories of service are essentially different in purport and spirit, Art.
14 can- not be attracted.
• Art. 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification. Thus, where persons belonging
to a particular class in view of their special attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like, are
differently treated in public interest to advance and boost members belonging to backward classes, such
a classification would not amount to discrimination having a close nexus with the objects sought to be
achieved so that in such cases Art. 14 will be completely out of the way.
• Art. 14 certainly applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis.
• The termination of the services of AHs on the ground of pregnancy or marriage within four
years is manifestly unreasonable wholly arbitrary and violative of Art. 14
• This new dimension of Art. 14 transcends the classificatory principle.
Art. 14 is no longer to be equated with the principle of classification. It is
primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness in state action and the doctrine
of classification has been evolved only as a subsidiary rule for testing
whether a particular state action is arbitrary or not