PALAWAN STATE UNIVERSITY

School of Law

Cases for Bar Operations

S.Y. 2024-2025

Submitted to: ATTY. ALLAN B. CARLOS

Submitted by: GILBERT A. DELOS SANTOS

No. DATE G.R. NO. TITLE

1. March 03, 2021 G.R. No. 232049 ADRIANO TOSTON Y HULAR, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
2. March 03, 2021 G.R. No. 244098 JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., SEA CHEFS
CRUISES LTD./EFFEL T. SANTILLAN,
Petitioners, vs. LORDELITO B.
GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

3. March 24, 2021 G.R. No. 229508 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. DENNIS PAUL TOLEDO Y
BURIGA, Accused-Appellant.

4. March 18, 2021 G.R. No. 233857 AGAPITO A. SALIDO, JR., Petitioner, vs.
(formerly UDK ARAMAYWAN METALS
16000) DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
CERLITO SAN JUAN, CORAZON SAN
JUAN, CRISTINA MARIE SAN JUAN,
Respondents.
5. March 16, 2021 A.M. No. P-20- BRYAN T. MALABANAN, Complainant, v.
4090 REUEL P. RUIZ, SHERIFF IV, BRANCH
(FORMERLY 84, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
OCA IPI NO. 18- MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN, Respondent.
4826-P)
6. March 17, 2021 A.C. No. 12836 FREDERICK U. DALUMAY, Complainant,
v. ATTY. FERDINAND M. AGUSTIN,
Respondent.
7. March 23, 2021 G.R. No. 213314 ALLAN DU YAPHOCKUN, ALFREDO
HEBRONA, JR., ROGER C. PARE,
GENERAL SANTOS CITY-SARANGANI
REAL ESTATE BOARD
(GENSANSARREB) AND SOUTH
COTABATO REAL ESTATE BOARD
(SOCOREB), Petitioners, v.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
COMMISSION (PRC), PROFESSIONAL
REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL
ESTATE SERVICE (PRBRES), AND
PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE OF REAL
ESTATE SERVICE PRACTITIONERS,
INC. (PHILRES), Respondents.
8. March 15, 2021 A.M. No. RTJ-21- ZAHARA PENDATUN MAULANA,
006 [Formerly Complainant, v. JUDGE OSCAR P. NOEL,
OCA IPI-18- JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
4802-RTJ] BRANCH 35, GENERAL SANTOS CITY,
SOUTH COTABATO, Respondent.
9. March 02, 2021 G.R. No. 246679 GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, NORBERTO B. VILLAMIN
AND SENANDRO M. JALGALADO,
Respondents.
10. March 18, 2021 G.R. No. 213523 MICHAEL CASILAG Y ARCEO, Petitioner,
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent.
11. March 15, 2021 G.R. No. 210501 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS (FIRST DIVISION) AND
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, Respondents.
12. March 03, 2021 G.R. No. 214407 COMMISSIONER CECILIA RACHEL V.
QUISUMBING, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND
CHAIRPERSON LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, COMMISSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, Respondents.
13. March 15, 2021 G.R. No. 249629 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, v. EDGAR MAJINGCAR Y
YABUT AND CHRISTOPHER RYAN
LLAGUNO Y MATOS, Respondents.
14. March 18, 2021 G.R. No. 215104 EUFROCINA N. MACAIRAN, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
15. March 15, 2021 G.R. No. 249011 CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA
ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN,
CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, AND
ROSITA ANABAN-BARISTO, Petitioners,
v. BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER,
MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO
ANABAN, Respondents.
 ADRIANO TOSTON Y HULAR, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 232049, March 03, 2021
Facts:
Toston, among others, was charged on March 26, 2013 with estafa and illegal recruitment for
allegedly illegally recruited MARY ANN O. SOLIVEN bound to Singapore as waitress.
Mary Ann testified that she first met Toston on June 19, 2010, when she went to the office of
Steadfast International Recruitment Corporation (Steadfast) to apply for a job as a waitress in
Singapore.
Mary Ann found Steadfast's website while browsing for overseas job openings on the internet.
When she went to Steadfast's office in Malate, Manila, she transacted with Toston and Runas.
According to Mary Ann, she was first interviewed by Runas for about five minutes. After that,
Toston and Runas told her that she was eligible for an overseas job. Toston then gave her leave to
go home and told her to wait for their call if she passed the interview.
After about two to three weeks, Toston phoned Mary Ann to tell her that she passed the interview
and that she needed to go back for her medical examination. Mary Ann thus returned to the
Steadfast office, where Toston gave her a referral slip for the medical examination.
On July 7, 2010, Gutierrez, who was General Manager of Steadfast, phoned Mary Ann to tell her
that she passed the medical examination and that she should pay P50,000.00 as placement fee.
That same day, at about 10:00 a.m., Mary Ann and Charles went to the Steadfast office to pay the
placement fee. Mary Ann paid the placement fee to Gutierrez, who issued an acknowledgment
receipt signed by Runas. Gutierrez then told Mary Ann to wait at least a year for deployment.
Mary Ann made regular follow-ups with Toston and Runas but she was never deployed.
By November, Mary Ann called Toston for confirmation after reading an internet blog post about
Steadfast engaging in illegal recruitment. Toston assured her that Steadfast was not engaged in
illegal recruitment.
Sometime in 2011, Mary Ann found more internet posts and a social media account of a certain Ka
Susan Bantay OCW (Ka Susan) pointing to Steadfast as an illegal recruiter. This proved to be the
last straw for Mary Ann, who went to the Steadfast office to withdraw her application.
Among the documents returned to her was the result of her medical examination, which showed
that she was unfit to work abroad.
Seeking the refund of her placement fee payment, Mary Ann went to the office of Ka Susan for
assistance. Ka Susan referred Mary Ann to the police authorities to file a formal complaint.
Upon the filing of her complaint, Mary Ann discovered that Steadfast's registration with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) was temporarily suspended and that Toston had
been deemed resigned from Steadfast as of August 13, 2007. This prompted Mary Ann to file a
criminal complaint before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila.
On September 16, 2011, after Mary Ann had filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor, Gutierrez
executed a promissory note for the return of the placement fee payment.
The trial court found Toston guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa.
The CA sustained the guilty verdict against Toston; but modified the penalty.
Toston filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in a Resolution dated
June 1, 2017. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Toston is guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa?

Ruling:
As to whether Toston is guilty of Illegal recruitment, the Supreme Court Ruled in negative.
According to the Supreme Court, At the time Mary Ann transacted with Steadfast, the crime of
illegal recruitment was defined and penalized by Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 as amended.
Under the prevailing law, there are three modes of committing illegal recruitment:
1) illegal recruitment per se, as defined in the first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No.
8042;
2) illegal recruitment practices, as listed [(a) to (m)] in the same provision; and
3) prohibited practices amounting to illegal recruitment as numerically listed, still in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042.
Illegal recruitment per se can only be committed by non-licensees or non-holders of authority;
while illegal recruitment practices and prohibited practices amounting to illegal recruitment maybe
committed by any person or entity, regardless of recruitment licensing status.
To ascertained on whether the Toston is guilty of illegal recruitment, the supreme said that the acts
of Toston must be established first if it is an act of recruitment.
While interviewing applicants is indeed not expressly mentioned in the definition of illegal
recruitment per se in Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, it is nevertheless an essential part of the
recruitment process.
Having established that Toston committed acts constituting recruitment under the law, we now
consider if he was correctly held liable for violating the law on illegal recruitment through illegal
recruitment per se or through illegal recruitment practice.
The record shows that at the time of Mary Ann's recruitment in June 2010, Steadfast's recruitment
license had not yet been cancelled; and Toston's employment thereat was duly reported to the
POEA. The fact that Toston's 2009-2011 stint at Steadfast does not appear in subsequent POEA
record searches cannot be held against him. In People v. Chowdury,92 this Court acquitted the
accused who was found guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis of a finding that his employment
in the subject recruitment agency was not reported to the POEA.
Toston cannot be faulted for not following up on his registration status. Since the obligation to
register his employment fell upon Steadfast, Toston was justified in relying upon his employer to
faithfully comply with industry regulations. Furthermore, there is enough documentation on record
to prove that Toston was employed at Steadfast at the time of Mary Ann's recruitment, and that
Steadfast reported his employment to the POEA. Like the accused in Chowdury, Toston's
participation in Mary Ann's recruitment was limited to the short interview to determine Mary
Ann's purpose in coming to the office, the referral to Runas, and the referral to the medical clinic.
Mary Ann herself admits that Toston was not present when she paid the placement fee to
Gutierrez.
Given these circumstances, it is clear that Toston was merely performing his tasks as a
documented employee of a validly licensed recruitment agency, under the supervision of the
agency's general manager, Gutierrez. Thus, he cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment per se.
As regards illegal recruitment practice under Section 6(1), it must be noted that Steadfast asked
Mary Ann to wait for one year after the approval of her application for her deployment. However,
before the one-year waiting period had passed, Mary Ann withdrew her application and sued
Steadfast for illegal recruitment after reading blogs and the social media posts of Ka Susan Bantay
OCW.
The records reveal that Mary Ann was found to be medically unfit for overseas deployment,
contrary to the representations made to Mary Ann by Gutierrez. However, the prosecution did not
present proof that Toston knew about the result of Mary Ann's medical examination or that he was
privy to Gutierrez' concealment of this fact from Mary Ann. At the risk of being repetitive, the
only acts of recruitment conclusively attributable to Toston are: 1) the preliminary interview, 2) the
referral to Runas, and 3) the referral to the medical clinic. Given these facts, Toston cannot be held
liable for violating Section 6(1), since the failure to deploy Mary Ann was based on a valid reason.
Furthermore, she voluntarily withdrew her application before the agreed-upon waiting period.
Given our findings that: 1) Toston was a validly documented employee of a validly registered
recruitment agency at the time he transacted with the complainant; and 2) Mary Ann's non-
deployment was not only partly attributable to her own fault but also based on a justified reason,
we must likewise absolve Toston of the crime of estafa.
Under the current law on illegal recruitment, a person who commits acts constituting illegal
recruitment may be held liable not only for the crime of illegal recruitment but also for estafa
under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of estafa under said provision are (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
While Mary Ann did suffer pecuniarily estimable damage in the form of the P50,000.00 placement
fee she paid to Gutierrez and Runas, the element of fraud by abuse of confidence or deceit with
respect to Toston is negated by the fact that, at the time of the act complained of, Toston was an
employee of a validly licensed recruitment agency.
Assuming arguendo that Mary Ann was indeed defrauded when Gutierrez lied to her about the
result of her medical examination, such fraudulent act cannot be attributed to Toston, absent any
proof that he directly participated in or abetted the commission thereof. However, as we have
previously mentioned, the prosecution was unable to prove that Toston knew about the result of
Mary Ann's medical examination or that he was privy to the concealment of this fact from Mary
Ann by Gutierrez, the general manager of Steadfast. Likewise, the defense was able to prove that
Toston was not present and had no participation whatsoever in the payment of the placement fee,
which was handled by Gutierrez and Runas. Thus, the charge of estafa against Toston has no basis.

JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., SEA CHEFS CRUISES LTD./EFFEL T. SANTILLAN,

Petitioners,
vs.
LORDELITO B. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 244098, March 03, 2021
Facts:
Lordelito B. Gutierrez (respondent) was hired on March 27, 2014 as Third Cook for the vessel MV
Mein Schiff I by Jebsens Maritime, Inc. for its foreign principal, Sea Chefs Cruises Ltd.
(collectively, petitioners). On June 19, 2014, while on board, respondent experienced severe pain
on the right paralumbar area, accompanied by paresthesia on the lower right extremity, and
difficulty in movement. He consulted with the ship doctor and underwent magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) scan of the lumbosacral spine while the ship was docked in Kiel, Germany, on
June 27, 2014. Thereafter, respondent was diagnosed with Disc Prolapse L4-L5 and medically
repatriated on July 2, 2014.
On July 4, 2014, respondent was examined by the company-designated physician at Shiphealth,
Inc. On July 9, 2014, he was diagnosed with L4-L5 Herniated Nucleos Pulposus and was
recommended to undergo 18 sessions of physical therapy which he completed on September 9,
2014. On the same day, respondent was given his Final Medical Report which diagnosed that his
condition had become asymptomatic and declared that he was "FIT TO WORK FOR THE
CONDITION REFERRED, CASE CLOSURE."
After receiving the fit to work diagnosis, respondent applied for re-engagement sometime in
October 2014, but his application was denied by petitioners because he failed the pre-employment
medical examination (PEME). The examining physician during the PEME declared that there was
a '"high probability of recurrence' of respondent's previous illness." On November 7, 2014,
respondent underwent an x-ray of the lumbar spine which showed a mild dextroscoliosis of the
lumbar vertebrae.
Thus, respondent filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) on November 28, 2014 for
continuation of medical treatment, underpayment of sick leave pay, payment of sickness
allowance, and attorney's fees (First Case). The complaint (First Case) was dismissed due to the
absence of contrary medical findings from respondent's personally appointed physician to refute
the fit to work diagnosis of the company-designated physician.
On July 3, 2015, respondent filed a second complaint, this time for total permanent disability
benefits, medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees (Second Case) and
while the first case was pending respondent had continued his medical treatment and sought the
opinion of a personally appointed physician, Dr. Renato P. Runas who issued a Medical Evaluation
Report finding that respondent was "permanently unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity with a
recommendation for permanent disability." The Second Case was raffled to LA Julia Cecily
Coching-Sosito (LA Sosito). During the conference on July 23, 2015, the parties agreed to refer
respondent's condition to a third doctor.
On August 5, 2015, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata, arguing
that the dismissal of the First Case barred respondent from claiming total and permanent disability
benefits in the Second Case. LA Sosito denied the motion, holding that the complaint is not barred
by res judicata as the issues in the First Case and Second Case are not identical.
The third doctor, Dr. Jason Paul P. Santiago (Dr. Santiago) opined that respondent was "presently
impaired and might not be able to perform his duty as a Chief cook which involves carrying heavy
food pan, cooking utensils, standing for long hours. Physical therapy might lessen the pain
whoever (sic) higher chance that it will come back again. Surgery might improve sic but will not
guarantee a full recovery and he might not be able to go back to his present job. Lifestyle and
work modification should be highly considered to prevent further aggravation of low back pain to
prevent other serious complications."
Thereafter, both parties filed their respective position papers and replies. Notably, petitioners
admitted in their Position Paper that respondent's injury or illness was work-related. They
maintained, however, that respondent's claim was barred by res judicata and that respondent was
already declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. They also reiterated their
opposition to the admission of the third doctor's opinion.
LA Sosito issued a Decision in favor of respondent, finding that he had suffered a work-related
illness which rendered him totally and permanently disabled and unfit for sea duty. Petitioners
were held solidarily liable to pay respondent total permanent disability benefits of US$60,000.00
and attorney's fees of US$6,000.00.
Petitioners appealed LA Sosito's Decision in the Second Case to the NLRC which reversed the
Decision and dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The NLRC held that the First
Case and Second Case, although praying for different reliefs, involved the same issue as to the
validity of the fit to work certification of the company-designated physician. The NLRC held that
LA Napiza had already sustained the company-designated physician's findings in the First Case as
respondent failed to present the contrary opinion of a personally appointed physician before filing
the complaint in the First Case. In initiating the Second Case, respondent sought to re-litigate the
same issue. The NLRC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration (MR).
Respondent elevated the case via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, which ruled
in his favor. In its Decision dated August 29, 2018, the CA overturned the findings of the NLRC,
holding that the Second Case was not barred by the First Case as they had different causes of
action, issues, and reliefs sought. The First Case was an action for payment of sickness allowance
and continuation of medical treatment while the Second Case was an action for total and
permanent disability benefits. The CA further ruled that the cause of action in the Second Case
was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the complaint in the First Case. The CA reinstated
LA Sosito's award of total and permanent disability benefits and attorney's fees. Petitioners filed
an MR which was denied by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in reversing the NLRC Decision and Resolution
as all the elements of res judicata are present in the case?

Ruling:
No. Res judicata is not applicable.
The literal interpretation of res judicata is "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It is anchored on the principle that parties should
not be allowed to re-litigate the same issue in multiple suits. Once a right or fact has been tried and
established opportunity for trial has been provided to the parties, the final judgment of the court
shall be conclusive as between the parties and their privies.
There are two concepts of res judicata, (1) bar by prior judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment applies when the following requisites are
present:
1. The prior decision must be a final judgment or order;
2. The court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
parties;
3. There must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two
cases; and
4. It must be a judgment or order on the merits.
The CA correctly ruled that the Second Case is not barred by res judicata as the third element is
lacking; the two cases are based on different causes of action. The present case is a claim for total
and permanent disability benefits while the First Case was a claim for continuation of medical
treatment, payment of sickness allowance, and underpayment of sick leave pay.
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which one party violates the right of another.
The elements that constitute a cause of action are: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) correlative
obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant
that violates such right.
The employer has an obligation to provide medical treatment and sickness allowance under
Section 20(A)(2) and (3) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). After the medical treatment, if the seafarer is found to be
suffering from permanent total or partial disability due to the work-related injury or illness, the
employer has an obligation to pay the seafarer disability benefits under Section 20(A)(6) of the
POEA-SEC in accordance with the schedule of disability ratings under Section 32. In some cases,
these benefits may be claimed together since they usually arise from the same injury or illness. In
the instant case, respondent had a right to claim the two causes of action separately, even if they
arose from the same illness. Further, Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC mandates that when
there are conflicting findings by the company-designated physician and the seafarer's personally
appointed physician, the parties may refer to a third doctor mutually agreed upon, whose decision
shall be final and binding on both parties.
A fundamental test to determine whether two suits relate to the same cause of action is whether the
cause of action in the second case was already existing at the time of filing of the prior complaint.
At the time respondent filed the First Case, the cause of action for permanent and total disability
benefits did not yet exist as the true nature and extent of respondent's condition and whether this
was work-related was not yet known. This is precisely why respondent initially requested for the
continuation of his medical treatment instead of immediately claiming disability compensation.
Thus, res judicata as a bar by prior judgment does not apply as the two cases are premised on
different causes of action.
Res judicata under the second concept of conclusiveness of judgment likewise does not apply. The
principle of conclusiveness of judgment dictates that when a competent court has issued a final
decision on a particular fact or question which has been squarely put in issue, deliberated, and
passed upon, the parties cannot raise the same issues or points in a later case even if based on a
different cause of action. Stated conversely, if the prior and the latter cases have the same parties
but different causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted determined and not as to matters merely related thereto. Conclusiveness of
judgment does not bar the Second Case because the issue of whether respondent is entitled to total
and permanent disability benefits was not raised and passed upon in the First Case. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that res judicata does not apply. The dismissal of the First Case for continuation of
medical treatment, sickness allowance, and underpayment of sick leave pay does not bar
respondent's current claim for total and permanent disability benefits.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DENNIS PAUL TOLEDO Y BURIGA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 229508, March 24, 2021
Facts:
Accused in this case was convicted for rape in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, for allegedly
raping an eight-year-old girl.
Accused in this case lured the victim and her brother who is five years old at the time of crime
happen, to go with him in his house in change that he will give him them food and allow the
brother to play with his computer, but when they arrived to his house, he let the brother to play
with his computer and bring the victim to another room and tell her to sleep. When the victim is
about to fall asleep, he entered the room and locked it, then start undressing the victim and
inserting his penis and finger to the vagina of the victim. He also, threatened the victim that if she
will shout, he let them bite by his dog or he will kill them both.
After, of so many things happen, and series pleading by the victim to allow them to leave his
house, the accused let them leave but told the victim to bring her older sister to him and not to tell
anyone on what happen to her.
When the victim arrived on their house, she took a bath but her parents notice that there’s a blood
stain on the towel bath used by the victim, but the victim told them that was came from to her
wound, however, her parents did not believe and insisted to ask her and later check her vagina
which they found it to be blooded, and that’s time when the victim told her parents that she was by
an unknown person, but she told that if she will see the accused he can identified him.
The parents reported it to camp crame, which the victim was examined and found to be raped. The
accused was apprehended and a case of raped was filed against him.
On the trial, the accused used the defense of insanity, that he was inase when the alleged crime
was committed. This was corroborated by the findings of National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH).
The trial court convicted the accused and it was affirmed by the Court of appeal but they modified
the awards given by the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of statutory raped despite his defense of insanity?

Ruling:
The Supreme court ruled in affirmative.
Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code exempts insane persons from criminal liability,
unless it is shown that they acted during a lucid interval. Under our present legal regime, persons
are presumed to be sane and to have intended the ordinary consequences of their voluntary acts.
Thus, the accused who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance is deemed to have admitted
or confessed to the criminal act. The commission of the crime having been established through
admission, the pivotal issue shifts to the fact of insanity; and the burden of proving such fact must
be borne by the accused who invoked it. Moreover, the defense must prove that the accused was
insane at the time of the commission of the crime. Proof of the insanity of the accused after the
commission of the crime, especially during trial, is immaterial, unless submitted to prove that the
insanity is continuous or recurring.
In the case at bar, the defense failed to prove Dennis' mental state at the time of the commission of
the crime charged against him. Crucially, the defense did not present Dennis himself; or anyone
who may have known him long enough to testify about his character, demeanor, or behavior,
before or immediately after the incident or prior to his arrest. Instead, the defense relied solely on
the psychological examinations conducted on Dennis by the NCMH staff, and the reports prepared
in connection therewith.
All of the reports submitted by NCMH were thus based on examinations conducted after Dennis'
arrest and detention. All three witnesses for the defense were NCMH employees; two of whom
merely identified the reports as official records and had no part in the preparation of said reports.
The NCMH reports categorically state that Dennis suffers from "psychosis classified as
Schizophrenia", a finding that is corroborated by Dr. Zarah Espinoza (Dr. Espinoza), the lone
defense witness who was able to examine and interact with Dennis. However, she could not
categorically state that Dennis was already experiencing schizophrenia at the time of the
commission of the crime.
As we have earlier stated, the exempting circumstance of insanity is based on a crucial temporal
parameter: the accused must be proven to be insane at the time of the commission of the crime.
Consequently, this Court cannot accept the NCMH reports as sufficient proof of Dennis' mental
state during the incident with AAA, since these reports pertain only to his mental state at the time
of the examinations, which were both conducted months after the incident and after he had been
attested. Without a shred of evidence as to Dennis' mental state before or during the incident, his
defense of insanity cannot be countenanced; and all that is left on record are the positive
testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC, as well as the results of the medico legal examination
conducted on AAA which prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dennis raped AAA when she was
still eight (8) years old.

AGAPITO A. SALIDO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
ARAMAYWAN METALS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CERLITO SAN JUAN,
CORAZON SAN JUAN, CRISTINA MARIE SAN JUAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 233857 (formerly UDK 16000), March 18, 2021
Facts:
This case is an intra-corporate dispute involving two different factions within Aramaywan, a
corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines.
Sometime in April 2005, Cerlito San Juan (San Juan), Ernesto Mangune (Mangune), and Agapito
Salido, Jr. (Salido), along with four other individuals (collectively, Salido faction), agreed to form
two mining corporations, namely Aramaywan and Narra Mining Corporation (Narra Mining).
San Juan was tasked to finance the initial operations of the intended corporation, Mangune was in
charge of the technical aspect of the operations, while Salido and the Salido faction were in charge
of the mining site and securing the necessary permits.
They entered into an Agreement to Incorporate (Agreement), wherein it was stipulated that San
Juan would advance the paid-up subscription for Aramaywan amounting to P2,500,000.00 and
would assure the payment of the subscription of the capital stock of Narra Mining. In exchange,
San Juan would own 55% of the stocks of Aramaywan and 35% of the stocks of Narra Mining.
In line with the said Agreement, San Juan then advanced the P2,500,000.00 paid-up subscription
of Aramaywan. This is evidenced by a Standard Chartered Bank Certificate indicating that the
amount of P2,500,000.00 was deposited in San Juan's name as treasurer, held by him in trust for
the corporation.
Aramaywan was then subsequently incorporated with nine named directors.
San Juan's 55% share, representing 13,750 shares in Aramaywan, was divided into three: 5,000
shares for himself, another 5,000 shares for Corazon San Juan (Corazon), his wife, and 3,750
shares for Cristina Marie San Juan (Cristina Marie), his daughter. Corazon and Cristina Marie
were also named directors of the corporation, and together with San Juan, they form the San Juan
faction in Aramaywan. The rest of the five directors, excluding Mangune, representing 35% of the
shares in the corporation, form the Salido faction in Aramaywan. The named officers of the
corporation were San Juan as Chairman and Treasurer, Salido as President, and Mangune as
Corporate Secretary.
the Board of Directors of Aramaywan had its first Board Meeting. In the said meeting, the Salido
faction claimed that San Juan delivered only P932,209.16 in cash during the incorporation process
of the corporation. The Salido faction claimed that the rest of the P2,500,000.00 remained
undelivered as it remained under San Juan's name. Thus, the Salido faction claimed that San Juan
was in breach of his undertaking to advance the payment of Aramaywan's capital stock. As regards
the incorporation of Narra Mining, it is undisputed that San Juan has yet to register the same,
although San Juan claimed that the Salido faction has not yet demanded its registration. Because
of these supposed breaches by San Juan of his obligations under the Agreement, Salido made a
proposal to reduce San Juan's shares in Aramaywan from 55% to 15%. It is not clear whether San
Juan accepted this proposal or not.
Later on, the shares of San Juan was reduced from 55% to 15% by Salido faction.
San Juan faction filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC) a complaint which sought to
invalidate the acts of the Salido faction.
RTC, ruling affirmed the acts of Salido Faction to be valid.
CA, ruling affirmed the decision of RTC, but reversed it in reconsideration sought by San Juan.
Hence, this petition filed by Salido Faction.

Issue:
Whether or not Salido Faction’s act reducing the corporate shares of San Juan’s Share is valid?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held in negative.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code, the law applicable at the time the events in this
case occurred, clearly sets out the parameters when a corporation may reacquire its shares and
convert them into treasury shares. According to Section 9 of the Corporation Code, "[t]reasury
shares are shares of stock which have been issued and fully paid for, but subsequently reacquired
by the issuing corporation by purchase, redemption, donation or through some other lawful
means." Apart from reacquiring the shares through some lawful means, the Corporation Code is
also explicit that while a corporation has the power to purchase or acquire its own shares, the
corporation must have unrestricted retained earnings in its books to cover the shares to be
purchased or acquired. In addition, in cases where the reason for reacquiring the shares is because
of the unpaid subscription, the Corporation Code is likewise explicit that the corporation must
purchase the same during a delinquency sale.
All the foregoing requirements were not met in the reduction of San Juan's shares.
At the outset, the records are bereft of any showing that Aramaywan had unrestricted retained
earnings in its books at the time the reduction of shares was made. During that time, Aramaywan
had just been existing for a few months, and had not in fact been able to perform mining activities
yet. It is thus both highly doubtful and unsupported by the record that Aramaywan had unrestricted
retained earnings to be able to purchase its own shares.
The Court has observed that: "The trust fund doctrine backstops the requirement of unrestricted
retained earnings to fund the payment of the shares of stocks of the withdrawing stockholders."
Under the trust fund doctrine, "the capital stock, property, and other assets of a corporation are
regarded as equity in trust for the payment of corporate creditors, who are preferred in the
distribution of corporate assets." Thus, "[t]he creditors of a corporation have the right to assume
that the board of directors will not use the assets of the corporation to purchase its own stock for as
long as the corporation has outstanding debts and liabilities. There can be no distribution of assets
among the stockholders without first paying corporate debts."
In this case, there was no showing that, at the time the reduction of San Juan's shares was made,
Aramaywan had unrestricted retained earnings in its books. Neither was it shown that it did not
have creditors or that they were already paid before the agreement to release San Juan was made.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that San Juan's subscriptions have already been fully paid by
him, and as such, Aramaywan cannot validly reduce his shares without giving a corresponding
return of his investment. As earlier stated, San Juan contributed P2,500,000.00 evidenced by a
Standard Chartered Bank certificate in San Juan's name which indicates that he holds that
money in trust for Aramaywan.
The RTC itself, in narrating its factual findings, noted that "the payment for the subscription of
shares of all the subscribers were paid by plaintiff Cerlito San Juan as his contribution in the
formation and running of the corporation. The payment for the subscribed shares, however, was
under the name of plaintiff Cerlito San Juan in trust for plaintiff corporation."
It is well established that when there is a trust relationship, there is a separation of the legal title
and equitable ownership of the property. In a trust relation, legal title is vested in the fiduciary or
trustee, while equitable ownership is vested in the cestui que trust or beneficiary. Here, it is clear
that San Juan's name was reflected in the bank certificate only because he is the trustee in the trust
relation, but Aramaywan is nevertheless the beneficiary. This means that San Juan only had legal
title over the money, but the ownership of the same ultimately remained with Aramaywan.
It is also bolstered by the fact that Aramaywan's Articles of Incorporation states that P2,500,000.00
of its authorized capital stock has already been paid. This is in accordance with the parties'
Agreement, which provides that "Cerlito G. San Juan shall advance the paid-up subscription for
ARAMAYWAN METALS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION in the sum of P2,500,000.00."
Notably, the SEC issued a certificate of incorporation on September 9, 2005, which means that it
found the contents of the Articles of Incorporation and the Treasurer's Affidavit which also
contains the information on how the shares are subscribed and paid to be correct.

BRYAN T. MALABANAN, Complainant,

vs.
REUEL P. RUIZ, SHERIFF IV, BRANCH 84, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALOLOS
CITY, BULACAN, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-20-4090 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 18-4826-P), March 16, 2021
Facts:
Complainant filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, in behalf of UCPB, before
the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, against the properties of Francisco Allarilla and the members
of the latter's family, consisting of 98 titles. The case was entitled UCPB Savings Bank v. Allarilla,
et al., represented by Francisco J. Alarilla, Attorney-in-Fact, docketed as EJF No. 28-2018 and
was raffled to respondent for the conduct of the auction sale on the mortgaged properties.
On April 12, 2018, the auction sale proceeded and UCPB was declared as the highest bidder.
Subsequently, respondent gave complainant a Billing for Sheriff's Fee, which was complained by
the complainant in this case, because the the sum of P490,000.00, which respondent seeks to
collect is so unconscionable to be considered as expenses for the posting and service of the
petition and conduct of the auction sale. He further said that respondent's billing was without any
basis and approval from the court as mandated by Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Hence, it is a
form of solicitation of money punishable by dismissal from the service.
Respondent denied the accusation that he is attempting to collect money from complainant.
Respondent admitted that he gave the questioned billing to the complainant but explained that the
same is only a guide for UCPB in estimating the amount to be paid.
OCA found respondent guilty of soliciting money which is a violation of Section 50(A)(10) of the
2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS). The OCA recommended
that the instant administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that
respondent be dismissed from service with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, excluding
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent committed improper solicitation in violation of Section 50(A)(10) of
the 2017 RACCS?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court agrees and adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
A sheriff is expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to his functions as an officer of the
court. Section 10 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court precisely enumerates the fees sheriffs, process
servers and other persons serving processes are entitled to pursuant to the performance of their
official duties.
In this case, the Billings for Sheriff's Fees is not disputed by respondent. He admitted that he
issued the said billing and the only excuse he proffered was that the same was merely given as a
guide for UCPB in estimating the amount to be paid.
Evidently, respondent's explanation does not merit any consideration. The OCA correctly pointed
out that respondent's Billing for Sheriff's Fee has no legal basis. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 and Rule
141 is very clear that all the fees authorized to be collected are specified or the means by which
these are to be computed are fixed. Moreover, Section 10 of Rule 141 provides the specific
amount of fee for a particular service or duty performed by the sheriff. It can never be based on the
sole discretion of the payor. Neither can it be based on the customary practice of banks paying a
specific fee per title in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, or as in this case the number of titles
at the rate of P5,000.00 for each title.
The Court have consistently held that the rules on sheriff's expenses are clear-cut and do not
provide procedural shortcuts. A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a
party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to
dishonesty and extortion. And any amount received in violation of Section 10, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court constitutes unauthorized fees. Besides, even if the party was amenable to the
amount requested or that the money was given voluntarily and applied for lawful purposes, such
would not absolve respondent from administrative liability because of his failure to secure the
court's prior approval.
Respondent's assertion that he has not received any amount from complainant will not excuse him
from incurring liability because mere demand is already sufficient.
It has been sufficiently established that respondent solicited money from complainant. It is evident
that the respondent showed carelessness or indifference in the performance of his duties. The
record showed that aside from his lame excuses, he offered no veritable explanation nor
satisfactory reason to support his actions. His failure to comply with the aforementioned rules
designed to promote full accountability for public funds, clearly undermines the public's faith in
courts and in the administration of justice as a whole, and render him unfit for the position of
sheriff.
Under Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713, solicitation is considered a prohibited act. Moreover, Section 2 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also provides that court personnel shall not solicit or
accept any gift, favor, or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift,
favor, or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Accordingly, respondent is guilty of improper solicitation. Following Rule 10, Section 50(A)(10)
of the 2017 RACCS, improper solicitation is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal
from the service.
Respondent's 24 years in the service cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance in his favor
because Section 53 of the 2017 RACCS provides that mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated when the offense committed is punishable by dismissal from the service.

FREDERICK U. DALUMAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FERDINAND M. AGUSTIN, Respondent.
A.C. No. 12836, March 17, 2021
Facts:
Respondent served as counsel for complainant and his family in several cases lodged in different
courts in Ilocos Norte. Initially, the parties herein were good friends and maintained an attorney-
client relationship imbued with trust and confidence, so much so that Dalumay entrusted Agustin
with the handling of several of his financial transactions and access to the bank accounts related
thereto.

During this period, Agustin was able to borrow money from Dalumay on different occasions. In
particular, Dalumay loaned money to Agustin in the amounts of P300,000.00 and US$9,000.00.
Due to the confidence initially reposed in Agustin, Dalumay dispensed with the necessity of
executing written agreements to cover said loans.

Sometime in 2014, Agustin became remiss in his duties as counsel missing his attendance in
numerous hearings without informing the court, Dalumay, or his representatives, of the cause of
his absence. Dalumay even claimed that he was advised by the court to look for another counsel to
avoid further delay of his case.
Eventually, Dalumay confronted Agustin and expressed his intention to sever their attorney-client
relationship. Dalumay then demanded Agustin to pay him the money he owed and execute the
necessary written agreement, but the latter refused to do so at first. However, Agustin later on
drafted an agreement, in his own handwriting, to pay his loans in installments.
Agustin failed to pay his loans up until the present notwithstanding numerous demands from
Dalumay and his mother. Agustin even challenged Dalumay and his mother to file a case against
him if they cannot wait for his payment. Hence, in the present complaint, Dalumay charged
Agustin with "unjustified abandonment of the cause of his client, blatant disregard of the rules on
prohibition on borrowing money from a client and the willful refusal to pay his loan."
Agustin denied the charges against him, particularly on the fact of receiving the stated amounts
from Dalumay as loans, and disputed the genuineness and due execution of the handwritten
agreement attached to the complaint bearing his signature.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found Agustin to have clearly violated Canons 7 and
16, and Rule 16.04 of the CPR. Also required the respondent to return the amounts of P300,000.00
and US$9,000.00 to Dalumay.
Issue:
Whether or not IBP findings is correct?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except for its recommended penalty and
its directive to Agustin to return the amounts of P300,000.00 and US$9,000.00 to Dalumay.
With regard to the charge of violating Rule 16.04 of the CPR, Agustin failed to dispute the
similarity of the signature appearing on the loan agreement with those affixed in the pleadings he
submitted before the IBP, nor did he allege that the signature on the agreement was forged.
Rationally, the Court is compelled to recognize the validity of the handwritten loan agreement and
to find that Agustin had indeed borrowed P300,000.00 and US$9,000.00 from Dalumay while
having served as his counsel.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings
to renege on his obligation. In the present case, it is clear that Agustin had violated Rule 16.04 of
the CPR.
The Court sustains the finding that Agustin also violated Canon 7 of the CPR. In unduly
borrowing money from his client and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, Agustin abused the
trust and confidence reposed in him, and in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession.
As regards the penalty to be imposed considering the foregoing violations, the Court, however,
takes exception to the recommendation of the IBP based on established precedent. The Court took
due consideration of the case of Frias v. Atty. Lozada,19 where the respondent was suspended from
the practice of law for two years under similar charges, but the amount involved was less. As the
amount involved in the instant case is less than that in Frias and considering that this is Agustin's
first transgression of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to modify the period of suspension
to one year.
Furthermore, the Court cannot order or require Agustin to return the money he loaned from
Dalumay under these same proceedings. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for money received from
his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. Thus, the directive to return the amounts of P300,000.00 and US$9,000.00 under the
IBP recommendation cannot be sustained.
 ALLAN DU YAPHOCKUN, ALFREDO HEBRONA, JR., ROGER C. PARE, GENERAL
SANTOS CITY-SARANGANI REAL ESTATE BOARD (GENSANSARREB) AND SOUTH
COTABATO REAL ESTATE BOARD (SOCOREB), Petitioners,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), PROFESSIONAL
REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE (PRBRES), AND PHILIPPINE
INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE PRACTITIONERS, INC. (PHILRES),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 213314, March 23, 2021
Facts:
The case "Yaphockun v. Professional Regulation Commission" involves two consolidated petitions
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.
The petitions challenge the validity of Section 3(h), Rule I of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646, also known as the "Real Estate Service Act of
the Philippines (RESA)."
The controversy centers on the interpretation of Section 34 of the RESA, which mandates the
integration of all real estate service associations into one national organization, recognized as the
Accredited and Integrated Professional Organization (AIPO) of real estate service practitioners.
The PRC and PRBRES, through the IRR, defined the AIPO as an organization of individual
practitioners, not associations.
Petitioners argued that the AIPO should be an integration of real estate associations, as envisioned
by the law's principal author, former Congressman Rodolfo G. Valencia.
The lower courts did not resolve the issue, leading the petitioners to file their cases directly with
the Supreme Court.
Petitioners sought to invalidate the IRR provision, arguing it contravened the RESA's intent and
legislative history.
The PRC and PRBRES, supported by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintained that
the IRR was consistent with the RESA and necessary for effective regulation of the profession.

Issue:
1. May the present petitions be dismissed for being an improper remedy and for violating the
rule on hierarchy of courts?
2. Does Section 3(h) of Resolution No. 2, Series of 2010 of the PRC and the PRBRES
contravene Section 34 of the RESA?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition were appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials. Therefore, the petitions were not dismissed on
procedural grounds.
 The Supreme Court reasoned that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition were
appropriate remedies under the expanded scope of judicial power provided by Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
This provision allows the Court to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
The Court emphasized that the hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule and that it has
full discretionary power to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over special civil
actions for certiorari and prohibition filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the
petition.

2. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 3(h), Rule I of the IRR, ruling that it did
not contravene Section 34 of the RESA. The Court found that the integration of individual
practitioners into the AIPO was consistent with the law's intent to professionalize the real
estate service sector and enhance regulatory oversight.
The Court found that the interpretation of Section 34 of the RESA by the PRC and
PRBRES was consistent with the law's policy and objectives.
The RESA aims to professionalize the real estate service sector by increasing the
competence and raising the ethical standards of real estate service practitioners.
The Court noted that similar provisions in other Professional Regulatory Laws (PRLs) also
mandate the integration of individual professionals into one national organization, not
associations.
The Court held that the integration of individual practitioners into the AIPO would ensure
efficient coordination and discipline, which would be diluted if the AIPO included real
estate associations.
The Court also gave weight to the interpretation of the law by the PRC and PRBRES, as
they are the administrative agencies tasked with implementing the RESA.
The Court concluded that the interpretation of Section 34 of the RESA by the PRC and
PRBRES, which defines the AIPO as an organization of individual practitioners, was valid
and consistent with the law's intent and objectives.
The petitions were dismissed for lack of merit, and the petitioners were ordered to pay the
costs of the suit.

ZAHARA PENDATUN MAULANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE OSCAR P. NOEL, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 35, GENERAL
SANTOS CITY, SOUTH COTABATO, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-21-006 [Formerly OCA IPI-18-4802-RTJ], March 15, 2021
Facts:
Zahara Pendatun Maulana filed a complaint against Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. of the RTC, Branch
35, General Santos City.
Maulana was a respondent in a criminal case for violating RA 10591, concerning firearms and
ammunition.
Firearms were seized from Maulana's residence under Search Warrant Nos. 17-98 and 17-99
issued by Judge Noel on July 11, 2017.
The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of General Santos City dismissed the complaint against
Maulana on September 25, 2017, citing lack of evidence and probable cause.
The OCP noted that Maulana and her co-respondent were licensed holders of the seized firearms,
except for one firearm and some government-issued ammunition.
Maulana's counsel filed a Motion to Release Seized Items.
During a hearing on November 16, 2017, Judge Noel allegedly directed Maulana to pay PHP
300,000 for travel expenses to verify firearm licenses at Camp Crame, Manila.
Judge Noel claimed the order was based on a manifestation by Maulana's counsel and presented
the TSN to support his claim.
Maulana did not file any motion for reconsideration or amendment of the order.
Maulana later denied executing an Affidavit of Desistance that exonerated Judge Noel.
The Office of Court Administrator (OCA) recommended further investigation, which confirmed
Maulana's desistance but still found Judge Noel liable for gross ignorance of procedural rules,
recommending a fine of PHP 20,000.

Issue:
1. Did Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. commit gross ignorance of procedural rules by requiring
personal verification of firearm licenses despite sufficient evidence?
2. Should the administrative complaint against Judge Noel be dismissed based on the
complainant's affidavit of desistance?

Ruling:
1. Yes, Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. committed gross ignorance of procedural rules.
The Supreme Court found Judge Noel committed gross ignorance of procedural rules by
issuing the order for personal verification of firearm licenses at the complainant's expense.
OCA Circular No. 11-2011 and the case of Del Rosario vs. People state that FEO
certifications are sufficient proof of valid firearm licenses.
It was not Judge Noel's duty to verify the authenticity of these certifications, and his
actions cast doubt on his integrity and probity.

2. No, the administrative complaint should not be dismissed solely based on the
complainant's affidavit of desistance.
Affidavits of desistance do not necessarily warrant the dismissal of administrative
complaints, as the court's disciplinary power cannot depend on complainants' whims.
The court cited Escalona v. Padillo, emphasizing that administrative actions are not
contingent on a complainant's willingness to pursue the case.
 The court modified the OCA's recommended penalty, imposing a three-month suspension
from office without salary and benefits on Judge Noel, with a stern warning against
repeating the infraction.

GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NORBERTO B. VILLAMIN AND SENANDRO M.
JALGALADO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 246679, March 02, 2021
Facts:
The petitioner was duly elected as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte in the 2010, 2013
and 2016 elections. He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016 terms. It is the turn of events in
respect of the petitioner’s 2016-2019 term that has spawned the controversy under review.
It appears that on January 28, 2013, one Edgardo Gonzales filed in the OMB an administrative
complaint charging the petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression or grave abuse of authority.
While the case was pending, the petitioner won as Governor in the 2013 elections.
On October 2, 2015, while he was serving his 2013-2016 term, the OMB found and declared him
administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension for one year which
suspension was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).
The petitioner timely appealed the suspension to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review.
Acting on the petitioner’s appeal, the CA promulgated its decision reducing the imposed penalty
of suspension from one year to six months. He immediately re-assumed his position after the lapse
of six months, and his re-assumption later became the subject of the third OMB case.
On November 4, 2015, several persons initiated the second OMB case against the petitioner. In the
decision dated April 18, 2016 and approved by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales on
September 13, 2016, the OMB held the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
oppression/abuse of authority and ordered his dismissal from the service.
Although the petitioner appealed to the CA, the DILG implemented the OMB decision on
November 8, 2016 by ordering the petitioner to vacate his position as Governor. On the same date,
the DILG issued another memorandum addressed to then Vice Governor Jonah Pedro G. Pimentel
(Pimentel) directing him to assume as Governor of Camarines Norte.
On December 12, 2016, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the DILG from
implementing or continuously implementing the decision of the OMB. Thus, the petitioner was
able to re-assume his post as Governor.
The third OMB case concerned the petitioner’s re- assumption of the office of the Governor after
the CA had initially reduced the penalty imposed in the first OMB case to suspension for six
months. The complainant thereat initiated another complaint on the basis that the petitioner had
violated the first OMB decision by re-assuming office without having fully served his suspension.
On January 11, 2018, the OMB rendered another decision finding the petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct, and ordering his dismissal from the service.
On September 26, 2018, the CA ruled on the petitioner’s appeal by modifying the penalty of
dismissal to six months suspension.
On October 29, 2018, the DILG issued its memorandum directing the implementation of the
decision of the CA, and the reinstatement of the petitioner as Governor if he had already served
the six-month suspension.
On October 30, 2018, the petitioner took his oath of office as Governor of Camarines Norte.
In the meanwhile, on October 15, 2018, the petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Camarines Norte for the May 2019 elections.
This prompted respondents Norberto B. Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado to file their separate
petitions with the COMELEC praying for the denial of due course to and/or for the cancellation of
the petitioner’s COC, which petitions were consolidated and predicated on the application of the
three-term limit rule.

Issue:
Whether or not a penalty of dismissal imposed on an elective official by the Ombudsman which
was later reduced to suspension by the CA constitutes to interruption of the term of office thereby
circumventing the three-term limit rule as provided by the Constitution?

Ruling:
Yes. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution embodies the three- term limit rule, viz.:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
For the application of the disqualification under the three-term limit rule, therefore, two conditions
must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same
local government post; and
(2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.
The first requisite for the application of the three-term limit rule is present inasmuch as the
petitioner was elected as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, specifically in
the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. But the second requisite was not satisfied because his
intervening dismissals from the service truly prevented him from fully serving the third
consecutive term.
Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position equates to failure to render service.
In this regard, Aldovino v. COMELEC is instructive, as follows:
From all the above, we conclude that the “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office.
The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and
its strint intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in
office to no more than three consecutive terms, using “voluntary renunciation” as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary
inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary,
should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of
title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining
title, is simply barred from exercising the function of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on
to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an
office holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons
established by law. Of course, the “failure to serve” cannot be used once the right to office is lost;
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really
lost.
The COMELEC relies on the OMB’s Rules to support its view that the execution of the orders of
dismissal against the petitioner did not create a permanent, but only a temporary, vacancy.
A review reveals that the OMB’s Rules did not justify the COMELEC’s reliance.
The OMB’s Rules, promulgated in Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1990, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 2003, stated in Section 7 of its Rule III as follows:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final,
executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
That the second paragraph of Section 7 of Rule III of the OMB’s Rules, supra, characterizes the
penalty of suspension or dismissal meanwhile enforced as a preventive suspension should the
public officer later win his or her appeal of the OMB’s decision is absurd and illogical as to the
penalty of dismissal. The characterization also lacks legal and factual support. In his case, the
petitioner was twice fully divested of his powers and responsibilities as Governor by the DILG
immediately transferring the discharge of the office of Governor and the exercise of the functions
and powers thereof to another person, Vice Governor Pimentel. The latter forthwith took his oath
of office as Governor and unconditionally assumed and discharged such office. Without doubt, the
execution of the OMB’s dismissals in that manner resulted in the petitioner’s loss of title to the
office of Governor.
Neither did the non-finality of the decisions render any less the petitioner’s loss of his title to the
office. It would be unwarranted to differentiate the dismissals enforced against him from the
dismissal based on and pursuant to a decision that was already final. Both dismissals would
produce the same effect – the ouster of the official from his title to the office.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the decisions directing the dismissal of the petitioner
included no indication of the petitioner being thereby placed under any type of suspension. In fact,
the decisions did not state any conditions whatsoever. As such, he was dismissed for all intents and
purposes of the law in the periods that he was dismissed from office even if he had appealed. In
that status, he ceased to hold the title to the office in the fullest sense.
The COMELEC considered developments in the petitioner’s appeals in holding that the DILG’s
execution of the decisions did not result into the loss of title to the office. This holding was
grounded on two matters, namely: (1) the non-finality of the decisions under the OMB’s Rules;
and (2) the fact that the petitioner was able to re-assume his seat as Governor.
The holding of the COMELEC was unjustified because it thereby disregarded the fact that the
DILG had fully implemented the decisions of dismissal. The full implementation immediately
carried legal repercussions that no developments in relation to the petitioner’s appeals could
change or undo. Among others, the petitioner effectively lost his title to the office by the DILG’s
act of directing Pimentel to take his oath of office as Governor, and by the latter then assuming
and discharging the office and functions of such office.
The provision of the OMB’s Rules allowing the petitioner to re–assume on the basis of the interim
being considered as a period of preventive suspension after his appeals resulted in the imposition
of lesser penalties did not alter the reality that he had actually been ousted from office. In other
words, there was still an interruption of the term of office. As aptly put in Latasa v. COMELEC,
the interruption, to be considered as interruption of the term, “contemplates a rest period during
which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority
over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.”
Conformably with said ruling, the period during which the petitioner was not serving as Governor
should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because he had then ceased to exercise
power or authority over the people of the province. Indeed, it was Pimentel who then held title to
the office and exercised the functions thereof. As such, the petitioner did not fully serve his entire
third term even if his re- assumption to office subsequently occurred.

MICHAEL CASILAG Y ARCEO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
G.R. No. 213523, March 18, 2021
Facts:
Michael Casilag was charged with violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, "The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." The incident occurred on April 16, 2010, in San
Pedro, Laguna. Casilag was accused of possessing two small sachets containing 0.02 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). He pleaded not guilty, leading to pre-trial and trial
proceedings.
According to Prosecution:
Police officers, including PO1 Freddie Ramos, PSI Antonio Gutierrez, and PO Sonny Xyrus de
Leon, were conducting a surveillance operation. They observed two men, one holding plastic
sachets, appearing to engage in a drug transaction. The men fled when approached, but PO1
Ramos apprehended Casilag with the sachets. The items were marked with initial “MC”, and
Casilag was informed of his constitutional rights before being taken to the police station. The
seized items tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
However, the defense claims that he was at a friend's house when two armed men, later identified
as police officers, forcibly took him to the police station. He alleged that no illegal items were
found on him and that he was physically harmed. Casilag only learned about the charges at the
Prosecutor's Office.
The RTC convicted Casilag based on police officers' testimonies, presuming they performed their
duties regularly.
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, dismissing Casilag's appeal regarding procedural non-
compliance and chain of custody issues.
Casilag then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Did the RTC and the CA err in convicting Casilag of the crime charged?
2. Was there a failure to comply with the procedure outlined in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the CA's decision.

The Supreme Court emphasized the constitutional presumption of innocence and the
requirement for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
This presumption in favor of the accused remains until the judgment of conviction
becomes final and executory. Borrowing the words of the Court in Mangubat, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., "[u]ntil a promulgation of final conviction is made, this
constitutional mandate prevails." Hence, even if a judgment of conviction exists, as long as
the same remains pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in People v. Mingming, the Court outlined
what the prosecution must do to hurdle the presumption and secure a conviction:
First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until final
conviction; conviction requires no less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral
certainty of guilt, not only with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more
importantly, of the identity of the accused as the author of the crime.

Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw
its strength from the weakness of the defense.15 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, what militates against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
Casilag is the failure of the prosecution's version to pass the test of credibility.

2. The Court also finds that the prosecution committed another error that militates against a
finding of guilt by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the procedure in conducting the required
inventory immediately after the arrest of a person involved in dangerous drugs. The said
provision states:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
 (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof
In the present case, only a representative from the media was present in the conduct of the
inventory, as shown by the Certification of Inventory dated April 16, 2010 wherein only Mr. Nick
Luares from The Laguna Expose Star signed as a witness to the inventory. That only a media
representative witnessed the inventory was likewise confirmed by the testimonies of both PO1
Ramos and PO de Leon.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS (FIRST DIVISION) AND PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 210501, March 15, 2021
Facts:
PSPC, a petroleum products manufacturer, imported alkylate, a blending component, from May
2010 to August 2011. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) initially ruled that alkylate was not
subject to excise tax. However, in September 2011, the BIR added a note in its rulings, leaving
open the possibility of excise tax, pending further review. Both the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and
the Department of Energy (DOE) agreed that alkylate was not a finished product and shouldn't be
taxed.
Despite these findings, the BIR later reclassified alkylate as subject to excise tax in a 2012 ruling.
PSPC contested this, leading to various legal battles. PSPC argued that this ruling violated due
process, and the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) initially sided with PSPC, suspending the tax
collection for past shipments. However, the BIR and BOC pursued their claim, seeking nearly P2
billion in taxes for previous imports. The legal dispute continued, with the case bouncing between
different courts and agencies. The Supreme Court eventually consolidated related petitions,
granting PSPC temporary relief but leaving the issue unresolved.

Issues:
1. Whether or not CIR, BOC, and the Collector guilty of forum shopping?

2. Does the CTA have jurisdiction over the subject matter of CTA Case No. 8535?

3. Does the CTA have jurisdiction to issue Suspension Orders over the assessments against
PSPC's subsequent and future alkylate importations, as well as a TRO/WPI against
enforcing Document No. M-059-2012?

Ruling:
1. The Court ruled that the petitions lack merit and found the CIR, BOC, and the Collector
guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping occurs when a party seeks multiple judicial
 remedies based on the same facts, transactions, and issues, which could result in
conflicting decisions. In this case, both the CIR and BOC sought the same relief—
dismissing CTA Case No. 8535—demonstrating the identity of issues and interests.
Although the BIR and BOC are distinct entities, their roles overlap in collecting excise
taxes on imported goods, making them subject to the same legal concerns. The overlapping
functions confirmed the forum shopping violation.

2. The CTA has jurisdiction over CTA Case No. 8535, which involves a tax dispute between
the BIR and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC). The main issue revolves
around the classification of Document No. M-059-2012 as a BIR ruling. BIR rulings are
official positions on tax matters, determining whether a transaction is taxable based on
specific facts. In this case, the BIR ruled that PSPC’s alkylate importations were subject to
excise tax and VAT under the National Internal Revenue Code. Since the document directly
affects PSPC's tax obligations, the CTA has the authority to review the case.

3. The CTA does not have jurisdiction to issue Suspension Orders on tax assessments beyond
the period covered by PSPC's Amended Petition for Review. The court clarifies that while
it has the power to issue injunctive reliefs (TROs or WPIs) and Suspension Orders, these
remedies serve different purposes. Suspension Orders under Section 11 of the CTA Law
require an existing tax liability (a tax assessment, ruling, or decision). Without a specific
tax liability, a Suspension Order cannot be issued. On the other hand, injunctive reliefs
(TROs/WPIs) can temporarily prevent the enforcement of tax laws or issuances. These
distinctions explain why the CTA correctly refused to issue a Suspension Order for PSPC’s
subsequent importations.

COMMISSIONER CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND
CHAIRPERSON LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 214407, March 03, 2021
Facts:
Respondent in this case, filed a case against Quisumbing for Direct Bribery, Grave Misconduct,
violations of Sections 3(b), (c), and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and Section 7(d) of R.A.
No. 6713.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is Cruel and disrespectful behavior, issuing illegal orders,
misuse of government vehicles, and falsifying records.
Petitioner denied the allegations, attributing behavior to side effects of fibromyalgia treatment.
Ombudsman found substantial evidence, imposed dismissal and accessory penalties.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but a Memoranda is issued by Secretary Ochoa and
Chairperson Rosales directing immediate dismissal of petitioner.
Quisumbing argued that implementing her dismissal pending her motion for reconsideration was
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Did the respondents commit grave abuse of discretion by implementing Quisumbing's dismissal
despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
implementing Quisumbing's dismissal.
The Office of the Ombudsman has the constitutional and statutory power to promulgate its own
rules of procedure, including the immediate executory nature of its decisions in administrative
cases. Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, states that a
decision in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course, regardless of a motion for
reconsideration or appeal.
Cited cases such as Villaseñor v. Ombudsman, Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, and Lee v. Sales,
which upheld the immediate executory nature of the Ombudsman's decisions. To protect the
integrity of the civil service and prevent public officers from influencing witnesses or tampering
with records during the pendency of motions or appeals.
Respondents were following the law and respecting the Ombudsman's orders. The Joint
Resolution was immediately executory, requiring no separate order for implementation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGAR MAJINGCAR Y YABUT AND CHRISTOPHER RYAN LLAGUNO Y MATOS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 249629, March 15, 2021
Facts:
Respondents Edgar Majingcar y Yabut and Christopher Ryan Llaguno y Matos were charged with
violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165). The charges
stemmed from an incident on October 5, 2016, in Naga City, where they were accused of selling
and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride ('shabu').
Both respondents pleaded not guilty during arraignment but later proposed to plead guilty to a
lesser offense under Section 12, Article II of RA 9165. The trial court accepted their plea despite
the prosecution's objections and declared certain DOJ circulars unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the People's petition for certiorari due to late filing and lack of
merit, leading to the current petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error by declaring the People's petition for
certiorari as untimely?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the respondents' plea to a lesser offense under
Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case Nos. 2016-0774 and 2016-0775?
 3. Does the People's challenge against the verdict of conviction violate the respondents' right
against double jeopardy?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in declaring
the People's petition for certiorari as untimely.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Here, the
People claims that it reckoned the sixty (60) day period from September 18, 2018 when the
prosecutor received a copy of the trial court's judgment of conviction that was rendered on
the same day. Remarkably, neither respondents nor the Court of Appeals disagrees that
indeed, on September 18, 2018, the trial rendered the assailed judgment and it was on the
same day, too, when the prosecutor had notice thereof. It follows, therefore, that starting
from September 18, 2018, the sixty-day period expired on November 17, 2018. So when
the People filed its petition for certiorari on November 16, 2018, it did so still well within
the reglementary period.
The Court of Appeals' erroneous counting led to the incorrect dismissal of the petition for
late filing.

2. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision in Criminal Case No. 2016-
0775, affirming the respondents' plea to a lesser offense with the prosecution's consent.
In Criminal Case No. 2016-0775, for illegal possession of drugs, the prosecution
interposed no objection to respondents' proposal to plead to the lesser offense of violation
of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165. Whether to grant this proposal already rested upon the
sound discretion of the court.25 Thus, the trial court cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when first, it approved respondents'
aforesaid proposal, then set their re-arraignment and accepted their pleas of guilty to the
lesser offense proposed, and finally rendered a judgment of conviction against them.
However, in Criminal Case No. 2016-0774, the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion by allowing the plea to a lesser offense without the prosecution's consent,
violating Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
Hence, in drug cases where there is no private offended party, the consent of the
prosecutor is the operative act which vests discretion upon the court to allow or reject the
accused's proposal to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, where this consent is withheld,
no such discretion gets vested in the court.

3. The Supreme Court ruled that the People's challenge does not violate the respondents' right
against double jeopardy.
 The respondents' right against double jeopardy was not violated as the plea of guilty to the
lesser offense was made without the prosecutor's consent, allowing for another prosecution
under the original charges.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act
or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in Section 1(f) of Rule
116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
EUFROCINA N. MACAIRAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 215104, March 18, 2021
Facts:
The case involves petitioners Eufrocina N. Macairan, Imelda Q. Agustin, Philip F. Du, Rosalinda
U. Majarais, Horacio D. Cabrera, Enrique L. Perez, Anthony M. Ocampo, and Priscilla G.
Camposano. They were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The charges stemmed from procurement activities by the Department of Health-National Capital
Region (DOH-NCR) in May 1996. DOH-NCR purchased 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol
Suspension from Aegis Pharmaceuticals and 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate with Vitamin B
Complex and Folic Acid from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.
There’s an anonymous letter to the Office of the Ombudsman alleged irregularities in these
purchases, which lead to an investigation and charges.
The Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
citing overpricing and lack of public bidding.
Petitioners were sentenced to imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office.
They filed consolidated petitions for review, arguing insufficient evidence to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:
Did the Sandiganbayan err in finding the petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 based on the evidence presented?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, acquitting them of the charges.
The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, including conspiracy, evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and overpricing.
The Supreme Court emphasized that a mere signature or approval on procurement documents does
not automatically establish conspiracy. Clear evidence of conscious and intentional participation in
the crime is required.
The absence of public bidding does not automatically indicate evident bad faith or manifest
partiality. The petitioners provided a reasonable explanation, stating the purchases were
emergency procurements based on previous public bidding results.
The prosecution failed to prove overpricing. The evidence, such as the DOH-Central Price List
and the 1994 Abstract of Bids, was insufficient to establish exorbitant prices. The price list was not
available at the time of procurement, and the abstract of bids did not provide a reliable comparison
basis.
The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted with corrupt intent,
dishonest design, or unethical interest, which was not established in this case.
The evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the petitioners.

CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-

WALANG, AND ROSITA ANABAN-BARISTO, Petitioners,
vs.
BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, AND MARCELO ANABAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021
Facts:
In 1942, Pedrito Anaban (Pedrito) and Virginia Erasmo (Virginia) got married in accordance with
the native customs of the Ibaloi Tribe to which they both belonged. They had three (3) children,
i.e., respondents Betty Anaban-Alfiler, Mercedes Anaban, and Marcelo Anaban.
In 1952, Pedrito got married to fellow Ibaloi Pepang still in accordance with their tribe's customs.
They begot eight (8) children – Lardi Anaban, Teodoro Anaban, Monina Anaban and respondents
Cristita Anaban, Crispina Anaban, Pureza Anaban, Cresencia Anaban-Walang, and Rosita Anaban-
Baristo.
Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia,
Pedrito acquired from his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-14574. But the new certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was
married to petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his marriage with their mother Virginia
was not yet legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate children of their father
Pedrito.
Petitioners claim legitimacy as children of Pedrito and Pepang, asserting that their parents' Ibaloi
Tribe marriage and subsequent divorce are valid under the Old Civil Code. They argue this
recognition applies to both marriage and divorce. Thus, the legitimacy of their parents' marriage is
upheld based on Ibaloi customs, despite Pedrito's prior marriage to Virginia.

Issues:
1. Whether Pedrito Anaban's divorce from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in
accordance with the Ibaloi customs is recognized under our laws?

2. Are the children of Pedrito and Pepang legitimate or illegitimate?

3. Is the subsequent marriage between Pedrito Anaban and Pepang Guilabo valid?

Ruling:
1. No. All of the courts below resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito
and Virginia through the lens of the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and
Virginia got married and even when they later on supposedly divorced, the old Civil Code
was not yet in effect. For it took effect on June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the divorce
decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders.

Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred
jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has
by statute prescribed.

The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be
superior to or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above
laws relating to marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect
public policy.

Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil Code and the IPRA recognize customs
in the solemnization of marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as
marriage. But, as discussed, customs which are contrary to law, public policy and public
order cannot be recognized.

Also, even assuming that the old Civil Code was applicable in the present case, the Court
would arrive at the same conclusion.

Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR provisions limited the State recognition
to "marriages performed" in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, and
practices. There is no mention of the recognition of dissolution of marriage in accordance
with the IP's customs.
2. Since the divorce between Pedrito and Virginia was invalid, their marriage remained
legally effective; consequently, Pedrito’s subsequent marriage to Pepang was bigamous and
therefore void. This rendered the petitioners’ status as illegitimate children.

3. Consequently, the subsequent marriage between Pedrito Anaban and Pepang Guilabo is
void for being bigamous.