1

CVG 5189 Blast Engineering

[Link]
 2

Introduction
❑ Blast-resistant design of civilian infrastructure is not a common practice in
Canada and elsewhere in the world. The National Building Code of Canada
(NBC) does not have explicit recommendations for blast-resistant design.
❑ Blast-resistant design has been within the domain of military engineering for the
protection of limited number of defense-related structures against military
attacks and accidental explosions of military facilities.
❑ Recently emerging international and geopolitical conflicts in the world have
triggered new challenges for civil engineering infrastructure. Civilian
infrastructure has become a target for maliciously intended acts of terror. In
terrorist attacks, bombing is considered to be the most desired form of attack.
 3

Introduction
❑ Another source of blast effects on civilian
infrastructure is accidental explosions
that are often encountered in industrial
facilities. These are referred to as
industrial explosions. Chemical plants,
nuclear power facilities, and explosives
storage are examples of such accidental
explosions. For example, Beirut Port
Explosion August 2020.

Source- [Link]
show-beirut-explosion-damage/
 4

Introduction
❑ Whether intentional or accidental, blast effects on structural and
non-structural components can be very significant, taking
materials beyond their elastic limits, resulting in significant
damage and potentially causing partial or complete failures.
❑ Ronan Point Tower was a 22-storey high apartment block in East
London, which partly collapsed on 16 May 1968. A gas explosion
blew out some load-bearing walls, causing the collapse of one
entire corner of the building. This was the first incidence that led
to the beginning of blast-resistant design of civilian structures
 5

Examples of Blast Damage on Structures

Progressive collapse of one corner of the load carrying system triggered by a local failure
of Ronan Point Tower.

Source: NAKAO, Masayuki (Institute of Engineering Innovation, School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo)
 6

Blast Protection Strategies (5D)

❑ Dissuade – discourage attack through layered security. Prevent soft target.
❑ Disguise – obscure the vital element so that attacks occur away from the most
impactful components. Waste energy through concealment.
❑ Disperse – disperse the possible target throughout the location to make pinpoint
attacks ineffective. Easier on rural campuses.
❑ Deterrent – physical and/or operational barriers to prevent access by intruders.
Enhanced security measures.
❑ Dampen(1D) – harden the structure to reduce the effect of the attack. Resilient
structures.
 7

Objective of Blast Design

❑ CSA S850: The objective of design against blast loading is to limit the extent and
severity of damage in order to reduce casualties, damage to target, and allow the
emergency evacuation of occupants of the target.
❑ Protection does not guarantee safety, but rather, it is aimed at minimizing the level of
damage to the integrity of a structure. Therefore, CSA S850 recommends four levels
of protection (LOPs) : very low, low, moderate, and high.
❑ Depending on the type of structure or structural elements, the provided level of
protection is justified. The lowest level of protection is sought to prevent the
progressive collapse of buildings.
 8

Progressive Collapse
❑ Progressive collapse is the occurrence of a cascading structural failure, where the
failure of a structural element triggers the collapse of adjacent structural elements
causing disproportionately large damage to the building.

Image source: Dept. of Homeland Security, BIPS 05

 9

Terrorist Incidents Worldwide

Methods of attacks:
▪ Bombing
▪ Suicide attacks
▪ Rocket and mortar
attacks
▪ Vehicle-based
attacks
▪ Chemical and
biological weapons
▪ Conventional
firearms

Source- [Link]
 10

Examples of Blast Damage on Structures

• A terrorist bomb attack caused the partial collapse
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995.
• The truck carrying explosives equivalent to 5000
lbs (2300 kg) of TNT was parked in front of the
nine-story building and was detonated.
• 168 people were killed and hundreds were injured.
The explosion caused a crater of 9.0 m wide and
2.4 m deep on the street in front of the building.
• The blast destroyed or damaged 324 buildings
within a 4-block radius and shattered glass in 258
A.P. Murrah Building, Oklahoma City (1995)
nearby buildings.
Source- [Link]
 11

Examples of Blast Damage on Structures

• A terrorist bomb attack on Khobar Towers in

Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996, resulted in 20
casualties and 498 injuries.
• The casualties were caused by debris impact
rather than structural collapse.
• The amount of explosives used was estimated
to be equivalent to 20,000 to 30,00 lbs (9,100
to 13,000 kg of TNT, detonated at a distance
of 105 feet (32 m).

Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (1996)

Source: [Link]
 12

Examples of Blast Damage on Structures

• The Center was attacked on Feb. 26, 1993
by a truck bomb containing 1310 lbs (590
kg) of explosives.
• Generating an estimated pressure of
150,000 psi (1,035,000 kPa). resulted in 6
deaths and 1042 injuries.
• The truck was parked in the second sub-
ground level indoor parking, and the
intention was to knock the North Tower into
World Trade Center, New York
The crater, looking from the B-2 the South Tower to bring both towers down.
level down to B-5.

Source: [Link]
 13

Examples of Blast Damage on Structures

• On July 2, 2011 a van bomb exploded in

front of the Office of the Prime Minister
and several other government buildings.
• The bomb was placed inside a van next
to the tower block housing the office
Prime Minister.
• The explosion killed 8 people and injured
209. Most of the damage was to the
windows of the nearby buildings.
Oslo, Norway (2011).

Source: [Link]
 14

Quantifying Blast Effects

❑ Blast shock waves are generated by the sudden
release of energy from the detonation of explosives.

❑ Blast forces are a result of a sudden change in air Standoff

Distance
pressure.
Charge

❑ Magnitude and duration of the blast shockwave

depends on two main factors

– Increasing charge weight increases the intensity of

the blast

– Decreasing standoff distance increases the

intensity of the blast

Source: FEMA 428

 15

Primary Parameters for Blast Effects

❑ Charge weight (size of
bomb), usually
expressed as weight of
explosives in pounds
(lbs) or kilograms (kg).
❑ Standoff Distance,
distance between the
centre of explosion and
the target.
 16

Primary Parameters for Blast Effects

❑ Blast loading is unique compared to other
loading types experienced by structures.

❑ It is a dynamic load with a very short duration

and very high intensities, the so-called
impulsive load.

❑ A 50 kg TNT at 10 m distance causes 434

kPa reflected pressure in 3.4 milliseconds
(equivalent).

❑ For reference, a blink of an eye is on

average 150 ms[1].

[1]: Scientific American Source: FEMA 428

 17

Standoff Distance
❑ The most cost effective solution for mitigating explosive effects is to ensure the
explosions occur as far away from the building as possible (increased
standoff).

• Therefore, site selection for new

construction and site protection for
existing structures are important in
the mitigation of blast risk.
• If adequate standoff is available,
additional hardening measures will
be minimized or possibly not
required.
 18

Effect of Standoff

Kohobar Towers – Building 131 Damage

 19

Standoff Distance
❑ There is no ideal standoff distance; it is determined by the type of threat (charge
weight and location/position of bomb), the type of construction (vulnerability of
building/bridge), and the desired level of protection (importance and value of the
asset).
❑ The primary design strategy is to keep terrorists away from inhabited buildings.
❑ Although sufficient stand-off distance is not always possible, maximizing the
distance may be the most cost-effective solution.
❑ Maximizing standoff distance also ensures that there is opportunity in the future to
upgrade buildings to meet increased threats or to accommodate higher levels of
protection.
❑ Stand-off distance must be coupled with appropriate building hardening.
Hardening and strengthening structural and non-structural components constitute
the main scope of this course, and will be discussed in detail later.
 20

Standoff Distance
❑ The first mode of site protection is to create “keep out zones” that can ensure a
minimum guaranteed distance between an explosion (e.g. from a vehicle) and the
target structures.
❑ The perimeter line is the outermost
line that can be protected by the
security measures incorporated
during design.
❑ Many vulnerable buildings are
located in urban areas where only
the exterior wall of the building
stands between the outside world
and the building occupants.
 21

Standoff Distance
❑ A good way to ensure sufficient stand-off distance is by establishing control zones.
These zones limit access to the area immediately surrounding a building. Control
zones can be exclusive or non-exclusive.
❑ An exclusive zone is within the
exclusive control of the building.
Anyone entering this zone must
have purpose related to that
building.
❑ A non-exclusive zone is either a
public right of way or an area
related to several buildings.
 22

Perimeter Security
❑ Masonry or concrete wall and steel
fence.
❑ The perimeter wall should be close to
the property line and have anti-
climbing measures.
❑ Designed against kinetic energy from
impact forces and pull-down forces
❑ Must allow for pedestrian and
vehicular access via gates
 23

Standoff Distance
❑ Often the perimeter line can be pushed out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of
bollards, planters, and other obstacles.
 24

Bollards
 25

Bollards

Anti-ram bollard

Anti-ram knee wall

 26

Barriers

Passive vehicle barrier

Active vehicle barrier
 27

Architectural and security intervention

Source-
[Link]
considerations-blast-mitigation-endro-sunarso-/

Image source: Dept. of Homeland Security, BIPS-06

 28

Real-life Examples

Parliament of Canada (111 Wellington St.)

US Embassy (490 Sussex Dr.)

 29

Cost versus Stand-off-Distance

 30

Blast Threat Risk Assessment

• It takes careful planning to determine where and when to use the protective
equipment mentioned above.

• Risk analysis determines which asset needs to be protected and how much.

• Blast engineering frequently involves a risk analysis. This collaborative effort

requires input from the owner, architect, structural engineer, HVAC engineer, etc.

• This assessment will provide valuable data to decision-makers when allocating

resources and deciding on precautions.

• It is possible to decrease the risk by taking protective measures. However, the

feasibility of these measures depends on the cost of implementation and the
involved threat.
 31

Blast Threat Risk Assessment

• The intent of this risk assessment is to quantify the risk by identifying the threat, vulnerability, and
impact.
• T. Krauthammer defines risk as follows:

Risk = Threat x Impact x Vulnerability

• Threat: Likelihood of a particular attack (0-1 or

C, L, M, H)

• Impact: How critical is the asset to the owner

(1-100, C, L, M, H)

• Vulnerability: weakness of the asset to a

particular threat (0-1, C, L, M, H).
 32

Blast Threat Risk Assessment

Risk = Threat x Impact x Vulnerability

• Are integrated together and used to establish a cost effective allocation of

resources to reduce the risks to infrastructure and human life.

• As structural engineers, by designing resilient structures that can resist blast

loads, we can decrease the vulnerability of an asset.

• Using protective architectural and security elements to increase the standoff

distance also decreases the vulnerability.

• Acceptable level of risk is a decision made by the owner. A lower risk requires
more protection and has a higher cost.
 33

Blast Threat Risk Assessment

• A rational approach for selecting mitigation
strategies is based on comparing the cost of
mitigation with the cost of the consequence.
• Four distinct regions:
❑ A: Early in the project, careful assessments and studies
of options must be performed before any meaningful
increases can be gained.
❑ B: Protection enhancement is much larger than the
required investment to implement it.
❑ C: Judgement is needed to decide whether further
investments in protection are feasible or warranted.
❑ D: uneconomical improvements. The cost of very small
improvements is very large. Cost analysis must be
performed.

Image source: T. Krauthammer, Modern Protective Structures

 34

Design Basis Threat

• The Design Basis Threat is a “design parameter” resulting from the risk
assessment.

• There is an uncertainty like all other loads, and DBT may be exceeded.

• The failure of the structure should be designed to account for uncertainties.

• Similar to the objectives of the CSA S850, the objectives of every blast-mitigation
design is to prevent/minimize loss of life, prevent property damage, and ensure
business continuity.
 35

Blast Hazard Mitigation

• Structural design for blast explosions has been an active research area for the
military and security authorities for decades.

• Research reports are generally classified and released to the public on a “need-to-
know basis” by the government.

• Recent concerns over geopolitical conflicts and global terrorism are leading to the
release of some of this research data on a need-to-know basis.

• A committee on the feasibility of adapting blast-mitigating technologies and design

methodologies for military facilities to civilian infrastructure was formed by the US
government following the 1995 WTC bombing.
 36

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

❑ Explosives can be solids, liquids or gases. Common explosives are either
solids or solid-liquids.
❑ Explosives can also be classified as chemical, nuclear or physical.
• Chemical explosives undergo very rapid oxidation and create a significant amount of
gas and heat in a very short amount of time when they explode. (Trinitrotoluene) TNT
and most other explosives dealt with in this course are chemical explosives.

• Nuclear explosives release the energy binding the nucleus of the atoms when they
explode.

• Physical explosives are containers (like boilers) that contain pressurized fluids. In case
of failure, sudden release of the contents and fragmentation of the container occur.
 37

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

❑ In chemical explosions, the oxygen needed for the chemical reaction to take
place (oxidation) may be contained in the compound itself. Hence air is not
necessary for the reaction to occur. The chemical explosive must remain inert
and stable at all times, except when it is required to be triggered.
❑ Blasts involving chemical reactions can be classified based on their reaction rate.
An oxidation reaction that happens inside the mass of explosive and propagates
at a rate less than the speed of sound (subsonic) is called “deflagration.” In
contrast, If the reaction speed is more than the speed of sound (supersonically),
the process is called “detonation.”
 38

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

Pressure distribution caused by deflagration Blast shock wave caused by detonation

 39

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

❑ Explosives may also be classified as “High Explosives,” or “Low Explosives.”
❑ High explosives are materials that are intended to produce detonations with
supersonic reaction fronts. High explosives can be classified by their sensitivity to
initiation into primary, secondary, and tertiary explosives.

• Primary explosives are very sensitive. Lead azide which is used in detonators.
• Secondary explosives are less sensitive and require an external initiator to
start detonation. TNT, C4, and Dynamite are secondary explosives.
• Tertiary explosives require a powerful initial boost to detonate. ANFO is a
tertiary explosive
 40

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

 41

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

❑ Low explosives, are energetic
materials that do not typically
detonate and are used to produce
gas, smoke, flash, or sound. Both
solid and liquid rocket propellants,
gun propellants, fireworks, and
black powder are examples of low
explosives. The relatively low
reaction rates of these materials
result in low blast pressure output.
Image Source- [Link]
 42

A Generic Explosive Device

 43

Explosion Fire Ball

❑ Fireballs are typically short-lived.
❑ Can have noticeable consequences for
infrastructures with flammable materials.
❑ Fireball effects are often ignored in blast
load effects studies.
❑ The diameter of the fireball is
proportional to the explosive charge
mass and is often given:
𝐷 = 𝑘𝑊m
k and m are constants
Image source- [Link]
 44

High Explosives
❑ High-explosive detonations are of interest to structural engineers, as they may
affect structures. They can result from accidental or intentional events. Accidents
involving high explosives can occur in processing, handling, and transportation.
Intentional detonations can include explosives testing, military weapons,
demolition, specialized cutting or explosive forming, and terrorist acts. The
explosives used for terrorist bombing are high-explosives.
❑ The supersonic combustion (oxidation) of a high explosive generates a blast
shock wave. It also generates heat of combustion.
 45

High Explosives

❑ TNT Equivalency: Since there has been significant experience with the blast
effects of TNT charges, it has become the traditional reference explosive.
Explosives having different chemical compositions are commonly expressed in
terms of equivalent TNT weight or mass. This can be done by relating peak
pressures, peak positive impulses, or heat of detonation.
❑ Factors affecting the equivalency: confinement, shape of explosive, range,
therefore average value of TNT equivalence is often used for simplicity.
 46
TNT Equivalency
𝑃
▪ If pressure governs the structural design: 𝑊𝑃,𝑇𝑁𝑇 = 𝑊
𝑃𝑇𝑁𝑇

Where P is the peak pressure produced by detonation of weight W of the

explosive under consideration.

𝑖
▪ If peak positive impulse governs the structural design: 𝑊𝑖,𝑇𝑁𝑇 = 𝑊
𝑖𝑇𝑁𝑇

Where i is the impulse produced by detonation of weight W of the explosive

under consideration.
▪ When TNT equivalence based on pressure and impulse is not available, it can
be estimated by comparing the heats of detonation of the two explosives.

∆𝐻𝑑
𝑊𝑇𝑁𝑇 = 𝑊
∆𝐻𝑑𝑇𝑁𝑇
 47

Representative densities, heats of detonation, and TNT equivalencies for common explosives

1Boldvalue is theoretical maximum density 2Data not available 3Estimated value

420% strength 594/6 ammonium nitrate/fuel oil 650% strength
 48

TNT Equivalency
Example1: The Alfred P. Murrah building bombing in 1995 used 3,200 kg
Ammonium nitrate–fuel oil (ANFO) explosive. Calculate the weight of TNT that
would create the same amount of pressure.

The equivalent weight pressure for ANFO is 0.82 from the table.
Equivalent TNT = 0.82 * 3,200 kg = 2,624 kg
 49

TNT Equivalency
Example2: A mixture of Ammonium Nitrate with Diesel Fuel, known as ANFO
(Ammonium Nitrate-Fuel Oil), is an easy-to-acquire explosive. Using a comparison
of the Mass Specific Energies, calculate the equivalent mass of TNT for a 1 m3
crate of ANFO with a density of 840 kg/m3.
 50

Charge Weight

▪ Different vehicles have varying

charge weight capacities
▪ Briefcase bomb = ~20 kg
▪ Car bomb = ~350 kg
▪ Van bomb = ~3,000 kg
▪ Truck bomb = ~15,000 kg

Image source: Dept. of Homeland Security, BIPS-06

 51

Charge Weight
▪ Increased charge weight
causes more significant
damage.
▪ A 300 kg (1,000 lb)
bomb at 300 m (1,000 ft)
causes minor cuts due
to glass.
▪ A 9,000 kg (20,000 lb)
bomb at 300 m (1,000 ft)
causes severe wounds
for glass with protective
film.

Image source: Dept. of Homeland Security, BIPS-06

 52

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

❑ As a high explosive detonates, the heat of detonation and a large volume of gas is
formed. The heat of detonation is approximately 1/3 of the heat of combustion.
❑ When a high-explosive detonation occurs, the following sequence of events takes place:
▪ The explosion reaction generates hot gas, which can be at a pressure of 100 to 300
kilobars (1 bar = 100 kPa) and a temperature ranging between 3000oC and 4000oC.
▪ A violent expansion of this gas occurs, pushing the surrounding air out of the volume
it occupies. As a result, a layer of compressed air, called a shock or blast wave,
forms in front of the expanding gas that has a thickness called wave length (Lw).
▪ The blast wave propagates in all directions from the explosion center. The front of
the wave called the shock front, is like a wall of highly compressed air moving at a
very high velocity.
 53

Explosives and Explosion Phenomenon

❑ The transient pressure greater than the ambient pressure (Po; surrounding
atmospheric pressure) is defined as the “overpressure.” The peak overpressure
(Pso) is the maximum value of overpressure. As the shock front arrives at a specific
point, the overpressure at that point rapidly increases from zero to peak
overpressure. This increase in pressure takes place in less than a millisecond.
❑ When a bomb explodes, a rapid release of stored energy is characterized by an
audible blast. The energy released is divided into two distinct phenomena:” i)
thermal radiation and air blast overpressure, and ii) ground shock, generated from
the coupling of air and soil/ground reflection. Air blasts are the principal cause of
damage to buildings and other infrastructure located on the ground. On the other
hand, the ground shock wave propagates by compressing the air molecules in its
path, thus producing the ambient overpressure or the incident pressure.
 54

Blast Pressures
❑ The waves propagate with supersonic velocity and finally hit the building.
The air blast penetrates through windows and doors and other openings in
the building. Floor slabs, partitions, and contents are subjected to these
pressures. Upon hitting the building (or any infrastructure) the pressure
reflects from the building with amplified overpressure. The amplified
pressure is referred to as “Reflected Pressure.”
❑ The reflected pressure can be 2 to 13 times the incident (in-air) pressure.
The higher end of this range is obtained as incident pressures increase.
❑ Reflected pressure is of interest to structural engineers as we calculate
design forces using this pressure vs time relationship.
 Blast Pressures 55

Pr: Reflected pressure Pso: Incident pressure (overpressure)

Po: Atmospheric pressure ta: Arrival time

Blast pressure decays

exponentially with time
 56

Blast pressures
▪ Ambient pressure, Po is 1 atmosphere and is equal to 101.3 kPa at sea level.

▪ Incident pressure, Pso is the surcharge of pressure (i.e. overpressure) created by

detonation. It is the pressure of the shock front and is also referred as “static
overpressure” or “side-on” or “peak incident” pressure.

▪ Reflected pressure, Pr is the pressure that is reflected of a solid surface (i.e.

building) when the shock wave reaches it.

▪ Impulse, i is the area under the pressure vs. time curve and is of importance for
structural design loads. Incident impulse, is and reflected impulse, ir are related
to incident and reflected pressures, respectively.
 57

Blast pressures – Incident pressure

▪ Modified Friedlander equation can be used to approximate the positive phase

incident pressure vs. time relationship where  is a time constant in ms
defining the sharpness of the decay (often obtained empirically).

  t − ta   −(t −ta )/

Ps (t ) = Pso 1 −   e for ta  t  ta + t0
  t0  

▪ Positive phase impulse is the area under the pressure time curve.
t0
  t − ta   − t /   − t0 / 
is =  Pso 1 −    e dt (
is =  Pso 1 − 1 − e ) 
0   t0    t 0 
 58

Blast Pressures

Angle of incidence for surface blast

 59

Blast Pressures- Reflected Pressure

▪ The peak reflected pressure at and angle of incidence can be written
as a function of the peak incident pressure.

Pr = Cr Pso

 60

Blast Pressures- Dynamic wind

❑ As the blast wave propagates through the atmosphere, a secondary effect
develops. The air behind the shock front moves outward at a lower velocity.
This lower velocity of air is associated with dynamic (blast wind) pressure, q.
The velocity of the air particles, and hence the wind pressure, depends on
the peak overpressure of the blast wave.
❑ Dynamic wind is a result of the movement of the volume of air behind the
shock front (volume of compressed air). Dynamic wind is particularly damaging
for smaller buildings or cars, as it can cause translation due to its longer
duration.
 61

Blast Pressures- Dynamic wind

❑ For typical conditions, standard
relationships are available between
the peak incident pressure PSO, the
peak dynamic pressure q0, the wind
velocity, and the air density behind
the shock front. The net dynamic
pressure is the product of q and the
drag coefficient CD. The drag
coefficient quantifies resistance
provided by the environment as the
air pressure travels.
 62

Blast Pressures
Blast Pressures 63

Where; W: Total charge weight in tons

R: Standoff distance between the
target structure and the centre of
detonation.

1ൗ
𝑊 3
𝑡𝑜 = 10.23 ∙ 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑠𝑜 < 70 𝑏𝑎𝑟
𝑃𝑠𝑜

1
𝑊 ൗ3
𝑡𝑜 = 20.77 ∙ 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑠𝑜 ≥ 70 𝑏𝑎𝑟
𝑃𝑠𝑜
 64
Blast Pressures
Example:

Charge weight W = 1.1 Tons; Standoff distance R = 90 m

1/2
1.1 1.1
𝑃𝑠𝑜 = 6784 3
+ 93 = 0.1244 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑠 = 12.44 𝑘𝑃𝑎
(90) (90)3
6 6
𝑃𝑟 = 2𝑃0 + = 2 1.0 + = 2.842 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑠 = 284.2 𝑘𝑃𝑎
7𝑃𝑜 + 𝑃𝑠𝑜 7 1.0 + 0.1244
 65

Blast pressures-Stagnation pressure

❑ When the shock wave engulfs the building, Pr

diffraction of the wavefront around corners

Ps + C Dq
causes changes in pressure. Pso + CDqo

Pso
❑ As the shock wave continues its movement and
tr tc td
when clearing effects are considered for blast Pressure on front face versus duration

load computations, the reflected pressure on tc: clearing time; time it takes for the
shock wave to travel to the closest
the front wall is reduced to stagnation pressure. edge of the wall and a pressure relief
wave to travel back
❑ Stagnation pressure is the sum of the drag
U: Shock wave velocity
pressure and the incident pressure.
 66
Blast pressures-Idealized pressure
❑ A simplified blast load assumes a triangular loading with the same peak reflected
pressure (Pr) and a fictitious duration (tr) that will have the same reflected impulse (ir).

❑ This approximation simplifies calculations while yielding relatively close results.

2ir
tr =
Pr

Approximate pressure pulse for shock only Approximate pressure pulse for shock plus gas
 67

Blast Pressure - Penetration

❑ If the building has a frangible front façade, the reflected pressure would be
lower than if the façade were infrangible, since the incident blast pressure is not
as drastically reflected by the frangible surface.
❑ However, appropriate consideration has to be given to blast pressures entering
the building through openings in the building envelope and loading both
structural and non-structural interior components. Floor slabs can be particularly
vulnerable to load reversals (upward loading) if this has not been specifically
considered in design. Similarly, non-structural components such as infill walls,
fixtures, and ductwork can be sources of secondary fragmentation that can
cause further internal damage and injuries or fatalities to building occupants.
 68

Blast Pressure - Penetration

❑ Air blast penetrates through windows and doors and other openings in the
building. Floor slabs, partitions, and contents are subjected to these
pressures.
 69

Blast Pressures
❑ In summary, the blast pressure on a building (or any other infrastructure)
consists of three component:
▪ Shock front, which arrives first. Shock front pressure is ambient
overpressure Po in air (incident pressure). Its maximum value at the target
is maximum incident pressure Pso. The pressure on the surface of the
building rapidly increases from zero to Pso when the shock wave arrives.
▪ Dynamic blast wind pressure (q) arrives next. Its maximum value at the
target is qo. Depending on the target location (i.e., front, side or top) it
assumes a different value as quantified by drag coefficient CD. Hence the
dynamic blast (wind) pressure at the target is CDqo.
 70

Blast Pressures
▪ Once the blast pressure interacts with the front face of the building (in this
case building wall) at supersonic velocity, it reflects from the surface of the
wall. This results in a significant amplification of pressure with the pressure
increasing to reflected pressure, Pr.
▪ Subsequently, the pressure decays exponentially, dropping below the
ambient pressure, developing negative pressure.
❑ The positive phase of blast pressure creates significant overpressure on
structures. Often the positive pressure region is considered for structural
design and investigations.
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Blast Loading Categories

❑ Depending on the location of the infrastructure and the explosive charge, blast
loads acting upon infrastructures can be divided into two types: confined
explosions and unconfined explosions. Confined explosion occurs within a
building or a vessel, meanwhile, unconfined explosion occurs out in the open
space.
❑ Unconfined explosions due to an external explosion can be subdivided into
three; i) free air burst explosion, ii ) air burst explosion and iii) surface burst
explosion.
 72

Blast Loading Categories – Air Blast ❑ Free air burst explosion

takes place in free air where
the blast waves propagate
from the center of detonation
with a spherical shape,
moving towards the structure
without any interference that
would amplify the blast loads.
These types of blasts are
generally caused by
ammunitions that are dropped
from the air and explode
before reaching the surface
 73

Blast loading Categories– Air Blast

❑ Air burst explosion
takes place in free air at
a distance close to the
ground surface. This
means that the blast
loads generated from
blast shock waves acting
on the structure would
get amplified after hitting
the ground surface.

Image source: T. Krauthammer, Modern Protective Structures

 74

Blast Loading Categories- Surface Blast

❑ A surface burst explosion takes place when the detonation is close to or at the ground surface
level. In this type of explosion, blast loads are amplified after hitting the ground, which generates
hemispherical shock waves on the structure. ~20% of blast energy is lost in cratering.
 75
Blast Loading Categories
❑ Blast loads can be categorized according to the confinement of the environment
around the explosive device.
❑ The following Table, adapted from the US Department of the Army (2008), provides
a clear distinction of blast loading categories based on charge confinement,
proximity to the ground surface, and ‘venting’ characteristics.
 76

Blast Loading Categories

❑ Confined explosions, also known as internal explosions, produce shock
pressures, leakage, and gas pressure build up, depending on whether the
chamber is fully vented, partially confined, or fully confined.
❑ A fully vented explosion occurs when an explosive is detonated inside a fully
vented structure (cubicle), one that is completely open to the atmosphere on one
or more sides. The confining structure is subjected to complex internal shock
pressures and leakage. Another example of a fully vented explosion is when the
target structure is in a relatively enclosed urban environment, surrounded by the
reflecting surfaces of adjacent buildings and other structures.
 77
Blast Loading Categories
❑ A partially confined explosion produces complex internal shock pressures and
leakage, but it is sufficiently confined such that a slower build up of gas pressure
from afterburn (of detonation products) also occurs. The gas pressure dissipates
by ‘venting’ to the atmosphere. The magnitude of the peak gas pressure is a
function of TNT-equivalent charge weight, free volume of the chamber, and vent
area; the magnitude of the corresponding gas impulse is also a function of these
parameters and the inertia of the vent covers. The fundamental frequency for
most confining structures (containment cells) is usually high enough that the gas
pressure load can be considered quasi-static.
❑ A fully confined explosion is a limiting case of the partially confined explosion.
A complex shock environment is created but, unless the containment cell fails,
fully confined explosions experience no leakage and have very long gas
pressure durations since no venting occurs.
 Blast Loading Categories 78

▪ Partially Confined
Explosion: Bombs that
explode within a
structure fall within this
category. The cubicle
containing the
explosives has a
number of frangible
surfaces or openings.

The initial blast load reflects off both frangible and non-frangible surfaces and are
contained for a finite amount of time before venting to the atmosphere
 Blast Loading Categories 79

▪ Fully confined explosions occur in

cubicles with only non-frangible
surfaces
▪ The initial blast wave is reflected
multiple times off the non-
frangible surfaces; each time, the
overpressure increases by a
reflection coefficient.
▪ The blast wave duration is much
longer than free airburst because
of the gas pressure component
Image source: T. Krauthammer, Modern Protective Structures
 Blast Loading –Shock Wave vs Asset Size
80

❑ Large vs Large: The large asset (building) will be engulfed by the shock wave
but unlikely to move. Assessing the condition of individual elements and dynamic
analysis of the structure will be of concern.
❑ Large vs Small: The small asset (vehicle) will be engulfed by the shock wave
and thrown sideways due to wind pressure. Damage will occur mainly as a result
of translational movement.
❑ Small vs Large: The large asset (building) may not be engulfed but individual
element of the structure may get damaged.
 Blast Loading Categories 81

❑ If an explosive charge is detonated very close to the target, it is referred to as

close-in (near-field) detonation; otherwise, it can be referred to as far-field
detonation.
❑ The loading along the structural elements varies with distance and orientation to
the explosive charge. No clear and simple guidance exists on defining the
magnitude and spatial variation of near-field blast loading or contact explosions.
❑ The method of analysis for structures subjected to far-field blast loads involves
the determination of blast load parameters and performing dynamic analysis to
ascertain the behavior of the structure.
❑ The scaled distance, Z, can be used to categorize the detonation as either:
Close-in : Z ≤ 1.18 m/kg1/3 or Far-field : Z > 1.18 m/kg1/3
Near-field : 0.053≤Z≤0.4m/kg1/3 or Far-field : 0.40<Z≤40.0m/kg1/3
source: ASCE (2011) and Cormie [Link]. (2014b)
 Blast Loading Categories 82

❑ If the explosive charge is in contact with the target, it is called a contact charge.
❑ Blast pressure caused by a close-in explosion or a contact charge is
nonuniform. They can cause tremendous local damage like breaching failure or
potentially cratering on the front side of the element (the side facing the
explosion) and spalling on the back side of elements (the side away from the
explosion).
❑ Designs to resist very close-in detonations, including contact charges, will
typically require the use of advanced analytical methods (i.e., hydrocodes) for
analysis and/or representative blast testing.
 83

Blast Scaling
❑ It is convenient to scale airblast parameters according to the dimensional “cube-
root” scaling law, also known as the Hopkinson-Cranz scaling.
❑ According to this law, a given pressure will occur at a given distance from an
explosion that is proportional to the cube root of the charge mass for a given
explosive type;

Where, Z is the scaled distance with units of m/kg1/3

R is standoff distance (m)
W is the charge weight (kg), usually taken as the TNT equivalent weight
 84

Blast Scaling
❑ Due to cost and testing difficulty, tests involving small amounts of explosive charge
are carried out. Scaling laws are essential to extend the applicability of small test
results to larger quantities.
❑ Hopkinson-Cranz scaling law indicates that two charges with similar geometry in
the same ambient conditions, identical explosive composition, and different size
(weight) will produce similar blast waves if their scaled distances are equal.
 85

Summary

1. Not all explosions are a result of malicious intent.

2. Charge weight and standoff distance are critically important.

3. Increasing the standoff distance is an effective way of protection.

4. Each explosive material has unique characteristics.

5. There is a significant amount of uncertainty about the threat.

6. Pressure vs. time graph can be idealized to simplify calculations.