CASES FOR FINALS

EXECUTIVE
1. PLANAS v. GIL
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.
Ruling: No. The court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive.
The acts of the Chief executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it
does not necessarily follow that the court is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of
his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more
truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the president is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act
in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Solicitor General that because
an investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines. Thus, the court has no
jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Planas.

2. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA

Issue: Whether or not respondents Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association and DENR has a claim of the land they
believe is awarded to them on the basis of President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 164, which amended President
Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1716?

Ruling: No. Corazon de Jesus and DENR do not have a claim of the land on the basis of Proclamation No. 164.
Proclamation No. 1716 issued by late President Marcos is within the due exercise of the legislative power vested
upon him. Being a valid act of legislation, said proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of
legislation.
Proclamation No. 164 is not valid. President Aquino took the reign of power under a revolutionary government
which promulgated the Provisional/Freedom Constitution. This Constitution gave the President exercise of legislative
power but only until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. When the 1987 Constitution was
ratified and Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power. Proclamation No.
164 was issued, legislative power was already solely on Congress. Hence there is a clear usurpation of legislative
power by the executive branch. This Court cannot allow such disregard so we take this exception from the usual
practice of not entertaining constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately
argued.

3. MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
Issue: Whether or not President Cory Aquino in the exercise of her powers granted by Constitution may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling: Yes, President Cory Aquino has discretion in determining the return of former President Marcos and his
family under the present circumstances which poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant
of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of
the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution.
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect
and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently,
the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden
duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in
arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

4. FLORES V. DRILON
Issue: WON the proviso in Sec 13, par (d) of RA7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.

Ruling: YES, the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution explicitly prohibits an elective official from
being appointed or designated to any public office or position during their tenure. This constitutional provision aims to
prevent elective officials from holding additional government offices, which could impair their capacity to serve their
constituents effectively.
In the case of Mayor Gordon, the proviso effectively mandates his appointment as Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), thus violating the constitutional prohibition. The law
deprives the President of the discretionary power to appoint, as it limits the appointment to a specific individual,
thereby converting the act of appointment into a ministerial duty, which goes against the nature of the appointing
power((186) G.R. No. 104732).
Thus, the Court declared the proviso unconstitutional and the appointment of Mayor Gordon to SBMA posts invalid.

5. LUEGO vs. CSC

ISSUES:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person
is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Felimon Luego, reversing the Civil Service Commission's (CSC) decision that
had revoked his appointment as Administrative Officer II. The court found that Luego's appointment was designated
as permanent by the Mayor of Cebu City, and thus should not have been classified as temporary by the CSC. The
CSC's role is limited to verifying compliance with civil service laws, not altering the nature of appointments made by
appointing authorities. The court emphasized that the approval stamped by the CSC did not change the character of the
appointment; it merely indicated conditional approval pending verification of qualifications. The ruling reinforced that
an appointing authority's designation of an appointment as permanent is protected under constitutional provisions, and
cannot be dismissed merely because another candidate is deemed more qualified. The court concluded that since
Luego met all legal requirements, his permanent appointment must be upheld, thereby affirming his right to the
position.
 6. SARMIENTO v. MISON
ISSUES: Whether Mison's appointment required confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under Article
VII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mison, stating that his appointment did not require confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. The Court clarified that while many presidential appointments require such
confirmation, the position of Commissioner of Customs is not included in those that need legislative consent. This
interpretation was based on historical context and the framers' intent when drafting the 1987 Constitution, which
deliberately excluded bureau heads from needing confirmation. The Court emphasized that the President has
constitutional authority to appoint officials like Mison without needing to submit their nominations for legislative
approval.

7. MANALO v. SISTOZA
Issue: Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation
Ruling: No, confirmation is not needed from the Commission on Appointments. Stated under Section 16, paragraph 1,
Article VII, of the Constitution, only the appointment by the President of this group of officers require the consent of
the Commission:
"xxx heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;"
The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines which was distinguished in RA 6975: "Sec. 2. Declaration of policy -No element of the police force shall
be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines."

8. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary

Issue: Whether RA 6975 is unconstitutional as it constitutes an encroachment, interference, and an abdication by the
president of, executive control and commander in chief powers
Ruling: No. There is no encroachment, interference and an abdication by the President of executive control since
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
Under the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department. The acts of the secretaries of the Executive departments performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Except when i) the acts are disapprove or
reprobate by the President; (ii) if the President is required to act in person by law or by the Constitution (e.g executive
clemency).
Hence, the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control
over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from, the Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk and has been held as the "power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter."
Wherefore, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies. The foregoing does not detract
from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national
police commission.
 9. LACSON vs. MAGALLANES
Issue: May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands
that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Executive Secretary, acting on behalf of the President, has the
authority to alter, modify or reverse decisions made by the Secretary of Agriculture. Under the Constitution, the
President has control over all executive departments, which includes the power to review, alter, or overturn decisions
made by department secretaries, and this authority can be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
Plaintiff’s argument that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture was final was dismissed because the President's
power of control allows him, through the Executive Secretary, to revise such decisions. The Court clarified that when
the Executive Secretary acts with the President's authority, his decisions are legally binding and represent the
President’s will. The Court upheld the Executive Secretary’s decision to modify the previous rulings, affirming that
this action was within the scope of the President’s constitutional powers.

10. OLAGUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34

The Supreme Court ruled decisively against the jurisdiction of military tribunals over civilians. It concluded that
military commissions do not have the legal authority to try civilians for offenses, even during times of martial law, if
civil courts are open and operational.
The Court stressed the importance of civilian supremacy over the military, reaffirming that only civil courts have the
constitutional authority to conduct trials. It highlighted the constitutional guarantee of due process and the need for a
fair and impartial trial system. The decision was further bolstered by Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
which explicitly prohibits military courts from exercising jurisdiction over civilians when civil courts are functioning.

11. CARPIO VS. EXEC. SECRETARY

The Supreme Court clarified that the President's Commander-in-Chief powers do not extend to the national police, as
it is not integrated with the military but is a civilian agency under executive control. The President maintains control
over the PNP through the executive branch but does not command it as part of the Armed Forces.
The provision that allows the Armed Forces to temporarily assist in internal security, does not constitute an abdication
of the President's powers. The national police force remains distinct from the military, ensuring civilian authority
remains supreme over the police.

12. AQUINO VS. ENRILE

The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state,
when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared,
therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the
President’s order.
13. LANSANG VS. GARCIA
Under the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege
to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b)
"public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the
Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional.
The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the
prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it
may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the
confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions
imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may,
within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.

14. PEOPLE vs. SALLE

Pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. A judgment of conviction becomes final (a)
when no appeal is seasonably perfected. (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to
appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the
accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant
case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant. The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. The acceptance of the pardon shall
not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefore
administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for
the release of the accused from confinement.

15. MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN

The Supreme Court affirmed that Salvacion A. Monsanto’s absolute pardon did not equate to an acquittal and did not
remove the disqualifications stemming from her conviction for estafa.
The court clarified that while a pardon removes penalties and disabilities, it does not erase the historical fact of the
crime or restore a former office automatically. Monsanto is eligible to reapply for her position as assistant city
treasurer but must go through the normal appointment process. Furthermore, her civil liability, including the indemnity
ordered by the court, remains despite the pardon.

16. GARCIA VS. CHAIRMAN, COA

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Commission on Audit's decision denying petitioner Vicente
Garcia's claim for back wages following his reinstatement after being granted executive clemency. The court
emphasized that Garcia's clemency was based on his innocence regarding the charges of dishonesty, which rendered
his prior dismissal unjust and void. As a result, he is entitled to full back wages from April 1, 1975, to March 12, 1984,
without any deductions, affirming that his wrongful dismissal caused significant harm to his dignity and reputation.
The ruling reinforces the principle that a pardon can restore civil rights and that individuals wrongfully dismissed
from government service deserve equitable reparation for their suffering.
JUDICIAL BRANCH
17. KILOSBAYAN vs. ERMITA

18. IFURUNG vs. MORALES

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.

Padilla vs. Congress

- Under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any
branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.
Santiago vs. Guingona
- Unlike the previous Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power.
- The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments.

FRANCISCO, JR v. HOR
- The Court reiterates that the power of judicial review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
- Impeachment is not beyond the power of the Court.

19. GUTIERREZ VS. HOR

20. REPUBLIC VS. SERENO
And as will be extensively hereunder, respondent’s failure to file her SALNs and to submit the same to the
JBC go into the very qualification of integrity.
In other words, when member of the Supreme Court transgresses the SALN requirement prior to his or her
appointment as such, he or she commits violation of the Constitution and belies his or her qualification to hold
the office.
21. CHAVEZ VS. JBC
22. DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA
Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation powers assumes, and justifiably so,
that the 3 departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling
the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution.
 As to the security of tenure, the Court ruled that the abolishment of courts and the consequent cessation of
incumbency did not violate the security of tenure provision, as long as it was done in good faith for the
purpose of reorganization and not for targeting specific judges.
23. SCHENECKENBURGER VS. MORAN
24. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. RODRIGUEZ

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
1. BRILLANTES, JR. vs. YORAC
FACTS:
The petitioner, Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. challenged the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the Commission on Elections.
This designation was made following the appointment of then Chairman Hilario Davide as chairman of the fact-
finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’etat attempt.
The petitioner did not contest the qualifications of the Yorac but questioned the President’s authority to make such
designation, arguing that it violated the independence of COMELEC as an independent constitutional body.
The petitioner cited Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution, which states that no member of the COMELEC
shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
ISSUE: Does the President has the authority to designate an Acting Chairman for the Commission on Elections,
given its status as independent constitutional body under the Constitution?

RULING: NO. The SC ruled that the President’s designation of Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC
was unconstitutional.
The Court ordered Yorac to desist from serving as Acting Chairperson, without prejudice to her being restored to
the position by the incumbent Associate Commissioners or by selection of another member pending the
appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President with the consent of the CA.
The Court emphasized that the COMELEC is an independent constitutional body as explicitly described in Article
XI-A, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. The independence of the COMELEC means it is not under the control
of the President in the discharge of this functions. The Constitution specifically prohibits the appointment or
designation of any COMELEC member in a temporary or acting capacity. The Court found that the designation of
an Acting Chairperson is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members of COMELEC themselves,
not by the President.

2. Aruela, Jr. CA
FACTS:
Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates for the Office of the Vice Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas,
Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of 4 votes.
On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian’s proclamation on the
ground of fraudulent alteration and tampering of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns.
Aruelo prayed before the CA for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial
court from implementing the Order regarding the revision of ballots. Gatchallian filed with the CA another
petition which was denied.
Aruelo claims that in the election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only
five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition and that his 5 day period had
lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there’s a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
RULING: No. The petition is dismissed. The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested on the SC.
3. GALIDO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
The petitioner Galido and the private respondent Galeon were the candidates for the position of mayor in the
Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, Province of Bohol, during the local elections in 1988. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed Galido as the duly-elected mayor.
Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol.
After hearing, the RTC upheld Galido’s proclamation by a majority of eleven votes. Galeon then appealed the
RTC decision to the COMELEC.
The COMELEC’s First Division reversed the RTC’s decision, declaring Galeon the duly-elected mayor by a
plurality of 5 votes. The COMELEC found that fifteen ballots in the same precinct containing the initial “C”
after the same “Galido” were marked ballots and thus invalid.

ISSUES: Can the COMELEC’s decision, which is final, executory, and not appealable, be reviewed by the SC
through a special civil action for certiorari?

Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring the fifteen ballots as marked ballots?

RULING:
Yes, the SC ruled that the COMELEC’s decision could be reviewed through special civil action for certiorari.
No. The SC found that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its decision.

Ratio:
The SC held that while the decisions, final orders, or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices are final, executory, and not appealable, this does not preclude a recourse to
the SC by way of special civil action for certiorari.
The Court emphasized that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction,
The COMELEC has the inherent power to decide the election contest based on physical evidence, equity, law,
and justice, and its discretion in applying established jurisprudence should not be controlled unless abused to
the prejudice of either party.

4. Luego vs. CSC

Facts: Mayor Solon of Cebu City appointed Luego as Administrative Officer II, describing the appointment as
permanent. However, the CSC approved it as “temporary” pending the resolution of protests filed by Tuozo, and
another employee. After extensive hearings, the CSC found Tuozo better qualified for the position and directed
that she be appointed in place of Luego, whose appointment was revoked. Tuozo was subsequently appointed by
the new mayor, Ronald Duterte. Luego contested this decision, involving earlier permanent appointment and
questioning the CSC’s authority to revoke it.
ISSUE: Is the CSC authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

RULING: The SC ruled in favor of Luego, setting aside the CSC’s resolution. The Court declared that Luego was
entitled to the office of Administrative Officer II by virtue of his permanent appointment.
The Court held that the CSC does not have the authority to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer. The CSC’s role is limited to approving or reviewing the appointments to
ensure compliance with the Civil Service Law. Once the appointee is qualified and meets all legal requirements,
the CSC must attest to the appointment.
The Court emphasized that the approval of the CSC is merely an attestation of compliance with the CS Law, and
not a discretionary power to alter the nature of the appointment. The Court also noted that the next-in-rank rule
cited by the CSC is not absolute and does not apply in this case, as neither Luego nor Tuozo was next in rank. The
decision underscored the importance of security of tenure in the Civil Service, which should remain apolitical and
free from partisan consideration.

5. TUPAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION

Facts: National Housing Corporation is a corporation organized under EO No. 399 of the Uniform Charter of
Government Corporations.
In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of certification election with DOLE Regional Office in order
to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members
comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by the med-arbiter
holding that NHC being a GOCC its employees are prohibited to form, join, or assist any labor organization
for purpose of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate election may be conducted among the NHC employees?

RULING: Yes. Under the Constitution, the civil service now covers only GOCC with original or legislative
charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and
pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by
the CS Law but by the Labor Code.
With respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Par. 5, Section 2, Article IX-B
which provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The rationale
for this is that the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane tasks such that it is also
an employer in the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation.

6. Santos vs. Yatco

Facts: Secretary of Defense Alejo Santos was sought to be retained from campaigning personally Governor
Tomas Martin in the Province of Bulacan, on behalf of the administration. He claimed that he was not covered
by the constitutional prohibition of being engaged in Partisan Political Activity.

Issue: Whether or not he is covered by the constitutional prohibition.

Ruling: The Court sustained Santos. The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included
within the terms “officers” and “employees” in the Civil Service. Furthermore, it was observed that Cabinet
members were supposed to be the alter ego of the President and were in fact usually chosen principally for
political influence they were expected to exert for the purpose of ensuring support for the administration.

7. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

Facts: The petitioner challenged EO No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries
and allowed assistant secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other
positions in the government although subject to limitation therein.
The respondents invoked Article IX-B, Section 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive
official “if allowed by the law or by the pressing functions of his positions.”
 Issue: WON the prohibition apply to the officials covered by Article VII, Section 13?

Ruling: No. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Sec. 13, Article VII
of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required
by the primary functions of said official’s office.
The purpose is to require him to devote his full attention and time to his basic work instead of permitting him
to dilute his efficiency in several positions being discharged by him, for which he may even be allowed to
collect extra compensation.

8. Quinzon v. Ozaeta
Facts: Appellant Quimson was Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal, in
addition from being treasurer, he was appointed as Agent Collector of Rural Progress Administration, a public
corporation. He assumed the office without waiting for approval of the President.

Issue: WON is entitled to additional compensation.

Ruling: The Court held that the prohibition of the Constitution was against double compensation, and not
double appointments.
Hence, a second position may be held concurrently with the principal position as long as the 2 are not
incompatible, but the incumbent cannot collect additional salaries for services rendered unless specifically
allowed by law.

9. Cayetano vs. Monsod

Facts: Respondent Chairman Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of chairman of the
COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: WON the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least 10 years.

Ruling: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur, a

lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
for the position of COMELEC chairman. The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
10 years.

10. Sarmiento vs. COMELEC

Facts: This is a consolidated special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the various COMELEC
Resolutions in special cases.
Among resolutions were:
 Ordering the exclusion of election returns from the canvass
 Dismissing the petitioner’s opposition to the composition of the Board of Canvassers
 Rejecting the petitioner’s objection to certain election returns.
Petitioners claim that these decisions were in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and that the COMELEC sitting en banc, took cognizance of the cases without first referring them
to any of its divisions.
Petitioners claim that under Sec. 3, Article IX-C, election cases shall be heard and decided in divisions,
provided that Motion for Reconsideration of the Decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
 Issue: WON the pre-proclamation controversies should be decided first by division.

Ruling: It is clear from the provision of the constitution that election cases including pre-proclamation
controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the COMELEC. The
Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same in the first instance.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, with respect to pre-proclamation controversies, the 2 divisions of
the COMELEC are vested with the authority to hear and decide those special cases. It is recognized that the
appeals from the rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions, to which they are
assigned, and not by the Commission en banc.
Thus, the resolutions are null and void.

11. Guieb vs. Fontanilla

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Guieb contested the ruling of the RTC of Dagupan City, presided over by Judge Luis
Fontanilla. The dispute originated from the barangay election held of May 9, 1994, for the position of Punong
Barangay in Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Guieb was initially proclaimed the winner of the
election. However, the private respondent Manuel Asuncion, challenged the result by filing election protest
with MTC of Sta. Barbara. The MTC ruled in favor of Guieb affirming his victory.
Asuncion subsequently appealed this decision to the RTC, which reversed the MTC’s ruling and declared
Asuncion the winner by a plurality of 4 votes. Guieb’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Asuncion filed a writ of execution, which the RTC granted, leading to the enforcement of the writ by the
sheriff, resulting in Asuncion being proclaimed as the new PB.
Guieb then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC, questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
appeal.

Ruling: The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner Guieb, concluding that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over
the appeal filed by Asuncion from the MTC’s decision. Consequently, the Court set aside the RTC’s decision
along with its order denying Guieb’s MR. The Court declared the MTC’s decision as final and ordered the
annulment of the writ of execution that had been issued by the RTC.
The decision was based on the interpretation of the constitutional provision regarding the appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC over election contests involving elective barangay officials. The Court
underscored that under Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC holds exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases, and any appeal from the MTC’s decision should have been directed to the
COMELEC rather than the RTC.

12. National Press Club vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling
or donating space and time for political advertisements. It is principally argued by petitioners that Sec. 11 (b)
of RA No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. It is
asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role, function and duty to provide adequate channels
of public information and public opinion relevant to election issue.
They contend that Sec. 11(b) of RA 6646 abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC space
of the newspaper and on COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning and limiting the right of voters to information
and opinion.

Issue: WON Sec. 11(b) of RA No. 6646 views contradictory to Article 3(4) and IX-C (4) of the Constitution.

Ruling:

13. Sambelo v. Province of Isabela

 Facts: An agreement was entered into by between the Province of Isabela and ECS Enterprises for the
purchase of wheelbarrows, shovels, and 1 set of radio communication equipment. Out of the items delivered, a
partial delivery was made. The Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50%, pending receipt of reply
to the query to Price Evaluation Division of COA.
A second delivery was made and payment of 50% was allowed by the Provincial Auditor. Based on the
findings of the Price Division of COA, there has been overpricing, ECS Enterprises proposed a 10%
deduction on the unpaid balance. The Provincial Auditor forwarded the matter to the COA Regional Director
who affirmed to stand of the former.

Issue: WON the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Provincial Auditor
and the Regional Director.

Ruling: No. The COA just exercised its regulatory power vested by the Constitution. It just adhered to the
policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved, that the authority extends
to accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by them in any accountable capacity.
In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with
the head and whether or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources.

14. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. COA

Facts: The case arose when Savellano submitted a confidential affidavit, he alleged that the NCA and the
PNOC has failed to pay taxes amounting to P234 Million on interest earning from their placements with the
Philippine National Bank since 1984. Following an investigation by the BIR, the tax liabilities were
confirmed, resulting in the payment of approximately P109 million by both agencies.

Issues:
a. Is the COA bound by the determination of the Department of Finance regarding the payment of the
informer’s reward?
b. Did the COA err in disallowing the informer’s reward on the grounds that it involved violations by
government agencies?
c. Does the classification of the delinquent taxpayer affect the entitlement to the informer’s reward?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, granting the consolidated petitions and setting aside the
COA’s decisions. The Court determined that the COA is not bound by the Department of Finance’s
determination regarding the payment of the informer’s reward.
The Court held that the payment of the informer’s reward does not depend on the classification of the
delinquent taxpayer, emphasizing that the law does not distinguish between types of taxpayers,
The Court concluded that the informer’s reward is justified when the informer’s information leads to the
recovery of revenues, regardless of the whether the taxpayer is a government agency or a private entity.