Case Study Paper South Korea
Alexandra Huang
Feb 18, 2019
International Political Economy
In 40 years, Korea successfully transformed itself from one of the world’s poorest regions to
a lively, active, and developed economy. Viewed from a global stance, Korea’s development is
viewed as a growth miracle, since many other countries that adopted similar growth strategies
ended up remaining poor and undeveloped. In this paper, I will outline why Korea was able to
succeed while others were not, evaluate whether this model should be adopted by other
countries, and show that how implementation of the same model can lead to drastic different
results since each country has a different historic, social, and political environment.
The essence of the Korea growth model lies it ins adoption of an active industrial policy that
includes providing subsidized credit, trade protection, tax breaks, and other benefits to
companies in order to achieve rapid industrialization. However, simply having these industrial
strategies was not enough for Korea to transform from a developing economy to a developed
one. I argue that there are three other important factors that allowed for the “Miracle on the Han
River” besides the basic industrialization strategies. They are: (1) a strong and capable education
system and government’s heavy investment in all levels of education; (2) an extreme amount of
money poured into Research & Development, which allows Korea to maintain its growth rate
even after industrialization; (3) a healthy political environment that encourages discipline and
integrity rather than fosters corruption. First of all, Korea invested heavily in its primary and
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secondary education and reached almost universal enrollment rate for both by the 1980s. This
made sure that skilled labor was able to keep up with the rate at which the country was
developing, as well as mitigated income inequality. Second, South Korea understood the
important of R&D since technology triggers growth in the long run. According to federal bank of
St. louis, between 1996 and 2015, South Korea’s R&D intensity grew 88.5 percent (from 2.24
percent in 1996 to 4.23 percent in 2015), while the U.S.’s only grew 14.4 percent (from 2.44
percent in 1996 to 2.79 percent in 2015). Third of all, South Korea has a rather healthy
government free of corruption and cronyism, which allowed the country to develop without
being disrupted by political disasters. If the country was in a messy political state, then funds
would be misallocated and the country would be plagued with political drama that distracts the
country from developing.
I argue that while it is indispensable for countries to adopt active industrial policies including
tariffs and support for the domestic industries, it is also important for countries to achieve the
three conditions described above in order to avoid staggering growth and being stuck in a
poverty trap. However, it is worth noting that these three factors are much more difficult to
implement, given the historical and social reality of many nations. But since all these factors are
tied closely to another, any major defect in any of these components can result in a country’s
failure to transition from a developing to developed nations. If we examine why countries like
Brazil failed to turn itself into a developed country, it is not necessarily because it did not adopt
the proper industrial growth strategies, but rather because it failed to achieve these three long-
term factors that Korea was able to establish. For example, with Brazil’s rampant corruption and
unsound political regime, it is difficult for Brazil to achieve sustainable growth even if it
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continues to adopt an active industrial policy. From Brazil’s previous president Michel Temer to
dozens of government officials and senators to corporate leaders, corruption has plagued Brazil
on its way to achieving development. Political chaos and extractive government policies defeats
the purpose of implementing growth strategies in the first place.
While certain conditions that allowed this model to work were unique to Korea, such as the
small size of the country and its historical background, but not all the conditions are unique to
Korea. With a successful implementation of active industrial strategies and the three key factors
outlined previously, other nations also have the potential to transform successfully the way
Korea did. To further elaborate, there are two major conditions that are relatively unique to
Korea, and those are (1) the development of chaebols, which are large oligarchies that formed
extremely tight connections with the government; (2) its relatively small size and population
compared to many other countries. First of all, chaebols are large conglomerates that are owned
by the most powerful families in Korea and backed up heavily by the government. According to
George Ogle, the author of “South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle”, ten chaebol
families were responsible for 60% of South Korea’s growth from 1960 to 2000. This is a
condition advantageous to a small country like Korea. Huge sized conglomerates can allow many
people to be employed, and can stimulate economy in a systematic and rapid fashion. However,
this is not strictly unique to Korea, either. Countries like Japan is also known for its successful
oligarchies, the Zaibatsu. The advantages of these family businesses lie in the effectiveness of its
top management branch, since it is run by a family member, the level of quality of these
conglomerates is usually guaranteed. Second, the small size of the country also made success
much more likely than many larger countries in the Africa continent or bigger countries in Asia,
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such as China. Smaller countries such as Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, and Finland also
witnessed rapid economic growth in a short amount of time. Perhaps smaller countries do it
better because it is easier for a smaller state to be sustainable, but also simply because there are
fewer ways for things to go wrong in the process of development.
However, not all of the conditions that set the ground for success were unique to Korea. The
Four Asian Tigers of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea have all turned from poor rural
regions into high-income economies in an extremely short amount of time. If we compare the
Asian Tigers to countries that failed in its transformation, we will see that all these countries
have developed advanced education systems and curriculums as well as have a somewhat
healthy political environment that fosters good governmental practices, despite its extent of
democratization.
Indeed, a sustainable education system and a healthy political regime is difficult to obtain.
For example, China has struggled in both of these factors which explains why China is starting to
stagger in its growth. By adopting active industrial strategies, China has also witnessed a
tremendous amount of growth in the past three decades. However, its poor education system fails
to produce a high quantity of educated citizens; its political regime is highly un-transparent and
corrupt; income inequality is vast because the number of skilled workers is in scarcity due to the
poor education system. Examining the Chinese model, it is fair to assume that while a set of
active agricultural policies might stimulate rapid short-term growth, the long term sustainable
growth that allows countries to actually take a leap and jump over the threshold lies in its sound
institutional systems from education to government. However, it is important to acknowledge
that these institutions take a long time and tremendous strenuous effort to develop. Countries like
Korea and Singapore were blessed with a higher starting point than many African nations
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because by the time their colonizers left, their nations were not broken into pieces and it would
take them less time to recover and begin industrialization. Historically, certain nations find it
difficult to open its political environment due to the long suppression of a dictator or the imperial
system that had always been in place. It is crucial to recognize that system and organization
drives growth, and without a government that is sincerely open to reforms and growth, the short-
term industrial strategies will not be transformative. In conclusion, it is fair to draw the
conclusion that not all of the conditions that allowed the industrial growth model to work was
completely unique to Korea. However, Korea did happen to be successful in many hidden factors
of growth, and that was one of the biggest reasons why Korea succeeded. Overall, countries who
strive to industrialize at a rapid pace should implement both short term and long term growth
strategies. In the short run, government can heavily subsidize loans to particular sectors that need
help developing and growing. Countries can even adopt Korea’s strategy of deciding when,
where, and how much to invest in a certain sector, as long as the government remains transparent
and uncorrupt. Firms can also borrow from abroad, with the government protecting domestic
firms from currency depreciation. Moreover, governments can adopt high tariffs allowed
domestic industries to mature and develop. According to Chang, United Kingdom and the U.S.
both would not have achieved its level of growth without implementing high tariffs, ranging
from 40 to 60 percent. In addition to protectionist measures that stimulates rapid
industrialization, the three hidden factors are equally important as well. While these strategies do
not pay off immediately, spending money on developing a strong education system, pouring
investment into R&D from both national and private sector, as well as doing what one can to
cultivate a healthy and open and political system are all crucial in helping a country develop
sustainably.