267

An Independent Kurdish State:

Achievable or Merely a Kurdish Dream?
Aram Rafaat∗
University of South Australia

Despite the claim that Kurds intend to remain part of Iraq, it is highly
unlikely that they will remain within the country’s borders. For the past 80
years or more, Iraq’s centralized system of control has failed to
accommodate the Kurds, and it is apparent that federalism, too, is a form
of government that will fail to satisfy them. The Kurdish goal of
independence is apparent in the system they have developed within their
state, and this could challenge any future plan for further integration back
into Iraq. This goal is also evidenced in popular demands for independence
in Kurdistan and in Kurdish politicians’ warnings that they will separate if
violence, intolerance, or tyranny continue in Iraq. The nature of Iraq’s
divided society constantly produces civil war and intolerance, and the
reality is that it is a nation dominated by ethnic-nationalism and clashing
ideologies and interests, but lacking a unifying national identity. Therefore,
it is not Kurdish secession that causes continuing communal violence; it is
the forced unification of people with different interests and ideologies.

Key Words: Kurds; Kurdistan; Kurdish role vis a vis Iraq; Kurdish independence; Iraq
and federalism.

This article will scrutinize those factors that make it highly likely
that Kurds will secede from Iraq. Initially, attention is given to whether
consociational democracy is a viable system in Iraq. Then it highlights
the issues of ethnic nationalism and considers whether the Kurds, Sunnis
and Shiites are classified as ethnic-nationalist groups. Next, it traces the
relationships between the Kurds and other Iraqi groups, and considers
to what extent ethnic-nationalism affects the identity and loyalty of the
Kurds. It also examines whether there are common interests or exclusive
interests for each group on issues such as the role of Islam, foreign
policy, parliament, the constitution, and the army. Discussions of these
matters are linked to the issue of Kurdish secession from Iraq.
A number of obstacles are analyzed with regard to Kurdish
secession from Iraq. They include that secession might result in civil war,
whether an independent Kurdistan should be dealt with as part of a
bigger package (that is, the partition of Iraq into three states) or
whether it should be regarded as a separate case. Other issues are
whether the future of mixed cities and the division of oil resources

∗
Address for correspondenceAramrafaat07@[Link]

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268 Aram Rafaat

should be regarded as problems or solutions. Finally, it will evaluate the

geopolitical barriers that could impede the Kurdish independent state,
assess the likelihood of Kurdish secession leading to anarchy and
instability in the region, and identify those factors that might help Kurds
to overcome these obstacles.
In July 2003, the U.S. developed a power-sharing arrangement and
it was embodied in the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council, which
comprises 13 Arab Shiites, five Kurds, five Sunnis, a Christian and a
Turkmen.1 Later, this arrangement was followed in both selected and
elected interim governments. Similarly, on 20 May 2006, representatives
of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds agreed to form a ‘national unity
government’. The cabinet comprises 21 Shiites, eight Sunni Arabs, seven
Kurds, and one Christian.2 The posts of President, Prime Minister, and
Parliamentary Speaker were allocated to representatives of the Kurds,
Shiites and Sunnis, respectively. Furthermore, the consociational
principles were emphasized in both interim and permanent Iraqi
constitutions,3 and the National Unity Program promulgated by Prime
Minister al-Maliki.4 In addition, Security Council Resolution 1546
endorsed the introduction of a form of ethnic power-sharing
government.5 Thus, most Iraqi groups together with the occupiers and
the international community currently seem to favor a power-sharing
arrangement for the future Iraq.
Power-sharing or consociational democracy in heterogeneous
societies is often a preferred alternative system for many scholars and
commentators. Lijphart, for instance, insists that “in plural societies, the

1
The Coalition Provisional Authority, “Iraqi Governing Council,” The Coalition
Provisional Authority, [Link] (accessed
May 5, 2006).
2
Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress:
[Link] (accessed May 5, 2006).
3
For example, Article 2 of the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional period stipulates that “this government shall be constituted in accordance with a
process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people
conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in
consultation with the United Nations”. Similar principles can be found in articles 9, 12, 49 and
142 of the Iraqi constitution.
4
Nouri Maliki, “Principles and Foundations of the Political Program of the Iraqi
Government,” Office of Prime Minister:
[Link]
[Link] (accessed June 6, 2006).
5
United Nations, “Security Council Resolution 1546,” United Nations Security Council,
[Link]
(accessed June 6, 2006).

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An Independent Kurdish State 269

majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than
democracy”.6 Therefore, he suggests that:
What these societies need is a democratic regime that emphasizes
consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and
that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being
satisfied with a bare majority: consensus democracy.7
However, despite the apparent agreements of the main internal and
external players in Iraq over power-sharing, there are many factors that
make consociational democracy an unviable method in Iraq. Firstly, as
Seaver notes, “power sharing devices have not consistently prevented
intercommunion conflicts, yielded peace and stable democracy”.8 For
instance, the Cyprus consociational democracy lasted three years (1960-
1963), Nigeria lasted only nine years (1967-1966), and Malaysia’s
coalition broke down during the 1969 riots.9 Further, the Lebanese
consociational system broke down and threw the nation into 20 years of
civil war.10
Secondly, there is considerable evidence that an Iraqi consociational
democracy has been accepted reluctantly by Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds,
because of the demands of the U.S.-led occupiers. The U.S. seeks
success in Iraq, and this objective requires the co-operation and
participation of all groups in reconstructing the government and the
state. It is important to note that, in the post-invasion years, Iraq’s
remaining (nominally) as a united country has not been because of the
Iraqis’ willingness, but because more than 140,000 U.S.-led coalition
troops have enforced this goal. The U.S. troops have acted to provide
checks and balances and to provide a safety valve to prevent further
sectarian conflict. The U.S. has also worked as an arbitrator between
Iraqi sects, imposed its vision on different groups, and pushed the
Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis to compromise and negotiate with each other.
Moreover, there is an absence of consensus among Shiites, Kurds
and Sunnis about most issues, including principles of power-sharing and

6
Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Pattern of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-one Countries, (London, Yale University Press,1984), 23.
7
Ibid., 23.
8
Brenda M. Seave, “The Regional Sources of Power-sharing Failure: The Case of
Lebanon,” Political Science Quarterly 115 (Summer2000), no. 2: 254.
9
Ibid., 248.
10
Michael Hudson, “Rebuilding Iraq: prospects for democracy,” Policy Forum, Cato Policy
Report 25 (2003), no. 5: 17, [Link] (accessed
April 9, 2006).

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270 Aram Rafaat

what Iraq is and ought to be. Because they constitute a majority in Iraq,
the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) has focused on simple majority
rule against consociational power-sharing. As evidence of Sunni
rejection of the power-sharing arrangement, the Sunnis boycotted the
first national election, and voted overwhelmingly against the
constitution.11 Also they worked to remove those features of the
constitution that had been developed in accordance with the consensus
principles. The articles to which they objected were federalism, Iraq’s
identity, the allocation of oil income, and the question of Kirkuk.
Further evidence can be seen in the demand of both Sunnis and Shiites
for the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq. This demand is particularly
emphasized by sections of both sects, which blame the Americans for
their plight. The Shiites (such as the al-Sadrists) believe that the U.S.
has prevented them from ruling Iraq, and the Sunnis believe that the
U.S. caused them to lose power. So both sides believe that the
withdrawal of U.S. troops would enable them to gain the upper hand
and to unilaterally govern the country. If withdrawal were to occur, it
would spell the end of power-sharing.
The Kurds, too, have shown distrust of the power-sharing
arrangement.12 As evidence of this, the Kurds insist that the issue of
Kirkuk be resolved by the time the U.S. eventually withdraws. Nichervan
Barzani13 explains that “Our fear is that Baghdad is weak today and
ready to make a solution, but tomorrow it might become stronger and
refuse to solve it”.14 Their distrust is also apparent in that they refuse the
presence of Iraqi Government institutions (including the Iraqi army) in
Kurdistan. Moreover, there are few reasons for the Kurds to remain
involved in the political process if the Kirkuk issue is resolved, whether
Kirkuk is incorporated into Kurdistan or not.
All these factors prove that the formal power-sharing arrangement
has been imposed by the U.S.. Power-sharing is strongly related to the
presence of the occupiers and will probably not be sustained following a

11
In the October 2005 national referendum, more than 96 percent of the voters in the
predominantly Sunni governorate of Anbar rejected the constitution.
12
Faleh A. Jabar, “Postconflict Iraq: a Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy,”
United States Institution of Peace Special Report (2004), no. 120: 3,
[Link] (accessed September 9, 2006).
13 Nichervan Barzani is a Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

14
Gareth Smyth, “Interview with Nichervan Barzani,” Interviewed by Gareth Smyth,
Financial Times, Jan 28, 2005:
[Link]
31 (accessed April 3, 2006).

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An Independent Kurdish State 271

U.S. withdrawal. In other words, the power-sharing arrangement is more

in response to the demands of the Americans than the inherent desire of
Iraqis for consensus.
Furthermore, “the consensus principle”, as Lijphart explains, “is to
let all of the important parties share executive power in a broad
coalition”.15 In other words, consociational democracy is a system of
compromise and accommodation, in which the different groups will
likely be represented in the highest government positions and the
cabinet according to their demographic size.16 However, on closer
scrutiny of the characteristics of Iraqi society, it is clear that it is a
heterogeneous community dominated by ethnic-nationalism, a clash of
identities, conflicts of interest, and exclusive visions. With the departure
of the occupying forces, the consociational regime will break apart, and
indeed Iraq is likely to be partitioned. In such a case Kurdish secession
would be inevitable and the Shiites would assume control over the rest
of the country. Otherwise, civil war is highly probable.
One factor that makes it almost impossible for the Kurds to stay
within Iraq is Sunni Arab and Kurdish ethnic nationalism. According to
Smith, the distinctive feature of the ethnic nationalism of any group is
“the group’s claim to be distinct from others with which it is in alliance
or conflict, and that it is distinguished by unique cultural features”.17 He
categorizes several forms of ethnic nationalism, and one group can have
more than one form. Based on this definition, both Kurds and Sunnis
are ethnic nationalists.
One form of Sunni ethnic nationalism is Pan-(Arab)-Nationalism.
Smith explains “pan-Nationalists claim that their defined entity is far
larger than the existing political unit” and “their ultimate goal is to
establish a state or expand it in such a way that state and ethnic
boundaries coincide”.18 According to Article two of the Iraqi Interim
Constitution-195819, Article one of the Iraqi Interim Constitution-196420,

15
Lijphart, Democracies, 23.
16
Andreas Wimmer, “Democracy and ethno-religious conflict in Iraq,” The Center on
Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University (2002), [Link]
[Link]/pubs/20214/[Link] (August 3, 2006).
17
Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983),
216.
18
Ibid., 223.
19
Iraqi National Congress, “Iraqi Interim Constitution-1958,” Iraqi National Congress
(Arabic), [Link]
(accessed March 24, 2006).
20
Iraqi National Congress, “Iraqi Interim Constitution-1964,” Iraqi National Congress
(Arabic), [Link]

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272 Aram Rafaat

Article one of the Iraqi Interim Constitution-196821, and article five of the
Interim Constitution of Iraq-199022, Iraq is a part of a greater Arab
nation.23 The relevant Articles in the constitutions of 1964 and 1968
stipulate that the full unification of the Arab countries is the goal, and it
is the Iraqi government’s responsibility to work for that unification.
From these four Articles of successive constitutions, three
interconnected issues can be identified. First, while the Sunnis governed
Iraq (until 2003), the respective constitutions reflected the Sunni point
of view. Second, Sunni Pan-Arab-nationalism was stipulated in the Iraqi
constitutions, and this means that Pan-Arabism was formally recognized
as national policy. Third, the successive Iraqi governments had an
obligation to implement that policy. In other words, Sunni pan-Arab-
nationalism was the Iraqi official state ideology, and in turn the Iraqi
state and its institutions became instruments for implementing Pan-
Arab-Nationalist projects.
Consequently, in past decades there were several attempts to
entrench Iraq into the broader Arab world, though none was successful.
In the early 1950s and in 1958 attempts were made to unite Iraq and
Jordan.24 This was followed by another attempt in 1963, this time
entailing the unification of Iraq, Syria and Egypt, the proposed unified
country to be called the United Arab Republic.25 Finally, the most recent
was the forced attempt at unification when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
In the post-Saddam era, the Sunnis have tried to re-impose their
narrative on the whole of Iraq.26 They have shown an uncompromising
stand towards the Arab identity of Iraq, and that identity was one of the

(accessed March 2, 2006).

21
Iraqi National Congress, “Iraqi Interim Constitution-1968,” Iraqi National Congress
(Arabic), [Link]
(accessed March 14, 2006).
22
International Constitutional Law, “Interim Constitution of Iraq-1990,” International
Constitutional Law, [Link] (accessed March
24, 2006).
23
These various constitutions were officially titled as ‘Interim’ or ‘Provisional’ which
implied that they were of a temporary nature. But in fact each continued for several years as the
formal constitution of the country until it was replaced by another ‘provisional’ constitution. For
example, the Constitution of 1958 remained in force until the regime was overthrown in 1963
and another constitution was promulgated in 1964 - and this sequence of changes continued after
the Baathist coup in 1968.
24
Reeva S. Simon, “The Hashemite 'Conspiracy’: Hashemite Unity Attempts, 1921-1958,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (1974), no. 3: 320-327.
25
Elie Podeh, “To Unite or not to Unite- that is not the Question: The 1963 Tripartite
Unity Talks Reassessed”, Middle Eastern Studies 39 (2003), no. 1: 150.
26
Jabar, “Post Conflict Iraq” : 3.

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An Independent Kurdish State 273

main Sunni goals in their involvement in the political process in 2005.27

Based on this belief, many Sunnis rejected Kurds representing Iraq in
foreign affairs and in the presidential post. They insisted that these posts
be held by the Sunni Arabs because they are the most appropriate
people for these positions.28 However, they failed in their claim. They
then proposed the formation of a ministry dedicated to Arab affairs, and
they requested that the foreign ministry should be managed by Arabs.29
Similarly, Kurdish claims for their distinctive culture are compatible
with Smith’s definition of ethnic nationalism. Kurdish ethnic nationalism
can be categorized as a form of secessionism and irredentism. According
to Smith, Secessionism stems from two elements. One element is
cultural homogeneity. As Bengio notes, “as far as language, race, and
common history are concerned the Kurds differ from the Iraqi Arabs”. 30
The other element is the existence of that homogeneous group within a
larger political unit.31 However, in addition of their being part of Iraq as
a ‘larger entity’, the Kurds have striven for independence. In other
words, as Bengio explains, the Kurds have been challenging the
territorial framework of Iraq, and have sought to exclude themselves
from Iraq ever since the framework took shape in 1926.32
Another distinctive feature of Kurdish ethnic nationalism is
irredentism. Kurdish irredentism desires to bring together Kurdish
populations that have historically become separated. “This group”,
Smith notes, “is both incorporated and divided up between different
oppressive units”.33 In this regard, Chatham House explains:
Iraqi Kurdistan is geographically located at the heart of greater
Kurdistan and shares contiguous boundaries with Kurds in other
countries, Turkey, Syria and Iran. The links between Kurds of those

27
Iraqi Accordant Front, “Our Political Programme and Election Programme 2005,” Iraqi
Accordant Front (Arabic):
[Link]
(eccessed 5 May 5, 2006).
28
Ma'ad Fayad, “Kurdish PM Nechirvan Barzani Discusses Security, EconomicIssues,”
Asharq Alwsat, June 13, 2006, English Edition:
[Link] (accessed July 19
2006).
29
“Kurds Will not Let Go of Foreign Ministry,” The Globe, May 2, 2006, no. 55, 5.
30
Ofra Bengio, “Nation Building in Multiethnic Societies: the Case of Iraq”, in Minorities
and the State in the Arab World, ed. Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, (Columbia
International Affairs Online, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1999), pp. 149-169,
[Link]
31
Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 223.
32
Bengio, “Nation Building in Multiethnic Societies”.
33
Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 218.

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274 Aram Rafaat

regions predate the formation of the four nation states. They are united
by a common language and experiences of discrimination, and currently
there is a resurgence of pan-Kurdish feeling across the four countries. 34
Moreover, Masud Barzani insists that the Kurds in these countries
are one nation, and “it is the legitimate right of the Kurdish nation to be
united and to build its independent state”.35
In this regard, flags constitute important symbols of Kurdish
secessionism and irredentism. In post-Saddam Iraq, Kurds reject the
Iraqi flag’s flying in Kurdistan. Their rejection stems from the flag’s
three stars. The stars originally signaled the proposed union of Iraq with
the two Arab nations of Egypt and Syria in the 1960s.36 Instead, the
Kurdish flag, which the Kurds of Syria, Turkey and Iran see as their flag,
is flying everywhere on official places in Kurdistan. The Kurds also have
their own ‘National Anthem’ which is different from the Iraqi National
Anthem, and most of the political organisations across ‘Greater
Kurdistan’ use the same Kurdish Anthem.
Another symptom of Kurdish irredentism is trans-nationalism.
According to Natali, “since the state-formation period, trans-border
networks have increased the significance of Kurdish nationalist
mobilizations”.37 Natali further explains the trans-nationalist nature of
the Iraqi Kurds, stating:
Qazi Mohammed’s Kurdistan Democratic party in Iran (KDPI) and
Said Elci’s KDP in Turkey benefited, … from Mullah Mustafa Barzani
and his traditional supporters in the KDP Iraq. …And Jalal Talabani
maintained important cross-border support networks with their
urbanized leftist counterparts in Turkey and Iran. 38
The Iraqi Kurds also significantly participated in the formation of
the Republic of Mahabad39, which formed in Iranian Kurdistan in the

34
Chatham House, “Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst?,” Chatham House (2004): 8:
[Link] (May 23, 2006).
35
Ma'ad Fayad, “Interview with Iraqi Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani,”
Asharq Alawsat, June 7, 2006, English Edition, [Link]
[Link]/[Link]?section=3&id=5221 (accessed September 9, 2006).
36
Babak Rahimi, “Flagging a new Iraq: Failure of a National Symbol,” Nebula, a Journal
of Multidisciplinary Scholarship 1, (June 2004) no. 1:39.
37
Denise Natali, “Transnational Networks: New Opportunities and Constraints for Kurdish
Statehood,” Middle East Policy 6, (2004), no. 1, 111.
38
Ibid., 111.
39
Following World War II, the Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan in north-western Iran was
a rump Kurdish state that was proclaimed on 22 January 1946, but collapsed by the end of that
year.

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An Independent Kurdish State 275

1940s.40
Yet another symptom of Kurdish ethnic nationalism is a lack of
feeling of belonging to Iraq and the absence (or weakness) of a sense of
Iraqi national identity among the Kurds. The absence of an Iraqi identity
stems from their belief--as confirmed in the Constitution of the Iraqi
Kurdistan region-1992 41 and the draft Constitution of the Kurdistan
Region42--that Kurdistan is compulsorily annexed to Iraq. Therefore,
they have never conceded the primacy of the Iraqi state43, and many
Kurds do not consider themselves Iraqis.44 In other words, the Kurdish
rebellion against Iraq has not been for fair representation within the
country, and it has aimed to free Kurds from Iraq. Thus the Kurdish-
Iraq difference is the sum of conflicts of contradictory ethnic
nationalism, identities and loyalties.
What further widens the rift between Kurds and Iraqi Shiites and
Sunnis is these communities’ similar response to their partner groups
outside Iraq. The rise and fall of any movements in the ‘greater’ Kurdish
homeland have a direct reflection on their fellows in Iraq. For example,
in 1945 the Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party was established and
soon after, in 1946, the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), was
founded. Later, the KDP led the largest, longest and best-organized
Kurdish rebellion from 1961 to 1975. Similarly, the Pan-Arab Ba’ath
party was established in Syria in the early 1940s and a few years later its
branch in Iraq was founded.45 Then in 1952 an Egyptian junta (affiliated
with Pan-Arab-Nationalism) commenced a coup against the royal
regime, and in 1958 an Iraqi junta (pan-Nationalists) did the same.
Iraq’s Shiite majority “is concentrated in the southern plain, and
they extend into the neighboring overwhelmingly Shiite Republic of
Iran”.46 There is also a shared sense of identity between Iraqi and

40
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 3rd ed., (London: I. B. Taurus, 2004)
241-243.
41
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 1992,”
Kurdistan Regional Government,
[Link]
882 (accessed March 21, 2006).
42
Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region, PUK Media (Arabic),
[Link] (accessed September 29, 2006).
43
Gareth Stansfield, “Divide and Heal,” Prospect Magazine, no. 122, May 2006.
44
Henri J. Barkey and Ellen Laipson, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq’s Future,” Middle East
Policy 12, (2005) no. 4: 70.
45
John F. Devlin, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphoses,” The American Historical
Review 96 (1991), no. 5: 1399.
46
Dilip Hiro, “Saddam the Phoenix,” The Nation 268 (1999), no. 18: 39.

Volume 32, Number 3, Fall 2007

276 Aram Rafaat

Iranian Shiites and Iraqi Shiites see Iran’s support as their hope to
secure their domination in Iraq.47 The Iranian revolution of 1979 initially
mobilized the Shiite identity. For example, after Shiite clerics founded
the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, in 1982 the Iraqi Shiites formed
their own political party, The Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI) with Iranian help.48 Moreover, Shiites “have periodically
served Iran as instruments for destabilizing Iraq”49, and SCIRI even
fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq war.50 Contrary to this
reflection by the Iraqi groups of their partners outside Iraq, there is a
limited development of national parties in Iraq.51 It is hard to find
mainstream parties among any groups that have been established as a
positive reflection of another mainstream party. The Shiite al-Dawa,
SCIRI and al-Sadr’s parties’ policies and goals are totally different from
those of Kurdish and Sunni-Arabs mainstream parties.
Thus, each of Iraq’s three communities is mirrored more by political
and social movements outside rather than within the country, and
Baghdad is not the main meeting point or the common capital.
Furthermore, the loyalties of Iraqi groups are based primarily on
ethnic/sectarian factors and on a belief in a ‘Greater Homeland’ which
extends across the borders of several neighboring countries. The Kurds
dream of an independent Kurdistan, the Sunnis of a Greater Arab
Nation, and the Shiites of stronger links with Iran. However, notions of a
greater Kurdistan (comprising elements of Iran, Syria, Turkey and Iraq)
are in conflict with Sunni dreams of a greater Arab Nation and Shiite
concepts of links with Iran to create a greater Shiite nation.52

47
Peter W. Galbraith, “Last Chance for Iraq,” New York Review of Books 52 (2005), no.
15: 20-25.
48
Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis, (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 34.
49
Chatham House, “Iraq in Transition”.
50
Joost R. Hiltermann, “Reviewing the Constitution: From Blueprint for Iraq's Dissolution
to Genuine National Compact?,” International Crisis Group, (March 2006),
[Link]
51
Many argue that the Iraqi List of Allawi is a cross-ethnic or sectarian list, and that
therefore it is a national party (bloc). However, the election results clearly suggest the weak
performance of his bloc. In January’s election his bloc gathered only 14 percent of Iraqi votes,
and in December’s election only nine percent. Moreover, no a single Kurd was on his list, which
was mostly exclusive to Arabs. Therefore, on the one hand, the Allawi bloc gained support from
less than one in ten Iraqi Arabs (Shiite and Sunnis). On the other hand, his bloc is another that is
not representative of all ethnic groups, and it is similar to the Kurdistani List which is a secular
nationalist list.
52
Although Shiites are a majority in Iraq, Sunnis were the rulers. The narrative of Iraq’s
identity reflected he Sunni point of view. In all the constitutions, particularly during the republic
era, it was emphasized that Iraq was part of the Arab nation. Therefore, the Kurds were not

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An Independent Kurdish State 277

Shiite and Sunni conflicts are rooted in Islamic history, and for
many centuries Iraq has been in the forefront of internal Islamic
conflicts around the globe. Many events in recent years testify to the
levels of conflict between the two worlds. Among other examples are
eight years of the Iraq-Iran war, Iraqi regime’s slogan of ‘no Shiite after
today’ following the Shiites’ uprising in 199153, and Shiite and Sunni
radicals killing each other on identity in the post-invasion period.54
Moreover, some Shiites have struggled to remove the Sunni narrative of
the Arabic identity of Iraq in the post-invasion era.55 In other words, the
internal tensions in Iraq are not merely the sum of the Iraqi differences
between these groups; they also represent the clash of several of the
main opposing identities in the Middle East.
Moreover, 80 years of conflict between these contradictions has
created exclusive interests for each group. There is a unique balance
between the former rulers, the Sunnis, and the subjugated Shiites and
Kurds. The Sunni’s main interest is to recover their grip on power while
keeping the country’s territorial integrity. Iraqi Kurds, who comprise
one-fifth of the population, have felt deprived of their basic right to self-
determination and an independent Kurdistan, and so their main interest
is to escape from its boundaries. Shiites form about 60 percent of Iraq’s
population, and their main interest has been to exercise their right as the
majority to run the country. Hence, the key interests of Iraq’s
ethnic/sectarian groups are diametrically opposed and seemingly
irreconcilable.
These opposite interests have resulted in the creation of exclusive
visions for each group over many things. The role of Islam is one
example. Most Shiites and Sunnis insist on an Islamic identity for Iraq,
but they inherited the problems of Islam. Al-Marashi notes that the
Kurds believe that “an Islamicized state will merely attempt to subsume
the Kurdish identity under the banner of Islam”56, and that therefore
such a state would be incompatible with their ambitions. As evidence of

directly in conflict with Shiites.

53
Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World, (New
York and London: WW Norton & Company, 1993) 97.
54
Both Shiite and Sunni fighters in Iraq often are accused of using traffic checks and
pulling people off the streets and checking their ID to see if they have Sunni or Shiite names to
find and kill members of the opposite sect, solely on the basis of their religious identity.
55
Khalid Salih, “Kurdish Reality in an Emerging Iraq,” Middle East policy 6 (2004), no. 1:
123.
56
Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “Iraq’s Constitutional Debate,” Middle East Review of
International Affairs 9 (2005), no. 3: 156.

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278 Aram Rafaat

this, Jalal Talabani insists that “Kurds will never submit to an Islamic
order”57, and Masud Barzani confirmed that Kurds “won’t accept an
Islamic identity being imposed on Iraq”.58 Moreover, a survey of the role
of Islam which was published in Awene shows that only three percent of
Kurds want Islam to become a main source of legislation, as stipulated
in the Iraqi constitution.59 Thus, finding a middle ground, which is
essential for holding the country together, is almost impossible.
Foreign policy is another area of disagreement. Though both Shiites
and Sunnis express their hostility to Israel, it is often reported that the
Kurds ‘hold agreements’ with Israelis.60 Moreover, counter-accusations
apply by both Shiites and Sunnis in regard to Iraq’s relationships to its
neighbors. Shiites view Iran as a “friend, the land of co-religionists, and
a model of a powerful Shiite state”, while Sunnis see it as “the ancient
enemy that now threatens the Iraqi Arab identity”.61
Finally, each group has its exclusive interpretation of democracy.
Many Shiites believe that democracy entitles them to run Iraq and to
impose their version of an Islamic state.62 By contrast, as Masud Barzani
explains:
The Kurdish issue is not an issue of citizenship to be settled in a
democratic atmosphere by representatives of one side or on its behalf.
The issue of the Kurds is a political and national issue.63

Furthermore, The Kurdish ambition for an independent state is

evidenced in two unofficial referendums that were conducted by the
Referendum Movement in Kurdistan (RMK).64 In 2004 the RMK
collected 1.7 million signatures, and in the second about 98 percent of

57
Kurdish Media, “Talabani: Kurds will Never Submit to an Islamic Order,” interviewed by
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, trans. W Lezgin, Kurdish Media,
[Link] (accessed September 6, 2006).
58
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, “Iraqi Crisis Report: Kurds Hold Out on Key
Demands,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), no. 136,
[Link] (accessed September 16,
2006).
59
Awene, “Most Citizens Demand Human Rights Principles as a Basis for Constitution”
(Kurdish), no. 44, November 14, 2006.
60
Seymour M Hersh, “Plan B”, New Yorker 80 (2004), no. 17: 55; Ivan Eland, “The Way
Out of Iraq: Decentralizing the Iraqi Government,” International Journal on World Peace 22
(2005), no. 1: 42.
61
Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War
Without End, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005) 173.
62
Ibid., 173.
63
Masud Barzani, “Iraqi Kurdish Claim for Federalism,” Kurdistan Regional Government,
[Link] (accessed May 29, 2006).
64
It is a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO).

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An Independent Kurdish State 279

the two million eligible voters expressed support for independence.65 In

other words, the Kurds interpret democracy as self-determination, and
prefer to exercise their democratic right to form their own state. Many
Sunnis, on the other hand, have a strong animosity towards democracy
as a means of ‘usurping’ their ‘right’ to be Iraq’s rulers, and as a way to
provoke the Kurds to separate from Iraq. Disagreement over each of
these affairs is deep enough to become a source of violence and
confrontation.
Contradictions over nationalism, identity, loyalty, and interests are
so ingrained that no solution (centralism, a consociational democratic
system, or federal arrangements) other than secession can satisfy the
Kurds and dampen their aspirations for independence. Under a
centralized government and pan-Arab-nationalism the Kurds
experienced “80 years of nightmare repression and genocide”.66 For
their part, “the Kurds have been in an almost constant state of revolt”.67
A consociational system, too, would fail to satisfy the Kurds because it
would not resolve these contradictions. As Elazar notes, this is because
“ethnic-nationalism is the most egocentric of all forms of nationalism
and the most difficult basis on which to erect a system of
constitutionalized power-sharing”.68
Also, ethnic-nationalism is a fundamental obstacle to sustainability
of a federal system. Elazar explains that ethnic-nationalism “is the
strongest force against federalism”.69 Furthermore, he comments that
“all aspects of society fostering uncompromising positions make
federalism more difficult if not impossible”. Consequently, he concludes,
“ethnic federations are among the most difficult to sustain because
constituent units based on ethnic-nationalisms normally do not want to
merge into the kind of tight-knit units necessary for federation”.70
Thus, all roads lead to an independent Kurdistan. Because of these
contradictions, the constant reproduction of violence, hatred and
instability has become an Iraqi reality. To terminate this situation,
Kurdish secession and the creation of an independent Kurdish state
(under the protection of the international community) is the best long-
term solution.

65
. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: 170-1
66
Galbraith, “Last chance for Iraq”
67
Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq, 35.
68
Daniel J. Elazar, “International and Comparative Federalism,” Political Science and
Politics 26 (1993), no. 2: 194.
69
Ibid., 194.
70
Ibid., 194.

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280 Aram Rafaat

One counter-argument could be that the Iraqis already have their

own parliament, constitution, and national army which are symbols of
national unity and harmony and that help them to jointly consider their
problems and find solutions through negotiation, consensus and
compromise. However, in reality, these three institutions mirror the
clash of identities and interests, and conflicts within the nation, and they
are additional sources of division. Parliament reflects the divisions and
tensions among the rival groups. Shiites vote for Shiite religious parties,
the Kurds for Kurdish nationalist parties, and Sunni Arabs for Sunni
religious parties or ex-Baathist nationalists.71 Similarly, while the
majority of Shiites and Kurds voted for the constitution, the majority of
Sunnis rejected it. Constitutional amendment has become the main task
of the Sunnis in the post-December election period, but this is an issue
that other groups reject and it has become a source of further division.
The national army is another institution built on an ethnic/sectarian
basis, but it has been penetrated by militias that have little national
loyalty. According to Galbraith72, of the 115 army battalions, 60 are
Shiite and are located in southern Iraq, 45 are Sunni Arab and stationed
in the Sunni governorates, and nine are Peshmerga stationed in
Kurdistan.73 Hence, the country has remained whole more in name than
in reality.
Another counter-argument is that fragmentation would likely result
in a series of bloody civil wars. In particular, there would be conflict over
borders and control of the mixed cities. However, supporters of this
argument have declined to identify the Kurdish independent state as a
separate case. For example, Cordesman argues that “Iraq does not have
a neat set of ethnic dividing lines”. “Recent elections”, he explains,
“have made it clear that Iraq’s cities and 18 governorates all have
significant minorities”.74 Further, he argues, “the country is heavily

71
The new Iraqi government comprises five main coalitions; the Shiite UIA (with 130
seats), the Kurdistani list KA (with 53 seats), Sunnis Islamists IAF (44), and Iraqi List IL (25).
All these blocs are either ethnic or sectarian based.
72
Galbraith, The End of Iraq, 186.
73
It is important to realize that no ethnic or sectarian group in Iraq wants to see other
groups’ solders in their region. For example, in his interview with Ma’ad Fayad Barzani explains
that “the Kurds did not take part in the Al-Fallujah battle, but the Iraqi Army had some Kurds in
its formations. They were there just like the Arabs, but there was a hue and cry over this issue.
The Kurds were accused of entering Al-Fallujah and killing the Arabs. Kurds within the Iraqi
units participated with the other units in attacking a site or mosque in which there were terrorists
or weapons. I do not exactly know what was there. Others then said the Kurds attacked a Shiite
mosque” (see Endnote no. 31).
74
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Dividing Iraq: Think Long and Hard First,” Center for

The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

An Independent Kurdish State 281

urbanized, with nearly 40 percent of the population in the divided

Baghdad and Mosul areas”. It is difficult to split cities, and any effort to
divide the country, he suggests, “would require massive relocations,
ethnic cleansing, and controversy over the borders”.75 Thus, the Kurdish
secession is not dealt with as a separate case, but assumptions are based
on considering the issue of Kurdish independence as part of a bigger
package, namely the partition of Iraq into three separate states (Shiites,
Kurds and Sunnis).
However, there are many factors suggesting that there is a clear
distinction between Kurdish demands and those of the Sunnis and
Shiites. First, the Kurdish struggle is focused on devising a way to escape
from Iraq. By contrast, in the pre-invasion era, as Dawisha notes, “the
Shiites have never demanded autonomy, let alone political
independence; they simply wanted a shift in the political and economic
balance”.76 In other words, Arab (Sunni and Shiite) groups are more
concerned with asserting their control over the country. Further, Kurds
see their case as an ethnic-national one that is quite distinct from those
of the other groups and this even can be seen in the Kurdish deal with
federalism. For example, Article 2 of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Iraq77, which is an initial Kurdish proposal for federalism in a
future Iraq, suggests a federal system based on two regions, a Kurdish
and an Arabic.78
Furthermore, Masud Barzani explains, while Kurds maintain their
control over the Kurdistan region, they leave it to the Shiites and Sunnis

Strategic and International Studies:

[Link] (June 29,
2006).
75
Ibid.
76
Adeed Dawisha, “The Prospects for Democracy in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities,”
Third World Quarterly 26 (2005), no. 4/5: 726.
77
Kurdistan Regional Government, “Constitution of the Federal Republic of Iraq 2002”,
Kurdistan Regional Government, [Link] (accessed
September 1, 2006).
78
Article Two of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Iraq (2002) stipulates that:
“The Federal Republic of Iraq consists of two regions:
i) The Arabic Region that includes the middle and southern regions of Iraq along with the
Province of Ninevah in the north excepting the districts and sub-districts that have a Kurdish
majority as mentioned in the item below.
ii) The Kurdish Region that includes the Provinces of Kirkuk, Sulaimaniyah and Erbil
within their administrative boundaries before 1970 and the Province of Duhok and the districts
of Aqra, Sheihkan, Sinjar and the sub-district of Zimar in the Province of Ninevah and the
districts of Khaniqin and Mandali in the Province of Diyala and the district of Badra in the
Province of Al-Wasit” (see Endnote no. 65).

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282 Aram Rafaat

to develop their own particular arrangements with the capital.79 The

Sunni Arabs also deal differently with the Kurdish claims and with
Shiites. Many commentators argue that the Sunni Arabs could
grudgingly tolerate a federal Kurdistan but not a federated Shiite,
Kurdish and Sunni Arab Iraq.80
Second, the nature of the Sunni-Shiite conflict over Baghdad is
quite different from the Kurdish claims to control Kirkuk and other
disputed areas. The current conflict is not about who should control
specific cities but who should govern the country. Since Baghdad is the
capital and is a symbol of national rule and Iraqi control, the country can
be ruled through Bagdad. Therefore it is the centre of confrontation,
dislocation and civil war between Shiites and Sunnis who struggle to
keep the country united but under their control. In other words, the
sectarian/ethnic violence is not between secessionist groups, or between
separatists and defenders of national unity. It is between those groups
who advocate centralism and Iraq’s unity.
Third, the Kurdish approach to control Kirkuk is different from the
approach adopted by Sunnis and Shiites to gain control of Baghdad and
other mixed cities. Whereas Kurds “are waging their property disputes
with law suits rather than guns”81, and applied to the constitution to gain
control of Kirkuk, the other groups have resorted to violence. The
nature of the problem in Kirkuk is different from the situation in
Baghdad. The demography of Kirkuk is partly artificial, while that of
Baghdad is natural. The artificiality of Kirkuk comes from the policy of
Arabisation that was recognized by the constitution.82 The Kurdish claim
has not been violated by ethnic cleansing as has happened in Baghdad.
By contrast, a peaceful way has been created to solve the dispute, and

79
Xebat, “The President of Kurdistan in a Special Interview with Xebat,” (Kurdish), no.
2097, March 29, 2006.
80
International Crisis Group, “The Next Iraq War? Sectarian and Civil Conflict,”
Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 52, [Link]
06/the_next_iraqi_war_sectarianism_and_civil_conflict.pdf (accessed November2, 2006); Hania
Farhan and Simon Williams, “Outlook for 2006-07: Political Outlook,” Economist Intelligence
Unit Limited- Country Report: Iraq:
[Link]
33a9273c57a2%40sessionmgr104 (accessed April 21, 2006);Ma’ad Fayad, “Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani Talks to Asharq Al-Awsat,” Asharq Alawsat, English Edition:
[Link] (accessed September, 28,
2006).
81
“Can Kurds and Arabs be Reunited?,” Economist 368 (2003), no. 8342: 44-45.
82
Coalition Provisional Authority, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period,” Coalition Provisional Authority, [Link]
[Link]/government/[Link] (accessed March 16, 2006).

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An Independent Kurdish State 283

this pathway to a peaceful resolution has been constitutionalized so that

it is the duty of the new government to implement the relevant articles.
This Constitutional solution has functioned as a form of safety valve.
It has calmed the Kurds by formally recognizing the Arabization of
Kirkuk as “the injustice caused by the previous regime”.83 Because the
article broadly conforms to Kurdish visions for the city, the Kurds were
convinced not to act unilaterally and take Kirkuk by force. It has also
restrained direct or random action by individuals seeking to reclaim
property.84 Instead, displaced Kurds were encouraged to use the courts
and legal avenues. For example, by May 2005 nearly 37,000 claims had
been registered in the offices of the Iraq Property Claims Commission
(ICCP) in Kirkuk85. Furthermore, as Rizgar Ali explains 86, almost 12,000
Arab settler families have expressed willingness to return to their former
cities if they were to be compensated87. Finally, the Iraqi government
insistence on its obligation to implement the constitutional article
related to Kirkuk is another positive indicator.88 Consequently, Kirkuk is
more secure and stable than many other Iraqi mixed cities. Nevertheless,
contrary to the popular claim, leaving these disputed areas unresolved
means leaving the future of these cities as a time bomb that could
explode at any time.

83
Article 140 stipulates that “First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary
steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of
the Transitional Administrative Law. Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive
branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional
Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance
with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (Normalization and census and
concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of
their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007”. However, Article 58 of
Transitional Administrative Law stipulates that “The Iraqi Transitional Government, and
especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act
expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s practices
in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and
expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of the region,
settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting
nationality”.
84
Sometimes individuals or small groups of two different ethnicities might quarrel over
properties or land, and this could spark a wider confrontation between these groups.
85
The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2005, Iraq: country reports on
human rights practices 2004, US Department of State:
[Link] (accessed 24 September 2006).
86
Rizgar Ali is the Kirkuk's Provincial Council president.
87
Rizgr Ali, We will not allow the civil war to break out in Kirkuk, PUK Media (Arabic),
[Link] accessed (14 November 2006).
88
In article 22 of his programme for the formation the permanent government, al-Maliki
pledged to implement Article 140 of the Constitution by the end of 2007 (see Endnote no. 3).

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284 Aram Rafaat

Fourth, Kurdistan functioned successfully as a semi-independent

state between 1991 and 2003, the most peaceful period in its recent
history. This period, which is described by many commentators as the
Kurds’ ‘golden era’89, demonstrates that secession is the best means to
resolve the 80-year conflict between the Kurds and Baghdad. It is also
interesting to note that the former Yugoslavia passed through a similar
experience. Ethnic cleaning and identity-based conflicts, which were
common in that country after the collapse of the Yugoslavian regime,
were ended when Yugoslavia was divided into constituent states. For all
these reasons the Kurdish case should be treated separately. In other
words, whether or not Iraq is partitioned, there is a case for an
independent Kurdistan.
Another reason commonly cited against partition is the possibility of
conflict over oil resources. For example, Cordesman argues that:
Once the nation effectively divides, so does its major resource, and in
ways that make the territorial losers in non-oil areas effectively
dysfunctional. This leaves the losers with little choice other than further
conflict.90
Again, this statement is based on the likely outcome if the country
were to be partitioned onto three states, and not merely on the
separation of Kurdistan. By considering Kurdistan’s case separately
from other parts of Iraq it becomes clear that Cordesman’s claim is
inaccurate. The Kirkuk region sits atop only as much as 10 billion barrels
of Iraq’s 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.91 Thus, even if
Kurdistan were separated with Kirkuk, almost 90 percent (or more than
100 billion barrels) of the nation’s oil resources would remain in Iraq.92
Moreover, Cordesman’s solution for the problem of ownership of the oil
revenue is to keep it in the hands of Baghdad. His justification is that
“more than 90 percent of Iraq’s government revenue comes from oil

89
Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, “The Implications of Elections for Federalism in
Iraq: Toward a Five-region Model,” Publius 35 (2005), no. 3: 371; Gareth Stansfield, “The
Kurdish Dilemma: the Golden Era Threatened,” The Adelphi Papers 354 (2002): 135.
90
Cordesman, “Dividing Iraq”.
91
Cameron W. Barr, “Kirkuk, a Mirror of Iraq's Schisms,” Christian Science Monitor 95
(2003), no. 67: 6; Elizabeth Rubin, “Spring Time,” New Republic 228 (2003), no. 11;
International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears Over Kurdsih Ambitions,” Crisis
Group Middle East Report, no. 35: 1:
[Link]
dish_ambitions.pdf htm (accessed September 9, 2006).
92
This calculation is based only on the proven oil reserves.

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An Independent Kurdish State 285

exports”.93 But giving Baghdad the right to manage oil revenue will
increase the possibility of the strongest group exploiting the funds to
dominate the nation and so return it to tyranny. Besides, Kurds see that
their protection from Baghdad’s threats depends on preventing Baghdad
from controlling all the oil resources. As Nechirvan Barzani explains,
“for the Kurds, oil was a curse because the central government used the
revenue to buy weapons which were then used against them”.94
Therefore it would continue to be a source of confrontation.
Particularly, the Kurds see that it is their right to develop and invest
their oilfields by themselves.
The claim that Sunnis would be the losers in partition (to three
states) because they would receive little revenue from oil is exaggerated.
There are “reports of major oil deposits in al-Anbar, an almost
exclusively Sunni Arab governorate, no exploration has taken place”.95
Similar information was reported by the Energy Information
Administration, confirming that deep oil-bearing formations located
mainly in the vast Western Desert region could yield large additional oil
resources (possibly another 45-100 billion barrels), but that these have
not been explored.96 Because al-Anbar province covers a significant part
of Iraq’s western desert, the Sunnis would have future access to a huge
oil resource, even if three independent states were formed. Further,
most Iraqi industries (including Iraq’s two largest oil refineries) are
located in Sunni provinces.
Another counter-argument is that the geopolitical barriers are the
main obstacle to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state and
are the main reason behind the Kurdish leaders’ denial of their
ambitions for independence. We will describe each of these barriers
without discussion, but then follow them with a consideration of their
merits.
One geopolitical barrier that is often promoted as a reason for
rejecting Kurdish independence is that such a state would be confronted
by hostile surrounding countries. The popular argument is that an

93
Cordesman, “Dividing Iraq”.
94
Nechirvan Barzani 2005, “Why Kurdistan Insists on Kirkuk”, Financial Times,
[Link]
=10342&location=http%3A//[Link]/cms/s/[Link]
(accessed September 9, 2006).
95
International Crisis Group, “The Next Iraq War?”: 14.
96
Energy Information Administration, “Iraq; Oil”, Energy Information Administration
(EIA), Official energy statistics from the U.S. Government:
[Link] (accessed 19 October 2006).

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286 Aram Rafaat

independent Iraqi Kurdistan could foster wider Kurdish aspirations for

independence and spark similar movements among Kurds of these
countries.97 Therefore in the long run, they argue, Kurdish
independence would threaten the territorial integrity and security of
Turkey, Iran, and Syria, and might result in military confrontation with
neighboring states. Turkey has even warned that it would be a casus belli
if the Iraqi Kurds declared their independence.98 Accordingly, it is a
difficult task to maintain an independent Kurdistan.
Another geopolitical consideration is that a Kurdish state could
create a new balance of power in the region because an independent
Kurdistan represents calls for redrawing the region’s map. The borders
and geopolitics of those countries with Kurdish minorities, and the
traditional balance of power in the region, could change in
unpredictable ways.99 Furthermore, Gunter argues, “the possibility of
instability and turmoil would not only be detrimental to the region but to
the U.S. and the broader international community”.100 In other words, as
Fuller argues, “the international system characteristically does not
welcome the break-up of existing states and the resulting turmoil and
violence, as witnessed by Yugoslavia”.101 Also, Gelb argues, an
independent Kurdish state has been unthinkable in Washington for
decades because a united Iraq was deemed essential to preventing
neighbors like Turkey, Syria and Iran from picking at the pieces and
igniting wider wars.102 Consequently, neither the regional governments
nor the international community would welcome the break-up of

97
Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurds in Iraq: Why Kurdish Statehood is Unlikely”, Middle
EastPolicy 11 (2004), no. 1: 108; Nihat Ali Özcan, “Could a Kurdish State be Set Up in Iraq,”
Middle East Policy 6 (2004), no. 1: 120; Eland, “The Way Out of Iraq”: 67; Nimrod Raphaeli,
“Kirkuk: Between Kurdish Separatism and Iraqi Federalism,” The Middle East Media Research
Institute (MEMRI), Inquiry and Analysis Series (2005), no. 215,
[Link] Dawn
Brancati, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?,” The Washington Quarterly 27 (2004), no. 2: 11;
Michael M. Gunter and Hakan Yavuz, “The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Middle East
Policy 12 (2005), no. 1: 120.
98
Khalid Salih, “Kurdish Reality in an Emerging Iraq”:124; Michael M. Gunter, “The
Possibilities for an Independent Kurdish State,” (paper presented at Kurdish Human Rights:
Statelessness, Resistance and Survival Conference 9/4-9/5/04), The Kurdish Human Rights
Conference, [Link] (accessed March
10, 2006).
99
Graham E. Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds,” Foreign Affairs 72 (1993), no. 2: 113;
Stansfield, “Divide and Heal”.
100
Gunter, “The Kurds in Iraq”: 108.
101
Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds”:109.
102
Leslie H. Gelb, “The Three-State Solution,” New York Times 153, no. 52678, November
25, 2003: 27.

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An Independent Kurdish State 287

existing states.103
A third difficulty posed by an independent Kurdistan is that it would
be landlocked. Barkey & Laipson argue that their landlocked situation
means that Kurds will always be vulnerable to embargos and
blockades.104
Furthermore, Özcan insists that:
If an independent Kurdistan failed to integrate with the world economy,
and if it is geographically trapped, it could survive only if an outside
power such as the United States offered support and protection, or if a
special relationship were established with a neighboring country. 105
But, he claims:
Neither the wider Arab community nor Turkey and Iran would be
willing to cooperate with the United States if the latter had helped the
Kurds establish their state. 106

That is why “the United States is less likely to become the protector
of the Kurdish autonomy vis-à-vis millions of Arabs, Persians and
Turks”.107 So an independent Kurdistan would be isolated in its region
and would have no ability to sustain its economy.
Considering that geography and power bases are strongly against
the Kurds, advocates of federalism, such as Gunter,108 Gunter and
Yavuz109, Karsh110, Brancati111, believe that Barzani and Talabani are
aware of the reality of the Kurds’ dilemma and so they were realistic
when they denied any claims for independence, opting instead for
federalism in a post-Saddam democratic Iraq. They also argue
federalism became the Kurds next-best option and the most realistic
hope.
However, some evidence suggests that these geopolitical
considerations are less clear-cut than they appear to most observers.
These geopolitical analyses are mostly based on the mistaken belief that
the Kurds are both passive and vulnerable, but there are other factors to
be taken into account. To better understand the geopolitical factors that

103
Gunter, “The Kurds in Iraq”: 106.
104
Barkey and Laipson, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq’s Future”: 70.
105
Özcan, “Could a Kurdish State be Set Up in Iraq”:120.
106
Ibid.,120.
107
Gunter and Yavuz, “The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan”: 127.
108
Gunter, “The Kurds in Iraq”: 108.
109
Gunter and Yavuz, “The Continuing Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan”: 124.
110
Efraim Karsh, “Making Iraq Safe for Democracy,” Commentary 115 (2003), no. 4: 26.
111
Brancati, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?”: 11.

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288 Aram Rafaat

might impinge on any future independent Kurdistan, it is important to

take note of the weaknesses of the surrounding countries. The
neighboring countries, too, are vulnerable to any Kurdish developments,
and this comes from three interconnected factors. First, these states are
bound by strict ideological foundations; pan-Turkism or Kemalism in
Turkey; pan-Arabism of the Ba’ath Party in Syria; and the pan-Shiite-
Islamism of Khomeini in Iran. These ideological foundations make them
feel that they are under constant threat from internal and external
changes.
The implications of these ideologies have resulted in constant
deprivation of minorities, particularly the Kurds. Among those
deprivations are Turkey’s denial of Kurdish identity112 by reclassifying
them as ‘Mountain Turks’113, Iran’s ethnic and sectarian repression of
the Kurds 114, and Syria’s refusal to grant citizenship to more than
100,000 indigenous Kurds since 1962115. The third source of vulnerability
of these countries is their unhappy past experiences with nationalist-
inspired Kurdish violence. These countries have been hostages to the
Kurdish issue since long before the U.S. occupation of Iraq or the
emergence of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in 1991.116 Kurdish nationalism
has been a challenge to the governments of the countries in which they
live, and in Turkey the Kurds were perceived to constitute a threat “to
the state itself and to the Turkish-based ethnic nationalism that
legitimized it”.117

112
In Turkey, for instance, the Kurdish identity and language are denied, and according to
Article 66 of The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey “everyone bound to the Turkish state
through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”.
113
Arthur Bonner, “Turkey and the European Union and Paradigm Shifts,” Middle East
Policy 12 (2005), no. 1: 48; Michael M. Gunter, “Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” Journal
of Muslim Minority Affairs 23 (2003), no. 1: 9.
114
In addition, Kurds are deprived from studying in their language in Iran, and Iranian
Kurds (most of whom are Sunni) are also deprived from holding specific posts. For example
Article 5 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates that “the wilayah and
leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just ('adil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih”. In other words
the leadership of the Islamic Republic is exclusive for Shiite Jurisconsult.
115
Chatham House, “Iraq in Transition”: 19.
116
For example, the first Kurdish state ever to be established was in Iranian Kurdistan in
1946, but it lasted just one year. Later in 1979 the Iranian Kurds rose up against the state in a bid
for independence immediately following the Iraqi invasion of Iran. Occurring at a time when the
Islamic Republic was at its weakest, the revolt was suppressed in 1984 following several years
campaign by the Iranian army. Meanwhile, in the mid-1980s the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) started its military movement in Kurdistan of Turkey, in a bid for independence. The
PKK rebellion, which has hit Turkey the hardest, has led to the deaths of 35,000 and cost the
Turks billions of dollars (See Endnote no. 35).
117
Robert Olson, “Turkey–Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: The Kurdish and Islamist

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An Independent Kurdish State 289

Three (almost) irreversible factors have further exacerbated those

countries’ vulnerability. Firstly, factors such as globalization, the
emergence of a new world order, the telecommunication revolution, and
increased international attention to human rights issues have
contributed to an awakening of Kurdish self-awareness.118 In other
words, the borders that isolated Kurds from one another are no longer
effective. Second, as Yavuz and Özcan noted, the American occupation
of Iraq has abetted the secessionist desire of the Kurds by opening the
Pandora’s box of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.119
The third factor is the heightening of Kurdish identity in Iraq, and their
achievement of greater political, cultural and social rights, including the
Kurdish veto, the formation of a Kurdish bloc in parliament, and official
use of the Kurdish language. All these factors have advanced the
Kurdish nationalist movement throughout the region.
With these factors in mind, when reviewing the options for Iraq’s
future development it is important to consider that the potential for
Kurdish (con)federation in Iraq to affect neighboring nations is almost
as significant as an independent Kurdistan. The events of the last three
years proved that, like an independent Kurdish state, federalism is a
form of government that could become a model for other Kurds and a
threat to the stability and integrity of the surrounding countries.
This was evidenced in the 2004 uprising by Syrian Kurds in Qamishli and
Damascus, and in the clashes between Kurds and Syrian security forces
in Aleppo and Qamishli in 2005.120 These demonstrations, which began
only one week after the signing of the TAL121, were for federalism of a
type granted to the Iraqi Kurds.122
Simultaneously, Iranian Kurdish demonstrations were held in the

Questions”, Third World Quarterly 21 (2000), no. 5: 872.

118
For example, the Iraqi Kurds have established a strong broadcast telecommunications
service which transmits in Kurdish. The Kurds of Iran Syria and Turkey who are deprived from
their own medias in Kurdish are motivated by Iraqi Kurdistan TV channels.
119
Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and
Development Party,” Middle East Policy 13 (2006), no. 1: 116.
120
Political Risk Services, “Syria Country Forecast Comment & Analysis 2005,” Political
Risk Services, no. 1054-6197: 12:
[Link]
e99fa0e0bf82%40sessionmgr109.
121
Gary C. Gambill, “The Kurdish Reawakening in Syria”, Middle East Intelligence 6
(April 2004), no. 4, [Link]
122
Jacob Sullum, “The Doctor is Not a Criminal,” National Review 57 (2005), no. 9: 27;
Robert Lowe, “The Syrian Kurds: a People Discovered”, Chatham House, (2006),
[Link]

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290 Aram Rafaat

Meriwan region123, followed by demonstrations in Sanandaj where

some Kurds demanded federalism while others called for
independence.124 Turkey’s Kurds, too, sought “to avail themselves of the
changed regional conditions when a faction of the PKK renounced the
1999 cease-fire and resumed hostilities against the Turkish Republic in
June 2004”.125 Facing heightened Kurdish nationalism and federalism in
Iraq, both Turkey126 and Syria127 have asserted their opposition to
federalism for Iraqi Kurdistan.
Whether or not Iraqi Kurds were complicit in these disturbances,
the events have signaled the emergence of Kurds as active players in the
Middle East political and security equation. The disturbances showed
the ability of Iraqi Kurds to increase political uncertainty in the
neighboring countries if those countries threatened their interests. In
other words, although Iraqi Kurdistan has lacked recognition as a state,
it has developed patterns of functional independence and become the
focal point for the regionalization and internationalization of Kurds as a
force to be reckoned with. This new status, which seems irreversible,
highlights the capability of Iraqi Kurds to deal with outside threats.
Therefore, pressure by neighboring states for Kurds to abandon their
quest for statehood could backfire and instead lead to a resurgence of
Kurdish nationalism within their own borders. This might be so if Iraqi
Kurds feel forced to encourage their fellow Kurds to rise up against their
oppressors. Particularly, Iraqi Kurdistan has become a magnet for trans-
border Kurdish nationalists.
It is important to realize that although the surrounding nations have
constantly declared their hostility to any Kurdish entity, in practice they
have all managed to cooperate since the formation of the semi-
independent Kurdistan in 1991. The neighbors have (in one way or
another) tacitly supported the KRG and in so doing have accepted the
status quo. For their part, the Kurds have refrained from fomenting

123
James Brandon, “Iran’s Kurdish Threat: PJAK,” Terrorism Monitor 4 (2006), no. 12: 2.
124
Chris Kutschera, “An Island of Prosperity and Calm,” Middle East (2004), no. 341: 42-
44.
125
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “The Kurds and Regional Security: an Evaluation of
Developments Since the Iraq War,” Middle East Brief, no. 14: 3:
[Link]
126
Michael M Gunter, “The US-Turkish Alliance in Disarray,” World Affairs 167 (2005),
no. 3: 121.
127
Charles Recknagel, “Iraq: Kurdish Factions Struggle to Achieve Unity,” Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty:
[Link]
41B4-8F64-1D866488186D (accessed July 18, 2006).

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An Independent Kurdish State 291

rebellion among the Kurds in neighboring states and have supported

only those moderate Kurds who seek peaceful solutions. It can be
surmised from this that if the surrounding countries were less hostile to
the Iraqi Kurdish independence, the Kurds would feel more secure and
so would be less likely to support their ethnic kinsmen (and particularly
the hard line nationalists) in those countries. Based on this scenario, it
would be possible for both an Iraqi Kurdish state and the neighboring
nations to accommodate each others’ respective interests.
One striking example is that “in October 1992 Barzani and Talabani
supported a major Turkish military campaign inside the Kurdish zone,
an action that delivered a devastating blow to the PKK’s infrastructure
and personnel”.128 Ironically, it was Saddam’s regime, and not the Kurds,
who “issued threats and supported the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
against Turkey during the 1990s”.129 For its part, “Turkey had
contributed significantly to the consolidation of Kurdish self-rule in
northern Iraq in the 1990s and even provided Kurdish leaders Barzani
and Talabani with diplomatic passports”.130 Further, Turkey “has
established de facto working agreements with Kurdish authorities to
maintain border security”.131 It also “recognized some government-to-
government relations with Kurdistan-Iraq both before and after the
invasion”.132
Similarly, there have been instances of cooperation between Iraqi
Kurdistan and Iran. As Galbraith notes, “Iran has historically supported
Kurdish separatists in Iraq”.133 In return, since 1991, when the Iraqi
Kurds took control of the region, the KRG has banned incursions into
Iran from those armed camps of the Iranian Kurdistan opposition
parties that have been based within the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan.134 In
the same way, The Iraqi Kurdish parties have distracted Syrian Kurds
from the struggle in Syria.135 In return, Syria has consistently kept
channels open with both the PUK and the KDP.136 The (PUK) was even
formed in Damascus. Thus commentators on the geopolitical situation

128
Özcan, “Could a Kurdish State be Set Up in Iraq”:120.
129
Chatham House, “Iraq in Transition”: 23.
130
Ibid., 23.
131
Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds,”: 113.
132
Robert Olson, “Turkey and Kurdistan-Iraq,” Middle East policy 6 (2004), no. 1: 115.
133
Galbraith, The End of Iraq, 218.
134
Iranian Refugees’ Alliance 1998, “Unsafe Haven, Iranian Kurdish Refugees in Iraqi
Kurdistan,” Iranian Refugees at Risk, no. 97, [Link]
(accessed September 7, 2006).
135
Lowe, “The Syrian Kurds”: 4.
136
Chatham House, “Iraq in Transition”: 20; Lowe, “The Syrian Kurds”: 4.

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292 Aram Rafaat

of the region have failed to distinguish between the ideological

considerations of the surrounding countries and their practical
relationships with the Kurdistan Government.
This Kurdish policy of supporting moderate Kurds in other nations,
and of seeking peaceful solutions to Kurdish problems in Syria, Turkey
and Iran, has been followed in the post-invasion period. On the one
hand, Barzani declared that “we call for a peaceful democratic solution
to the Kurdish issue in every part of Kurdistan and in accordance with
the special character of this or that part”.137 On the other hand, the
KRG has become home to thousands of nationalist Kurds from
surrounding countries. For example, around 11,000 Kurdish refugees
from Turkey, some of whom are affiliated with the PKK138, and more
than 7000 Iranian Kurds, are living in Kurdistan. However, to avoid
giving the neighboring nations a pretext for hostility, the PUK-KDP
leadership urged the PKK and Iranian organizations not use
KRG territory to stage attacks against Turkey or Iran.139 This
Kurdish policy has two advantages for the surrounding countries. It
reduces disturbances in those countries by preventing military attacks on
them, and it absorbs the hard line nationalist Kurds by giving them
refuge in the KRG and so reduces their direct influence on the Kurds of
those countries.
There are other important factors that support the idea that the
Kurds should not be seen as a threat to their neighbors. Indeed, an
independent Kurdistan could provide more security, stability and
economic advantages to the neighbors than Iraq has done in the past.
Despite the geopolitical concerns of some commentators, the Kurdish
independent state could act as a buffer for Turkey as well as assist in its
economic recovery. According to Chatham House, Turkey is now more
likely “to accommodate Iraqi Kurdish independence than oppose it
militarily”, because “Turkey will prefer an independent Kurdish state
over the Iraqi state dominated by an Islamist government”.140 Galbraith
even suggests that “being secular and pro-western makes the Kurds
natural allies for Turkey and a buffer to an Islamic Arab state to the

137
Fayad, “Interview with Iraqi Kurdistan Region”.
138
Pola Aral, “Turkey's Kurdish Refugees in Makhmur Want to Return Home,” Ministry
for Extra Regional Affairs:
[Link]
[Link]/articles/[Link]?smap=01010000&lngnr=12&anr=11669&rnr=138
(accessed 29 November 2006).
139
Shifrinson, “The Kurds and Regional Security”: 4.
140
Chatham House, “Iraq in Transition” : 4.

The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

An Independent Kurdish State 293

south”.141
Another reason that could encourage neighbors to recognize a
stable independent Kurdistan is the wars, anarchy and rebellions that
characterized the last eighty years of Iraq’s history. Since 1932142, Iraq
has clashed with all six of its neighbors, including the eight years of the
Iraq-Iran war.143 Also, it has been embroiled in conflicts with the U.S in
1991 and 2003. Additionally, “at least 10 times in Iraq’s history, the army
intervened to change the government, either by actual coup, threatened
coup, or political pressure”.144
One of the consequences of all these conflicts has been economic
damage. For example, abiding by international sanctions before the first
Gulf War, Turkey closed its border with Iraq, and it has been estimated
that the cost of the closure to Turkey might have been as high as US$100
billion.145 However, a stable independent Kurdistan would help reverse
this, and Kurdistan already enjoys relatively good economic links with
Turkey. As noted by Dizayi146, Kurdistan has been flooded with Turkish
companies which operate everywhere and are involved in most sectors of
the economy. By the beginning of 2006, Dizayi explains, hundreds of
Turkish companies had signed contracts for projects worth $2.5 billion.
147

Turks are even involved in the oil industry which is central to the
Kurdistan economy, and agreement has been given for Turkish oil
companies to operate in Kurdistan’s oil fields.148 This has created a new
balance of economic interdependency between the two countries. As
Birand notes, should the Kurds declare their independence, then in the
event of Turkey closing its borders, the southeast of Turkey would

141
Galbraith, The End of Iraq, 117.
142
The year of Iraq’s independence from Britain.
143
Andrew Flibbert, “After Saddam: Regional Insecurity, Weapons of Mass Destruction,
and Proliferation Pressures in Postwar Iraq,” Political Science Quarterly 118 (4004), no. 4: 551.
144
Joseph McMillan, “Building an Iraqi Defense Force,” Strategic Forum (2003), no. 198,
[Link]
145
Carol Migdalovitz, “Iraq: the Turkish Factor,” Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress, no. RS21336:
[Link]
146
Safin Dizayi, the foreign relations representative of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP).
147
Safin Dizayi, “Any Dialogue in the Region Will be Failed if the Kurds are Excluded,”
(Kurdish), Gulan (2006), no. 599. pp. 9-13.
148
Olson, “Turkey and Kurdistan-Iraq,”: 115; Mark Dewhurst, “Assessing the Kurdish
Question: What is the Future of Kurdistan?,” USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army
War College (2006):
[Link]

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294 Aram Rafaat

starve.149 Considering both economic and security issues, he commented

that “Kurdistan and Turkey complement each other”.150 Therefore, as
the International Crisis Group notes, “Turkey needs stability in Iraqi
Kurdistan (whatever its eventual status), and the only way it can
facilitate this is to work closely with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to
promote trade and funnel investment to the region”.151
One counter-argument could be that Iraqi Kurdistan was under
constant threat throughout the 1990s, and there were constant
incursions by Turkish troops into Kurdistan. However, most of the
Turkish invasions were under the pretext of eliminating the PKK
activities and destroying its camps 152, and were directly or indirectly
supported by Kurdish parties.153 Moreover, prior to the invasion, Turkey
was the strongest U.S. ally in the region. Turkey was also an important
part of the U.S.-led protection process for the Kurds. For a number of
years it acted as arbitrator between the two rival Kurdish parties, the
KDP and the PUK. Further, due to the international and Iraqi sanctions
imposed on Kurdistan, the Kurds experienced economic hardship and
Turkey’s support was crucial for their survival.154 For all these reasons,
Turkey had a special say in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Nevertheless in the post-invasion period, significant alterations
occurred in the balance of power. Turkey found that it was replaced by
others as strategic partners of the U.S. and it lost many of its geopolitical
advantages. With the fall of Saddam, Turkish protection was no longer
necessary. The Kurds unified their administrations and founded a strong
bloc. Eventually, the sanctions on the Kurds were lifted. Moreover, they
found alternative ways to establish relations with the outside world by
traveling abroad without returning to Turkey or to other neighboring
countries as they did in the past. Therefore, as the Chatham House
noted, “once the war began, Turkey’s self-proclaimed red lines were all
but erased”.155
Finally, the experiences of other nations have showed that a newly-

149
Mehmet Ali Birand, 2005, “Bush's Turkey Warning to Barzani,” Turkish Daily News,
[Link]
(accessed October 1, 2006).
150
Ibid.
151
International Crisis Group, “Iraq: Allaying Turkey”: 16.
152
Gunter, “The US-Turkish Alliance in Disarray,” : 120.
153
Gunter, “The Kurds in Iraq”: 107.
154
The Kurds were subjected to a double embargo, one imposed by the United Nations on
all of Iraq and one imposed by Saddam on their region.
155
Chatham House, “Iraq in Transition”: 23.

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An Independent Kurdish State 295

established state with minorities in surrounding countries can survive

peacefully with those countries. One interesting case is Azerbaijan,
which has many similarities with the case of Kurdistan. Just as Kurdistan
has been divided amongst four countries, Azerbaijan was formerly
divided between the Soviet Union and Iran. The Soviet part of
Azerbaijan gained its independence after the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991.156 Similar to Iraqi Kurdistan (which located in the region
where Syria, Iran, Turkey and Iraq meet), Azerbaijan is located “in the
centre of the Russian-Turkish-Iranian geopolitical triangle”.157 Also
there are similarities in oil resources, population, and area. Moreover,
the largest part of Azeri (with a population of almost three times that of
independent Azerbaijan) is located in Iran, and Iranian Azerbaijan is
contiguous to Azerbaijan. Additionally, there are almost three times as
many Azaris in Iran as there are Kurds in that country.158
Furthermore, similar to the Iraqi Kurds, Azerbaijanis have
irredentist aspirations. For example, following its establishment, the
Azerbaijani state “continuously challenged Iran on several occasions and
called for the separation of Iranian Azerbaijan from the mainland”.159
Iran remained “slow and cautious in establishing relations with the new
state”160, and there were some “hostile acts by Iran”.161 However Iran
competed with other countries to establish a better relationship with
Azerbaijan162, and despite some problems Azerbaijan has maintained
peaceful links with Iran. A further example can be seen in regard to the
Arabs in Iran. Arabs constitute a significant minority in oil-rich southern
Iran, and despite the ethnic-nationalist tendencies of Arab nations, Iran
has shown that it can manage the influence of those countries without
significant problems. Iran has a long history of living peacefully side-by-
side with countries that share the same ethnic origin as the Iranian
minorities.
From all of the above, we see that, contrary to those who predict
geopolitical reasons for Kurdistan’s demise, an independent Kurdistan

156
Azerbaijan, The World Fact Book:
[Link] (October 29, 2006).
157
Nazrin Mehdiyeva, “Azerbaijan and its Foreign Policy Dilemma,” Asian Affairs 34
(2003), no. 3: 272.
158
Azeris make up 24 percent of the Iranian population.
159
Nader Entessar, “Iran's Security Challenges,” Muslim World 94 (2004), no. 4: 550.
160
Mehdiyeva, “Azerbaijan and its Foreign Policy Dilemma,”: 272.
161
Ayça Ergun, “International Challenges and Domestic Preferences in the Post-Soviet
Political Transition of Azerbaijan,” Perspectives on Global Development & Technology 2
(2003), no. ¾: 648.
162
Mehdiyeva, “Azerbaijan and its Foreign Policy Dilemma,”: 272.

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296 Aram Rafaat

offers a realistic and permanent alternative, and that it can promote the
interests of Kurds and surrounding countries.
Summary
Iraq, we have seen, is a country of contradictions. In the post-
invasion years, Iraq’s remaining (nominally) as a united country is not
because of the Iraqis’ willingness, but rather because the occupier forces
have willed it. It is likely that with the departure of the occupying forces,
not only the power-sharing regime will break apart, but also the country
is likely to be partitioned. The conflict of ethnic-nationalists, the clash of
identities and loyalties, the opposing interests, and exclusive visions over
strategic issues are all sources of conflict between Kurds and the other
Iraqi groups. For several decades the Kurdish secessionist and
irredentist movement has been in conflict with Sunni Pan-Arab
nationalism and territorialism. However, while the Sunnis were in
power, their ethnic-nationalism gained ascendancy and defined the
official state ideology, and in turn the Iraqi state and its institutions
became instruments for implementing Pan-Arab-Nationalist projects.
The conflicts between the Kurds and other Iraqi groups turned the
Kurds into oppressed victims. Termination of this victim status required
the Kurds to change that balance, and one way was to escape from Iraq.
On the other hand, the accumulated effects of the conflicts created
exclusive interests and loyalties. The divisions within the society are too
deep and could trigger serious conflict if a federal or central system were
to be imposed on the nation. The Kurdish secession is both the ultimate
goal of the Kurds and a permanent solution to the country’s woes.
As we have seen, some commentators assert that a Kurdish
independent state is not a realistic solution because it could trigger
further conflict in Iraq and because there are serious geopolitical
barriers to such a move. However, the assumption that Kurdish
secession could lead to civil war is mostly based on misunderstandings of
the Kurdish case and on the belief that it is part of the bigger package
that is the partition of Iraq into three states. The nature of the Kurdish-
Baghdad conflict is different from the ongoing conflict between Sunnis
and Shiites. The former is about how to escape from Iraq while the latter
is about who controls the country. Further, the Kurdish approach to
controlling the disputed areas is quite dissimilar to the violent
confrontations between Sunnis and Shiites over controlling Baghdad.
The issue of losers and winners in the event of the partitioning of Iraq is
exaggerated. Judging by Iraqi history and the post-invasion events, the

The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

An Independent Kurdish State 297

permanent solution lies in the division of the mixed cities and oil
resources, not in the forced maintenance of unity.
Geopolitical barriers are another factor that has been exaggerated.
This is evidenced by the success of the KRG during the 1990s, for in that
time the semi-autonomous state developed economically and established
satisfactory diplomatic relations with neighboring countries. Contrary to
the view that the Kurdish independent state could lead to anarchy in the
region, it could act as an effective buffer between some hostile forces,
reduce the threat of civil war, and limit the possible formation of an
Islamic state in Iraq. Moreover, as the past decade has demonstrated, it
could economically benefit surrounding countries. In their struggle for
independence the Kurdish gains have reached the stage where they are
irreversible. Both the international community and the regional
countries have to recognize and support the Kurdish independent state
if a peaceful, durable solution and human rights are to be achieved.

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