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2. ‘Expansive interpretations of rights by the European Court of Human Rights

on issues such as prisoner voting and preventing deportations have favoured the living
instrument doctrine over the margin of appreciation for States by the court.’ To what
extent do you agree with this statement?

The European Convention of Human Rights (hereafter “the Convention”) was drafted
in the aftermath of the Second World War to protect democracy, the rule of law, and human
rights in Europe1. However, society’s standards and values have changed dramatically in the
past decades. So, how is a Convention that was written more than 70 years ago not
considered outdated? It was the capacity of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter
“the Court”, “the Strasbourg Court”, or the “European Court”) to understand that human
rights cannot be limited to the conception of what a fundamental right once was that has
allowed the Convention to evolve. The Court created an interpretive mechanism, known as
the living instrument doctrine, which takes the Convention as a contemporary document that
can adapt to and progressively incorporate changing social and legal developments in
European states2. However, this doctrine conflicts with another interpretive mechanism of the
Court, known as the margin of appreciation. The margin operates as the level of deference
given to a State on a particular case, and the principle of subsidiarity sustains it.

This paper will show the Court’s preference for the living instrument doctrine over
the margin of appreciation in general and how it can be verified in two human rights issues.
However, before addressing the Court’s preferences, it is necessary to examine how these
two interpretive mechanisms operate and the relationship between them.
Firstly, we will consider the creation and development of both doctrines in
Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. It is essential to understand the principles sustaining both
doctrines to comprehend how they operate in different human rights issues.
Secondly, we will examine the use of the margin of appreciation and the living
instrument in cases concerning prisoners’ voting rights and prevent deportations. This paper

1
George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, OUP 2007)
2
Lawrence R. Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights’ [1993] 26(1)
Cornell International Law Journal
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will show that the Court has favoured an expansive interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No.
1 on prisoner voting but how this expansion was very limited. The Court's willingness to
narrow the margin of appreciation for blanket bans on prisoner voting will be showcased.
However, it will be noted the Court’s reluctance to enlarge the scope of this Article any
further than blanket bans. Then, the paper will examine the expansive interpretation of
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to prevent the deportation of asylum-seekers, illegal
immigrants, and refugees.
Thirdly, we will examine how the living instrument doctrine has, on the one hand,
increased the scope of human rights protection and allowed the Convention to remain
relevant in modern society. However, on the other hand, this evolutive approach has
developed at a rapid pace new positive obligations for States, which has intensified the
tension between the Court’s roles. Finally, the paper will briefly discuss the greater
importance of the margin of appreciation with Protocol 15.

It is argued that the conception of the Convention as a living instrument can be traced
to early cases in Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. In the case of Wemhoff v Germany3, the Court
explicitly stated that the Convention was a law-making treaty. Letsas goes as far as to
consider Golder v United Kingdom4 one of the most critical cases of the European Court of
Human Rights, as this case suggested the dynamic nature of the Convention. However, the
Court only confirmed this approach in Tyrer v United Kingdom5. In this case, the Court stated
for the first time that “the Convention is a living instrument which (…) must be interpreted in
the light of present-day conditions”6. It, therefore, rejected the originalist stance that rights
should be interpreted as originally intended by the drafters and favoured an expansive
interpretation of the human rights treaty. This interpretative tool allows the Court to consider
“the level of uniformity present in the legal frameworks of the member States” 7and expand
the scope of an Article according to the standards shared by most European states.
It was confirmed in Marckx v Belgium8 that a common practice shared amongst states,
also known as European consensus, would likely trump a singular State’s definition of an
acceptable standard of conduct. However, a consensus amongst European states might not be
3
Wemhoff v Germany App 2122/64 (ECHR, 27 June 1968)
4
Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451(70 (ECHR, 21 February 1975)
5
Tyrer v United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECHR, 15 March 1978)
6
Ibid, para 31
7
Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals, ‘Interpretative mechanisms of ECHR case-law: the concept
of European consensus’ < [Link] accessed 29 April 2021
8
Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECHR, 13 June 1979)
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determinative of the Court’s decision. This is because the living instrument doctrine conflicts
with the margin of appreciation the Court can afford to a State. For instance, in the A, B and
C v Ireland 9 case, it was held that regardless of most European states permitting abortion, the
moral values of most of the Irish people embedded the protection of unborn life. Therefore,
the Court decided to afford Ireland a wide margin of appreciation in this case.

The margin of appreciation is an interpretative mechanism created in 1969 by the

Strasbourg Court in the Greek10 case. It is based on the Court’s supervisory role as an
international court and the notion of subsidiarity. These principles are enshrined in Article 1
of the Convention. It states that the contracting States “shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms”11 contained in the Convention. Therefore, it conveys the
idea that States have the primary role of applying these rights. As the Court confirmed in
Handyside v United Kingdom12, its function is to supervise the application of these rights.
Hence, the Strasbourg Court has a subsidiary role. The Court explained in Ireland v United
Kingdom13 that the national authorities are better placed than the European Court to determine
the limitation of rights because “of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs
of the moment” 14. The notion that the State is a more suitable actor for assessing the interests
at stake sways the Court to often defer to a States’ judgment. Therefore, the Court’s
subsidiary principle conflicts with its function as a supervising international human rights
Court.

When evaluating a potential breach of an Article, the Court will assess if the
legislative choices underlying the measure justify it, rather than if less restrictive means could
have achieved the aim. That means that the Court will evaluate if the measures are
proportional to the circumstances. A notable example of the principle of proportionality in
operation is Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2)15. The case concerned an absolute ban on
prisoner voting in the U.K and whether that constituted a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No.

9
A, B and C v Ireland App no 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010)
10
Greek Case App no 3321/67 (Denmark v. Greece), 3322/67 (Norway v. Greece), 3323/67 (Sweden v.
Greece), 3344/67 (Netherlands v. Greece) (ECHR, 5 November 1969)
11
European Convention on Human Rights [1950], Article 1
12
Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976)
13
Ireland v United Kingdom App no 5310/71 (ECHR, 18 January 1978)
14
Ibid, para 207
15
Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) App no 74025/01 (ECHR, 6 October 2005)
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116, which guarantees the right to free elections. The Court interpreted the Article to grant
individual rights, including the right to vote, thereby expanding on the rights afforded by this
Article. The Strasbourg Court then ruled that the imposition of a blanket ban on prisoner
voting did not fall within the margin of appreciation because “an absolute bar on voting by
any serving prisoner”17 cannot be considered proportional. Nevertheless, the Court reassured
that this Article is still open to implied limitations. Ergo, the Court can still afford a margin of
appreciation to the States in other circumstances.

From this case, the European Court started to develop an expansive interpretation of
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to protect prisoners’ voting rights. In Frodl v Austria18, the Court
elaborated on this topic and stated that disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners should be
an exception and not the rule19. This expansion received substantial criticism: (i) due to the
significant decrease of the margin of appreciation given to states on prisoner voting 20; and (ii)
due to the European Court acting ‘illegally’ by imposing obligations that the States did not
agree to when signed the Convention21. Nonetheless, the Court confirmed this decision in
Greens and M.T v United Kingdom22 later that year. These cases marked a clear inclination of
the European Court towards an expansive interpretation of this Article, which is why
Scoppola v Italy (No. 3)23 came as an unexpected departure from previous judgments.

In the Scoppola24 case, the Court clarified its stance on prisoner disenfranchisement
under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 by ruling that the Italian law was within the margin of
appreciation afforded to the State 25. The basis for this shift was that the Italian restrictions

16
Council of Europe, ‘Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms’ (Council of Europe, 20 March 1952) <
[Link] > Accessed 8 May 2020
17
Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) App no 74025/01 (ECHR, 6 October 2005) para 51
18
Frodl v Austria App no 20201/04 (ECHR, 8 April 2010)
19
Ibid, para 35
20
Adam Wagner, ‘Prisoner votes and the democratic deficit’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 20 September 2011) <
[Link] > accessed 1 May 2021
21
Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ (Speech at the 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, 20 November 2013) <
[Link] > Accessed 12
May 2021
22
Greens and M.T v United Kingdom App no 60041/08 and 60054/08 (ECHR, 23 November 2010)
23
Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) App no 126/05 (ECHR, 22 May 2012)
24
Ibid.
25
Djurdja Lazic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber: Scoppola v Italy (No. 3)’ [2017]
Cambridge University Press
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were not general, automatic, and indiscriminate like the U.K restrictions, which were the
factors that underpinned the decision in Hirst (No. 2)26. However, as pointed out by Judge
David Thór Björgvinsson in his dissenting opinion 27, the Italian restrictions could be
considered harsher because they stripped prisoners of their right to vote even after their
release. Therefore, the distinction of both cases based on the harshness of the restrictions was
arguably subjective and a retreat from a landmark decision made on Hirst (No. 2)28. Some
commentators confirmed this view but stated that it was “no surrender” 29 of prisoners’ voting
rights.

Since this case, the European Court has found violations of Article 3 of Protocol No.
1 in Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia30, Söyler v Turkey31, Firth and Others v United
Kingdom32, McHugh and Others v United Kingdom 33 and Kulinski and Sabev v Bulgaria34.
These decisions showcase that there is no margin of appreciation for blanket bans on prisoner
voting. However, the Strasbourg Court has not clearly expressed its stance on the variety of
prisoner voting rights among the contracting states. Sixteen contracting states use an
intermediate approach between barely any form of voting restrictions and nearly a complete
ban on all convicted prisoners 35. There is a wide range of practices across Europe, and the
Court has only demonstrated willingness to expand Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on one type of
restriction. It can be inferred that the Court will likely give at least some margin of
appreciation to States if the restrictions are not affecting a group of people automatically,
generally, and indiscriminately. Although, some might subjectively consider these measures
to be disproportional and a violation of prisoners voting rights.

26
Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) App no 74025/01 (ECHR, 6 October 2005)
27
Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) App no 126/05 (ECHR, 22 May 2012)
28
Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) App no 74025/01 (ECHR, 6 October 2005)
29
Adam Wagner, ‘European Court of Human Rights retreats but doesn’t surrender on prisoner votes’ (UK
Human Rights Blog, 22 May 2012) < [Link]
rights-retreats-but-doesnt-surrender-on-prisoner-votes/ > accessed 1 May 2021
30
Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia App no 11157/04 and 15162/05 (ECHR, 4 July 2013)
31
Söyler v Turkey App no 29411/07 (ECHR, 17 September 2013)
32
Firth and Others v United Kingdom App no 47784/09, 47806/09, 47812/09, 47818/09, 47829/09, 49001/09,
49007/09, 49018/09, 49033/09 and 49036/09 (ECHR, 12 August 2014)
33
McHugh and Others v United Kingdom App no 51987/08 (ECHR, 10 February 2015)
34
Kulinski and Sabev v Bulgaria App no 63849/09 (ECHR, 21 July 2016)
35
Djurdja Lazic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber: Scoppola v Italy (No. 3)’ [2017]
Cambridge University Press
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The living instrument doctrine has become a crucial interpretative mechanism. It has
allowed for an incremental change through an evolving interpretation of the Convention from
the standards accepted by contemporary European society 36. Often, it is used to the detriment
of the margin of appreciation. As explained in Selmouni v France37, the Court “takes the view
that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human
rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in
assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies” 38. An example of this
is how the Court has used the living instrument to expand the scope of Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention. The Court has often interpreted these articles together to prevent the extradition
of illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers39. Additionally, in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy40,
the Court expanded the scope to protect refugees. Thus, reducing the States’ margin of
appreciation in these areas.

Article 241 guarantees everyone’s right to life and has been expanded to protect
individuals who could be subjected to the death penalty, which is a relatively recent
development. The Court has done this cautiously due to the uncertainty and lack of coherence
in applying this Article. In Al Nashiri v Poland42 the Court interpreted Article 2 to prohibit
“the extradition or deportation of an individual to another State where substantial grounds
have been shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk of being subjected to the
death penalty there”43. The Court then confirmed this judgment in F.G v Sweden44. However,
it has used Article 3 to prevent deportations at a much higher rate.

Article 345 prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment. In

Soering v United Kingdom46, the Court suggested for the first time that expulsion of an
36
George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, OUP 2007)
37
Selmouni v France App no 25803/94 (ECHR, 28 July 1999)
38
Ibid, para 101
39
European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human Rights-
Immigration’ (ECHR, 31 December 2020) <
[Link] > accessed 1 May 2020
40
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECHR, 23 February 2012)
41
European Convention on Human Rights [1950], Article 2
42
Al Nashiri v Poland App no 28761/11 (ECHR, 24 July 2014)
43
European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human Rights-
Right to Life’ (ECHR, 31 December 2020) page 19 <
[Link] > accessed 1 May 2020
44
F.G v Sweden App no 43611/11 (ECHR, 23 March 2016)
45
European Convention on Human Rights [1950], Article 3
46
Soering v United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECHR, 7 July 1989)
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asylum seeker could result in a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. In Cruz Varas v
Sweden implemented guidance on the assessment of the risk of ill-treatment and advanced
that the Court would rule on a violation of Article 3 if the deportation would expose an
individual “to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment on his return”
47
. Then, it was reiterated in Vilvarajah and Others v United Kingdom 48 that evidence of the
risk had to be substantial. However, it was only in Chahal v United Kingdom49 that the Court
finally held a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. This case established a strong
precedent for preventing the deportation of individuals if they would be subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 in the destination country. Since then, the European Court has
consistently ruled that the extradition of any illegal immigrant by a member State may give
rise to an issue under Articles 350.
Although most of these cases only found a violation of Article 3, the Court often
considers a potential breach of both articles, thus the judgments may well have a bearing on
the Court’s willingness to expand the protection of human rights through both articles.

Furthermore, the Court upheld in Saadi v Italy51 that Article 3 imposes an actual
obligation on States not to extradite individuals facing a risk of being subjected to torture,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment because States have a duty to take reasonable
and suitable measures to safeguard the rights of an individual 52. Therefore, this implies that
the State has a positive obligation to refrain from deporting an illegal immigrant if removing
them from the territory would risk their safety. However, a State has the right to control the
entry of illegal into its territory and their residence in its territory. Thus, although there is a
tension between the States’ rights and obligations, the European Court has still chosen to
create new positive obligations for States. This tendency has resulted in States’ concerns,
which will be addressed in the next paragraph.

47
Ibid, para 82
48
Vilvarajah and Others v United Kingdom App no 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87
(ECHR, 30 October 1991)
49
Chahal v United Kingdom App no 22414/93 (ECHR, 15 November 1996)
50
European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human Rights-
Immigration’ (ECHR, 31 December 2020) <
[Link] > accessed 1 May 2020
51
Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (ECHR, 28 February 2008)
52
Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights: A guide to the implementation of the
European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, 2007) Vol. 7
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So far, the Court has expressed willingness to interpret the Convention rights
creatively through the living instrument doctrine. The expansion of the Articles’ scope
reasserts the rights individuals are entitled to, and reiterates the obligations States have as
members of the Convention53. This duality creates a dilemma for the Court. On the one hand,
the expansive interpretation of rights does not correspond to what the member states
originally agreed to when they signed the Convention. However, on the other hand, it comes
as a necessary coping mechanism to allow the Convention to evolve and remain relevant.
Critics who prefer an originalist stance fail to account the lack of evidence that the
Convention drafters “intended to enshrine a specific interpretational approach” of Convention
rights54. The Convention has even granted the European Court interpretative authority under
Article 32 and binds the States to the Court’s judgment under Article 46(1). Nevertheless, this
evolutive approach has come with development at an increasingly rapid pace of new positive
obligations for States. Consequently, member states have expressed concerns that the Court is
not giving the margin of appreciation enough weight in the determination of cases before it 55,
which intensifies the tension between the Court’s subsidiary role and its supervisory function.

In order to address these concerns, the European Court has adopted Protocol No. 15,
which includes the principle of subsidiarity in Article 1 of the Convention. The Protocol calls
to include at the end of the preamble “Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the
rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so
they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights established by this Convention” 56. This change indicates that,
although the Court might have favoured the living instrument doctrine on the issues of
prisoner voting and preventing deportations, the Court should start favouring the margin of
appreciation on future cases as the Protocol is not yet entered into force.

53
George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, OUP 2007)
54
Stefan Theil, 'Is the Living Instrument Approach of the European Court of Human Rights Compatible with the
ECHR and International Law' [2017] 23(3) European Public Law 587, p. 592
55
Rachel Ita, ‘The margin of appreciation doctrine and the interpretation of the European Convention on Human
Rights as a living instrument’ (DPhil thesis, University of Derby 2018)
56
European Convention on Human Rights, ‘Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (ECHR, 24 June 2013) <
[Link] > Accessed 8 May 2020
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In conclusion, this paper has argued that it agrees with the statement that the
European Court has favoured the living instrument doctrine over the margin of appreciation
on issues such as prisoner voting and preventing deportations. Although, it finds that the
Court has expanded the interpretation of rights modestly. The European Court still affords a
margin of appreciation to States if the prisoner voting restrictions do not constitute blanket
bans. In order to prevent deportations, the Court has generously expanded Article 3 of the
Convention but has been more cautious with Article 2. As a final thought, although the living
instrument doctrine has been favoured in previous cases, we can expect a shift to the margin
of appreciation after Protocol No. 15 enters into force.
Word Count: 2749

Methodology:

I started this paper by researching the living instrument doctrine and the margin of
appreciation. I wanted to develop a deeper and better understanding of how the doctrines
operate, their historical background and their current influence. I decided to read Letsas's
book, once it contained a comprehensive account of both doctrines and how they developed
until the early 2000s. I then attempted to complement my knowledge with journal articles on
the topic.
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Secondly, I examined the guidance the European Court of Human Rights provides for cases
concerning prisoner voting and preventing deportation. It was essential to examine how these
areas have developed through case law. Moreover, I decided to read the cases the guides cited
to comprehend the Court's reasoning, judgments, and dissenting opinions. I took the initiative
to research through the European Court of Human Rights' database other cases the Court had
decided on these topics to draw my own understanding of how the Court has developed these
areas of law.

Thirdly, I researched different opinions through journal articles, websites and blogs about the
most important judgements concerning prisoner voting and preventing deportation, and on
the cases, the Court has developed the doctrines. The U.K Human Rights Blog revealed to be
an excellent source as it provided a different perspective on the cases I read and the
implications they would have to the European States and the United Kingdom, in specific.
Word count: 232

Bibliography:

Table of Cases

A, B and C v Ireland App no 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010)

Al Nashiri v Poland App no 28761/11 (ECHR, 24 July 2014)

Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia App no 11157/04 and 15162/05 (ECHR, 4 July 2013)
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Chahal v United Kingdom App no 22414/93 (ECHR, 15 November 1996)

Cruz Varas v Sweden App no 15576/89 (ECHR, 20 March 1991)

Firth and Others v United Kingdom App no 47784/09, 47806/09, 47812/09, 47818/09,
47829/09, 49001/09, 49007/09, 49018/09, 49033/09 and 49036/09 (ECHR, 12 August 2014)

F.G v Sweden App no 43611/11 (ECHR, 23 March 2016)

Frodl v Austria App no 20201/04 (ECHR, 8 April 2010)

Greek Case App no 3321/67 (Denmark v. Greece), 3322/67 (Norway v. Greece), 3323/67
(Sweden v. Greece), 3344/67 (Netherlands v. Greece) (ECHR, 5 November 1969)

Greens and M.T v United Kingdom App no 60041/08 and 60054/08 (ECHR, 23 November
2010)

Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451(70 (ECHR, 21 February 1975)

Handyside v United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976)

Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECHR, 23 February 2012)

Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2) App no 74025/01 (ECHR, 6 October 2005)

Ireland v United Kingdom App no 5310/71 (ECHR, 18 January 1978)

Kulinski and Sabev v Bulgaria App no 63849/09 (ECHR, 21 July 2016)

Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECHR, 13 June 1979)

McHugh and Others v United Kingdom App no 51987/08 (ECHR, 10 February 2015)

Saadi v Italy App no 37201/06 (ECHR, 28 February 2008)

Scoppola v Italy (No. 3) App no 126/05 (ECHR, 22 May 2012)

Selmouni v France App no 25803/94 (ECHR, 28 July 1999)

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Soering v United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECHR, 7 July 1989)

Söyler v Turkey App no 29411/07 (ECHR, 17 September 2013)

Tyrer v United Kingdom App no 5856/72 (ECHR, 15 March 1978)

Vilvarajah and Others v United Kingdom App no 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87,
13448/87 (ECHR, 30 October 1991)

Wemhoff v Germany App 2122/64 (ECHR, 27 June 1968)

Table of Statutes
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) [1950]

Books
George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st
edn, OUP 2007)

Online Journals
Djurdja Lazic, ‘The European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber: Scoppola v Italy (No.
3)’ [2017] Cambridge University Press

Lawrence R. Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights’
[1993] 26(1) Cornell International Law Journal

Stefan Theil, 'Is the Living Instrument Approach of the European Court of Human Rights
Compatible with the ECHR and International Law' [2017] 23(3) European Public Law 587

Encyclopedias
Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights: A guide to the
implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, 2007) Vol. 7

Thesis
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Rachel Ita, ‘The margin of appreciation doctrine and the interpretation of the European
Convention on Human Rights as a living instrument’ (DPhil thesis, University of Derby
2018)

European Court of Human Rights Guidance

Council of Europe, ‘Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (Council of Europe, 20 March 1952) <
[Link] > Accessed 8 May 2021

European Convention on Human Rights, ‘Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (ECHR, 24 June 2013) <
[Link] > Accessed 8 May 2021

European Court of Human Rights, ‘Factsheet- Prisoners’ right to vote’ (ECHR, April 2019) <
[Link] > accessed 1 May 2021

European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on
Human Rights- Immigration’ (ECHR, 31 December 2020) <
[Link] > accessed 1 May 2021

European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on
Human Rights- Right to Life’ (ECHR, 31 December 2020) page 19 <
[Link] > accessed 1 May 2021

Speeches
Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ (Speech at the 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, 20
November 2013) < [Link]
[Link] > Accessed 12 May 2021

Websites and Blogs

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Adam Wagner, ‘European Court of Human Rights retreats but doesn’t surrender on prisoner
votes’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 22 May 2012) <
[Link]
doesnt-surrender-on-prisoner-votes/ > accessed 1 May 2021

Adam Wagner, ‘Prisoner votes and the democratic deficit’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 20
September 2011) < [Link]
democratic-deficit/ > accessed 1 May 2021

Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals, ‘Interpretative mechanisms of ECHR case-
law: the concept of European consensus’ (HELP, no date) <
[Link] accessed 29 April 2021

Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, ‘Positive obligations under the European Convention on

Human Rights- A guide to the implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (Council of Europe, January 2007) < [Link] > accessed 1 May
2021