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Lying: Thoughts of an applied social psychologist
Article in American Psychologist · April 1991
DOI: 10.1037/0003-066X.46.4.409
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American Psychologist © 1991 by the American Psychological Association
April 1991 Vol. 46, No. 4, 409-415 For personal use only--not for distribution.
Lying
Thoughts of an Applied Social Psychologist
Leonard Saxe
Brandeis University
ABSTRACT
Lies are considered bad, immoral, and reprehensible. Yet there is considerable evidence that
prevarication is a ubiquitous feature of human social interaction. Psychologists, as well as
others in society, often use deceptive techniques for the "social good," and there are a
number of conditions under which lying is seen as acceptable. There are also numerous
situations in which the "truth" cannot be discerned. This article argues that a psychology of
lying needs to be developed that is focused on understanding how actors and observers
come to view the world and particular situations, rather than on the detection and
punishment of lying.
This article was originally presented as a Distinguished Contributions to Psychology in the Public
Interest award address at the 98th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association in
Boston in August 1990. Author's note. Appreciation is expressed to Marion Gardner-Saxe, Aleza
Greene, Gretchen Lovas, Gila Shusterman, Judith Gardner, and Theodore Cross, who provided
comments on an earlier draft.
Correspondence may be addressed to Leonard Saxe, Heller School, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA,
02254.
Electronic mail may be sent to saxe@[Link]
In 1986, I was privy to a drama staged by the producers of CBS TV's news program, "60 Minutes," that
investigated the controversial use of polygraph tests by private employers. My initiation into the lie
detector conflagration was the unintended outcome of an assignment from the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment to examine the validity of polygraph tests ( Saxe, Dougherty, & Cross, 1985 ).
The "60 Minutes" staff sought my help as they designed a demonstration of the use of polygraph tests.
What resulted was an elaborate deception experiment that would have been the envy of 1960s social
psychologists.
Using CBS-owned Popular Photography magazine as a front, "60 Minutes" hired several polygraphers
to identify the culprit in an alleged theft. The design was quite sophisticated: CBS randomly selected
four polygraph examiners from the telephone directory and had each polygrapher examine four
employee suspects. The polygraphers were initially contacted by a manager at the magazine, who told
them that more than $500 of camera equipment had been stolen, almost definitely by someone on the
inside. The polygraphers did not know that other examiners had been engaged, and they conducted their
examinations in a Popular Photography office. Unbeknownst to them, the office had been modified to
enable surreptitious filming. When the polygraphers arrived onscene, each was told that although all of
the suspects had access to the camera, one of the four was probably the guilty party. A different person
was "fingered" for each polygrapher.
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Not surprising to polygraph critics, each examiner found the person who had been fingered to be
deceptive, and each examiner tried mightily to get the guilty person to confess. No one, of course, had
stolen anything. The four employees were confederates, paid $50 if they could convince the polygrapher
of their innocence. With dramatic flair, CBS demonstrated that polygraphers do not necessarily use
psychophysiological information to make their diagnoses of deception.
The demonstration was very clever, but dishonest: CBS lied to the polygraphers. The four polygraphers
unwittingly starred in a television drama viewed by millions. The "60 Minutes" staff were gleeful at the
success of the deception and the clarity of the outcome of the demonstration; no doubt, polygraphy
critics were also pleased. The "60 Minutes" demonstration would have been virtually impossible to
conduct in the post-Milgram era of ethically sensitive psychology; yet, it is hard to think of a way to do
this study without deception. Informing the polygraphers that they were research subjects would have
made it a different study.
Ubiquity of Lying
Each of us has been socialized to believe that lying is bad. We are taught, and teach our children, that
lying is immoral, reprehensible, and the mark of an immature person (see Ford, King, & Hollender,
1988 ; see also, Goldberg, 1973 ). Such views have a long tradition in religious and philosophical
thought ( Bok, 1978 ). From St. Augustine to Kant, lying has been viewed as "sinful" and as denying our
human dignity. Yet, just as parents may lie to their children even while in the act of telling them not to
lie (e.g., describing sanctions for lying that they have no intention of using), there are a plethora of
occasions when it is socially acceptable to lie.
Many situations in which lying may be acceptable, such as CBS's use of deceit or the use of deception in
psychological research (cf. Aronson, Brewer & Carlsmith, 1985 ), do not involve complex assessments.
Nor do they involve situations as dramatic as the classic religious-philosophical problem of lying to
preserve life. Perhaps philosopher Kant would argue against a person lying to the Gestapo about the
presence of a Jew in his or her home, but most of us would not ( Bok, 1978 ).
One does not need to focus on extreme instances to find situations in which lying might be excused. The
Bible is replete with examples of heroes lying when it enabled them to teach an important lesson or
preserve harmony. Contemporary life is full of mundane examples in which deception is acceptable.
From the parent who gives a child false reassurances about his or her own health to the suitor who
makes false promises or proclamations of love or is falsely complimentary, intentionally inaccurate
statements are not far from our everyday experiences. The state of revelations in recent years about
deceptive behavior of our political leaders (e.g., Caro, 1989 ) should not be surprising given our
interpersonal proclivities. One would have to be a social isolate never to be either the perpetrator or
recipient of a deception.
The Persian Gulf crisis has exposed us daily not only to the dangers of a world war but to charges and
countercharges of lying. President Bush and Iraq's Saddam Hussein cannot both be correct about
whether Kuwait was invaded or had invited Iraq to help deal with unrest. Hussein, from our perspective,
may be the contemporary incarnation of Adolf Hitler, who in Mein Kampf told the world how he would
use lies to carry out policy. Yet, Hussein's own supporters maintain just as vigorously that he is merely
trying to protect his nation, as well as Palestinians.
That lies are all around us does not mean that we accept lying. To the contrary, the insidious nature of
lying seems all too apparent. We are barraged, almost daily, by reports of yet another public figure who
has been charged with some form of malfeasance or convicted of a criminal activity. In virtually all
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cases, these individuals deny the allegations. From political figures such as Mayor Barry of Washington
(convicted of drug possession), to military officers such as Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter (both
convicted of lying to Congress), to sports heroes including runner Ben Johnson (found to have illegally
used steroids, despite his denials) and baseball player Pete Rose (convicted of tax evasion connected
with gambling), lying is rife.
Recent history has not spared even religious leaders from involvement in scandal and deceit. From the
Reverend Jim Bakker, convicted of fraud, to Reverend Jimmy Swaggert, found to have engaged
prostitutes while prosletizing against the evils of sex, examples of destructive deceptiveness abound. In
the business sector, where truth may be a valuable commodity but is not a central tenet, consternation
remains, nevertheless, over the dishonest behavior of those who have abused the financial system. Little
did we know that the insider stock trading scandals and the prosecution of leading Wall Street figures
would be over-shadowed by the dishonesty that appears to be at the core of the savings and loan
debacle.
Although discussion of public figures found to have lied makes it appear that deceitfulness is a disease
that afflicts solely the rich and powerful, the correlation is spurious. In some cases, public figures are
famous because of their lies; in other cases, their renown obscures the universality of deceptiveness.
From individuals who lie to a partner about their other intimate relationships, to students (and
professors) who create excuses for late papers, to salesmen and lawyers for whom deceptiveness can be
a normatively sanctioned aspect of their daily work life, the lack of truthfulness is too common to be
restricted to those who make headlines.
Although college students are not typical members of society, there is no reason to believe that they are
any less honest than others. Nevertheless, with frightening regularity, surveys indicate yet another
dramatic increase in cheating by students. This year, news reports of surveys indicated that between one
third and two thirds of college students cheat, and that a similar percentage of high school students
engage in cheating (American Council on Education, cited in Collison, 1990a ; Moffatt, cited in
Collision, 1990b ). Another study indicated that 60% of the faculty at a midwestern state university
observed cheating ( Jendrek, 1989 ).
If the hypothesis about the universality of lying is correct, something pernicious has occurred; along
with other social problems, we have defiled our interpersonal relationships. Paradoxically, this seems to
have become a society in which lying is endemic, but in which a Victorianlike attitude is also
maintained that heavily sanctions those who are caught in prevarication.
Role of Psychology
The role of psychology in dealing with this fundamental aspect of human behavior is curious. For the
most part, psychologists have ignored lying. Researchers have viewed it either as a stable trait or,
alternatively, as a situationally dependent behavior whose traces can be detected. Hartshorne and May's
(1928) classic Character Education Inquiry with children set the pattern for much later work. Their
initial interest was in discerning characteristics of honesty. What they found, however, was that honesty
is not greatly dependent on any general trait. Honesty in children, according to Hartshorne and May's
research, was tied closely to features of the situation. Although recently there has been criticism of
Hartshorne and May (see Ekman, 1989 ), much of the criticism (e.g., that they made it "too easy" to
cheat) only reinforces a social situational explanation.
The most significant body of scientific psychological work on lying has been on methods to detect
deceptiveness, using nonverbal behavior (see, e.g., DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985 ; Ekman, 1985 )
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and psychophysiological data ( Lykken, 1981 ; Saxe et al., 1985 ) and by attitude and personality testing
(see O'Bannon, Goldinger, & Appleby, 1989 ; Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, 1989 ; Sackett & Harris,
1984 ). Although some of this work, particularly the nonverbal studies, has important theoretical
implications, lie detection has been the central and controversial focus of most recent attention to lying.
It is ironic that in Bok's (1978) influential philosophical work on lying, virtually the only references to
psychological research are the ethical implications of conducting deceptive social science research.
Bok's decision to exclude discussion of psychological research was probably reasonable, given the little
that is known about the characteristics of liars and the nature of lying.
Lie Detection
The incentives for psychologists to develop lie detection technologies make it almost irresistible.
Dishonest employees are said to cost American businesses tens of millions of dollars a year, and the
government fears that the stability of the Western world is dependent upon its ability to ensure that
secrets remain so (e.g., Department of Defense Security Review Commission, 1985 ). Instrumental
reasons aside, the idea of a reliable lie detection test suggests that perfection of human beings and an
underlying justness to life. As physician Lewis Thomas (1983) once mused, "[what] extraordinarily
good news, ...that we are biologically designed to be truthful to one another...a human being cannot tell
lie...without setting off a kind of smoke alarm somewhere deep in a dark lobule of the brain" (p. 128).
Unfortunately, both for those in psychology who have visions of profiting from the ability to detect
human prevarication and for those who would appreciate the aesthetics of a lie detector, no such device
now exists ( Furedy & Helsegrave, in press ; Lykken, 1990 ). Furthermore, development of a generally
applicable and infallible lie detection technology is probably a fantasy with more latent content than
manifest potential to detect deception. Individuals have too many options available to encode their
thoughts for us to be able to probe what they choose to hide. Although consistencies in human behavior
can be measured, the "trait" of honesty seems so embedded in situational contexts (cf. Mischel, 1984 )
that the possibility of measurement appears limited.
Currently popular methods of lie detection-polygraph tests and paper-and-pencil honesty tests-are
technologies that have the appearance of meeting the demand for reliable predictive tools. Although the
problems inherent in polygraph and honesty testing are somewhat different, both are based on a flawed
and incomplete understanding of the nature of lies. Because much of what psychology knows about
lying comes from the study of means to detect lies, understanding the defects underlying polygraphy and
honesty testing is essential.
Polygraph Tests
The premise of a polygraph test is that when individuals attempt deception, autonomic nervous system
arousal results ( Lykken, 1981 , 1984 ; Saxe, 1985 ; Saxe et al., 1985 ). The most popular and accepted
form of polygraph testing is the Control Question Test (CQT), which attempts to control for arousal that
may be generated by sources other than lying. Such control is, however, ephemeral, and some (e.g.,
Furedy, 1990 ) regard the procedure as pseudoscientific. The CQT has the trappings of a systematic
comparison, but it is based on the untenable assumption that autonomic activity resulting from
deceptiveness can be distinguished from other bases of arousal.
Although there are substantial data on the validity of polygraph tests, severe methodological limitations
affect generalizations from much of this work (see Saxe et al., 1985 ), and only a small group of studies
are helpful in predicting accuracy ( Brett, Phillips, & Beary, 1986 ). The methodological problems are
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inherent in the nature of lie detection and are not easily resolved. Knowing the "truth" in an actual
situation is often not possible, and so objective studies of polygraph testing must be done in artificial
situations.
The intricate and somewhat arcane dispute about the merits of particular polygraph studies aside,
polygraph tests are mislabeled. The construct allegedly tested is deception, but the construct actually
measured is autonomic arousal. Deceptiveness may be correlated with arousal, and in some cases,
alternative explanations for arousal can be ruled out; nevertheless, arousal is not equivalent to deception.
It seems inappropriate to infer that we have measured deception when we have merely measured
arousal.
It is likely that the cause of arousal, if it is exhibited by deceptive subjects, is fear of detection ( Saxe,
1985 ). If one believes that an examiner can detect attempts to be dishonest, that may make one fearful
and anxious. Conversely, if one is responding honestly and believes that the test will establish one's
veracity, no fear or anxiety may be present. In an experiment by Saxe, Schmitz, and Zaichkowsky
(1987) , conducted to test this hypothesis, subjects had the option of taking some money from a desk
drawer, with the promise that they could retain the money if they could pass a polygraph test. Subjects
were told that a new type of computer polygraph was being tested. In one condition, the test was
described accurately in terms of the authors' doubts about its validity; in another condition, the standard
polygrapher's injunction about the test's infallibility was given. Subjects also had the test demonstrated,
except that the demonstration failed in the condition in which they were told of the problems with the
polygraph.
The results were clear-cut. When subjects believed in the efficacy of the test, detection rates were
obtained that were similar to those found by other analogue researchers (see Table 1 ). We were able to
detect most of the guilty subjects, although at the expense of misidentifying innocent subjects. When
subjects did not believe in the efficacy of the procedure, however, none of the guilty subjects were
detected and errors were again made in misidentifying innocent subjects as guilty.
Honesty Tests
At least on the surface, paper-and-pencil honesty tests represent a wholly different set of issues (see
O'Bannon et al., 1989 ; U. S. Congress, 1990 ). The tests are widely used, even more so now that
polygraph tests of employees have been severely curtailed. As personality and attitudinal measures, their
foundation is psychometric evaluation. Unlike polygraph tests, they are standardized instruments that
not subject to the kinds of interpretive errors that plagued the "60 Minutes" polygraphers. Nevertheless,
they are nearly as controversial, as both the Congressional study and a forthcoming American
Psychological Association (APA) task force report indicate.
The problem with honesty tests seems to be that, like polygraph tests, they are mislabeled. The construct
actually measured (in overt tests) is attitudes toward theft or self-reported illicit activities, and it is a
substantial leap of faith to label such responses as probative of their future honesty or dishonesty. The
link between attitudes and behavior is complex; for example, individuals who reveal that they believe it
is acceptable to take office supplies home may not be a poor risk on the job. Conversely, an individual
who does not admit to drug or alcohol use may, in fact, be a poor risk.
Researchers on paper-and-pencil honesty tests face the same fundamental problem as polygraph
researchers: One can never be sure of the criterion, because lies by definition are maintained as secrets.
In addition, although substantial predictive validity research has been conducted on these tests (see
O'Bannon et al., 1989 ; Sackett et al., 1989 ; U.S. Congress, 1990 ), much of it is proprietary and very
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little of it involves prospective control. In fact, even if one were to conduct a true experiment in which
one assigned employees on the basis of their honesty test scores, it would be inadequate because one's
dependent variables are limited. Losses would have to be detected and subjects caught for the test to be
properly validated.
Not To Despair
Although the failure of lie detection technologies implies that psychologists' abilities are somewhat more
limited than has been claimed, there is no need for despondency. To the contrary, it suggests an
important area for inquiry: the conditions that compel individuals to lie or tell the truth. This conclusion
is not much different from that of earlier researchers and theorists including Hartshorne and May
(1928) , as well as Bok (1978 ). It implies that one take seriously the ubiquity of lying and the strength
of its situational determinants. In several recent studies, we have tried to examine some of the situational
factors associated with dishonesty.
Lying in Relationships
In one study, inspired by a popular film depicting marital infidelity, Shusterman and Saxe (1990) sought
out more than 50 undergraduate students who were involved in relationships and asked them whether
they had ever lied to their partners. More than 85% reported that they had lied (see Table 2 ). What did
they lie about? Not surprisingly, almost all had been deceptive about another relationship. Particularly
interesting was that almost all of the subjects excused their deceit by saying that they told the lie to
protect their partners. Each of us has ways of justifying lies, and in part, the behavior results from seeing
the world in a way that makes the behavior acceptable.
Lying to Teachers
In another study-this one inspired by experience as both a student and teacher- Greene and Saxe (1990)
investigated students' excuses. A role-playing experiment was conducted in which students had to talk
with a professor to gain an extension on an assignment. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six
conditions, in which the value of the paper (15% or 75% of the grade) and the reason for being late
(hangover, too much work, sick with the flue) were systematically varied. What Greene and Saxe found
was that when the paper was critical to the course grade and they had an illegitimate reason (e.g., could
not work because of a hangover), virtually all of the students lied (see Table 3 ). The study had
substantial experimental realism-students were engaged and many were genuinely upset. In the few
cases in which there was pressure, but subjects did not lie, in debriefing they reported that they could
have "kicked themselves" for not lying.
Perhaps this study explains why deceitful practices are so common and confirms the powerful role of the
situation in encouraging dishonest behavior. It would be self-destructive to admit failure in completing
an assignment, and students are very creative in providing alternative explanations for their behavior. In
developing this study, Greene and Saxe (1990) had originally intended to also use faculty as subjects
and try to determine how convinced they were by the explanations and how they would have reacted.
Unfortunately, the authors could not overcome the inherent ethical problem of using faculty and running
the risk that they would later teach subjects who were in the study. One prediction was that truthful
explanations would not be believed-we faculty would think it too weird were a student to offer a socially
unacceptable excuse.
These findings are also consistent with the long tradition of cognitive dissonance research in social
psychology. That dissonance experiments produce powerful effects, using relatively trivial situations,
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attests to individuals' rationalizing abilities (cf. Aronson, 1988 ). It is not at all surprising that when it
really matters and the penalty for being honest is severe, individuals can develop cognitions that allow
them to be deceptive. In fact, it would be surprising if this were not the case.
Alternatives
How, then, does one create a social environment in which individuals will be encouraged to tell the
truth? If one encourages honesty by diminshing penalties for honesty (about socially sanctioned
behavior), would that lead to further dishonesty? An example from a recent incident illustrates at least
one possibility.
The president of American University, Richard Berendzen, was recently accused of placing obscene
phone calls from his university office. The accusation, at first, seemed bizarre. That one of the most
successful and articulate leaders in higher education should be engaged in such depraved behavior did
not make sense. Berendzen was, apparently, caught red-handed and shortly thereafter became an
inpatient in a psychiatric hospital. He later pleaded guilty to making the obscene calls. Berendzen, in an
interview after his release from the hospital, suggested that he was able to be truthful about the incident
because his psychiatric disorder was an acceptable explanation for his behavior. As his psychiatrist
noted, "We concluded that Dr. Berendzen is a patient, and...these telephone calls, are symptoms of [that]
patienthood" (cited in Koppel, 1990 ).
Contrast Berendzen's behavior with that of individuals convicted of criminal offenses who, after their
trials, continue to deny the charges. Although there are, no doubt, individuals who are wrongly
convicted, the penalties are such that there is overwhelming pressure to lie. We do not make it easy for
those caught in illegal actions to be honest (a psychiatric defense is untenable for most). But that is only
part of the problem, and developing a more enlightened view of penalties is only a partial solution.
Scientific Fraud
Unfortunately, most individuals accused of criminal acts do not admit guilt as readily as did Berendzen,
and definitive evidence is usually not available. There is an ambiguity to most lies that makes their
detection, as well as their understanding, difficult. Uncomfortable as it may be, there is often no
objective way to identify the truth. The analysis, thus far, has focused on the situation and how it
influences a person to either engage in prevarication or not. But the liar's perspective is only one part of
the equation. Our perceptions as observers are also essential to an understanding of prevarication.
Thus, for example, as much as it may strain credulity, Iraq's Saddam Hussein may actually believe that
he liberated Kuwait and that its citizens welcomed his takeover. Given the rapid way in which
perceptions of the world change-President Reagan's "evil empire" (the Soviet Union) of just a few years
ago has now become our peace-loving ally-such a view is conceivable. Assuming that others see the
world in the same way that we do denies much of what we understand about human cognition and
motivation. It also hinders our effectiveness in dealing with despicable behavior.
To bring this discussion closer to home, consider the charges of fraud and dishonesty leveled against
Professor Cyril Burt, one of the central figures in psychology's attempt to understand intelligence. The
charges, that he had manufactured data and even coauthors, surfaced in the mid-1970s, several years
after his death. They have been widely accepted (see Hearnshaw, 1979 ; Joynson, 1989 ) and officially
acknowledged by the British Psychological Society. Yet (without accepting or rejecting the charges), it
turns out that there is another side to the story.
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As described in a recent book-length analysis of the Burt affair by Joynson (1989) , a host of benign
explanations can be provided for the various discrepancies in his data and the authorship of his papers.
According to Joynson, critics applied present-day standards to research done 50 or more years ago;
placed in context, Burt's errors are explainable. Joynson's analysis is complex, but in addition to
presenting evidence that the errors are less dramatic than other have claimed, he also noted the political
and social factors that led to acceptance, and later rejection, of Burt.
As part of recent revisionary assessments of the historical record, a curious but perhaps telling paradox
has been noted: If Burt intended to deceive (falsely claiming the heritability of intelligence), would he
not have invented data that at least had the appearance of correct data? That he reported data with
similar correlations is, according to some, evidence that he is likely innocent of having deceptively
reported data. It is impossible now to establish whether Burt intended to deceive us, but this may be less
important than whether his ideas stand the scrutiny of further research (see, e.g., Bouchard, Lykken &
McGue, 1990 ).
Conclusions
The need to encourage honesty is clearly pressing. Ways to reinforce honesty need to be found, perhaps
even for individuals who have done despicable deeds. Society cannot function well with the massive
dishonesty now evident, and increasing the penalties for dishonest behavior may only serve to create
additional deception. The effects of rampant dishonesty, from a lack of confidence in governmental
leaders to mistrust among colleagues and friends, can only have a corrosive impact on our public and
private lives.
Along with encouraging honesty, however, the present social psychological analysis also suggests that
there is a need to foster a more sophisticated view of honesty and dishonesty. The line between a lie and
the truth is just not as clear-cut as parents and public ways of dealing with dishonesty would have it.
This is not a call for wholesale application of relativism, and it is certainly not a recommendation to
excuse dishonesty. The argument is that we need to understand how actors and observers may differ and
to acknowledge that psychological insight requires understanding of how others think.
A kind of hysteria about dishonesty seems to have permeated our culture. Perhaps stimulated by
pervasive mendacity, we are quick to call others liars and frauds. From spousal arguments to disputes
with colleagues, we feel unrestrained in alleging dishonesty-it seems to be an accepted way of dealing
with our differential perceptions of the world. Yet, even when the evidence is clear and persuasive (as in
the case of Burt), it may not be so-or, at least, there are alternative perceptions. Our understanding of
lying needs to encompass the fact that actors and observers may differ in their view of the situation.
Even if an objective observer can discern a lie, understanding the lie from the perspective of the
miscreant (i.e., the situation from his or her vantage point) may be essential in order to deal with it.
Although the present emphasis on the understanding of honesty and dishonesty, rather than its detection
and punishment is, perhaps, controversial, both types of response play an important role in social
interaction. Lies (small and large) may not only create social friction ( Aronson & Metee, 1968 ), but
may also serve as a kind of social lubricant. They enable individuals to hold strong beliefs and to
interpret situations in a way that makes sense to them. An individual obsessed with being totally honest,
might, in fact, become a social isolate. From the time one wakes in the morning and responds to
questions about how one feels, to our relationships with colleagues and friends, complete honesty could
make relationships tedious, if not conflict laden.
Perhaps the initial illustration of CBS's deception in the service of investigative reporting exemplifies
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the important role that deceit may play. In the case of deception research (including the "60 Minutes"
report), lying enables one to conduct high-impact research that potentially serves the public good. No
doubt, it can be deleterious, but such impact is well-known (cf. Bok, 1978 ). There are a host of
situations in which deception may play a role. Taylor (1990) , for example, in her recent work on the
role of illusions suggested that one's health may be dependent on having positive-even if incorrect-views
of the cause of one's illness or the prognosis.
As socially and ethically problematic as these instances of deception may be, that does not deny their
importance. Just as I doubt that we have the capacity to develop a useful lie detector, I doubt that we
would want to develop techniques that would make it impossible for individuals to engage in deception.
To live in a world in which individuals had to share the same interpretation of the world would be to live
in a society in which creativity and individualism were repressed. Although our current prevarication-
filled society has serious problems, identifying liars and insisting on complete honesty is not the
solution.
Instead, a balance needs to be struck. Not only is there a need to create the conditions for honesty, but it
must be recognized that honesty is a perception held by both actors and observers. Psychologists need to
restrain their urge to identify liars and, instead, help society to understand the meaning of honesty and
the conditions under which individuals behave honestly and dishonesty. The psychology of honesty
needs to be elevated from a measurement problem to that of a central focus of our efforts to understand
human behavior.
In Shakespeare's Henry IV, when the Prince tells Falstaff that he saw him dead, Falstaff says "Lord,
Lord, how this world is given to lying." Would that psychologists could contribute to understanding the
phenomenon as beautifully as Shakespeare captured its ubiquity.
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