Masterthesis:

‘How The New York Times covers the war

against Islamic State (ISIL)’

MA Journalism and Media

Supervisor: Dr. Peter Vasterman
Student: Mathieu Peulen (6134688)

Uiterwaardenstraat 85-3
1079 BT Amsterdam
mpeulen@[Link]
0657598834

1
Introduction

‘The first casualty when war comes, is truth’, wrote American senator Hiram Johnson in
1917, commenting on the widespread censorship used by western media on their coverage
of WW1.1 He did not know however, that, 100 years later, his words would still contain
undeniable truth. Throughout the decades, journalism during wartime has been a
problematic phenomenon. Journalistic ethics often seem to evaporate and deeply rooted
patriotic sentiments suddenly come to the fore.
When one flicks through a western newspaper, and reaches the international affairs
section, there is a fair chance it will be dominated by a terrorist group called ISIL, or ISIS. Its
militants are a hot topic nowadays. Or even hotter: the war against ISIL to ‘degrade and
destroy’ the group, to use the words of American President Obama. It’s easy to find reports
on the cruelty of ISIL, but much harder to find reports of the dark side effects of the war, like
the ever expanding civilian casualties.
Our current knowledge of war coverage of ISIL though, is based on impressions and
assumptions. There is an urgent need of an academic study of this hypermodern
phenomenon, and I would like to commit myself to take up this challenge. In my
Masterthesis I will focus on the coverage of the war against ISIL, no research of western
media in general, but a very specific study of one major news outlet, in order to be able to
closely examine the dynamics, practices, framing technics and developments of one
particular news media. I have chosen for one of the world’s most leading and prominent
newspapers, The New York Times.
One of the main reasons why this could be a very interesting study is the major trauma
suffered from the last war in Iraq (2003-2011). It compelled and even horrified many
American journalists. Although initial support seemed overwhelming, as the war plodded
on, many reporters felt betrayed by their leaders. No weapons of mass destruction had been
found, casualties were going through the roof and there was no real prospect of victory or
stability in the Middle East. Many renowned journalists even expressed remorse for their
complete lack of courage to challenge Bush’ disputable war motives and regretted their
jingoistic coverage, among them many renowned Times reporters, like Judith Miller.
The hypothesis of my study is that Times reporters, considering the huge Iraq trauma, will
be very wary and skeptical of any new military involvement in Iraq. At a certain point
though, I assume, their attitude transformed into pro-interventionist. I expect this turning
point to be the decapitations of two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, in
the summer of 2014, as the outrage in American society surrounding these events was
tremendous. I will elaborate on this societal turmoil later on.
But first, I will examine how journalism during and prior to major wars has evolved, in a
period stretching over a century, to explore parallels in framing technics, changing attitudes,
societal dynamics, journalistic dynamics, changing ethics and patriotic sentiments etc.
Considering I will analyze The New York Times in my case-study, there wil be a strong
emphasis on media coverage in the United States. The wars featured in my theoretical
framework are: First World War (1914-1918), Second World War (1939-1945), Vietnam
War (1964-1973) Gulf War (1990-1991) ,until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-
2011). Consecutively, I will explore to what extent the findings of my theoretical framework
apply to my case study. In the Methodology section (22-23) I will further elaborate on this
practice. Also my research strategy, focus points etc. can be found in this section.

1 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 16

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Theoretical Framework
Not only in the heat of warfare, well before the first shots being fired, dissimulation settles
in. War is no un-forecasted hurricane, it is a well planned horror. War starts in the minds of
men. Organized violence requires planning: mobilizing civilians psychologically. This is the
phase when political leaders urgently need media organizations. Never would leaders
attempt to mobilize the masses by stating their wars are driven by greed, land grabbing,
imperial pride or expropriating resources. Instead they will frame their ‘cause’ as defensive,
just or even inevitable. In essence, in their eyes every war is just and victory therefore is
certain. 2
History teaches us that journalists often become fervent, ardent advocates of military
invasions, rather than peaceful solutions to conflicts, writes Carruthers. Moreover, they
often support the justifications for armed conflict offered by political leaders. In retrospect,
there are very few examples of prominent newspapers, radio or television companies
endorsing fierce anti-war positions during wartime. Instead of continuously questioning the
war-motives of the aggressor, media organizations have always played an important role in
the process of rallying opinion for war. 3
Considering the fact that in western democracies the ethos of the press is to function as a
watchdog of the truth and to check and reveal abuses of power, this is a painful reality.
However, if we look at reporting prior to the war, we see a more balanced image. As political
scientist William Dorman’s words illustrate: ‘the only meaningful time to debate the need
for war is before one begins’.4

The First World War (1914-1918) ‘The ‘Hunt the Huns’ War’
In July 1914, just a month before the outbreak of WW1, there was little enthusiasm for a
military conflict on mainland Europe, quite the contrary. In Germany for instance, most
newspapers even gave voice to fierce anti war sentiment. In Britain no media-outlet neither
wanted nor expected a large scale war on the ‘Continent’. Instead, British journalists were
too preoccupied writing about strikes, uprisings and fighting nationalist militias on, what
they referred to as their ‘backyard’: Ireland.5
Besides, prospect of a world war did not appeal to the ordinary people of France, Russia,
Germany and Britain either. Instead of imperial rivalries, colonial disputes, looming war
crises and arms race, they were rather worried about workplace conditions, wages, food,
housing, women’s emancipation and popular representation. And also as early as the 1910’s,
newspapers dealt with what ‘was on people’s minds’. 6

2 Idem 16-17
3 Ibidem 17
4. William Dorman, ‘A Debate Delayed Is A Debate Denied’ in: Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate. (New York 2006) 11
5. Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 44-46
6 Idem 44-46

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What really was on people’s minds? In the early 1910’s socialist movements were on the
rise all across Europe, scaring European elites and threatening the very existence of the
semi-democratic capitalist nation states. Strikes, labour unrest, armed uprisings and riots
rocked Europe to its foundation.7
Mayhem of a different category gripped Europe after the assassination of Austro-
Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist in June 1914. As earlier
alliance commitments clicked into place, binding Britain, France and Russia to war against
Germany and Austria-Hungary, manpower was needed, writes Knightley. 8 Over 70 million
European men were finally drafted to fight in this inter-imperial showdown. A new
unprecedented horror reality came to the fore, that of Total War.
And for that, total conviction was needed. Thus, civilian morale of the soon-to-be drafted
men and the home front became of unprecedented importance. Officials dedicated
themselves to shatter fighting spirit on the enemy side while enhancing it at home. In a
matter of weeks, all fighting nations set up state-supported channels of propaganda:
newspapers, posters and pamphlets. Authorities put enormous pressure on existing
newspapers to wholeheartedly support the war, and censor if necessary.9
High ranked officials, as prominent as Prime Minister Lloyd George himself, personally
visited the editorial boards of newspapers in Great Britain to discuss the possibilities of
censoring war-reports. To C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, he said: ‘If people
really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and can’t
know. The correspondents don’t write and the censorship would not pass the truth.’10
One should understand that in the early 20th century, leaders had more powers to confine
freedom of speech. In general, before the war Germany and Britain both executed tight
control over the press anyway. With the declaration of war, leaders put far greater emphasis
on prohibition of speech than before. More importantly, mass media were seen as important
tools to rally support for warfare. In Germany, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg issued the
press with a list of 26 prohibitions to confine ‘the right to express opinion freely by word,
print or picture.’ 11
In France, censorship was so dramatic, that one American reporter in Paris noted: ‘the
news does not arrive, or maybe it does not exist’. In Great Britain, BBC suspended news
programs on radio, to replace it with hours of repetitive organ music, suggesting the tens of
thousands men perishing in the trenches did not fit in the news category. 12
In the United States Woodrow Wilson got re-elected in 1916 using the slogan ‘I Kept
America Out Of The War’, reflecting popular sentiment of the American people: maximum
economic growth through isolationism. No costly wars, no interference in European
disputes. This only changed when horror, fiction-like, stories of the war reached urban
America in 1917, largely copied by the press. America’s public sphere was horrified with
published stories of despicable atrocities, committed by ‘the Huns’, as the Germans were
sarcastically nicknamed. German troops were said to brutally rape, pillage, even slice of
breasts of Belgian nurses and beat babies to death with rifles. 13

7 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 44
8 P Knightley, The first casualty: The war correspondents as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore 2004) 116
9 Idem 116-118
10 Ibidem 116-118
11 Ibidem 116-118
12 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 69

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13 Idem 23

The most notorious story featured a German corpse factory, melting down German soldiers’
bodies for glycerin. Tales like these were fabricated by British officials to rally support for
the war-effort in the US. ‘The Hun’ was dehumanized, depicted as a blood thirsty beast.
Newspapers produced headline stories about these Hun horror stories, causing a steady
wave of anti-Germanism sweeping urban America and isolationism therefore was rapidly
abandoned. 14
Thus, in the case of the First World War, British authorities had successfully framed the
German enemy as a bloodthirsty savage, who had to be stopped. In fact, the ‘Great War’ was
nothing more than an inter-imperial showdown, but was framed by authorities and
journalists as a ‘Hunt the Huns’ war, a struggle to stop savagery, and bring Anglo-Saxon
enlightenment and civilization to mainland Europe. Journalists played a crucial role in
convincing the American people the US had to wage war against these barbaric Huns.
After WW1, ending in an allied victory, predominantly because of fresh American troops
joined the fight in 1917, it became clear that many of these horror stories the press had
adopted were false. Unreliable audi alteram partem, no supported witness testimony, et
cetera.15 Even if we take into consideration that in the 1910’s reliable journalism about a war
fought on the other side of the Atlantic was a wee bit more challenging, dehumanizing
nicknames as ‘The Huns’, and the above mentioned horror tales, were adopted by almost all
newspapers. Reporters had indeed bought sheer lies.
‘We were lied to’, has become a common complaint of journalists whose stories have been
criticized of biased- or false reporting during wartime. Indeed, it’s a fact that throughout the
centuries, reporters have been manipulated by policy-makers, pro-war lobbies, spin doctors
and by foreign states and their agents.16 Only in the 1920’s, American scholars and
journalists discovered that British agents had successfully sold American authorities and
journalists the tales about ‘the Hun’. More lies were told than in any other period of history,
writes Knightley, calling WW1 a ‘discreditable period’ in the history of journalism.17

Second World War (1939-1945) ‘The Good War’

In the late 1930’s, when Nazi troops were Blitzkrieg-ing their way through eastern Europe,
committing mass murder and ethnic cleansing, American journalists were extremely
cautious to take these reports of atrocity serious, fearing that they might make the same
mistakes as during the late First World War years. They assumed these reports would not be
more reliable than the fiction they bought in WW118 Even in 1941, when the Germans had
occupied almost all of Western, Central and Eastern Europe, atrocities were far less visible
in the press than in 1917, whereas this time reported German horrors weren’t fiction.
Opinion polls, this time not being encouraged by the press in favor of war, showed that the
American people almost unanimously opposed taking up arms.19
American journalists were extremely skeptical about engaging in another European
military mission. In the late thirties, American newspapers even gave voice to pro-German
sentiments. When Hitler expelled French soldiers from the occupied Rhineland, American
journalists wrote that this step was justified, as the Rhineland was Germany’s ‘backyard’ and
crucial industrial heartland.20 Some even argued that Hitler had successfully ended post
WW1-chaos and replaced it with order and stability.
14 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 23-24
15 Idem 23-24
16 P Knightley, The first casualty: The war correspondents as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore 2004) 100-104
17 Idem 103
18 Ibidem 103

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19 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 71
20 J.R. Gritz, ‘Interview Andrew Nagorski: Early warnings: How American Journalist reported the Rise of Hitler’ The Atlantic (13-2-2012)

Andrew Nagorski, author of Hitlerland, did extensive research on the coverage of American
correspondents in Germany during the late 30’s. He discovered that although some
journalists warned the home-front of Hitler’s dangers, most of them were very cautious.
Most striking is the story of Hans Kaltenborn, a famous radio Berlin-based correspondent of
German descent. He refused to believe reports that SA-militants attacked American visitors
for not bringing the Hitler salute.21 Even when his own son was severely beat up, he
remained reluctant to write about it. The Nazis apologized: ‘I hope you won’t write about
this.’ Kaltenborn replied: ‘No, I don’t insert anything personal in my stories.’
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the soon-to-follow American
declaration of war, dramatically changed the attitude of American journalists. Many quickly
became ardent supporters of the war and gave voice to anti-German sentiments,
predominantly because of the framing used by the authorities.22
Roosevelt and Churchill sold the war as the ultimate struggle for Liberty, because
Freedom was what made the allies superior over the Nazis. They framed it as the cause of
freedom vs. fascism, or, the ‘Good War’. Who on earth would be against this war against evil?
Journalists were ‘free’ to write what they wanted, leaders declared.23 Mainly because
Freedom of speech was one of the ‘Four Freedoms’ for which the allies fought the war,
Roosevelt and Churchill established in 1941’s Atlantic Charter. Also at home, they meant to
staunchly defend this freedom. It was what made them ‘morally superior’ over those
‘savage’ Germans with their lying propaganda machine, they told American citizens in –
ironically - their own pro-war propaganda series called Why We Fight.
However, this emphasis on liberty to express oneself was not only designed as a framing-
tactic. A degree of righteousness and honesty would encourage civilians to feel that leaders
trusted them to accept even the worst possible news, writes Hynes. A report, in 1939 issued
to the British government, illustrates this picture: ‘distrust breeds fear much more than
knowledge of reverses. The all-important thing for publicity to achieve is the conviction that
the worst is known’. 24
Journalists voluntarily became their own censors. They even encouraged each other to
practice censorship and reminded each other there was a ‘war going on’. State officials
barely needed to interfere, since editors simply disciplined each other and many even
adopted a hawk-like attitude. 25
For instance, when the Nazis officially surrendered on May 7, 1945, one correspondent,
Edward Kennedy of the Associated Press, talked about this event in the press before the US
PR committee had officially published it. Colleagues heavily criticized him for doing so and
some even lamented that he endangered the lives of American troops, writes Hynes.24 Not
only newspaper editors, also their readers were unpleased with Kennedy’s ‘shenanigan’. A
poll showed that only 35% of newspaper readers approved of it. Overall, national polls
showed that Americans were largely supportive of the war anyway.26

21 [Link] Gritz, ‘Interview Andrew Nagorski: Early warnings: How American Journalist reported the Rise of Hitler’ The Atlantic (13-2-2012)
22 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 78
23 Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front and the Ministry of Information in World War II (Crows Nest 1979) 28
24 Idem 28
25 Ibidem 28
26 Samuel Hynes ea, Reporting World War II: American Journalism. 1938-146 (New York 2001) 650-655

6
Not surprising, considering allied leaders did everything they could to sell their ‘Good War’.
For instance, American and British State PR officials released official statements declaring
that allied airplanes were bombing ‘strategic’ military targets in Germany. The press copied
and published these reports as the truth.27 Not knowing, or just denying, they were lied to:
Allied planes were deliberately destroying civilian residential areas to shatter German
morale, using fuel air-bombs, making sure everything would burn down to the ground.
Even more striking, after two atomic bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in
August 1945, state officials knew all about the horrendous radiation and atrocious burns
suffered by thousands of Japanese citizens in the nuclear firestorms, but silenced these
horror-stories. Months later, correspondents were still prohibited to inspect these cities.
Quite surprising acts for leaders who told ‘the truth, nothing but the truth and, as near as
possible, the whole truth’, as American officials put it.28
But did journalists mind? Not really. As we have seen, WWII journalists harmoniously
cooperated with allied leaders to achieve victory, and even reminded each other their
country was at war and should act accordingly. Because above all, the ‘Good War’, the just
cause for freedom against evil, had to be won. Quite striking, considering this ‘evil’ had been
rampaging through Europe and Asia well before America’s involvement in the war. During
these years, journalists had been fervent advocates of non-interventionist politics and even
gave voice to pro-German sentiment. This shows how powerful the ‘Liberty’ and ‘Good War’
frame were and also how easily journalists adopted it.
Then the question remains: How ‘Good’ was this war? Hynes points out that there was
nothing ‘good’ about it. The cause might have been just, the war itself was hell, like every
other war. American journalists liked to portray their servicemen as heroic, brave and well-
mannered. The truth is many American marines looted, pillaged, murdered POW’s and
raped tens of thousands of women they encountered from Normandy, Germany to the
islands in the Pacific.29

27 Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front and the Ministry of Information in World War II (Crows Nest 1979) 137
28 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 82
29 Samuel Hynes ea, Reporting World War II: American Journalism. 1938-146 (New York 2001) 651-653

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Vietnam War. (1964-1973) ‘The ‘Stop the Communists’ War’

‘Blood, looks very red on the television screen’, wrote British broadcaster Robin Day in
Encounter magazine in 1970.29 With almost 90% of American households possessing a
television set in the mid-sixties, the Vietnam War was quickly coined the TV- or living room
war. For most Americans, blood, however, unlike the words of Mr. Day might suggest,
remained a shade of black-grey, since most people had black-white TV’s until the mid
1970’s, writes Daniel Hallin, author of ‘The Uncensored War’.31
Television caused such an enormous revolution that C.L. Sulzberger, a renowned foreign
policy commentator for The New York Times even complained: ‘few Americans actually seem
to remember how to read’.32 With television on the rise, newspapers lost their role as main
supplier of the news and as the major journalist platform, which still even was the case
during the Korea War in the 1950’s.
Liebes states that the introduction of television radically changed the way audiences
interpreted news coverage. Written text cannot be perceived as an authentic depiction of
reality, whereas the iconic nature of television made people believe that what we see is real,
uncensored. Of course, quite the opposite is true.33
Months before the invasion in Vietnam, media-outlets were divided over the matter if the
US should wage war against Communist forces in Vietnam, who were beleaguering pro-
Democratic forces in the south. The New York Times for instance, warned that a land war in
Asia might provoke a Soviet or Chinese response, like during the Korean War in 1953.34
Once the US invaded Vietnam, media outlets seemed to have become unanimous
advocates of the war. Daniel Hallin’s work shows that television news programs and
newspapers rarely showed and wrote about atrocities committed by American troops. Until
1968, only 22% of Vietnam War-coverage featured combat scenes. A similar picture as in
WWII emerged. ‘Free’ media harmoniously cooperated with leaders, in conveying the
importance of ‘the defense of democracy’. In the case of the Vietnam War, ‘containing global
communism’ was added to that paradigm.35 The authorities framed the invasion of Vietnam
as a necessary struggle during the ‘Cold War’, to contain global Communism and defend pro-
Democratic forces in Vietnam. In this case the ‘Cold War’, is used as a meta-frame: it entails
the general struggle of the ‘free’ Capitalist western world against Soviet Russia and
Communist China.
Journalists quickly adopted this frame. Journalists, politicians and citizens alike,
condemned every report or article that could be interpreted as not fully supportive of the
war.36 A good example is the case of CBS reporter Morley Safer. When Safer witnessed how
American troops were burning down Vietnamese houses with flamethrowers, he said on
camera: ‘Today’s operation is the frustration of Vietnam in miniature. There is little doubt
that American fire power can bring a military victory here. But to a Vietnamese peasant
whose home is built within a lifetime of back-breaking labor, it will take more than
presidential promises to convince him that we are on his side’37 But what had Safer really
said? By no means, anything anti-American or anti-war.

30 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (Los Angeles 1989) 3
31 Idem 105-106
32 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 102
33 Tamar Liebes, ‘Performance Journalism: The Case of Media’s Coverage of War and Terror’ in: The Communication Review (Jerusalem 2009) 241
34 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (Los Angeles 1989) 108-110

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35 Idem 90
36 Idem 108-110
37 Shooting with a camera: The Modern American War’, JP Keenan. (2009)

President Lyndon B. Johnson personally called the director of CBS news to tell him that Safer
had ‘shat on the American flag’. CBS fired him on the spot and he was prohibited to enter any
site of American military action afterwards.38
During the Vietnamese lunar New Year, or ‘TET’, in 1968, Communist forces had launched
a surprise offensive on American and South Vietnamese bases. Initially losing control over
several cities, American troops responded with a ruthless counterattack, killing over
110.000 Vietcong guerrillas, North Vietnamese soldiers and many more innocent civilians,
in just a matter of days.39
Before the TET offensive, clashes between Communist and American forces had been brief
operations in desolated areas, almost impossible for film crews to capture. In their attempt
to pursue the virtues of objective journalism, during the TET offensive, they finally had the
chance to shoot enormous amounts of footage directly witnessing these clashes. In the heat
of action, journalists captured pictures of napalmed kids, crying peasant women, piles of
killed VC and bleeding marines, compelling lots of Americans.40
Even though, ending in a landslide victory for the Americans, the TET offensive made
many Americans, even the country’s elites, wonder whether the Vietnam war could be won.
They never expected Communist forces to be able to wage such an enormous offensive as far
south as Saigon. As political debate changed, so did the media. They were simply affected by
it, states Hallin: ‘As the parameters of political debate changed, so did the behavior of the
media: stories that previously had been reported within a consensus framework came to be
reported as controversies; subjects and points of view that had been beyond the pale in the
early years came to be treated as legitimate news stories’41
Before TET, stories of atrocities committed by American marines, rarely appeared in
newspapers. Even more ‘objective’ newspapers such as The New York Times were
consciously filtering out such reports. The most striking example of this practice is the story
of a brutal assault launched by American troops on the village of My Lai, in march 1968.
They raped, murdered and mutilated over 300 Vietnamese villagers.42 Although there was
plenty of evidence, editors of all newspapers consciously blocked the story, fearing it could
damage the image of America’s intentions during the Vietnam war.
Not until November 1969, 18 months after the atrocities took place, the local Texan paper
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, published an elaborate report about the events, conducted by
investigative journalist Seymour Hersch.43 Later on, several interviews with My Lai veterans
were shown on national TV, revealing marines were ordered to shoot little kids because
‘when they would grow up, they would become Vietcong anyway’ and how hey would ‘cut
them with knives, scalp ‘em like Indians, anything. Some guys really enjoyed cutting their
throats also’, among other quotes, shocked millions of Americans, fuelling a rising anti-war
movement.44 .
Huge demonstrations broke out in cities and campuses everywhere in America. Protestors
appeared more in the news than ever before. Hallin states however, that this did not mean
journalists were endorsing their views. On the contrary, often reporters depicted them as
‘disruptive hippies’ protesting only for the sake of rebellion.45
38 Shooting with a camera: The Modern American War’, JP Keenan. (2009)
39 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (San Diego 1989)
40 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 107
41
Daniel C. Hallin ‘Images of War: The Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars in American Television’, in: Viewing War: How the Media
Handled the Persian Gulf, (New Brunswick 1994) 54-44
Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (San Diego 1989) 189-191
42

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43 Idem 189-191
44
Joseph Strick, ‘interviews with My Lai veterans’ (Laser film corp. 1970)
45 Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (San Diego 1989) 196-201

This should not come as a surprise, said MIT sociologist Gans in 1970. Journalists simply
represent the ‘middle-class culture that dominates America’. They ‘accept most of the
economic and social values of that culture, and often judge other societies by these values.
Thus, they generally see what goes wrong in Socialist countries more easily than what goes
right, and are more aware of propaganda in Russian pronouncements than American ones,
consider protestors more militant than insistent lobbyists, and deem marijuana-smoking
more of a social problem than alcohol consumption.’46 The Cold War frame and anti-
Communist frame, used by American authorities to sell the Vietnam war, were therefore
quickly adopted by these predominant middle class journalists, argues Gans. The Vietnam
war had become the ‘Stop the Communists’ war.
Ironically, newspapers and channels were torpedoed with criticism from both leftist
activists and staunch conservatives. Leftists stated a newspaper like The New York Times
was part of an ‘imperialist war machine’, representing America’s ruling class. On the right,
conservatives fiercely blamed the ‘liberal press’ for rallying public opinion against the war.
Undisputedly, the latter is what mostly resonates in the minds of Americans when thinking
about ‘media’ and ‘Vietnam’: the media made America lose the Vietnam-war.47

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46 Herbert J. Gans, ‘Since Spiro Agnew Brought Up The Subject, How Well Does TV Present the News?’, The New York Times (Januari 11 1970) 33
47 Shooting with a camera: The Modern American War’, JP Keenan. (2009)

Gulf War (1990-1991) ‘The Incubator War’

During the aftermath of the war in Vietnam, America’s elites continuously reminded
reporters that they indeed made America lose the war in Vietnam. Officials, as high ranked
as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, repeatedly stated it wasn’t the ‘tenacity of the North-
Vietnamese’, that gave American troops the final blow, the press did, he told journalists.48
Never again were journalists supposed to undermine America’s victory on the battlefield,
elites warned.
When the USA got entangled in a diplomatic crisis with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who
threatened to invade Kuwait, journalists gave voice to both pro- and anti-invasion
sentiments, especially during periods of congressional debate, writes Kalb.49 Many scholars
argue that both journalist’ and public opinion in favor of the war grew significantly after the
speech of a 15-year old Kuwaiti girl named ‘Nayirah’, in front of a congressional meeting,
October 10 1990.50 In tears, she said: ‘When I was there I saw Iraqi soldiers coming to the
hospital with guns. They took the babies out of the incubators, and left them to die on the
cold floor. Well after the war, in 1992, journalists revealed that this ostensibly ‘random’ girl,
turned out to be the Kuwaiti ambassador’s daughter. Moreover, it turned out that the
incubator kills were sheer lies, manufactured by a Pentagon aligned PR-company,
determined to ‘sell’ the war to Americans. And they did so, effectively.51
When America took up arms in 1991 to halt Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait,
president Bush warned that this time US troops would not be asked to ‘fight with one hand
behind their back’, like the media allegedly forced them to during the Vietnam war.
Personally, he swore to ‘kick the Vietnam syndrom’ and curb critical journalists.52 Also
general Colin Powell got on television and personally urged journalists to ‘trust’ him during
the war.53
Virtually every journalist did, abandoning the more objective approach they had before
the war.54 According to Kalb, a renowned journalist himself, reporters resorted to the ‘most
dangerous of professional practices’: patriotic journalism. Kalb even accuses journalists to
have been ‘wrapped in the flag no less proudly than the troops themselves’. Even Sam
Donaldson, one of television’s most renowned hawks, said he was surprised and
disappointed, by the ‘jingoist tone of some of my colleagues’. Tom Shales, of the Washington
Post, also expressed his concern: ‘I’m worried. The networks are whooping up war fever’.55

48 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 3
49 Idem 3
50 Yasemin Inceoglu, ‘Continuity in Disinformation: With some examples from the War on Iraq’ in (Istanbul 2014) 7
51 Idem 7-8
52 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 131
53 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 3,4

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54 Idem 5
55 Ibidem 5

Not just the networks, newspapers and tabloids, were equally conveying a patriotic
message: The New York Post headlined: ‘Up Yours!’. Even a more objective and ponderous
newspaper as The New York Times published a photo of cheering marines, captioned: ‘New
York Celebrates, Operation Welcome Home, Monday, June 9, 1991’ 56 Saddam Hussein was
often portrayed as ‘The Hitler of our Time’, which is not only a historically false parallel, it is
also a strong exaggeration. Journalists did little to criticize this comparison, instead, they
helped emphasizing it.57 Patriotic journalism denies people crucial facts, information and
prevents them from shaping a well formed opinion of the war, states Kalb.58
After the Vietnam controversy, the military did whatever they could to prevent American
camera crews from gaining access to sites where ‘real war’ was fought. Crews shot artillery-
fire, aviation, moving tanks, but never combat, blood or dead marines.59 One journalist
complained: ‘Pester though we might, they wouldn’t put anybody up to talk to us about it,
nor arrange visits to field hospitals’. Authorities imposed an unprecedented censorship and
restrictions on all press-institutions. But complaints such as the above were scarce.60
Ironically, during operation ‘Desert Storm’ an unprecedented huge number of journalists
gathered in Kuwait and Iraq to cover the war: over 1600. In retrospect, back in 1968, at its
peak, 637 reporters were covering the Vietnam war. But still, their liberties were extremely
limited.61 For instance, BBC’s Martin Bell lamented that frontline footage shot by his crew
was not approved by the military press committee, for it featured images of dead Iraqi’s.
However, Bell wasn’t violating any rules, only showing pictures of American casualties was
prohibited.62
Because, in the early 1990’s, virtually every American household possessed a color-TV,
which meant that blood would now indeed be very red on the television screen, instead of a
shade of black-grey, which it had been during the Vietnam war. And if blood was very red,
the war must be made to appear without bloodshed.63
The story of journalist Molly Moore, a Washington Post correspondent in Iraq during the
war, illustrates this picture. In 1993 she published the book ‘A Woman at War’. In an
interview with C-SPAN she talks about her findings: ‘We had a leash around our neck. There
was nothing they didn’t check.’ The result of this large scale censorship on the awareness of
the American people, she says, was vast.64 ‘When I came back from the war, and it seemed to
me that Americans believed that this had been a very easy war, it was antiseptic, surgical’
This is was exactly what leaders tried to convey, and was all over the media, but not based
on the truth, says Moore. ‘The war I saw was nothing like that. The ground war that I saw,
was chaotic, there were miscalculations and mistakes. (..) There were so many friendly fire
incidents.’ 65

56 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 5-6
57 Lance W. Bennet, ‘The News about Foreign Policy’ in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 25
58 Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago 1994) 6
59 Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester 1998) 237
60 Idem 237
61 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 136
62 Idem 136-137
63 Ibidem 136-137
64 Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines – Gulf War Journalism. Molly Moore (C SPAN 18-7-1993)
65 Idem

12
‘During the ground war many of my colleagues had horrendous experiences. A USA Today
reporter, for instance, spent weeks living with his unit in the desert. In the 4-5 days of the
ground war he was continuously writing. At the end of the war he went to the army
headquarters and they handed him back all his work.’ 66 None had been sent to the states for
publishing; weeks of work down the drain.
The fact that Moore’s revelations came two years after the war, is illustrative for the
hawk-like atmosphere during the war. ‘We just couldn’t get the information out there’,
Moore explains. Not only were they stopped from doing so, no reporter wanted to be called
unpatriotic either.67 Moreover, Carruthers emphasizes, that even though journalists
regularly lamented about lack of access, they only very rarely criticized the war itself. As
journalist John MacArthur (also two years later) put it in 1993: ‘it was difficult to find
anyone who didn’t, at least officially, count Desert Storm as a devastating and immoral
victory for military censorship and a crushing defeat for the First Amendment.’ 68
The vast majority of news organizations had been fully condoning America’s offensive in
Iraq during the war. But the examples mentioned above illustrate a striking pattern: two
years after the war ended, the time finally seemed ripe to reflect on the widespread self-
censorship and the almost dictatorship-like approach on the media. How ‘American’ were
these practices? Because journalists had so easily swallowed the restrictions and censorship
they faced, critics nicknamed television during Desert Storm ‘Pentavision’ (reference to
Pentagon). However, polls consistently found that an overwhelming majority of Americans
approved of the way the press covered the war. Polls even showed that many thought the
Pentagon should have had greater influence on press coverage.69
The President proudly claimed that he ‘finally kicked the Vietnam syndrom’. And most
Americans, even journalists, seemed to agree with him. In times of war, journalists simply
hate to be called ‘unpatriotic’, seems to be a painful reality.70

66 Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines – Gulf War Journalism. Molly Moore (C SPAN 18-7-1993)
67 Idem
68 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011) 139-140
69 Idem 139
70 Ibidem 140

13
The Afghanistan and Iraq War (2001-2008) ‘The War on Terror’

On September 11, 2001, allegedly Al Qaeda-linked terrorists flew two passenger planes into
the World Trade Center in New York. Thousands perished. The next day, President George
W. Bush, called the attacks ‘acts of war’ and announced a ‘monumental struggle of good
versus evil’71 Eight days later he held a speech during a meeting with Congress: ‘Our war on
terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.’
‘The War on Terror’ was born. This ‘war’ didn’t have a clear enemy or battlefield; it was a
moral superior mission, an ultimate fight between good and evil. The mainstream media
quickly picked up the War on Terror frame, without debating its built-in neoconservative
worldview, nor questioning what it exactly entailed, writes Lewis.72 A day after the
President’s speech, the ‘War on Terror’ was featured into tens of thousands news reports, to
explain the ‘logic’ for both armed invasions abroad, and radical soon-to-be-imposed interior
policies. No major newspaper or news network argued against military action.
Lewis and Reese state that there should be little surprise about the journalist’ acceptance
of the War on Terror frame, since major political figures quickly endorsed it, both
Republicans and Democrats.73 Especially the latter shows how effective the Bush
Administration framed the ‘War on Terror’: Even liberal democrats sided with Bush. Not
even that surprising. The president gave them little choice: ‘you are either with us, or with
the terrorists’, he repeatedly stated. Journalists found it very hard to ride against the wave of
fierce nationalism, swallowing the United States after 9/11.74
In her book ‘Shock Doctrine’, journalist Naomi Klein states that reporters were paralyzed,
shocked, by the unprecedented wave of fierce nationalism and administration pressure to
be ‘with us or with the terrorists’ after 9/11. In her chapter ‘Erasing Iraq’, Klein states that
many journalists simply thought waging wars, even in Iraq, was justified after 9/11. Like
Richard Cohen, a prominent Washington Post columnist, explained his support of the Iraq
war as following: ‘In a post-Sept. 11 world, I thought the prudent use of violence could be
therapeutic’.75
She also describes how, on the eve of the invasion of Bagdad, the Pentagon effectively
put pressure on American media outlets to ‘fear up’ Iraq. As an example, she mentions a CBS
News report, two months before the invasion: ‘They’re calling it A-day. A’ as in airstrikes so
devastating they would leave Saddam’s soldiers unable or unwilling to fight.’76 The news-
anchor, Dan Rather, ended the report with a message to his viewers: ‘We assure you this
report contains no information that the Defense Department thinks could help the Iraqi
military’. Especially the latter typically illustrates how fearful journalists were to undermine
the authorities’ war plans and how consciously they avoided anything that could question
their own patriotic intentions as ‘good’ American citizens.77

71 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 86
72 Idem 86
73 ibidem 87
74 Ibidem 87
75 Naomi Klein, Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York 2007) 325

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76 Idem 334
77 Ibidem 334

Just like the ‘Cold War’, ‘The War on Terror’ is a metaframe, entailing a ‘lager world of
meaning’, with a strong distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’.78 Once frames are endorsed or
naturalized by the media, they gain organizing power. A striking example of this
phenomenon is the framing of the Abu Graihb prison scandal, in which countless Iraqi
prisoners were brutally tortured. Journalists simply adopted the administration’s ‘isolated
abuse’ frame, downplaying the more appalling ‘policy of torture’ frame, endorsed by critics.79
Why then, would journalists simply internalize administration rhetoric?
The words spoken out by MIT professor Gans in 1970, once again, prove to be a plausible
explanation. Journalists, wrote Gans, are members of the ‘middle class that rules America’,
and are thus more skeptical and aware of propaganda used by dissidents than the culture
and political order they represent. The latter they take for granted.80 Thus, journalists saw
the Vietnam War as a ‘necessary’ struggle, seen the geo-political circumstances during the
‘Cold War’ (adopted metaframe), just as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were crucial
for the ‘War on Terror’ (equally, a metaframe).
Reese and Lewis interviewed 13 USA Today journalists about this ostensibly easy
acceptation of The War on Terror frame. All lamented about the press’ usage of the term and
all had difficulties defining what the War on Terror exactly entailed. These reporters
acknowledged that American media organizations did not only become advocates of Bush’s
phraseology, they also naturalized the policy, making it almost incontestable.81
When the USA Today reporters were asked the question: ‘When you think of the War on
Terror, what issues and ideas tend to fall under that label?’, their answers reveal a striking
pattern. Many reporters mentioned a series of policies and events, mostly calling it the
‘general basket of activities’ of the government since 9/11, but rarely specifically mentioned
the role of the Bush administration during the War on Terror, forgetting the latter had
created the frame in the first place.82 This is illustrative of how powerful and effective the
use of the War on Terror frame was: it wasn’t ‘Bush’s war on terror’ but ‘America’s war on
terror’.
The hawkish vibe during Bush’s speech in Congress on September 20th 2001, when the
President officially declared the War on Terror, illustrates this. Often not even being able to
finish his sentence, Congress rose up, Republicans and Democrats alike, to applaud their
commander in chief. 83 What American journalist, watching this ostensibly unanimous
nationalist uprising, would even question the War on Terror when there was such an
overwhelming political consensus for this cause? The country clearly was in shock,
paralyzed. ‘The war on terror will not stop, until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated’, Bush concluded, only to hear the cheering intensify.
Democrats and republicans represent America as a nation.84 If they agree, the nation agrees.
What journalist would even question the motives of an entire nation?

78 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 88
79 Idem 88
80 Herbert J. Gans, ‘Since Spiro Agnew Brought Up The Subject, How Well Does TV Present the News?’, The New York Times (Januari 11 1970) 33
81 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 89
82 Idem 90

15
83 George W. Bush addresses Congress. Live. CNN (20-9-2001)
84 Idem

Liebes argues that journalists have a certain responsibility when a terror attack has just
occurred, for in the immediate aftermath, audiences are the most vulnerable and anxious.85
The often sensational, shocking and hawkish reports easily shaped the American opinion in
favor of warfare. Liebes also states that the War on Terror caused the rise of ‘performer’
journalists: reporters moving from the studio to the field, in search of sensation, drama and
action. The journalist presents himself as the ‘hero’, risking his life.86 Correspondents in Iraq
even mobilized to the war effort, Liebes explains.
Equipped with an American army helmet and life-vest, hard to distinguish from a real
marine, the war-reporter has become the image of patriotic, mobilized journalism. Often he
would even sneak into enemy territory, risking his life to show audiences who ‘these
terrorists’ really are.87 Often these reporters would even achieve more than the military. For
instance, when the US army was trying to track down the notorious terrorist group
‘Muhammad Army’, it wasn’t the marines, but Newsweek’s Scott Johnson who managed to
discover the secret hideaway of these Baghdadi terrorists. He was not met with hostility; on
the contrary, he gained access and interviewed the jihadists.88
The word ‘amorphous’ was pretty popular among USA Today reporters trying to describe
the term War on Terror. ‘I don’t think it’s a particularly useful term. It’s too.. amorphous. I
don’t think it has any meaning anymore.89 You listen to me struggle to define it,’ said
‘journalist E’. ‘The war on terror has come to be a catch-all phrase. It’s so amorphous. Not
sure anyone knows what it means anymore’, explained ‘journalist B’. It was also coined as a
‘handy catchphrase.’ Others also denied it was their responsibility using the term, simply
because they were ‘quoting’ the President. Although claiming they wouldn’t use the term
independent from the Bush administration, they did, shows the research Reese and Lewis
conducted.90
Many USA Today reporters also admitted they used the phrase for convenience sake. As
one journalist put it: ‘When you’re writing a big story about a big event and you have 10
inches to write it in, are you going to reach for a phrase that is less nuanced than another?
Yeah, you bet. So often these decisions have so little to do with politics and everything to do
with space constraints and deadlines.’ Another explained, ‘Perhaps if we had more time, we
could write more nuanced reports.’ 91
And when talking about how they had adopted the term, one journalist simply said: ‘There
wasn’t really another phrase being used at that time. That was the one put out there. That
was the crawl on all the TV screens. That was what the CNN talked about. So, I imagine
everyone in the press picked it up as a shorthand’.92

85 Tamar Liebes, ‘Performance Journalism: The Case of Media’s Coverage of War and Terror’ in: The Communication Review (Jerusalem 2009) 240
86 Idem 243-244
87 Ibidem 244
88 Ibidem 245
89 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 90

16
90 Idem 91
91 Ibidem 92
92 Ibidem 92

In short, the fact that these USA Today reporters explained their adoption of the term as ‘a
shorthand’ or ‘catch-all phrase’, shows a certain indifference. It also shows a degree of
ignorance: these journalists failed to see the political power embedded in word choice.93 By
using ‘the War on Terror’ as a taken-for-granted term, and thus policy, journalists shaped
the political debate in favor of Bush’s neo-cons. Even though many journalists were critical
of Bush’s policies, especially concerning the war in Iraq, their criticism still seemed to be
executed within the framework of the War on Terror, contesting not the frame, but only the
execution of the war itself.94
A striking parallel with the Gulf War-days of the early 90’s becomes visible. Two, three
years after the invasion of Iraq, a number of high-profile journalists and news networks
started to publicly self-scrutinize coverage of the War on Terror. Bob Woodward for
instance, a prominent Washington Post-reporter, admitted that he should have encouraged
his editor-in-chief to make a cover-story on the weakness of Bush’s claim of weapons of
mass destruction on the eve of the invasion in Iraq. A top editor for The New York Times also
blamed herself for not having had the guts to question Bush’s actions.95
According to Liebes, in times of unrest or war, dilemmas such as the above, are legion.
Should journalists value the public’s right to know or avoiding the risk of causing damage to
national interest or security?96 In times of war, though, the nation, including journalists, are
in such a state of shock that they almost always choose the latter, writes Liebes.
Consequently, aided by an ‘echoing press’, the Bush administration effectively framed the
invasion of Iraq as the ‘sequel’, or extension, of the War on Terror. Many journalists later
showed regret for not having been more sceptical.97 ‘I wish we were tougher minded in the
build-up to Iraq, but it took time for the traditional adversarial relationship to reassert itself
because of the shock of 9/11.’ Another reporter explained: ‘You run the danger that it can
become propaganda. If you allow a government to put everything and anything under the
rubric of ‘it’s part of the war on terror’… it’s an effort to convince people that, well, you have
to go along with this, it’s part of the war on terror, or else we’ll all be terrorized and killed.’ 98

17
93 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 92
94 Idem 93
95 Ibidem 87
96 Tamar Liebes, ‘Performance Journalism: The Case of Media’s Coverage of War and Terror’ in: The Communication Review (Jerusalem 2009) 241
97 Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009) 94
98 Idem 94-9

Conclusion
As the self-reflecting words of the last reporter illustrate, during war-time, journalists
generally have a very hard time riding against the popular wave of pro-war sentiment.
Before wars have been declared though, we see a dramatically different pattern. Months
prior to wars, journalists tend to adhere to their core-journalistic principles: function as a
watchdog of truth, critically examine both sides of the story and not to take a narrative or
frame for granted. On the eve of WWII for instance, journalists even gave voice to pro-
German sentiment. Just before the war in Vietnam erupted, reporters warned for a powerful
Soviet or Chinese response. As soon as leaders have declared war, my study shows that
journalists generally turn into patriots.
Why? Journalists are human beings, they’re flesh and blood, vulnerable to pressure from
society, politicians, and colleagues, afraid to be called a dissident or unpatriotic. As Gans
pointed out in 1970, journalists are middle-class citizens, ‘the soul’ of western nations, who
are likely to take their own society and political order for granted, and are more inclined to
emphasize the propaganda and wrongdoings of other cultures/enemy countries. This can be
one explanation for the quick adoption of the whole set of pro-war rhetoric and frames used
by authorities throughout the years.
Another striking pattern, visible from the First World War until the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, is the use of framing. As I mentioned earlier in the introduction, never will
authorities frame their wars as imperial, oil-thirsty campaigns, but always portray their
enemies as forces of evil, which inevitably have to be fought and beaten. From the days of
the savage Huns during ‘the Great War’, the ‘Good War’ during which the fascists Nazis had
to be defeated, the Vietnam War, which was a crucial ‘Cold War’ struggle to stop the
Communist, to the War on Terror in the 21st century. These frames show a crucial pattern:
they always feature Good versus Evil. The latter could be called the ultimate metaframe, as it
is dominant during all wars.
Another metaframe that has been used throughout the decades, is the frame of Inevitable
and Just. As soon as a war has erupted, journalists frame a war as something necessary, as a
phenomenon there is no way around of. As a just cause that will ultimately benefit the
nation. An even stronger metaframe I have witnessed in all wars is the frame of Atrocities.
As soon as this frame was applied by one journalists, others quickly followed. It helped to
rally journalistic support for the war-effort. The real power of these frames is that, as soon
as they are adopted, they gain organizing power.
And because journalists mainly are middle-class, norm-abiding citizens, they are the
perfect agents to let these frames powerfully resonate throughout society. In doing so,
authorities do not hesitate to consistently tell lies in order to sell their war. From fairytales
about bloodthirsty Huns who sliced off nurses’ breasts, to fake stories about babies being
thrown out of incubators to ‘die on the cold floor’ on the eve of the Gulf War. Even during the
second war in Iraq, 12 years later, journalists again bought the lies of authorities: the
narrative about Weapons of Mass Destruction turned out to be a complete fabrication. Often
journalists lament: ‘we are lied to’. This is undeniably true. Though one might wonder, why
would journalists consistently believe these lies, time after time?
These lies are often made up of atrocious stories, meaning to shock journalists. They often
do so, effectively. Often it even mobilizes journalists and public opinion in favor of war. The

18
horror slicing-breasts tales appalled American journalists, who first were very skeptical of
warfare. Newspapers published these fiction stories causing a steady wave of anti-
Germanism throughout the USA, ultimately resulting in a declaration of War. Similarly,
months prior to the Gulf War, media outlets were very divided over whether an invasion
was worth it. When the fabricated incubator stories came around, journalists responded in
shock. Many now were in favor of invading Kuwait, the American people quickly followed.
Atrocities -lies or truth- seem to be a factor which highly influences journalists. Like I stated
earlier, journalists are ordinary human beings, like most other Americans they were
outraged by such stories. Equally, the horror stories about the Weapons of Mass
Destruction, had a huge impact on many journalists.
Never again would journalists believe the horror tales they were told during the First
World War, they declared some years later, when the breast slicing stories turned out to be
lies. My study shows that this statement didn’t have any prophetic value. War after war,
journalists started to self-scrutinize their lack of critical attitude and almost sheep-like pro-
war coverage. Two years after the gulf war, when the incubator-story turned out to be a
fabrication, reporters felt like they betrayed their own profession. And in essence, they had.
Equally, some years after the invasion of Iraq, journalists of all media outlets regretted they
had so easily believed the Administration’s tale of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A
prominent Washington Post journalist even admitted he should have pushed his editor-in-
chief for a front-page story on the weakness of evidence for these weapons on the eve of the
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
My study shows, that during war-time, Jingoism almost always takes a grip on reporters.
Paralyzed, petrified and scared to say anything that can undermine the war effort, or to be
called ‘unpatriotic’.

19
Case study. ‘How the New York Times Cover the war on ISIL’
Factual framework: The Rise of ISIL
When President George W. Bush launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as an extension of his
‘War on Terror’, American forces rapidly defeated Saddam Hussein’s army. Victory was
certain, Bush declared. But as soon as Bush’ troops occupied Iraq, real armed resistance
would be met. Various militias rose up to arms. One of the fiercest was ‘Jama’at al-Tawhid
wal-Jihad’, an extremist Sunni insurgent organization. In 2004 it pledged allegiance to Al-
Qaeda, to merge with other Sunni militias to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council in 2006.
Due to the Al-Qaeda affiliation, foreign fighters flocked to Iraq to join the fight. Its
commanders proclaimed the ‘Islamic State in Iraq’.99 Although the Americans suffered
severe losses due to the guerilla tactics of this militant group, American forces would still
largely dominate Iraq.
When the last American troops left Iraq in 2011, the group continued to grow as a
consequence of the major shift of power in favor of the country’s Shia’s, comprising 62.5
percent of the population (Saddam Hussein was a Sunni). Under his authority Al-Maliki gave
Shia militias a carte blanche to kill countless Sunni civilians, fueling support of the country’s
moderate Sunnis for extremist organizations such as Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).100
Although America had provided Iraq’s army with top-notch military equipment when it
withdrew its troops from the country, Al-Maliki’s soldiers were not capable to halt the
insurgence of Al-Qaeda affiliates. That same year, the Syrian civil war broke out. ISI, under
the leadership of radical Al-Baghdadi, started sending missions into Syrian territory to side
with Syrian Al-Qaeda associates to fight the Shia dictator Bashar Al-Assad. On April 8 2013,
they merged with ISI, and called themselves ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’, a name
inundated with territorial ambitions. The ultra-orthodox Islamic Sunni state would not just
comprise of Iraq and Syria, but also of Lebanon, Jordan and ultimately Israel.101 Also the
acronym ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is widely used. During my case study I will use
ISIL, as it describes the group’s territorial ambitions more accurately.
In the spring/summer of 2013 the group first gained international attention by rapidly
expanding throughout northern Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, coined it
‘the strongest rebel group’ of the region. Some weeks later, on May 11, ISIL carried out
suicide attacks in Turkey, killing 51. 102
In late December, ISIL advanced throughout Northern Iraq and conquered large areas at
expense of the Iraqi army in a crushing defeat. In early January, it had launched a siege on
Falluja, a key Iraqi city, to fully control it at January 4th. A day earlier it had proclaimed Iraq
as an Islamic State. With Falluja being 20 miles from Baghdad, ISIL’s threat became real. 103
In February and March ISIL suffered several setbacks. After an intense power-struggle, Al-
Qaeda broke all ties with ISIL on February 3, blaming the group for religious fallacies and
calling it a band of ‘thugs’, referring to its pillaging, raping and indiscriminate decapitating of
fellow Muslims. Al Nusra, an important Syrian ISIL affiliate, remained loyal to Al Qaeda. In
Syria, they joined other rebel forces against ISIL. Consequently, the group was driven out of
several Syrian cities. Also in Iraq, ISIL lost the key city of Ramadi and most of Fallujah to
Iraqi government forces. Also in April and May they continued to lose ground. 104

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99 Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York 2015) 40-43
100 Idem 40-43
101 Ibidem 132-136
102 Danny Romero ‘ISIS timeline: A year under the so-called Islamic State’ The Independent (28 6 2015)
103 Idem
104 Ibidem

At June 9, after days of intense fighting, ISIL conquered Iraq’s second most populous city,
Mosul. A day later ISIL carried out an execution of 670 Shia prisoners in Mosul. On the 11th
also Tikrit, the birthplace of the Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein, fell in the hands of ISIL. In
the weeks to come ISIL would continue to conquer countless villages and cities across Iraq
and Syria. ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, announced the establishment of a new
‘Caliphate’ on June 29th. A few days later, he would declare that IS’ ultimate goal was world
domination, calling for all Muslim worldwide to capture ‘Rome, in order to own the world’.
June 2014 is one of the most turbulent months in ISIL’s offensive.105
In early August, ISIL launched an offensive in northern Iraq. In a relentless rampage, they
killed countless men and women of the Yazidis-minority, adherents of a religion infused
with elements from Islam, Christianity and Pagan beliefs. Around 50.000 Yazidis fled into
the Sinjar mountains. The UN warned for ‘a humanitarian tragedy’: thousands would
potentially perish of hunger, thirst and diseases. Many in fact did. The Yazidi-crisis gained
huge international attention. Barack Obama was exposed to tremendous international
pressure, to which he yielded on August 7. 106
The president authorized targeted airstrikes, along with airdrops of aid. A day later he
would justify his decision publicly as an essential step to ‘prevent genocide against the
Yazidis’. In close coordination with Kurdish ground troops, the Americans managed to
establish a humanitarian corridor, through which the starving Yazidis could finally escape to
a safe haven. 107
While American airstrikes continued, hundreds more Yazidis were killed and decapitated
by ISIL, thousands of Yazidi women were abducted and finally sold as sex slaves. Such
stories outraged the West. The EU agreed to supply Kurdish troops with weaponry. Also
Pope Francis, called on the international community to halt ISIL.
On August 20, Obama would reveal the decapitation of American journalist James Foley by
ISIL. The terrorist group released a graphic video of the execution, featuring Foley, dressed
in an orange prison outfit –an obvious reference to Guantanamo Bay-, and his executioner,
incognito. With his knife pointing at the camera, he says: (…..). Foley’s death had an
enormous impact on the West. Mainly because, many now felt ISIL’s war wasn’t simply
confined to the Middle-East, but now also westerners were involved. A mere two weeks
later, ISIL released a new decapitation video, this time featuring journalist Steven Sotloff,
also an American national.108 Millions of western citizens watched both these videos on e.g.
social media, causing massive outrage.
A few days later, on September 10, Barack Obama announced a coalition, including many
western nations, to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL’. Among other allies, were many
Arab nations, including Saudi-Arabia. Obama’s declaration of war against ISIL will be
another key event in my case-study. It followed quickly after the beheadings of Foley and
Sotloff, which had caused massive turmoil in the West, especially in the US. Despite intense
bombing of ISIL positions by coalition forces, the group would only enhance its terror. In a
series of new decapitations of western citizens, suicide bombings and an unprecedented
armed offensive, thousands were killed. ISIL kept expanding northwards in Syria, and
besieged the symbolically important Kurdish city of Kobani.109

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105 Graeme Wood ‘What ISIS Really Wants’ The Atlantic (March 2015)
106 Danny Romero ‘ISIS timeline: A year under the so-called Islamic State’ The Independent (28 6 2015)
107 Idem
108 ‘Timeline: ISIS hostage killings’ The Guardian (16 11 2014)
109 ‘Battle for Kobane: Key events’ BBC World News (25 6 2015)

It wasn’t until March 15th 2015, after a period of 6 months of fierce Kurdish resistance and
thousands of allied airstrikes, that ISIL was finally driven out of the city and neighboring
villages. The everlasting fierce battle for Kobani, lead to a wave of pro-Kurdish sentiment in
the West. Even more important: for citizens morale: allied airstrikes had made a vital
difference in the battle. 110
In the months to come, Kurdish forces, assisted by allied air support, would continue to
gain ground and drive ISIL forces increasingly southward. On the other hand, the terrorist
group would retake Ramadi and the ancient Syrian town of Palmyra. In other words, despite
thousands of allied airstrikes, Kurdish offensives and the rise of Shia militias in south and
central Iraq, ISIL still is far from defeated. The summer of 2015 would be period of no
significant breakthroughs. Even a partnership with foe Iran is possible at this point. The
status quo is lingering. 111

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110 ‘Battle for Kobane: Key events’ BBC World News (25 6 2015)
111 Graham Allison ‘Defeating ISIS: With Whose Boots on the Ground?’ The Atlantic (27 10 2014)

Methodology
In studying the coverage of The New York Times concerning the war against ISIL, I will
conduct a qualitative content analysis, during which the emphasis will lie on my own
interpretation, based on the concepts and findings of my theoretical framework. I believe
this is an effective strategy to spot parallels, shifting tone, vocab and frames.
During my study, I will conduct a thorough content analysis of articles written around the
dates of several dramatic ISIL-related events, such as the fall of Mosul and the beheadings of
Foley and Sotloff, based on the ‘ISIL-explainer’. I have composed an overview of these dates,
and will explain below why I have chosen these particular ones as the key moments my case
study evolves around.
In order to answer my hypothesis, I will particularly focus my analysis on the months and
especially weeks prior to the week declaration, to be able to closely spot developments and
sudden changes. Therefore, focus points are the Yazidi-crisis, the beheadings and war
declaration, as these events are crucial to my case study. In essence, the aim of my case
study is to reveal the stance of Times journalists about the war on ISIL, and the aspects that
clarify their vision, such as word choice, framing, selective information and explicit
standpoints in opinion pieces and Editorials.
At what specific date/event can we see a striking development of the above-mentioned
features in the Times? I will study as many articles around my selected dates as possible, but
analyze the most relevant and striking ones.

1. Rise (Summer of 2013)

The first time period that I will discuss in my case study is the summer of 2013, when ISIL
first gained international attention. As I mentioned earlier, the Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights even coined it ‘the strongest rebel group’ of the region. It also slowly gained
ground in Iraq.

2. Takeover of Falluja (January 2014)

When ISIL-forces took Falluja, billions of American dollars worth of military equipment,
including tanks, anti-aircraft technology and other weaponry granted to the Iraqi Army by
the U.S., fell in the hands of ISIL affiliates. The militants were now only 30 miles from
Baghdad. Considering Iraq’s security and stability now really at stake, I will use this
dramatic date as a key moment in my case study: did Times journalist frame the takeover as
American interests under siege?

3. Fall of Mosul (June 2014)

Months later, the occupation of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, in June 2014, confirmed
earlier assumptions that ISIL had transformed from a Sunni insurgency to an established
power, even calling for world domination and announcing a march on Rome. ISIL now, had
completely disrupted Iraq. I will use the fall of Mosul as important milestone in my study.
Did Times journalists envision a role of the U.S. to halt ISIL? Or did they frame it as a region
the USA shouldn’t ever get involved in again, considering the tremendous Iraq-trauma?

4. The Yazidi crisis (August 2014)

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The Yazidi crisis has marked a milestone in the approach of the USA towards ISIL: for the
first time it actually responded with force. What stance do Times take in covering the Yazidi-
crisis of early August on fighting ISIL? How has Obama’s decision of ordering airstrikes
affected the standpoint of Times reporters? Do they support a role of the U.S. in saving the
Yazidis?

5. Decapitations and War Declaration (August/September 2014)

In August and early September, two beheadings of American journalists shocked the U.S.,
and other western countries. How did these decapitation videos influence the stance of The
New York Times on dealing with ISIL? To what extent did the coverage of Times journalists
reflect the outrage in society? Shortly after the beheading of journalist Sotloff, Obama
declared war on ISIL. Did their stance towards military involvement change, with American
nationals now directly being targeted by ISIL’s terrorism?

6. Status Quo (Summer of 2015)

Almost a year later, it would become clear the effect of allied war effort had been limited.
Despite billions of dollars, thousands of airstrikes, ISIL still remained in power in key cities
in both Iraq and Syria. Criticism on Obama’s ISIL policy is mounting. Many experts have
stated never to expect the coalition to ultimately prevail without boots on the ground. In
Washington D.C., the call for ground troops rises, even among Democrats. How does The
New York Times envision the future of the fight against ISIL? How should the war be fought,
according to Times journalists?

Further Analysis
During the analytical process, my theoretical framework will function as an academic
compass. In other words, in this case study, I will explore to what extent the findings of my
framework also apply to the coverage of ISIL by the Times.
One of the most striking elements of my framework, is the notion that journalists are flesh
and blood, middle class-citizens, ‘middle class that rules America’, as Gans pointed out. They
are likely to take their own society and political order for granted, and thus more inclined to
emphasize the wrongdoings and propaganda of the ‘enemy’. My framework has clarified
that journalists often copy their leaders’ vocab and rhetoric. Concerning my case-study:
President Obama has held lots of speeches regarding ISIL, some down to earth, some
determined and some emotional. How has the word-choice, visions and framing by the
Times developed in relation to Obama’s speeches and rhetoric?
The lack of skeptical reporting during wartime is overwhelming, as I pointed out in my
framework. Generally, journalists buy the story their leaders tell the nation about the ‘why’
of the war. I should certainly hope that Times journalists, with two Iraq traumas, two times
being lied to by their leaders, would now critically examine and screen Obama’s war
motives. Especially considering, most reporters of the time of Bush’ Iraq invasion, are still
employed.
Jingoism often takes a grip on reporters, blurring their journalistic ethics. Allied fighter
pilots have conducted countless airstrikes, which have caused hundreds of civilian
casualties. Would Times reporters also cover this dark side of the war against ISIL? Or would
they silence this fact and set their own priorities?

Framing
Another very important aspect of my framework is the use of framing. In my content
analysis I will explore to what extent the three most dominant metaframes apply to the ISIL
coverage by the Times, and naturally, will also try to spot new emerging frames. Frames play

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an important role in my case study because they often reveal the visions of journalists, as I
have elaborately explained in my framework.

1. Good vs. Evil

So dominant in my theoretical framework, I coined it the ultimate Masterframe. What role
does it play in the coverage of ISIL? In western media, Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein was
framed as a force of evil in the last two Iraq wars. How are ISIL’s warriors portrayed? How
does this frame contribute to the stance of Times journalists on fighting ISIL?

2. Atrocities
Stories of atrocities have often been decisive in rallying both journalist and public opinion
for war. In a lot of cases, leaders even fabricated these stories to push public opinion over
the edge. With all decapitations, ethnic cleansing, mass murders, mass rape, I could imagine
it could play a role in the coverage of ISIL. More importantly, to what extent does this frame
influence the stance of Times reporters regarding toppling ISIL?

3. Inevitable and Just

As leaders frame their wars as inevitable and just, so do journalists, shows my theoretical
framework. To what extent does it play a role in the coverage of the war on ISIL? To what
degree does this frame influence the stance of Times journalists in regard to the fight against
ISIL?

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Case Study

1. Rise (Summer of 2013)

July 12: Syrian Infighting Undermines Anti-Assad Effort
Like many newspapers media outlets, during the summer of 2013, when ISIL first gained
international attention, the Times spoke about ‘Qaeda-linked’ extremists. On July 12, Times
journalists Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, reported about ISIL in an article titled ‘Syrian
Infighting Undermines Anti-Assad Effort’. They write about open hostilities between
competing rebel factions. ISIL, who they refer to as ‘Islamic State Fighters’ ,had carried out
brutal attacks (including beheadings) on militants of the moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA).
Barnard and Saad state that ISIL and other extremist factions had grown stronger than FSA
due to financial aid and weapon deliveries by nations as Saudi Arabia. The reporters state
ISIL lacks popular support in Northern Syria. Many protests had broken out and spread
graffiti featuring slogans like ‘Go back to Afghanistan, you have ruined the revolution’ and
‘Out with the Islamic State, they are no different from Assad’
What is striking about Barnard and Saad’s article, is that they do mention the fusion of Al
Qaeda in Iraq and several Nusra brigades, without noticing that ISIL had now become a
powerful force with cross-border potential. Instead, they emphasize that the ‘quarrels’
among rebel factions ‘is a new low’ for the Syrian opposition. Taking into account, that in the
summer of 2013, the interest of the West had been the toppling of Assad’s regime, not
eliminating its –no matter how radical or perilous- opponents. Although these reporters
mention the beheading of several FSA rebels, they do not give a value judgment, or use
framing technics. They nonetheless underestimate ISIL as a serious threat for the region’s
stability. Its emergence as Syria’s most powerful rebel force who had now merged with
Iraqis Al Qaeda faction was not approached as a potential danger at all. Instead, they
emphasize the emergence of ISIL as the continuing dramatic divide of the Syrian opposition
and thus undermining the anti-Assad struggle.

2. Takeover of Falluja (January 2014)

Jan 4: Qaeda-Linked Militants in Iraq Secure Nearly Full Control of Falluja
When ISIL militants advanced southward in Iraq and occupied the strategically important
city of Falluja, Times journalists Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango described this dramatic event
as a clear sign of ‘a Sunni-led insurgency that threatens to tear the country apart’. Ghazi and
Arango refer to its rebels as ‘Qaeda-Linked Militants’ or ISIS. They write that Washington
had declared the attacks ‘barbarism against civilians of Ramadi and Falluja’. They also
choose to give voice to Republican criticism on Obama’s administration, quoting Senator
John McCain: “many of us predicted that the vacuum would be filled by America’s enemies
and would emerge as a threat to U.S. national security interests.” Although, they do not
consecutively show the perspective of the Obama administration or at least assess these
bold statements critically.
The authors also emphasize the painful reality that despite the fact that Iraqi troops ‘were
trained and equipped by the US at a cost of billions of dollars’, the country’s stability only
seemed to deteriorate. Moreover, ISIL had confiscated countless army Humvees and tanks
from fleeing Iraqi soldiers. Ghazi and Arango frame the rise of ISIL as a failure of Obama’s
Administration.

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 Although Ghazi and Arango acknowledge the military power of the ISIL, as of January 4,
they ridicule its fighters because they ‘apparently did not know how to use the tanks,
because an ISIL militant had put out a call over a mosque’s loudspeaker: ‘if anyone knows
how to drive a tank, please come to the mosque.’

Fall of Mosul (June 2014)

June 10: Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul
When Mosul fell to ISIL on June 9 2014, Times journalists enhanced their critical approach of
Obama’s foreign policies. Journalists Suadad Al-Salhy and Tim Arango state that critics had
long warned that America’s withdrawal of troops from Iraq, ‘without leaving even a token
force, invited an insurgent revival’. They even state that the takeover of Mosul ‘helps
vindicate those (..) who have called for arming more moderate groups in the Syrian conflict’.
They point out that the fall of Mosul is especially painful because it was ‘the last major
urban area to be pacified by American troops, and when they left, the United States
contended that Iraq was on the path to peace and democracy’. With the latter, they openly
criticize Obama’s Iraq policy. The ISIL-led disruption of Iraq clearly was his responsibility,
they argue.
In addition, Al-Salhy and Arango suggest that the rise of ISIL seemed to ‘add to the foreign
policy woes of the Obama administration, which has faced sharp criticism for its swap of five
Taliban officers for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl’ and now also ‘must answer questions about the
death of five Americans by friendly fire on Monday night.’
The journalist duo points out that when ISIL had taken Falluja, ‘the US rushed guns,
ammunition and Hellfire missiles to Iraq, but those seemed to make little difference.’ They
point out that Obama’s strategy is actually counterproductive, as million dollars worth of
arms had fallen in the hands of ISIL militans, ‘including American-made Humvees’. They also
emphasize the complete incompetence of the American-trained Iraqi army, suffering
countless consecutive crushing defeats.

June 15: Rebels’ Fast Strike in Iraq Was Years in the Making
Considering ISIL just has ‘a few thousands fighters, the group’s lightning sweep into Mosul
and farther south, appear to catch many Iraqi and American officials by surprise’, write Tim
Arango, Kareem Fahim and Ben Hubbard. In reality, the territorial gains of ISIL had been
part of a years long strategy of ‘state-building’, they argue. ‘It has published voluminously,
even issuing annual reports, to document its progress in achieving its goals’, of which its
Iraqi predecessor ISI even published a pamphlet in 2007 ‘laying out its vision for Iraq’.
ISIL’s success after the Americans left in 2011, ‘was largely dismissed – or played down –
by American officials’, they write. In 2012, when civilian casualties in Iraq were rising
according to UN data, VP’s adviser Anthony J Blinken, ‘wrote that violence was ‘at historic
lows’. The Obama Administration also ignored top army intelligence officials, that ISIL
would most likely ‘will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria to exhibit its strength in
2014’.
The US is facing very severe problems, the authors argue, as ISIL has gained the support of
Iraq’s Sunnis, sharing a common enemy: Shia PM Al-Maliki. Also in Syria it has conquered
huge areas. Also many Baath military commanders, moderate Sunni Saddam Hussein
loyalists, have joined ISIS. The group’s rise though, they state, is a direct consequence of the
American legacy in Iraq. American Prisons as Abu Ghraib, ‘were fertile recruiting grounds
for jihadist leaders, and virtual universities, where leaders would indoctrinate their recruits
with hard-line ideologies.’
ISIL’s rise should not have caught American officials surprise, the Times reporters argue.
They should not have ignored warnings by both military and political advisers. They frame

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the rise of ISIL as a failing of the Obama administration, which should have screened the
danger of the militants if they had only paid attention. Now, Iraq and Syria are completely
disrupted. Obama’s foreign policy is failing dramatically.

Yazidi crisis (August 2014)

August 8: Fear of ‘Another Benghazi’ Drove White House to Airstrikes in Iraq
In early August, during their advance in northern Iraq, ISIL had killed thousands of Yazidis, a
religious minority its militants consider devil worshippers. Thousands were fleeing into the
Sinjar mountains, without any water, nutrition or first aid. Also, American interests were
exposed to danger as ISIL forces had launched a siege on the Kurdish capital Erbil, a beacon
of pro-American tranquility and home to an important American consulate.
Times journalists Mark Landler and Alissa J. Rubin write that General E. Dempsey had
warned the president that American interests were in danger. On Aug 7 Obama had
authorized airstrikes against ISIL to ‘save’ Erbil. Landler and Rubin argue that Obama had
ordered force in order to prevent a ‘second Benghazi’:
‘Looming over that discussion, and the decision to return the United States to a war Mr.
Obama had built his political disparaging, was the specter of an earlier tragedy: the
September 2012 attack on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, which killed four
Americans, including Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, and has become a potent symbol
of weakness for critics of the president.’
Landler and Rubin conducted several interviews with officers that ‘paint a portrait of a
president forced by the unexpectedly rapid deterioration of security in Iraq to abandon his
longstanding reluctance to use military force.’ Although they approve of Obama’s decision,
they argue that more needs to be done because the Kurdish ground forces were not capable
of halting ISIL. Lander and Rubin write that they are ‘demoralized, uncertain,
underequipped and facing a formidable foe along several hundred miles of border between
the Kurdistan region and Iraq’s Nineveh and Kirkuk Provinces, where the militants are now
the dominant force.’ Many also were ‘daunted’ when they discovered that ISIL militants
were driving in bullet-proof vehicles, ‘that left the peshmerga’s bullets doing little more than
pockmarking the metal.’
The Times reporters mention an outcry by Kurdish army commanders to the Americans,
‘we told them: ‘we cannot hold it for very long. We are not a country; we don’t have an army;
we don’t have aircraft (..) I said: ‘We are fighting in the front lines now. You have to help us.’
Consecutively, they write, ‘On Thursday evening, after a long day in the West Wing, Mr.
Obama had a message for Iraqis: “Today, America is coming to help.”
What is striking about this article, titled ‘Fear of ‘Another Benghazi’ Drove White House to
Airstrikes in Iraq’, is the blatant support of airstrikes against ISIL. On top of that, they don’t
discuss risks, setbacks, potential civilian casualties, or challenge Obama’s decision in any
way. Instead, they present airstrikes as a fundamental step in order to protect the American
consulate in Erbil. They frame the use of force as inevitable, justified to prevent genocide
and protect American interests.

August 9: No Water, Nothing

A day later, NYT correspondent Alissa J. Rubin, reported about the events from Sinjar.
She remarks that President Obama had called the attacks on Yazidis ‘potential genocide’, but
that in reality he hasn’t done enough to help the Yazidis. Rubin points out that ‘airdrops by
the Iraqi government and by the Americans have reached a number of the refugees, but the
scale of the mountain, its many folds and crevasses, means that the refugees are scattered
across miles of scrabble wastes.’
Rubin describes the complete despair, stories of decapitations, parents crying over their

28
daughters being abducted. She also emphasizes that local Yazidi militias and Kurdish
Peshmerga forces were not capable to halt ISIL’s offensive. She quotes a UN associate: ‘If we
don’t get it up to them, the more people will die; the more we wait, the more they die’.
The last lines of the article, consist of a short interview with a Yazidi refugee. His words are
inundated with despair and a call for help: ‘We thought ISIS would only stay a short time in
our village and we thought the Kurdish fighters would succeed in beating back ISIS,” said
Mrs. Aslan, explaining that their village had been defended by peshmerga soldiers. “But they
used up all their bullets”, she said, looking down. Her husband nodded and said: “We can
never go back to our village, or we will die.
Rubin approves of Obama’s decision to launch airstrikes but urges him to do more to act in
order to prevent genocide. She frames ISIL as a band of bloodthirsty thugs, the international
community, the US particularly, are the forces of good, protecting innocent civilians from
certain death.

August 9: Airstrikes May Continue for Months, Obama Says

Just a few days after Obama ordered airstrikes, he explained that they would most likely be
extended. Times journalists Michael D. Shear and Tim Arango quote the president: ‘I don’t
think we’re going to solve this problem in weeks. This is going to be a long term project.’
Shear and Arango comment that ‘the open-ended nature of Mr. Obama’s actions presents a
tricky political problem for a President who campaigned against what he once called ‘a
dumb war’ and repeatedly pressed Republicans to set a date for the departure of American
troops from the battlefield. The last American troops left Iraq in December 2011, yet Mr.
Obama finds himself in charge of a new, if very different, military operation there with no
certain end in sight.’
They also warn that ‘his acknowledgment that the effort in Iraq will take time may not be
enough to satisfy republican critics.’ They quote Senator John Mccain: ‘Obviously, the
president of the US does not appreciate this is not just a threat to American troops on the
ground, or even Iraq or Kurdistan. This is a threat to America.’ Although they discuss the
challenges Obama faces at home, the Times reporters do not discuss the risks or prospects
of the military strikes for the situation in Northern Iraq.
Generally, Shear and Arango approve of Obama’s announcement that the fight might turn
into a long term project. The duo emphasizes the strength of ISIL, which cannot be
underestimated, they argue: ‘It has shown an intent to act strategically when it comes to
natural resources. But its control over the fragile Mosul dam also gives the group the ability
to create a civilian catastrophe: A break could unleash a tidal wave over Mosul and cause
flooding and deaths long the Tigris River south to Baghdad and beyond, experts say.’
Instead of critically examine Obama’s military invasion, Shear and Arango, just like Rubin,
welcome his plans. They quote the offensive as Inevitable and Just. In fact, they criticize him
for not doing enough to halt ISIL. Also in this article, there is a tremendous lack of skeptical
reporting and even a sense of jingoism.

August 2014: decapitation of James Foley and Sotloff.

On August 20, Obama informed the American public about the beheading of James Foley, an
American journalist. He personally got on television to say that this ‘cancer’ (ISIL) needs to
be extracted from the Middle East. ‘We will continue to confront this hateful terrorism’ and
‘A thing we can all agree on is that a group like ISIL has no place in the 21st century’.

August 21: Despite ISIS Horror, Congress Is Wary of U.S. Military Expansion
The next day, Times Journalist Mark Landler wrote an article reflecting on the execution of
Foley and Obama’s speech. The article is inundated with framing technics, even featured in
the title itself: ‘ISIS Horror’. Times reporters had shown their disapproval of ISIL’s terror

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before, but never so blatantly as in this article. Landler proceeds to speak about the
‘gruesome’ execution of an ‘American journalist, James Foley’. Landler wonders why both
Democrats and Republicans only ‘warily’ back Obama’s airstrikes against ISIL, despite the
‘intensely emotional reaction from lawmakers in both parties’ about such a ‘gruesome’
attack on an American citizen. Landler mentions that especially Democrats ‘deeply oppose
any new war in the Middle East’.
However, the reporter suggests that even in the Democratic Party support for an expanded
mission against ISIL rises. Adam Schiff for instance, a Democrat for California, who shares
Landler’s notion of ‘Horror’: ‘Seldom is the descriptor ‘evil’ applied with perfect accuracy as
it is with this monstrous group.’ Also Senator Dianne Feinstein is in favor of ‘coordinated
and sustained action’ because ‘only then can we reverse ISIL’s rise and eliminate this very
dangerous threat.’ Peter Welch, a Vermont Democrat, says: ‘This horrendous event has got a
lot of folks in Congress talking”, but it doesn’t give us a license to ignore the lessons of
George W. Bush in Iraq.’ Landler then proceeds to name Republican after Republican,
expressing their fierce criticism on Obama for not doing enough against ISIL.
But still, Landler argues, ‘little has changed in Congress (..) even if a vote to use military
action in response to an attack on Americans would naturally draw more support than
intervening in a distant cival war.’ Even though, Foleys death ‘brought the conflict much
closer to home than a threat to an unfamiliar religious minority like the Yazidi, it did not
remove the hurdles to a more widespread campaign’, Landler paraphrased the words of
some analysts.
Landler’s article conveys a sense of jingoism. He is surprised that such a ‘gruesome’
execution of an ‘American journalist’ doesn’t seem to result in a more homogeneous support
for military expansion in Congress. The use of terms such as ‘ISIS horror’ and ‘gruesome
execution’, frame ISIL as a barbaric bloodthirsty organization. Never before, was the
Atrocities frame so powerfully imposed in Times’ coverage as during the aftermath of Foley’s
death.
This also highlights Landler’s jingoism. Although Times journalists Rubin and Arango also
use the Good vs. Evil’ frame, Landler goes further by using strong terms as mentioned above
to dehumanize ISIL. What is also striking, is that Landler, just like other Times journalists I
have studied, doesn’t discuss the potential risks of military expansion against ISIL.
What is also conspicuous about this article, is how quickly Times journalists seem to
endorse Administration rhetoric. Before the murder of Foley, Obama had been cautious with
his choice of words. After Foley’s decapitation, his emotional speeches frequently featured
terms as ‘horror’, ‘barbarism’ and ‘gruesome’. In New York Times coverage, we see an
interesting parallel. Earlier, Times journalists had been rather discreet. After Foley’s death,
words as ‘horror’ and ‘gruesome’ suddenly were suddenly endorsed as coverage vocab.

September 2: ISIS Says It Killed Steven Sotloff After U.S. Strikes

Only 10 days after the beheading of James Foley, ISIL released another video, claiming the
death of Steven Sotloff, another American journalist. On Sept 2, Times reporters Mark
Landler and Eric Schmitt, wrote that ‘the video raised pressure on the president to order
military strikes on the group in its sanctuary in Syria.’ They argue that the videotaped
beheadings have transformed the group ‘into one of the most urgent threats facing the
president.’
The latter is conspicuous, not the complete disruption of the Middle-East by ISIL, but, as
they suggest, the beheadings of two American journalist are Obama’s biggest threat. In a
sense, they are right, the murders of two American nationals have a way more significant
impact on the American public. But by stating this so ad hoc, Landler and Schmitt imply that
they share this belief.
They proceed by suggesting that ‘the killing raises difficult questions for Mr. Obama, who

30
last Friday said he had not yet formulated a strategy for using military force against the
militants in Syria.’ The decapitation video had ‘an emotional resonance and stoked calls on
Capitol Hill and elsewhere for Mr. Obama to act more boldly.’
Also in this article, the use of the Good vs. Evil frame is very present. Landler and Schmitt
write about the ‘horrifying’ killing of Sotloff and about the ‘harrowing images of Americans
with knives to their throats’. The latter implies that not just two individuals, but the whole
American nation is under attack.
Landler and Schmitt write that ‘as horrifying this latest killing was, some former officials
predicted that it would have little effect on Mr. Obama’s deliberations’, as ‘the the farther
west the US strikes ISIS, the more it will be seen as intervening on behalf of President Bashar
al-Assad in the Syrian civial war.’ Here we see a striking difference with the article covering
the murder of Foley: here they do write about the difficult dilemmas Obama is facing.
Again, we see the use of strong words such as ‘horrifying’ and ‘gruesome’, to frame ISIL’s
practices as an atrocity. Also the Good vs. Evil is very present. What is striking about this
article, is the assumption of Landler and Schmitt that the beheadings ‘raise pressure’ on
Obama. They themselves though, are part of that pressure. In some cases, Times journalists
would argue that the political pressure on Obama rises, but often they also write it down
with no relation to politics or societal developments, suggesting they themselves raise
pressure on Obama.

September 3. After Beheading of Steven Sotloff, Obama pledges to Punish ISIS

Here, framing is also present in the article’s title: ‘Punish’. This word has a connotation of ‘an
act of justice’. The fact that journalist Julie Hirschfeld Davis uses this word as a natural given,
suggests that she shares this interpretation. After the news of Sotloff’s death came out,
‘President Obama vowed on Wednesday to punish the Sunni militants whose videotaped
beheadings of two American journalists he said had ‘repulsed the world’, saying the United
States would lead a regional and international coalition to beat back the terrorists’, she
writes.
Davis argues that ‘Mr Obama’s strongly worded statement came after he drew criticism
from allies and foes last week, when he said that he had not yet developed a strategy for
confronting ISIS in Syria’. She suggests that Obama yielded to pressure of critics. According
to Davis, Obama still doesn’t have a clear vision to target ISIL: ‘Pressed on whether he was
talking about the elimination of ISIS, Mr. Obama suggested he was seeking instead to limit
the group’s reach.’
Davis frames Obama’s pledge to be inevitable and just, as ISIL has to to be ‘punished’ for the
beheadings of Foley and Sotloff.

September/October 2014: War on ISIL declared

September 10: Highlights From Obama’s Speech on ISIS
On Wednesday September 10, when Obama announced his plan to ‘degrade, and ultimately
destroy ISIL’, Times journalists Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger and Mark Landler, covered his
speech in a live-blog. They would at times quote the President, but mostly provide analysis.
Schmitt for instance, would quote the president calling ISIL a ‘warped ideology’, but would
himself accredit the group with ‘brutal’ tactics. Sanger wonders why Obama would declare
war on this specific date: ‘Because two Americans were horrifically beheaded? Because ISIS
has taken territory? He did not say.’ Sanger is also surprised that in Obama’s speech there
was no mention of the following: ‘it is the one with perhaps the greatest influence in the new
battleground against ISIS. The country is Iran, and in this case America’s interests and
Tehran’s have tremendous overlap.’ Sanger implies he would be supportive of a possible
alliance with Iran, especially because its ‘interests’ are similar in this conflict.
Instead of outlining possible risks of the war, the Times suggests Obama should bond with

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foe Iran, to halt ISIL. Again, no skeptical reporting. No mention of the potential danger of this
potential alliance or American airstrikes for civilian population of Iraq and Syria.

September 29: Here There Is No Why (For ISIS, Slaughter Is an End in Itself)
Times’ International Affairs and Diplomacy expert, Roger Cohen, dedicated himself to write
an opinion piece on ISIS, inundated with framing technics and jingoism.
To characterize the inhuman character of ISIS, he quotes a passage of Primo Levi’s book
‘Survival in Auschwitz’, to characterize the moment ‘when the human meets the inhuman’:
‘Levi looks around in search of some means to quench his thirst: ‘I eyed a fine icicle outside
the window, within hand’s reach. I opened the window and broke off the icicle but once a
large, heavy guard prowling outside brutally snatched it away from me. ‘Warum?’ I asked in
my poor German ‘Hier ist kein Warum (there is no why here), he replied, pushing me inside
with a shove.’
‘There is no why here’, Cohen proceeds. ‘The phrase has been reverberating in me since I
watched a henchman of the organization that calls itself Islamic State behead two American
journalists. (..) How many times they must have asked themselves the why of their captivity,
humiliation and torture right up to the moment when a small knife was applied, with a
sawing motion to their throats.’ Cohen argues that although ISIL pledges they ultimately
want to restore the Caliphate, ‘but whose raison d’être is the slaughter itself.’
Although Cohen argues that ‘facile invocation of it (WWII) is too frequent, belittling the
phenomenon and its victims’, ISIL’s inhumanity is unprecedented in the post WWII-era.
‘Presented with the counter-human, the human must fight back’, Cohen argues. The world
has to learn from the mistakes in WWII, when there was no mention of the Jews in the
‘Statement of Atrocities’ of October 1943, ‘although millions had been gassed or shot by
then.’ That’s why the world now can’t simply say: ‘Leave it to the Arabs, it’s their mess, they
can clean it up’. Therefore he wholeheartedly supports Obama’s decision to intervene.
‘President Obama’s coalition in the war to eradicate ISIS may be flimsy but passivity was not
an option.’
The latter is striking. By saying Obama’s coalition is ‘flimsy’ he suggests that a lot more
needs to be done, like boots on the ground, to root out ISIL. Also the WWII frame is
conspicuous: the first time since the rise of ISIL, that a Times journalist so blatantly infused
it. But Hawkish Cohen doesn’t stop there: ‘In this fight, I would say, all means are good. The
Soviet Union, an ideological rival, was a key ally of the United States in defeating Nazism. It is
obvious which nation today can play that role against ISIS. Its name is Iran.’
Although this is an opinion piece, it has lots of parallels with regular news articles I have
studied, such as the jingoism, the suggested alliance with Iran, the Good vs. Evil frame, the
Atrocities frame and the notion that Obama should do more to halt ISIL. Cohen’s piece also
reveals the strong emotion that some Times journalists experience when they write about
ISIL.

September 29: Many Missteps in Assessment of ISIS Threat

Times reporters Eric Schmitt and Peter Baker published a devastating article about Obama’s
assessment of ISIL’s danger on September 29. Schmitt and Baker suggest that Obama had
ignored warnings from Pentagon officials for way too long. They argue that the White House
had ‘failed’ in anticipating the rise ‘of a militant force that in the space of a few months has
redrawn the map of the Middle East resonates inside and outside the Obama
administration.’ They point out that Obama made security services into scapegoats, by
merely pointing at them.
Schmitt and Baker argue that both Obama and the services were ‘caught off guard’ by the
speed of ISIL’s rise. As an example, they mention that both Obama and Congress reacted
negatively on PM Al-Malikis request for American weaponry and airstrikes. Among other

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missteps, they state that dozens Administration officials had informed Obama of ISIL
endangering American interests. When Falluja and Ramadi fell in hands of the terrorist
group, the U.S. should have directly intervened to halt its insurgency. ‘Since Falluja and
Ramadi had long been hotbeds of Sunni extremist sentiment, American officials assumed the
Islamic State could be checked there and eventually rolled back’, although ‘intelligence
agencies warned against such an assumption.’
But with the fall of Ramadi and Fallujah, ‘by then, it was too late’, they suggest, because
‘thousands of Sunni militants poured over the border from Syria and seized control of
Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city.’ They doubt that Obama’s approach will work now because
he was basically forced to do something and doubt if Obama is fully determined to annihilate
ISIL. ‘For Mr. Obama, the question now is whether this approach works any better than the
last one.’
Reading this article, it is almost as though one is reading an opinion piece, rather than an
analysis in a newspaper as ‘progressive’ and ‘balanced’ as The New York Times. In a
devastating article, Schmitt and Baker analyze the miserable failing of President Obama
assessing ISIL’s threat, in what they call, a whole series of ‘Missteps’. Schmitt and Baker,
acting like pro-war Hawks, suggest the Obama’s policy is flimsy and even state he should
have acted with full force against ISIL much earlier.
Times journalists have repeatedly argued that Obama should do more to halt these
extremist militants, but never so blatantly and devastating as in this article. The authors
frame the military offensive against ISIL as inevitable and just. They don’t discuss the
hazards of war, but instead, the danger of not responding with full force. Skeptical reporting,
yes. But not questioning the war, but the lack of violence. Since the beheadings of Foley and
Sotloff, New York Times reporters have increasingly become patriotic, but not to such an
extent as of September 29. When America’s interests were in danger in Iraq, the President
should have directly intervened. This is one of Obama’s many missteps, the authors argue.

October 2: The Fundamental Horror of ISIS

In this New York Times Editorial, issued some weeks after Obama had vowed to ‘ultimately
degrade and destroy ISIL’, the editorial board reveals its abhorrence of the terrorist group.
With use of strong words and framing technics, they argue that ‘no Islamist group before, no
other offshoot of Al Qaeda or Hamas or Hezbollah, has so nakedly adopted a cult of sadism,
not only as a weapon in its stated goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate but as the very
reason for its existence.’ The board is also repulsed by the fact that militants seem to ‘revel’
in ‘taking a knife to the throats of innocent men’.
The newspaper has taken a firm stance: it absolutely despises ISIL, which has reached
such a ‘level of evil’, they argue, that ‘even Al Qaeda, an extremist movement responsible for
the horrors of 9/11 and innumerable other acts of terror, was compelled to disown the
Islamic State’s brand of savagery.’ Even the label ‘crimes against humanity’ will not
accurately describe ISIS, the editorial board argues, because such a term ‘is to put a legalistic
spin on raw evil.’
With continuous use of words as ‘gruesome’, ‘evil’, ‘savagery’, ‘horror’ and ‘remorseless’,
the editorial board frames ISIS strongly than ever before as a force of evil, a sadistic army of
Satan itself. That’s why, they argue, ‘that it must be degraded and ultimately destroyed’,
using the words of the President. ‘The United States and its allies, including several Arab
states, have accepted the challenge, but it will not be quick or easy.’
The mere use of the word ‘challenge’ shows its full support for the war. The forces of good,
they argue, using an almost Lord Of The Rings like rhetoric, have united against ISIL, the
forces of evil. To argue that The New York Times shows itself an ardent advocate of war
against ISIL in this piece, is a euphemism. Its editors have transformed into proper hawks.
They are immensely proud of their President to take up the ‘challenge’ to destroy ISIS. This

33
also explains why the newspaper had such difficulties maintaining journalistic ethics after
the murder of Foley and Sotloff. Reporters resorted to the use of words such as ‘gruesome’,
‘horror’ and ‘harrowing’ and their articles were inundated with framing technics.
Although this piece is an Editorial, it features striking parallels with regular newspapers I
have studied. The frames, choice of words, no criticism of the war itself and the large
proportions of jingoism are identical, only more bluntly. What it reveals though is the
abundance of emotion of the Times editors, inevitably translated back into their regular
reporting some way or another.

Present: status quo (Summer of 2015)

July 21: ISIS Transforming Into Functioning State That Uses Terror as Tool
Eight months later, during the summer of 2015, Times correspondent Tim Arango wrote an
article about the functioning of the Islamic State. A year into the war, Times articles remain
induced with framing technics, portraying ISIL as a band of thugs: ‘The Islamic State uses
terror to force obedience and frighten enemies’, he writes. And: ‘destroyed antiquities,
slaughtered minorities and turned children into killers’. Arango accredits ISIL to be even
‘more coldblooded’ than Al Qaeda. The word ‘coldblooded’ is used to frame the group as the
embodiment of savagery and indiscriminate massacres. Despite its terror, Arango argues,
ISIL has managed to build op a functioning state, of relative stability and free of corruption.
Nonetheless, its only governing tool is ‘terror’, such as releasing ‘gory’ beheading videos’ and
‘graphic brutality’. Again, the frame of Atrocities comes to the fore.
The US might need to revise its military ISIL-strategy, Arango writes, because the current
approach has not driven the group out of key Iraqi and Syrian cities such as Mosul and
Raqqa. Consequently, ISIL is consolidating as a state, also slowly winning the support of
even moderate Sunnis for replacing a decade of war and anarchy with relative stability.
Arango argues that more needs to be done to defeat ISIL, otherwise ISIL will keep
consolidating its position.
As we have seen earlier in this case-study, Times journalists are not hesitant to convey a
sense of jingoism and pro-war rhetoric. Still, there is no mention of civilian casualties in one
single Times article I have studied. Times journalists are so preoccupied with their own
agenda -targeting ISIL- that they seem to forget to stick to their journalistic standards.

August 12: U.S. Jets Meet Limit as Iraqi Ground Fight Against ISIS Plods On
Aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, in the Persian Gulf, Times
correspondent Helene Cooper, covers the siege of the ISIL-occupied city of Ramadi. It
already is ‘one of the worst defeats for the American-led coalition’, she writes. ’10 weeks
into the campaign to retake Ramadi, it remains in the control of ISIS’. Cooper argues that
aboard the carrier, it ‘is the ultimate paradox: No matter how fast, expensive and advanced
the American air campaign – and it is all of those things – warfare in Iraq remains a slow and
grinding business.’
She proceeds to lament that American jets cannot go ‘as fast as their partners on the
ground’, cause in this ‘new American way of warfare’, those partners are not ‘highly trained
American troops, with more than a decade of combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan
under their belts, communicating directly on the telephone in English with the American
pilots overhead’.
Instead, these partners are Iraqi soldiers, who call for airstrikes in Arabic to their
commanders, who then ‘relay that information to command centers in Baghdad and Erbil,
where American controllers then call the pilots in the air’. This practice can be described as
a ‘convoluted game of telephone that can add crucial minutes to the overall enterprise’.
Cooper also argues that Iraqi soldiers don’t have the combat equipment that American
marines have. One pilot, who flew several missions over Ramadi, said that ISIL had blown up

34
all bridges, leaving the Iraqi army paralyzed. To American troops that would not pose a
problem, she argues, since they could simply lay out their own bridges to cross rivers.
But even in the air, Cooper writes, American pilots often return from missions without
having fired one missile, cause frequently they would not scan any militants in the targeted
area or would have to refuel. ‘Frustrating’, Cooper quoted fighter pilot John Izzo. Frustrated
is not only pilot John Izzo, also author Cooper is. The ‘new American way of warfare’, as
Cooper describes Obama’s strategy to offer air support to local allies on the ground, is
failing, she argues. Not only the lack of communication between Iraqi troops and American
military command fuels that, also the complete inability of the ill-equipped Iraqi forces to
combat ISIL. As she elaborately describes, well-trained, well-equipped experienced
American marines could easily do the job. Without them, the war against ISIL can’t be won,
is Cooper’s suggestion.
Once again, we see a Times journalist argues Obama is failing in his effort to tackle ISIS, and
should in fact do more. Also the call for the deployment of ground troops among Times
journalists seems to grow louder, as the status quo lingers on. Again there is no mention of
civilian casualties. No skeptical reporting about the war effort itself, only criticism that
Obama should enhance his military ambitions. Cooper frames the latter as something
inevitable, because otherwise, the war can’t be won, she argues.

August 14: ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape

As ISIL consolidates power in its conquered territories in both Iraq and Syria, it has
reintroduced slavery and developed a Theology of rape, Times journalist Rukmini Callimachi
argues. Her study contains several graphic accounts and interviews of Yazidi girls and
women who had endured months of captivity as sex-slaves.
An interview with a young teenager: ‘In the moments before he raped the 12-year old girl,
the Islamic State fighters took the time to explain that was he was about to do was not a sin.
Because the preteen girl practice a religion other than Islam, the Quran not only gave him
the right to rape her – it condoned and encouraged it, he insisted.’
‘He bound her hands and gagged her. Then he knelt beside the bed and prostrated himself
in prayer before getting on top of her. ‘I kept telling him it hurts – please stop,’ said the girl,
whose body is so small an adult could circle her waist with two hands’. Especially the latter
reveals the author’s abhorrence of ISIL’s rape practices, as this girl is so young, it is
incredibly despicable and inhumane.
Callimachi states that ‘interviews with 21 women and girls who recently escaped the
Islamic State, as well as an examination of the group’s official communications, illuminate
how the practice has been enshrined the group’s core tenets’. ISIL has even recently
published a ‘detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery’, she writes.
Escapees have described the sex slave trade, as being part of a well-planned bureaucracy,
since contracts are issued to captured women, Callimachi writes. ‘When their owner would
sell them to another buyer, a new contract would be drafted, like transferring a property
deed’. The latter suggests that the author frames the practice as a commodification, thus
dehumanization. The closing lines of Callimachi’s article contain a very graphic account of
the brutal rape of another 12 year old, inevitably compelling the reader. An older Yazidi
woman, who witnessed it all, said the girl was raped for days on end by ISIL militants
despite intense bleeding. “He destroyed her body. She was badly infected. The fighter kept
coming and asking me, ‘Why does she smell so bad?’ And I said, she has an infection on the
inside, you need to take care of her,’ the woman said’.

35
The following lines emphasize how much the author despises the ISIL militants, in which the
Atrocities frame of Times coverage, reaches its culmination: ‘Unmoved, he ignored the girl’s
agony, continuing the ritual of praying before and after raping the child.’ Callimachi frames
the practices as something so repulsive, that it is hard to comprehend. Especially also the
last lines frame the militants as sadistic rapists, who somehow has the ludicrous notion that
their brutal acts are part of worshipping God. In Callimachi’s article therefore is inundated
with the Good vs. Evil frame.

36
Conclusion and discussion

Not the mass slaughter of Shias, the beheadings of countless civilians during the sieges of
Falluja and Mosul, not the thousands of Yazidi slaughtered during the Sinjar crisis, but
instead, it took two decapitations of American nationals to enrage journalists of the New
York Times. A war declaration quickly followed, and Times journalists wholeheartedly
supported Obama in his ambition to halt ISIL. That’s a long story short, let’s zoom in now to
the most important conclusions of this case-study.
An important part of my hypothesis has been brutally rejected. I expected New York Times
reporters to be wary and skeptical to any new military expedition in Iraq, considering the
tremendous Iraq trauma, and also based on the findings of theoretical framework.
Journalists had been lied to in both the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War twelve years
later. In addition, they showed immense regret of their lack of skeptical reporting and
dismissal of journalistic values years later. That part of my hypothesis proved wrong.
Exactly the opposite happened.
Months prior to the war declaration in September 2014, Times editors would only blame
Obama for not doing enough to halt ISIL. As early as the takeover of Falluja, Obama’s Iraq
policy was heavily criticized by Times reporters and the rise of ISIL was entirely his fault,
because he didn’t leave ‘even a token force’ when he pulled out the troops in 2011. From
that point on, the voices of criticism only grew louder in the Times. The fall of Mosul was
reason for Times reporters to argue that Obama would not have been taken by surprise if he
only had listened to warnings from his advisers. During the Yazidi crisis, when Obama
yielded and announced airstrikes, the Times didn’t point out the potential dangers of using
force. Obama was only criticized for not acting firmly enough.
The beheadings of Foley and Sotloff, had caused massive outrage among Times journalists.
The widespread terror, beheadings and massacres of Syrians and Iraqis hadn’t caused a shift
in word-choice. The murders of Foley and Sotloff did. Very strong words such as ‘ISIS
horror’, ‘gruesome’ and ‘harrowing’ were suddenly adopted. What is striking, is that Times
editors partially copied the rhetoric of Barack Obama, who had used words as ‘gruesome’ in
his speech, declaring war on ISIL, just some days earlier.
The latter is an indication of how deeply rooted journalists are in the societal
establishment. Just as Gans had pointed out, they are the ‘middle class citizens that rule
America’, who are likely to copy the rhetoric of their own leaders and denounce the enemy
as a threat to western values and interests. As the President’s rhetoric regarding ISIL
changes, so does that of journalists. Reporters would only encourage the President to show
his teeth.
By incorporating such strong words to characterize ISIL, the Atrocities metaframe was
adopted. As we have seen in my theoretical framework, in many wars, stories of atrocities
(fabricated or real) have strongly influenced journalists, to support the war effort. And so it
did in the case of ISIL coverage of the New York Times. Its editors fully supported Obama’s
ambition to defeat ISIL, following the beheadings. From that perspective, my hypothesis has
proved correct.
The metaframe Inevitable and Just is adopted by Times journalists from the Yazidi crisis
on, in a very powerful way. American interests in Erbil were under attack, and had to be
defended. Also Obama’s decision to ultimately destroy ISIL was framed as something
Inevitable and Just, as this branch of evil had to be defeated, and be punished for the
murders of Foley and Sotloff. During the summer of 2015, the deployment of boots on the
ground was framed as something inevitable, because otherwise, ISIL won’t be defeated,
Times journalists argue.
Without doubt, the metaframe Good vs. Evil, is the absolute Masterframe in my case-study,

37
as it has been in other wars I studied in my theoretical framework. This frame started to
emerge during the Yazidi crisis, but only really accelerated after the murders of Foley and
Sotloff. The USA was the embodiment of the ‘Good’, taking up the ‘challenge’ to defeat these
forces of ‘evil’. Generally, framing technics started to be powerfully imposed during the
aftermath of the murder of Foley and Sotloff. Before, massacres and beheadings were taking
place on the same scale, but the fact that two American nationals were involved changed
everything. ISIL transformed from a threat to American interests, into a force of evil which
had to be defeated. As I pointed out in my case study, as soon as journalists adopt a frame, it
gains organizational power. That’s exactly why it is so powerful and thus so harmful to
journalist ethics.
The latter emphasizes the jingoism of many Times journalists, already present in very early
stages of ISIL’s offensive, reaching a peak during the aftermath of the murders of Foley and
Sotloff. Many months later, during the summer of 2015, patriotic reporting would reach a
new high. Never before, would Times reporters so openly advocate for boots on the ground.
Jingoism has transformed into hawkish reporting. Also the Atrocities frame would reach a
new peak, with Times reporters openly despising ISIL’s rape theology in a news article. Also,
they argue, Obama should defeat ISIL before it consolidates an Islamic State. Still, there is no
mention of civilian casualties, which are estimated in the hundreds. How come Times
reporters don’t examine such a vital and indispensable aspect of war coverage?
Personally, I am extremely surprised by the incredible patriotic reporting at such an early
stage of the ISIL-crisis, only seeming to enhance until this day. After all the lies around the
last two Iraq was and the tremendous trauma that journalists endured, I wouldn’t have
expected this all. For some reason, when America’s interests are at stake, journalist become
paralyzed, not able to execute their profession they way they should. All traumas, all lies, all
regret of coverage of previous wars, no matter how fresh or recent, don’t seem to matter
when America’s interests are at stake or when war is looming again. Nor do journalistic
ethics.
No war I have studied in my theoretical framework is covered with such patriotism at
such an early stage as the War on ISIL. In that sense, this war is unique. If we look at ISIL as a
terrorist organization though, it is equally unique. Its nature is so relentlessly atrocious and
gruesome, and also tries its utmost, to come across as such. Therefore, it’s almost impossible
to sympathize with what many regard as ‘pure savagery’. The West seems to have reached a
consensus that ISIL really is a force of ‘evil’. In the past, some reporters at times
sympathized with the ‘just cause’ of the enemy, such as the independence seeking Vietcong,
but also the general innocence of the Iraqi people, who suffered as a whole for the fight
against Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, during both the Gulf War as the Iraq War. ISIL’s
doctrine of sadism, beheading, rape and terror is historically unique. This could therefore
serve as an explanation of the consensus of Times journalists to be so unanimously
compelled the practices of ISIL. The fact that the newspaper so ardently pleas for the
complete annihilation of ISIL on the other hand, is a clear sign the Times has completely
abandoned its journalistic ethics and values, with no eye for dark sides of the war, such as
civilian values. All articles are written to serve the anti-ISIL agenda of the Times.
Another explanation of the Times’ unanimous support for the war against ISIL could be,
that Obama, from the very beginning, vowed not to engage in a ground war in the Middle
East again. In that sense, American casualties would be extremely limited, and therefore the
war would have less chance to become unpopular, like the wars in Vietnam and Iraq.
Although the financial costs are high, the human cost is low. Paradoxically, the call for the
deployment of hawkish Times journalists only seems to grow. The coming months we will
see how the war against ISIL develops. The current strategy has lead to a status quo, with no
prospect of victory. Something has to change, obviously. If Obama breaks his promise and
deploys ground troops, I am very curious how the coverage in the New York Times will

38
change. Will jingoism prevail? Or will the inevitable military casualties raise questions on
the question if the USA should be involved in the war in the first place? Just like what
happened in Vietnam and Iraq? Will Times journalists, just as their predecessors of virtually
all wars I have studied, show regret for their jingoistic reports? For their complete denial of
civilian casualties and other dark sides of the war? This will all become clear in the coming
months/years.
Marvin Kalb, a renowned Washington Post reporter, showed immense regret of unchecked,
jingoistic reporting at times of the Gulf War. His words, written in 1994, turned out to be
prophetic, even two bloody traumatic Iraq wars later: ‘Journalist are wrapped in the
American flag no less proudly than the troops themselves’.

39
Bibliography

_______________________
Sources used in Theoretical Framework
Literature
Susan L. Carruthers, The Media At War. 2nd Edition. (New York 2011)

William Dorman, ‘A Debate Delayed Is A Debate Denied’ in: Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate. (New York

2006)

P Knightley, The first casualty: The war correspondents as hero and myth-maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore 2004)

Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front and the Ministry of Information in World War II (Crows Nest 1979)

Samuel Hynes ea, Reporting World War II: American Journalism. 1938-146 (New York 2001)

Daniel C Hallin, The Uncensored War: The media and Vietnam (Los Angeles 1989)

Tamar Liebes, ‘Performance Journalism: The Case of Media’s Coverage of War and Terror’ in: The Communication Review

(Jerusalem 2009)

Daniel C. Hallin ‘Images of War: The Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars in American Television’, in: Viewing War: How the
Media Handled the Persian Gulf, (New Brunswick 1994)
Yasemin Inceoglu, ‘Continuity in Disinformation: With some examples from the War on Iraq’ in (Istanbul 2014)

Marvin Kalb, ‘A View from the Press’, in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf war. (Chicago

1994)

Lance W. Bennet, ‘The News about Foreign Policy’ in: Taken by Storm: the media, public opinion and U.S. foreign policy in the gulf

war. (Chicago 1994)

Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester 1998)

Seth C. Lewis and Stepen D. Reese, What is the war on Terror? Framing through the eyes of journalists (Austin 2009)

Naomi Klein, Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York 2007)

Newspapers
J.R. Gritz, ‘Interview Andrew Nagorski: Early warnings: How American Journalist reported the Rise of Hitler’ The Atlantic

Herbert J. Gans, ‘Since Spiro Agnew Brought Up The Subject, How Well Does TV Present the News?’, The New York Times (Januari 11

1970)

Audiovisuals
Joseph Strick, ‘interviews with My Lai veterans’ (Laser film corp. 1970)
Shooting with a camera: The Modern American War’, JP Keenan. (2009)

Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the U.S. Marines – Gulf War Journalism. Molly Moore (C SPAN 18-7-1993)

George W. Bush addresses Congress. Live. CNN (20-9-2001)

________________________
Sources used in ISIL explainer
Literature
Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York 2015)

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Newspapers
Danny Romero ‘ISIS timeline: A year under the so-called Islamic State’ The Independent (28 6 2015)|
Graeme Wood ‘What ISIS Really Wants’ The Atlantic (March 2015)
‘Timeline: ISIS hostage killings’ The Guardian (16 11 2014)
‘Battle for Kobane: Key events’ BBC World News (25 6 2015)
Graham Allison ‘Defeating ISIS: With Whose Boots on the Ground?’ The Atlantic (27 10 2014)

_________________________________
Sources used in case study New York Times
July 12: Syrian Infighting Undermines Anti-Assad Effort
[Link]
[Link]?_r=0

January 4: Qaeda-Linked Militants in Iraq Secure Nearly Full Control of Falluja

[Link]
[Link]

June 10: Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul

[Link]

June 15: Rebels’ Fast Strike in Iraq Was Years in the Making
[Link]
[Link]?_r=1&assetType=nyt_now

August 8: Fear of ‘Another Benghazi’ Drove White House to Airstrikes in Iraq

[Link]
[Link]?_r=0

August 9: No Water, Nothing

[Link]
[Link]

August 9: Airstrikes May Continue for Months, Obama Says

[Link]

August 21: Despite ISIS Horror, Congress Is Wary of U.S. Military Expansion
[Link]
[Link]?_r=0

September 2: ISIS Says It Killed Steven Sotloff After U.S. Strikes

[Link]
[Link]

September 3. After Beheading of Steven Sotloff, Obama pledges to Punish ISIS

[Link]
[Link]?_r=0

41
September 10: Highlights From Obama’s Speech on ISIS
[Link]

September 29: Here There Is No Why (For ISIS, Slaughter Is an End in Itself)
[Link]
[Link]

September 29: Many Missteps in Assessment of ISIS Threat

[Link]
[Link]

October 2: The Fundamental Horror of ISIS

[Link]

July 21: ISIS Transforming Into Functioning State That Uses Terror as Tool
[Link]
[Link]

August 12: U.S. Jets Meet Limit as Iraqi Ground Fight Against ISIS Plods On
[Link]
[Link]

August 14: ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape

[Link]
[Link]

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