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Political Change in Madagascar:

Populist democracy or neopatrimonialism by another name?

Richard R. Marcus

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ISS Paper 89 • August 2004
STUDIES
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INTRODUCTION The paper concludes by offering a tentative answer to

the question in the sub-title, considering whether
Madagascar’s political space is defined by the Madagascar has gone through a momentous change
country’s social movements. This is in contrast to in the nature of its democracy1 or whether it has given
many African states which have been shaped by a birth to a new incarnation of neopatrimonial rule in
history of domination by “big men”. In the case of which the president’s office is used more for personal
Madagascar, no leader has had as much influence on gain than public benefit.2
the nature of the political system, or its dynamics, as
the anti-colonial uprising of 1947, the military’s
dissolution of the First Republic in 1972, the strikes of MALAGASY POLITICS BEFORE 2002
1991, or the populist support for “democracy” that
Balkanised the country in 2002. Former President The colonial period
Didier Ratsiraka was the single largest
figure in Malagasy politics from 1975 to Madagascar became a French colony in
1992, yet the nature of his rule was 1896. Previously, the island had been
defined by the events of 1972 and the largely centralised under the Merina
President Marc monarchy of the central highlands. An
way he came to office, just as the
administration of Madagascar’s first Ravalomanana created earlier attempt by the French to govern
president, Philibert Tsirinana, was the 2002 uprising that indirectly through the Merina had failed,
defined by what had happened in 1947 so in 1896 the French colonial authorities
and Zafy Albert’s 1993 – 96 presidency
brought him to power, resorted to the model of direct rule.
was defined by the events of 1991. The but this event, in turn, Merina administrative personnel were
pattern appears to continue, but with an has now come to recruited, however, and came to be
interesting twist: President Marc relied upon throughout the country. This
Ravalomanana created the 2002 define him. resulted in a marked divide in privilege
uprising that brought him to power, but between the Merina and the seventeen
this event, in turn, has now come to other ethnic groups, nominally grouped
define him. together as côtier-coastal people. The
impact of this social divide continues to be felt today.
This paper examines the formation of the Third
Republic in 1992 in a historical context, and the On 28 September 1958 Madagascar held a successful
events leading up to the crisis of 2002, before turning referendum to determine whether it should become a
to consider the efforts of Marc Ravalomanana and the self-governing republic. A presidential election was
new government since. This should provide a better held, under French auspices, on 27 April 1959 in which
understanding of the institutional, social, and personal Philibert Tsiranana and his Parti Social Démocrate de
factors that influence Madagascar’s political direction. Madagascar (PSD) emerged victorious. On 26 June
To this end, this paper is divided into three sections: 1960, Madagascar gained full legal sovereignty from
the first traces the patterns of political events to 1992 France with President Tsirinana at the helm. Its
and the institutional structure that Ravalomanana has constitution created a state closely resembling the
inherited; the second outlines the events of 2002 and French system in its division of legislative and executive
their significance; the final section delves more deeply powers, but with a more powerful presidency.
into the person of Marc Ravalomanana, his
nationalistic views and their importance, his
relationship with the legislature and the judiciary, and After independence
his performance to date, before turning to the recent
emergence of challenges to his administration. The years of Madagascar’s First Republic, from 1960
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to 1975, were tumultuous ones. Tsirinana, an ethnic the effects of capital flight. Ratsiraka called for the
Tsimihety, maintained close ties with France, a stance assistance of the International Monetary Fund and,
of which many Malagasy disapproved. The Merina shortly thereafter, the World Bank, and bilateral
elite, which would have benefited from decreased American and European donors. The result was an
competition from French companies objected to the abandonment of the economic ideals of socialism and
new opportunities the president afforded côtier the retention of a strong, autocratic presidency
business leaders, experiencing little advantage from resistant to competition.
the political and economic changes that had taken
place. Many argued that the independence was only In 1989 President Ratsiraka, by then undisputed
nominal. By the end of the decade the country had autocratic leader for 14 years, had a problem. His
begun to run into difficult times economically, further economy was in tatters, he had a debt crisis stemming
eroding the president’s support base. The political from a donor bailout of his experiment in state-
sphere degenerated steadily until a student-led owned enterprise, and his most significant partner, the
general strike shut down much of the country in Soviet Union, was on the brink of collapse. For the
1972. On 13 May, government troops opened fire on first time his opponents were publicly challenging his
student demonstrators, killing at least a dozen and legitimacy, and his authority was waning.
wounding scores more. The president declared a state
of emergency and dissolved the parliament but, By 1991 Ratsiraka had become so weak that
unable to maintain control of a disintegrating country, opposition leader Zafy Albert was able to lead an
turned over power to General Gabriel Ramanantsoa 80,000-strong civil servants’ strike in Antananarivo. In
on 18 May 1972. August, 400,000 people marched on the city centre,
and Malagasy economic life came to a sudden halt as
General Ramanantsoa, a patrician Merina bureaucrat, banking, trading, and governance sectors ceased to
was able to placate the aristocracy, but was not able to function. The government was unable to stem the
stave off economic hardship or appease an angry crisis and in the wake of Ratsiraka’s loss of control Zafy
populace. On 5 February 1975 he turned over power to Albert set up a shadow government proclaiming
Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava, a Merina commoner. himself prime minister and the Haute Authorité, a
Ratsimandrava was assassinated five days later and political body of the 16 parties in the opposition
power was handed to the oligarchic National Military coalition the Hery Velona (Living Forces), the National
Directorate. To date many Malagasy consider the 1972 Assembly. Many embassies, including the United
– 75 period to be the real independence revolution, but States and France, started sending official
although there are similarities to be found with other correspondence to both “governments.” While this
revolutionary experiences, the fundamental social and was done on the pretext of remaining neutral, it had
institutional change experienced by France, Russia, and the effect of legitimising Zafy’s efforts. The surprisingly
others during revolutionary periods were not present in rapid and successful challenge from this parallel
Madagascar. Indeed, the continued role of an oligarchic legislature forced President Ratsiraka to the bargaining
military directorate, and the lack of fundamental table. On 31 October 1991 he signed the Panorama
institutional change, would suggest that the period of Convention allowing for a government transition. The
1972 – 1975 is better characterised as a slow coup. terms of the Convention left Ratsiraka as president, but
removed most of his powers. The Haute Authorité
On 15 June 1975 Lieutenant-Commander Didier effectively became the legislature. A constitutional
Ratsiraka, a Betsimisiraka from the Toamasina coast, convention was held in March 1992 and the new
was installed by the military directorate as head of constitution was approved by 70 percent of the
state and president of the Supreme Revolutionary population in a referendum on 19 August, creating
Council (SRC). A referendum on Ratsiraka’s elevation Madagascar’s Third Republic. Multiparty presidential
and his call for a new socialist government was held elections were held on 10 February 1993 and Zafy
on 21 December 1975, giving birth to the Second Albert emerged victorious with 66.74 percent of the
Republic. Ratsiraka quickly assumed the mantle of vote to Ratsiraka’s 33.26 percent. He was sworn in on
Leninist “scientific socialism”, in which a strong- 27 March 1993. The Hery Velona parties subsequently
armed administration leads the social revolution. won a clear majority in the 16 June 1993 legislative
According to his “Red Book”, Charter of the Malagasy elections. Madagascar had become a “democracy.”
Socialist Revolution, his “revolution” called for
benefiting the poor and decentralising administrative
functions – away from his Merina competitors in the The lack of institutionalisation
capital. In March 1977 Ratsiraka’s AREMA party won
a commanding 90 percent of seats in the country’s Madagascar’s institutional structure is based on its 1992
first local elections. Shortages of basic goods started constitution, and the delegation of powers roughly
the same year, even as he constructed ‘white follows the French system.3 The prime minister was
elephant’ manufacturing facilities throughout the appointed by the National Assembly and responsible
provinces and nationalised private industries. for domestic affairs. The president was the head of
state and responsible for all issues pertaining to
By 1979 the country was bankrupt and suffering from international relations, primary executive relations, and
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the maintenance of sovereignty. What was to become democracy became one in which the president could
important was not the original design so much as the exert a great deal of power not only over executive
institutional changes over time and, more importantly, matters, but legislative matters as well.
the reasons for these. Article 41 of the constitution
states that “the structure of the State shall include: the This constitutional shift was the first of many efforts by
executive power, consisting of the President of the Zafy to centralise authority in the hands of the
Republic and the Government; the legislative power, president and create a unitary government, secure in
formed by the National Assembly and the Senate; the his Antananarivo power base. These efforts caught up
judicial power, exercised by the Administrative and with him, however, when he was accused of
Financial Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, corruption and of exceeding his constitutional
Courts of Appeal, Tribunals, and the High Court of powers. This was the official reason for his
Justice.” This remains unchanged. The nature of the impeachment by the National Assembly in July
relationship between the structures has been tampered 1996;4 the High Constitutional Court ratified the
with so much, however, as to be unrecognisable. impeachment on 5 September 1996.

The institutional relationships, and the concomitant In the event of the president relinquishing office,
powers of the presidency, were first altered in 1995. Article 52 of the constitution passes power to the
This process was initiated by President Zafy Albert, president of the Senate but, constitutional provisions
frustrated by the restraints placed upon the powers of notwithstanding, no Senate had yet been created.
his office. Specifically, he found himself engaged in a Norbert Ratsirahonana, then prime minister and
constant battle for power with then Prime Minister former president of the High Constitutional Court,
Francisque Ravony. The decision to affect a shift in the therefore became acting president until elections
constitution came not from any desire to improve could be held in December. Ratsirahonana ran for the
institutional relations, but to divert power from his presidency in his own right but his Merina ethnicity,
rival. Clearly unable to amend the lack of provincial appeal, and
constitution by achieving a two-thirds technocratic nature ensured his
vote in the legislature, Zafy turned to the Madagascar’s institutional campaign would fail to draw popular
other constitutional mechanism: a structure is based on its support. Despite his impeachment, Zafy
popular referendum. Zafy’s campaign in Albert was permitted to run again and
1992 constitution, and the
support of the referendum said little the second round of elections was
about the constitutional shift in power, delegation of powers contested by Zafy and Ratsiraka once
instead focusing on how it would bring roughly follows the French again. This time, Ratsiraka won.
development to the Malagasy people [Link] nature of the
while rooting out corruption. The relationship between the Ratsiraka won for three reasons. First, Zafy
maneuver was successful and the structures has been was the only viable contender and had
electorate endorsed the amendment. tampered with so much, recently been impeached for corruption.
however, as to be Second, Zafy was seen as having presided
As a direct consequence, changes were unrecognisable. over an economic downturn in the
made to seven constitutional articles: country. And, third, voters were largely ill-
53, 61, 74, 75, 90, 91, and 94. Most informed about substantive issues. The
significant of these were Articles 53 and only four candidates of note for president
90. The original Article 53.1 read “The President of were former President Ratsiraka, acting President
the Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister under Norbert Ratsirahonana, former Industrial Promotion
the conditions established in Article 90.” Article 90 Minister Herizo Razafimahaleo, and former President
read “At the beginning of each legislature, or in case Zafy. Ratsirahonana and Herizo (leader of the Fanilo
of resignation of the Government or vacancy in the party) had neither the stature nor recognised name to
office of Prime Minister for any other reason, the win the necessary votes outside of the capital and the
National Assembly, by a majority of its members, shall regional capital of Fianarantsoa (also in the Central
designate a Prime Minister from among its members Highlands). In addition, ethnopolitics played a role in
or elsewhere within a period of seven days from the their downfall, as Norbert Ratsirahonana was from the
opening of the special session or from the date of the despised Merina highlands of Antananarivo and Herizo
vacancy.” Article 90 thus made the president’s powers Razafimahaleo was a Betsileo from Fianarantsoa. Their
in Article 53 a formality. It was the National Assembly highest votes were in their home provinces, which
that chose the prime minister. The referendum altered afforded them 10.1 percent and 15.1 percent of the
these articles to afford the National Assembly the vote respectively. For his part, Zafy Albert, though from
opportunity to choose three potential candidates, the northern province of Antsiranana, had long derived
from among whom the president could select the his base of support from the capital. His removal from
prime minister. If the president did not like the power, the drama of which had played out in the
choices offered he could refuse them and demand capital, undermined his electability. In the end Ratsiraka
three more names. In addition, the president gained won the first round with a less than convincing 36.6
the power to dismiss the prime minister without new percent, skewed heavily by the vote in his home
elections being necessary. As a result, Madagascar’s province of Toamasina where he captured 59.6 percent
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of the vote. Thus it was a case of Zafy Albert losing the managers of Madagascar’s “new democracy”. What
election rather than Ratsiraka winning it. Whereas in was left vague in a single Article (139) was the
1992 Zafy had secured 46 percent of the vote in cooperation intended between the central authority
Antananarivo province, in 1996 he secured less than 10 and the provinces, which was left subject largely to
percent. presidential interpretation. The institutional vacuum
left in Antananarivo allowed President Ratsiraka to
The dearth of informed voters meant that the political expand his control. As regional government remained
debates over the socialism of the Second Republic, the subservient to the national government in Ratsiraka’s
expansion of democracy, and the platforms of the form of decentralisation, and few constitutional
candidates themselves, were immaterial. People who guarantees existed to protect regional governments
voted their conscience in the 1996 – 97 presidential from encroachment from the centre, regional
election did so because they thought life had been governors had little power to challenge the president’s
better under the then former President Ratsiraka. augmented authority. In the aftermath of these
constitutional amendments, the majority of provincial
Following his presidential victory in 1997, Ratsiraka held governors were drawn either from the president’s
his own constitutional referendum. Once again the AREMA party or his close personal allies and even
constitutional issues were secondary as Ratsiraka family members, so the question of actual regional
promoted the idea that a “Yes” vote implied authority remained relatively moot.
development and security. This 15 March 1998
referendum was close run: 51 percent voted “Yes”, 49 There was an important institutional ramification in the
percent “No”. Broadly viewed as an extension of the provincial base Ratsiraka established. The electoral
1996 – 97 Presidential elections, this was a significant code was revised in August 2000 to extend the 1998
victory for President Ratsiraka. constitutional amendments.6 Under these new revisions
an electoral college system was set up alongside the
The constitutional changes resulting from the 1998 provincial councils, which became responsible for
referendum5 were far more sweeping than those in choosing the provincial leadership, including the
1995. Presidential powers once again increased. Under governor, through an indirect electoral process.
Article 53 the president gained the power to name the Madagascar held its first elections for councillors in
prime minister without reference to the legislative December 2000. With virtually no public education
provisions of Article 90. Furthermore, he acquired the campaign, few people other than those within certain
power to name the other members of government communities targeted by the president turned out at the
without consulting the legislature. In terms of Article 54 polls. Ratsiraka’s AREMA party won nearly 95 percent
he gained the power to name the Council of Ministers of the seats in an election, with a turnout of only 10
without consultation and to sign all Council decrees, percent of registered voters.
though he could, should he so wish, delegate these
powers to the prime minister. The elections for the newly created Senate were held in
March 2001. Under the new constitution and
The relationship between the Senate and the President subsequent code, senators were voted in by the
also changed. Whereas senators originally held office for councils, not in direct elections. AREMA, despite its
four years, their mandate now was increased to six. In flagging popularity, won 49 of the 60 contested seats.
the 1992 constitution, Article 77.1 stated that “Two- Ratsiraka appointed the remaining 30, which resulted
thirds of the Senate shall consist of an equal number of in him controlling 79 of the upper house’s 90 seats. In
members elected in each electoral district by elected June 2001 new gubernatorial elections were held, again
representatives of the territorial entities, and one-third indirectly voted upon by the councils. AREMA won
shall consist of members representing economic, social, every province except Antananarivo, and Ratsiraka
cultural, and religious groups appointed by the President further strengthened his control over the newly
of the Republic upon nomination by legally constituted “autonomous” provinces. That AREMA failed in
organisations and groups.” In 1998 the specific wording Antananarivo province would become significant the
changed so that the article read “The senate is following year.
comprised, in two tiers, of members elected in equal
number in each autonomous province and for one tier,
the members named by the President of the Republic, The power of the president in the Third
for reason of their particular competences in judicial, Republic
economic, social, and cultural matters.” In effect the
specific number of seats that could be chosen by the By June 2001 Ratsiraka’s powers were extensive. While
president was now unclear. not the autocrat he had been during the Second
Republic, nevertheless through institutional
Beyond these fundamental institutional relationships, manipulation, including reforms to the constitution and
the government accelerated a process of devolution by electoral law, he could pass his agenda effortlessly
creating “autonomous provinces.” Articles 126 – 138 through the legislature, ensure its leadership answered
were added to the constitution to spell out in detail the to him, and guide provincial efforts in managerial
role of the autonomous provincial leadership as reform.
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Beyond institutional changes, Ratsiraka used his own personal wealth, meant that the latter could
presidential powers to establish a significant political build a base even in the côtier provinces, despite his
network reminiscent of the Second Republic. Samuel ethnic origins.
Lahady was President of the Executive Committee of
Toamasina when Ratsiraka took power in 1975. A close At this stage Ratsiraka took measures to assert firm
colleague of the president, he held a series of important control over the judiciary. Article 98 of the 1992
posts, and although ousted by Zafy Albert in 1991, he Constitution read: “The judicial power shall be
returned in 2001 appointed by Ratsiraka as a senator independent of the executive and legislative powers.
and as Governor of Toamasina shortly thereafter. Other The Administrative and Financial Constitutional Court
governors, including Governor Emilson of Fianarantsoa, and the Supreme Court shall assure this
Governor Jean-Robert Gara of Antsiranana, and independence.” However, under the 1998
Governor Jean de Dieu Benjamin Maharante of Toliara, constitutional revision Article 98 begins: “The President
had longstanding political and economic relationships of the Republic is guarantor of the independence of
with the president and his family members. Family Justice,” and goes on to granting the president the
members in the private sector benefited greatly as well: power to name and remove magistrates. Ratsiraka
Elyse Ratsiraka became a board member of Galana in exercised this power on 22 November 2001 when he
Toamasina, the country’s largest refinery, a relationship approved Decree N° 2001 – 1081. This law ratified the
that proved important following the December 2001 High Constitutional Court’s appointment of Georges T.
elections as President Ratsiraka strangled distribution of Indrianjafy as President of the High Constitutional Court
petroleum to the capital. Ratsiraka’s daughter, Annick (HCC) and Benjamin Rakotomandimby to the post of
Ratsiraka, was charged with organising the HCC justice. Indrianjafy was Ratsiraka’s first Minister of
Francophonie summit in Antananarivo in 1997, and Population and Social Conditions when he took power
was named to the administration council of Air in 1975. He was a member of Ratsiraka’s Conseil
Madagascar, presided over by Ratsiraka’s close Supreme de la Revolution and one of the founders of
counselor Nirina Andriamanerasoa. The the AREMA party in 1976. He had held
president’s daughter Sophie, whose various ministerial posts before Ratsiraka
husband Mamy Ranaivo became Director appointed him to the Court in 1991.
General of the Society of Exploitation of Beyond institutional Rakotomandimby was another close
Minerals, KRAOMA, became a powerful associate and sometime AREMA leader.
advocate for her father, sitting on the
changes, Ratsiraka Indian Ocean Newsletter noted at the
board of the Banque de Solidarite used his presidential time that “Intervening as it does right
Malgache (BSM), Global Madagascar powers to establish a before the campaign for the presidential
(telecommunications), and similar bodies, election of December 16 begins, the
receiving significant funding for the significant political nomination of a former Ratsiraka minister
creation of non-profit organisations in the network reminiscent to the head of the HCC illustrates the
name of AREMA. His son Xavier, a pilot, of the Second incumbent’s determination to keep a
became Director General of the Society sharp eye on the institution that will be in
of Malagasy Air Navigation (Sonavam) at Republic. charge of validating the electoral results
the age of 23. Roland Ratsiraka, his and of verifying cases of electoral fraud,
nephew, became Mayor of Toamasina, should any arise.”7
the president’s native city. Daniele
Ratsiraka, his niece, was appointed to the Malagasy Ratsiraka further used his presidential power to
embassy in Paris in 1999. These were merely some of introduce a significant amendment to the electoral
the more obvious cases of presidential nepotism. law. On 3 September 2001, he announced that the
elections would be held on 16 December 2001.
In the absence of any charismatic challenger, with the While he went out of his way to state at the time that
opposition deeply fractured, a neo-patrimonial he would respect the constitution, he was
network well entrenched, and such significant immediately accused by civil society groups of “poor
institutional control firmly established, by June 2001 governance” for simultaneously announcing decrees
Ratsiraka was unconcerned about the forthcoming to guide the electoral process. First, candidates had to
December presidential elections. Then, suddenly, confirm their candidature by 27 October. This
Marc Ravalomanana made his appearance on the announcement was accompanied by a significant,
scene. He was already the popular major of and unexpected, rise in the registration fee for
Antananarivo who had been in this post, his only candidates. Many independents and candidates of
political position, for less than two years. In early July smaller parties were unable to raise the money that
2001 there was open speculation within the Merina rapidly. Second, candidates were allowed to
political community that Ravalomanana would campaign only between 25 November and 15
oppose Ratsiraka. Yet Ravalomanana’s campaign only December; this made it difficult for lesser-known
came together in September – just three months contenders to get their voices heard. Third, the only
before the election. Once it got under way, however, news agencies allowed to cover the electoral process
the great public distaste for Ratsiraka, the strong directly was comprised of journalists chosen by the
desire for a new populist leader, and Ravalomanana’s president. And, fourth, no posters were allowed to be
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affixed to public Table 1: Percentage of Votes Won by Candidate and Province
buildings or structures (CNE Results in December 2001)
and no political
Province RAVALOMANANA RATSIRAKA RAZAFIMAHALEO ZAFY RAJAKOBA RAJAONARY
advertisements could Marc Didier Herizo J. Albert Daniel Patrick R.
be associated with Antan- 63.41 30.35 2.39 1.34 1.22 1.29
purchasable goods. This anarivio
last edict was directly Antsir- 31.01 36.63 2.54 26.94 1.65 1.24
aimed at the candidacy ananana
of Marc Ravalomanana. Fiana- 40.97 42.76 7.44 4.60 2.12 2.12
rantsoa
As founder of Tiko, the Mahajanga 47.11 37.39 4.24 6.45 2.85 1.96
country’s largest dairy Toamasina 28.84 62.52 2.43 3.67 1.31 1.24
products company, his Toliara 31.37 47.27 10.18 6.25 2.93 2.00
greatest potential for Total 46.44 40.61 4.27 5.34 1.77 1.57
increasing his
recognition outside the were reported. These were not, however, deemed
capital was to employ the supply lines established by serious enough to nullify the validity of the elections.
his company. Ravalomanana skirted this law through On the other hand, the vote counting process was
clever word play. He introduced his “Tiako i highly irregular. There was a parallel vote counting
Madagasikara” campaign slogan (“Love Madagascar;” process. The official count saw Ravalomanana lead 53
later the TIM party) parallel to his new Tiko slogan percent to Ratsiraka’s 36 percent on 18 December,
“Tia Tiko” with Madagasikara written under it. For his with a precipitous drop to 47.52 percent to Ratsirka’s
part, Ratsiraka blatantly violated his own regulations 4 point rise on 20 December. The Committee to Elect
by giving a public address on election day warning of Marc Ravalomanana (KMMR — Komity Manohana
dire consequences should he lose. an’i Marc Ravalomanana) reported on 20 December,
with two-thirds of the vote counted, that its candidate
was leading with 54.95 percent to Ratsiraka’s 34.98
THE CRISIS OF 2002 percent. The National Electoral Committee, under
heavy pressure from President Ratsiraka, halted the
Marc Ravalomanana is a charismatic leader. His rapid parallel voting process and closed the vote counting to
rise from obscurity in the provinces between public scrutiny. It completed the count itself behind
September 2001 and December 2001 was an closed doors. By the final vote count there was a 5.6
indication that the population was yearning for percentage point spread between the CNE’s count
change. In fact there was great frustration with and that of the KMMR. A civil society group, the
Ratsiraka, who had won back the presidency due to Consortium of Election Observers (CNOE) had been
his opponent’s lack of popularity. Not long previously, conducting its own count and came to a tally between
Ravalomanana’s role as a business tycoon would have the two, giving Marc Ravalomanana’s 50.5 percent to
made him apparently unable of understanding the Ratsiraka’s 37.7.
common man, and his Merina
ethnicity would have put him on the Table 2: Percentage of Vote Total Compared: CNE, CNOE, and KMMR
wrong side of the country’s single
largest divide in political culture. Yet, CNE CNOE KMMR
taking the stage when he did, the Didier Ratsiraka 40.4 37.7 35.7
majority of the population appeared Marc Ravalomanana 46.6 50.5 52.2
to look on his business success as a
harbinger of what he could do for the country. His The margin of victory was crucial. Under Article 47 of
ethnicity was eclipsed by his sense of nationalism and the constitution the president had to win a simple
his call for a united Malagasy people. Ratsiraka was majority to avoid a run-off election. By the CNE count
unable to stave off the challenge from Ravalomanana, there would be a second round of elections. Under
despite having spent his entire second presidency the CNOE and KMMR counts Ravalomanana was the
manipulating institutions and deepening his personal victor in the first round. A maelstrom of accusations
networks. from all sides followed immediately. The sudden
change in the official vote count between 18 and 20
According to the official tally of the National Electoral December, noted by neither the CNOE nor the
Council (CNE) of the Ministry of the Interior, Ratsiraka KMMR, and the opacity of the official vote count that
won 40.6 percent of the vote to Marc Ravalomanana’s followed, provided little reassurance that the Ministry
46.4 percent, with no other significant showings. of the Interior was acting independently of President
Ravalomanana won every province except Ratsiraka’s Ratsiraka. Yet the lack of access by the other bodies to
home province of Toamasina. the final third of the ballot counting exercise was
hardly calculated to inspire confidence. Ratsiraka lost
The balloting process was said to have gone off the plurality but won the battle for the high ground, as
relatively well. Accusations of vote tampering, he turned, in his New Year’s declaration, to accept the
problems with national identity cards, and the like, results:
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 Dear Malagasy people, the 16 December 2001 take the “high ground” stating that he would accept
presidential election has now been completed, so whatever decision the Court made.
I wish to make a strong appeal to all of us, on the
occasion of the New Year, to accept any election The international community’s reactions served to
results published by the High Constitutional Court further cloud the issue. On 8 January the European
(HCC) which is the only constitutionally- Union, the United States, Japan, and Switzerland
recognised institution empowered to proclaim released a joint statement: “‘Persuaded that the
official election results.8 agitation comes from the suspicion that hangs over
the counting of the popular vote’s results’, they called
This choice of words was more important than it on the ‘country’s public authorities and all the parties
might have at first seemed. Ratsiraka knew, following of the electoral process’ to defuse the current political
the changes to the HCC he had made in November, crisis by working for ‘a common interpretation of the
that he could count on the support of the HCC. He results, notably on the basis of elements gathered by
was right; it was indeed the responsibility of the HCC observers accredited to the CNE.’”10 As the United
to determine the final vote count and ratify the States was an unabashed supporter of Ravalomanana,
elections. Ravalomanana could do nothing more than this was a confusing statement. On 15 January US
demand a fair recount by the HCC. That Ratsiraka President George W Bush released a statement that
could depend on an HCC predisposed in his favour read, in part:
was not challengeable, as it had been within his
constitutional prerogative to change the makeup of Candidates, political parties, election monitors and
the court in the previous November. In this sense, any especially the electorate should have trust and
electoral tampering had happened not at the ballot confidence that the election results will be
box or the vote count, but in the constitutional according to the law, reflecting the true will of the
amendments of 1998 and the modification of the voters and genuine progress to democracy. The
electoral code that followed. USA wishes that the HCC High
Constitutional Court announce the
The HCC sequestered itself in the small election results quickly.
Ratsiraka knew, following
town of Mantasoa while it deliberated.
There was no public scrutiny of the the changes to the HCC he The Organisation of African Unity
discussion. On 16 January 2002 it made had made in November, (OAU, now African Union) concurrently
its ruling, which was an unabashedly that he could count on the released a similar statement:
partisan determination in favour of the support of the HCC. He
incumbent. The HCC called for a We wish to highlight the fact that the
was right; it was indeed
recount of the vote, but rather than OAU is calling on the Malagasy people
undertake this itself, it insisted that the the responsibility of the and all those involved in the current
CNE conduct the recount, from the HCC to determine the final presidential election to remain
beginning, behind closed doors, without vote count and ratify the completely calm and respect law and
oversight from the Court, the CNOE, or elections. order, so as to enable the relevant
representatives from either leading institution – that is the HCC – to
candidate. Ravalomanana expressed his perform its duty with total peace of
immediate concern about the Court, mind and in line with the constitution
stating: “The HCC has responded to our demand, but governing the nation-state in Madagascar
it is not enough. We want it to do the comparisons
itself and not to give the job to the CNE, which is not A cacophony of international voices supported this
entitled to do it... and which is not credible.” Yet the institutional position but apparently ignored the
HCC ruling stood. character of the institution itself. In consequence,
when the HCC verdict was released the following day,
The timing of the HCC ruling was important. On 5 the US, OAU and other international powers could do
January 2002 supporters of Marc Ravalomanana little but support a suspect ruling.
began to express their outrage publically; ten
thousand of them took to the streets of Antananarivo President Ratsiraka latched onto President Bush’s
to demand a recount that would confirm statement, using it as support for his own institutional
Ravalomanana’s victory in the first round. position, while Ravalomanana could do little but resort
Ravalomanana himself fanned the flames by to his power base. He called the masses on to the
appearing at the rally to shout “We will defend the streets on 17 January with a statement that “As long as
sovereign choice of the people up to the end.”9 He the HCC does not make any effort to check the return
also used the occasion to warn the HCC that he sheets, we would go all the way with our protests”
would accept only its comparison of the voter returns. and, as Ratsiraka called for second elections by the
Within days, demonstrators on the streets numbered end of the month, Ravalomanana responded that “it’s
well over 100 000. Tempers flared as several people not up to me to boycott the second round, but it’s up
were injured and a car was set ablaze. Ratsiraka, to the whole nation to reject it.” The numbers of
confident in his position with the HCC, continued to protestors on the streets of Antananarivo grew rapidly,
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and similar protests began in the regional capitals of Ravalomanana had now exhausted his constitutional
Fianarantsoa and Mahajanga. In addition to his appeal options. With the ruling of the HCC, the final word on
to the people, Ravalomanana petitioned the HCC to the vote count, legally he had to accept a second
disqualify Ratsiraka’s candidature on the grounds that round of elections. The ethical quandary was clear: if a
he had violated electoral law by canvassing outside of challenger is faced with a highly flawed electoral
given dates, and using state vehicles, buildings, and process and a dearth of constitutional options for
civil servants for his campaign. All of these accusations rectifying the outcome, does that give him license to
were true, though it is unclear whether they reflected undertake extra-constitutional measures in the name of
the commission of a crime severe enough to warrant a more democratic end?11 Ravalomanana quickly
disqualification. In any event, there was no decided that he was justified. In his view, his actions
opportunity to test this conclusion, as the HCC were not extra-constitutional, because the highest
dismissed the petition out of hand. constitutional authority, the HCC, was acting on behalf
of one of the parties involved, not performing a neutral
On 25 January the HCC announced its support for the function. As a good populist, he argued that democracy
recount undertaken by the CNE; this gave should reflect the will of the people, and the will of the
Ravalomanana 46.11 percent of the vote and people was for him to take office. A second round of
Ratsiraka 40.89 percent (a marginally higher elections would merely provide an opportunity for
percentage for Ratsiraka than the first count). It then electoral manipulation. On 22 February 2002 Marc
declared that a second round of voting would take Ravalomanana declared himself president.
place thirty days hence. Not surprisingly,
Ravalomanana rejected both this count and the idea This action immediately fanned the flames of crisis at
of a second round of elections. home and created a quandary for the international
community. Almost unanimously, the international
The next day, 26 January, was a Friday. Over the community chose to regard this dangerous and
weekend Ravalomanana called for an unlimited destabilising move as undermining the constitutional
general strike, to begin on Monday, 28 January. The process. Even the United States and Germany, which
popular response was unprecedented in particularly feared a Ratsiraka victory, could not
Madagascar’s independence period. The official condone this action and tried to convince
figures released by Ratsiraka’s government put the Ravalomanana to recant. The formal statement by the
number of people in the streets of the capital at US Embassy declared:
about half a million, while strike organisers said they
exceeded one million. More critical than the ...the United States government objects to the
numbers was the fact that those who were in the action taken by the leading opposition candidate,
streets represented a cross-section of society: Marc Ravalomanana, to declare himself president.
different ethnic groups, classes, professions, and, The United States urges Mr Ravalomanana and all
within Merina society, castes. It was a virulent though parties to consider carefully the repercussions that
organised, even festive, social movement that extra-legal and or violent actions could have in
brought the financial centre of Antananarivo, as well Madagascar in future and its relationships with the
as Fianarantsoa and Mahajanga, to a halt. The international community.12
government and the economy were paralysed;
banks, roads, and the airport were closed. France and the OAU took the strongest stands against
Ravalomanana’s declaration. The Secretary General of
Ratsiraka spent the following week calling for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Amara Essy,
preparations for the second round of elections. Every stated:
day at noon, Ravalomanana made a speech to his
supporters in Antananarivo’s Place 13 Mai, at the I made it clear to Ravalomanana’s supporters that
same time calling for a presidential dialogue and if their candidate was inaugurated contrary to
reiterating that he would not stand in a second round constitutional provisions, the OAU would neither
of elections until the first round was properly tolerate nor accept that unconstitutional change of
counted. In early February he spelled out the Government, by virtue of the Algiers Decision of
conditions under which he would accept a second July 1999 and the Lomé Declaration of July 2000.
round of elections: there had to be international I therefore encouraged him to accept the second
observers (barred by Ratsiraka in the first round); the round to confirm the choice of voters.
CNE would have to be broadened to include groups
other than government functionaries; there had to Ravalomanana countered that Ratsiraka was merely
be an assurance that protestors would not be using the time to mobilise his cronies to ensure that a
penalised; and there had to be a change in the proper second round could not be successful. Further
process of scrutinising the ballots (effectively OAU efforts to ameliorate the crisis proved futile.
marginalising the High Constitutional Court). His
demands were ignored rather than rejected by the For his part, Ratsiraka seized upon Ravalomanana’s
prime minister’s office and the Ratsiraka extreme actions as an opportunity to further centralise
administration. his power. Article 59 of the Malagasy constitution
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states that the President may declare Martial Law, actions must be measured against the consequences,
effectively wresting power from both the provinces in that they brought out the sort of instability the US,
and the other branches of government with the France, OAU, and others had feared – the country
“agreement of the Presidents of the National was split in two. The pro-Ratsiraka governors of the
Assembly, the Senate, and the Constitutional Court.” five provinces (Mahajanga, Toamasina, Toliara,
Having such strong institutional backing and given the Fianarantsoa and Antsiranana) declared on 4 March
ill-considered actions of Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka that they were autonomous of Antananarivo. They
declared a State of Emergency that same day, which established a “capital” of the autonomous provinces
only served to further incite the protestors. The festive in Ratsiraka’s home town of Toamasina. Part of the
climate of the support for Ravalomanana began to army, led by Ravalomanana’s new “defense minister”
change as the stakes were raised. Though Major-General Mamizara Jules, ignored this
Ravalomanana’s vocal supporters diminished in declaration, while pro-Ratsiraka forces were
number, they became more strident and violent. decentralised and told to obey only their immediate
Within a week, injuries resulted as protestors used officers, not the central command. Ratsiraka’s support
rocks and sticks to try to suppress their rivals. for this change of capital was, perhaps, a tactical error.
It was his first significant violation of the constitution,
Ravalomanana, backed by this intensity of support, which clearly afforded only Antananarivo the status of
resorted to another strategy: calling for a referendum. capital city, with no provision for any alternative. The
Rather than a second round of elections, he argued resulting state of affairs was becoming increasingly
there should be a popular referendum on the validity dangerous and unstable.
of his victory. Meanwhile, he continued forming a
government as the new “president.” He asked his International efforts to stave off a complete
“prime minister,” Jacques Sylla, to form a cabinet. He Balkanisation of the country were stepped up. Cape
also galvanised the support of one of the country’s Verdian President Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro led
largest civil society organisations, the an OAU negotiation team to
Protestant FJKM (Church of Jesus Christ Antananarivo on 5 March. This group
in Madagascar). quickly concluded that there were
Ravalomanana, backed by effectively two rival governments
Ratsiraka declared Martial Law on 28 this intensity of support, operating in rival capitals. French Prime
February 2002, without institutional Minister Lionel Jospin personally called
resorted to another
challenge. Effectively, General Leon on both sides to compromise; United
Claude Raveloarison became governor strategy: calling for a Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
of Antananarivo. This afforded Ratsiraka referendum. Rather than a effectively labelled Ravalomanana’s
the constitutional power to suspend the second round of elections, actions a coup and supported cries for a
right of protest, employ strong-arm he argued there should be compromise that would lead the
military tactics, and attempt to control a popular referendum on country back to the ballot box. Yet, even
the press. That he used these new as the official representatives of the
powers more to further his political the validity of his victory. international community condemned
claims and avoid transparent vote- Ratsiraka, expatriate enthusiasm was
counting was immaterial to his legal apparent. Americans living in
status; it was a case of upholding the Antananarivo wrote a collective letter
constitutional process while subverting the intent of challenging the US position, and their government for
constitutional Article 59. If the subversion of intent its inaction early in the conflict. Rallies in Réunion
outweighed the overtly extra-constitutional measures accused the French government of supporting
of Marc Ravalomanana, then the answer to the Ratsiraka for reasons of personal gain. The Paris-based
question as to whether Ravalomanana’s actions were Malagasy Council of Environment and Development,
justified is in the affirmative. the largest Malagasy expatriate organisation, signed a
petition condemning the French government and the
What was critical was that Ravalomanana did not only international community in general for acting
openly defy the declaration of Martial Law, he ignored legalistically to the point of frustrating democratic will.
it altogether. He swore in his new cabinet, the
members of which took up their posts within the week. March saw a further increase in conflict. The KMMR
In a particularly unusual event, the new ministers targeted Samuel Lahady’s position as Toamasina’s
approached their respective government offices with governor. As Ratsiraka fled to Toamasina to consolidate
tens of thousands of supporters behind them. General his defences, the five self-proclaimed autonomous
Raveloarison had given the order for the military to provinces cut off Antananarivo from the key ports and
“defend” the ministries, but that would have meant supplies; oil and food in particular became scarce in
firing on the large number of unarmed Ravalomanana the capital. Ratsiraka initiated a campaign of violence
supporters. In the event, the soldiers stood back and in which his supporters would threaten and, in some
the new ministers took over without bloodshed. cases, kill Merina merchants on the coast. In a sign that
ethnicity was becoming the plaything of political
With hindsight, the justification for Ravalomanana’s entrepreneurs, Ratsiraka incited his supporters to
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pretend to be Merina and threaten côtier groups in the from the Dakar Agreement before his plane even
hopes of raising the accusation that Ravalomanana touched down on his return to Madagascar. On 29
was playing at ethnopolitics.13 Ravalomanana’s acting April 2002 the newly constituted High Constitutional
“Prime Minister,” Jacques Sylla, responded, saying Court announced the results of its recount:
“We do not accept any terrorist act committed in our Ravalomanana 51.46 percent, Ratsiraka 35.90
territory.” So began the reclassification of Ratsiraka’s percent. Ratsiraka reacted:
support movement. Meanwhile, in Antananarivo,
protestors clashed even where armies did not, killing three of its nine members, including the president,
more than half a dozen people and injuring another did not sit in the deliberations and four of the six
40 by the end of the month. General Raveloarison, others who effectively participated in what is
unable to maintain security, persuade his troops to referred to as a vote-counting exercise, are in fact
clamp down on protestors, or restore order, resigned close to the Marc Ravalomanana camp.
his post as governor of Antananarivo a month after
assuming the position. The International Monetary He therefore refused to accept the results, and the
Fund left the country, joining the majority of bilateral violence escalated further. The Court ruling did,
donors. Discussions began about whether civil war however, give the international community a way out
was inevitable. of its impasse. All but the OAU ignored the political
wrangling over the Court’s composition in favour of a
April did not see civil war, but there was escalation in recognisable confluence between institutional design
conflict as the once neutral military continued to (following the ruling of the HCC as mandated by the
fracture between the camps of the presidential rivals. constitution) and a seemingly irresistible social
Antananarivo was further isolated, as bridges from the movement. Ravalomanana was re-inaugurated
coast to the landlocked capital were blown up, president on 6 May, this time in front of the Court and
ensuring no private operators could bring in supplies the representatives of the international community.
of any kind. The Antananarivo homes of some of In his inaugural address Ravalomanana called for
Ratsiraka’s ministers, who had already fled the capital, victory and reconciliation even while he assumed a
were burned down. tone of intense nationalism:

A number of international attempts were made to seek ...I call on the former president Didier Ratsiraka to
a resolution of the conflict. The most important of these help restore these Malagasy values, so that we can
was by a high-powered OAU-sponsored delegation move forward hand in hand to develop this
comprising Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, country. Indeed we are all sons and daughters of
President Gbagbo from Côte d’Ivoire, President Madagascar...I do wish to make an appeal so that
Kérékou from Benin and President Chissano of all the pages are turned so that the country can
Mozambique; this brought the two rivals to Dakar. develop rapidly, so that the masses stop suffering ...
I especially call on you, the armed forces, to now
The result was the Dakar Agreement of 18 April 2002, assume your responsibilities. Time for hesitation has
the five articles of which were a reflection of how now gone … You have now seen that justice, truth
much ground Ratsiraka had already lost. The and legality emerged as a result of our efforts...14
Agreement was a compromise in which Ratsiraka
agreed to another recount, and a popular referendum In May the situation continued to deteriorate
in the event of there being no clear victor from the alarmingly, even as Ravalomanana emerged as the
first round of elections. Should this happen, a clear political and military victor. He gained some
transitional government would be established and an level of control of four of the five provinces that had
Independent Electoral Commission would replace the previously sided with Ratsiraka, which left only
National Electoral Commission. Unfortunately, the Toamasina, under Samuel Lahady’s leadership, a
timing of the Agreement was unpropitious, as on 16 desperate and untenable measure.
April 2002 the Administrative Chamber of the
Supreme Court overturned the 25 January 2002 The OAU continued to break ranks with the rest of
ruling of the High Constitutional Court which had the international community and rejected
mandated a second round of elections. The same Ravalomanana’s investiture. It continued shuttle
Chamber also annulled decree No.2001-1080 of 22 diplomacy throughout the month even as the
November 2001, which had stacked the High erstwhile street violence turned into military conflict.
Constitutional Court in Ratsiraka’s favour, and called A second meeting was held in Dakar on 8 and 9 June.
for another recount of its own. This time Ravalomanana was in a much more
favourable position and made sure all in attendance
Ratsiraka interpreted the Chamber’s actions as a knew it. The Second Dakar Agreement (Dakar II) had
personal affront on the part of vacillating justices. In a committed both sides to move towards early
sense the Chamber’s judgement was probably not too legislative elections as a sort of proxy vote. If
radical a legal interpretation, as the sudden shift of Ravalomanana’s supporters were to win a
judicial favour seemed to follow the trend towards a parliamentary majority, then Ratsiraka would
Ravalomanana victory. Ratsiraka distanced himself recognise the presidency of Ravalomanana; if
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Ratsiraka’s supporters were to win the legislative assistance of the World Bank to launch a new
majority then Ravalomanana would agree to a enterprise: Tiko. Tiko is now the primary Malagasy
presidential referendum.15 dairy company and a leader in the agribusiness sector.
Ravalomana claims that Tiko provides 3 000 regular
From the perspective of enhancing democracy and jobs and collateral employment for 100 000 people in
seeking the expression of popular will, this Agreement Madagascar. Though Africa Intelligence claims that the
was, in comparison with Dakar I, a poor document. number of primary employees is closer to 1 000, the
Not only did it undermine the Malagasy constitution, company’s importance to the Malagasy economy and
it belittled the importance of the separation of powers its reflection of Ravalomanana’s strong business
contained therein. Its success would be predicated on leadership skills have been unassailable.
the population voting in the same pattern for a
legislator as for the president, a curious assumption. It The popular joke is that Ravalomanana decided to
proved immaterial as the Dakar II Agreement was no enter politics in 1999 by running for mayor of
more successful than Dakar I. Antananarivo because there was too much red tape
for him to conduct his business unfettered. His stated
As the conflict continued, Ratsiraka lost further reason was that “People are ready for big change. But
ground. He maintained gubernatorial support outside the barrier is the old system, the old politics.” The
of Antananarivo, but, with the exception of change he referred to was the need to address
Toamasina, commanded a diminishing popular corruption, mismanagement, unmotivated and
following. By mid-June Ravalomanana’s security forces underpaid municipal employees, crime, and pollution
had taken control of all key towns including in Antananarivo. His success in Antananarivo led to
Toamasina. Ratsiraka fled for France on 15 June 2002. his decision to run for president. In his supporters’
In the eyes of virtually every Malagasy and all the view, “over the past two years, his result-oriented style
major foreign powers Ravalomanana was now of governance has given Antananarivo a dramatically
president of Madagascar; only the OAU needed face lifting. One prowess to be
refused to accept his victory until the credited to the new mayor’s team in
legislative elections in December placed their ongoing efforts to clean the capital
the TIM in power.16 Ravalomanana and Ravalomanana and the off its garbage-strewn streets and
the TIM inherited a country divided by TIM inherited a country implementation of an efficient system to
the conflict and suffering as a result of collect the city most unsightly, disease-
divided by the conflict and
the economic devastation brought about prone refuse.”17 Much of the city’s
by six months without significant trade suffering as a result of the population seemed to agree with this.
and by international corporate flight. economic devastation As one man in Antananarivo put it
brought about by six (September 2001):
months without significant
THE MALAGASY MACRO- trade and by international “I will vote for Marc Ravalomanana.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT I see that he has been a very competent
SINCE THE POLITICAL corporate flight. person as mayor of Tana....He has done
CRISIS OF 2002 a good job with Tana and his a good
politician too.”18
Marc Ravalomanana: Background
Given that, according to the 29 April 2002 High
Marc Ravalomanana is a self-made millionaire, a Constitutional Court ruling, Ravalomanana won 71
capitalist, a nationalist, and Merina (Ambaniandro). He percent of the vote in Antananarivo Province, it
was born 12 December 1949 in Imerinkasinina appears this view was widely representative.
(Centre). Imerinkasinina was an established IMerina
centre even before the rise of Antananarivo and the Marc Ravalomanana is a practising Christian, and his
centralisation of IMerina under King spiritual life has had a strong influence on both his
Andrianimpoinimerina in the 1790s. Thus, when private and public sector success. All Tiko employees
Ravalomanana decided to declare his candidacy for are required to go to church, though not necessarily
president from his native town, many construed it to be the Protestant church of Ravalomanana’s own faith. As
a statement about where his sympathies lie. In a country he was Vice President of Madagascar’s most important
where the strongest ethnic divide has been between religious association, the Church of Jesus Christ in
Merina and côtier it was a bold choice of venue for so Madagascar (FJKM), he won support for his candidacy
important an announcement. It did, however, help to for both Mayor of Antananarivo and President of
galvanise his political base. Madagascar from the important church sector of
Malagasy civil society. As president, Ravalomanana has
Ravalomanana was born to an ethnic advantage, but increased the stature of the FJKM and specific
to fairly humble roots. He convinced the Danish Christian leaders, and has encouraged the proliferation
ambassador to underwrite his studies in Denmark and of Christianity in Madagascar, even as he has faced
then returned home to take over the family dairy. In more organised challenges from the church for his
1982, at 33 years old, he successfully obtained the inability to confront economic problems.
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Nationalism and internationalism for the US in the waning years of the Franco-American
contest for influence in Africa. Clearly this was a
Ravalomanana is first and foremost a businessman. concern in Paris as the French Foreign Minister,
He is an economic liberal who got his start with the Dominique de Villepin, visited Ravalomanana in
assistance of the World Bank, and he is a great Madagascar in June 2002. Significantly, he met with
supporter of US-style business-first policies in Marc Ravalomanana, Prime Minister Jacques Sylla,
Madagascar. While he does not stand to benefit and Marcel Ranjeva, Ravalomanana’s Minister of
directly from Madagascar’s access to US markets Foreign Affairs, a meeting that led to the signing of five
under the African Growth and Opportunities Act financial conventions focusing on increased trade
(AGOA), he has been vocal about his support for this relations and French aid to Malagasy recovery.
Act, and the market opportunities it creates. This is a
far cry from Ratsiraka’s “socialist” path or even the Looking towards Ravalomanana’s own actions, this
import substitution and protectionist policies that view that Madagascar has chosen the US in
followed his change of direction. In this sense, preference to France is equally untenable.
Ravalomanana is an internationalist – even a Ravalomanana may speak English with reasonable
globalist. proficiency, but this does not imply that his gaze is
fixed across the Atlantic. He has been working to link
Ravalomanana is also a nationalist. He is not a Madagascar more firmly into the global economic
protectionist, but has shown a propensity to protect system while maintaining the country’s distinct
those goods that are readily available from Malagasy character. Using business linkages as an engine for
manufacturers.19 There is a close correlation between growth has been at the core of his strategy.
Ravalomanana’s “internationalism” as a businessman,
his “nationalism,” and his political strategy. A note
about Tiko distribution exemplifies this. Starting in Ravalomanana and the legislature
mid-2001 Ravalomanana used Tiko distribution
channels to enhance his political presence in the Ravalomanana came into power with a pressing
countryside and used the network of Tiko employees domestic problem. The National Assembly, the
to help run his campaign. At the time of the 2001 Senate, and five of the six provinces were controlled
election Tiko had 14 stores in the country. There is a by Ratsiraka’s AREMA party. He had mooted political
large distribution centre in the Antananarivo quarter reconciliation, but immediately after the resolution of
of Akorondrano, strategically opened next to the the presidential drama this was impossible. AREMA
original location of Madagascar’s premier leaders who remained in power had been abandoned
supermarket, Géant Score. Yet, while Géant Score is by their leader. Ravalomanana had to deal with each
owned by a Réunionaise concern (Sucreries de institution separately.
Bourbon), Tiko is decidedly Malagasy. Management is
Malagasy and product inputs are Malagasy. As its According to Article 77 (modified by decree No.
distribution has increased throughout the island, so 2001-007 of January 2001) of the constitution,
inputs have come from diverse parts of the island. Ravalomanana could not dissolve the Senate, but he
could, and did, replace the 30 senators appointed by
The expansion of Tiko’s interests, and use of goods President Ratsiraka. This left him far short of control of
from, across the country, are consistent with the Senate, however. Following the constitutional
Ravalomanana’s own brand of nationalism. Many changes of 1998, the president enjoyed the right to
Tiko products are inscribed with “Vita Malagasy” dissolve the National Assembly; Ravolamanana used
(Made in Madagascar). He himself has said that this is his authority to bring forward the scheduled elections
to “counterbalance the undesirable influences to December 2002.
brought by foreigners.” This nationalistic sentiment
manifested itself in his campaign slogan for mayor of This proved a good strategy. Ravalomanana’s TIM
Antananarivo: “Tiako Iarivo” (I love Antananarivo), support network quickly became the TIM party and
and his campaign for the presidency, “Tiako-i- won 102 of the 160 available seats. The closely
Madagasikara” (I love Madagascar). associated Firaisankinam-Pirenena coalition of
moderate political parties won another 22 seats and
All of this would seem to contradict those who seek to non-partisans, mostly supportive of the president, won
depict Ravalomanana as essentially Francophobic. He another 22 seats. AREMA won only 3 seats and its ally
is a believer in global capitalist norms, supporting the Leader Fanilo 2. The usual voter apathy of legislative
continuation of a strong economic relationship with elections proved something of the past, a turnout of
France not for reasons of patronage (as in the First 67.9 percent exceeded that of the 2001 presidential
Republic), but because France is the island’s largest elections. This victory provided three things to
trading partner. The support he received from the US Ravalomananana: it helped him remove the vestiges of
and Germany in 2002 served only to further his desire AREMA power; it helped him gain essential legislative
to take advantage of broader market opportunities. support for his programme; and it provided the victory
This is an important distinction. There are those who necessary for the African Union to join the rest of the
saw Ravalomanana’s presidential victory as a victory world in recognising his presidential victory.20
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Ravalomanana: Beyond neopatrimonialism? TIM party headquarters in Fianarantsoa and other
provinces and the presidential security detail is
As Bratton and Van de Walle note: charged with protecting Magro officers for their role in
sponsoring the TIM. Tiko was the primary mechanism
…contemporary political changes are conditioned for Ravalomanana to get his message to Madagascar’s
by mechanisms of rule embedded in the ancien remote rural population. Indeed, his campaign was
régime. Authoritarian leaders in power for long complemented by a plethora of free Tiko T-shirts and
periods of time establish rules about who may hats, as well as a reduction in the price of milk
participate in public decisions and the amount of products shortly before the election.
political competition allowed. Taken together,
these rules constitute a political regime. Regime Now that he is president, Ravalomanana freely mixes
type in turn influences both the likelihood an state politics and business in a manner that has some
opposition challenge will arise and the flexibility labelling him a corporatist. The presidential airplane is
with which incumbents can respond. It also registered under Tiko’s name. Asa Lalana Malagasy, a
determines whether elites and masses can arrive at Tiko sub-corporation, has become the de facto public
new rules of political interaction through roads company. The largest media outlet, Madagascar
negotiation, accommodation, and election, that is Broadcasting System (MBS), does not suffer from
whether any transition will be democratic.21 executive over-reach. Ravalomanana owns the
company, and his daughter Sara runs it. Tiko has
Clearly, it was Ratsiraka who shaped the nature of expanded dramatically in the two years of its
political competition during the Second Republic and founder’s presidency, creating new alliances with
his period of “democratic” revival. Popular antipathy German and American companies. It has part
to him ensured that accommodation of the ancien ownership of Phoenix, which took over the state oil
régime would ultimately fail and negotiation proved company on its privatisation, and is considering
impossible. The question at hand is whether the rise starting a Tiko Petroleum company. Tiko also bought
of Ravalomanana, and the subsequent social SINPA, the state agricultural corporation, and
movement were sufficient to constitute a break with SOMACODIS, the Malagasy trading corporation,
the ancien régime and to bring about democratic when they privatised in 2003. There was no invitation
transition, or if the right to rule is afforded to tender in either case.
Ravalomanana as person, rather than by virtue of his
occupation of the presidential office, and whether his There were other reasons to be concerned about
power is derived from favours to his supporters and Ravalomanana when he assumed office. There have
his accumulated wealth, or from the bureaucratic and been accusations of corporate malfeasance:
administrative systems in place. specifically, that Tiko had failed to repay debts.
Ravalomanana himself was the target of lawsuits for
At first sight, it would appear that Ravalomanana has expulsions and expropriations, contract violations,
not been in politics long enough to muster such lines among other matters. The accusations against Tiko
of personal power. The close relationship between have continued, mostly resulting in legal settlements.
Tiako-i-Madagasikara and Tiko, however, belies such Ravalomanana however, has remained above the fray.
a claim. Numerous members of Ravalomanana’s inner
circle come from Tiko. Most notably, Guy Rajemison Another challenge to Ravalomanana from the outset
Rakotomaharo was Tiko’s CEO’s advisor from 1996 to was based not on his corporate holdings but rather his
1999, followed Ravalomanana to City Hall, became allegiance to a corporate class. Since de Tocqueville,
his presidential campaign manager, and, ultimately, scholars have asserted that the growth of democracy is
was appointed as President of the Senate in July 2002. dependent upon a strong, energetic middle class. In
Narisoa Rajaonarivony, was formerly a marketing Madagascar, the closest thing to a middle class is the
director at Tiko, briefly became Vice Prime Minister, business elite from which Ravalomanana emerged. This
before being made Ambassador to the US. Secretary new business elite is a strong and important
of State for Commerce, Eric Beantanana worked for constituency in the capital. However, it has a reputation
Tiko, and then for Ravalomanana’s mayoral for excluding Madagascar’s poor rural majority while it
campaign, before becoming Minister for Information, creates new wealth for itself. This may be an acceptable
Culture and Communication. In April 2003 practice in the private sector, but as Ravalomanana has
Razoharimihaja Solofonantenaina, Tiko officer in imported this model into the public sphere he has
charge of protocol and administration (and an come under significant, and deserved, scrutiny.
executive member of the FJKM alongside Ravalomanana has clearly proven himself to be
Ravalomanana), was named the TIM’s National Ratsiraka’s moral superior. He has gone beyond
President. The Chairman of Air Madagascar, enriching himself to undertake roads and other
Heriniaina Razafimahefa, the chairman of JIRAMA macro-level development projects with such fervour
(electricity and water parastatal), Patrick as to make a mockery of the memory of Ratsiraka. In
Ramiaramanana, and the Chairman of Secren (boat this sense he has brought improvement for the
construction contractor), General Andrianafidisoa, people. Yet doing this while placating the business
were Tiko bosses. Magro, a Tiko subsidiary, serves as class, blurring political and corporate lines, and
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buoying his own fortunes provides little assurance the questionable legal arrest and detainment processes
Madagascar has eschewed its neo-patrimonial past. were dismissed. Most notably, former Prime Minister
Tantely Andrianarivo said that he could not be tried
under the existing court system because he was not
Changes in presidential power prime minister at the time he allegedly committed
offenses in 2002. If it was argued and found that he
Ravalomanana’s constitutional powers in relation to had been prime minister then he would have to be
the Senate are clearly delineated and very favourable tried by the High Court of Justice, a body that had yet
to him. He has the right to appoint (or dismiss) 30 to be created. The HCC allowed the trial to go
senators of his choosing. On 23 July 2002 he did just forward in the normal court process. Though
that. However, this left him and his TIM with a one- proceedings were supposed to go ahead in July, they
third minority while Ratsiraka’s AREMA still held 48 were postponed and Tantely was held without bail. In
seats. As the remaining senators are elected indirectly, November the prosecution introduced another
local elections must precede senatorial elections. charge, embezzlement. The defence went back to the
While local elections took place in November 2003, HCC to argue that it was a violation of Article 305 of
senatorial elections, had not been undertaken at time the penal code to introduce late evidence and that,
of writing. This means that AREMA still commands a therefore, all charges should be dropped. Despite the
majority in the Senate; rather than making AREMA an apparent technical error on the part of the
effective opposition party, however, effectively this prosecution, the HCC allowed both the continuation
has marginalised the Senate. of the trial and the introduction of the new charge.
This turned out to be significant as Tantaly was
Local elections were divided – rural elections were convicted the following month on only two of the
held on 9 November 2003 and urban elections on 23 seven charges against him: embezzlement and
November 2003. Complaints about the efficacy of the usurpation of power. He was sentenced, harshly, to
rural elections led to a nullification of results in 20 twelve years hard labour. The HCC ruling set another
constituencies, mostly in the extreme south,22 and precedent as the prosecution successfully convinced
there were further challenges in Andoharanofotsy, the lower courts that Ratsiraka could be tried in
rural Antananarivo province. Further electoral normal courts as he was no longer president when he
complaints led to a recount and a disputed result in committed his crimes.23
Mahajanga province, where the TIM did not fare as
well as it had hoped. Voter turnout was not accurately The Supreme Court proved equally supportive of
measured outside the capital, but even by the most Ravalomanana’s programme. A notable example came
optimistic estimates it did not exceed 25 percent of in February 2003 when France Telecom sued the
registered voters. Complaints about the registration Malagasy government for allowing Hong Kong based
process further marred the process and reduced the Distacom to take over Telma Telecom Malagasy, despite
percentage of adults who went to the polls. The TIM French investment in the latter. Madagascar’s
party won 66 percent of the commune-level rural privatisation code is clear on the matter and by no
vote. The TIM won the mayoral office of all major stretch of the imagination could France Telecom be
urban centres except Toamasina (where Ratsiraka’s denied its rights. The administrative chamber of the
nephew retained his position). In Mahajanga, Supreme Court, however, ruled that it was in the “higher
however, the PFDM won more councillors’ seats, interests of the state” to allow the sale to Distacom. The
though many resigned within days, claiming they Supreme Court also hastened to ratify the 2003 local
were unable to work with the TIM. elections without investigation, despite allegations of
malfeasance.24 To date, there have been no significant
In November 2002 Ravalomanana presented the court challenges to Ravalomanana’s efforts at any level.
HCC an interesting challenge as he began to issue This includes challenges to Tiko’s benefiting from
executive orders, by-passing the AREMA-controlled privatisation and challenges to the process under which
National Assembly. One of these orders was to former Ratsiraka supporters have been tried.
provide tariff exemption from a long list of imported
goods; these included cement, fertilisers, paper,
fibres, iron, steel, sheet metal, construction materials The performance of the president
and agricultural machinery. The importance of this
was not whether it was the best fiscal measure for a Ravalomanana’s consolidation of power has clearly
country trying to rebuild while in dire economic not been a result of institutional strengthening.
straits, but that the HCC permitted a sweeping tax Indeed, the opposite would seem to be the case:
reform by executive order without action by the political institutions are, largely, as strong as the
National Assembly and without direct reference to the president has allowed them to be. He has shaped the
provinces. Throughout 2003 Ravalomanana TIM party which dominates the political sphere. He
encountered a compliant HCC. His plan for rounding has shaped the nature and actions of the legislature
up and trying perpetrators of the conflict exclusively and the judiciary. In addition, he has largely
from Ratsiraka’s side was upheld and the lion’s share undermined many of the powers given to the
of constitutional challenges to what were sometimes provinces by the 1998 constitutional revisions. The
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question is whether he is a great institution-builder establishments on the coast, but allegedly engaging in
simply reaping personal benefits in the process, or the pretence that Merina were attacking Betsimisiraka
merely enhancing his personal network, entrenching establishments. This desperate ploy failed to bring
his political and economic power. The test will come ethnic difference once again to the centre of political
when there are significant issues on which he is culture. AREMA supporters have continued such
challenged by one of the institutions he himself has strategies since 2002, but have met with equally
created. This has yet to happen. limited success.

Ravalomanana continues to tout his non-partisan Ironically, Ravalomanana’s ethnic challenges today
attempts at reconciliation with the forces of the ancien are greater from within his own Merina support
régime. The perpetrators of crimes in 2002, he asserts, network. Merina society is historically caste based.
should be tried as part of the effort to bring about While this caste system has diminished significantly in
reconciliation. Not only should innocent AREMA importance, it continues to permeate key Merina
leaders be allowed to hold office, he has appointed political constituencies. Ravalomanana is from an
them within his administration. intermediate caste. The aristocratic caste (Andriana)
supported him in 2002 because he is Merina.
This appears to reflect a partial truth. Seeking justice However, now that he is in power Tiko is profiting at
is important for reconciliation, as tribunals in South the expense of many Merina-owned businesses, and a
Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and elsewhere have number of Andriana in positions of authority have
demonstrated. Some critics, however, accuse the suffered through his attempts to reconcile other
administration of selectively guiding the choice of groups. The fear is that ultimately there could be a re-
who should be tried; harsher critics consider this a emergence of the Club des 48, or something like it.
witch hunt. Ravalomanana is correct in saying that This strong civic group, resembling a secret society,
non-offenders have been offered positions, but these was composed only of leading Merina families. They
are mostly civil servant appointments at the Director are believed to have been responsible for the
General level or below. There was only one AREMA assassination of Colonel Ratsimandrava in 1975 and
member in Ravalomanana’s original cabinet. Grad- thus, in part, for Ratsiraka’s rise to power. The
Iloafo, a Malagasy think tank, argued as early as April problem takes on a further political significance. For
2003 that “either the government is reshuffled or instance, Manandafy Rakotonirina and Olivier
social chaos will prevail.”25 The president did Rakotovazaha, both of the MFM party, are advisors to
ultimately push Prime Minister Sylla to reshuffle the Ravalomanana; they are Andriana. As concerns have
cabinet in January 2004. Nine ministers lost their post grown that Merina business is not benefiting enough,
and a large number were replaced with leaders from their position has become more challenging of the
other parties. While this was both a move to build president and their party has become less supportive
political will and reconciliation on the one hand, and of the TIM and has formed a stronger alliance with the
co-opt opposition leaders on the other, the core moderate opposition. Fortunately for Ravalomanana,
motivation is unclear. Regardless of this, he has been the primary opposition parties, AREMA and the
reasonably successful in either arresting or promoting Comite de Reconciliation Nationale (CRN) of Zafy
would-be spoilers from the old regime. Albert, have won no support from Andriana, so
Ravalomanana has benefited from the lack of
The greatest threat in the political sphere in the pre- competition for their favour.
2002 era was the ethnic divide between the Merina
and the seventeen other groups on the island. The Ravalomanana faces similar challenges from the
Merina began centralising control over the island at church. As Vice-President of the FJKM, his ties to the
the end of the 18th century and this position of church as an instrument of civil society have been
supremacy led to their being favoured under French strong. He has benefited greatly from Protestant
colonial rule. The point should not be missed that support, but this is no mere political window dressing;
Didier Ratsiraka is Betsimisiraka from the Toamasina Ravalomanana is an evangelical minister himself. It
coast, the region of highest tensions in the 1947 anti- has been said that he requires his entire staff to
colonial movement. Some 100,000 people were participate in organised prayer, and many of his
killed in the suppression of this uprising, as the Merina political speeches resemble sermons. He often blurs
sided with the French. Ravalomanana is Merina. the constitutionally drawn line separating church and
Through the First and Second Republics it was state, even as this process has helped him straddle the
unimaginable that a Merina could win the presidency. ethnic divide. Recently, however, the FJKM has begun
Ravalomanana has worked assiduously to overcome showing signs of weariness with Ravalomanana and,
this cleavage. Ultimately, his indisputable victory in of in particular, his inability to address the concerns of
5 of the 6 provinces is testament to the fact that the their poorer constituents.
Malagasy people ultimately saw the ethnic divide as a
marker of times past, and secondary to the need for a Ravalomanana is playing with fire with the military as
change of charismatic leadership. As mentioned, well. In order to win the military battles of 2002,
Ratsiraka attempted to fan the ethnic flames in his Ravalomanana had to enlist the assistance of army
favour in 2002, not only attacking Merina “reservists” under the command of General Jules
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Mamizara. Following their victory, Mamizara was parliamentary group, and AVI (Judged by the Work
rewarded with the Defense Ministry portfolio, but was They Do Party) parties form the core of the moderate
subsequently a victim of the January 2004 cabinet opposition. Norbert Ratsirahonana, head of the AVI
reshuffle. The coincidental timing was poor; reservists party, gives cause for particular concern. He has long
were soon to be demobilised and a coalition of been a supporter of Ravalomanana, and helped bring
members accused the government of failing to pay him to office. AVI has been the TIM’s closest partner.
them their due. Mamizara remains behind By mid-2004, however, the economic crisis led
Ravalomanana, but he supported the reservists, Ratsirahonana to join with other moderate opposition
adding weight to their claims. Street demonstrations members in directly denouncing Prime Minister
led the government to enter into negotiations, but Jacques Sylla’s government, and the president
efforts through June 2004 failed, and protests turned circuitously. Ratsirahonana even joined with
violent. While Ravalomanana still commands the presidential advisor Alain Ramaroson and perennial
support of the military as a whole, he has marginalised Malagasy opposition leader Richard Andriamanjato
a small, but vocal and organised, military opposition. (Akfm-Renouveau) to call for Sylla to be replaced by
In May 2004, as Ravalomanana celebrated two years Ny Hasina Andriamanjato.
in office, he could no longer boast the sort of
unquestioned support he had previously enjoyed. Yet AREMA, Zafy Albert’s CRN (Committee for National
his strength should not be underestimated. The Reconciliation), and the OFPACPA (Organisation of
institutions he has created have served him well, Families of People Detained Following Current
though without opposition from within to challenge Political Crisis) constitute a more radical opposition.
any of his programmes it is unclear if they serve an Without Ratsiraka at the helm many thought that
independent function that will survive a change of AREMA would cease to exist as a party, but the old
government (a litmus test for the level of guard has proven more resilient than expected,
institutionalisation). While Ravalomanana has not forming itself into a small, but credible, opposition.
continued to win the hearts of all the business elite, or Zafy Albert has never recovered from his 1996
of the aristocratic Merina caste, he has opened up impeachment, but he has galvanised a vocal core
markets. There has been a flurry of international group. He labels the president “incompetent” and the
interest in Madagascar, if not yet investment by state of Malagasy affairs “a crisis”, seeking government
multinational corporations. However questionable action before (in a thinly veiled threat) suggesting that
the benefactors poorly-run state industries are being the people will ultimately take to the streets to remove
privatised. Part of the economic slump is a result of Ravalomanana just as they brought him to power. He
Ravalomanana floating the Malagasy currency. He has seeks as agenda items a South Africa-style Truth and
altered the tax structure and agency, and he has Reconciliation Commission to identify and try AREMA
streamlined the import and export processes. Given leaders and the perpetrators of the violence of 2002.
his unusual view of nationalism, he has even pushed He also calls for a new constitution and thus the
through a law that allows foreigners to purchase land establishment of a Fourth Republic. OFPACPA has
in Madagascar. The severity of the economic decline both launched and faced the strongest challenge. Its
has created hardship and threatened rural support in leader, Victor Wing Hong, was close to Ratsiraka and
particular, but the rationale is that he believes he the party remains close to AREMA. Hong was arrested
needs to get Madagascar’s fiscal house in order not in March 2004 for his role in organising a public
just because the International Monetary Fund has told opposition meeting the government saw as seditious;
him to, but because he is a free-marketeer at heart. in June 2004 he was sentenced to 42 months in
All of these efforts will benefit business in Madagascar prison. While none of these opposition groups claims
generally, and Tiko in particular. Reforms are a connection, ethnic conflict in Toamasina has
necessary, however, and will, presuming the social ills continued since 2002. There appears a link to
can be redressed, ultimately be to the benefit the Ratsiraka, but less clear is the role of AREMA.
Malagasy population at large.
No single opposition party is very strong, and no
single opposition party is mobilised. Moreover,
Opposition and the struggle for political cooperation between opposition parties is not very
party independence effective. Yet opposition parties old and new are
gaining strength, and in the absence of political
Ravalomanana’s political honeymoon ended in early consolidation to date, Ravalomanana has few lines of
2004. As yet he has met few of his campaign defence against hit-and-run attacks.
promises, the economy has slumped, and his
domestic base is slowly eroding. As of the time of The TIM claims that economic life in Madagascar is
writing he is not under imminent threat, but his better for the majority of the population than it was
internal support needs to be watched carefully. during Ratsiraka’s presidency. Ravalomanana, in
particular, refers to the enhanced international
Other opposition parties can be categorised into engagement, the implementation of a poverty
moderate and radical factions. The RPSD (New Rally reduction plan, improvements in the rule of law, and
for Sovereignty and Development), GPR in decentralisation. On all counts this is probably
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correct. Yet, beyond road improvement projects Germany and France have both continued to support
government has to date done little to focus Madagascar in increasing amounts of aid and the
development benefits on the rural poor who make up sponsorship of business ties. Key African partners,
more than two-thirds of the population. Perhaps more notably South Africa and Senegal, have offered
to the point, without concurrent institutionalisation it significant verbal support for Ravalomanana, and
is not clear that even improvements in the rule of law, criticised his challengers, while promoting bilateral
reflected in less capricious courts, are necessarily trade. Multilateral donor impacts have been all the
deepening the democratic process for urban or rural greater: the once intransigent African Union has come
populations. to support him; in January 2004 the European Union
dedicated 1.9 million euros to “democracy” in
The greatest internal challenge Ravalomanana faces is Madagascar to demonstrate its support for the
on the constitution itself. Zafy Albert, in particular, has political direction of the country. This comes in
called for its complete overhaul, claiming that addition to its dedicating 430 million euros to the
Madagascar is facing a crisis and that anything short of country over five years for “revitalisation.” The
a Fourth Republic will lead to a bloodbath; he International Monetary Fund committed itself to
demands a national constitutional conference. funding a $117.1 million poverty alleviation
Ravalomanana has answered that “a president is not programme in 2004, though the first disbursement
involved in such an issue,”26 but this is a clear effort came under threat because of Ravalomanana’s “zero-
to avoid the process. The problem he has is that, as tax” programme, in terms of which, certain consumer
described above, the constitution has been items had taxes removed in an effort to ameliorate
profoundly modified from its original state. It no social problems. Ravalomanana has reason for
longer provides a clear set of basic laws or offers a concern: other economic liberalisation measures,
cohesive roadmap for institutional strengthening and including significant currency devaluation, have made
the development of the rule of law. To change the life harder for the average Malagasy citizen. As a
constitution, however, would mean result, popular support for
undermining the broad powers the Ravalomanana’s ability to lead the
president enjoys, while appearing to Ravalomanana has country to an improvement in the
give in to opposition demands. Even if quality of life has waned. The zero-tax
reason for concern:
Ravalomanana did agree to a measure was only stop-gap, but
constitutional convention, this would be other economic nonetheless went against IMF
unlikely to produce the sort of liberalisation conditionalities. In the end, Madagascar
document Madagascar needs, as the measures, including got only a warning from the Bretton
goal of the opposition is not an effective Woods Institution, and received the
fundamental law, but institutional
significant currency funding – a sure sign of the desire the
manipulation to undermine the devaluation, have IMF has to work with the Ravalomanana
Ravalomanana government. It was, after made life harder for government.
all, the same Zafy Albert who initially the average Malagasy
altered the powers of the president
when he was in office. citizen. CONCLUSION

International support for Ravalomanana It has been broadly argued that the
and the TIM is far less questionable than domestic transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Africa
favour. The United States, in particular, has supported is largely a function of the internal dynamics of
the TIM and the administration. President George Bush neopatrimonial rule.29 Madagascar is no exception.
first met Marc Ravalomanana on 11 November 2001 – Ravalomanana created the social movement of 2002
before the elections. Referring to that event the White only to have it shape him into a populist leader. But
House calls it a meeting with “President” Ravalomanana was the way Ravalomanana came into office
without chronological qualification.27 The US was one democratic? The electoral process was skirted, the
of the first countries to recognise Ravalomanana in constitution was subverted, and fledgling democratic
2002; since then Madagascar has qualified to participate institutions were uprooted. Yet social movements are a
in the second phase of the trade preference African form of political participation. New social movements
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and it has in Latin America have been well discussed and their
become one of 16 countries (8 in Africa) that has relevance to modern democratisation significantly
qualified for the $1 billion in funds from the US probed. A common conclusion, as argued by Arturo
Millennium Challenge Account. President Bush has Escobar, is that social movements that achieve political
personally “congratulated” the Malagasy government for goals in fact help undermine clientalism.30 This gives
its battle against corruption.28 There are two apparent participants in the movement a sense of efficacy. Thus,
reasons for the strong support: the strong pro-US, if political mobilisation is “the process by which a
economically liberal actions in Antananarivo, and group goes from being a passive collection of
Ravalomanana’s continual pledge to assist in the US’s individuals to an active participant in public life”31 then
War on Terror (in particular cracking down on potential six to eight percent of Malagasy society became active
weapons trafficking in the Mozambique Channel). political participants in a truly overt fashion.
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The elections of 2001 cannot claim to have been part NOTES
of a procedural democratic process. But, in an
Aristotelian sense, the will of the people was realised 1 What constitutes democracy in Africa has been the
through social movement. People take to the streets subject of a significant body of theoretical exploration
when institutions fail to provide the mediating for more than a decade. See in particular L. Diamond.
Democratization in Africa, Johns Hopkins University
opportunity they are designed to perform. In this case, Press, Baltimore, 1999.
the democratic process would have led to a second 2 In a well-explored discussion, Bratton and Van de Walle
election and, perhaps, electoral manipulation and the describe neopatrimonialism as follows: “In
retention of Ratsiraka as president. This would have neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains
been a less democratic outcome. authority through personal patronage, rather than
through ideology or law. As with classic patrimonialism,
the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an
Assuming we are willing to accept the way that office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism,
Ravalomanana came into office is democratic, and relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade formal
that he came to power as the people’s choice, this political and administrative systems and leaders occupy
does not make him a “democrat.” A new democrat bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than
would be building institutions that can perpetuate the to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction
between private and public interests is purposely
smooth transition of government over multiple blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award
electoral cycles. It is not clear that the president is by public officials of personal favours, both within the
doing this. What is apparent is that, by way of the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for
advantages afforded Tiko, he is benefiting personally instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for
from his office. He has worked to advance his material rewards, clients mobilise political support and
supporters and has ensured his political base through refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to
patrons.” M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle,
the process. Coming into office as a wealthy Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in
businessman, Marc Ravalomanana may prove an Africa, World Politics 46(4), 1994, p. 458.
unusual species: a “democratic” corporatist who 3 Journal Officiel de la République de Madagascar, No.
enriches himself and those around him, and 2140, du 21 Septembre 1992, pp. 2196 – 2204.
consolidates his power base through patronage, while 4 While the grounds for impeachment related to his abuse
of authority, the support for impeachment within the
enhancing the lot of the population at large and
National Assembly came from broader causes. Ravony
reflecting popular will. How he reacts to the had been driven from the prime minister’s office, but
challenges he is now facing will define who he is, by support for him remained. His successor, Rakotovahiny,
determining how democratic and how personalised was short lived in office and resigned in May 1996. The
his rule will become. new finance minister, Jean-Claude Raherimanjato, was
openly critical of Zafy’s intended reforms. And, perhaps
most critically, in May IMF Director Michel Camdessus
effectively froze all IMF and World Bank funding until
significant economic reforms were to be put in place,
shutting off the single largest source of aid and
jeopardizing foreign investment.
5 Journal Officiel de la République de Madagascar, No
2495, du 08 Avril 1998, pp. 1274 – 1286.
6 Journal Officiel de la République de Madagascar, No
2657, du 28 Aout 2000, pp. 2988 – 3018.
7 Georges T Indrianjafy, Indian Ocean Newsletter, 1
December 2001.
8 Madagascar: Ratsiraka says he will accept poll results in
New Year message, BBC Monitoring Worldwide, 31
December 2001.
9 “Opposition supporters take to the streets in
Antananarivo,” Pan-Africa News Agency, 6 January
2002.
10 Pressure mounts for vote recounts, Indian Ocean
Newsletter, 12 January 2002.
11 For further discussion on this question see R. R. Marcus
and P. Razafindrakoto, Participation and the poverty of
electoral democracy in Madagascar, Afrika Spectrum,
2003(1) p 27.
12 Madagascar: US objects to opposition candidate’s self-
proclamation as president, BBC Monitoring Worldwide,
23 February 2002.
13 For a discussion of ethnicity at the mercy of political
entrepreneurs in Madagascar see: F. Roubaud,
Democratie électorale et inertie institutionnelle à
Madagascar. Document de Travail. Développement et
Insertion Internationale (DIAL). DT/2001/03.
14 Madagascar: New president addresses nation, says
Malagasy people indivisible.” BBC Monitoring
International Reports, 29 April 2002.
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15 The “referendum” was a bit of word play. Ravalomanana
had publicly called for a referendum on his victory. The
Dakar II Agreement called for a referendum on the two
candidates – a legalistic distinction from a run-off
election but with the same ends. The language choice
both avoided a constitutional issue over the terms of
second elections and would allow Ravalomanana to
save face by saying that he only agreed to a referendum
and that there would be no second round of elections.
16 The OAU became the African Union at the Durban
Summit, June 28 – July 10, 2002. Its Madagascar policy
was unchanged.
17 h t t p : / / w w w . t i a k o - i - m a d a g a s i k a r a .
org/Ravalomanana_US.htm
18 Survey conducted by Richard R. Marcus and Paul
Razafindrakoto
19 This often means Tiko goods. For instance, an
agreement with South Africa ensured a great
proliferation of South African goods, but milk product
imports remain scant and subject to tariff.
20 Union africaine: Télégramme...enthousiaste, Midi
Madagasikara, 13 janvier 2003; Les élections législatives
vues par la presse étrangère, Midi Madagasikara, 27
décembre 2004.
21 M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle, Neopatrimonial
regimes and political transitions in Africa, World Politics
46(4), 1994, p. 458.
22 Most significant were inconsistencies that halted vote
counting in Ambovombe sub-prefecture. Elections
législatives à Ambovombe: soupçons à l’encontre de la
sous-préfecture. Midi Madagasikara 27 décembre 2002.
23 Significant is that Tantely received a sentence of 12 years
hard labour when Didier Ratsiraka himself received only
10 years hard labour (in abstentia).
24 The Supreme Court is the highest authority overseeing
local elections and the High Constitutional Court is the
highest authority overseeing presidential and legislative
elections.
25 Madagascar: Pro-government party urges cabinet
reshuffle to avert “social chaos,” BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 17 April 2003.
26 Malagasy president interviewed on second anniversary
in office, BBC Monitoring International Reports.
27 President Bush’s Africa Policy Accomplishments and
Initiatives, [Link]
africa_accomplishments.pdf 5 July 2004.
28 Remarks by the President at Ceremony Celebrating
Countries Selected for the Millennium Challenge
Account. Office of the Press Secretary, 10 May 2004.
[Link]
[Link] 5 July 2004.
29 Bratton and Van de Walle (M. Bratton and N. van de
Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa. Cambridge
University Press, New York, 1997) make the point
directly. It has been explored to some degree, however,
by such scholars as Goran Hyden, Samuel Huntington,
Naomi Chazan, and Larry Diamond.
30 A. Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez, eds. The making of
social movements in Latin America: Identity, strategy,
and democracy, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, p 322.
31 C. Tilly. From mobilization to revolution, Random
House, New York, 1978, p 69.
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About this paper

Madagascar’s political space is defined by the country's social movements. This is in
contrast to many African states which have been shaped by a history of domination by
"big men". In the case of Madagascar, no leader has had as much influence on the nature
of the political system, or its dynamics, as the anti-colonial uprising of 1947, the
military's dissolution of the First Republic in 1972, the strikes of 1991, or the populist
support for “democracy” that Balkanised the country in 2002. Former President Didier
Ratsiraka was the single largest figure in Malagasy politics from 1975 to 1992, yet the
nature of his rule was defined by the events of 1972 and the way he came to office, just
as the administration of Madagascar’s first president, Philibert Tsirinana, was defined by
what had happened in 1947 and Zafy Albert’s 1993-96 presidency was defined by the
events of 1991.

The pattern appears to continue, but with an interesting twist: President Marc
Ravalomanana created the 2002 uprising that brought him to power, but this event, in
turn, has now come to define him. This paper examines the formation of the Third
Republic in 1992 in a historical context, and the events leading up to the crisis of 2002,
before turning to consider the efforts of Marc Ravalomanana and the new government
since. This should provide a better understanding of the institutional, social, and
personal factors that influence Madagascar’s political direction. The paper concludes by
offering a tentative answer to the question in the sub-title, considering whether
Madagascar has gone through a momentous change in the nature of its democracy or
whether it has given birth to a new incarnation of neopatrimonial rule in which the
president’s office is used more for personal gain than public benefit.

About the author

Dr Richard R. Marcus is Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Yale University
and Assistant Professor at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.

Funder
This research is funded by the governments of Sweden and Switzerland through the
African Security Analysis Programme.

© 2004, Institute for Security Studies • ISSN: 1026-0404

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