\·

Neobehaviorism and the Cognitive Revolution

- - - - - Ill.. . , . . . . , . . . , . .

Watson's Behaviorism- expression of his commitment to a

positivist science restricted to the description, prediction,
and controi of observable behavior.
expression of his inductivist conception of the
development of scientific theories, according to which the
aim of science is to accumulate observational laws that
can eventually be integrate~ _sumipative theories.

Neobehaviorism- Embraced the hypothetico-deductive

account of the development of scientific theories
Theories play more than a merely summative role
Theoretical postulates are introduced not only to
accommodate previously established obseryational laws,
but also to generate new observational predictions.

_,,/ Explain the differences

between behaviorism, Skinner's Radical Behaviorism- focused upon what h~
neobehaviorism, and radical called operant behavior,. as opposed to Pavlovian
behaviorism. respondent behavior.
·defined operant behavior as behavior whose pr.o bability of
recurrence is increased by reinforcement
respondent behavior as behavior elicited by unfqnditioned
and conditioned stimuli.
operant conditioning ~ncreases' the probability of the
recurrence of a behavior (in a stimulus situation) and the
frequency of its recurrence, through reinforcement of the
behavior. ·
Skinner maintained that behaviorist psychology should .
focus on the description of functional relationships
between observable behavior and environmental stimuli,
based upon the experimental analysis, control, and
manipulation of environmental reinforcement
Skinner didn't see any need for theory and rejected the
hypothetico-deductive method advocated by Tolman and
Hull.
TOLMAN'S PURPOSEFUL BEHAVIOR- Claimed that
Explain the differences most animal and human behavior is intentionally directed
between Hull an9 Tolman's toward goal or end states.
 I

I versions ofneobehaviorism. Like Aristotle, Tolman maintained that most animal and
human behavior is intrinsically purposive or teleological.
Tolman did not deny the independence of conscious
mentality and behavior. He thought it was perfectly
legitimate to postulate mental determinants of the
purposive behavior of animals and humans.
He rejected the common conception of learning as the
automatic connection of stimulus and response, based
upon principles of contiguity, frequency, and
reinforcement. ,
Tolman and Honzik ( 1930) maintained that rats are able to
learn maze layouts in the absence of reinforcement:-
T olman field that rats develop cognitive maps of their
spatial environment based upon confirmations of their
expectancies: in the course of learning something like a
field map of the environment gets established in the rats
brain.

Clark Hull- claimed that all learning is based upon the

reduction of drives related to an organisms primary
biological needs
food, drink, sexual gratification, temperature regulation,
and relief from pain
reinforcement is equivalent to drive reduction or
satisfaction
Hull's operationalism- claimed that theoretical intervening
variables such as drive and habit strength must be related
to observable independent and dependent variables
Hull's realism-theoretical references to habits must be
operationally defined in terms of observable stimuli and
responses, he maintained that habits exist independently of
their particular behavioral expression in stimulus
situations
theoretical references to drives must be defined in terms of
observable stimuli and responses, but maintained that they
exist independently as internal states of an organism that
causally mediate between environmental stimuli and
. behavioral responses
No need for consciousness or Cognition.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HULL AND TOLMAN- Hull

agreed with Tolman that cognitive constructs are
hypothetical constructs with surplus meaning that is not
reducible to the mere description of correlations between
observable stimuli and responses
but differed in insisting that postulated cognitive states
I
must be defined operationally as internal causal variables
By the end of the Second World War, many psychologists
had come to question the behaviorist presumption that all
or most of human psychology and behavior could be
explained in terms of general theories of conditioning
based upon the experimental study of rats and pigeons.
They doubted that such theories could be extended to
accommodate human moral, social, and lihguistic
behavior, as most behaviorists had maintained.
In the 1950s and 1960s behaviorist theories based upon
conditioning came under increasing attack, in terms of
both the scope and basic principles of conditioning theory.

The meaning of theoretical postulates in natural science is

generally determined independently of operational
definition.
operational measures of theoretical constructs such as
electron and short-term memory are important, but they do
not determine their meaning, as evidenced by the fact that
their meaning remains invariant when different
operational measures are employed in different empirical
or experimental con-texts.
Describe at least 3 problems most neobehaviorists insisted that surplus meaning has no
identified with behaviorism. place in psychological science
This placed quite unnecessary constraints on the
development of psychological theory and created a critical
conceptual dilemma for neobehaviorists.

If the meaningful content of theoretical postulates really is

exhaustively determined by the observational stimulus-
response sequences in terms of which they are
operationally defined, then why not simply dispense with
theoretical constructs altogether and restrict psychological
science to the description of observational stimulus-
response sequences?

Lashley claimed that traditional behaviorist explanations

in terms of reflex arcs and chains of association or
connection could not account for complex serially ordered
behavior such as language.
He maintained that many forms of human and animal
behavior require explanation in terms of hierarchically
organized cognitive control structures that determine
I
complex sequences of serially ordered behavior, which are
occasioned by environmental inputs but cannot be
explained in terms of associations between environmental
inputs and responses or reinforcement histories.
HULL
no need for consciousness or cognition: He acknowledged
that explanations in terms of consciousness are legitimate
in principle, but held that there is no need to appeal to
them in practice. Hull doubted that theoretical references
to consciousness would ever be needed to explain animal
or human behavior.
Hull also acknowledged the legitimacy of cognitive
theoretical postulates and sometimes employed them in
his own work, but he rejected Tolman's theories of
representations and cognitive maps. He believed that all
behavior, including human moral and social behavior,
could be explained in purely mechanistic terms.

TOLMAN
Cognitive determinism: Tolman's commitment to the
cognitive determination of both animal and human
behavior was a distinctive feature of his purposive
behaviorism. It distinguished it from the forms of
behaviorism advocated by most other behaviorists.
State Hull, Tolman, and Tolman rejected Lloyd Morgan's claim that all animal
Skinner's positions on the behavior-could be explained in terms of association and
role of consciousness. never embraced the standard behaviorist attempt to
accommodate all forms of animal and human behavior in
terms [Link] learning

SKINNER-
cognitive states: Skinner acknowledged the existence of
cognitive states, but denied that they are centrally
initiatep.
Cognitive states are merely internal links in fully
determined causal chains relating behavior and
environmen4tl stimuli.
He rejected the notion that the cognitive agent is the true
originator or initiator of action and, like most other
behaviorists, was a committed environmentalist.
Skinners theoretical commitment to the environmental
determi~ation of behavior led him to champion progrl'µIls
of sociai engineering based upon experimentally derived
principles of behavior modification.
Logical Intervening Variable
Explain the difference merely a logical device for integrating descriptions of
between a logical and causal observable stimuli and behavioral responses
intervening variable. expression of the instrumentalist conception of scientific
theories, according to which theoretical postulates are
merely logical devices for integrating observational laws
many neobehaviorists embraced an instrumentalist
conception of theory

Causal Intervening Variable

represents an internal state of an organism that causally
mediates between observable stimuli and behavioral
responses
expression of the realist conception of scientific theories,
according to which theoretical postulates are potentially
true descriptions of entities such as electrons and cognitive
states
Hull and Tolman, were committed realists who treated
intervening variables as explanatory references to internal
states that causally mediate between observed stimuli and
behavior
The central doctrines of logical positivism were
essentially linguistic restatements of the psychological and
meaning empiricism of David Hume.
Hume had claimed that the only meaningful ideas are
Verification principle those derived from experience, and the logical positivists
advanced the _ verification principle_, according to
which the only meaningful factual propositions are those
verifiable by observation.
Logical Intervening Variable
merely a logical device for integrating descriptions of
observable stimuli and behavioral responses
expression of the instrumentalist conception of scientific
theories, according to which theoretical postulates are
merely logical devices for integrating observational laws
many neobehaviorists embraced an instrumentalist
conception of theory

Logical and causal Causal Intervening Variable

intervening variables represents an internal state of an organism that causally
mediates between observable stimuli and behavioral
responses
expression of the realist conception of scientific theories,
according to which theoretical postulates are potentially
true descriptions of entities such as electrons and cognitive
states
Hull and Tolman, were committed realists who treated
 ·intervening variables as explanatory references to internal
states that causally mediate between observed stimuli and
behavior

((Neobehaviorists (such as Hull and Tolman) embraced

this later version of logical positivism, which became
known as scientific empiricism (or logical empiricism).
They treated theoretical references to consciousness and
cognition in psychology as analogous to theoretical
references to electrons and gravitational fields in natural
science, as theoretical postulates related to publicly
observable behavior.

Scientific empiricists treated theoretical postulates relating

to the internal states of organisms as intervening variables,
defined in terms of relations between observable
independent variables such as environmental or
physiological stimuli and observable dependent variables
such as behavioral responses))
By the end of the Second World War, many psychologists
had come to question the behaviorist presumption that all
or most of human psychology and behavior could be
explained in terms of general theories of conditioning
based upon the experimental study of rats and pigeons.
They doubted that such theories could be extended to
accommodate human moral, social, and linguistic
behavior, as most behaviorists had maintained.
In the 1950s and 1960s behaviorist theories based upon
conditioning came under increasing attack, in terms of
both the scope and basic principles of copditioning theory.

Problems with behaviorism The meaning of theoretical postulates in natural science is

generally determined independently of operational
definition.
operational measures of theoretical constructs such as
electron and short-term memory are important, but they do
not determine their meaning, as evidenced by the fact that
their meaning remains invariant when different
operational measures are employed in different empirical
or experimental con-texts.
most neobehaviorists insisted that surplus meaning has no
place in psychological science
This placed quite unnecessary constraints on the
development of psychological theory and created a critical
 conceptual dilemma for neobehaviorists.

If the .meaningful content of theoretical postulates really is

exhaustively determined by the observational stimulus-
response sequences in terms of which they are
operationally defined, then why not simply dispense with
theoretical constructs altogether and restrict psychological
science to the description of observational stimulus-
response sequences?

Lashley claimed that traditional behaviorist explanations

in terms of reflex arcs and chains of association or
connection could not account for complex serially ordered
behavior such as language.
He maintained that many forms of human and animal
behavior require explanation in terms of hierarchically
organized cognitive control structures that determine
complex sequences of serially ordered behavior, which are
occasioned by environmental inputs but cannot be
explained in terms of associations between environmental
inputs and responses or reinforcement histories.
Embraced the hypothetico-deductive account of the
development of scientific theories
Theories play more than a merely summative role
Theoretical postulates are introduced not only to
accommodate previously established observational laws,
but also to generate new observational predictions.
Included Logical Positivism- The central doctrines of
logical positivism were essentially linguistic restatements
of the psychological and meaning empiricism of David
Hume.
Hume had claimed that the only meaningful ideas are
those derived from experience, and the logical positivists
The neobehaviorists advanced the verification principle, according to which the
only meaningful factual propositions are those verifiable
by observation. The logical positivists employed the
verification principle to dismiss metaphysical, ethical,
religious, and aesthetic propositions as literal nonsense,
because they could not be empirically verified. But They
recognized that many of the theoretical propositions of
science, such as propositions about electrons and ·
gravitational fields, were also incapable of direct empirical
verification, but they were reluctant to,dismiss them as
nonsense. To accommodate theoretical propositions about
 unobservable entities such as [Link] and gravitational
fields, the logical positivists claimed that it is legitimate to
introduce theoretical propositions so long as they are
defined in terms of observables, via correspondence rules
or operational definitions relating theoretical propositions
to propositions about observables.
In the early version of logical positivism known as
sensationalism, observational propositions were held to
describe the properties of private sense experience, such as
the intensity of colors or apparent differences in weight.
In the later version of logical positivism known as
physicalism, observational propositions were held to
describe the publicly observable properties of physical
objects, such as readings on spectrometers or the motion
of bodies.
Neobehaviorists (such as Hull and Tolman) embraced this
later version of logical positivism, which became known
as scientific empiricism (or logical empiricism).
They treated theoretical references to consciousness and
cognition in psychology as analogous to theoretical
references to electrons and gravitational fields in natural
science, as theoretical postulates related to publicly
observable behavior.

Tolman- purposeful behavior, latent learning, cognitive

determinism, intervening variables, hypothetical
constructs
Hull- Operationalization, Realism, no need for
consciousness

The neobehaviorist conception of theoretical postulates as

operationally defined intervening variables impeded the
development of psychological theory.
The neobehaviorist error, inherited from scientific
empiricist philosophy of science, was to confuse the
reasonable demand for operational measures qf postulated
theoretical states and processes with the peculiar notion
that the meaning of theoretical postulates must be
specified in terms of such operational measures.
MacCorquiodale & Meehl's (1948) distinction
hypot!1etical constructs, unlike intervening variables,
contam s_urplus meaning that is not reducible to empirical
Hypothetical constructs laws.
Tolman's theor~tical cognitive postulates were
hypothetical constructs rather than intervening variables,
 as he later acknowledged.
focused upon what he called operant behavior, as opposed
to Pavlovian respondent behavior.
defined operant behavior as behavior whose probability of
recurrence is increased by reinforcement
respondent behavior as behavior elicited by unconditioned
and conditioned stimuli.
operant conditioning increases the probability of the
recurrence of a behavior (in a stimulus situation) and the
frequency of its recurrence, through reinforcement of the
behavior.

Law of Effect= Operant Conditioning?

Skinner claimed that his account of operant conditioning
was merely a refinement of Thorndike's law of effect.
However, Skinner rejected Thorndike's references to
satisfaction and discomfort and Hulls interpretation of
reinforcement as drive reduction.
He maintained that the only defining characteristic of a
reinforcing stimulus is that it reinforces, ignoring the
obvious circularity of the definition.

Unobserved states and processes-

Skinner rejected the scientific empiricist and
Skinner
neobehaviorist account of psychological theories.
theories about unobservable states and processes,
including theories about cognitive states and processes,
are explanatory fictions:
They are vacuous as explanations of relations between
observable stimuli and responses and play no role in the
development of novel predictions about behavior

Skinner also recognized that the notion that operationally

defined intervening variables can generate novel empirical
predictions is completely illusory.
Since at any point in time, the content of postulated
intervening variables is supposedly determined by the
functional relationships between observable stimuli and
responses in terms of which they are operationally
defined,
the only basis for the prediction of novel functional
relationships is our present knowledge of functional
relationships between observable stimuli and responses.
Skinner maintained that behaviorist psychology should
focus on the description of functional relationships
between observable behavior and environmental stimuli,
 based upon the experimental analysis, control, and
manipulation of environmental reinforcement
Skinner didn't see any need for theory and rejected the .
hypothetico-deductive method advocated by Tolman and
Hull.
Skinner acknowledged the existence of cognitive states,
but denied that they are centrally initiated.
Cognitive states are merely internal links in fully
determined causal chains relating behavior and
environmental stimuli.
He r_ejected the notion that the cognitive agent is the true
originator or initiator of action and, like most other
behaviorists, was a committed environmentalist.
Skinners theoretical commitment to the environmental
determination of behavior led him to champion programs
of social engineering based upon experimentally derived
principles of behavior modification.
Skinner's radical behaviorism became a distinctive
movement within scientific psychology.
Skinner was the most famous 20th century psychologist.
While Tolman may not have had, as revolutionary an
impact as Watson or as immediate an influence as Hull,
his theoretical position has endured better than theirs.
Tolmans own research was focused on purposive or goal-
directed behavior in animals and humans.

Purposeful behavior- Claimed that most animal and

human behavior is intentionally directed toward goal or
end states.
Like Aristotle, Tolman maintained that most animal and
human behavior ·is intrinsically purposive or teleological.
Tolman did not deny the independence of conscious
mentality and behavior. He thought it was perfectly
Tolman legitimate to postulate mental determinants of the
purposive behavior of animals and humans.
He rejected the common conception of learning as the
automatic connection of stimulus and response, based
upon principles of contiguity, frequency, and
reinforcement.

Latent Leaming-Tolman and Honzik (1930) maintained

that rats are able to learn maze layouts in the absence of
reinforcement. Tolman held that rats develop cognitive
maps of their spatial environment based upon
confirmations of their expectancies: in the course of
learning something like a field map,ofthe environment
 gets established in the rats brain.

Cognitive Determinism- Tolman's commitment to the

cognitive determination of both animal and human
behavior was a distinctive feature of his purposive
behaviorism. It distinguished it from the forms of
behaviorism advocated by most other behaviorists.
Tolman rejected Lloyd Morgan's claim that all animal
behavior could be explained in terms of association and
never embraced the standard behaviorist attempt to
accommodate all forms of animal and human behavior in
terms of conditioned learning

Intervening variables- Tolman came to treat cognitive

states as intervening variables, operationally defined in
terms of external environmental or internal physiological
stimulus variables (independent variables) and behavioral
response variables (dependent variables)
"Mental processes are but intervening variables between
the five independent variables of (I) environmental
stimuli, (2) physiological drive, (3) heredity, (4) previous
training, and (5) maturity, on the one hand, and the final
dependent variable, behavior, on the other."

His hypothetical constructs- Tolman specified the

meaning of his theoretical cognitive constructs
independently of any operational definition.
Tolman specified his theoretical references to cognitive
maps, for example, in terms of an organism's
representation of its spatial environment, not in terms of
its behavior in that environment.
Given this theoretical specification; one could understand
how rats represent their environment without knowing
how they behave in that environment.
claimed that all learning is based upon the reduction of
drives related to an organisms primary biological needs
food, [Link], sexual gratification, temperature regulation,
and relief from pain
reinforcement is equivalent to drive reduction or
satisfaction
Hull
Operationalization- claimed that theoretical intervening
variables such as drive and habit strength must be related
to observable independent and dependent variables

Realism- theoretical references to habits must be

 operationally defined in terms of observable stimuli and
res~onse~, he maintained that habits exist independently of
t~e1r ~articular behavioral expression in stimulus
situations
theoretical references to drives must be defined in terms of
ob~e1:able stimuli and responses, but maintained that they
exist independently as internal states of an organism that
causally mediate between environmental stimuli and
behavioral responses

No consciousness/cognition- He acknowledged that

explanations in terms of consciousness are legitimate in
principle, but held that there is no need to appeal to them
in practice. Hull doubted that theoretical references to
consciousness would ever be needed to explain animal or
human behavior.
Hull also acknowledged the legitimacy of cognitive
theoretical postulates and sometimes employed them in
his own work, but he rejected Tolman's theories of
representations and cognitive maps. He believed that all
behavior, including human moral and spcial behavior,
could be explained in purely mechanistic terms.
Hull agreed with Tolman that cognitive constructs are
hypothetical constructs with surplus meaning that is not
reducible to the mere description of correlations between
observable stimuli and responses
but differed in insisting that postulated cognit~ve states
must be defined operationally as internal causal variables

Hulls theories of conditioned learning had far greater

initial impact than Tolman's cognitive theories.
Hulls theories remained highly influential throughout the
1940s and 1950s and Hull's form ofneobehaviorism
remained the dominant force in American departments of
psychology until the advent of radical behaviorism and the
cognitive revolution in the 1950s and I 960s.
subjected Skinners claim that the complexities or'verbal
behavior could be explained in terms of discriminative
stimuli and reinforcement history to a devastating critique.
argued that Skinners basic concepts of stimulus, response,
and reinforcement could be objectively defined only in
Chomsky tenns of rigorously controlled experiments and could not
be extended to accommodate complex verbal behavior.
 Chomsky argued that human verbal behavior could only
be explained in terms of representations of the rules
governing the construction of sentences. According to
Chomsky, our ability to recognize sentences cannot be
explained in terms of behaviorist principles such as
stimulus generalization or in terms of basic associationist
principles ( such as contiguity, frequency, and
reinforcement), but must be explained in terms of the
internal representation of the grammar of a language.

doubted that any behaviorist theory could account for the

remarkable fact [Link] normal children acquire essentially
comparable grammars with remarkable rapidity, based
upon a very limited set of data (the so- called poverty of
the stimulus argument).
the child's ability to acquire grammar at such a rapid rate
can be explained only by the postulation of some innate '
hypothesis-formulating ability, a suggestion Chomsky
later developed in his theory of (innate) transformational
grammar a postulated system of rules governing the
production of grammatically well- formed sentences.

IMPACT-Although Chomsky influenced many individual

psychologists and persuaded some to abandon
behaviorism am;! embrace cognitive forms of
psychological explanation, his own distinctive theoretical
position had little direct impact upon the development of
later theories in cognitive psychology
Bigger impact as a philosopher and political activist
Contiguity and Frequency
Studies by John Garcia and others showed that contiguity
and frequency are not necessary or sufficient for
conditioned learning.
Garcia discovered that rats that refus~ to drink saccharin
that has been paired with radiation sickness do so after a
single trial, violating the principle of frequency, and after
Garcia an interval of up to 12 hours between drinking saccharin
and sickness, violating the principle of contiguity.
Kamins' studies of blocking suggested that prior
conditioning to one element of a compound stimulus {such
as light in a light and noise complex) attenuates or blocks
conditioning to the other element.
Conciousness & Cognition- Dulany (1968) suggested that,
Delaney in many of these studies, not only were subjects aware of
 the relevant response reinforcement connections, but also
that such awareness was a necessary condition of
successful conditioning.
hypothetical constructs, unlike intervening variables,
contain surplus meaning that is not reducible to empirical
laws. -
McCorquodale & Meehl Tolman's theoretical cognitive postulates were
hypothetical constructs rather than intervening variables,
as he later acknowledged.
Turing test:
Set-up: a human interrogator poses questions to a machine
and another human whose only contact with them is via a
teleprinter link
Conclusion: Turing maintained that we should be prepared
to ascribe intelligence to a machine if we could not
discriminate the responses of the human communicator
from a machine simulating or imitating these responses

developed the abstract idea of a hypothetical machine,

now known as a Turing machine, capable of performing
elementary operations on symbols printed on a paper tape
Turing originally approached the question by conceiving
of a human operator, or human computer, who
mechanically' performed a set of instructions from a
rulebook.
By imagining a human'. replaced by a machine with a
Explain the different stored set of instructions, Turing created the notion of a
interpretations of artificial computer program.
intelligence made by the In conceiving of a machine capable of performing a
Turing test and the Chinese variety of tasks (such as computing numbers, drawing
Room problem. logical implications, and playing chess), Turing developed
the principle of the modem computer
Artificial intelligence-raised the question of whether
cognitive processes, such as those involved in proving
theorems, playing chess, or understanding language, can
properly be ascribed to machines, in the same sense in
which they are paradigmatically ascribed to humans.

This question has vexed psychologists as much as it has

vexed critical philosophers and humanists.

Chinese room
 John Searle argued that the symbols that computers
manip?late, such as those processed by computers
operating on story-reading programs, mean nothing to
them, unlike the symbols that humans employ in language
comprehension and communication.

Searle proposed The Chinese Room Scenario as a counter-

point to Turing's test.
imagine a room in which a person who speaks only
English receives written questions in Chinese
The person responds with printed answers in Chinese in
accord with instructions from an English rulebook, which
specifies the appropriate Chinese answers to questions set
in Chinese
The person identifies the Chinese questions merely by ~he
shape of the symbols and prints out the,.set of symbols that
the rulebook iqentifies as the appropriate answer in
Chinese
Searle claimed that a person performing such a task could
pass the Turing test, but would not understand Chinese.
Such a person would merely produce the ans~ers by
m~ipulating uninterpreted formal symbols,.
Since such [Link] would essentially behave like a
computer, per-forming computational operations on
formaily specified elements, Searle concluded that
linguistic comprehension and communication should not
be ascribed to digital computers.
The primary stimulus for the emergence of cognitive
psychology came from external developments in
information theory, linguistics, and computer simulation,
rather than from the internal empirical anomalies faced by
behaviorism.
The conflict between behaviorism and cognitive
Explain how two psychology was not a conflict between exclusive
developments in Computer theoretical paradigms.
Science influenced the
cognitive revolution'. it did mark a significant change in the conception of
theories of cognitive states and processes .
from their-treatment as operationally defined intervening
variables to their treatment as independently meaningful
hypothetical constructs
Purposeful behavior- maintained that the behavior of
servomechanisms such as torpedoes ,is intrinsically
In what respect did Weiner's purposeful
information theory mark a such machine behavior requires a teleological explanation
return to Aristotle? in terms of regulation by feedback, defined as signals from
 th e goal th at modify the activity of the object in the course
of the behavior

Wiener maintained that the same information-theoretical

principles of explanation apply to the restricted class of
animal, human, and machine behavior that involves
regulation by information feedback.
In doing so, he made a major contribution to the
development of the cognitive revolution.
He legitimized the concepts of purposive behavior and
teleological explanation for hard-nosed scientific skeptics
by demonstrating their applicability to the behavior of
inanimate machines.
complained that a major obstacle to the development of
mechanical systems that could mimic purposive behavior
in humans was the inadequacy of neobehaviorist theory
Purposeful behavior- maintained that the behavior of
servomechanisms such as torpedoes is intrinsically
purposeful
such machine behavior requires a teleological explanation
in terms of regulation by feedback, defined as signals from
the goal that modify the activity of the object in the course
of the behavior
Wiener maintained that the same information-theoretical
L at was the fundamental principles of explanation apply to the restricted class of
/ w animal, human, and machine behavior that involves
difference
. between. . the regulation by information feedback.
theoret1cal cognitive In doing so, he made a major contribution to the
construe~ e~ployed by . . development of the cognitive revolution.
neobehavi?nsts and cogmtive He legitimized the concepts of purposive behavior and
psychologiSts? teleological explanation for hard-nosed scientific skeptics
by demonstrating their applicability to the behavior of
inanimate machines.

Chinese Room-
y es to computer models, no to computer simulation ..,1
Made cognitive theories testable (to behaviorists chagrin)
Undermined behaviorists complaints that cognition was a
return to immaterial souls or spirits
Allowed autonomy and mechanistic explanation to be
combined
The most influential form of information-processing
theory was the product of the creation of the electronic
computer.
I...---" Cognition
Cognitive psychologists treated cognitive states and
I

processes as le ·f .
themselves. g1 imate obJects of explanation in
The ··
re·ec~:gn1tJve revolut~on_ in psychology involved the
oipsyc: ~f the behaviorist restriction of the subject matter
0 ogy to observable behavior.

rhe most influential form of infonnation-processing

eory was the product of the creation of the electronic
computer.

Turin~ developed the abstract idea of a hypothetical

machm~, now known as a Turing machine, capable of
performing elementary operations on symbols printed on a
paper tape
Turing originally approached the question by conceiving
of a human operator, or human computer, who
mechanically performed a set of instructions from a
rulebook. •
By imagining a human replaced by a machine with a
stored set of instructions, Turing created the notion of a
computer program.
In conceiving of a machine capable of perfonning a
variety of tasks (such as computing numbers, drawing
logical implications, and playing chess), Turing developed
Computers the principle of the modern computer

Artificial Intelligence- raised the question of whether

cognitive processes, such as those involved in proving
theorems, playing chess, or understanding language, can
properly be ascribed to machines, in the same sense in
which they are paradigmatically ascribed to humans.

This question has vexed psychologists as much as it has

vexed critical philosophers and humanists.

Yes to computer models, no to computer simulation

Made cognitive theories testable (to behaviorists chagrin)
Undennined behaviorists complaints that cognition was a
return to immaterial souls or spirits
Allowed autonomy and mechanistic explanation to be
combined

a
Metaphors
Turing Test:
Set-up: a human interrogator poses questions to a machine
and another human whose only contact with them. is via a
Turing test & Chinese room
teleprinter link
Concl~sio?: Tu~ing maintained that we should be prepared
to ascribe mtelhgence to a machine if we could not
discriminate the responses of the human communicator
from a machine simulating or imitating these responses

CHinese ROom
imagine a room in which a person who speaks only
English receives written questions in Chinese
The person responds with printed answers in Chinese in
accord with instructions from an English rulebook, which
specifies the appropriate Chinese answers to questions set
in Chinese
The person identifies the Chinese questions merely by the
shape of the symbols and prints out the set of symbols that
the rulebook identifies as the appropriate answer in
Chinese

Searle claimed that a ·person performing such a task could

pass the Turing test, but would not understand Chinese.
Such a person would merely produce the answers by
manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols.
Since such a person would essentially behave like a
computer, per-forming computational operations on
formally specified elements, Searle concluded that
linguistic comprehension and communication should not
be ascribed to digital computers.