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Potret Pemikiran 28(1) (2024), 23-42

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From Secularism to Islamism: A Portrait of Minority

Dynamics in Turkey's Changing Political Landscape
Doni Azhari

Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Corresponding E-mail: donyazhary00@[Link]

ABSTRACT ARTICLE INFO

Article History:
This study examines the evolving dynamics of minority groups within Submitted/Received 8 Jan 2024
Turkey's shifting political landscape, from Atatürk's secular reforms to the First Revised 10 May 2024
rise of Islamist ideology under Erdoğan's leadership. It traces Turkey's Accepted 15 Jun 2024
political transformation from the decline of the Ottoman Empire through Publication Date 30 Jun 2024
the establishment of a secular republic and the recent resurgence of Islamic
influence in governance. The research employs qualitative methods,
including historical analysis and case studies, to explore how these
Keyword:
political shifts have impacted minority rights, cultural expressions, and Turkish political transformation,
societal integration. Findings reveal that both secularization and Minority rights in Turkey,
Islamization processes have presented challenges for minority Secularism vs. Islamism,
communities, albeit in different ways. The study highlights the ongoing Atatürk's reforms; Erdoğan's
tension between modernization, traditional values, and religious identity policies.
in shaping Turkey's national character and its treatment of minority
groups. This research contributes to broader discussions on the role of
religion in public life, the limits of secularism, and the complexities of
managing diversity in modern nation-states.

© 2024 Potret Pemikiran IAIN Manado

How to cite:
Azhari, D. (2024). From Secularism to Islamism: A Portrait of Minority Dynamics in Turkey's Changing
Political Landscape. Potret Pemikiran, 28(1), 1–22. [Link]

All publications by Potret Pemikiran are licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
 Doni Azhari, From Secularism to Islamism: A Portrait of Minority Dynamics in Turkey's … | 24

1. INTRODUCTION

The history of Turkey's political development reflects the dynamic changes in the
relationship between religion and state in the Islamic world (Albayrak, 2019; Kuru &
Stepan, 2012; Şentürk, 2014). From the 7th to the 13th centuries, Islam experienced a
golden age with significant advancements in various fields (Renima et al., 2016).
During this period, the majority of classical Islamic political scholars viewed religion
and state as inseparable entities (Axiarlis, 2014; Dalacoura, 2019). This perspective saw
Islam not merely as a set of spiritual guidelines, but as a comprehensive system for
organizing society and governance (Dorroll, 2014; Valk et al., 2017; Yavuz, 2020). The
concept of the caliphate, spanning from the time of Abu Bakr as-Sidiq to the end of
the Ottoman Empire, embodied this fusion of religious and political authority
(Khaleel, 2016). The ulama played a crucial role in legitimizing and maintaining the
caliph's position, exemplifying the symbiotic relationship between political and
religious spheres in classical Islamic thought (Acar, 2019; Sacmali, 2021).
Entering the 19th century, the Islamic world faced a significant turning point (Islahi
& Islahi, 2015). Western powers began to colonize Muslim-majority territories,
bringing not only industrial and technological advancements but also new ideological
concepts, including secularism (Olivier & Olivier, 2020). This period of colonization
coincided with a decline in Islamic political and economic power, challenging
traditional notions of Islamic governance and sparking debates about modernization
and reform within Muslim societies (Becker et al., 2021). The Ottoman Empire, long
considered the bastion of Islamic political authority (Melvin-Koushki, 2018), found
itself increasingly unable to compete with Western powers, leading to a series of
reforms aimed at modernization but often at odds with traditional Islamic governance
structures (Bari, 2019; Cornell, 2014).
The culmination of these trends came with the actions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in
Turkey (Rustow, 2016). On March 3, 1924, Atatürk officially abolished the caliphate,
sending shockwaves through the Islamic world and fundamentally altering the course
of Turkish history (Κουτσουράς, 2019). This move was part of a broader secularization
campaign that included the elimination of religious authority from governance, the
banning of religious symbols like the headscarf in public institutions, the replacement
of Arabic script with Latin alphabet, and the substitution of the Arabic call to prayer
with a Turkish version (Göl, 2017). Atatürk's reforms were predicated on the belief
that Islam's involvement in public and political spheres had contributed to its decline,
and that secularization was necessary for Turkey to modernize and compete with
Western nations (Cloudsley, 2014).
Under Atatürk's leadership, Turkey proclaimed itself a secular state, with the
government asserting control over religious affairs (Cloudsley, 2014). This model of
secularism was distinctive in that it did not merely separate religion from state affairs
but placed religious institutions under state control (Al Faruki & Siddiky, 2017).
Atatürk viewed this form of secularism as essential for Turkey's progress and its
alignment with Western, particularly European, standards of modernity (Çinar, 2020).
The military, which Atatürk had carefully cultivated as a guardian of secular
principles, played a crucial role in enforcing and maintaining this new order (Onar et

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al., 2014), often intervening in politics to protect the secular constitution from
perceived religious threats (Adar & Seufert, 2021).
In subsequent developments, the study of Turkey's transition from an Islamic
empire to a secular republic has produced extensive and diverse literature. Scholars
have examined this transformation from various angles, including political science,
sociology, and religious studies. Several seminal works have provided comprehensive
analyses of the historical processes that led to the establishment of the secular Turkish
state. These views challenge simplistic narratives of Atatürk as the sole architect of
Turkish secularism, placing his reforms in a broader historical context. Recent studies
have focused on the complexities and contradictions within Turkish secularism,
exploring how Turkish nationalism, often presented as secular, has always been
intertwined with Islamic identity. These arguments suggest that the seemingly clear-
cut division between secularism and Islamism in Turkey is, in fact, much more
blurred, with many Turks’ embracing a form of "Muslim nationalism" that combines
elements of both.
However, the process of Islamization in Turkey began to gain momentum in the
latter half of the 20th century, culminating in the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the early 2000s. This shift was preceded
by the efforts of Islamic-oriented political figures such as Necmettin Erbakan, who
challenged the secular establishment in the 1990s. Erdogan's ascent to power marked
a significant turning point in Turkish politics, as he skillfully navigated the complex
terrain between Turkey's secular institutions and its Islamic heritage. Under Erdogan's
leadership, Turkey has witnessed a gradual but steady reintegration of Islamic
principles into public life, including the lifting of the headscarf ban in public
institutions, increased support for religious education, and a more assertive role for
Turkey in the Muslim world. This process of re-Islamization has been accompanied
by significant economic growth and political reforms, allowing Erdogan to maintain
broad popular support despite growing concerns about authoritarianism and the
erosion of secular safeguards. The Erdogan era thus represents a complex
renegotiation of Turkey's identity, balancing its Ottoman and Islamic past with its
aspirations for modernity and regional influence (Tamadonfar & Lewis, 2024; Vidotto,
2022).
In subsequent developments, the study of Turkey's transition from an Islamic
empire to a secular republic, and then to its current state under Erdogan, has produced
extensive and diverse literature (Göl, 2017). Scholars such as Adar and Seufert (2021),
Azgın (2020), Çinar (2020), Dogan (2017), and Onar et al. (2014) have examined this
transformation from various angles, including political science, sociology, and
religious studies. Several seminal works have provided comprehensive analyses of
the historical processes that led to the establishment of the secular Turkish state and
its subsequent evolution (CSahin, 2020). These views challenge simplistic narratives
of Turkey's political development, placing reforms and changes in a broader historical
context. Recent studies have focused on the complexities and contradictions within
Turkish secularism and the resurgence of Islamic politics, exploring how Turkish
nationalism, often presented as secular, has always been intertwined with Islamic

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identity. These arguments suggest that the seemingly clear-cut division between
secularism and Islamism in Turkey is, in fact, much more blurred, with many Turks
embracing a form of "Muslim nationalism" that combines elements of both.
Current research on Turkish political development increasingly recognizes the
need for more nuanced approaches that move beyond binary oppositions of
secularism and Islamism (Agbaria, 2018; Gulmez et al., 2023; Judge, 2020). Recent
studies have begun to explore the ways in which secular and religious discourses in
Turkey have influenced and shaped each other, rather than existing as entirely
separate or antagonistic forces (Sørensen, 2012; Warhola & Bezci, 2010). Some
researchers have examined how the interplay between secular and religious politics
has shaped Turkey's democratic trajectory, arguing that the country's political
development cannot be understood through the lens of secularization or Islamization
alone (Gulmez et al., 2023; March, 2015). Additionally, focus on grassroots movements
and social dynamics that have facilitated the rise of political Islam within the context
of a nominally secular state has provided new insights into the complex negotiations
between religious and secular actors in Turkish civil society (Marshy, 2005).
This research aims to provide a more comprehensive perspective by tracing the
evolution of Turkish politics from the Ottoman era through to the contemporary
period under Erdogan's leadership. By examining the continuities and ruptures in
Turkish political thought and practice across different regimes, from the late Ottoman
reforms through Atatürk's radical secularization to the more recent resurgence of
Islamic politics under Erdogan, this study offers new insights into the ongoing
negotiation between secular and religious ideologies in Turkish public life.
Furthermore, the research's focus on the role of minority dynamics within these
shifting political landscapes adds a crucial dimension often overlooked in broader
historical narratives.
Despite extensive research on Turkish politics and secularism, significant gaps
remain in our understanding of how these historical processes have affected different
segments of Turkish society, particularly minority groups. While much attention has
been paid to the high-level political struggles between secularists and Islamists, less
research has focused on how these ideological shifts have impacted the daily lives and
identities of Turkey's diverse ethnic and religious communities. Additionally, there is
a need for more comparative work that situates Turkey's unique experience within
broader global trends of secularization and religious resurgence. This study aims to
address these gaps by providing a more inclusive analysis that considers the
perspectives and experiences of minority groups throughout Turkey's political
transformations, while also drawing connections to similar processes in other post-
imperial, Muslim-majority states.
The significance of this research lies in its potential to highlight the complex
dynamics of secularism, religion, and national identity in modern nation-states.
Turkey's experience offers valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities
faced by countries attempting to navigate between religious traditions and secular
modernity. By examining how Turkey has grappled with these issues over time, this
study can contribute to broader discussions about the role of religion in public life, the
limits and possibilities of secularism, and the ways in which diverse societies manage

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competing claims to national identity and political legitimacy. Furthermore,

understanding Turkey's political evolution is crucial for comprehending
contemporary geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East and Europe, as Turkey
continues to play a pivotal role as a bridge between these regions.
2. METHODS
This study employs a qualitative approach (Khan, 2014; Mohajan, 2018; M. S.
Rahman, 2020) to examine the dynamics of minority groups within Turkey's changing
political landscape, from Atatürk's secularism to the rise of Islamist thought under
Erdoğan's leadership. The research design combines historical analysis and
contemporary case studies to provide a nuanced understanding of how these political
shifts have affected minority communities.
Data collection primarily involves an extensive literature review of academic
articles, books, historical documents, and policy statements related to Turkey's
political evolution and its impact on minority groups (Mohajan, 2018). This is
supplemented by a critical discourse analysis of political speeches, media
representations, and educational materials to examine how minority identities and
rights have been framed and addressed across different political eras (Negrón-
Gonzales, 2016).
This study explores the experiences of key minority groups such as Alevis, Kurds,
and non-Muslim communities, analyzing how their status, rights, and societal
position have changed from the secular republic to the current Erdogan government.
The analysis centers on how the transition from secular to Islamist-leaning policies
has affected minority rights, cultural expressions, and political participation.
The research examines the legal, educational, and social policy changes that have
particularly impacted minority communities. It acknowledges limitations such as
potential biases in historical sources and the challenges of representing diverse
minority experiences through literature alone.
By employing this approach, the study aims to provide a comprehensive portrait
of minority dynamics within Turkey's changing political landscape, highlighting both
the continuities and ruptures in minority experiences as Turkey navigates between
secularism and Islamism.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Decline of the Ottoman Empire: A Historical Overview
The Ottoman Empire, like most Islamic kingdoms, followed a typical pattern of
expansion, zenith, decline, and ultimate destruction. Founded by Osman I in the late
13th century, the empire experienced rapid growth under Sultan Mehmed II (the
Conqueror) in the 15th century, reached its apex under Sultan Suleiman the
Magnificent in the 16th century, before finally entering a prolonged period of decline
(May, 2006). This historical trajectory reflects a cycle common to many great empires
throughout history.

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The rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire is a compelling narrative that mirrors the
cyclical patterns observed in many of the world's most powerful empires. Founded by
Osman I in the late 13th century, the Ottomans quickly established themselves as a
formidable force in the region. Their success was fueled by a combination of military
prowess, strategic alliances, and the unifying force of Islam, which provided a
cohesive ideological framework for the expanding empire. Under the leadership of
Sultan Mehmed II, known as Mehmed the Conqueror, the empire achieved one of its
most significant milestones—the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. This victory not
only marked the end of the Byzantine Empire but also signaled the beginning of the
Ottomans' dominance over Southeastern Europe, Western Asia, and North Africa.
The Ottoman Empire's zenith came during the reign of Sultan Suleiman the
Magnificent in the 16th century. Suleiman's rule was characterized by extensive
territorial expansion, military victories, and an era of unprecedented cultural and
architectural achievements. The empire became a beacon of Islamic civilization, with
its influence extending across vast territories. The legal reforms and administrative
structures implemented during Suleiman's reign ensured a degree of stability and
governance that allowed the empire to thrive. This period also witnessed a flourishing
of arts, literature, and science, solidifying the Ottomans' reputation as not just
conquerors, but also patrons of culture and knowledge.
However, like many great empires, the Ottoman Empire eventually entered a
period of decline. Historians often attribute this decline to a combination of internal
and external factors. Internally, the empire faced challenges such as administrative
corruption, economic difficulties, and the weakening of the central authority. The
system of succession, which often led to power struggles among potential heirs,
further destabilized the empire. Externally, the rise of European powers and the
shifting balance of power in the region put the Ottomans at a disadvantage. The defeat
at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 and the failed siege of Vienna in 1683 are often cited
as turning points that marked the beginning of the empire's long decline.
Many historians identify the death of Sultan Selim II in 1574 as the inception of the
Ottoman Empire's decline (Evrensel & Minx, 2017; Fanani, 2011; Lewis, 1962). The
period following Selim II's reign was characterized by a lack of strong and effective
leadership from subsequent sultans. This weakness became increasingly apparent as
the empire faced new challenges from rising European powers.
One significant blow to Ottoman power occurred in 1571 when the Ottoman fleet,
under the command of Kaptan Pasha Ali, suffered a decisive defeat against the
combined Christian fleet led by Don Juan of Austria in the Battle of Lepanto (Fields,
2020, 2021; Walsh, 2015). This engagement not only resulted in the destruction of
much of the Ottoman fleet but also marked the end of Ottoman dominance in the
Mediterranean Sea. Although the Ottomans managed to rebuild their fleet rapidly, the
event demonstrated that the empire was no longer invincible at sea.
While Ottoman land forces remained feared in Europe for some time after Lepanto,
their defeat in the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683 marked a decisive turning point.
The Ottoman failure to capture the Habsburg capital, led by Kara Mustafa Pasha, was
not only a major military defeat but also signaled the end of Ottoman expansion into
Central Europe (Ágoston, 2021; Hötte, 2015; Michels, 2019). This defeat was
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exacerbated by the strong coalition between the Habsburg Empire, the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, and other Christian states, demonstrating the increasing
strength of European alliances against the Ottomans.
This series of military defeats, combined with internal exhaustion and the
strengthening of alliances among European powers, forced the Ottoman Empire to
increasingly seek peace or sign treaties with its enemies. One of the most significant
was the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, which ended the Great Holy War (1683-1697).
This treaty required the Ottomans to cede significant territories including Hungary,
Transylvania, and most of Slavonia and Podolia to the Habsburgs and Poland-
Lithuania (Ahmad, 2005; V. Aksan, 2021b; V. H. Aksan, 1993; Davison, 1990; Hötte,
2015; Mitev, 2010). It marked the first time the Ottomans were forced to surrender
significant territory to their Christian adversaries.
Despite these treaties, conflicts between the Ottomans and European powers,
particularly the rising Russia, continued (Reynolds, 2011). Throughout the 18th
century, Russia gradually expanded its territory southward, taking over areas
previously controlled by the Ottomans or their allies (Ágoston, 2011; Kollmann, 2016).
The Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 ended in a decisive defeat for the Ottomans,
followed by the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 (V. Aksan, 2021a; V. H. Aksan,
2011). This treaty not only forced the Ottomans to cede vast territories to Russia but
also recognized the independence of Crimea, which soon fell into the Russian orbit
(Bodger, 2005; Ostapchuk, 2013; Taki, 2015).
This series of defeats and territorial concessions illustrates the gradual decline of
Ottoman power and its inability to keep pace with European technological and
military organizational advancements. Internal factors such as corruption, inefficient
governance, and the inability to implement necessary reforms also contributed to the
empire's decline (Brisku, 2017; Duranoglu & Okutucu, 2009). Although the Ottomans
would persist until the early 20th century, the foundations of their power had been
significantly eroded by the end of the 18th century, transforming them from a feared
power to the "sick man of Europe".
Mustafa Kemal Attatur and his Secularist Thought
Turkey's reforms predate Ataturk by several centuries, having been implemented
by generations of Turks. before the reforms of Ataturk. The Turkish generation carried
out reforms in the military, administration, economic, social, and religious spheres
during the Tanzimat era, which spanned 1839 to 1876 AD. The Tanzimat program,
which they viewed as being indifferent to social and religious needs, sparked the
Young Ottoman era in 1876 AD, which spanned from the 1860s to the 1870s. a new
generation of young Turks emerged by the end of the 1880s, one that was indifferent
to social and religious obligations. This new generation of Turks called themselves
(Ottoman Society for Union and Progress). This group ostensibly defending the
continuity of the Ottoman empire, but they were explicitly agitated for the restoration
of the Parliamentary and constitutional regime (Al-Usyairi, 2004).
One could view Ataturk's Turkish revival philosophy as a synthesis of the three
earlier generations of Turks' ideas. Actually, the idea of Turkish renewal thought as it
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is portrayed in the national framework of Turkish society today is essentially a

distillation of the ideas of Ziya Gokalp, a Turkish scholar who is regarded as the
founder of Turkish nationalism. Upon being posted to Sofia in 1913 AD as a military
attaché, Ataturk's Principle of Renewal Thought got its start. military attaché in Sofia
in 1913. It was at this point that he was introduced to Western culture, specifically the
concept of parliament. Turkish nationalism, secularism, and westernism comprised
the three pillars of Turkish renewal thinking, which subsequently became his
philosophy. The Western World (Nasution, 1982).
From the three principles above, the ideology of Kemalism was born, which
consists of: republicanism, nationalism, populism (populism), laism (secularism),
etatism (statehood), and reformism (reformism). (statehood), and reformism
(Esposito, 2001). The ideology associated with the figure of Musthafa Kemal then
flourished in Turkey and was developed by his followers and judging from the above
developments, the Republic of Turkey is a secular state. Nevertheless, Ataturk did not
establish a fully secular state. As a nationalist supporter of the west who desired the
advancement of Islam, Ataturk believed that religious changes were required to make
religious laws more appropriate for the Turkish environment. Islam is a reasonable
religion that humanity needs, but the clerics of that era corrupted it. As a result, he
established a secular state structure and focused his secularization efforts on removing
the religious class's influence over matters of politics and the state. Religion and the
state must be kept apart (Sunanto, 2007).
According to Alfan Firmanto's (2005) view, the secularization process started with
the French Revolution. Firmanto in his thesis, religious establishments were among
the revolutionary regime's first casualties at that point. The reason religious
institutions are employed as emblems of the previous regimes is that religion and
political authority have a very intimate relationship, especially in traditional
countries. Similar to Ataturk's belief that religion was a way of thinking that upheld
the institutional and structural order of the previous regime and resisted the changes
advocated by the revolutionary movement, secularization became a crucial
component of his reforms to the Turkish government (Toprak, 1999)
As a legal term with multiple components, secularism possesses various features,
including being one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish republic's
constitution. 1) In a secular state, the state is in charge of ensuring that each individual
is free to practice any religion in accordance with their conscience and also of shielding
its citizens from pressure and compulsion from other faiths. is charge of shielding its
people from religious compulsion and other forms of duress. Alfan Firmanto used this
passage from Article 19, Paragraph 3 of the Republic of Turkey's 1961 Constitution as
support for his theory. 2) The 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, article 19,
paragraph 5, states that the misuse and exploitation of religion or religious sentiments
for political or personal gain, or for social, economic, political purposes, or the basis
of a juridical structure for a state based on religion is against secularism. 3) In a secular
state, educational institutions and their curricula cannot be based on religious rules.
This is mentioned in the constitutional law of the republic of Turkey of 1961, article
19, paragraphs 4 and 21 (Firmanto, 2005).

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The idea that Islam had a conservative influence on the Ottoman Turkish Empire's
political system was the fundamental source of Ataturk's criticism of Islam. Ataturk
interpreted conservatism as anti-Westernization, despite the fact that he associated
secularization with westernization. Since Ataturk believed that conservatism was a
type of westernization, the secularization program seeks to oppose it. This makes
sense if westernization was the revolution's driving force. oppose the conservatism he
saw Islam to be the source of. Thus, Islam's influence in institutions, society, and
politics was intended to be diminished through the secularization process of Ataturk's
reform movement. Cultural, social, and institutional life.
According to Binnaz Toprak, Turkey's secularization program went through four
stages, including (Toprak, 1999): First, secularization in symbolism. I.e., revitalization
achieved through incorporating Islamic symbolic identity into national culture or
social life. or an Islamic symbolic identity in social life. For instance, the Arabic and
Persian terms that had been assimilated over the ages were replaced with Turkish
words when the script switched from Arabic to Latin in 1928 AD. Consequently, the
call to prayer was made without the usage of Arabic. Some instances include the
adoption of Western-style attire and headgear in 1925 CE, the shifting of national
holidays from Friday to Sunday in 1935 CE, and so on.
The second is the secularization of institutions. That is, modifications to
organizational structures intended to undermine Islam's institutional dominance. For
instance, the Caliphate and sultanate were abolished in 1924 CE, and the positions of
Syaikhu al-Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Waqf were abolished as
well. In 1928, the article designating Islam as the official state religion was abolished.
The third is secularization with functionality. That is, altering the designated roles
in institutions of government and religion. The reform of the legal field demonstrates
this. The Tanzimat period, which preceded the republic and saw the first
implementation of legal reforms, saw the beginning of legal reform at a time when
prior legal products were still founded on Islam. After Tanzimat, the earliest legal
codification, several secular laws pertaining to trade and commerce were passed in
the ensuing years. Islamic law was supplemented by a number of secular laws in the
areas of commerce, penal law, and civil law. to supplement the laws of Islam. Secular
courts were also set up at the same time to enforce the new legislation. The shari'ah
courts were ultimately eliminated and incorporated into the legal system in 1924 CE.
were ultimately eliminated and integrated into the legal system, falling under the
purview of the Ministry of Justice. Additionally, the Shari'ah courts were established,
and secular laws were fully enforced. Governments have not been the only institutions
to undergo functional modifications. During the Tanzimat period, for example, and in
the years that followed, a large number of secular schools have grown to
accommodate students pursuing degrees in the military, engineering, and medical
sectors. Additionally, a law pertaining to education was passed in 1924 AD, effectively
placing the Ministry of Education in charge of all schools. The Ministry of Education
was in charge of schools. The Ministries of Religious Affairs and Waqf had formerly
overseen schools; but, after a merger, the Ministry of Education assumed control over
all of them.

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Fourth, secularization by law. This is a shift in society's legal framework. With a

legal framework that does away with rules and regulations based on religion, this
secularization is carried out to increase symbolic, institutional, and functional
secularization. functional secularization, removing rules and regulations based on
religion from the legal system. In an attempt to create completely new secular
legislation, the Ataturk government formed special commissions in 1922 and 1923.
However, due to the heavy influence of religious laws, the project was discontinued
and instead the government adopted the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Criminal Code
and the German Commercial Code, with minor changes. These changes included: a).
Individual freedom to choose one's religion, while in Islam there is a strict prohibition
against leaving Islam, the perpetrator of which is even punishable by death. b). Legal
marriages must be registered with the civil authorities. c). The principle of marriage
is monogamy, while in Islam polygamy is allowed. d). In Islamic law the right of
divorce is only with the husband, whereas in the new law the wife has equal rights in
divorce. e). In Islam, only Muslim men can marry women of different religions. In the
new law this regulation is abolished. f). The right to care for children by their parents
is the same for both men and women. g). In Islam, the share of inheritance for men is
greater than for women, whereas in the new law both have the same rights (Firmanto,
2005).
Recall, however, that Ataturk's conception of Westernism actually implies the
secularist premise. Ataturk's westernism. Ataturk's interpretation holds that
secularism not only limits the influence of religion on state affairs (legislative,
executive, and judicial), but it also minimizes its role in Turks' daily lives as a people.
the significance of religion in Turks' collective lives. Secularism during the Ottoman
era was more of an opposition to nearly anything that was in vogue. Still, but religion
was not completely eradicated by secularization. The secularization process The sole
purpose of secularization was to remove the ulama's role and influence in politics and
power. authority, such that religiously motivated political parties—such as the
Christian Party and the Islamic Party—were outlawed. Parties representing Islam,
Christianity, and so on. Due to the fact that Ataturk's secularism merely sought to
keep Islam from being exploited as a political instrument or as a means of defending
political programs, it was able to function as a religion that is genuinely apart from
world affairs. Because the use of religion as a political tool was deemed unreasonable
by Ataturk's secularist principles. It is crucial to remember that Ataturk's secularism
was not prompted by anti-Islamic or atheist sentiments. negative opinions on Islam.
since Ataturk was a person who always proclaimed his adherence to Islam. to the
Islamic faith. This can be seen for example in 1923 AD, he stated:
"Our religion (Islam) is the most reasonable and natural religion. That is why, our
religion is the ultimate religion. A natural religion must be in accordance with reason,
science science, technology and logic. And our religion does fulfill that
requirement."(Anwar, 1989)
Political changes in Turkey, especially under the leadership of Atatürk and
Erdogan, have had significant impacts on society, particularly on minority groups.
During Atatürk's era, the drastic implementation of secularization altered social and
political structures, affecting the lives of minority groups (Hudda, 2013). For example,
the abolition of the caliphate and sultanate, along with legal reforms that replaced
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Islamic law with secular legislation, impacted many minority communities that
previously held important roles in the Ottoman religious and social structure.
Minority groups such as Christians and Jews experienced changes in their rights and
social roles. These reforms, while aimed at modernization and eliminating religious
dominance, sometimes led to tensions and a sense of marginalization among
minorities who felt they were losing their rights and identity (Idi, 2018).
In the context of Erdogan, the phase of Islamization brought different impacts.
Policies supporting the wearing of hijab and the reinforcement of Islamic values in
public life represent a significant shift in the country's orientation. While these policies
might be accepted by a large segment of Turkey's Muslim population, minority
groups such as Alevis, Christians, and other non-Muslims often feel marginalized and
experience a decline in their rights (Podomi, 2021). The implementation of more pro-
Islamic policies can sometimes exacerbate tensions between majority and minority
groups, affecting social dynamics and creating uncertainty about the future of
integration and social equality in Turkey. Consequently, these political changes
highlight the challenges Turkey faces in balancing modernization, secularism, and
respect for minority rights.
Erdogen and the Progress of Turkish Islamic Civilization
Turkey was formerly more widely recognized as a secular state; this is inextricably
linked to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's contribution to the spread of secular thought in
this nation that serves as the boundary between Europe and Asia. He formally ended
the caliphate in Turkey on March 3, 1924 (Iqbal, 2010). Islam has declined, according
to Kemal, as a result of its meddling in a number of public spheres, like as politics.
Kemal made a comparison between the West and other cultures that ventured to
secularize and remove religion from politics in order to create advanced civilizations.
That means Turkey can only follow the West's lead and secularize in order to advance
and modernize. We need to adapt Turkish society to Western norms.
The institutions of sharia were eliminated by Kemalist politics after the caliphate
was overthrown, even though Ottoman reformers had greatly limited their use. Sharia
was seen by Kemalists as the last stronghold of the old religious order. In addition,
the Kemalists abolished the madrassas, which had been a part of Islamic education
since the 1300s. The Kemalist government's meddling in the religious affairs of
Turkish society manifested itself in this religious reform, also known as the
Turkification or Nationalization of Islam. Kemalists enforce secularism with a strong
nationalist bent, separating the state's guarantee of citizens' freedom of religion from
the relationship between religion and governance.
But only until the collapse of the Kemalist (Republican People's Party) government
did this religious nationalization program come into effect. The call to prayer has been
in Arabic once more since 1950. Mosques in Turkey still have the same common forms
as mosques in other nations. For Mustafa Kemal, civilization equates to Western
culture. His major thesis regarding Westernization was that Turkey ought to adopt all
of the practices of a Western country. In order to achieve this, the Kemalist
administration imposed laws that forbade the wearing of religious attire in public

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areas and encouraged Turkish citizens to dress in Western attire. Hat wear in
European societies vanished long ago, along with the custom of donning them
(Mustafa, 2016).
The most significant change of the Kemalist system, aside from religious reform,
was linguistic reform. According to a decree issued on November 3, 1928, by the
Supreme National Council, Arabic lettering was replaced with Latin script. As part of
the language reform, the Turkish language was to be freed from the "shackles" of
foreign languages, focusing on removing Arabic and Persian influences. Mustafa
Kemal personally traveled to many locations to educate the Turkish people on how to
write using the new script. Through a decree of the Grand National Council dated
February 17, 1926, a committee of jurists adopted the Swiss Civil Code to replace
Sharia Law to fulfill Turkey's legal needs. The Civil Code, which went into effect on
October 4, 1926, incorporated monogamy, outlawed polygamy, and established equal
rights for men and women in marriage and divorce. This equality of rights and
obligations resulted in the elimination of Islamic inheritance law. The civil law also
permitted interfaith unions. On January 1, 1935, the government banned the use of
titles popular during the Ottoman Turkish era and made surnames mandatory for all
Turks. Mustafa Kemal adopted the surname Atatürk, meaning "Father of the Turkish
Nation." The lunar calendar system was replaced with the Gregorian calendar in 1935,
and Sunday was declared a holiday instead of Friday (El Bakri, 2013; Heper et al.,
2018; Kucukcan, 2009; Muzaki et al., 2021; Salehi, 2020; Yilmaz, 2023).
Professor Bryan S. Turner of Flinders University in South Australia concluded that
secularism in Turkey during the Kemalist regime was a tool of the regime rather than
a byproduct of modernization as in European nations. Furthermore, Turkey's
secularization at the time was a deliberate emulation of more evolved and
sophisticated European social mores. Binnaz Toprak, citing Darver, described the
Turkish republic as a semi-secular state. According to Kemalists, the new Turkish man
must not only think and behave rationally like Europeans but also adopt their clothing
and mannerisms. Amien Rais might legitimately state in his introduction that the
Turkish Republic is the only Muslim nation in the world to have undergone such
extensive secularization. Under Kemal Atatürk's regime, Turkey became the first
nation to experience widespread secularization, facilitated by the unbridled authority
of the Atatürk government.
Turkey, led by Mustafa Kemal, proclaimed itself to be a secular state with religion
existing in the private sphere under official supervision. To Mustafa Kemal,
secularism was the best path to improving Turkey and bringing it up to speed with
Western nations, particularly Europe. Under Mustafa Kemal's leadership, the Turkish
military protected the constitution, therefore solidifying the ideology of secularism.
His ability to enforce his beliefs was firmly rooted in the military. Secularism,
however, contributed to the government and society's decline in Turkey along with
other existing developments, which made people's consciences stir for positive
changes to Turkey. This was demonstrated by the gradual eroding of the military's
authority to uphold Mustafa Kemal's constitution, which resulted in modifications
that reflected the country's needs and developments. Many people in Turkey had their
eyes opened by the global wave of democratization in the 1980s, which was matched
by a global wave of political awareness of civil society in various regions. In Turkey's
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case, this was particularly true because joining the EU requires Turkey to run a fully
democratic system. They established parties and took part in constitutional elections
after realizing that Mustafa Kemal's concept of secularism had become stale. They also
attempted to engage in politics in a constructive manner (Junaidi, 2016).
Additionally, it provided impetus for the Muslim middle class and proponents of
Islamic principles to resurrect Islamic politics, which included the formation of
Islamic-based political parties. Nonetheless, the secular nationalist ruling party—a
devoted adherent of the late Mustafa Kemal—remains the dominant force in Turkish
democracy and held significant influence within the National Assembly. Many
Islamic parties were consequently outlawed for ideologies they believed to be in
violation of the Turkish constitution; in this case, military intervention was also quite
strong. Islam was no longer the center of sovereignty due to the circumstances that
emerged at that time. Islam was seen as an ideology or set of teachings that had
become outdated. The sharia component of government was, in other words,
rendered obsolete by the drive to secularize the state. This did not, however, put an
end to the people's ongoing struggle for Islam and faith. Sheikh Said Nursi
Bediuzzaman, a prominent Turkish Islamic cleric, has, nevertheless, consistently
opposed Attartuk's policies and waged a campaign to raise public awareness of the
threats facing Turkey. Turkey is dealing with. Because it was forbidden for the call to
prayer to be recited in Arabic, he was hunted down everywhere and once had his
privacy violated when he was going to pray. Sheikh Mustaffa Sabri, Turkey's Sheikh
al-Islam, has issued a fatwa criticizing secularism. Those who follow this instruction,
according to him, are not Muslims. Despite the fact that very few people abide by his
fatwa.
Nevertheless, this did not stop the fighters who promoted Islamism in Turkey. One
such fighter was recognized as a prominent member of the Islamic movement and
awarded the title "An Islamic Fighter" in recognition of his tenacious, unceasing, and
unrelenting efforts. acclaimed as "A Fighter for Islam" in recognition of his lifelong,
unceasing battle to preserve Islamic principles among Turkey's secular political
landscape. Turkey's political life away from religion. His full name, Necmetin
Erbakan, is how Turkish society addresses him. Constructed in a country that was
once the center of the Islamic caliphate, he established the "Islamist Movement" in
Turkey, which faced tough secular life and powerful military dominance. This
movement became the "vanguard" of the secular system.
Erbakan collaborated with Tancu Ciller, the head of the Fatherland Party, to build
the Turkish government after his party and the Islamic Refah party won the 1996
election. Erbakan was appointed prime minister. His government, however, was only
in place for a year until it was overthrown by the Turkish military, who did not want
Erbakan to advance his Islamist ideas, which would eventually become Turkish policy
(Peena, 2012).
The removal of Necmekin Erbakan from office in 1997 is one instance of the
nationalist-Islamist tensions that continue to influence Turkey's political climate. This
demonstrates the conflicts between Islamists and nationalists that continue to
influence Turkish political culture. However, as is well known, the fight to Islamize
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Turkey is still ongoing. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a protege of Necmekin Erbakan, and
Abdullah Gul took the lead in founding an Islamic party. Both of them have
commonalities with their professors in that they have been persistent in battling for
Islamic philosophy in Turkey. It was demonstrated by the fact that the AKP party,
which was established on August 14, 2001, was well-received by the public as
evidenced by its growth and success, which included winning the 2002 general
election. won the 2002 general election. AKP won 367 of the 550 seats, making it the
ruling party. 367 of the 550 seats in parliament are available for use. In the 2007 general
election, the AKP, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emerged victorious once again, with
Abdullah Gul becoming the party's strategic nominee for president and Prime
Minister. the presidency, which fell to Abdullah Gul, and the majority of
parliamentary seats went to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who held the office of prime
minister. Soccer Erdogan's activities and policies include bringing back the long-gone
practice of teaching the Quran and Hadith in Turkish public schools as well as the
right to wear the headscarf on Turkish campuses. Under Prime Minister Erdogan's
direction, the Turkish state advanced quickly, and today Turkey is regarded as one of
the most powerful nations in Europe. and established himself as one of the greatest
leaders in the world. the greatest leaders in the world. So that in the 2011 general
election, AKP won the trust of the people to win again and Erdogan served as Prime
Minister for the next period in the general election to convey the aspirations of the
Turkish people (Junaidi, 2016).
Following the conclusion of his tenure as prime minister in 2014, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan entered the presidential race in Turkey with the backing of the AKP party.
Consequently, Erdogan was duly elected to a five-year term as President of Turkey on
August 10, 2014, following general elections. Five Years.
Erdogan has succeeded in winning over the Turkish people mostly through his
remarkable Islamization effort, rather than just through his economic or "secular"
programs. Erdogan is still despised by radical secularists despite the public's
admiration for him due to the Islamic message of his nonviolent political practices.
Erdogan has continuously battled for the right to wear a headscarf in Turkey before
taking office, as was previously noted. Due to Turkish government regulations against
kids donning headscarves, he was forced to send two of his children to school in the
United States. Erdogan relentlessly pursued his Islamization policies up until he was
elected president, removing restrictions on headscarves in all spheres of life,
outlawing alcohol, endorsing the Palestinian cause, backing the overthrown president
Mursi, and so forth.
The political changes in Turkey, particularly the transition from Kemalist
secularism to more Islamist policies under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership, have
had significant impacts on Turkish society, especially on minority groups. Under the
Kemalist regime, secularism was implemented rigorously, resulting in the
marginalization of non-Muslim minority groups and restrictions on their religious
practices (Bahri, 2020). Religious schools and institutions were abolished, and
nationalist policies eliminated various non-Turkish cultural and religious elements
from public life. In this context, minority groups such as Christians, Jews, and Alevis
experienced a reduction in their cultural and religious rights, and faced systemic
discrimination that constrained their participation in society.
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However, under Erdoğan's government, the resurgence of Islamist ideology has

brought about other changes that also affect minority groups. Although there has been
a shift back to some elements of Islam in public policy, such as the reopening of
religious schools and the relaxation of restrictions on religious symbols like
headscarves, these changes have not always had a positive impact on all minority
groups. Some minorities feel marginalized as policies increasingly prioritize Islamic
identity in public life, which can exacerbate tensions between the Muslim majority
and non-Muslim minorities. This instability often reflects concerns about declining
religious tolerance and increased social pressure on groups different from the
majority, potentially triggering intergroup conflicts and threatening the pluralism that
was established during the Kemalist secular period (M. T. Rahman, 2020).
4. CONCLUSION

Turkish history is a lengthy and intricate journey that started with the illustrious
Ottoman Turks and ended with their decline as a result of peace treaties and military
setbacks. After losing the Battle of Lipanto in 1571 and the unsuccessful siege of
Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Turks' golden age—headed by Sultans Sulaiman al-
Qanuni and Salim II—became a period of decline. Sultan Salim II's demise brought
about significant changes as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ushered in a new era marked by
intense secularization attempts. He implemented institutional, functional, symbolic,
and legal reforms. Ataturk was pro-Western, but he did not lose Islamic influence
when he implemented reforms like substituting Latin script for Arabic writing and
outlawing the use of Arabic in the call to prayer as a symbolic act. Turkey had an
Islamization phase during the reign of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Through his effective
economic leadership, Erdogan altered the political and social perception of Islam.
Islamic principles are being revived in a contemporary setting through policies like
the return of the hijab's freedom of wear and the inclusion of Islamic education in the
curriculum. A difficult conundrum is created in the framework of Turkish national
identity by the conflict between modernity, secularization, and Islamic influence. At
many societal and political levels, there are continuous discussions over religious
identity, modernism, and traditional values. The ramifications raise important queries
regarding Turkey's political course and identity in light of shifting international
circumstances. The protracted evolution and transformation of Turkish identity from
Ottoman to modern times is marked by this complete historical journey, which also
produces a dynamic political scene.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all those who have contributed to
my understanding of Turkish history and its intricate journey from the Ottoman era
to modern-day Turkey. Special thanks go to the scholars and historians whose work
has profoundly influenced my research. Their insights into the significant events, such
as the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, the transformative reforms of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, and the complex interplay of secularization and Islamization under
various leaderships, have been invaluable. I also extend my appreciation to my
mentors and peers for their continuous support and encouragement. This work is a
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testament to the collective knowledge and dedication that has shaped my

understanding of Turkey's rich and multifaceted history.
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