SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

Chapter 4

SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

Callout
Instructions to call out the MRT and proceed to an incident will normally come from the ARCC.
However, requests for assistance may be received from other sources, such as the Police, civilian
rescue authorities, or members of the public. Before proceeding on any callout the approval of the
ARCC must first be sought. If the urgency is such that this is impractical, they should be informed at
the first opportunity.

Team members are contacted by the quickest means possible. This may be by tannoy, telephone,
radio pager or VHF radio. If the team is on base they should report to the MR Section as soon as
possible, kitted and ready to move. Vehicles should be loaded and prepared for departure. The
Station Commander, or out of normal working hours, the SDO, should be notified of the impending
operation. Arrangements will vary for callouts during weekend training, dependent on the location of
the incident and whether or not it is necessary to move the basecamp.

Preparation for Action

It is essential to obtain first of all as much accurate information as possible about the crash or incident.
It is very important to know the origin of a callout message and the name of the person passing that
message. If the report comes direct from an eye witness, it would be helpful for the Team Leader to
talk to that person, to help in the preparation of plans for the search or rescue before the area is
reached. In any case the person receiving the message should complete as much as possible on
the appropriate callout form. Further information that may be useful should be collected; for example,
a local weather forecast for the area concerned and names of other MRT’s involved. A briefing should
then be given to team members to explain the provisional plan for search and rescue, transport
arrangements and rendezvous location.

The Team Leader may decide or be directed to provide a fast party to travel as quickly as possible to
the incident location. This party may travel either by road or by SAR helicopter when available.

Before leaving for the incident the Team Leader will inform the ARCC of the teams’ prospective route
and the radio operator will establish communications between the MRT control vehicle and the ARCC.

Having left the station, the vehicles will normally move in convoy to the rendezvous point. The use of
blue lights and sirens will be at the Team Leader’s discretion, depending on the urgency of the
situation or the prevailing traffic conditions. The Team Leader may also ask the ARCC to arrange a
Police escort through heavy traffic and will often decide to go ahead of the convoy to try and find out
more information, interview witnesses, and if possible, to arrange a basecamp for the team on their
arrival.

As soon as the team is called out, it comes directly under the control of the ARCC, who must be kept
regularly informed of the team’s intentions and progress of the operation. The same details should
also be reported to the teams’s parent station, for information.

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Search Planning
Having obtained all the information available, the method of search will have to be decided upon and
the parties detailed. The conduct and type of search will be related to:

a. The nature of the incident.

b. The extent and reliability of information available.

c. The urgency of the situation.

d. The terrain.

e. The number of searchers.

f. The weather.

It is vital that all available information should be obtained. Minutes spent cross-examining or
interviewing witnesses and others, or making telephone calls before a team is committed to a course
of action, may save many hours on the hillside and, eventually a life. The temptation to rush into a
search without a plan, or without all the available information, must be resisted.

The base camp for a search should be chosen from local knowledge; the following points should be
borne in mind:

a. A protracted search is always likely. Sometimes incidents occur in well known spots,
but it is wise to anticipate a lengthy job.

b. Dependable communications with both search parties and the ARCC by means of radio
or telephone are essential. The radio control vehicle may have to be sited away from the main
base camp to maintain reliable communications over the whole of the search area.

c. Various other facilities at base camp are useful, and may be vital - lighting, drying
cooking, parking, storage, helicopter landing sites etc.

Search Operations
When more than one team is involved, responsibility for overall control must be clearly defined and
made known to all participating forces. The Incident Controller is responsible for:

a. The search plan.

b. Casualty evacuation procedures.

c. Arrangement for transfer of casualties to hospital.

d. Police liaison.

e. Media liaison.

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After planning the operation, the Incident Controller will:

a. Brief Team Leaders and Police.

b. Advise on search methods and equipment required.

c. Define search areas.

d. Instruct teams on when and where to report.

During any operation all information gathered and areas searched should be plotted and recorded on
a master map which in turn will be constantly updated and edited as circumstances change. These
maps, along with all other relevant material and information, should be retained following the
termination of the search, for possible use by any future Inquiry. Throughout the operation the
Incident Controller will always have to consider the possibility of moving the search into a new area or
even of terminating the search. A non-military search may only be terminated with the agreement
of the Police and the ARCC. Only the ARCC can terminate the search for a member of HM Forces.
The planning of any search operation needs to be thoroughly prepared as undue haste or misdirected
operations may greatly diminish the chances of locating survivors. However, action must be initiated
without delay and if necessary planning completed and assets deployed as the situation develops.
Search planners should seek information from all sources and should delegate where possible. On
large scale searches it will often be helpful to have assistance from other experienced personnel
during the search planning phase to spread the load from one individual.

Search Planning Calculations

Some planners have found it useful to give values to the search areas, indicating the likelihood that
the missing person / or persons are in those areas. This figure, knows as the Probability of Area
(POA) value is generally given as a percentage. The Probability of Detection (POD) in any search can
also be calculated quite accurately. The formula POA x POD = POS is used but must never be
considered totally reliable and is used to calculate the Probability of Success (POS) value for any
given area. The search planner can than allocate priorities to different areas based on this formula.
This system has been used to great effect by SAR teams in the United States and is of growing
popularity in the UK.

The Search Party

Weather and the Team Leader’s knowledge of the area will largely determine the method of search.
Whatever method is adopted, the team is divided into self-contained parties, each operating under a
Party Leader. The size of this party depends on the circumstances; a sweep search party in good
visibility over moorland could involve the whole mountain rescue team; a party search on a rock face
might be unmanageable for groups of more than two people. Each party carries, in addition to their
normal day bags, extra equipment as directed by the Team Leader. In many areas it is wise to
include a rope in the party equipment. It is essential to maintain contact between members of a party
and if possible with adjacent parties, and control. If necessary, a radio link party should be deployed
to a high ground location which has line of sight communications with both search parties and control.
Briefing should include details of the incident (what to look for), starting point for the search, area to be
covered, general information on other parties, reporting procedures, and any special advice on the
area.

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Each search party consists of a minimum of two persons. Before leaving the forward base the
Party Leader must ensure that:

a. He understands his route and area of search.

b. He knows the radio callsign for his party.

c. He knows the callsign for any rescue helicopter which may be operating in the area.

d. All the equipment carried by his party is serviceable, and as directed by his
Team Leader.

e. Each member of the party has (in his daybag) the necessary additional clothing,
equipment and emergency rations.

f. All members of the party are aware of the object of the search and the importance of
reporting any items of clothing, equipment or discarded ‘rubbish’ which could be identified as
belonging to the missing person or persons. These clues can be invaluable in determining /
confirming the route taken.

Method of Search
When searching, party members should remain alert, sweeping the area ahead and around them with
their eyes, and every 20 paces or so, looking back over the ground they have just covered. Other
senses such as smell and hearing may also provide clues to the location of the casualty or,
particularly, to an aircraft crash site. The importance of reporting and collating of clues cannot be over
emphasised.

The following methods of search may be employed:

a. Sweep Search. Each party keeps in line abreast and sweeps the area; visual contact
with the next person in line is maintained within the party. The distance between searchers will
depend on the terrain and the prevailing weather conditions. Movement of the line is controlled
by the Party Leader who will place himself behind the line itself, in a central position. In a large
sweep search involving many searchers, radios should be positioned at each end of the line to
relay any instructions from the Party Leader to those around him. Carried out efficiently, a
sweep search is a very thorough method of searching, with a high probability of a find or of
confirmation that an area is clear. It is however very costly in terms of time and manpower per
acre of ground searched, and it is difficult to control and to maintain the enthusiasm of
searchers. As such, sweep searches are generally only considered if the location of the
casualty can be narrowed down to a small area, or if there is a requirement to eliminate a
particular area or areas, from the search.

b. Party Search. A party search consists of a small group of two or more searchers
which operates independently in the most effective manner within its allotted area. In rugged
or mountainous terrain when the line of a sweep search would soon break up, the initiative and
ability of each Party Leader becomes more important. He must decide how best to cover the
ground, whether to follow a natural feature such as a ridge or a well defined route, whether to
probe likely looking lines from a valley floor, or to concentrate on one particular part of the area
first. Although the thoroughness of a party search cannot match that of a sweep search, it has
been found that the large areas of ground quickly covered by relatively few searchers coupled
with a reasonable probability of discovery, will often make it the most suitable method when
searching for a missing person or aircraft crash site.

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c. Avalanche Search. During the winter and spring months, avalanches can occur
throughout the UK mountains, but are more frequent in Scottish hills. Search methods for
avalanches differ from normal search tactics and these are described at Annex E to this
chapter.

On Return
The Party Leader must be fully debriefed on the efficiency of his search. Other information such as
areas not fully covered are important, and an honest attitude is essential. Information provided by the
Party Leader will be used by the search planner when calculating further areas for searching.

Bad Weather
It is sometimes unjustifiable to start a search in extremely rough weather, especially at night. It is
solely the Team Leader’s responsibility to take this decision and he will base his conclusion on all the
circumstances of the incident, including weather, the possibility of saving life, the state and
composition of the search party, and the degree of control and communication that can be maintained
during the search.

Searching with Aircraft Aid

Both aeroplanes and helicopters can be used to advantage to help in a search. If the Team Leader
considers that this would be the case he will advise the ARCC controller who will deploy an aircraft if
available. Helicopters can be used very effectively in mountain rescue in many ways. Given good
visibility they can search large areas very rapidly from the air, or terrain which is inaccessible or
difficult to cover effectively from the ground. On some occasions SAR helicopters, equipped with
winches and stretchers, will be able to evacuate casualties direct from the mountain tops. On other
occasions, weather conditions that prevent flying near the tops may be good enough lower down the
mountain to allow a helicopter to land. The casualty can then be transferred by the team to the
helicopter and flown directly to hospital, arriving more quickly and comfortably than would have been
possible by road and ambulance. Helicopters may be further utilised to transport search parties from
basecamp or home station to convenient high points from which the search or recovery can start.
Further details on helicopter operations are at Chapter 8.

Fatalities
In the event of a fatality in the UK, on or off base, military or civilian, the authority for movement of
deceased persons rests with the Coroner (Procurator Fiscal in Scotland). In practice, authority is often
delegated to the Coroner’s Officer or the Civil Police Incident Officer. In the absence of a doctor, the
MRT Leader must obtain police authority for the recovery of human remains. Only a doctor can
certify a casualty dead, however, if life is clearly extinct, the body should be placed in a body bag
completely undisturbed, as unnecessary disturbance of clothing and equipment may have an adverse
effect on any subsequent investigation. In the event of multiple fatalities, each body and bag must be
labelled with a number and the position of each body should be carefully noted on a plan of the
accident site. It should be noted that at aircraft incidents involving fatalities, prior permission is not
required from either the Board of Inquiry President or the Convening Authority, nor may Service
personnel insist that photographs be taken before human remains are moved. Each team is
however equipped with a fully automatic camera which records the date of each photograph.

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Fig: 5

Search Dogs
The Search and Rescue Dog Association (SARDA) is a voluntary organisation dedicated to the use of
dogs for search and rescue. Search dog teams (ie dog and handler) are usually summoned by the
Police control room via a SARDA callout coordinator. Callouts within mountainous areas will see
search dog teams working alongside members of MRTs and as such form an invaluable part of the
search operation.

There are two favoured ways of deploying Search Dogs. In mountain searches where the missing
person’s intended route is known, the usual technique in the first instance is a corridor search,
covering the route and/or any usual descent routes off the mountain. The second method, more often
used in the second phase of a search, is to allocate each dog team an individual area within the main
search area.

SARDA dogs are trained to use air scent to locate missing persons and can clear large areas of
ground rapidly and efficiently, while having the ability to make a “find” at some considerable distance
and largely irrespective of weather and daylight conditions. Consequently, the general rule for
deployment of dogs involves very early use in sufficient numbers to cover all high priority areas
simultaneously.

It should be remembered, however, that search dogs are not infallible machines and in certain
circumstances their use may be limited. The deployment of search dogs requires a thorough
understanding of how dogs work and their capabilities; it is therefore always advisable to have a
SARDA representative involved in the management of a search operation to ensure that dog teams
are utilised efficiently.

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Aircraft Crashes
It may not, of course, be necessary to search for a crashed aircraft. The information from the ARCC
may pinpoint the position, or someone who saw the aircraft crash may be able to lead the team
directly to it. If the position is not known, but the ARCC can give some idea of the aircraft’s course, a
systematic search will be initiated by the Team Leader designated by the ARCC as On Scene
Commander (OSC).

It is generally assumed that the most likely area in which the crash site will be located is along the
Flight Plan Track, from its last known position and within a distance either side of the track. Unless
more detailed information is available, the OSC may be faced with a search area of vast size. This
initial area however, can be further refined by the selection of priority areas within the overall search
area. Examples are areas of low population, large forestry plantations and areas of high ground.
These areas will normally be quickly searched by small parties and vehicle sweeps with the intention
of gaining more information. Police personnel and vehicles can be requested to carry out road
searches and to question local farmers and inhabitants. High ground that faces into the flight path
would normally receive highest priority from search parties. Further clues as to the location of the
crash site may be as follows:

a. Reports from local inhabitants of explosion, fire or of unusually low flying aircraft.

b. Damage to tree tops or structures.

c. Signs of fire.

d. Smell of aviation fuel or burning.

e. “Hi-tech” clues such as seismic readings and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR)
traces (Available from the ARCC).

As more information comes in it should be possible to determine more accurately which areas are of
highest probability. Searches in these areas can be concentrated and should lead to a ‘find’. This will
often be the crash site or scattered wreckage in the first instance. In the case of an aircraft fitted with
an Aircraft Assisting Escape System (AAES), it must quickly be determined whether or not the crew
have ejected. If it can be confirmed that they have ejected, the search must be concentrated on their
location. Factors such as windspeed and direction, altitude of the aircraft when ejection took place (if
known), and potential parachute drift must be taken into consideration. Tables to assist in these
calculations are found in the unclassified NATO document ATP10(D). A crewman who has ejected
successfully may be some distance from the actual crash site. However, his Personal Locator Beacon
(PLB) may have started to transmit a radio distress signal when he separated from his ejection seat.
This PLB signal should be picked up by SAR aircraft and satellites (SARSAT), and the Distress and
Diversion (D&D) cells at West Drayton and Prestwick, and will give the approximate position of the
crewman. PLB transmissions are used by SAR helicopters to ‘home in’ on the signal, and the PLB
itself may have a receive / transmit voice facility for line of sight communications either on the same
frequency, 243 MHz., 282.8 MHz. or on 121.5 MHz.

It should be noted that following an aircraft crash, all the occupants may not be in or even near the
aircraft. If the aircraft has broken up in midair, the occupants may have been thrown out before the
actual impact with the ground. Also, although the chances of survival in the mountains are better if
survivors remain near the aircraft, do not ignore the possibility that one or more may have walked
away from the crash in shock, or in search of help.

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Approaching the Crash Site

All MRS personnel should be aware of the dangers and hazards to be expected at aircraft crash sites,
and the actions required to protect both themselves and others in such situations. See Fig 6b. Such
dangers include fire, explosion, aircraft armament, high pressure gasses, toxic fumes and substances
hazardous to health.

The following guidelines should be observed at every crash site, whether military or civilian.

a. All vehicles and personnel should approach, wherever possible, from an upwind and
uphill direction (fuel, fuel vapour, and smoke travel downhill and downwind).

b. Be constantly aware of ruptured fuel tanks. It is wrong to assume that all the fuel will
be burned off in the post crash fire, as large capacity drop tanks containing fuel may well have
broken free and could be some distance away from the main crash site, thus avoiding the initial
fireball. Under no circumstances should smoking be allowed near the crash site.

c. Do not enter smoke unless absolutely essential to save life. In incidents involving a post
crash fire or involving aircraft which contain significant Man Made Mineral Fibres (MMMF) or
known toxic substance such as Hydrazine, Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) must be
worn by any personnel entering the crash site area. This PPE consists of a full waterproof suit,
Full Face Respirator and Canister, rubber or leather gloves and boots. Aircraft which come
into this category include the Harrier GR9, recent US military aircraft, and recent civilian
aircraft. See Annex A for full details on MMMF and other hazards.

d. Do not block roadways - other Emergency Services will also require access.

e. If it is thought that the aircraft may be armed it is safest to approach from the side. Do
not allow personnel, vehicles, or equipment to congregate in front of the aircraft at any cost.
(See Danger of Explosives).

Action on Arrival at the Crash Site

As with all rescue operations, the aim is to save life and it is essential that the occupants of the aircraft
are located as a matter of urgency. If the aircrew have remained with the aircraft (look for ejection
seats and other obvious signs within the wreckage), it must be confirmed whether they have survived
or perished before committing the team to other tasks at the incident site. No wreckage should be
moved unless essential to save life.

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Fig 6a: A RAF Mountain Rescue Team member

dressed for entry into an aircraft crash
site where it is expected that smoke will be
entered or a MMMF hazard exists

Assuming that the aircrew have remained with the aircraft and have survived the crash, but are unable
to help themselves; it will be necessary to remove them from their ejection seats to a position of safety
away from the aircraft . In the past the scenario has been recognised as extremely unlikely, however,
with the introduction into service of the Tucano trainer, equipped with both ejection seats and
Linear Cutting Cord (LCC)/Minature Detonating Cord (MDC), the possibility of a survivable crash has
become a reality.

The Emergency Rescue Procedure for the Tucano T MK 1 aircraft can be found at Annex C to this
chapter and in AP 109 B-0011-1A.

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Fig 6b: APPROACHING THE CRASH SITE. The safest approach is from an UPHILL, UPWIND
direction. If it is suspected that the aircraft may be armed then safest approach is from the side.
DO NOT ENTER SMOKE UNLESS ESSENTIAL FOR LIFE SAVING. Keep personnel, vehicles
and equipment at a safe distance and uphill / upwind of crash site. NEVER GO ALONE.

Danger of Explosives and Ejection Seats

A crashed aircraft with known explosives on board should always be treated with respect. If the
aircraft is on fire then approach should only be considered if it is essential to save life and any
evacuation should be carried out as quickly as possible by the minimum number of personnel. Even
after an aircraft has completely burnt out there may still be some unexpended explosives remaining.
Any such explosives will have completely unpredictable behaviour and NO attempt should be made to
move or interfere with them.

Aircraft ejection seats are another hazard that may well be encountered at the crash site. An unused
ejection seat could well have live cartridges fitted and an intact rocket pack that are all potentially very
dangerous. It is not unknown for ejection seat cartridges and rocket pack propellant to be found
lying close to the remains of an ejection seat. Even on a seat that has been fired, there may still be
certain parts containing live explosives (eg manual separation and guillotine) and the whole ejection
seat must therefore be treated with extreme caution.

It should be noted that many explosives fitted to an aircraft are electrically initiated and can be set off
by radio waves when transmitted close by. A distance of at least five metres must be maintained
from explosives when transmitting on any radio.

A list of Ordnance Hazard Markings can be found at Annex B.

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Post Crash Management Procedures

Once all SAR activities have been completed at a military aircraft accident, team members’ actions are
governed by policy established by MOD Defence Aviation Safety Centre. The generic term for this
phase is Post Crash Management and the relevant manual is JSP 551 Vol 2 which has a special
chapter for RAF MRTs. It also provides very strict limits to what information can be released to the
media following a military aircraft accident. Advice on post crash management at the scene of civil
aircraft accidents is normally given by the Home Office - in general terms the guidance in JSP 551
Vol 2 can be applied.

Crash Site Cordons and Control

When all life saving actions have been completed, the MRT will normally be instructed by the ARCC to
establish a crash guard and cordon around the site of a military aircraft crash. This may also be
provided, at the request of the Police, for civilian aircraft incidents. This ‘Immediate Response
Guardforce’ will be replaced by a ‘Long Term Guard Force’ within 36 hours, deployed by the relevant
Command HQ. An Aircraft Recovery Officer (ARO) or Incident Commander will also be deployed by
Command HQ to the incident. He will assume responsibility for the crash guard and cordon on his
arrival.

The mission of the crash guard is to:

a. Ensure that Service and civilian personnel are protected from the hazards that will be
present at the crash site.

b. Ensure the security of wreckage, of classified equipment and information that may be in
the vicinity, and of Service equipment that may be deployed. The cordon will be set up so as
to contain all pieces of wreckage within its bounds using the following guidelines:

a. Entry to the area within which substances hazardous to health are located must be
prevented.

b. Unauthorised persons must be prevented from interfering with any part of the
wreckage.

c. For aircraft known to be carrying high explosive weapons, an initial cordon at 300
metres radius from the main body of the wreckage or at 30 metres beyond the area that
encompasses all items of wreckage (except AAES components which may be guarded
separately), whichever is greater, will be set up. See Fig 7 and 8.

d. For aircraft not carrying high explosive weapons, an initial cordon at 100 metres
radius from the main body of the wreckage or at 30 metres beyond the area that encompasses
all items of wreckage (except AAES components which may be guarded separately),
whichever is greater, will be set up. See Fig 7 and 8.

e. For aircraft with major components manufactured from MMMF, the relevant cordon will
be set up as above, but with MMMF dust being considered as part of the wreckage. Due
concern must be taken if an aircraft of this type burns. There may be need to consider a
downwind evacuation. If heavy smoke or dust plumes are present, the police may elect to
evacuate the publuc from up to 800 metres downwind

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Fig 7: CRASH SITE CORDON, SCATTERED WRECKAGE - Cordon to be set up

30 metres beyond the area that encompasses all items of wreckage.

Note: Special rules exist for aircraft known to be carrying nuclear weapons or material.

Fig 8: CRASH SITE CORDONS -

A. Aircraft known NOT to be carrying High Explosives - 100 metres.
B. Aircraft known to be CARRYING High Explosives - 300 metres.

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Crash Guard and Incident Control Point Identification

It is often necessary in populated areas to identify all members of the crash guard to discriminate
between authorised and unauthorised personnel. To this end, the Mountain Rescue Armband should
be worn by all team members at the crash site.

It is equally important to visually identify the Incident Control Point (ICP). This will usually be the
MRT Command and Control Vehicle in the first instance and is achieved by placing the “RAF Incident
Control” banner in a prominent position. Also available is a large dayglow windsock, which has the
additional benefit of providing continuous wind direction information to SAR helicopters. The
Team Leader himself can be made conspicuous by wearing the yellow “RAF Team Leader” vest.

Limitations to MRT Actions

Other than the immediate and necessary actions required to save life, (actions by) MRT personnel at a
military aircraft crash site are limited to the following:

a. AAES. MRT activities in respect of the rendering safe of AAES components are
restricted to those essential for the immediate rescue of crew/passengers. Unless directed
otherwise by the AAES Support Authority, team personnel are to leave all other aspects of
AAES safety to the AAES Investigation team.

b. Explosive Ordnance / Components. MRT personnel are not to engage in the

rendering safe of explosive ordnance or explosive components other than of AAES as
described as sub para. a above.

c. Photography. On completion of the SAR phase, the Team Leader will arrange for a
video and / or a photographic record to be made of the crash site and wreckage.

d. Crash Site Mapping. On occasions when the MRT Leader considers that actual or
forecast weather conditions might obscure explosive ordnance or other important items of
interest, he is to arrange for them to be flagged and mapped. Any map or plan is to be offered
to the ARO and BOI on their arrival. Once SAR photography and mapping activities have been
completed, MRT personnel should remain outside the cordoned areas. At civil aircraft crash
sites the Team Leader will use his discretion as to the extent of the teams activities.

Crash Site Access

Access to any crash site must be limited to those personnel who hold the necessary authorisation.
The MRT Leader holds a list of these personnel and any requests for access should be directed to him
or to the ARO on his arrival.

Dealing with the Media

Aircraft crashes and, in particular, Military aircraft crashes, tend to attract a large amount of media
attention. Depending on the location of the crash site and ICP, crash guard members may find
themselves faced with TV, radio and press representatives, all of whom are looking for a story
and may ask some very pointed questions. For this reason the Incident Controller and or OSC will
usually appoint a suitable person to liaise with the media. This will often be the Mountain Rescue
Team Liaison Officer - MRTLO, or MRS Flt Cdr if he is available. The Press Officer should give as
much information as is permitted under the current guidelines. A suitable flow of information to the
media can ease the pressure of work on those co-ordinating the operation. The Press Officer can do

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much to prevent incorrect or classified information being given to the media by persons not
qualified to do so. The police will often notify the TV and press quickly in order to handle them in a
controlled manner. No ban is to be imposed on media personnel collecting photographs, video or film
coverage of the crash site from outside the cordon. However, a courteous request should be made for
them to
refrain voluntarily from making film coverage until suitably qualified Service personnel have examined
the scene and covered or removed any classified material. Should any media personnel fail to
cooperate, the Incident Commander should be notified, who will take details and inform the MOD
Defence Press Office immediately. If such information is withheld, the Incident Commander will
report the facts to the civil Police and to the MOD Defence Press Office.

Team members should avoid giving opinions to members of the public and only authorised statements
are to be made to the media. To avoid mistakes, all media enquiries and requests for photography
etc. should be passed on to the Press Officer. All members of the cordon are to be in possession of a
copy of JSP 551 Vol 2 Section 400 Annex F “Orders for Crash Guards”.

Helicopters
Should a helicopter be required, the landing site must be upwind and far enough away from the crash
site so that no wreckage is disturbed. Should the wreckage be spread over a large area as in a
mid-air collision, a helicopter is extremely useful in determining the boundary of the cordon, deploying
cordon personnel quickly, and for locating pieces of wreckage or ejection seats that may be some
distance from the main crash site.

Professionalism
With the constant public outcry against low flying, it is common practice for the crash site to be visited
by local MP’s from all parties, very senior Police Officers, and a vast number of officials from local
council offices (eg Water Board, Forestry Commission). The teams’ operations and professionalism
then come under scrutiny from other professional bodies; a point that all team members should be
aware of when attending an aircraft incident. MRT personnel should also be aware of the Protection of
Military Remains Act 1986, the relevant sections of which are at Annex D.

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Annex A to SAR Operations

MAN MADE MINERAL FIBRE (MMMF) - HAZARDS,

PRECAUTIONS, FIRST AID ACTIONS AND DRESS
STATES FOR CORDONS AT CRASH SITES
The law requires that personnel who may be exposed to MMMF are provided with information about
the risks to health created by their exposure, together with information on the precautions to be taken
to minimise those risks. RAF MRS personnel may well be exposed to MMMF hazards during SAR
and Post Crash Management operations involving aircraft with significant MMMF content (eg Harrier
GR9, F18, F117A, B2 and most helicopters) and should ensure that they are aware of the hazards,
precautions and possible first aid treatment required in such a situation.

Hazards
The hazards that exist when dealing with an aircraft crash involving MMMF can be placed in the
following categories:

a. Possible puncture wounds / abrasions from splintered material.

b. Irritation of the skin and eyes caused by prolonged contact of fibres with the skin.

c. Irritation of the upper respiratory tract due to excessively dusty conditions.

d. Inhalation of toxic fumes caused by the burning of the bonding agents used in the
preparation of MMMF.

Precautions
Should the presence of MMMF be suspected at the crash site, the following precautions are to be
taken:

a. Wear the correct Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

b. Restrict the number of personnel entering the cordon area (100m from the extent of the
wreckage throw, with any dust pattern to be considered as part of the wreckage) to those with
essential tasks.

c. Prevent or minimise direct skin contact with fibres, splinters or composite material dust.

d. Do not allow fibres, splinters or composite material dust to enter the eyes.

e. Do not keep or consume food or drink inside the cordon area.

f. Do not smoke inside the cordon area.

g. Wash hands thoroughly after working near MMMF, particularly before eating, drinking
or smoking. The skin should be rinsed in luke warm water before using soap, otherwise the
soap may have the effect of rubbing fibres into the skin. DO NOT use solvents as skin
cleansers.

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h. To minimise fibre release, MMMF should not be broken up prior to its disposal. All
waste MMMF must be placed in a sealed bag or container.

First Aid Actions

All personnel involved in the handling of, or exposure to MMMF at the crash site are to be made aware
of the following first aid measures:

a. Ingestion. If fibres or composite material dust are ingested, obtain medical advice.

b. Inhalation. If fibres or composite material are inhaled, remove the casualty to an area
upwind and outside the cordon, and obtain medical advice.

c. Skin Contact. If fibres, splinters or composite material dust contact the skin:

(1) Remove contamination by firstly rinsing the affected area with luke warm water
then washing with soap and water.

(2) Remove any splinters using tweezers.

(3) If irritation develops, obtain medical advice.

d. Eye Contact. If MMMF or composite material dust enters the eyes:

(1) Irrigate the eyes thoroughly for 15 minutes with either clean running water or an
approved eye wash.

(2) Get medical help immediately.

Decontamination
In order to prevent cross contamination and the uncontrolled removal of contaminated clothing from
the site, an elementary Decontamination Control (dusting off, washing down and bagging facilities)
with an entry and exit point is to be established and manned at a suitable location outside the cordon
area. Dusting off should be done with a wet brush, and contaminated clothing is to be disposed of in a
sealed plastic bag.

Crashed F16 Aircraft - Hydrazine Hazard

Hydrazine is used as a fuel in the Emergency Power Unit (EPU) of the F16 aircraft. This substance
is toxic and the notes that follow provide general and medical guidance and should be read in
Conjunction with the relevant STC Eng SI.

General Precautions
MRT personnel should only approach the wreckage of an F16 aircraft when necessary to save life
and, in doing so, must exercise extreme caution. Specifically, they should observe the following rules:

a. Helicopters should land and remain upwind and well clear of the crash site.

b. A rescue party of 2 men only should approach the crash site on foot from upwind.
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c. Of the 2 men, one should effect the rescue and the other act as safety observer and
remain upwind to assist if required.

d. Personnel should wear full PPE including Sabre Mask and new canister.

All personnel should be aware that a smell of ammonia indicates the presence of hydrazine in the
atmosphere. In all cases where personnel suspect they have been subject to hydrazine contamination
they are to seek medical help as soon as is practicable.

Medical Guidance Notes - Hydrazine

Hydrazine is a colourless oily liquid with a faintly ammoniacal odour, which fumes on exposure to air.
It is a strong reducing agent and is highly flammable. It is freely miscible with water. The TLV (Toxic
Level Volume) is 0.1ppm, but the odour is first detected at concentrations a little greater than this.

Hydrazine may be absorbed through skin, by inhalation and by ingestion. It is corrosive and highly
irritant to the respiratory tract, eyes and skin. Direct contact may therefore cause severe irritation,
redness and even burns to both skin and eyes. Inhalation or absorption through skin or gastro
intestinal tract may cause severe weakness, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, dysponea,
cough, convulsions and even death. Complications include pulmonary oedema, liver failure, acute
renal tubular necrosis and haemolysis.

Personnel working in the immediate vicinity of an F16 aircraft should be advised that if they detect an
ammoniacal odour, however faint, they should move at least 300 metres up wind, well clear of the
aircraft and the smell and immediately inform their supervisor. If that has been the extent of their
contact with hydrazine, it is extremely unlikely that they will have come to any harm. If there has been
any more direct contact, then the following action should be taken:

a. Clothing should be removed and the individual should wash with soap and copious
quantities of water. Eyes should be irrigated with water for at least 15 minutes.

b. They should be admitted to the Station Medical Centre for observation for 48 hours
if symptom free and to hospital if they have any positive symptoms.

c. Blood should be taken for liver and renal function tests and for routine haematology
at the time of their admission. This should be repeated after 48 hours and if all tests have
been normal, they may then be discharged as fit for return to normal duty. If any of the tests
are abnormal, they should immediately be referred for specialist opinion.

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Annex B to SAR Operations

ORDNANCE HAZARD MARKINGS

RAF aircraft may carry a variety of armament including bombs, rockets and missiles of varying shapes
and sizes and are not always easily recognisable as weapons. Each weapon should, however, be
colour coded to indicate its explosive content. The following hazard markings may help identify items
found at a military aircraft crash:

a. Matt Blue (completely covered) - Practice weapon.

b. Matt Green (completely covered) - Live weapon.

c. Brown Ring - Low Explosive.

d. Yellow Ring - High Explosive.

e. Red Ring - Incendiary.

f. White (Ring or completely covered) - Flash composition.

Notes

1. Weapons may consist of a combination of the above colours to indicate various hazards.

2. Detachable pylons and carriers fitted to aircraft wings or fuselage may incorporate explosive release
bolts. These explosive bolts will be marked in a similar way to the aircraft ejection seat. (See Fig 9).

Fig 9:

3. Emergency Release Handles fitted to Ejection Seats: Any handles with black and yellow
stripes should not be operated under any circumstances. This includes the manual separation handle.
In recent seats the operation of the manual separation handle will also fire the ejection seat drogue
gun.

REMEMBER: MAKE NO RADIO TRANSMISSIONS WITHIN FIVE METRES OF ANY

EXPLOSIVE ITEM OR MATERIAL.

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Annex C to SAR Operations

TUCANO T Mk 1 - EMERGENCY RESCUE

PROCEDURES

Contents
AIRCRAFT DATA
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND GENERAL INFORMATION
General
Cockpit access
Normal canopy opening
LCC / MDC system canopy opening
Operation of engine throttle/shutdown lever
Safety pin stowages
Safety pin installation

Fig
10 Tucano T MK 1
11 LCC/MDC danger and fragmentation areas
12 Ejection seat safety pin installed

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Fig 10: Tucano T Mk 1

Aircraft Data

CREW
One or two

EJECTION SEAT
2 x Type 8LC.
Command ejection.
Safety pin stowages:
Front cockpit - central stowage 2 x 1 maintenance pins for both cockpits - rear left hand.
Front / rear cockpits - LCC/MDC and seat pan firing handle safety pin stowage, centre left hand.

CANOPY OPENING (NORMAL)

External lock/unlock handle - left hand fuselage.

CANOPY OPENING (EMERGENCY)

LCC/MDC firing handles - left hand/right hand fuselage.

MAXIMUM (USABLE) FUEL

Internal tanks - 1,300 lb.

WEAPONS
Various external stores (training) - wing pylon mounted.

OTHER INFORMATION
1 x 2,250 litre gaseous cylinder at 124 bar g - behind rear cockpit bulkhead.

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Safety Precautions and General Information

General

The Tucano T Mk 1 aircraft is equipped with two fully automatic Martin Baker Type 8LC ejection seats
located in the front and rear cockpits. The cockpits are enclosed by a single canopy hinged at the
right hand side. The portion of the canopy that encloses the front cockpit is toughened (increased in
thickness) to improve resistance against birdstrike damage. Because of this, this portion of the
canopy is fitted with linear cutting cord (LCC) whilst the rear portion which is less susceptible to
birdstrike damage and not toughened, is fitted with miniature detonating cord (MDC).

The LCC/MDC system normally operates as part of the ejection sequence, to fragment the canopy
and allow the free passage of the rising seat/s. The system can also be operated by the crash crew
using external handles. Operation of the LCC / MDC creates a fragmentation area in the centre of
which is a 2.4m (8 ft) radius danger area (FIG 11).

Fig 11: LCC / MDC danger and fragmentation areas

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Cockpit Access
WARNING...
IF THE AIRCRAFT ENGINE IS STILL RUNNING, APPROACH THE AIRCRAFT FROM THE SIDE
OR REAR. KEEP WELL CLEAR OF THE PROPELLER.

Access is normally gained to the cockpits (FIG 10) by using the canopy external lock/unlock handle
located on the left hand centre fuselage. In an emergency the canopy can be fractured by using either
one of the LCC / MDC system operating handles, one located each side of the fuselage at the rear of
the canopy.

Normal canopy opening

a. Depress the latch to the rear of the handle to release the handle.

CAUTION...
If wind strength is either fresh or above, assistance may be required when opening the canopy.

b. Rotate handle clockwise to unlock the canopy and raise the canopy manually to open.
If necessary and time allows, support canopy in open position using the canopy support rod
(located at the rear of the cockpit) and lock it in position using the supplied pin (stowed in red
bag kept in the large fuselage locker on the left hand side of the canopy).

LCC/MDC system canopy opening

a. Personnel shall be dressed in crash protective clothing with the helmet visor down.

b. Depress the white latch on the yellow access door (either left hand or right hand
fuselage) and open the door. Remove handle from its stowage.

Note: If circumstances require it and time allows extend the handle lanyard using a line.

c. Ensure all personnel are at least 2.4m (8 ft) from the cockpit and warn the aircrew
(if possible).

d. Move away from the cockpits to the full extent of the lanyard 5m (16.4 ft), face away
from the cockpits and pull the handle hard.

e. If necessary, enlarge opening in canopy to facilitate access.

Operation of Engine Throttle / Shutdown Lever

If the engine is running the following shutdown procedure should be carried out:

Note: The following shutdown procedure need only be carried out in one cockpit.

a. Close the throttle to GND IDLE position.

b. Pull emergency shutdown lever rearwards to OFF / FEATHER position.

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Safety Pin Stowages

The ejection seat and LCC/MDC safety pins are stowed in three stowages, two in the front cockpit and
one in the rear cockpit. The safety pins are stowed as follows:

a. Front cockpit, central stowage (one pin from each cockpit), rear left hand sidewall:

(1) MOR sear (2 off).

(2) Front cockpit, centre left hand sidewall.

(3) Seat pan firing handle.

(4) Rear cockpit, as in para 5.2.

Safety Pin Installation

WARNING...
THE EJECTION SEAT FIRING SYSTEMS ARE INTERCONNECTED BY A COMMAND FIRING
SYSTEM. INADVERTENT FIRING OF THE REAR SEAT WILL EJECT THE FRONT SEAT, IF
SO SELECTED.

The seat pan firing handle safety pin is the only pin relevant to the immediate action of the crash
rescue team (Fig 12). All other safety pins are the sole responsibility of qualified ejection seat
tradesmen.

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Fig 12: Ejection seat safety pin installed

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TUCANO T MK 1 - EMERGENCY RESCUE

PROCEDURES

1. OPEN CANOPY MANUALLY OR FIRE LCC / MDC

Fig 13:
2. FIT SEAT PAN FIRING HANDLE SAFETY PIN TO EACH SEAT

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Fig 14:
 SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

TUCANO T MK 1 - EMERGENCY RESCUE

PROCEDURES

3. CLOSE THROTTLE / ENGINE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN LEVER

Fig 15:

4. SET BATTERY MASTER TO OFF

5. REMOVE OCCUPANTS FACE MASK

Fig 16:

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TUCANO T MK 1 - EMERGENCY RESCUE

PROCEDURES

6. RELEASE OCCUPANT FROM SEAT AT FOUR POINTS IN FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:

7. LIFT FEET FROM RUDDER PEDALS. LIFT KNEES AND PLACE FEET ON FLOOR

8. LIFT OCCUPANT FROM COCKPIT.

9. QUALIFIED EJECTION SEAT TRADEMAN – FIT REMAINING SAFETY PINS TO EJECTION

SEAT

Fig 17:

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Annex D to SAR Operations

PROTECTION OF MILITARY REMAINS ACT 1986

The protection of Military Remains Act was passed in July 1986 as “An act to ensure the protection
from unauthorised interference of the remains of military aircraft and vessels that have crashed, sunk
or been stranded and of associated human remains;and for connected purposes”.

ALL MRS personnel should be aware of the relevant section of the Act, which apply equally to SAR
personnel, members of the media and the general public. Any person who contravenes the Act is
liable to prosecution unless covered by the exceptions clause at sub-para c below. Relevant sections
are as follows:

a. Protected Place. For the purposes of this Act a place (whether in the United Kingdom,
in UK waters or in International waters) is a Protected Place if:

(1) It comprises the remains of, or a substantial part of, an aircraft, or vessel to
which this Act applies; and

(2) It is the place, or in the immediate vicinity of the place, where the remains were
left by the crash, sinking or standing of the aircraft or vessel.

b. Contravention of the Act. A person contravenes this subsection in relation to any

remains:

(1) If he tampers with, damages, moves, removes or unearths the remains.

(2) If he enters any hatch or other opening in any of the remains which enclose
any part of the interior of an aircraft or vessel; or

(3) If he causes or permits any other person to do anything falling within

sub-paras b (i) and b(ii) above.

c. Exceptions to the Act. In proceedings against any person for an offence under this
section it shall be defence for that person to show what he did, or as the case may be, what he
caused or permitted to be done was urgently necessary in the interests of safety or health or to
prevent or avoid serious damage to property.

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Annex E to SAR Operations

AVALANCHE SEARCH TECHNIQUES

Sometimes people are able to dig themselves out after burial by an avalanche. Sadly, however, many
climbers and walkers caught in an avalanche are unable to escape and remain buried and possibly
injured, unable to help themselves. Chances of survival once buried in an avalanche are never better
than 80% at the outset and decrease rapidly with increasing burial times. See Fig 18.

Fig 18: Survival time for a buried avalanche victim

Organised Avalanche Rescue

Use of Search Dogs

Trained avalanche dogs are highly effective in locating buried persons, and in good conditions they
can search an area in perhaps one tenth the time that a team of 20 men equipped with probes would
take.

Compact, non-porous, icy snow will limit the passage of the scent of the victim, and make the dogs
less effective, as will the presence of distracting scents and severe weather. If a dog is immediately
available it is wise to keep other rescuers off the avalanche debris, and to discourage them from
urination near the site, so as not to confuse the dog.

“Resting” the slope for 10 minutes after searchers have operated will allow many of the false scents to
dissipate. In any case, the vital search by people on the spot must not be delayed by the expectation
of the appearance of a search dog.

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Fig 19: Path of Avalanche Debris

Probing
This is the traditional method of searching for buried persons, and involves systematic probing of the
debris with rigid metal probes of about 3 metres in length. It is worth noting that the avalanche tip may
drive under the snowpack. This is most likely with dense, wet snow avalanches and allowance for this
should be made in the area searched. See FIG 19.

Ideally, each probing team will consist of 20 searchers under the direction of a Party Leader or
“probe-master”. They are backed up by a shovel party, and if necessary a lookout is posted in a safe
place to warn of any further avalanches. The area to be searched should be marked with coloured
flags, and if sufficient manpower is available, 2 men holding a cord along the line of probes at snow
level is useful to keep the line straight. The probemaster’s job is to ensure that the probing follows a
systematic pattern. Two types of search pattern are normally used:

a. Coarse Probe

(1) This gives a coarse grid of 70 x 75 cm which has only a 75% chance of locating
a buried person (See Fig 20). The search-line stand elbow-to-elbow, hands on hips to
define the spacing. On the command “Probe” the probe is inserted between the
searchers’ feet, and pushed down until an obstruction is felt, or until the top of the
probe is at about waist height (probing deeper is wasteful of time).

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 SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS
(2) The probe-master checks the line of probes and on the command “Probe”
the line extracts the probes, takes one pace forwards and inserts the probes again.
This process continues. If a searcher feels he might have found something he leaves
his probe in place as a marker and informs the shovel party. They will give the
searcher a replacement probe and dig at the indicated point. The line must continue to
search until a definite location is made by the shovel party. See Fig 21.

b. Fine Probe

(1) This is done by probing at each foot and between the feet, before taking a half
step forward. This gives a grid of 25 x 30 cm with a near 100% chance of finding a
body. See Fig 20.

(2) However, to search an area of one hectare, 20 men will require 4 hours for a
coarse probe and about 20 hours for a fine probe. This means that the fine probe is so
slow that it is not normally used for locating living persons. Two consecutive coarse
probes gives a better chance of effecting a live rescue than a single fine probe.

Size of Grid Coarse Fine

Probe Probe

Chance of location 75% 100%

(victim at 1.4m)

Time for 20 men to About 4 About 20

search one hectare hrs hrs

Fig 20: Probe Spacing

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Fig 21: A Probe Line

Avalanche Transceivers
RAF MRS personnel are issued with Ortovox avalanche transceivers when operating in winter
conditions (see Fig 22a). It transmits on the international 457khz frequency. It allows the fast pinpoint
search by a visual indication in the shape of an arrow and a loudspeaker. Each transceiver is
issued in its own case and with a set of operating instructions which should be followed. Some
members of the public and, in particular, instructors from the National Outdoor Centres may also carry
them when conditions dictate.

Fig 22a: ORTOVOX Avalanche Transceiver as

issued to RAF MRT’s

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 SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS
An internationally agreed frequency of 457 kHz became universal on 1 Dec 95. Transceivers
using this frequency are in common use in Europe and dual frequency transceivers which are also
compatible with the old 2.275 MHz frequency continued to be sold until the agreed date. Groups
should carefully check the compatibility of transceivers which they may be using. All MRS personnel
should be practised in the use of transceivers and familiar with the particular set they are using. The
sets must be equipped with batteries which are in good condition. Before departure the transmitting
and receiving functions of each set must be checked, the set switched on to “transmit” and worn
securely under the clothing. Sets that are switched off or become detached provide no protection!

Fig 22b: Avalanche transceivers must be worn

securely on the chest under outside clothing

Search for the First Signal

1. Marking the Prime Search Area. If you witness the avalanche note the point where the victim
was last seen, estimate the position where he is buried by considering the direction and speed of
avalanche, see Fig 23a. If the accident had no witnesses, estimate the primary search area by
observing the victims tracks, if possible the point of capture, size and direction of avalanche.

2. Determine the Search Strategy. This will be determined according to Fig 23b.

3. Surface Search. Before you start your coarse search, the surface of the prime search area
should be searched visually for any equipment or body parts showing. If something is spotted, then
go towards the object with the receiver turned on and pay attention for the “First Signal”. If a signal is
received proceed with a fine search. If not then start the coarse search as follows:

4. Coarse Search. All the transceivers must be switched on to receive so that there can be no
confusion of signals from non-victims. The switch should be set to the first zone ‘Start 80m’. Decide
your search path depending on your search strategy and pay attention for the ‘First Signal’ received.
When it is received the fine search begins.

Fine Search
1. Induction Lines Method. Once you have received your first signal then hold the transceiver
with the direction arrow pointing ahead of you. Now turn yourself and the horizontally held transceiver
through 360 degrees slowly to locate the loudest signal. Go forward 5m then stop and again turn
through 360 degrees to locate the loudest signal. This process is then followed turning the volume
setting down until it is eventually at the lowest search zone (2-0 m) see Fig 23c.

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Visual Search Indicators. The visual search indicators consist of three lights shaped as an
arrow. A green light will start to flash at a range of 35m from a victim.

a. Hold the transceiver horizontally and scan from side to side until the strongest signal is
received, which is visually indicated by the most lights flashing. The light sequence then is
green then yellow and then red.

b. Walk in the direction of the arrow for 5 steps. If the signal decreases, turn back. Scan
the device for the strongest signal.

c. Repeat this until the red light begins to light up. Now turn the volume control down by
one-step increments.

d. The process started again until eventually the strongest signal is received at the lowest
volume setting.

e. You are now as close as you are going to get to the victim therefore, you can now start
the pinpoint search.

2. Grid Pattern Method. Follow the direction of the increasingly louder signal in a straight line. As
soon as the maximum volume is received then turn the volume down so that it can increase whenever
you get nearer to the victim. When the red light flashes, turn the volume down. If the signal gets
weaker then turn round and go back to the position where it was the strongest. Mark that position.
Turn 90 degrees and walk in that direction. If the signal gets weaker, again turn around and go back
to where it was the loudest. Continue with this method until you have reached the lowest search zone
(2-0 m) see FIG 23d.

The Pin Point Search

The pin point search is the final search for the location of the victim. Side step for at least 3m and
listen to the signal. The exact position of the victim is determined by the loudest volume, see FIG 24.

Fig 23a: Marking the Prime Search Area

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Fig 23b: Search strategy

Fig 23c: Induction Lines

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Fig 23d: Grid Search

Fig 24: Pinpoint Search

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Finally, it should be noted that whilst searching, the rescuers are no longer protected by their own
transceivers. Also proximity of a Mobile Phone can seriously reduce the Transmit / Receive range of
an Avalanche Transceiver due to the phone’s frequent “Hand-Shaking” transmissions to receiver
antennae. Rescuers are advised to separate Transceivers and Mobile Phones as much as is
practicable.

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