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Criminal Charges Against Yinpiao Zhou

Yinpiao Zhou, 39

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
124 views22 pages

Criminal Charges Against Yinpiao Zhou

Yinpiao Zhou, 39

Uploaded by

michael.kan
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 1 of 2

1 ISMAIL J. RAMSEY (CABN 189820)

2
United States Attorney

MARTHA BOERSCH (CABN 126569)


FILED
3 Chief, Criminal Division
Dec 10 2024
4 GALEN A. PHILLIPS (CABN 307644)
Assistant United States Attorney Mark B. Busby
5
450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36055 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
6 San Francisco, California 94102-3495 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Telephone: (415) 436-7110 SAN FRANCISCO
7 Email: [Link]@[Link]

8 Attorneys for United States of America

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

12
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CASE NO. 3:24-mj-71740 MAG
13 )
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS ON OUT-OF-
14 ) DISTRICT CRIMINAL CHARGES PURSUANT TO
v. ) RULES 5(c)(2) AND (3) OF THE FEDERAL
15 ) RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
YINPIAO ZHOU, )
16 )
Defendant. )
17 )

18
Please take notice pursuant to Rules 5(c)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
19
that on or about December 9, 2024, the above-named defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest
20
warrant (copy attached) issued upon an
21
Ƒ Indictment
22
Ƒ Information
23
X Criminal Complaint
24
Ƒ Other (describe)
25
pending in the Central District of California, Case Number 2:24-MJ-07256.
26
In that case (copy of complaint attached), the defendant is charged with violations of Title 49,
27
United States Code, Section 46306 for failure to register an aircraft not providing transportation, and
28

v. 7/10/2018
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 2 of 2

1 Title 49, United States Code, Section 46307 for a violation of national defense airspace.

2 In the Complaint, the government alleges that, on November 30, 2024, the defendant traveled to

3 a park near Vandenberg Space Force Base (“VSFB”) and used a drone to fly over and photograph

4 sensitive areas of the military facility for approximately 59 minutes. Notably, on that same day,

5 November 30, 2024, a sensitive payload developed for the National Reconnaissance Office had been

6 launched to orbit by a space contractor. The defendant has admitted that he flew the drone to take photos

7 of VFSB. And a search of the drone authorized by federal warrant revealed photos of VFSB. Complaint,

8 ¶¶ 4 – 7.

9 The maximum penalties are as follows:

10 49 U.S.C. § 46306 (Failure to Register an Aircraft):

11 x 3 years imprisonment;
12 x 1 year supervised release;
13 x $250,000 or twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss resulting from the
14 offense; and

15 x $100 special assessment.


16
49 U.S.C. § 46307 (Violation of National Defense Airspace):
17
x 1 year imprisonment;
18
x 1 year supervised release;
19
x $100,000 or twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss resulting from the
20
offense; and
21
x $25 special assessment.
22
Respectfully Submitted,
23
ISMAIL J. RAMSEY
24 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
ATT
25
Date: December 9, 2024
26 GALEN A. PHILLIPS
Assistant United States Attorney
27

28

v. 7/10/2018
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 1 of 20

Complaint

Complaint
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 2 of 20

2:24-MJ-07256-DUTY
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 3 of 20

AFFIDAVIT

I, Mike Wood, being duly sworn, declare and state as follows:

I. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT

1. This affidavit is made in support of criminal

complaint and arrest warrant against Yinpiao Zhou (“ZHOU”) for a

violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46306 (failure to register an aircraft

not providing transportation) and 49 U.S.C. § 46307 (violation

of national defense airspace).

2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon

my personal observations, my training and experience, and

information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and

witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there

is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and

arrest warrant and does not purport to set forth all of my

knowledge of or investigation into this matter. Unless

specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and

statements described in this affidavit are related in substance

and part only.

II. BACKGROUND OF SPECIAL AGENT MIKE WOOD

3. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”) and have been so employed since January of

2015. I am currently assigned to the Santa Maria Resident Agency

of the FBI’s Los Angeles Division, where I have worked

counterintelligence matters since November of 2018. As part of

my current job duties, I work closely with Air Force, Office of

Special Investigations (“OSI”) Special Agents on national

security matters pertaining to Vandenberg Space Force Base. In

1
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 4 of 20

2023, I executed a six-month temporary duty assignment during

which I was posted overseas and embedded with Department of

Defense partners and worked closely with officers from multiple

branches of the United States military on matters of mutual

Department of Defense-FBI interest. I am familiar with

tradecraft and techniques utilized by foreign adversarial

nations and the efforts those nations undertake to collect

intelligence on elements of military infrastructure of their

interest. Before working counterintelligence matters, I was

assigned to FBI criminal squads, where I worked criminal matters

that included the writing of search and other criminal process

in furtherance of FBI investigations.

III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE

4. On November 30, 2024, ZHOU traveled to a park near

Vandenberg Space Force Base (“VSFB”) and used a drone to fly

over and photograph sensitive areas of the military facility for

approximately 59 minutes. Notably, on that same day, November

30, 2024, a sensitive payload developed for the National


Reconnaissance Office had been launched to orbit by a space

contractor.

5. After military personnel detected the drone inside

VSFB’s restricted airspace, investigators traveled to the park,

contacted ZHOU and another individual (“Individual-1”), and

found that ZHOU had the drone (defined below as the “DJI Drone”)

inside his jacket. During a Mirandized interview with FBI

agents, ZHOU admitted he flew his drone from the park to take

photographs of VSFB. ZHOU further admitted that he had

2
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 5 of 20

downloaded specific software onto the drone to bypass the

drone’s built-in restrictions to prevent it from taking off and

flying in no-fly zones. ZHOU further admitted that he knew

taking photographs of the space contractor facility at VSFB was

“probably not a good idea.”

6. A search of the DJI Drone pursuant to a federal search

warrant revealed several photographs of VSFB taken from an

aerial viewpoint on November 30, 2024. A search of ZHOU’s

cellphone pursuant to the same federal search warrant showed

ZHOU conducted a Google search approximately a month earlier for

the phrase “Vandenberg Space Force Base Drone Rules” and

messaged with another person about hacking his drone to allow it

fly higher than it could otherwise.

7. ZHOU admitted to traveling from the People’s Republic

of China to the United States, with ZHOU most recently coming on

February 12, 2024. Individual-1 most recently arrived in the

United States on November 26, 2024. Both ZHOU and Individual-1

are scheduled to leave the United States and return to China on

an international flight scheduled on December 9, 2024.

IV. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

A. Background on the Relevant Statutes and Regulations

1. National Defense Airspace

8. Title 49, United States Code, Section 46307 provides

that “[a] person that knowingly or willfully violates section

40103(b)(3) of this title or a regulation prescribed or order

issued under section 40103(b)(3) shall be fined under title 18,

imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”

3
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 6 of 20

9. Title 49, United States Code, Section 40103(b)(3)

provides that “[t]o establish security provisions that will

encourage and allow maximum use of the navigable airspace by

civil aircraft consistent with national security, the

Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,

shall (A) establish areas in the airspace the Administrator

decides are necessary in the interest of national defense; and

(B) by regulation or order, restrict or prohibit flight of civil

aircraft that the Administrator cannot identify, locate, and

control with available facilities in those areas.”

10. Title 49, United States Code, Section 40102(a)(6)

provides that “‘aircraft’ means any contrivance invented, used,

or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”

11. Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 99.7

provides that “[e]ach person operating an aircraft in an ADIZ or

Defense Area must, in addition to the applicable rules of this

part, comply with special security instructions issued by the

Administrator in the interest of national security, pursuant to

agreement between the [Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)]

and the Department of Defense, or between the FAA and a U.S.

Federal security or intelligence agency.”

12. Based on my review of the FAA webpage for Notices to

Air Missions (“NOTAMS”),1 I have learned that on August 28, 2023,

the FAA issued NOTAM 3/2496. The NOTAM started on September 2,

1 See FNS NOTAM Search, [Link],


[Link] (last
visited Dec. 6, 2024).

4
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 7 of 20

2023, and ends on September 1, 2025. The NOTAM provides, among

other things, the following:

PURSUANT TO 49 U.S.C. SECTION 40103(B)(3), THE FAA


CLASSIFIES THE AIRSPACE DEFINED IN THIS NOTAM AND IN
FURTHER DETAIL AT THE FAA WEBSITE IDENTIFIED BELOW AS
‘NATIONAL DEFENSE AIRSPACE’. OPERATORS WHO DO NOT
COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES MAY FACE THE
FOLLOWING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MAY PURSUE CRIMINAL CHARGES, INCLUDING
CHARGES UNDER 49 U.S.C. SECTION 46307 . . . .

PURSUANT TO 14 C.F.R. SECTION 99.7, SPECIAL SECURITY


INSTRUCTIONS (SSI), ALL UAS FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE
PROHIBITED: WITHIN THE DEFINED AIRSPACE OVER SELECT
NATIONAL SECURITY SENSITIVE LOCATIONS EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED FOR BELOW.

REFER TO THE FOLLOWING FAA WEBSITE: HTTPS://UDDS-


[Link] FOR: A LIST OF THESE SELECTED
LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES, AND VISUAL DEPICTIONS,
ALTITUDES, AND GEOSPATIAL DEFINITIONS OF THE OVERLYING
AIRSPACE IN WHICH UAS OPERATIONS ARE
PROHIBITED . . . .

13. Based on my review of publicly available mapping data

from the FAA,2 I have learned that the area over VSFB is listed

as part of a “National Security UAS Flight Restriction.”

Furthermore, based on the mapping data, the area surrounding

Ocean Park and parts of VSFB is designated as Class D airspace.


Flight in Class D airspace requires authorization from Air

Traffic Control. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.41. Individuals seeking

authority to fly drones in Class D airspace must seek

authorization through one of two online FAA systems. See Section

19-6-1, FAA Order 7210.3DD (April 20, 2023).

2 See UAS Data Delivery System, [Link], [Link]


[Link] (following link to “Map of “FAA UAS
Data”) (last visited Dec. 7, 2024).

5
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 8 of 20

2. Registration Requirements

14. Title 49, United States Code, Section 46306(b)

provides, among other things, that “a person shall be fined

under title 18, imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both,

if the person . . . knowingly and willfully operates or attempts

to operate an aircraft eligible for registration under section

44102 of this title knowing that . . . the aircraft is not

registered under section 44103 of this title . . . .”

15. Title 49, United States Code, Section 44102(a)

provides, among other things, that “[a]n aircraft may be

registered under section 44103 of this title only when the

aircraft is . . . not registered under the laws of a foreign

country and is owned by (A) a citizen of the United States; [or]

(B) an individual citizen of a foreign country lawfully admitted

for permanent residence in the United States.”

16. Title 49, United States Code, Section 44103(a)(1)

provides that “[o]n application of the owner of an aircraft that

meets the requirements of section 44102 of this title, the

Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall

(A) register the aircraft; and (B) issue a certificate of

registration to its owner.”

17. Statutes and FAA rules create an exception to the

registration requirement for drones that weight less than 0.55

pounds and are used for recreational flight. See 14 C.F.R.

§ 107.110 (weight threshold); 49 U.S.C. § 44809 (requirements

for qualifying as recreational flight). Title 14, Code of

Federal Regulations, Section 48.15, provides, among other

6
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 9 of 20

things, that “[n]o person may operate a small unmanned aircraft

that is eligible for registration under 49 U.S.C. 44101-44103

unless one of the following criteria has been satisfied: (a) The

owner has registered and marked the aircraft in accordance with

this part; [or] (b) The aircraft is operated exclusively in

compliance with 49 U.S.C. 44809 and weighs 0.55 pounds or less

on takeoff . . . .”

18. The FAA website summarizes the drone registration

requirement this way: “All drones must be registered, except

those that weigh 0.55 pounds or less (less than 250 grams) and

are flown under the Exception for Limited Recreational

Operations.”3

B. VSFB Learns About ZHOU’s Drone Flying Over the Base on


November 30, 2024

19. Based on my communication with VSFB Security Forces

and OSI personnel, I have learned, among other things, the

following:

a. On the morning of November 30, 2024, VSFB

personnel were alerted to the presence of an unmanned aerial


system (“UAS” or “drone”) flying over the base. The personnel

were alerted by a drone detection system employed by VSFB

Security Forces and a drone detection system employed by the

FBI.

How To Register Your Drone, [Link],


3
[Link] (last
visited Dec. 6, 2024). The recreational flight requirements –
and the reasons ZHOU does not meet them – are described in more
detail below.

7
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 10 of 20

b. The FBI drone detection system identified the UAS

as a DJI model Mavic 2 UAS, bearing drone identification number

163CG98R0A18BW (the “DJI Drone”). The OSI drone detection system

detected that the DJI Drone appeared to originate from Ocean

Park, a publicly accessible park adjacent to VSFB, and then

travel south toward VSFB Space Launch Complexes Three and Four.

Based on my training and experience, a Space Launch Complex is a

facility used to launch rockets and other spacecraft into space.

c. The FBI drone detection systems identified that

the DJI Drone was in flight for a total of approximately 59

minutes. A report from the FBI UAS detection system shows the

path of travel for the drone originating in the vicinity of

Ocean Park and traveling south near Surf Beach and directly

toward Space Launch Complex Three and Four. The drone then

returned to the vicinity of Ocean Park. The drone traveled to a

maximum height of approximately 4939 feet, or approximately .9

miles.

d. Space Launch Complex Four is currently utilized

by Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“SpaceX”) to conduct

commercial and government launches into space. Notably, earlier

in the morning on November 30, 2024, Space Launch Complex Four

had hosted a launch of a National Reconnaissance Office payload

built by SpaceX and another contractor.

20. Based on my communications with VSFB Security Forces

and my review of VSFB Security Forces reports, I have learned,

among other things, the following:

8
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 11 of 20

a. After detecting the DJI Drone, approximately four

VSFB Security Forces traveled to Ocean Park to investigate the

drone travel.4 There, Security Forces personnel saw two

individuals, ZHOU and Individual-1. Security Forces personnel

asked to speak with ZHOU and Individual-1. When Security Forces

personnel began talking to them, ZHOU and Individual-1 walked

away. Security Forces personnel again asked to talk to ZHOU and

Individual-1, who stopped and began speaking to them. The

personnel then asked if ZHOU and Individual-1 had seen any

drones flying nearby and, if so, whether they had seen the

pilot. ZHOU stated that he had seen a drone but that he did not

see the pilot.

b. While ZHOU and Individual-1 were speaking to

Security Forces personnel, ZHOU had his hands inside his jacket.

Security Forces personnel asked ZHOU to remove his hands from

his pocket. After they did that, ZHOU removed his hands,

exposing a drone underneath his jacket.

c. Security Forces personnel asked ZHOU why he had

lied about not seeing the drone pilot, and ZHOU responded that

he was afraid because he believed that the Security Forces

personnel were from the military.

d. Security Forces personnel later asked ZHOU for

his driver’s license. ZHOU responded that his license was in his

car. Security Forces personnel followed ZHOU when he walked to

4 Based upon my conversations with OSI Special Agents, I


have learned Ocean Park has concurrent law enforcement
jurisdiction shared between VSFB and the Santa Barbara County
Sherriff’s Office.

9
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 12 of 20

his car, where ZHOU retrieved his driver’s license. While ZHOU

was at his car, he placed the drone that was on his person

inside a large bag on the passenger seat.

e. During the contact with ZHOU, ZHOU showed

Security Forces personnel footage that ZHOU had taken using his

drone. ZHOU showed the Security Forces personnel the footage on

a cellphone device attached to the drone controller (the “ZHOU

Cellphone”). Upon seeing that the footage consisted of parts of

VSFB, Security Forces personnel instructed ZHOU to delete

footage of the base from the cellphone and watched ZHOU delete

the footage.5

C. Interview with ZHOU and Search of ZHOU’s Car

21. On November 30, 2024, I interviewed ZHOU at Ocean

Park. Before the interview, I advised ZHOU of his Miranda

rights, and he agreed to speak with me.6 Based on my interview of

ZHOU, I learned, among other things, the following:

a. ZHOU stated that on November 28, 2024, he and

Individual-1 stayed overnight at Kirk Creek campground in the


Big Sur area of Monterey County, California. ZHOU stated that he

tried to fly his drone at their campsite at Kirk Creek, but a

park ranger told him not to fly it.

b. On November 29, 2024, ZHOU and Individual-1 drove

further south from Kirk Creek, arriving at Ocean Park, in the

5 As discussed below, the FBI later obtained a federal


warrant to search the drone, the drone controller, a cellphone
belonging to ZHOU, a handheld camera belonging to ZHOU, and two
cellphones belonging to Individual-1.
6 The interview with ZHOU was audio recorded. The interview
was conducted in English.

10
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 13 of 20

vicinity of VSFB, later in the day. According to ZHOU, after

arriving at Ocean Park, he learned about the imminent SpaceX

launch that night, i.e., the one that took place in the early

morning hours on November 30, 2024. ZHOU said he took pictures

of the launch with his handheld camera.

c. ZHOU said that in the morning on November 30,

2024, he took pictures of the SpaceX Space Launch Complex with

his drone. ZHOU stated that he knew the SpaceX facility was on a

military installation. ZHOU said that his drone flew for 10 or

15 minutes and went approximately one to two miles south towards

the SpaceX facility.7

d. ZHOU also admitted he purchased software on a

particular website that allowed the DJI Drone to bypass

restrictions on altitude as well as no-fly-zone restrictions

that would otherwise not allow his DJI drone to fly at VSFB.

ZHOU expressed an understanding that drones operated in the

United States had to comply with altitude limits and no-fly

limits. ZHOU explained that the DJI mobile application featured

a map that would outline for the user which areas contain a no-

fly zone restriction. ZHOU originally downloaded the bypass

software in 2019 to get around the no-fly zones in Shanghai.

Referencing the bypass software and his UAS, ZHOU said,

“Normally, if you didn’t have that software, it wouldn’t be able

to take off from here.”

7 As noted above, this contradicts the flight time


identified by the FBI drone detection system, which identified
the DJI drone in flight for a total of approximately 59 minutes.

11
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 14 of 20

e. ZHOU also said that he had not registered his

drone with the FAA. ZHOU said FAA instructions for registering

drones were not clear. ZHOU was familiar with licensing

requirements for operating a UAS in China, but he never himself

got a license for his UAS. ZHOU was not familiar with specific

United States requirements for UAS licensing, but he assumed

that there must be some requirements.

f. ZHOU said he previously got into trouble in China

for flying a UAS in a restricted area. More specifically, ZHOU

was arrested for flying a UAS near a government building at

People’s Square in Shanghai. He was subsequently fined for this.

ZHOU did not register the UAS in China either.

g. ZHOU claimed he entered the United States on

February 12, 2024, on an immigrant visa. ZHOU stated that he and

Individual-1 were returning to China on or about December 9,

2024.

h. During the interview, ZHOU stated that he had

rented the car. ZHOU gave consent to search that car. ZHOU

signed an FBI consent to search form, which also authorized

agents to seize items inside the car.

22. Based on my participation in that search and my

communication with other law enforcement officers, I have

learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about November 30, 2024, after ZHOU

consented to the search of his car, other FBI agents and I

searched the car. Inside, agents found a large bag on the

passenger seat, which contained the following:

12
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 15 of 20

i. A DJI drone. The serial number for DJI Drone

matches the drone identification number for the UAS identified

as flying above VSFB, as described above. Accordingly, based on

my training and experience, I believe the drone on ZHOU’s person

and then placed in his car was the DJI Drone that was flying

above VSFB.

ii. A DJI drone controller.

iii. The ZHOU Cellphone, a black Apple iPhone

that was connected to the DJI controller.

iv. A Canon EOS 5D Mark III camera, which

contained an SD card.

b. Agents subsequently seized the aforementioned

items.

23. Based on my communications with a United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services officer, I have learned,

among other things, that ZHOU is a Chinese citizen and a lawful

permanent resident of the United States. Based on my review of

United States Customs and Border Patrol records and my

communications with a United States Citizenship and Immigration

Services officer, I know that Individual-1 arrived in the United

States on a visitor visa on or about November 26, 2024.

D. Evidence Found During Preliminary Search of ZHOU’s


Drone and Other Digital Devices

24. On or about December 4, 2024, the Hon. Alicia G.

Rosenberg, United States Magistrate Judge, authorized a warrant

to search the DJI Drone, the drone controller, the ZHOU

Cellphone, ZHOU’s handheld camera, and Individual-1’s

13
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 16 of 20

cellphones,8 as well as storage medium inside the devices. See

Case No. 2:24-MJ-7204 (C.D. Cal.).

25. Based on my personal observations and my

communications with an FBI Computer Analysis Response Team

examiner, I have learned, among other things, that the DJI Drone

contained an SD card (the “Drone SD Card”), which is a type of

digital information storage device. A review of the contents of

the Drone SD Card showed several photographs of VSFB taken from

an aerial viewpoint. Metadata for those photographs show they

were taken on November 30, 2024, and location-related metadata

shows they were taken from an area above VSFB. Accordingly,

based on my training and experience, I believe the photographs

were taken by ZHOU from the DJI Drone while it was flying to,

from, or above VSFB.

26. Based on my review of a data image of the ZHOU

Cellphone provided to me by an FBI Computer Analysis Response

Team examiner, I have learned, among other things, the

following:

a. On or about November 10, 2024, ZHOU searched on

Google for the phrase “Vandenberg Space Force Base Drone Rules.”

On or about December 8, 2024, I conducted the same search on

Google and saw various search results cautioning that drones

were not permitted at VSFB.

b. The phone contained a WeChat messaging service

conversation between WeChat user wxid_mpqagydly8cp12, believed

8 On or about November 30, 2024, Individual-1 gave officers


consent to search two cellphones found on his person.

14
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 17 of 20

to be an account associated with the user of the phone, ZHOU,

and WeChat user wxid_v9nttsu3fy1i12. In a conversation that took

place on October 21 and 22 2024, communications focused on

photographs ZHOU claimed to have taken with his drone.

Specifically, starting at 11:58:47 PM on October 21, ZHOU shared

five photographs that appeared to show a city and mountains from

a high altitude. At 11:59:44 PM, ZHOU messages the other user,

saying “first one taken from 1800 ft, the others about 8000 ft”.

At 12:03:33 AM on October 22, the other WeChat user says to ZHOU

“Oh wow that damn thing flys high”. At 12:04:20 AM, ZHOU then

remarked “I hacked my drone. It’s not supposed to go that high

lol”. As set forth above, during my interview with ZHOU, he

acknowledged that he downloaded software for his drone that

allowed him to bypass UAS altitude restrictions.

E. Investigation Regarding the Violation of National


Defense Airspace

27. As set forth above, the area over VSFB is designated

as a “National Security UAS Flight Restriction.” As set forth

above, ZHOU acknowledged to agents that he had to download

software that would specifically bypass the typical device

restrictions on flying over VSFB. ZHOU also recognized that

photographing the SpaceX facility on VSFB was “probably not a

good idea.”

28. As set forth above, the area surrounding Ocean Park

and parts of VSFB is also designated as Class D airspace in FAA

maps. Based on my communications with FAA employees, I have

learned that ZHOU’s drone was not registered in a small unmanned

15
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 18 of 20

aerial systems database and, without being registered in this

database, ZHOU’s drone would not be permitted to operate in

Class D airspace.

F. Investigation Regarding the Registration Requirement

29. Based on my review of correspondence from the FAA, I

have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about December 5, 2024, a Special Agent

with the FAA searched the FAA small, unmanned aircraft system

(“sUAS”) Registration Database to determine if any sUAS are

registered to ZHOU.9 The search revealed that no sUAS is

registered to ZHOU.

b. The FAA Special Agent also searched the FAA sUAS

Registration Database to determine if sUAS with serial number

163CG98R0A18BW, i.e., the DJI Drone, is registered with the FAA.

The search revealed that sUAS with serial number 163CG98R0A18BW

is not registered.

30. As set forth above, FAA rules require the registration

of any UAS over .55 pounds, or approximately 250 grams. Based on

my review of publicly available specifications the for the DJI

model Mavic 2,10 I have learned that the DJI model Mavic 2 weighs

approximately 907 or 905 grams, depending on the exact

configuration, both of which are approximately 1.99 pounds and

9 Title 49, United States Code, Section 44801(9) provides,


in part, that “‘small unmanned aircraft’ means an unmanned
aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds, including the weight of
anything attached to or carried by the aircraft.” As set forth
below, the DJI Drone weighed less than 55 pounds, and was
therefore a small unmanned aircraft.
10See Mavic 2, [Link], [Link]
2/info#specs (last visited Dec. 4, 2024).

16
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 19 of 20

therefore above the weight required for registration with the

FAA.

31. ZHOU also does not meet the requirements for mere

recreational use. Among other things, the DJI Drone was not

flown within the visual line of sight of the drone pilot or a

co-located observer, see 49 U.S.C. § 44809(a)(3), 14 C.F.R.

§ 107.31. Based on my review of the report of the DJI Drone’s

flight and publicly available mapping records, I believe the DJI

Drone flew approximately 1.8 miles from its origin in Ocean Park

into VSFB. As set forth above, the drone flew to approximately

.9 miles at its maximum height. Likewise, as set forth above,

ZHOU told agents that he lost sight of the DJI Drone while it

was flying. Accordingly, the DJI Drone likely went out of the

visual line of sight of the drone pilot or a co-located

observer.11 For this reason too, ZHOU was required to register

the DJI Drone.12

Publicly available information gives different estimates


11
for what distance would put a drone beyond the visual line of
sight, but at least one drone-related website notes that
“[d]epending on the terrain, time of day, and use of anti-
collision lights, you’ll be hard-pressed to see your drone when
it’s one mile away.” Is there a specific distance implied when
the FAA says ‘visual line-of-sight’?, UAV Coach,
[Link]
distance-implied-when-the-faa-says-visual-line-of-sight/ (last
visited Dec. 4, 2024); see also VLOS: How Drone Pilots Determine
Maximum Flight Distances, Aerial Northwest,
[Link]
blog/oregon-drone-safety/how-far-can-vlos-aerial-drone-pilots-
[Link] (May 9, 2024) (“Some pilots say they can see
their drone in the sky no farther than 300 feet away. Some other
pilots claim to be able to spot their drone at aerial distances
of over one mile away.”).
Another requirement for the recreation exception is that
12
the drone pilot obtain prior authorization from the
(footnote cont’d on next page)

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Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 20 of 20

Common questions

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ZHOU managed to bypass the drone’s built-in safety restrictions by downloading specific software onto his DJI Drone. This software allowed him to override restrictions on altitude and no-fly zones, enabling the drone to take off and operate within restricted areas like VSFB. ZHOU had previously downloaded similar software in 2019 to bypass restrictions in Shanghai, demonstrating his familiarity with such technological exploits .

The unauthorized drone flight conducted by ZHOU over Vandenberg Space Force Base (VSFB) raises significant legal implications. ZHOU violated 49 U.S.C. Section 46307 and the regulations under 14 C.F.R. Section 99.7 and 40103(b)(3), which prohibit unauthorized aircraft operation in national defense airspace. This breach allows for criminal charges, including fines and imprisonment. Additionally, ZHOU bypassed no-fly zone restrictions, complicating the legal situation further by indicating willful violation of U.S. airspace regulations .

ZHOU's decision to hack his drone and bypass flight restrictions raises significant ethical concerns. It reflects a blatant disregard for legal and safety protocols designed to protect national security and the integrity of restricted areas. Ethically, such actions can lead to security breaches, potential endangerment of national interests, and compromise sensitive operations such as those conducted at VSFB. Additionally, modifying technology to bypass security measures undermines trust and efforts to regulate safe and compliant drone operations globally .

Upon detecting ZHOU’s unauthorized drone flight over VSFB, US authorities, specifically VSFB Security Forces and the FBI, deployed personnel to investigate the incursion. They identified ZHOU at Ocean Park, found the drone on him, and engaged in a conversation where ZHOU initially denied being the pilot. During a Mirandized interview, ZHOU admitted to flying the drone and using software to bypass restrictions. Subsequently, his drone and cellphone were searched under a federal warrant, revealing photographs of VSFB .

Operating an unregistered drone in the United States can result in fines under Title 49, U.S.C. Section 46306(b), with potential imprisonment for up to three years. ZHOU's case meets the criteria for such penalties as he admitted that his DJI Drone was not registered with the FAA, and he was aware but dismissive of registration requirements. The drone's weight exceeded the 0.55 pounds threshold for exemption from registration, thus potentially subjecting ZHOU to mentioned penalties .

FAA regulations, specifically NOTAM 3/2496, synchronize with military protocols by designating airspace as National Defense Airspace, which imposes aircraft restrictions vital for security. Under these regulations, any unauthorized UAS operation, like ZHOU's, triggers strict enforcement actions such as the possibility of criminal charges. The NOTAM outlines necessary communication between FAA, military, and other federal agencies to ensure cohesive management of airspace, maintaining national security standards and enhancing the safety and integrity of sensitive operations in areas like VSFB .

ZHOU's unauthorized drone operations at a sensitive U.S. military facility could strain international relations, particularly with the People’s Republic of China. Such actions are often seen as breaches of trust and may be interpreted as non-state espionage activities, prompting diplomatic tensions. These incidents require careful handling to avoid escalating conflict and necessitate dialogue and cooperation between nations to address security protocols, privacy concerns, and mutual respect for sovereign regulations governing airspace .

Enhancing detection and prevention of unauthorized drone flights over sensitive areas involves multiple steps. Installing more sophisticated detection systems, such as radar and RF tracking, can help quickly identify drones entering restricted zones. Deploying counter-drone technologies like signal jamming or drone capture systems can mitigate risks once unauthorized entry is detected. Strengthening regulatory frameworks with clearer and more strict penalties deters violations. Comprehensive public awareness campaigns about legal regulations and potential consequences can further prevent such infractions .

Special security instructions under 14 C.F.R. Section 99.7 enhance national security by establishing specific operational constraints within designated sensitive airspace to prevent unauthorized UAS flights that could pose threats. For places like VSFB, these regulations ensure that UAS operations are meticulously controlled and monitored, minimizing risks of espionage or interference with national defense activities. By dictating security measures through collaboration between the FAA and the Department of Defense, these instructions protect critical infrastructure from unauthorized surveillance, a concern directly applicable in ZHOU's case .

International regulations on drone operations vary, and ZHOU's actions suggest gaps in understanding or strategically ignoring U.S. rules. While ZHOU was familiar with drone licensing requirements in China, he admitted to not having registered his drone there. This indicates that his familiarity with international standards influenced his disregard for U.S. regulations. His previous conflict with regulations in China, where he was fined for operating a drone in a restricted area, suggests a pattern of non-compliance with both international and U.S. drone regulations .

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