Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 1 of 2
1 ISMAIL J. RAMSEY (CABN 189820)
2
United States Attorney
MARTHA BOERSCH (CABN 126569)
FILED
3 Chief, Criminal Division
Dec 10 2024
4 GALEN A. PHILLIPS (CABN 307644)
Assistant United States Attorney Mark B. Busby
5
450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36055 CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
6 San Francisco, California 94102-3495 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Telephone: (415) 436-7110 SAN FRANCISCO
7 Email: [Link]@[Link]
8 Attorneys for United States of America
9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
12
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CASE NO. 3:24-mj-71740 MAG
13 )
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS ON OUT-OF-
14 ) DISTRICT CRIMINAL CHARGES PURSUANT TO
v. ) RULES 5(c)(2) AND (3) OF THE FEDERAL
15 ) RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
YINPIAO ZHOU, )
16 )
Defendant. )
17 )
18
Please take notice pursuant to Rules 5(c)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
19
that on or about December 9, 2024, the above-named defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest
20
warrant (copy attached) issued upon an
21
Ƒ Indictment
22
Ƒ Information
23
X Criminal Complaint
24
Ƒ Other (describe)
25
pending in the Central District of California, Case Number 2:24-MJ-07256.
26
In that case (copy of complaint attached), the defendant is charged with violations of Title 49,
27
United States Code, Section 46306 for failure to register an aircraft not providing transportation, and
28
v. 7/10/2018
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 2 of 2
1 Title 49, United States Code, Section 46307 for a violation of national defense airspace.
2 In the Complaint, the government alleges that, on November 30, 2024, the defendant traveled to
3 a park near Vandenberg Space Force Base (“VSFB”) and used a drone to fly over and photograph
4 sensitive areas of the military facility for approximately 59 minutes. Notably, on that same day,
5 November 30, 2024, a sensitive payload developed for the National Reconnaissance Office had been
6 launched to orbit by a space contractor. The defendant has admitted that he flew the drone to take photos
7 of VFSB. And a search of the drone authorized by federal warrant revealed photos of VFSB. Complaint,
8 ¶¶ 4 – 7.
9 The maximum penalties are as follows:
10 49 U.S.C. § 46306 (Failure to Register an Aircraft):
11 x 3 years imprisonment;
12 x 1 year supervised release;
13 x $250,000 or twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss resulting from the
14 offense; and
15 x $100 special assessment.
16
49 U.S.C. § 46307 (Violation of National Defense Airspace):
17
x 1 year imprisonment;
18
x 1 year supervised release;
19
x $100,000 or twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss resulting from the
20
offense; and
21
x $25 special assessment.
22
Respectfully Submitted,
23
ISMAIL J. RAMSEY
24 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
ATT
25
Date: December 9, 2024
26 GALEN A. PHILLIPS
Assistant United States Attorney
27
28
v. 7/10/2018
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 1 of 20
Complaint
Complaint
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 2 of 20
2:24-MJ-07256-DUTY
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 3 of 20
AFFIDAVIT
I, Mike Wood, being duly sworn, declare and state as follows:
I. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT
1. This affidavit is made in support of criminal
complaint and arrest warrant against Yinpiao Zhou (“ZHOU”) for a
violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46306 (failure to register an aircraft
not providing transportation) and 49 U.S.C. § 46307 (violation
of national defense airspace).
2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon
my personal observations, my training and experience, and
information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and
witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there
is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and
arrest warrant and does not purport to set forth all of my
knowledge of or investigation into this matter. Unless
specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and
statements described in this affidavit are related in substance
and part only.
II. BACKGROUND OF SPECIAL AGENT MIKE WOOD
3. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) and have been so employed since January of
2015. I am currently assigned to the Santa Maria Resident Agency
of the FBI’s Los Angeles Division, where I have worked
counterintelligence matters since November of 2018. As part of
my current job duties, I work closely with Air Force, Office of
Special Investigations (“OSI”) Special Agents on national
security matters pertaining to Vandenberg Space Force Base. In
1
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 4 of 20
2023, I executed a six-month temporary duty assignment during
which I was posted overseas and embedded with Department of
Defense partners and worked closely with officers from multiple
branches of the United States military on matters of mutual
Department of Defense-FBI interest. I am familiar with
tradecraft and techniques utilized by foreign adversarial
nations and the efforts those nations undertake to collect
intelligence on elements of military infrastructure of their
interest. Before working counterintelligence matters, I was
assigned to FBI criminal squads, where I worked criminal matters
that included the writing of search and other criminal process
in furtherance of FBI investigations.
III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE
4. On November 30, 2024, ZHOU traveled to a park near
Vandenberg Space Force Base (“VSFB”) and used a drone to fly
over and photograph sensitive areas of the military facility for
approximately 59 minutes. Notably, on that same day, November
30, 2024, a sensitive payload developed for the National
Reconnaissance Office had been launched to orbit by a space
contractor.
5. After military personnel detected the drone inside
VSFB’s restricted airspace, investigators traveled to the park,
contacted ZHOU and another individual (“Individual-1”), and
found that ZHOU had the drone (defined below as the “DJI Drone”)
inside his jacket. During a Mirandized interview with FBI
agents, ZHOU admitted he flew his drone from the park to take
photographs of VSFB. ZHOU further admitted that he had
2
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 5 of 20
downloaded specific software onto the drone to bypass the
drone’s built-in restrictions to prevent it from taking off and
flying in no-fly zones. ZHOU further admitted that he knew
taking photographs of the space contractor facility at VSFB was
“probably not a good idea.”
6. A search of the DJI Drone pursuant to a federal search
warrant revealed several photographs of VSFB taken from an
aerial viewpoint on November 30, 2024. A search of ZHOU’s
cellphone pursuant to the same federal search warrant showed
ZHOU conducted a Google search approximately a month earlier for
the phrase “Vandenberg Space Force Base Drone Rules” and
messaged with another person about hacking his drone to allow it
fly higher than it could otherwise.
7. ZHOU admitted to traveling from the People’s Republic
of China to the United States, with ZHOU most recently coming on
February 12, 2024. Individual-1 most recently arrived in the
United States on November 26, 2024. Both ZHOU and Individual-1
are scheduled to leave the United States and return to China on
an international flight scheduled on December 9, 2024.
IV. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Background on the Relevant Statutes and Regulations
1. National Defense Airspace
8. Title 49, United States Code, Section 46307 provides
that “[a] person that knowingly or willfully violates section
40103(b)(3) of this title or a regulation prescribed or order
issued under section 40103(b)(3) shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”
3
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9. Title 49, United States Code, Section 40103(b)(3)
provides that “[t]o establish security provisions that will
encourage and allow maximum use of the navigable airspace by
civil aircraft consistent with national security, the
Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
shall (A) establish areas in the airspace the Administrator
decides are necessary in the interest of national defense; and
(B) by regulation or order, restrict or prohibit flight of civil
aircraft that the Administrator cannot identify, locate, and
control with available facilities in those areas.”
10. Title 49, United States Code, Section 40102(a)(6)
provides that “‘aircraft’ means any contrivance invented, used,
or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”
11. Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 99.7
provides that “[e]ach person operating an aircraft in an ADIZ or
Defense Area must, in addition to the applicable rules of this
part, comply with special security instructions issued by the
Administrator in the interest of national security, pursuant to
agreement between the [Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)]
and the Department of Defense, or between the FAA and a U.S.
Federal security or intelligence agency.”
12. Based on my review of the FAA webpage for Notices to
Air Missions (“NOTAMS”),1 I have learned that on August 28, 2023,
the FAA issued NOTAM 3/2496. The NOTAM started on September 2,
1 See FNS NOTAM Search, [Link],
[Link] (last
visited Dec. 6, 2024).
4
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 7 of 20
2023, and ends on September 1, 2025. The NOTAM provides, among
other things, the following:
PURSUANT TO 49 U.S.C. SECTION 40103(B)(3), THE FAA
CLASSIFIES THE AIRSPACE DEFINED IN THIS NOTAM AND IN
FURTHER DETAIL AT THE FAA WEBSITE IDENTIFIED BELOW AS
‘NATIONAL DEFENSE AIRSPACE’. OPERATORS WHO DO NOT
COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES MAY FACE THE
FOLLOWING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MAY PURSUE CRIMINAL CHARGES, INCLUDING
CHARGES UNDER 49 U.S.C. SECTION 46307 . . . .
PURSUANT TO 14 C.F.R. SECTION 99.7, SPECIAL SECURITY
INSTRUCTIONS (SSI), ALL UAS FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE
PROHIBITED: WITHIN THE DEFINED AIRSPACE OVER SELECT
NATIONAL SECURITY SENSITIVE LOCATIONS EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED FOR BELOW.
REFER TO THE FOLLOWING FAA WEBSITE: HTTPS://UDDS-
[Link] FOR: A LIST OF THESE SELECTED
LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES, AND VISUAL DEPICTIONS,
ALTITUDES, AND GEOSPATIAL DEFINITIONS OF THE OVERLYING
AIRSPACE IN WHICH UAS OPERATIONS ARE
PROHIBITED . . . .
13. Based on my review of publicly available mapping data
from the FAA,2 I have learned that the area over VSFB is listed
as part of a “National Security UAS Flight Restriction.”
Furthermore, based on the mapping data, the area surrounding
Ocean Park and parts of VSFB is designated as Class D airspace.
Flight in Class D airspace requires authorization from Air
Traffic Control. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.41. Individuals seeking
authority to fly drones in Class D airspace must seek
authorization through one of two online FAA systems. See Section
19-6-1, FAA Order 7210.3DD (April 20, 2023).
2 See UAS Data Delivery System, [Link], [Link]
[Link] (following link to “Map of “FAA UAS
Data”) (last visited Dec. 7, 2024).
5
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2. Registration Requirements
14. Title 49, United States Code, Section 46306(b)
provides, among other things, that “a person shall be fined
under title 18, imprisoned for not more than 3 years, or both,
if the person . . . knowingly and willfully operates or attempts
to operate an aircraft eligible for registration under section
44102 of this title knowing that . . . the aircraft is not
registered under section 44103 of this title . . . .”
15. Title 49, United States Code, Section 44102(a)
provides, among other things, that “[a]n aircraft may be
registered under section 44103 of this title only when the
aircraft is . . . not registered under the laws of a foreign
country and is owned by (A) a citizen of the United States; [or]
(B) an individual citizen of a foreign country lawfully admitted
for permanent residence in the United States.”
16. Title 49, United States Code, Section 44103(a)(1)
provides that “[o]n application of the owner of an aircraft that
meets the requirements of section 44102 of this title, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
(A) register the aircraft; and (B) issue a certificate of
registration to its owner.”
17. Statutes and FAA rules create an exception to the
registration requirement for drones that weight less than 0.55
pounds and are used for recreational flight. See 14 C.F.R.
§ 107.110 (weight threshold); 49 U.S.C. § 44809 (requirements
for qualifying as recreational flight). Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations, Section 48.15, provides, among other
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things, that “[n]o person may operate a small unmanned aircraft
that is eligible for registration under 49 U.S.C. 44101-44103
unless one of the following criteria has been satisfied: (a) The
owner has registered and marked the aircraft in accordance with
this part; [or] (b) The aircraft is operated exclusively in
compliance with 49 U.S.C. 44809 and weighs 0.55 pounds or less
on takeoff . . . .”
18. The FAA website summarizes the drone registration
requirement this way: “All drones must be registered, except
those that weigh 0.55 pounds or less (less than 250 grams) and
are flown under the Exception for Limited Recreational
Operations.”3
B. VSFB Learns About ZHOU’s Drone Flying Over the Base on
November 30, 2024
19. Based on my communication with VSFB Security Forces
and OSI personnel, I have learned, among other things, the
following:
a. On the morning of November 30, 2024, VSFB
personnel were alerted to the presence of an unmanned aerial
system (“UAS” or “drone”) flying over the base. The personnel
were alerted by a drone detection system employed by VSFB
Security Forces and a drone detection system employed by the
FBI.
How To Register Your Drone, [Link],
3
[Link] (last
visited Dec. 6, 2024). The recreational flight requirements –
and the reasons ZHOU does not meet them – are described in more
detail below.
7
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b. The FBI drone detection system identified the UAS
as a DJI model Mavic 2 UAS, bearing drone identification number
163CG98R0A18BW (the “DJI Drone”). The OSI drone detection system
detected that the DJI Drone appeared to originate from Ocean
Park, a publicly accessible park adjacent to VSFB, and then
travel south toward VSFB Space Launch Complexes Three and Four.
Based on my training and experience, a Space Launch Complex is a
facility used to launch rockets and other spacecraft into space.
c. The FBI drone detection systems identified that
the DJI Drone was in flight for a total of approximately 59
minutes. A report from the FBI UAS detection system shows the
path of travel for the drone originating in the vicinity of
Ocean Park and traveling south near Surf Beach and directly
toward Space Launch Complex Three and Four. The drone then
returned to the vicinity of Ocean Park. The drone traveled to a
maximum height of approximately 4939 feet, or approximately .9
miles.
d. Space Launch Complex Four is currently utilized
by Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“SpaceX”) to conduct
commercial and government launches into space. Notably, earlier
in the morning on November 30, 2024, Space Launch Complex Four
had hosted a launch of a National Reconnaissance Office payload
built by SpaceX and another contractor.
20. Based on my communications with VSFB Security Forces
and my review of VSFB Security Forces reports, I have learned,
among other things, the following:
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a. After detecting the DJI Drone, approximately four
VSFB Security Forces traveled to Ocean Park to investigate the
drone travel.4 There, Security Forces personnel saw two
individuals, ZHOU and Individual-1. Security Forces personnel
asked to speak with ZHOU and Individual-1. When Security Forces
personnel began talking to them, ZHOU and Individual-1 walked
away. Security Forces personnel again asked to talk to ZHOU and
Individual-1, who stopped and began speaking to them. The
personnel then asked if ZHOU and Individual-1 had seen any
drones flying nearby and, if so, whether they had seen the
pilot. ZHOU stated that he had seen a drone but that he did not
see the pilot.
b. While ZHOU and Individual-1 were speaking to
Security Forces personnel, ZHOU had his hands inside his jacket.
Security Forces personnel asked ZHOU to remove his hands from
his pocket. After they did that, ZHOU removed his hands,
exposing a drone underneath his jacket.
c. Security Forces personnel asked ZHOU why he had
lied about not seeing the drone pilot, and ZHOU responded that
he was afraid because he believed that the Security Forces
personnel were from the military.
d. Security Forces personnel later asked ZHOU for
his driver’s license. ZHOU responded that his license was in his
car. Security Forces personnel followed ZHOU when he walked to
4 Based upon my conversations with OSI Special Agents, I
have learned Ocean Park has concurrent law enforcement
jurisdiction shared between VSFB and the Santa Barbara County
Sherriff’s Office.
9
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 12 of 20
his car, where ZHOU retrieved his driver’s license. While ZHOU
was at his car, he placed the drone that was on his person
inside a large bag on the passenger seat.
e. During the contact with ZHOU, ZHOU showed
Security Forces personnel footage that ZHOU had taken using his
drone. ZHOU showed the Security Forces personnel the footage on
a cellphone device attached to the drone controller (the “ZHOU
Cellphone”). Upon seeing that the footage consisted of parts of
VSFB, Security Forces personnel instructed ZHOU to delete
footage of the base from the cellphone and watched ZHOU delete
the footage.5
C. Interview with ZHOU and Search of ZHOU’s Car
21. On November 30, 2024, I interviewed ZHOU at Ocean
Park. Before the interview, I advised ZHOU of his Miranda
rights, and he agreed to speak with me.6 Based on my interview of
ZHOU, I learned, among other things, the following:
a. ZHOU stated that on November 28, 2024, he and
Individual-1 stayed overnight at Kirk Creek campground in the
Big Sur area of Monterey County, California. ZHOU stated that he
tried to fly his drone at their campsite at Kirk Creek, but a
park ranger told him not to fly it.
b. On November 29, 2024, ZHOU and Individual-1 drove
further south from Kirk Creek, arriving at Ocean Park, in the
5 As discussed below, the FBI later obtained a federal
warrant to search the drone, the drone controller, a cellphone
belonging to ZHOU, a handheld camera belonging to ZHOU, and two
cellphones belonging to Individual-1.
6 The interview with ZHOU was audio recorded. The interview
was conducted in English.
10
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vicinity of VSFB, later in the day. According to ZHOU, after
arriving at Ocean Park, he learned about the imminent SpaceX
launch that night, i.e., the one that took place in the early
morning hours on November 30, 2024. ZHOU said he took pictures
of the launch with his handheld camera.
c. ZHOU said that in the morning on November 30,
2024, he took pictures of the SpaceX Space Launch Complex with
his drone. ZHOU stated that he knew the SpaceX facility was on a
military installation. ZHOU said that his drone flew for 10 or
15 minutes and went approximately one to two miles south towards
the SpaceX facility.7
d. ZHOU also admitted he purchased software on a
particular website that allowed the DJI Drone to bypass
restrictions on altitude as well as no-fly-zone restrictions
that would otherwise not allow his DJI drone to fly at VSFB.
ZHOU expressed an understanding that drones operated in the
United States had to comply with altitude limits and no-fly
limits. ZHOU explained that the DJI mobile application featured
a map that would outline for the user which areas contain a no-
fly zone restriction. ZHOU originally downloaded the bypass
software in 2019 to get around the no-fly zones in Shanghai.
Referencing the bypass software and his UAS, ZHOU said,
“Normally, if you didn’t have that software, it wouldn’t be able
to take off from here.”
7 As noted above, this contradicts the flight time
identified by the FBI drone detection system, which identified
the DJI drone in flight for a total of approximately 59 minutes.
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e. ZHOU also said that he had not registered his
drone with the FAA. ZHOU said FAA instructions for registering
drones were not clear. ZHOU was familiar with licensing
requirements for operating a UAS in China, but he never himself
got a license for his UAS. ZHOU was not familiar with specific
United States requirements for UAS licensing, but he assumed
that there must be some requirements.
f. ZHOU said he previously got into trouble in China
for flying a UAS in a restricted area. More specifically, ZHOU
was arrested for flying a UAS near a government building at
People’s Square in Shanghai. He was subsequently fined for this.
ZHOU did not register the UAS in China either.
g. ZHOU claimed he entered the United States on
February 12, 2024, on an immigrant visa. ZHOU stated that he and
Individual-1 were returning to China on or about December 9,
2024.
h. During the interview, ZHOU stated that he had
rented the car. ZHOU gave consent to search that car. ZHOU
signed an FBI consent to search form, which also authorized
agents to seize items inside the car.
22. Based on my participation in that search and my
communication with other law enforcement officers, I have
learned, among other things, the following:
a. On or about November 30, 2024, after ZHOU
consented to the search of his car, other FBI agents and I
searched the car. Inside, agents found a large bag on the
passenger seat, which contained the following:
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i. A DJI drone. The serial number for DJI Drone
matches the drone identification number for the UAS identified
as flying above VSFB, as described above. Accordingly, based on
my training and experience, I believe the drone on ZHOU’s person
and then placed in his car was the DJI Drone that was flying
above VSFB.
ii. A DJI drone controller.
iii. The ZHOU Cellphone, a black Apple iPhone
that was connected to the DJI controller.
iv. A Canon EOS 5D Mark III camera, which
contained an SD card.
b. Agents subsequently seized the aforementioned
items.
23. Based on my communications with a United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services officer, I have learned,
among other things, that ZHOU is a Chinese citizen and a lawful
permanent resident of the United States. Based on my review of
United States Customs and Border Patrol records and my
communications with a United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services officer, I know that Individual-1 arrived in the United
States on a visitor visa on or about November 26, 2024.
D. Evidence Found During Preliminary Search of ZHOU’s
Drone and Other Digital Devices
24. On or about December 4, 2024, the Hon. Alicia G.
Rosenberg, United States Magistrate Judge, authorized a warrant
to search the DJI Drone, the drone controller, the ZHOU
Cellphone, ZHOU’s handheld camera, and Individual-1’s
13
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cellphones,8 as well as storage medium inside the devices. See
Case No. 2:24-MJ-7204 (C.D. Cal.).
25. Based on my personal observations and my
communications with an FBI Computer Analysis Response Team
examiner, I have learned, among other things, that the DJI Drone
contained an SD card (the “Drone SD Card”), which is a type of
digital information storage device. A review of the contents of
the Drone SD Card showed several photographs of VSFB taken from
an aerial viewpoint. Metadata for those photographs show they
were taken on November 30, 2024, and location-related metadata
shows they were taken from an area above VSFB. Accordingly,
based on my training and experience, I believe the photographs
were taken by ZHOU from the DJI Drone while it was flying to,
from, or above VSFB.
26. Based on my review of a data image of the ZHOU
Cellphone provided to me by an FBI Computer Analysis Response
Team examiner, I have learned, among other things, the
following:
a. On or about November 10, 2024, ZHOU searched on
Google for the phrase “Vandenberg Space Force Base Drone Rules.”
On or about December 8, 2024, I conducted the same search on
Google and saw various search results cautioning that drones
were not permitted at VSFB.
b. The phone contained a WeChat messaging service
conversation between WeChat user wxid_mpqagydly8cp12, believed
8 On or about November 30, 2024, Individual-1 gave officers
consent to search two cellphones found on his person.
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to be an account associated with the user of the phone, ZHOU,
and WeChat user wxid_v9nttsu3fy1i12. In a conversation that took
place on October 21 and 22 2024, communications focused on
photographs ZHOU claimed to have taken with his drone.
Specifically, starting at 11:58:47 PM on October 21, ZHOU shared
five photographs that appeared to show a city and mountains from
a high altitude. At 11:59:44 PM, ZHOU messages the other user,
saying “first one taken from 1800 ft, the others about 8000 ft”.
At 12:03:33 AM on October 22, the other WeChat user says to ZHOU
“Oh wow that damn thing flys high”. At 12:04:20 AM, ZHOU then
remarked “I hacked my drone. It’s not supposed to go that high
lol”. As set forth above, during my interview with ZHOU, he
acknowledged that he downloaded software for his drone that
allowed him to bypass UAS altitude restrictions.
E. Investigation Regarding the Violation of National
Defense Airspace
27. As set forth above, the area over VSFB is designated
as a “National Security UAS Flight Restriction.” As set forth
above, ZHOU acknowledged to agents that he had to download
software that would specifically bypass the typical device
restrictions on flying over VSFB. ZHOU also recognized that
photographing the SpaceX facility on VSFB was “probably not a
good idea.”
28. As set forth above, the area surrounding Ocean Park
and parts of VSFB is also designated as Class D airspace in FAA
maps. Based on my communications with FAA employees, I have
learned that ZHOU’s drone was not registered in a small unmanned
15
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aerial systems database and, without being registered in this
database, ZHOU’s drone would not be permitted to operate in
Class D airspace.
F. Investigation Regarding the Registration Requirement
29. Based on my review of correspondence from the FAA, I
have learned, among other things, the following:
a. On or about December 5, 2024, a Special Agent
with the FAA searched the FAA small, unmanned aircraft system
(“sUAS”) Registration Database to determine if any sUAS are
registered to ZHOU.9 The search revealed that no sUAS is
registered to ZHOU.
b. The FAA Special Agent also searched the FAA sUAS
Registration Database to determine if sUAS with serial number
163CG98R0A18BW, i.e., the DJI Drone, is registered with the FAA.
The search revealed that sUAS with serial number 163CG98R0A18BW
is not registered.
30. As set forth above, FAA rules require the registration
of any UAS over .55 pounds, or approximately 250 grams. Based on
my review of publicly available specifications the for the DJI
model Mavic 2,10 I have learned that the DJI model Mavic 2 weighs
approximately 907 or 905 grams, depending on the exact
configuration, both of which are approximately 1.99 pounds and
9 Title 49, United States Code, Section 44801(9) provides,
in part, that “‘small unmanned aircraft’ means an unmanned
aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds, including the weight of
anything attached to or carried by the aircraft.” As set forth
below, the DJI Drone weighed less than 55 pounds, and was
therefore a small unmanned aircraft.
10See Mavic 2, [Link], [Link]
2/info#specs (last visited Dec. 4, 2024).
16
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therefore above the weight required for registration with the
FAA.
31. ZHOU also does not meet the requirements for mere
recreational use. Among other things, the DJI Drone was not
flown within the visual line of sight of the drone pilot or a
co-located observer, see 49 U.S.C. § 44809(a)(3), 14 C.F.R.
§ 107.31. Based on my review of the report of the DJI Drone’s
flight and publicly available mapping records, I believe the DJI
Drone flew approximately 1.8 miles from its origin in Ocean Park
into VSFB. As set forth above, the drone flew to approximately
.9 miles at its maximum height. Likewise, as set forth above,
ZHOU told agents that he lost sight of the DJI Drone while it
was flying. Accordingly, the DJI Drone likely went out of the
visual line of sight of the drone pilot or a co-located
observer.11 For this reason too, ZHOU was required to register
the DJI Drone.12
Publicly available information gives different estimates
11
for what distance would put a drone beyond the visual line of
sight, but at least one drone-related website notes that
“[d]epending on the terrain, time of day, and use of anti-
collision lights, you’ll be hard-pressed to see your drone when
it’s one mile away.” Is there a specific distance implied when
the FAA says ‘visual line-of-sight’?, UAV Coach,
[Link]
distance-implied-when-the-faa-says-visual-line-of-sight/ (last
visited Dec. 4, 2024); see also VLOS: How Drone Pilots Determine
Maximum Flight Distances, Aerial Northwest,
[Link]
blog/oregon-drone-safety/how-far-can-vlos-aerial-drone-pilots-
[Link] (May 9, 2024) (“Some pilots say they can see
their drone in the sky no farther than 300 feet away. Some other
pilots claim to be able to spot their drone at aerial distances
of over one mile away.”).
Another requirement for the recreation exception is that
12
the drone pilot obtain prior authorization from the
(footnote cont’d on next page)
17
Case 3:24-mj-71740-MAG Document 1-1 Filed 12/10/24 Page 20 of 20