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BNMPCMUN III - DISEC

Agenda:

Regulating the Emerging Threat of Autonomous UAVs being Used in the Nuclear
Command-and-Control Infrastructure of Nuclear-Armed States.

Table of Contents:
1. Committee Overview............................................................................................................2
2. Mandate of the Committee.................................................................................................. 2
Working Methods................................................................................................................. 2
Landmark Documents.......................................................................................................... 3
3. Agenda Overview................................................................................................................. 4
4. Key Points............................................................................................................................. 5
(i) Understanding ‘Regulate’................................................................................................5
(ii) Emerging Threats........................................................................................................... 5
(iii) Autonomous UAV......................................................................................................... 6
(iv) Nuclear Command-and-Control (C2)............................................................................7
(V) Nuclear Armed States.................................................................................................... 8
(vi) Threats of Cyber-attacks and DDOS attacks on Nuclear System................................. 9
5. Previous Regulations about Emerging Threats............................................................... 11
6. References........................................................................................................................... 20

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1. Committee Overview
Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), the first committee of The
United Nations General Assembly, addresses the critical issues regarding disarmament,
global challenges, as well as the threats to peace that have consequences on international
community. This body holds crucial importance in formulating strategies and proposing
solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. It undertakes a comprehensive
examination on all disarmament and international security matters within the grounds in the
principles of UN charter and the organs of UN. Aiming to establish international peace and
security, a set of overarching principles serve as the foundation for the states to collaborate
collectively, governe disarmament and the regulation of armaments and promote of
cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels
of armaments.

2. Mandate of the Committee

The main object of the first committee is to address disarmament and relevant international
security matters. Being the only main committee of the General Assembly entitled to
verbatim records coverage pursuant to Rule 58 (a) of the rules of procedure of the General
Assembly, this committe works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament
Commission. The First Committee sessions are structured into three distinctive stages:
(i) General debate, (ii) Thematic discussions, and (iii) Action on drafts.

Working Methods
As mentioned in the resolution 42/42 [N] (1987), this committee has taken significant efforts
to rationalize the work system, concentrating on rearranging its agenda and improving its
organization of work.
1. Historical Context and Reforms:
During the 48th session of the Assembly, in 1993, the item entitled “Rationalization of
the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee” was included in the agenda
of the Assembly. Thereafter, the Assembly has focused on improving the effectiveness
of the methods of work of the First Committee (see resolutions 48/87 of 16 December
1993, 49/85 of 15 December 1994, 57/300 of 20 December 2002, 58/41 of 8

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December 2003, 58/126 of 19 December 2003, 58/316 of 1 July 2004 and 59/95 of 3
December 2004).
2. Member States’ Contribution:
During the 59th session, in response to a request of the Secretary-General to seek the
views of Member States on improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the
First Committee, a report compiling those views was submitted by the Secretariat (see
A/59/132 and addenda 1 to 6).
3. Contemporary Practices:
Since the 60th session, under the item “Revitalization of the work of the General
Assembly”, the Committee has adopted its programme of work and timetable for the
forthcoming session. Please also see the note by the Secretariat (A/C.1/68/INF/4).

Landmark Documents
1. Resolution 1 (I): The very first General Assembly resolution, entitled “Establishment of
a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy”,
was adopted on recommendation by the First Committee on 24 January 1946, in
London.
2. Resolution 1378 (XIV): The very first General Assembly resolution that was
co-sponsored by all Member States at that time.
3. Special sessions on disarmament (resolutions and decisions adopted at the 10th, 12th
and 15th special sessions of the General Assembly)
A/S-10/4 (23 May – 30 June 1978); A/S-12/6 (7 June – 10 July 1982); A/S-15/6 (31
May – 25 June 1988)
4. Wassenaar Agreement 1996.

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3. Agenda Overview

The regulation of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into military operations,
particularly within the nuclear command-and-control (C2) infrastructure of nuclear-armed
states, requires immediate attention. In the nuclear context, lack of proper regulation
frameworks rise potential threat on peacekeeping missions.

A multitude of different uncrewed (aerial) vehicles or systems (UAV/UAS), also known as

drones, are increasingly taking a dominant role in wars and armed conflicts. The demand for
military drones is rapidly increasing, and exports are on the rise throughout the Middle East,
Africa and Europe. Non-state armed groups are simultaneously boosting their own drone
capabilities, often with state-supplied single-use explosive drones, and actively using them in
conflict areas that provoke state military responses. The UN Secretary General’s New
Agenda for Peace report highlights the perils of the proliferation of drones among both state
and non-state actors in the absence of sufficient governance frameworks. The increasing
global misuse of drones by terrorist groups has been a particular concern of the UN Security
Council Counter-Terrorism Committee.

Drones and other so-called Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems (AROS) present a
uniquely challenging terrorist threat. In the wrong hands, regular consumer drones can be
used as lethal weapons, enabling terrorist to plan, coordinate and launch a vast range of
deadly and potentially disruptive attacks against civilians, soft targets, and critical
infrastructure. The number of nonstate actors already using aerial drones has steadily
increased over the past several years. Through rapid advances in drone technology, AROS are
slated to become a primary tactic of terrorist attacks in the future. At the same time, drones
and other AROS have the potential to become tools in counter-terrorism efforts. The Global
Counter-Terrorism Programme on Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems (AROS
Programme) was created in 2021 to support member states in addressing the threat posed by
drones, UAS, and other AROS.

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4. Key Points

(i) Understanding ‘Regulate’

According to Cambridge dictionary, the term ‘Regulate’ refers to check the activities of a
business or organization are legal and follow official rules or laws. This also involves
developing and adjust principles according to standards and requirements.

(ii) Emerging Threats

Emerging threats refer to the start of a suggestion that something unpleasant or violent will
happen, especially if a particular action or order is not followed. In the context of UAV, the
potential threats are:
a) Physical attacks and acts of terrorism: When drones are employed to carry out
attacks, transport explosives, or threaten the safety of critical infrastructure such as
airports, power plants, and public events.
b) Surveillance and Intelligence Gathering: Drones equipped with cameras can be
used for unauthorized surveillance and data collection, potentially compromising
privacy and security.
c) Disruption of Operations and Privacy Violations: Unauthorized drone flights in
restricted areas or near sensitive facilities can disrupt operations, compromise safety,
and invade privacy.
d) Smuggling and Contraband Delivery: Criminal organizations may exploit drones to
transport illicit substances across borders, compromising security measures.
e) DDOS Attacks: Distributed Denial of Service attack is a type of cyberattack where
multiple compromised systems (often part of a botnet) overwhelm a target server,
network, or service with a flood of internet traffic. The goal is to disrupt normal
operations by exhausting the target's resources, making it unavailable to legitimate
users. These attacks are distributed because they come from numerous sources,
making it harder to stop the traffic at a single point.

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(iii) Autonomous UAV

An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle refers to the aircraft that operates without a human pilot pilot,
allowing it to navigate remotely. While this term can be used accurately to describe drones in
commercial or civilian use cases, it is most commonly used in reference to military
applications. In this context, UAVs are deployed for reconnaissance, surveillance, target
acquisition, and combat missions, providing tactical advantages because to their ability to
operate in hazardous settings for manned aircraft. They are referred as remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA) as well. The chart below shows the list of countries with MALE (A
medium-altitude long-endurance) UAV or drones:

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(iv) Nuclear Command-and-Control (C2)

Nuclear command and control (NC2) is the exercise of authority and direction, through
established command lines, over nuclear weapon operations by the President as the chief
executive and head of state. The fundamental requirements of NC2 are that it must be
assured, timely, secure, survivable, and enduring in providing the information and
communications for the President to make and communicate critical decisions throughout the
crisis spectrum.

Survivable and enduring nuclear command and control (NC2) capabilities disseminate
warning information and nuclear control orders and add significant resilience to the NC3
system of systems. NC2 is the exercise of authority and direction by the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces, through established national command
authority lines over nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and nuclear weapon
operations of military forces. NC2 mission essential functions include force management,
planning, situation monitoring, decision making, and force direction.

The proceeding discussion shows how nuclear command and control systems can strengthen
or weaken strategic stability, depending on the operational nature of a state’s command and
control systems. Most concerningly, the analysis shows that countries that delegate the ability
to use nuclear weapons to lower-level military commanders early during a crisis create
pathways through which the likelihood of unwanted nuclear use and crisis escalation
increases. Policymakers have three broad options for how to address this challenge and
promote strategic stability during crises.

Reductions in verbal threats will likely have a limited effect in reassuring adversaries of
benign intent. To more credibly signal a promise not to threaten an adversary’s state or
political regime, policymakers would need to reduce the presence of military forces near an
adversary’s border. This approach would reduce the likelihood of states delegating nuclear
use capability early in a crisis, as those states would have more time to negotiate during the
process of military build-up. Doing so, however, entails further risks.

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(V) Nuclear Armed States

Nine countries possess nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, France, China, the
United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea. In total, the global nuclear
stockpile is close to 13,000 weapons. While that number is lower than it was during the Cold
War—when there were roughly 60,000 weapons worldwide—it does not alter the
fundamental threat to humanity these weapons represent.
Despite progress in reducing nuclear weapon arsenals since the Cold War, the world’s
combined inventory of nuclear warheads remains at a very high level: nine countries
possessed roughly 12,121 warheads as of early-2024.

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Combined, the United States and Russia now possess approximately 88 percent of the world’s
total inventory of nuclear weapons, and 84 percent of the stockpiled warheads available for
use by the military. Currently, no other nuclear-armed state sees a need for more than a few
hundred nuclear weapons for national security, although many of these states are increasing
their nuclear stockpiles.
Globally, the overall inventory of nuclear weapons is declining, but the pace of reductions is
slowing compared with the past 30 years. Moreover, these reductions are happening only
because the United States and Russia are still dismantling previously retired warheads.

(vi) Threats of Cyber-attacks and DDOS attacks on Nuclear

System
No cyberattacks on nuclear weapons systems have been publicly disclosed to date, but
historical incidents provide some indication of what could happen.
For example, in 1980, warning systems showed missiles headed for the United States. In the
minutes remaining before the president would have had to order a retaliatory strike, the
warning was determined to be a false alarm caused by a faulty computer chip. More recently,
in 2010, 50 nuclear-armed missiles based in Wyoming were offline for nearly an hour
because of a computer hardware failure.
Those are the kinds of incidents that, particularly in a crisis or conflict, could bring leaders to
the brink of ordering a nuclear attack on the basis of faulty information and could undermine
the confidence in military systems that is needed to prevent a grave mistake.
Concerns associated with cyber attacks on nuclear systems are:

● Risk of launch as a result of miscalculation: When coupled with today’s nuclear

posture—nearly 1,000 nuclear system poised to launch within minutes and a
ground-based force vulnerable to a disarming first strike—a cyberattack on early
warning systems to credibly spoof an incoming nuclear attack would create a high risk of
a miscalculated nuclear response. Similarly, during a conflict, the detection of a
malicious code in the command and control system that is assessed or reported to be
capable of rendering some or all strategic forces inoperable also could heighten the risk
of use

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● Risk of unauthorised use: Cyberattacks could be used in combination with a physical

attack to defeat the security of nuclear arms, leading to theft or unauthorised use of a
nuclear system, with potentially catastrophic results. Another possible, although perhaps
less credible, scenario would be an illicit or unauthorised order to launch nuclear
weapons through a compromised command and control system.

● Reduction of confidence in the nuclear deterrent and the effect on strategic

stability: In addition to heightening the risk of use as a result of miscalculation or
unauthorised launch, cyber threats to nuclear systems could undermine the very
foundation of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. The uncertainty caused by the
unique character of a cyber threat could jeopardise the credibility of the nuclear deterrent
and undermine strategic stability in ways that advances in nuclear and conventional
weapons do not. For example, cyberattacks against communications systems could
prevent the flow of information vital for making decisions about the use of nuclear
weapons, including responding to warnings of attack; disable the ability to transmit
nuclear orders; cut off much-needed de-escalation channels between nations in a crisis;
or lead to misinterpretation if dual use systems are attacked with no way to clarify the
adversary’s intentions. In addition, the introduction of a flaw or malicious code into
nuclear weapons through the supply chain that compromises the effectiveness of those
weapons could lead to a lack of confidence in the nuclear deterrent. Confidence in the
ability to use nuclear weapons as intended, and the adversary’s belief that the country’s
weapons could be used and would work as intended, are vital ingredients for nuclear
deterrence. A loss of confidence in the ability to deter nuclear use by an adversary would
have a significant negative effect on strategy stability.

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5. Previous Regulations about Emerging Threats

States are increasingly developing and deploying weapons with autonomous functions.
However, certain systems incorporating rudimentary autonomous functions have been in
existence for decades.
The most common types of weapons with autonomous functions are defensive systems. This
includes systems such as antivehicle and antipersonnel mines, which, once activated, operate
autonomously based on trigger mechanisms.

Title Publishing Entity Year Link

Report of the Special UNHRC 2013 [Link]

Rapporteur on extrajudicial 755741?ln=en
summary or arbitrary executions

Human rights implications of UNHRC 2022 [Link]

new and emerging technologies [Link]
in the military domain
(A/HRC/51/L.25)

Artificial intelligence and ICRC 2020 [Link]

machine learning in armed g/sites/default/files/reviews-pdf/20
conflict: A human-centred 21-03/ai-and-machine-learning-in-
approach armed-conflict-a-human-centred-a
[Link]

Legal Reviews of New ICRC 2021 [Link]

Weapons new-weapons-factsheet

Position on Autonomous ICRC 2021 [Link]

Weapons Systems icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-
systems

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Title Publishing Entity Year Link

A Comparative Analysis of the UNODA 2021 [Link]

Definitions of Autonomous ontent/uploads/2021/10/20210721-
Weapons Systems Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-De
[Link]

What you need to know about ICRC 2022 [Link]

autonomous weapons what-you-need-know-about-auton
omous-weapons

Towards Responsible AI in UNIDIR 2023 [Link]

Defence: A Mapping and t/files/2023-02/Brief-Responsible
Comparative Analysis of AI [Link]
Principles Adopted by States

Proposals Related to Emerging UNIDIR 2023 [Link]

Technologies in the Area of t/files/2023-05/UNIDIR-Proposals
Lethal Autonomous Weapons _Emerging_Technologies_Lethal_
Systems: A Resource Paper Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_
[Link]

Table-Top Exercises on the UNIDIR 2021 [Link]

Human Element and table-top-exercises-human-element
Autonomous Weapons System, -and-autonomous-weapons-system
2021

Confidence-Building Measures UNIDIR 2022 [Link]

for Artificial Intelligence t/files/2022-12/Confidence-Buildin
g_Final.pdf

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Title Publishing Entity Year Link

Human-Machine Interfaces in UNIDIR 2022 [Link]

Autonomous Weapons Systems t/files/2022-07/UNIDIR_Human-
Machine%[Link]

Known Unknowns: Data Issues UNIDIR 2021 [Link]

and Military Autonomous 2021-05/Holland_KnownUnknow
Systems ns_20210517_0.pdf

The Black Box, Unlocked: UNIDIR 2020 [Link]

Predictability and 2020-09/[Link]
Understandability in Military AI

Modernizing Arms Control: UNIDIR 2020 [Link]

Exploring Responses to the Use 2020-09/Modernizing%20Arms%
of AI in Military 20Control%20-%[Link]
Decision-Making

Swarm Robotics: Technical and UNIDIR 2020 [Link]

Operational Overview of the t/files/2020-04/UNIDIR%20Swar
Next Generation of m%20Robotics%20-%[Link]
Autonomous Systems

The Human Element in UNIDIR 2020 [Link]

Decisions About the Use of 2020-03/UNIDIR_Iceberg_Single
Force Pages_web.pdf

The Role of Data in UNIDIR 2019 [Link]

Algorithmic Decision-Making publication/pdfs/the-role-of-data-i
n-algorithmic-decision-making-en-
[Link]

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Title Publishing Entity Year Link

Algorithmic Bias and the UNIDIR 2018 [Link]

Weaponization of Increasingly publication/pdfs/algorithmic-bias-a
Autonomous Technologies nd-the-weaponization-of-increasin
gly-autonomous-technologies-en-7
[Link]

Title Publishing entity Year Link

Completely outside human Article 36 2023 [Link]

control? loads/2023/03/Completely-outside
-[Link]

Laws for LAWS: Towards a Friedrich-Ebert-Stift 2023 [Link]

treaty to regulate lethal ung national/[Link]
autonomous weapons

An Agenda for Action Human Rights 2022 [Link]

Watch 1/10/agenda-action/alternative-pro
cesses-negotiating-killer-robots-tre
aty

Negotiating a Treaty on Stop Killer Robots 2022 [Link]

Autonomous Weapons Systems Campaign p-content/uploads/2022/06/Stop-K
– The Way Forward iller-Robots-Negotiating-a-Treaty-
on-Autonomous-Weapons-System
[Link]

Principles for the Combat Center for a New 2021 [Link]

Employment of Weapon American Security reports/proposed-dod-principles-fo

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Systems with Autonomous r-the-combat-employment-of-wea

Functionalities pon-systems-with-autonomous-fun
ctionalities

Code of Conduct on Artificial Centre for 2021 [Link]

Intelligence in Military Systems Humanitarian ent/uploads/2021/08/AI-Code-of-
Dialogue [Link]

New Weapons, Proven Human Rights 2020 [Link]

Precedent Watch 0/20/new-weapons-proven-preced
ent/elements-and-models-treaty-ki
ller-robots

AI, Emerging Technology and Nonviolence 2020 [Link]

LAWS: Security, Moral, and International p-content/uploads/2021/11/NISEA
Ethical Perspectives in Asia Southeast Asia -AI-Emerging-Tech-and-LAWS-P
[Link]

The Militarization of Artificial Stanley Center for 2019 [Link]

Intelligence Peace and Security, t/uploads/2020/06/Stanley-Stimso
UNODA & n-UNODA-2020-TheMilitarizatio
Stimson Center [Link]

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Stance on the use of Autonomous Nuclear Systems

European Union (EU) Signatory to the CSDR (Common security defence policy under EU)
● CSDP considers adopting autonomous weapons in military operations. Minding
regulations and legislations.
● At the national level, several countries attempt to regulate the investigated field of
activities, while others are moving towards a complete ban on the development,
production, acquisition, and transfer of LAWS. For example, on September 12, 2018, the
EU Parliament adopted its first resolution (EUROPEAN, 2019) on the merits of the issue
under consideration, in which it called on all member states to stop the development, use,
and production of lethal autonomous weapon systems equipped with artificial
intelligence, and to start international negotiations for the preparation of a legally binding
document. However, the above resolution, noting the potential danger of autonomous
armed systems, was not binding on the EU member states. This situation is caused by the
fact that there is no unity among the partners on this issue; for example, Belgium adopted
a resolution calling to ban such systems in the same year. On the contrary, Germany,
France, and some other European countries gain traction in the manufacture of weapons,
including those equipped with artificial intelligence.

African Union (AU) - There is an assumption that African states are preoccupied with very
different development and security concerns and that autonomous weapons are simply not a
priority for them. However, in reality, LAWS are as much a pressing security issue for
African nations as they are for the P-5. Between the Somali Civil War, communal conflicts in
Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency, and several other instances of armed conflict, Africa is
where some of the deadliest, most persistent violent conflicts in the world take place.
Autonomous weapons, even with their promise of greater policing power and potential to
reduce casualties, would be dangerous if deployed in such conflicts, especially in the absence
of norms and legal frameworks.
This context has shaped the African response to autonomous weapons. For instance, Algeria,
Egypt, Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe along with The African Group represented by South
Africa were some of the first countries to have supported a ban on killer robots. Each
statement reflects different priorities: for some, the concern is human control; for others, it is
the potential for a massive number of casualties falling outside the purview of international

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humanitarian law. Ghana and Zimbabwe present arguments that acknowledge that great
powers will continue to develop LAWS for their immense military benefits irrespective of the
views of smaller powers. This last point in particular best reflects the paradox faced by
African actors calling for a ban: no legally-binding instrument on LAWS is possible with the
backing of the P-5. Moreover, while the most prominent non-governmental actors on the
global stage push for a ban, the active pursuit of the same capabilities by the militaries of the
Western countries they originate from, continues in parallel.

LAWS are thus transforming into an arena of geopolitical and strategic competition while
also reflecting the same inequalities that have characterised technology-led military
innovation for decades. In the case of LAWS, there is a strong first-mover advantage due to
exponential increases in lethality provided by even the most incremental improvements in
speed and efficiency. Currently, research and investment in AI/ML and robotics is dominated
by the US, China and a handful of other major powers. In 2016, 80% of the $26-39 billion
invested by private firms in artificial intelligence was by Alibaba, Amazon, Google,
Facebook and Baidu. Similarly, some of the largest seed-funded robotics startups of 2018
were Chinese, American and German. Thus, the great powers control the technologies as well
as the institutions and the agenda.

Most global-level institutions and platforms have a similar approach to the African problem:
they have them at the table, but rarely build and shape the debate on terms that translate to
their countries. Given the stakes state and civilian actors in Africa have in shaping the
development of norms and technologies linked to LAWS, an Africa-centred LAWS debate is
much overdue. For several of these countries, the conflicts are close to home; the distant
geographies and distant futures that concern most of the major powers are not directly
relevant.

ICRC Regulations:
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has, since 2015, urged States to
establish internationally agreed limits on autonomous weapon systems to ensure civilian
protection, compliance with international humanitarian law, and ethical acceptability.

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With a view to supporting current efforts to establish international limits on autonomous

weapon systems that address the risks they raise, the ICRC recommends that States adopt
new legally binding rules. In particular:
1. Unpredictable autonomous weapon systems should be expressly ruled out, notably
because of their indiscriminate effects. This would best be achieved with a prohibition
on autonomous weapon systems that are designed or used in a manner such that their
effects cannot be sufficiently understood, predicted and explained.
2. In light of ethical considerations to safeguard humanity, and to uphold international
humanitarian law rules for the protection of civilians and combatants hors de combat,
use of autonomous weapon systems to target human beings should be ruled out. This
would best be achieved through a prohibition on autonomous weapon systems that are
designed or used to apply force against persons.
3. In order to protect civilians and civilian objects, uphold the rules of international
humanitarian law and safeguard humanity, the design and use of autonomous weapon
systems that would not be prohibited should be regulated, including through a
combination of:
● limits on the types of target, such as constraining them to objects that are military
objectives by nature
● limits on the duration, geographical scope and scale of use, including to enable human
judgement and control in relation to a specific attack
● limits on situations of use, such as constraining them to situations where civilians or
civilian objects are not present
● requirements for human–machine interaction, notably to ensure effective human
supervision, and timely intervention and deactivation.
The ICRC supports initiatives by States aimed at establishing international limits on
autonomous weapon systems that aim at effectively addressing concerns raised by these
weapons, such as efforts pursued in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to
agree on aspects of a normative and operational framework.

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QARMA: (Questions A Resolution Must Answer)

1. What regulatory measures can be implemented to govern the use of autonomous

UAVs in nuclear command-and-control systems to mitigate the risks of miscalculation
or unauthorized actions?
2. What verification methods can be established to ensure the safety and traceability of
autonomous UAV technology in nuclear states, particularly in addressing cyber
threats and unauthorized surveillance?
3. Could non-nuclear states act as neutral parties in overseeing transparency and
verification mechanisms for autonomous UAV regulation, similarly to their role under
CTBT monitoring systems?
4. How can international legal frameworks be revised to effectively regulate autonomous
UAVs in nuclear contexts, and what mechanisms can ensure compliance by nations?
5. What confidence-building measures and transparency initiatives can be developed to
engage non-nuclear states in the regulation of UAVs, thereby enhancing security and
reducing the likelihood of conflict?
6. How can cooperation be fostered between nuclear and non-nuclear states to address
the emerging risks posed by autonomous UAVs, particularly in preventing their use by
non-state actors?

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6. References
1. [Link]
2. [Link]
[Link]://[Link]/africarenewal/web-features/unmanned-aerial-vehicles-are-effective-prot
ecting-civilians%E2%80%94herv%C3%A9-ladsous
4. [Link]
5. [Link]
6. [Link]
7. [Link]
8. [Link]

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