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GLOBALIZATION THEORIES
We have established the many definitions of and issues in defining globalization and
the metaphors that we can use to understand easily the concept. We have also
looked into its origins and history. This section will give you a glimpse of the
important theories on globalization. We will analyze globalization culturally,
economically, and politically in this book as reflected in the succeeding chapters. In
the meantime, it would be helpful to assert that the theories see globalization as a
process that increases either homogeneity or heterogeneity.
Homogeneity refers to the increasing sameness in the world as cultural inputs,
economic factors, and political orientations of societies expand to create common
practices, same economies, and similar forms of government. Homogeneity in
culture is often linked to cultural imperialism. This means, a given culture influences
other cultures. For example, the dominant religion in our country is Christianity,
which was brought to us by the Spaniards. Another example is Americanization,
which was defined by Kuisel (1993) as "the import by non-Americans of products,
images, technologies, practices, and behavior that are closely associated with
America/Americans" (p. 96). In terms of the economy, there is recognition of the
spread of neoliberalism, capitalism, and the market economy in the world
(Antonio, 2007). Global economic crises are also products of homogeneity in
economic globalization. Stiglitz (2002), for instance, blamed the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for its "one-size-fits all" approach which treats every country in
the world as the same. In the end, rich countries become advantageous in the world
economy at the expense of poor countries, which leads to increased inequality
among nations. The political realm also suffers homogenization if one takes into
account the emerging similar models of governance in the world. Barber (1995) said
that "McWorld" is existing. It means only one political orientation is growing in today's
societies.
The global flow of media is often characterized as media imperialism. TV, music,
books, and movies are perceived as imposed on developing countries by the West
(Cowen, 2002). Media imperialism undermines the existence of alternative global
media originating from developing countries, such as the Al Jazeera (Bielsa, 2008)
and the Bollywood (Larkin, 2003), as well as the influence of the local and regional
media. The Internet can be seen as an arena for alternative media. Cultural
imperialism denies the agency of viewers, but people around the world often
interpret the same medium (e.g., a movie) in significantly different ways. Global
media are dominated by a small number of large corporations. As McChesney
(1999) put it, this is being "extended from old media to new media" (p. 11), such as
Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Apple's itunes, As a result, in the long
run, the Internet could end up being less diverse and competitive. Independent
Media Center, associated with the alter-globalization movement, helps to counter
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this trend. It disseminates information to facilitate global participation of activists.
Hacktivists extend activism to the Internet by hacking into computer programs to
promote a particular cause (Juris, 2005).
Ritzer (2008) claimed that, in general, the contemporary world is undergoing the
process of McDonaldization. It is the process by which Western societies are
dominated by the principles of fast food restaurants. McDonaldization involves
the global spread of rational systems, such as efficiency, calculability, predictability,
and control. Ritzer (2008) pointed out that this process is "extended to other
businesses, sectors, and geographic areas" (p. 169). Grobalization, in contrast to
glocalization, is a process wherein nations, corporations, etc. impose themselves on
geographic areas in order to gain profits, power, and so on (Ryan, 2007). Ritzer
(2007) also espoused the idea that globalization can also be seen as a flow of
"nothing" as opposed to "something," involving the spread of non-places, non-
things, non-people, and non-services. On the other hand, heterogeneity pertains to
the creation of various cultural practices, new economies, and political groups
because of the interaction of elements from different societies in the world.
Heterogeneity refers to the differences because of either lasting differences or of
the hybrids or combinations of cultures that can be produced through the different
transplanetary processes. Contrary to cultural imperialism, heterogeneity in culture is
associated with cultural hybridization. A more specific concept is
"glocalization" coined by Roland Robertson in 1992. To him, as global forces
interact with local factors or a specific geographic area, the "glocal" is being
produced. Economic issues are not exempted from heterogeneity. The
commodification of cultures and "glocal" markets are examples of differentiation
happening in many economies around the world. The same goes with political
institutions. Barber (1995) also provided the alternate of "McWorld"-the "Jihad."
As Ritzer (2008) mentioned, it refers to the political groups that are engaged in an
"intensification of nationalism and that leads to greater political heterogeneity
throughout the world" (p. 576).
Although homogeneity and heterogeneity give us idea about the effects of
globalization, the picture is not yet complete. The theories about globalization will be
clarified as we look closer at each of them in the succeeding chapters.
DYNAMICS OF LOCAL AND GLOBAL CULTURE
Global flows of culture tend to move more easily around the globe than ever before,
especially through non-material digital forms. There are three perspectives on global
cultural flows. These are differentialism, hybridization, and convergence.
Cultural Differentialism
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— emphasizes the fact that cultures are essentially different and are only
superficially affected by global flows. The interaction of cultures is deemed to contain
the potential for "catastrophic collision." Samuel Huntington's theory on the
clash of the civilizations proposed in 1996 best exemplifies this approach. According
to Huntington, after the Cold War, political- economic differences were
overshadowed by new fault lines, which were primarily cultural in nature. Increasing
interaction among different "civilizations" (such as the Sinic, Islamic, Orthodox, and
Western) would lead to intense clashes, especially the economic conflict between
the Western and Sinic civilizations and bloody political conflict between the Western
and Islamic civilizations (Huntington, 2004). This theory has been critiqued for a
number of reasons, especially on its portrayal of Muslims as being "prone to
violence" (Huntington, 1996).
Cultural Hybridization Approach
— emphasizes the integration of local and global cultures (Cvetkovich and Kellner,
1997). Globalization is considered to be a creative process which gives rise to
hybrid entities that are not reducible to either the global or the local. A key concept
is "globalization" or the interpenetration of the global and local resulting in unique
outcomes in different geographic areas (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2007, p. 133).
Another key concept is Arjun Appadurai's "scapes" in 1996, where global flows
involve people, technology, finance, political images, and media and the disjunctures
between them, which lead to the creation of cultural hybrids.
Cultural Convergence Approach
— stresses homogeneity introduced by globalization. Cultures are deemed to be
radically altered by strong flows, while cultural imperialism happens when one
culture imposes itself on and tends to destroy at least parts of another culture. One
important critique of cultural imperialism is John Tomlinson's idea of
"deterritorialization" of culture. Deterritorialization means that it is much more
difficult to tie culture to a specific geographic point of origin.
THE GLOBALIZATION OF RELIGION
Globalization has played a tremendous role in providing a context for the current
revival and resurgence of religion. Today, most religions are not confined to the
countries where they began. Religions have, in fact, spread on a global scale.
Globalization has provided religions a fertile milieu to spread and thrive. As Scholte
(2005) made clear: "Accelerated globalization of recent times has enabled co-
religionists across the planet to have greater direct contact with one another. Global
communications, global organizations, global finance, and the like have allowed
ideas of the Muslims and the universal Christian church to be given concrete shape
as never before" (p. 245).
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Information technologies transportation means, and the media are deemed
important means on which religionists rely on the dissemination of their
religious ideas. For instance, countless website that provides information about
religions have been created. This makes pieces of information and explanation about
different religions ready at the disposal of any person regardless of his or her
geographical location. In addition, the internet allows people to contact each other
worldwide and therefore hold forums and debates that allow religion ideas to spread.
It has been difficult for religion to cope with values that accompany globalization like
liberalism, consumerism, and rationalism. Such phenomena advocate scientism
and secularism. This, in fact, pushed Scholte to speak of the anti-rationalist faiths.
Since he equated rationalism with globalization and considered religion anti-
rationalist, it can be deducted that religion is anti-globalization. To quote Scholte
(2005). The challenges of globalization to religion link automatically to the challenges
of religion to globalization. In the other words, while religion takes caution against the
normsand the values related to globalization, it challenges the latter since the
religion does not approve it hybridizing effects. The idea of de-hybridizing effects
of religion is approved also by Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations, which
maintains that such dehybridizing upshots spring also from the religious partitioning
and clashes.
GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION
The processes of globalization and regionalization reemerged during the 1980s and
heightened after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. At first, it seems that these
two processes are contradicting-the very nature of globalization is, by definition,
global while regionalization is naturally regional.
The regionalization of the world system and economic activity undermines the
potential benefits coming out from a liberalized global economy. This is because
regional organizations prefer regional partners over the rest. Regional organizations
respond to the states' attempt to reduce the perceived negative effects of
globalization. Therefore, regionalism is a sort of counter-globalization.
In a 2007 survey, the Financial Times revealed that majority of Europeans consider
that globalization brings negative effects to their societies (as cited in Jacoby and
Meunier, 2010). Many policy makers and scholars think that globalization must be
regulated and managed. The threats of an "ungoverned globalization" can be
countered what Jacoby and Meunier called managed globalization; it refers to "all
attempts to make globalization more palatable to citizens" (p. 1).
It is important, however, to consider the gradual development of inter-regional
relations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
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European Union (EU), or the South American trade bloc, Mercosur. In fact, a sort
of "contagion effect" (Held et al., 2005, p. 77) has spread during the past ears.
Regionalization in one part of the world encourages regionalization years—
elsewhere whether by imitation, like the success of the European Single Market, or
by "defensive" reaction, such as Mercosur's establishment as response to the
creation of NAFTA. According to this, regionalization and the development of
interregionalism would indeed be global in nature. As Held et al. (2005) claimed,
"the new regionalism is not a barrier to political globalization but, on the contrary,
entirely compatible with it if not an indirect encouragement" (p. 77).
Hurrell (2007) captured this debate in his "one (global) world/many (regional) worlds
relationship" (p. 1). Regional developments in one part of the world have
affected and fueled regionalization everywhere else in a sort of contagion or
domino effect. This fact, along with increasing developments in interregional
cooperation, shows that the regionalization process is global in nature. Therefore,
regionalization is intimately linked to globalization since it is part of it and it builds on
it.
The argument concerning the relationship between regionalization and globalization
is perfectly summarized in this claim:
The age of economic globalization has also been the age of regionalization,
and much of the analysis of the new regionalism has been devoted to the links
between the two tendencies. Thus, regionalism is seen as critical part of the
political economy of globalization and the strategies that states (and other
actors) have adopted in the face of globalization ... The emergence of
regionalism needs to be understood within the global restructuring of power
and production. The many worlds are very closely intertwined with the
character and fate of the one. The core driving force is global even if the
manifestation is regional. (Hurell, 2007, p. 4)
Globalization "goes back to when humans first put a boat into the sea" (Sweeney,
2005, p. 203). We can understand globalization as "the increased flows of goods,
services, capita, people, and information across borders" (Jacoby and Meunier,
2010, p. 1). But as we have learned from the previous there are many controversies
about and varying definitions of the term. Defining region and regionalization is
complicated. Nevertheless, region, according to Mansfield and Milner (1999) is "a
group of countries in the same geographically specified area" (p. 2.). Hurrell (2007)
defined regionalization as the "societal integration and the often undirected process
of social and economic interaction" (p. 4). In addition, regionalization is different
from regionalism, which is "the formal process of intergovernmental collaboration
between two or more states" (Ravenhill, 2008, p. 174).
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The motivations for the recent regionalization in Asia, as well as other regions in the
world, cannot be isolated from one another. It is a complex mixture of factors. One of
the reasons behind regionalism is the concern for security, which is to ensure peace
and stability. Confidence building can be enhanced through economic cooperation
within a region. The ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
are regional organizations that seek strong security in Asia through cooperation.
Huntington (1996), on the contrary, believed that culture and identity guide
regionalization. As he put it, "In the post-Cold War world, states increasingly define
their interests in civilizational terms" (p. 30). For him, culture and identity are
civilizations. He identified nine major civilizations: Western, Latin American,
African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. He argued
that international organizations like the EU or Mercosur share a common culture and
identity and are far more successful than NAFTA, whose member states belong to
different civilizations. If we follow Huntington's idea of the "clash of civilizations," one
could argue that the potential for such clash can be strong in Asia because many of
those civilizations are, at the least, can be found in the region.
Nevertheless, economic motivations are arguably the main motivation behind
contemporary regionalization. By entering in regional organizations, Asian states
may regain some control over flows of capital and enhance their bargaining power
against transnational economic actors such as investment groups or transnational
corporations (TNCs) (De Martino and Grabel, 2003). Aside from this, domestic
companies may benefit from belonging to a regional market big enough to allow
them scale economies while still being protected from global competition. In other
words, regional organizations allow national companies the opportunity to succeed in
a protected but big enough market in a way that they would otherwise fail if exposed
to global competition.
Finally, non-state actors, such as the TNCs, act as a driving force toward
regionalism. These TNCS, whose host countries are not part of a given regional
trade agreement, find themselves in a disadvantaged commercial situation.
ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF GLOBALIZATION
The previous discussions answered the question "What is globalization?" The next
question "Where did it start?" is not easy to answer as well because there are
different views about this. This book generally adheres to the perspective that the
major points of the beginnings of globalization started after the Second World
War. Nevertheless, it would mean no harm to look at the five different
perspectives regarding the origins of globalization.
Hardwired
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According to Nayan Chanda (2007), it is because of our basic human need to make
our lives better that made globalization possible. Therefore, one can trace the
beginning of globalization from our ancestors in Africa who walked out from the said
continent in the late Ice Age. This long journey finally led them to all-known
continents today, roughly after 50,000 years.
The recent years could also be regarded as the beginnings of globalization with
reference to specific technological advances in transportation and communication.
Some examples include the first transatlantic telephone cable (1956), the first
transatlantic television broadcasts (1962), the founding of the modern Internet
in 1988, and the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York (2001).
Certainly, with this view, more and more specific events will characterize not just the
origins of globalization but also more of its history.
Broader, More Recent Changes
Recent changes comprised the fifth view. These broad changes happened in the
last half of the twentieth century. Scholars today point to these three notable
changes as the origin of globalization that we know today. They are as follows:
1. The emergence of the United States as the global power (post-World War II)
2. The emergence of multinational corporations (MNCs)
3. The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War
Through its dominant military and economic power after WWII, the United States
was able to outrun Germany and Japan in terms of industry. Both Axis powers and
Allies fall behind economically as compared to the new global power. Because of
this, the United States soon began to progress in different aspects like in diplomacy,
media, film (as in the Hollywood), and many more.
Before MNCs came into being, their roots were from their countries of origin during
the eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. The United States, Germany, and Great
Britain had in their homeland great corporations which the world knows today.
However, they did not remain there as far as their production and market are
concerned. For example, Ford and General Motors originated in the United States
but in the twentieth century, they exported more automobiles and opened factories to
other countries.
More recent than the first two would be the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This
event led to the opening of the major parts of the world for the first time since the
early twentieth century. Many global processes-immigration, tourism, media,
diplomacy, and MNCs-spread throughout the planet. This paved way for the so-
called "free" world. China, even though the government remains communist, is on its
way to becoming a major force in global capitalism (Fishman, 2006). Moreover,
China is also globalizing in terms of other aspects such as their hosting of the
Olympics in 2008.
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Chanda (2007) mentioned that commerce, religion, politics, and warfare are the
"urges" of people toward a better life. These are respectively connected to four
aspects of globalization and they can be traced all throughout history: trade,
missionary work, adventures, and conquest.
Cycles
For some, globalization is a long-term cyclical process and thus, finding its origin
will be a daunting task. What is important is the cycles that globalization has
gone through (Scholte, 2005). Subscribing to this view will suggest adherence to
the idea that other global ages have appeared. There is also the notion to suspect
that this point of globalization will soon disappear and reappear.
Epoch
Ritzer (2015) cited Therborn's (2000) six great epochs of globalization. These
are also called "waves" and each has its own origin. Today's globalization is not
unique if this is the case. The difference of this view from the second view (cycles) is
that it does not treat epochs as returning. The following are the sequential
occurrence of the epochs:
1. Globalization of religion (fourth to seventh centuries)
2. European colonial conquests (late fifteenth century)
3. Intra-European wars (late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries)
4. Heyday of European imperialism (mid-nineteenth century to 1918)
5. Post-World War II period
6. Post-Cold War period
Events
Specific events are also considered as part of the fourth view in explaining the
origin of globalization. If this is the case, then several points can be treated as the
start of globalization. Gibbon (1998), for example, argued that Roman conquests
centuries before Christ were its origin. In an issue of the magazine the Economist
(2006, January 12), it considered the rampage of the armies of Genghis Khan into
Eastern Europe in the thirteenth century. Rosenthal (2007) gave premium to
voyages of discovery-Christopher Columbus's discovery of America in 1942, Vasco
da Gama in Cape of Good Hope in 1498, and Ferdinand Magellan's completed
circumnavigation of the globe in 1522.
Global Demography
Demographic transition is a singular historical period during which mortality and
fertility rates decline from high to low levels in a particular country or region. The
broad outlines of the transition are similar in countries around the world, but the pace
and timing of the transition have varied considerably.
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The transition started in mid-orr late 1700s in Europe. During that time, death
rates and fertility began to decline. High to low fertility happened 200 years in
France and 100 years in the United States. In other parts of the world, the
transition began later. It was only in the twentieth century that mortality decline in
Africa and Asia, with the exemption of Japan. According to Maddison (2001), life
expectancy in India was only 24 years in the early twentieth century while the
same life expectancy occurred in China in 1929 until 1931. Fertility decline in Asia
did not begin until the 1950s and so on. In the case of Japan, it was until the 1930s
that "total fertility rate did not drop below five births per woman" (Shigeyuki et
al., 2002, p. 250). This resulted in rapid population growth after the Second World
War, affecting the age structure of Asia and the developing world. Specifically, the
baby boom in the developing world was caused by the decline of infant and child
mortality rates. The West, on the other hand, experienced baby boom that resulted
from rising birth rates.
A remarkable effect of the demographic transition, as Shigeyuki et al. (2002)
stated, is "the enormous gap in life expectancy that emerged between Japan
and the West on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other" (p. 251).
By 1820, the life expectancy at birth of Japan and the West was 12 years greater
than that of other countries. It increased by 20 years by 1900. Although there was
an improvement in life expectancy all throughout the world in 1900-1950, the gap
had reached 22 years. In 1999, the gap declined to 14 years. These differences in
time of transition affected the global population. During the nineteenth century,
Europe and the West had an increased in share in the world's population, from 22.0
percent to 33.0 percent, while Asia and Oceania's contribution dropped from
69.0 percent to 56.7. India and China suffered from economic stagnation and
decline during that time.
There was a reverse in global population shares during the twentieth century
as Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania had high levels of population growth
rates. According to Shigeyuki et al. (2002), population growth shows a more
remarkable shift: "Between 1820 and 1980, 69.3 percent of the world's
population growth occurred in Europe and Western offshoots. Between 1950
and 2000, however, only 11.7 percent occurred in that region" (p. 252).
The United Nations projected that population growth will be shifted toward Africa. It
is estimated that by 2150, the regions' share to the world population will be
almost 20 percent, relatively much greater than its share in 1820 (seven
percent) and in 1900 (six percent). Also in 2150, there will be a projected
increase of two billion if we combine the populations of Asia, Latin America, and
Oceania.
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In terms of the age structure, the overall trend in Japan and the West was downward
until 1950. Their dependency ratio was close to 0.5. It only increased, although
temporary, when the baby boom after the Second World War occurred. Japan's
dependency ratio, however, increased between 1888 and 1920. Its dependency
ratio was higher than the West between 1920 and the early 1950s. It dropped in
1970 and later since its precipitous decline in childbearing during the 1950s
and low fertility rates in recent years.
The developing countries like India and the Philippines had higher dependency
ratios than the West in 1900. A great increase in dependency ratio was caused by
the decline in infant and child mortality and high levels of fertility, with its peak
around 1970.
Dependency ratios started to disappear because there is a decline in global birth
rate. Furthermore, the gap in fertility between the West and the less developed
countries became smaller by the twenty-first century. Over the next 50 years, the
cases of dependency ratios of these two areas in the world will be reversed
(Shigeyuki et al., 2002). The aging of populations will cause a rise in dependency
ratio, starting in the West.
GLOBAL MIGRATION
The nuances of the movements of people around the world can be seen through the
categories of migrants-"vagabonds" and "tourists" (Bauman, 1998).
Vagabonds are on the move "because they have to be" (Ritzer, 2015, p. 179) they
are not faring well in their home countries and are forced to move in the hope that
their circumstances will improve. Tourists, on the other hand, are on the move
because they want to be and because they can afford it.
Refugees are vagabonds forced to flee their home countries due to safety concerns
(Haddad, 2003). Asylum seekers are refugees who seek to remain in the country to
which they flee. According to Kritz (2008), those who migrate to find work are
involved in labor migration. Labor migration is driven by "push" factors (e.g.,
lack of employment opportunities in home countries), as well as "pull" factors
(work available elsewhere). Labor migration mainly involves the flow of less-skilled
and unskilled workers, as well as illegal immigrants who live on the margins of the
host society (Landler, 2007).
Unlike other global flows, labor migration still faces many restrictions. Many of these
barriers are related to the Westphalian conception of the nation-state and are
intimately associated with it. Shamir (2005) discussed that the state may seek to
control migration because it involves the loss of part of the workforce. An influx of
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migrants can lead to conflicts with local residents. Concerns about terrorism also
affect the desire of the state to restrict population flows (Moses, 2006).
Migration is traditionally governed either by "push" factors such as political
persecution, economic depression, war, and famine in the home country or by
"pull" factors such as a favorable immigration policy, a labor shortage, and a
similarity of language and culture in the country of destination (Ritzer, 2015).
Global factors, which facilitate easy access to information about the country of
destination, also exert a significant influence.
Many countries face issues of illegal migration. The United States faces a major
influx of illegal immigrants from Mexico and other Central American states
(Thompson, 2008). A fence is being constructed on the US-Mexico border to
control this flow of people (Fletcher and Weisman, 2006). However, its efficacy is
questioned and it is thought that it will only lead illegal immigrants to adopt
more dangerous methods to gain entry. In addition, tighter borders have also had
the effect of "locking in" people who might otherwise have left the country (Fears,
2006). Other countries with similar concerns about illegal immigration include
Great Britain, Switzerland, and Greece as well as countries in Asia.
A strong case can be made on the backlash against illegal immigrants (Economist,
2008, January 3, "Keep the Borders Open"). In the North, such immigrants constitute
a younger workforce that does work which locals may not perform, and they are
consumers who contribute to growth. They also send remittances back to family
members in the country of origin, which improves the lives of the recipients, reduces
poverty rates, and increases the level of education as well as the foreign reserves of
the home country (Economist 2007, November 1). Banks are often unwilling or
unable to handle the type (small amounts of money) and volume of remittances. As a
result, specialized organizations play a major role in the transmission of remittances.
According to Malkin (2007), the Philippines is one of the leaders when it comes
to the flow of remittances ($14.7 billion), next to India ($24.5 billion) and China
($21.1 billion).
The term "diaspora" has been increasingly used to describe migrant
communities. Of particular interest is Paul Gilroy's (1993) conceptualization of the
diaspora as a transnational process, which involves dialogue to both imagined
and real locales. Diasporization and globalization are closely interconnected and
the expansion of the latter will lead to an increase in the former (Dufoix, 2007).
Today, there exists "virtual diasporas" (Laguerre, 2002) which utilize technology
such as the Internet to maintain the community network.