Collapse, environment, and society

Author(s): Karl W. Butzer

Source: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America , March 6, 2012, Vol. 109, No. 10 (March 6, 2012), pp. 3632-3639
Published by: National Academy of Sciences

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 Collapse, environment, and society
Karl W. Butzer
Department of Geography and the Environment, University of Texas at Austin , Austin , TX 78712

This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected in 1996.

Edited by B. L. Turner, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, and approved December 2, 2011 (received for review September 10, 2011)

Historical collapse of ancient states poses intriguing social-ecological questions, as well as potential applications to global change and
contemporary strategies for sustainability. Five Old World case studies are developed to identify interactive inputs, triggers, and feedbacks
in devolution. Collapse is multicausal and rarely abrupt. Political simplification undermines traditional structures of authority to favor
militarization, whereas disintegration is preconditioned or triggered by acute stress (insecurity, environmental or economic crises,
famine), with breakdown accompanied or followed by demographic decline. Undue attention to stressors risks underestimating the
intricate interplay of environmental, political, and sociocultural resilience in limiting the damages of collapse or in facilitating reconstruction.
The conceptual model emphasizes resilience, as well as the historical roles of leaders, elites, and ideology. However, a historical model
cannot simply be applied to contemporary problems of sustainability without adjustment for cumulative information and increasing
possibilities for popular participation. Between the 14th and 18th centuries, Western Europe responded to environmental crises by in-
novation and intensification; such modernization was decentralized, protracted, flexible, and broadly based. Much of the current alarmis
literature that claims to draw from historical experience is poorly focused, simplistic, and unhelpful. It fails to appreciate that resilience and
readaptation depend on identified options, improved understanding, cultural solidarity, enlightened leadership, and opportunities
for participation and fresh ideas.

historical disasters | Egypt | Mesopotamia | Fayum Oasis | Ethiopia

Rise and Fall of Civilizations Khaldun's writings were poorly dissem- could and would be fixed by technological
inated, and Western interest in collapse innovation.

tion with societal collapse, an issue was initially stimulated by Edward Gibbon Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the
outlined in the introduction to (3), who, with laborious detail, attributed West (1918-1922) (4) was written in the
There this outlined tion Specithis
al with has in sociSpecial
etal been the Feature inordiFeature
nate introduction collapse, ((1). a- an to issue con-con- the decline and fall of the Roman Empire
1). The fascinThe wake of a world war and before the Nazi
cept has intuitive appeal but ambiguous to moral decay and barbarian invasions, ascendance. He redefined ontogeny in
meaning, and has been applied to states, much like his predecessor had. Gibbon humanistic terms that included premoni-
nations, or complex societies, in the senseobserved that Roman collapse had tions of the authoritarian state. His "win-
that such entities rise and flourish, but changed the sociopolitical map of Europe ter" would coincide with a demise of
and the Mediterranean world, a trans- abstract thought, accompanied by em-
eventually disintegrate and fail. Sociopolit-
ical organization, economic weakness, and formation that continues to generate powerment of the rich, and the rise of
environmental or demographic trends a secondary literature. Although Gibbon caesarian, demagogic leaders. Spengler
have received emphasis. Change takes held to an ethical dimension, he recog-
saw a society in deep crisis, and his pre-
a long-term cyclic rhythm, at first organiz-
nized that Roman collapse could not be
scient but pessimistic ideas anticipated the
separated from historical processes that horrors of fascism and Stalinism. His in-
ing, then expanding and integrating, before
shaped the dynamic context of its time,
sinking in disorder. Systemic failure in one sights remain pertinent for modeling al-
and he was uneasy about the potential
synergistic network may destabilize adja- ternative pathways of political resilience in
future failure of even more enlightened
cent structures. Other open questions the wake of collapse.
and powerful states.
concern the scale of collapse, the time By contrast, the French authors of the
When the archaeological discoveries of
frames involved, the key elements that fail, Annales School chose a nonlinear track to
the 19th century revealed a periodic failure
and whether the outcome is cataclysmic or capture the rich detail of regional histo-
of kingdoms and empires across the
eventually allows restructuring. Not all ries, and to develop an interdisciplinary
breakdowns are alike.
Near East, the collapse model became
a durable theme of social and historical method in which millennial demographic
This challenging concept and its atten-
discourse. However, the message shifted: waves served as a bellwether of key in-
dant issues were first articulated by the
whereas ephemeral Eastern civilizations teractive processes (5-7). Disjunctures
Islamic historian Ibn Khaldun [after 1377
regularly dissolved in chaos, the compar- were attributed to competing economic
common era (CE)] (2), who identified theative durability of ancient Rome improvedsystems, long-distance networking, war-
periodic rise and fall of dynasties as mac-the prospect that Western Europe might fare, or pandemics (8), ideas that gave
rostructures in the history of sedentary endure indefinitely. impetus to world-system history (9-11).
civilizations. Beginning with the Roman With the proliferation of biological The annalistes eventually turned to more
Empire and continuing with its Islamic analogues in the mid-1800s, ontogenetic humanistic studies that introduced
counterparts, he attributed demise to ruralor evolutionary qualities such as growth,
rebellions or outside invaders confrontingmaturity, and decline were used to in-
a ruling hierarchy that had forfeited the terpret historical macrostructures. For so-Author contributions: K.W.B, designed research and original
solidarity of its supporters. Rather than cial Darwinists, material culture became anmaps, performed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper.
a global history, Khaldun's work was an index for the increasing achievements of The author declares no conflict of interest.
implicit critique of Islamic society that civilization, in an era when the Industrial This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
went beyond theological arguments. He Revolution exuded the driving force of 1 E-mail: [Link]@[Link].
faulted the greed and selfishness that came"progress." The West was seen as a new
This article contains supporting information online at
with power, at the expense of the com- empire, wherein technology would assure [Link]/lookup/suppl/doi :10.1073/pnas.1 1 14845109/-/
mon good. unlimited economic growth. Problems DCSupplemental.

3632-3639 I PNAS I March 6, 2012 | vol.109 | no. 10 [Link]/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1114845109

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environmental variability as an integral affect feedbacks, but then go on to simply wanton tomb or cemetery violations, and ш
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part of historical process (12, 13). dispossession of the elite. Other, less au-
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fit a group of societal factors into a few
Notable is the increasing diversity of preconceived categories, supported by thentic admonitions of the era amplify the
perspectives about collapse, ranging ini- tertiary digests of no better than mixed themes of poverty, anarchy, and the up-
tially from ethical and social, to ideological value, to "explain" a particular outcome by ending of social roles. The basic message is
or ethnocentric, and eventually to in- assumed, axiomatic processes. Instead, our a breakdown of the "cosmic order" and и

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terdisciplinary and systemic. The under- five case studies (later and in the SI Text) social justice, perhaps in the wake of an <
lying ideas continue to echo. The salient identify important, qualitative variables environmental disaster. However one mi

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concern today is the interface between and track their roles and interplay in sys-chooses to interpret such writings, there ОЭ
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environment and society, to require greater temic outcomes. Although difficult to was no central government, while justice,<
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attention to social science and humanities simulate, societal inputs and feedbacks areorder, or respect for tradition fell by the
perspectives. There has indeed been more common than environmental varia- wayside during the nadir of collapse, pre-
rapid growth of theoretical sophisticationbles. The case studies also offer temporal sumably the seventh to eighth dynasties.
in regard to complexity and network the- parameters for transformation.
ory, agent-based models, resilience theory, Onset of Economic Decline. During the sixth
or tipping points. However, the challengeAnatomy of a Collapse: Old Kingdom dynasty, central authority was steadily di-
Egypt
for a scientific study of historical collapse luted by privileges granted to courtiers
remains to develop comprehensive, in- The historical cycle of the Egyptian Old around the throne. Mortuary temples were
tegrated or coupled models, drawing upon Kingdom (14) closed shortly after the im- already built for pharaohs of the fourth
the implications of qualitative narrativesprobably long reign of Pepi II [~2278- dynasty, institutions that engaged groups of
that go well beyond routine social science2184 before СЕ (ВСЕ)], the last signifi- priests, paid by the treasury in perpetuity,,
categories, to better incorporate the com- cant ruler of the sixth Dynasty. Such long whereas such foundations and their farms
plexity of human societies (1). periods of rule can lead to issues of suc- were exempt from taxes, much as nonprofit
Current research in historical collapse cession, and royal authority promptly col- corporations are today. Gradually such
suggests a primary fascination with climaticlapsed at the death of Pepi II, judging by privileges were accorded to other powerful
change and environmental degradation as a cluster of approximately 20 powerless men at court, a pattern accelerating during
primary agents of change, but at the cost kinglets, marking the seventh-eighth dy- sixth Dynasty times until a significant part
of less attention to the necessary cross- nasties, a very short time span, perhaps of the prime lands was removed from the
disciplinary integration. Indeed, the recentfrom 2181 to 2160 ВСЕ. Egypt broke apart fiscal rolls, even as the state continued
return to environmentalism is not about into several feuding provincial powers, to support the upkeep of mortuary cults
a fresh interest in the environment-society controlled by members of the old elite or ("entitlements").
interface, but a continuing failure to ap- a novel genre of warlords, to be reunited Economic decline also resulted from
preciate the complexity of such inter- through force of arms after approximately breakdown of the vital foreign trade,
relationships. At issue is not whether 2040 ВСЕ by a new, 11th Dynasty. mainly carried out over the entrepot of
climatic change is relevant for sociohis- Byblos (now Jubail, Lebanon). Cedar and
torical change, but how we can deal moreDidactic Literature. An interval of approxi- fir were imported for shipbuilding, or
objectively with coupled systems that in- mately 120 to 200 y (réf. 15, table S7; luxury goods such as wine and olive oil,
clude a great tapestry of variables, amongref. 16, p 464), known as the First In- for elite use. Pharaoh is likely to have profi-
which climatically triggered environmentaltermediate Period (dynasties 9-10), rep- ted greatly from such transactions, but
change is undeniably important. The SI resents a radical sociopolitical trans- archeology shows that, during the reign of
Text reviews the problematic revival of formation, documented by written records Pepi II, Byblos was destroyed by the
environmental determinism in regard to and archeology. Instead of burial near Akkadians, its Egyptian imports ending
the Akkadian collapse, as well as the Memphis, the rich or powerful began to abruptly (19) and then interrupted for
purported societal passivity about anthro-build rock tombs near their provincial 250 y. That would have cut off a critica}
pogenic degradation and potential future land-holdings. Wealth was dispersed to source of royal revenue, weakening
collapse. The Old World case studies new centers, with economic growth, artis- pharaoh's personal power.
range from early historical times to the tic and cultural change, and a shift to
threshold of globalization, with additionala different style of social complexity (17). Environmental Trigger. Inferred from the
examples outlined in the SI Text , or pre- Some of the elite were deeply disturbed by admonitions, Nile failures are quite plau-
sented in the various research articles of the course of events, leading to a body of sible in view of the limnologica! record of
this Special Feature of PNAS. Examined didactic literature (labeled as instruc- Lake Turkana: fed to approximately 90%
at different levels of detail, these cases tions, lamentations, or prophecies) that by the Omo watershed in mountainous
help single out more important, interactive became literary classics during the Middle western Ethiopia, an area with climatic
variables, to estimate time scales for and New Kingdoms, when they were used conditions similar to those of the Blue
transformation, and explore the roles of in the schooling of young scribes. Nile. Prominent and dated beach ridges
preconditioning, triggering and recon- Few such tracts have the necessary au- indicate a sporadic, early to mid-Holocene
stituting processes. The ultimate goal thenticity of historical descriptions, but overflow of this nonoutlet lake, through
would be to design complex simulation they do represent an insider perspective on a series of swamps to the Sobat and White
models that incorporate sophisticated so- Egyptian cultural memory of a painful Nile rivers (20). Together with diatom as-
cietal components and that can be vali- transition (ref. 18, p. 109-113). The auto- semblages, alkalinity levels, and Omo de-
dated (1). biography of Ankhtifi, a southern pro- trital silicates, the lake levels offer a proxy
This presentation attempts to trans- vincial governor [ninth Dynasty, ~2120 (?) record for Blue Nile behavior, but the
cend simple assumptions or truisms and ВСЕ], was inscribed in a rock-cut tomb. chronology is only approximate (21). A
monocausal explanations, by dissecting The full list of woes enumerated had not decrease in Omo material approximately
historical examples so as to illustrate the been previously used in literary conven- 2800 (calibrated years) ВСЕ was followed
full palette of social-ecological variables tion, and was not a mere figure of speech. by an abrupt change in water chemistry, to
and why they are so important for resil- The text elliptically reports rampant civil a closed, alkaline-saline lake, approxi-
ience within coupled systems. Some cur- war, famine, and starvation caused by Nile mately 2400 ВСЕ. This coincided with
rent models for change pay careful at- . failure, mass dying or aimless dislocation a late fourth Dynasty shift to downcutting
tention to biophysical variables that may of starving people, cannibalism (sic), (i.e., channel incision) of the Nile at Giza

Butzer PNAS | March б, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 10 | 3633

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(22), implying a pattern of poor or in- that social anarchy is difficult to contain states of the eastern Mediterranean, in-
different floods that would only inundate when institutional structures falter. Amid cluding Egyptian hegemony in the Levant,
parts of the flood basins. Omo influx social chaos and insecurity analogous to to terminate traditional commercial rela-
was minimal approximately 2100 ВСЕ, but that of modern Somalia, ancient Egypt tionships, with implications for widespread
sharply greater 2000 to 1800 ВСЕ, before experienced political simplification as economic depression (26). Although
declining again. Considering the partial the contestants repeatedly resorted to Ramesses III still carried out a major
match of these rough dates, it is pos- armed force. building program and sent an expedition
sible but unproven that Nile failures A concatenation of triggering economic, to Punt, he made an unusual offering to
may have helped trigger collapse of the subsistence, political, and social forces the Nile in 1179, to propitiate the river and
old kingdom. probably drove Egypt across a threshold of seek good floods (29). High-level malfea-
instability, setting in train a downward sance and corruption surfaced in 1157,
Civil Wars. The Egyptian record after Pepi II spiral of cascading feedbacks. In the end, and the king was victim to a harem con-
not only points to dynastic instability, but a semblance of the cosmic order was re-
spiracy at the time of his death.
also includes direct and indirect evidence stored, with the support of new elites, butThe severity of gathering economic
of civil wars during the ninth to 11th dy- with the heavy hand of military men, even problems can be gauged by unprecedented
nasties. Permanent reunification of Egypt as the echoes of civil war continued to strikes and rioting, because of insufficient
toward approximately 2016 ВСЕ required reverberate until the authoritarian rule of food and unpaid wages for the royal arti-
several bloody campaigns until the victory the Pyramid Age was reinstated (ref. 17; sans (in 1156). The vizier could turn up
of a Theban dynasty over the northern pp. 118-119 and 130-131). The initial only half the wheat needed, because the
center of Heracleopolis, but even then the breakdown took a few decades, but the temple storage facilities were empty. The
Delta remained to be subjugated (23, 24). processes of collapse played out on a cen-food supply had failed, the king's authority
The Theban vizier later usurped the tennial scale, as did reconstitution (16). was brazenly challenged, and Egypt was
throne, waging intermittent warfare to as- This detailed analysis, with the advan- patently in decline.
cend to the kingship as Amenemhet I tage of a body of fragmentary but rich,
(-1985-1956 ВСЕ) of the 12th dynasty, written records, helps illustrate the true Process of Devolution. On the accession of
against vigorous opposition by some of the complexity of collapse. It involved more the king's son (Ramesses IV) (30), the
elites (ref. 16, p. 493-495; and ref. 25). than an impersonal network of systemic royal workmen were paid off with food
He was later assassinated. He and his interactions. It encompassed people, ad- and silver, not by the king's treasury but by
successors had been supported by the mittedly at cross purposes and with in- representatives of the High Priest (ref. 28,
provincial warlords of Middle Egypt (24), complete information, who ultimately p. 607). Conflict between institutions is
who retained considerable power until sought to bring their country back together,implied. Rolling food shortfalls continued,
approximately 1850 ВСЕ, when a new king consonant with their vision of the cosmic with runaway inflation. Grain prices, with
phased out or eliminated the office of order. In the persons of military leaders respect to nonfood products, had begun to
provincial governors - potential militaryand conflicted elites, one can gain a increase in 1170, eventually increasing to
contenders - and returned Egypt to glimpse of the ambiguous notions that eight times and occasionally 24 times the
a more traditional, centralized [Link] and social resilience imply. standard price. Inflation peaked at ap-
Demilitarization followed, with reemer- proximately 1130, stabilizing at approxi-
gence of a middle class (ref. 16, p. 506;Autopsy of Another Collapse: New mately 1110, with food prices falling
and ref. 25), ending 300 у of intermittentKingdom Egypt rapidly at approximately 1100 to 1070
warfare and civil strife. The collapse A second historical example better illu- (31). This was the first subsistence crisis
after Pepi II had evidently unleashed un- minates the socioeconomic components actually recorded in accounting books
welcome feedbacks that repeatedly fa- and processes of national failure, with the(-1170-1110 ВСЕ). Hardship was exac-
vored destructive military unrest, variously
important benefit of specific economic erbated by insecurity caused by Libyan
coupled with both elite contestation andrecords. Under the 20th Dynasty (-1187-marauders (1117-1101), favoring rural
resilience. The didactic literature implies
1064 ВСЕ) (27, 28), Egypt devolved fromflight and declining productivity.
that the goal of reunification remaineda powerful state to a divided nation in Royal power and prestige were fading.
central to the cosmic order ascribed to which authority had been usurped by Rock for monumental construction was no
by key national power groups. a high priesthood that controlled the well-longer quarried after 1151, and an 1135
endowed temples as well as military forces,expedition to the turquoise mines of Sinai
Concatenation. The details marshaled here ready to engage in civil war. However, in-was the last. A new High Priest had himself
illustrate the immense complexity of col-stead of recovery, Egypt came to be ruledrepresented the same size as the king
lapse. The economic prosperity of Egypt by foreign dynasties. (-1113), suggesting a more direct appro-
had declined through the course of the priation of power. Looting of the royal and
sixth Dynasty, inversely to the growing When Did Decline Begin? The pharaoh Mer-private tombs at Thebes was underway
wealth and power of now-hereditary pro-enptah shipped a great amount of grain with high-level complicity, and became
vincial governors. The expansion of mor-to alleviate famine in the wavering Hittitescandalous under Ramesses XI (1099-
tuary endowments, fiscal stagnation, empire at approximately 1210 ВСЕ, sug- 1069 ВСЕ), who did not use his completed
decentralization of authority, and loss ofgesting a major drought in Anatolia but tomb in the Valley of the Kings, and ap-
hegemony over eastern Mediterranean food abundance in the Nile Valley. Then,parently chose to be buried in northern
trade had served to precondition Egypt forin 1207, he had to fend off a determined Egypt. This last monarch attempted to
collapse across 160 у or more. Nile failures
invasion of Libyans in alliance with sev- avoid the inevitable, calling in the Egyp-
probably unleashed a severe subsistence eral "Sea Peoples," perhaps mobilized by tian viceroy from Nubia, who battled the
crisis that helped trigger an economic the same environmental crisis in western High Priest's army and, interestingly, as-
breakdown near the end of Pepi II's reign,Anatolia and the Aegean world. sumed the notable title Overseer of the
but other factors were also involved (17, Three further foreign onslaughts con- Royal Granaries (1086 ВСЕ), while con-
26). Contending elite groups may origi- fronted Ramesses III (1185-1153 ВСЕ) of trolling southern Egypt for a decade.
nally have used an impending crisis of the 20th dynasty. He managed to defeat Thereafter, a new High Priest disen-
succession to undermine royal legitimacy, the fleet of Sea Peoples amid the Delta franchised the pharaoh as the provider of
in an effort to steer more power to the marshes in 1174. However, these powerful life and safeguard of the cosmic order,
provinces. However, they discovered raiders had already destroyed all other declaring him a simple agent of the

3634 I [Link]/cgi/doi/10. 1073/pnas.1 114845109 Butzer

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supreme god Amun (32). By 1075, Ram- (i.e., new Persian empire) times (226-637 gemony were punctuated by serious Ш
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esses XI was a mere figurehead, residing CE), after which the population eventually rebellions and the wanton Seljuk de-
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in the Delta, with Upper Egypt ruled by collapsed by as much as 95%, toward struction of Khuzistan at approximately
the High Priest in the name of Amun, the time of the destruction of Baghdad by 1015 CE (41), until the economy was in
while Nubia became independent. Usur- a Mongol-led coalition in 1258 CE. That full decline and the Nahrawan canal ULI
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pation had been completed and Egypt span of approximately 700 y is hardly ceased to function (35). Islamic historians
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was divided. "abrupt" by any reckoning, but it does not and poets have eulogized the size, wealth, I
take into account that there were in fact and scholarship of Baghdad at the mo- i
Evaluation. The subsistence crises from two distinct collapses. ment of its demise and depopulation inS
1170 to 1110 were preconditioned by During the 630s CE, the Arab Conquest 1258, but such descriptions actually harked <
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(i) debilitating wars to repel invaders,destroyed the Sasanid Empire militarily, back 300 y, to the heyday of Abbasid civ-
(и) the loss of Mediterranean commerce, replacing its administrative institutions, ilization (42). Instead the archaeological
(iii) official corruption, and (iv) a lackbringing
of with it a new elite and many set- evidence shows that the irrigation system
support from the priesthood controlling tlers from Arabia. Islam replaced Zoro- had collapsed well before any Mongol
the temple granaries. However, the re- astrianism and Christianity as the leading destruction (35), and was not recon-
peated waves of wild inflation strongly religion. Indigenous speakers of Aramaic, structed until the 20th century. Unfor-
suggest that famines were triggered by Persian, and Arabic gradually amalgam- tunate is that the early Islamic archives of
Nile failures (33). At Memphis, floods atedhad with immigrant Arabs to forge a new, Iraq had only been partially studied before
declined by approximately 6 m from ap- Arabic-speaking ethnicity (40). Sociopo- their destruction by fire in 2003.
proximately 1300 to 1100 ВСЕ, a trend litical collapse was complete by approxi- There were then two Islamic collapses in
that was paralleled in Nubia, where sand mately 642 CE, but with some evidence of Mesopotamia, the first in the wake of the
dunes swept the floodplain and agricultureearlier decline in response to population Arab Conquest at approximately 640
had to be abandoned (22). loss from the Justinian plague (541 CE), CE, the second beginning in the 10th
However, decline of the redistributive exacerbated by many decades of in- century and concluding with Mongol
economy continued even after the famines conclusive warfare between the Sasanids plundering of what was left of Baghdad in
were overcome, while Egypt was divided andasByzantium until shortly before the 1258 CE. The first collapse spanned ap-
a state and fragmented as a country. Unlike Arab onslaught. proximately a century, the second as long as
the admonitions literature of the First In- Repeated innovations in irrigation 300 y, and the responsible processes
termediate Period, which espoused a strategy can be traced in Mesopotamia,were very different. However, consistent
return to traditional cosmic values, duringbeginning with the Sasanids, who de- themes were war, land use change, and
the 20th Dynasty, there was no persuasiveveloped a novel system that opened up irrigation, or fiscal mismanagement.
exhortation toward a moral high ground large areas for cultivation with a lattice ofThe collapse of new kingdom Egypt and
(18). Instead there is the "Tale of Woe," intersecting canals to enclose polygons of of Islamic Mesopotamia involved the
which laments arbitrary rule, violence, variable size, with waters distributed persons and sources of indigenous power,
excessive tax demands, falsified units of from the Euphrates and Tigris (ref. 35, pp. both worldly and divine, and the external
measure, hunger, and the breakdown 200-241). Although favoring salinization forces of chaos may have weighed heavily
of the social contract (ref. 34 and ref. 18. in the long run, such basins could be on sociocultural consciousness. The out-
pp. 291-293). Egypt was impoverished and flooded annually, to optimize the use of comes probably were traumatic, but in the
demoralized, and at the end of the new available water. A great canal, the Nah-end, Egypt, as a society and an environ-
kingdom, swelling disaster did not provokerawan, was led from the Tigris near Sa-ment, was more resilient than Mesopota-
political or social resilience. Instead the marra to irrigate the eastern side of themia and continued to function with a
ascendant military-priestly caste exhibitedriver. However, the Sasanid network had modicum of success. The failure of the ir-
little vision. The once integrative national begun to deteriorate in the wake of cata- rigation society of Mesopotamia was an
bureaucracy had failed amid pervasive strophic floods after 628 CE that de- ecological tragedy, leading to the wasteland
corruption, giving way to a chaotic and stroyed or silted up transverse canals, as reported by 19th century travelers (43).
superstition-driven theocracy that paradedthe Tigris shifted and caused the growth of
as a "rebirth." Nubian and Libyan dynas- a vast swamp, accompanied by a high wa- Integration: A Didactic Model for
ties followed in control. ter table favoring salinization of the low-Historical Collapse
There was, in fact, no reconstitution ermost alluvial plain. After the Conquest,Discourse on historical collapse has tended
or significant restoration until the in- the Sasanid system was abandoned andto be macroscopic and generalizing, based
digenous Saite revival, which began under new master canals were cut along differ- on limited comparative research. Little
a vigorous king in 664 ВСЕ, almost a half ent, more traditional trajectories, but wa- attention was given to the politicoeco-
millennium after initial disintegration. tering less than half of its previous [Link] markers of state devolution, or the
The end of new kingdom Egypt was a quite This catastrophic disjuncture suggests strategic solutions that may have been at-
different experience than old kingdom fundamental social disruption in the wake tempted but failed. Rarely considered
collapse, with breaching of multiple of the Arab Conquest, as the administra- were the attributes of cultural identity that
thresholds that apparently created virtually tive superstructure was replaced by a might have been rejected or transformed.
irreversible changes. new elite, probably unfamiliar with Sasa- The preceding analyses emphasize the wide
nid methods (ref. 35, p. 218). range of variables involved, the compli-
Insights from Islamic Mesopotamia However, Mesopotamia promptly re- cated time frames, and the roles of textual
Lower Mesopotamia has qualified as an covered and, after 750 CE, became the or insider information.
irrigation society for approximately 6000 y. heartland of the powerful Abbasid Empire,Interpreted with the aid of a simplified,
heuristic model (Fig. 1), the case studies
Much of the central alluvial plain was ar- based on a modest recovery of the irriga-
chaeologically surveyed by Robert Adams tion system and the tribute from far-flungexamined here and in the SI Text suggest
(35-39) before field research in Iraq came provinces. It reached its apogee under that the complexity of the social-ecologi-
to a halt. Such survey data are dependent the legendary Harun al-Rashid (786-809 cal interface is as much about inter-
on pottery dating and are not an ideal relationships as it is about the identifi-
CE) but then began to decline as a result
proxy for population trends, but cautious of wasteful expenditures and rapacious cation of stressors. Related questions are
inferences are possible. Premodern set- tax farming (40). Late Abbasid mis- comprehensively discussed later, but, be-
tlement density peaked during Sasanid government and weakening imperial he-ing grounded in historical examples, a

Butzer PNAS | March б, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 10 | 3635

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 RESILIENCE & RECONSTITUTION
ADAPTATIONS New ideologies
Environmental resilience Partial reversal of social changes 4 '
TDirPPDQ o Reemphasis of 'cosmic order' Authoritarian military leader I
JJ гд! í _ , _ . , _ г чш Rallying of elites Conservative, archaizing trend I
PRECONDITIONS CONCATENATIONS _ , _ . , _ г чш Social transformation Partial ecological recovery I

Abusive tax-farming Foreign attacks/invasion STABILIZATION RECONSTRUCTION ? INCOMPLETE

Uncontrolled pastoralism Loss of economic networks RECOVERY
Rural insecurity Food shortfalls
Agro-maximization Shortage of raw materials
Declining agro-productivity Declining productivity INITIAL BREAKDOWN ADVANCED BREAKDOWN
Anthropogenic degradation Economic depression
Subsistence crises Fracture of social order
? Foreign invasion
Polarization of elites Civil wars
ECONOMIC/FISCAL Epidemic disease Chaotic internal migration _
DECLINE ® >4 Rural flight ^ Subsistence crises - ^
(Decadal) Urban decline ^ Population decline
(Timescales Depopulation begins state fragmentation
Decadal or Centennial) Loss of revenues/authority Partial loss of cultural memory
Political simplification Pastoral settlers
Foreign hegemony ^ r

INSTABILITY roilAPSF UULLArot

roilAPSF UULLArot С0М*ЕТ
SOCIOPOLITICAL
(Decadal) (Centennial) DEVOLUTION
K.W. Butzer/J. Oswald

Fig. 1. A conceptual model for historical collapse, situating the variables and processes of stress and interaction discussed in the text. Timescales range from
multidecadal to centennial. Alternate pathways point to important qualities of resilience. Red superscripts identify stages that are elaborated by blue sub-
scripts. Environmental components (red within boxes) are secondary to sociopolitical factors.

word of caution is due that the insights of graded environment to unleash more cat- as the elasticity of resilience. Drawing from
the model are not applicable to currentastrophic forms of hydrological behavior or the experience of the historical case
issues without modification. slope failure (44-46). Climatic variables studies, Fig. 1 suggests that a precon-
can also precondition the environment by ditioning economic decline typically
Inputs, Triggers, and interactive Variables. accelerating degradation, or disastrous spans decades or centuries. Contrary to
The process of breakdown typically floods may provoke outbreaks of epidemic frequent claims of "abrupt" collapse, the
begins with economic or fiscal decline disease. Population decline or the disin- triggers that bring economic crisis are
caused by external and internal inputs, tegration of economic networks may re- more likely to operate at a multidecadal
some of which are long-term and pre- inforce environmental feedbacks, com- scale. The first stage of stabilization or
condition a system to suboptimal perfor- promising food production as well as instability may also be fairly rapid, whereas
mance or weakened social-ecological access to external information, food sup- a more complex reconstitution or com-
response. Others are short-term but in- plies, markets, and raw materials. plete breakdown is likely to span a century
tense, serving as triggers (or, in combina- However, the case studies (SI Text) in- or more. Time frames would also be af-
tion, as concatenations) for a deep dicate that environmental inputs mainly fected by the absence of rapid or sustained
economic crisis provoking rapid change. played supporting roles in a train of eventsmeans of communication in earlier his-
Such inputs may activate cascading (posi- set in motion by institutional incom- torical eras.
tive) feedbacks that sustain or enhance petence or corruption, civil strife and inse-
negative trends, to create instability in thecurity, invasion, or pandemics. Here gov- Environmental Resilience. "Resilience"
early stages of breakdown. If instead ernment failure is likely to precondition of human ecosystems can be usefully
there is a resilient response, leading to the system, with external war as another subdivided into a triad of intersecting
beneficial readaptations, devolution may potential trigger. Protracted conflict may environmental, political, and cultural
be slowed or stabilized. In the longer term, well be destructive for infrastructure, food components. Negative feedbacks resist,
such pathways may allow reconstitution production, manufacturing, market access, dampen, or reverse change. Precondition-
and reconstruction or, alternatively, con- and demographic success. It can also bring ing factors may also impose a degree of
tinuing breakdown and eventual collapse. sociopolitical domination of one group stability. Perhaps little appreciated is
Degradation of soils or other biotic by another, enslavement, rural insecurity, that some environmental systems are more
resources (deforestation, ground-cover and socioeconomic or ethnic conflict, resilient than others in regard to anthro-
removal, soil erosion, or groundwater de- stimulating everyday violence and rural pogenic or climatic change and their cas-
pletion and salinization) represents in- abandonment. cading feedbacks.
cremental damage that lowers thresholds Finally, it bears emphasizing that decline Politicoeconomic structures in Europe
for more rapid down-the-line change, or collapse can be either consequence orhave been less vulnerable to collapse than
particularly in conjunction with in- cause of sociopolitical devolution. It may those of arid lands in the Near East. Great
competent administration, destructive land undermine traditional customs, law, and irrigation networks that supported large
use, or rural flight. Declining resource institutions, particularly in the case of populations in Mesopotamia were fragile
productivity increases pressure on the en- conflict between different elite groups, so because they are artificial, i.e., relatively
vironment and may precondition an envi- as to reduce sociocultural resilience. Out- homogeneous, managed, and hierarchical
ronmental subsystem for failure. comes are difficult to predict because of thesystems that require much capital or labor
Effective climatic inputs are most likely interplay of multiple, cascading, or buff- to maintain, and exponentially more to
to be high-recurrence perturbations, such ering feedbacks (Fig. 1). reconstruct. The desert may return after
as excessive rains or floods, and more abandonment, not because of damage to
persistent, decadal anomalies (such as se- Time Frames. Duration of the processesthe environment but because of human
vere droughts) that serve as triggering favoring decline or recovery helps to disengagement. Critical here are land
mechanisms, impacting a stressed or de- tenure, the mobilization of labor, and the
identify the processes of devolution as well

3636 I [Link]/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1 114845109 Butzer

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complexity of large irrigation systems. When and reforestation with invasive or orna- centralization. First, the power-sharing
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rent, tax, or work demands become im- mental trees does not qualify as recovery. councils of traditional nobility disap-
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possible, Near Eastern peasants have his- Similar misunderstandings can arise about peared. Eventually, the generals of the
torically abandoned their villages to enter tropical savanna woodlands (52), as to huge army assumed that role, while the
the broad spectrum of semipastoral pursuits the role of fire, or about the age and origin traditional kin and landholders were dis- ш

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that fill the gap between cultivation and fully of grassy mosaics in woodland (53). placed from lower management roles by
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mobile nomadic herding. Beyond the reach Facile generalizations are equally in- civil servants, with a work force increas- <

appropriate in arid lands. The conjoined ingly formed of non- Assyrian deportees,è to
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of the tax collector, such semipastoralists
reverted to simpler lifeways in what was Tigris/Euphrates floodplain with its radialfavor non-Assyrian cultures and belief эо
a fiscal wasteland, but not a deserted canal systems is vulnerable to violent floods systems. In this late Assyrian case, political
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landscape. This was the condition of lower that destroy riverbank cities (36-38), ex- transformation was not catastrophic but
Mesopotamia until the late 19th century plode in crevasses, shift courses, over- part of a strategic progression that ma-
(43). That is the true meaning of socio- whelm canals with silt, or raise the water nipulated institutional roles.
ecological collapse in irrigable, Near East- table of desert plains liable to salinization. States may collapse because of in-
ern desert environments. Multiple domains By contrast, artificial irrigation in Egypt competent rulers, but surviving members of
and scales of institutional displacement was superimposed on the natural rhythm the old elites, together with new allies of
imply fairly resilient "final" regimes (47), diverging persuasion, will eventually help
of existing flood basins, to enhance the
i.e., reconstitution will be very difficult. height and duration of the inundation pick a new candidate to support. In other
In southern Europe, by contrast, mixed words, even in the wake of substantial
while flushing soluble salts downstream.
farming is less specialized but also less Egypt could support permanent settle-change, the political class represents a key
productive. Temporary abandonment plays ment even with little artificial irrigation, force of resilience and potential stabiliza-
out at intermediate scales in compartmen- although at a much lower carrying capacity. tion, in tandem with the religious estab-
talized but selected biohabitats. It does That was not the case in Mesopotamia, lishment. Important is the rallying of elite
not turn the land over to desert, and where breakdown of complex canal net- groups and institutional bureaucracies,
renewed settlement requires more modest works would force wholesale abandonment perhaps with a shift of ideology. The
community coordination or start-up in- of agriculture. Such differences underscoreconvergence of such fundamental interests
vestment. In Greece, with great spatial the distinct environmental and land use may not be able to halt a downward cycle
complexity, there were periodic waves of soil histories of Egypt and Mesopotamia. En-of collapse, but they are basic to sub-
erosion caused by climate or land use (48, vironmentally triggered collapse in Egyptsequent regeneration through the revival of
49), but urban life and agriculture soon would be comparatively short-term and dynastic ambition, the imposition of law
resumed, with the necessary investment to have modest demographic impact, but in and order, and a redefined symbolic co-
mitigate much past damage. In other Mesopotamia it could be catastrophic. hesion of national interests.
words, Mediterranean and many Western In specific ecological contexts and at The darker side of revival is that it may
agrosystems are relatively stable and less different spatial scales, environmental not involve a reassessment or reaffirma-
liable to "catastrophic" simplification. En- inputs mobilize certain processes, define tion of old ideals embedded in cultural
vironmental resilience - not impairment - thresholds, follow time-paths, and favor memory. Many or most decisions would be
is the basic difference between southern outcomes that may be distinctive. Beyondmade under stress, with the goal of securing
Europe and the Near East in the longue the exotic rivers of the Near East, pre- or consolidating power. Disagreements
durée of demography and agrarian pro- cipitation anomalies vary spatially and may have been contested by populist
duction. It is not a matter of Eastern dec- temporally. However, environmentally demands but are more likely to be settled
adence or Western cultural fortitude. grounded crises are culturally screened and by military force. Traditional values may
What may be true at a large, global scale perceived, so as to affect vulnerability, fall into oblivion in the course of de-
is more complicated at the regional or local resilience, and response, as well as the structive violence, as the old order falters.
level. Deforestation or land clearance timescales at which underlying processes In the end, the new elites probably cast
can put diversity at risk, but the often can be addressed. Environmental elasticitytheir lot with a new military leader, as
higher inherent diversity of secondary Spengler foresaw (4), more adept at neu-
may be critical in the mitigating of collapse,
vegetation, with its many commensal or in the ability of a society to carry on. tralizing internal or external enemies than
plants, may actually impart greater resil- championing the higher ideals of gover-
ience to stressed biotic communities. In Political Resilience. In conjunction with thenance. Interlinear clues from Egypt and
northern Greece, the prehistoric pollen case studies, analogues from anthropologyMesopotamia imply that the emerging so-
record shows that plant diversity was and political ecology suggest that ruling cial contract is more likely to have been
greater in areas of degraded vegetation authoritarian than enlightened, with older
families and elites tend to support the state,
(50), whereas in Spain, Mediterranean if only in self-interest. The trauma of rules of class distinction and land tenure
scrub (i.e., monte bajo ) offers more nutri- collapse in ancient kingdoms can be re- rigidly enforced. In general, the chances are
tious graze, especially after burns, through versed by new dynastic cycles, during which that an exploitative political economy will
increased legume dispersal (51). It also rulers rebuilt their societies with the sup-not favor conservationist land use (46).
opens opportunities for subsequent con- port of new elite groupings, but not
version to olive groves or vineyards. necessarily with the same identity or po- Cultural Resilience. Sociopolitical structures
Mediterranean people regard monte bajo litical center. Whatever the complex appear to be the most fragile compo-
not as "waste" but as land in reserve, rationales of statehood or power, elites can nents in collapse of archaic states or tra-
which is used for local pastoralism and come together to support a new ruler in ditional societies, in which there was no
wood gathering, but can be converted to rebuilding similar or modified administra-role for the equivalent of contemporary,
more productive orchards when markets tive and ideological structures. In this community-based structures. The case
improve (46). Early forestry experts from way, ruling dynasties were periodically able studies suggest that hierarchical orders
higher latitudes were disturbed by the to reassert the authority of kingship in were "simplified," probably with a transfer
open nature of Mediterranean woodlands, Egypt and Mesopotamia. of authority. Formal institutions, dynas-
even though they were looking at old- Repeated simplification and cyclic ties, national symbols, and states come and
growth formations (44, 45). Deforestation change in Assyria in approximately 1800 to go, but was ťhis accompanied by a loss
is therefore not a simple process that can 1600 ВСЕ is documented and interpreted of religious or linguistic identity? Either
be equated with human degradation, by Yoffee (54) as a net shift to greater or both have frequently changed in the

Butzer PNAS I March 6, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 10 | 3637

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course of human history, without engen- little room for community decision-mak- it adds only two examples of collapse
dering collapse. However, both are critical ing if a top-down leadership screens the [Greenland, the Maya (58, 59)], but four
facets of self-identification and cultural or • compatibility of new ideas, adaptive instances in which resilience allowed fun-
social memory, and their loss can mark strategies, and behavioral feedbacks. Al- damental change without simplification or
ethnic transformation. though cultural resilience may have been breakdown (the prehistoric Levant, Ice-
Was cultural integrity involved, in the mainly passive in a longer historical frame, land, Cyprus, Colonial Mexico (44, 60-62)].
sense of community values, rituals of sol- there are counter-examples such as in- Reviewing subsistence crises in western
idarity, age-cohort and sex relationships, digenous rebellions in Ptolemaic Egypt Europe after approximately 1200 CE
strategies for subsistence, stewardship of (57) or bloody slave and peasant revolts in identifies food riots, peasant revolts, and
multigenerational resources, and general Abbasid Mesopotamia (40). Whether up- wars of religion, but no radical sociopoliti-
lifeways? Such traits circumscribe a tighter risings achieved their desired results is cal transformations until the French Rev-
radius of "who we are," "what we do," dubious because they often appear to have olution. This more recent historical
and "how we make a living," that pre- provoked tighter repression. Cultural re- experience also suggests that environmental
sumably underlie a dominant social ratio- silience is a tricky quality. It may help or economic disasters do not necessarily
nale and are quite resistant to change. resist change, but only up to a certain lead to social breakdown or collapse.
However, the fact that cultures develop threshold, beyond which cascading feed- However, the late Medieval to early
unique situational constraints is critical in backs can trigger unanticipated social or Modern period in western Europe did see
understanding the processes of resilience. political transformation. a continuing and fundamental shift of food
For example, the cultural integrity of Egypt producing and distribution strategies, to
or Mesopotamia - similar at some levels From Past to Present. Several generalizations a good degree in response to a series of
but not at others - has remained intact can now be drawn from the case studies and wrenching environmental crises. After the
across many millennia, despite changes of discussion of historical collapse: Medieval Warm Period (~850-1280 CE),
language, religion, and ethnic identity. and until the Little Ice Age (~ 1570-1860
Collapse commonly involves demo- /) The most common input attribute at an CE), there were three centuries marked
graphic change. A population may be de- early stage of every breakdown (ex- by extreme climatic perturbations (63,
cimated by warfare, disease, famine, for- cept possibly Axum) was institutional 64) analogous to the seemingly unprece-
eign colonization, migration, expulsion, or failure, viz. incompetence, loss of eco- dented disturbed weather of the past 25 y.
total elimination. Large-scale expulsion nomic networks, corruption, or dynas- These environmental changes and their
and deportation are verified for the late tic crises. context are encapsulated in the SI Text
Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian empires, ii) Civil war or invasion was as critical as because they suggest a transition of focal
symptomatic of an unstable balance be- length, organization, and available in-
any form of climatic forcing.
tween human resources and imperial formation, in approaching the inter-
iii) Environmental degradation such as soil
ambitions. An inability of civilian author- section of diachronic and synchronic
erosion is only documented for Axum
ities or religious ritual to redress the rav- perspectives.
ages of epidemic disease can spur social and the Black Death (see SI Text), in
The modernization of western European
unrest, and high losses leave land un- contrast to climatic perturbations that food production during the past millen-
cultivated to cause subsequent famine. helped trigger breakdowns in Old and nium, as painful as it was for the many, was
Strong demographic declines may not lead New Kingdom Egypt, the Fayum, or decentralized and protracted. It reveals
to collapse, but they can put institutional Mesopotamia on the eve of the Islamic unexpected resilience and the ability of
structures under severe stress, or favor conquest. people under extreme stress to try new
ecologically harmful land use strategies iv) Demographic retraction was preva- solutions. It appears that, after overcoming
of short-term survival. initial, ideological dissonance, people can
lent during or after collapse, com-
Since the 15th century CE, major Medi- monly linked with pestilence. The indeed come together to support change.
terranean cities were dependent on Polish The key differences with our historical
Black Death is the classic example
wheat imported by sea (55). Such conti- case studies are structural. Ancient Egypt
of a pathogen-driven, catastrophic
nental economic networks are a stabilizing and Mesopotamia were authoritarian, with
depopulation.
force, and their breakdown can have global no feasible bottom-up options, whereas
demographic repercussions. Parallel cycles v) Ideological shifts accompanied col-
western European societies were, to a sur-
of urban growth or decline throughout lapse in New Kingdom Egypt, the prising degree, corporate and participatory
Eurasia have been evident during the past Fayum, Mesopotamia, and Axum, in (65), with a high tolerance of individu-
2500 y (9, 11), and have been linked to part overlapping with foreign intru- alistic behavior (66). Change is difficult to
climatic perturbations (56) or, more likely, sion or ethnic change. implement in dictatorships that cow their
manpower shortages in the wake of pan- citizens by force, silence dissent, and
demics. However, as the disastrous modern In other words, poor leadership, admin- stifle initiative. Megacrises can best be
famines of Ireland (1840s) and India istrative dysfunction, and ideological am- confronted by flexibility and the cohesion
(1940s) - each with a mortality of 1 millionbivalence appear to be endemic to the of most social classes or components
or more lives - bear out, millennial or processes of collapse. War or climatic per- within a particular polity or region.
centennial demographic waves cannot be turbations possibly served as triggering Historical monitoring across long time-
explained by single factors. mechanisms, but environmental degradation scales is vital to situate the present or apply
Constructions of the nature of collapse, does not appear as a universal variable. to contemporary or future problems of
like contemporary opinions of "failing Demographic decline was either a coagency sustainability (67-69). However, it does not
states," must be sensitive that some crite- or a delayed result of change, except for the provide simple prescriptive insights about
ria are inherently Eurocentric, not cross- Black Death. Collapse was a consequence of the risks of global change, counter-ecolog-
cultural. Peoples with different historical multiple factors, reinforced by various ical behavior, pandemics, or sustainability.
experience do not necessarily share feedbacks and partly balanced by resilience, What it does do is suggest that all too much
Western perceptions of stress, chaos, or with unpredictable outcomes. The compar- of the alarmist literature that claims to
disaster. This might indirectly affect the ative importance of societal versus environ- draw from historical experience is poorly
political economy of traditional social mental inputs seems to favor the social side. focused, simplistic, and unhelpful. Our
contexts. Given structural constraints and If the number of case studies is expanded diachronic investigation implies that the
elite demands, there may well have been to include others from this Special Feature, specter of historical collapse has become

3638 I [Link]/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1 1 14845109 Butzer

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a red herring. The pundits should instead citizenry. Given the increasing frequency lightened leadership, and opportunities for a.
turn their attention to information diffusion and scale of disastrous climatic events, broad participation and fresh ideas.
IS)

and socioeconomic integration, across class today there is an urgent need for competing
lines and different spatial scales. societal elites to downplay ideological ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. Sheryl Luzzadder Beach,
Modern states, even when marginally difference and face the realities of global Georgina Endfield, David Helgren, Andrew Ш

Dugmore, Paul Hudson, Elisabeth Butzer, and Paul d

dysfunctional, have significant advantages climate change, anticipating its momentous
Butzer contributed critical suggestions and feed- ё
over their archaic counterparts in terms of socioeconomic implications. These dia- back. Cartographic rendering was done by John <

administrative experience, information, chronic insights highlight the importance Oswald, and Anwar Sounny-Slitine contributed to <
сс
and an increasingly educated and engaged of information: better understanding, en- the library search. э
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1
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