Understanding Moral Realism Today
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ChrisUnderstanding Moral Realism Today
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ChrisChapter one
Values in a
disenchanted world
1.1 Disenchantment
This book is about morality in the broadest, most fundamental
sense. The philosophical study of such a topic is called “metaethics,”
reminding us that we are not so much searching for particular answers
to everyday ethical questions (e.g. is it okay to tell a small lie to bring
about a greater good? do the ends justify the means?), but instead
are seeking an understanding of the very idea of morality in the first
place. What do we mean by moral words such as “good,” “right,”
and “evil”? Do these words correspond to any objective facts, or
are they merely (perhaps useful) artificial creations? The general
position of this book is to defend a metaethical view commonly
called “Moral Realism.” This view will not necessarily tell us what
to do in actual, concrete situations (although we will consider some
possible concrete applications in Chapter 7); rather, it is designed to
help shed light on what morality itself is. Specifically, moral realists
believe that something about our ethical beliefs, actions, and concepts
is “real” in some sense—that a core aspect of morality is “not up to
us” or is “independent” from us in some way. Moral realists believe
that there are “moral truths” in the world and that an individual or
even an entire culture might be “wrong” about moral matters.
On the one hand, some may find this sort of moral realism highly
intuitive, if not downright obvious. After all, humans are constantly
making moral claims about what “should” or “should not” be done,
2 Moral Realism
about what is “right” and “wrong,” about things or people which
are “good” or “bad.” Morality is a ubiquitous and foundational
dimension of our lives: our moral ideals and behavior are part of
how we define ourselves as both individuals and groups. Indeed,
morality is deeply intertwined with our sense that our lives and
actions “have value” or “mean something” (cf. Wiggins 1976). Yet,
on the other hand, the claim that “morality” is somehow “real” may
strike others as naive and unhelpful. After all, “morality” is a broad
domain of human experience and thought, and saying that “it” is
real is rather like saying “biology” or “art” is real—either trivial or
else a category mistake. Furthermore, even a cursory philosophical
reflection is sufficient to recognize that there are formidable
challenges facing moral realism: Where are these alleged moral
facts, and why do people constantly (and often brutally) disagree
about them? For morality to affect us in the alleged existential way
that it does, must it not be at least partially subjective? Those who
find this second line of reasoning more attractive may be called
moral antirealists.1
The very existence of this debate tells us something about the
contemporary position in which morality finds itself. Metaethics
as a domain of philosophical inquiry is by and large a uniquely
modern phenomenon. This is not to say that earlier cultures or
people never reflected on the foundations of morality, or did
not have commitments to particular views which have analogs
in modern metaethics. Even though the word “metaethics”
wasn’t coined until well into the twentieth century, we can still,
for instance, speak perfectly sensibly about Plato’s or Aquinas’s
or Zhuangzi’s metaethical outlooks. But there are features of
the modern world that undergird our approach to morality in
fundamentally different ways than these earlier thinkers may have
appreciated. Most notably, the specific terms of the contemporary
realist/antirealist debate have arisen in response to what we might
call a modern “disenchantment” with traditional substitutes for
metaethics. The idea that modernity has been “disenchanting”
in certain ways was popularized by Max Weber, “the father of
sociology,” who famously remarked that, “The fate of our times
is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and,
above all, by ‘the disenchantment of the world’” (1948: 155). Since
Weber’s time, the theme of “modernist dissatisfaction” has almost
assumed the status of a truism. Rather than evaluate this theme
VALUES IN A DISENCHANTED WORLD 3
in its generality, however, let’s look at three particular features
of modern “disenchantment” that have been thought to generate
unique challenges for moral realism.
First, organized religion has lost much of its uncontested status
in the modern world. This is certainly not to say that individuals
or cultures are necessarily becoming “less religious.” For example,
while an increasing number of young Americans might be leaving
the organized churches, mosques, or temples of their parents,
their “spirituality” and the degree to which they see religion as
important in their lives seems to be on the rise.2 So-called mega
churches are getting more mega, mission trips are on the rise, and
far from Nietzsche’s provocative prognosis that, under conditions
of modernity, “God is dead,” globalization instead seems to have
generated more religious zeal and influence in political affairs
worldwide (cf. Shah and Toft 2006). However, even if people are
not necessarily becoming less religious, nonetheless the authority of
religion is becoming more contestable. Theology can no longer be
assumed as the “queen of the sciences” as it was for centuries, for
theology is relative to a specific religious tradition which provides
its starting assumptions, and modernity has confronted us with a
variety of different, potentially competing religious traditions, and
thus potentially divergent theologies. Choice of membership within
different religious affiliations is more open, and atheism as a social-
political identity is an explicitly articulated (if still controversial)
alternative in a way that would have largely been a nonstarter two
centuries ago.3 Religiousness has become more of a self-conscious
phenomenon than an enthymematic constituent of identity: even for
religious individuals, there is more of an awareness of religion qua
religion (i.e. as something against alternatives). Sectarian fissures
within historic religious traditions highlight the “open question”
that confronts a particular faith. It is not obvious that we all live
within the same Christendom, or Dar al-Islam, or under the same
Heaven, mainly because, from a religious perspective, it is not
clear that there is a monolithic “we” any longer. (Of course, there
probably never was such monism; the point, though, is just that
this plurality is harder to deny in the modern world.) Thus, even
religious fundamentalism must be seen as a uniquely modernist
phenomenon, that is, as a counter-culture response that only makes
sense as opposition to (perceived) developments in mainstream
modern cultures.