Spectators (gate receipts), Sponsors and Subsidies from Local sources – the SSSL
model as described in Andreff and Staudohar (2000) – and switched to a MCMMG
model of finance based on new Global sources of revenue, such as Media (TV revenue),
Corporations, Merchandising and Markets. FL1 is so typical of MCMMG1
O fato do artigo de Adreff e Saudohar ter sido escrito antes do início do novo
milênio é interessante pelas expectativas falhas com relação à viabilidade financeira dos
clubes, desde que rendessem à inevitável realidade do modelo MCMMG. A situação
financeira dos clubes se provou bem distinta – clubes estão se mostrando deficitários em
plena década de 2020, muitos indo à falência e outros sendo vendidos por preços
simbólicos, para o repasse de dívidas para um novo proprietário. De todo modo, os
autores preveem problemas dessa ordem, advindos da ausência de uma maior regulação
da remuneração dos atletas.
Lei Bosman
The Bosman case is akin to the 1975 arbitration ruling in the United States that allowed
free agency for baseball players who played with their clubs for 1 year without a
contract, and which was later extended to American football, basketball, and hockey.
Although revision in the European system of sports finance was underway before the
Bosman decision, the elimination of restrictions on the player labor market has
accelerated the change.
1
ANDREFF, W.; STAUDOHAR, P., The Evolving European Model of Professional Sports Finance,
Journal of Sports Economics, 1 (3), 2000, 257-76.
Throughout most of the 20th century, the primary source of revenue to European
professional sports was gate receipts. In some countries (Germany, France, Italy) there
were subsidies from national and local governments and industrial patrons such as Fiat,
Bayer, Philips, and Peugeot.3 Advertising revenues became more important, and in the
1960s and 1970s, corporate sponsorship increased significantly, as firms sought more
direct identification in terms of audience, image, notoriety, and sales. Even in cases
where a club received subsidies from local authorities, usually municipalities, there was
corporate sponsorship (but not ownership), typically in situations where the companies
were geographically located close to the club (e.g., Fiat and Juventus, both in Torino,
Italy; Philips and PSV, both in Eindhoven, Holland; and Peugeot and FC Sochaux, both
in Sochaux-Montbéliard, France. (Andreff p. 259)
The above model of finance can thus be referred to as Spectators-Subsidies-Sponsors-
Local or SSSL. It has existed for a long time in all European countries. In countries
where public subsidies to professional clubs are forbidden, most of the difference is
made up by private donations, subscriptions, and membership fees.
Although television rights sales appeared in the financing of the British cricket clubs in
1978 and in French football in 1980-1981, television was not an important source of
funds to clubs. It simply did not fit into the strategies of professional leagues and clubs.
In 1967, for instance, the British Football Premier League rejected a BBC proposal of a
million pounds for live broadcast of championship matches. In France, the Stade
Rennais football club refused a 50,000 franc proposal in 1965 for televising a single
match. The leagues and clubs were fearful that live television broadcasting would
decrease attendance at the stadium, thus shrinking their major source of revenue. Given
the lack of competition among broadcasters— there was only one public television
station at the time—the monopsony rights fee would not be sufficient to compensate for
lost gate receipts.
Most top-level European professional clubs no longer have the financial structure of the
old SSSL model. During the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s, new sources of
revenue emerged and old ones declined. For example, gate receipts in Division 1 French
football fell from 81% in 1970-1971 to 50% in 1985-1986 and 19.9% in 1997-1998 (see
Table 2). In Italian Division 1 football a similar trend is evident, as spectators brought in
71% of revenue in 1988, but only 36% in 1998 (see Table 5). An exception to the trend
is Spanish football, which remains more dependent on spectators due to the important
system of season ticket buyers (“socios”) in that country A CULTURA ASSOCIATIVA
FOI IMPORTANTE, MESMO APÓS O FIM DAS ASSOCIAÇÕES – AGORA
SEASON TICKETS (!!!!!)
ATENTAR PARA O MERCHANDISING DOS INGLESES!!!!
If the SSSL model has declined, what are the new sources of funds to professional
sports? In 1997-1998, television rights took the first rank in the finance of French
professional football and the second rank in the finance of several big European clubs
(see Tables 2 and 5). The relative importance of television is increasing in other sports
as well. Television has become, or is destined to be, the main source of professional
sports finance
A media takeover is evidenced by the current strategy of firms in the broadcast industry,
such as BSkyB, CLT-UFA, AB Sports, Canal Plus, and Pathé (Bourg, 1999), which
consists of buying up shares in a professional club’s stock. Involvement of the media is
not entirely new. Also, public television channels have long been contributors to
football revenues (RAI to the Italian Calcio, ARD-ZDF to the German Bundesliga,
BBC to the British Premier League, and ORTF to the French National Football League).
However, their support has been a subsidiary source of funds compared to spectators,
patrons, and sponsors.
A major reason explaining the rise of television and participation by media companies is
increased competition in the industry. Whereas once there was one public television
station, now there are many public and private channels to choose from (Andreff, Nys,
& Bourg, 1987; Bourg, & Gouguet, 1998). Professional leagues and clubs can make use
of this competition by negotiating more lavish television rights deals. This is a
consequence of privatization and deregulation of the media industry in Europe,
particularly television channels and the phasing out of the monopsonistic position of a
single public channel on the market for sports broadcasting in each European country
Another interesting aspect of the revised model is the emergence of a new generation of
entrepreneurs onto the scene. These corporate titans are no longer the unselfish,
financially disinterested businessmen of the past, but investors bent on improving
financial results of the clubs through ownership and control. There are numerous
examples, a few of which are Jean-Luc Lagardére (Matra into Racing Paris), Silvio
Berlusconi (Fininvest into Milano AC), Joe Lewis (ENIC into Glasgow Rangers), Mark
McCormack (IMG into RC Strasbourg), and Rupert Murdoch (BSkyB’s bid for
Manchester United). The penetration of entrepreneurs and corporations into the sports
business has triggered two significant changes. One is that the club’s administration is
taken over by professional managers, usually but not always resulting in financial
stability. The other change is that the club’s finances benefit from the ability of these
new investors to mobilize additional funds for further growth and competitive edge. The
new owners are eager to establish vertical integration in the industry through promotion
of sporting events, control of stadium facilities, ownership of television rights,
merchandising, and facilitating other aspects of a corporate empire.
A synergism can develop as a result of the interaction between sport and business.
Merchandising, for example, has long been a practice of clubs. But they lacked the
resources for full-scale marketing. Specialists are now doing a better job of promoting a
larger variety of team merchandise to greater numbers of people across broader
geographic areas. Merchandising reached 10% of football club Milano AC’s revenue in
1997, 13% of the Tottenham Hotspurs’, 22% of Newcastle’s, and 34% of Manchester
United’s. For the latter, in 1998, merchandising revenues provided as great a share as
gate receipts. Merchandising is currently the main by-product of football clubs’
operations, providing a whole catalog of items—apparel, linen, toys, schoolbags,
watches, perfumes, and so forth.
This strategy of supplying the market with new players has been pursued more because
the Bosman case allowed any club to recruit an unlimited number of players from other
European Union countries. For instance, French football has been a net supplier to the
European market for professional players after Bosman, and this has contributed to a
flourishing financial state for French clubs.4 Numerous British, Spanish, and Italian
clubs, net buyers in the market, are in the red (Szymanski, 1999).
To conclude, this model is based on four pillars: “Media-Corporations-Merchandising-
Markets.” Moreover, there is no longer a necessary link between the nationality of the
professional club and the television broadcaster, or the company that has an investment
stake, or the stock underwriter, or the players on the field. Thus, at least on a European
scale, professional sport finance is globalized. We thus refer to this model as MCMMG.
The MCMMG model rests more on price and quality variables than on a quantitative
approach to the management of a professional club. Television contracts attract
sponsors who inflate revenues to the stations and thus justify more generous rights fees
to the club or league. This amount is a function of the broadcast market (Bourg &
Gouguet, 1998). For instance, in the case of a supply monopoly of a professional league
selling its events to several competing television channels, broadcast rights fees are far
higher than in the case of a monopsony by a single channel negotiating rights with
several competing leagues or clubs. The latter situation applied to all professional sports
in Europe until the early 1980s, under the SSSL model. A IMPORTÂNCIA DAS
LIGAS
REASONS FOR THE TRANSITION
Prior to the 1980s, European economies were much more government administered and
regulated, so that the intervention of public authorities into the sports business was
common. European economies were less internationalized and less open to competition.
With the emergence of globalization and more open markets, no sector, including
sports, can now escape the logic of the market (Andreff, 1996b). The transformation of
some professional clubs into joint stock equity corporations and the impetus toward
profitability are logical outcomes of applying the MCMMG model to the deregulated
market structure.
The SSSL model is necessarily running out. Under this model, the wage bill was
spinning out of control. In French professional football in 1966-1967, wages (including
mandatory social security payments) were 56% of overall expenses and caused a deficit
of 6.5 million francs. By 1974-1975, wages reached 72% of expenses and about 84% in
1982-1983. Only after a financial stabilization program was launched by the auditing
body of the French National Football League in 1990-1991 did the wage bill decline, to
48% in 1993-1994 and 45% in 1997-1998. This is compared to wage bills in 1997-1998
of 43% in Germany, 46% in Spain, 52% in England, and 68% in Italy (Deloitte &
Touche, 1998). As noted above, deficits have existed in the United Kingdom, Italy, and
Spain. This creates a need for new sources of finance. (…) The value of the best
domestic players was correspondingly overrated, fixed above the equilibrium price by
excess demand. This was incompatible with the hard budget constraints of clubs
hemmed in by the limited sources of finance in the SSSL model. It is not surprising that
a number of European clubs have lost money. HAHAHAHA Ô COITADO!!!!
Anderson
O desenvolvimento da Indústria Cultural sobre o esporte se dá também em
consequência do contexto político-econômico global, marcado, após a crise estrutural
dos anos 1970, por uma mudança do padrão de acumulação do capitalismo ocidental,
que inclui a busca por novas áreas de expansão, como é o caso da cultura, processo
facilitado pelo desenvolvimento da digitalização e das tecnologias da informação e da
comunicação. (Anderson, p.104)
Nos diferentes países do centro e da periferia os governos modificam as legislações,
permitindo a presença do mercado na organização e no controle dos clubes e das ligas.
Além disso, fixa linhas de financiamento – caso da Inglaterra com a reestruturação dos
estádios nos anos 1980 e nos anos seguintes com a disponibilidade de empréstimos para
os clubes – e patrocínios de estatais e empresas públicas de televisão – como ocorreu na
Itália também nos anos 1980. Além disso, estabelece políticas de renegociação das
dívidas dos clubes – casos de Espanha, Itália, Portugal e Brasil – e disponibiliza toda a
infraestrutura de transporte e segurança para a realização dos locais dos espetáculos
futebolísticos (MATIAS, 2018, p. 104).
Os anos 1980 marcam o fim de importante barreira da transmissão de partidas de
futebol pela televisão. Até então se entendia que exibir torneios realizados num mesmo
local tiraria o interesse dos torcedores em ir aos estádios, o que reduziria as receitas com
a bilheteria, valor até então mais relevante para os clubes. O futebol se torna um
programa midiático importante para adquirir audiência para os veículos de
comunicação, num momento histórico de ampliação da concorrência na exibição
audiovisual televisiva (gratuita ou, com o desenvolvimento tecnológico, paga) – com
destaque para o fim do monopólio estatal na radiodifusão em países europeus, tais como
Itália e França. Por outro lado, como afirma Santos (2019), a venda dos direitos de
transmissão de eventos esportivos se tornará a maior fonte de receita dos clubes. Moraes
(2009, p. 73) afirma que: (Anderson, p.105)
Este complexo coloca a mídia no coração das estruturas e práticas esportivas, porque
sem a capacidade da mídia de espalhar os signos e mitos esportivos para diversas
audiências através do globo, o esporte poderia ser uma atividade popular relativamente
menor e incrivelmente anacrônica. A cobertura televisiva, especialmente em sua forma
satelital, tornou-se a principal unidade de receitas na economia cultural do esporte. 45
A transmissão desse esporte em escala maior serve para aumentar a sua difusão, com
público potencial maior do que o que era possível nos estádios. Williams (2016, p. 77)
lembra que “o rádio e a televisão surgiram para satisfazer e estender um hábito cultural
já desenvolvido”. Segundo o autor, a formação de redes esportivas midiáticas gerou
“uma dimensão social cada vez mais significativa na cultura urbana industrial”, com a
televisão sendo “um poderoso vetor de certos movimentos já em curso na sociedade
industrial” a partir de suas diferentes possibilidades de perspectivas de
acompanhamento, que dão “uma nova emoção e um senso de imediatismo ao
assistirmos à ação física e, até mesmo, um novo tipo de experiência visual” (Ibid., p.
78). (Anderson, p.108)
Matias (2018, p. 104) parte para sua análise dos reflexos da reestruturação capitalista,
com expansão da lógica do valor sobre outros campos culturais, caso do futebol, por
entender que a partir da década de 1970 há uma potencialização da “mercantilização do
futebol e em torno dele formou-se um mercado de produtos, serviços, espetáculos,
eventos e megaeventos”. As condições histórico-estruturais que possibilitariam a
apropriação do futebol à forma mercadoria são elencadas pelo autor: a) crescimento do
setor de serviços e entretenimento combinado com processos de precarização e aumento
da taxa de exploração do trabalhador; b) hipertrofia do capital especulativo parasitário;
c) Estado com uma feição empreendedora, que amplia o seu papel em garantir as
condições de produção e reprodução do capital em detrimento ao desenvolvimento de
políticas que garantam direitos; d) produção destrutiva e a taxa decrescente do uso dos
produtos, combinadas com a espetacularização dos fenômenos culturais; e) relativização
do luxo e das necessidades combinado com o exibicionismo e a ostentação em paralelo
ao entesouramento (MATIAS, 2018, p. 74).
A partir daí, há um conjunto de mudanças legais que possibilitaram a ampliação da
mercantilização do jogo, o que envolveu alteração significativa das relações trabalhistas,
ainda que para um modelo que se propunha a dar maior liberdade de atuação do atleta
profissional, com outra etapa de profissionalização do esporte e, consequentemente, de
exploração do trabalho. Isso considerando uma mundialização do mercado futebolístico,
com queda de barreiras para atuação de jogadores estrangeiros em alguns campeonatos
nacionais, o que acentua a centralização de capital e os problemas de concorrência.
Sobre isso, podemos trazer outro conceito, só que mais amplo, que é o de “nova divisão
internacional do trabalho cultural” (NICL) (MILLER et al., 2003).
Há ainda o aumento da comercialização das competições e jogos com os veículos de
comunicação, o que possibilitou também a ampliação da difusão de marcas nos
uniformes das equipes e a possibilidade de utilização da imagem dos jogadores para a
venda de diversos produtos e serviços.
Ocorre também a queda de barreiras para investimentos nos clubes em alguns países,
com destaque para Inglaterra, Itália e França, a partir dos anos 1980, com equipes de
diferentes lugares do globo sendo compradas por acionistas de diversas áreas – JÁ
ENTRA A EMPRESARIZAÇÃO
Mas, ainda segundo A. Santos e I. Santos (2015), o que muda a partir dos anos 1990 é
que a bilheteria deixa de ser a fonte principal de receita, com os recursos de mídia tendo
maior destaque
No final da década de 1980, a liberalização do mercado de telecomunicações contribuiu
para a criação de novas empresas. A atração do desporto, em especial o futebol,
enquanto conteúdo mediático, passou a ter um papel de destaque para a concorrência no
mercado. Assim, a corrida pelos direitos de transmissão fez crescer os preços,
aumentando, significativamente, as receitas dos clubes de futebol. O dinheiro da
televisão tornou-se o principal motor de transformação na indústria do futebol.