JGU Id. No.

______________

O.P. Jindal Global University

Jindal Global Law School
Re-sit Examination – Semester A

Course Name : Legal Methods

Course Code : L-CT-0001
Programme : B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), B.B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) & LL.B. – Year I
Time Allowed : 3 Hours
Maximum Marks : 100

This question paper has seven (7) printed pages (including this page).

Instructions to students:
1. This question paper has two parts: PART A and PART B
2. Answer any three out of five questions in PART A.
3. Each question in PART A carries 20 marks.
4. Answer any four out of five questions in PART B.
5. Each question in PART B carries 10 marks.
6. DO NOT write your Name and Student Id. No. anywhere on the answer book except on the space provided.
7. DO NOT write anything on the question paper except Student Id. No. on the space provided.
8. Start each question on a new page.
9. Students undertaking the examination are requested to adhere to the University norms related to examinations.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________
This is a Closed Book examination. Students are not allowed to bring any material in the Examination Hall.
Warning: Plagiarism in any form is prohibited. Anyone found using unfair means will be penalized severely.

JGLS [Re-sit Examination of Semester A, November’2016] Page 1

 PART A

Answer three (3) out of following five (5) questions. (3 X 20 = 60 Marks)

Question 1. Kamla, a young girl of 18, got married to Raju in the Harbhanga district of Uttar Pradesh. Since the day
of her arrival in her husband’s place, Kamla has been subjected to mental and physical harassment by her in-laws for
not bringing enough dowry and jewelry from her parental home. She tolerated the torture and continued living in her
husband’s place. A few months later Kamla became pregnant. However, the village witch-doctor predicted that she is
carrying a girl-child. After this, the physical and mental harassment on Kamla increased manifold. At some point, she
could not bear any more pain. One night, she put some kerosene oil on herself and set herself on fire.

However, she was saved by the neighbors who came rushing in. They rescued her and took her to the village health
center. Kamla and her baby survived, but Kamla was blinded and half her face was burnt. Her appearance became
horrifying. Raju refused to accept her as his wife anymore. He took her to the railway station, and dumped her in a
train. The train took Kamla to the Lucknow station which became her home. She tried to beg but no one would go near
her because of her appearance. It was a new place in which she knew no one and nobody came to her aid. She couldn’t
work because of her lost eye-sight. To add to her pain, she gave birth to the child on one night on the platform of the
Lucknow railway station.

After the child-birth, Kamla didn’t have any strength left in her. She starved for the next five days and was unable to
feed the child. Kamla realized that she cannot provide for her child, and at the same time couldn’t see her child go
without food. She realized that she will not survive. She was horrified to think what will happen to her child once she
dies. She didn’t want to die and leave her child alone. One day she tried to kill herself and her child by throwing
themselves before a moving train. Both were saved by God’s grace, and the railway police arrested Kamla and charged
her for attempt to murder u/s 307 of the IPC:

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act
caused death, he would be guilty or murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such
act, the offender shall be liable either to 104[imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is here in before
mentioned;
and u/s 309 of IPC:
Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall he
punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year 151[or with fine, or with both].

Do you think Kamla is guilty u/ss. 307 and 309? Answer with reference to Lon Fuller’s article: The Case of Speluncean
Explorers. (20 Marks)

Question 2. You are working as an intern in a law firm and your senior requires you to write a case brief on Lewis v
Averay, decided by the Queen‘s Bench, England. Refer to the following judgment and prepare a case brief with the
following heads:
a. Outline the key facts;
b. Summarise the issues;
c. Identify the rule applied by the Court;

JGLS [Re-sit Examination of Semester A, November’2016] Page 2

 d. Analyse the decision and the conclusion;
e. Opine on what would you decide. Would you agree or disagree – but for different reasons to those of
the judges? Explain why.

Lewis v Averay, [1972] 1 QB198 (CA)

The plaintiff advertised his car for sale. A rogue came to see the car, introduced himself as Richard Greene and made
the plaintiff believe that he was the well-known film actor Richard Greene . The rogue said he would like to buy the
car and take it away that night. He wrote out a cheque, signing it R. Greene. The plaintiff asked for proof that he was
Richard Greene and the rogue showed him a pass to Film Studio in the name of 'Richard Greene’ bearing a photograph
of the rogue and an official stamp. The plaintiff was satisfied and let the rogue have the logbook and the car.

The cheque had come from a stolen cheque book and was dishonoured. Meanwhile the rogue sold the car to Averay
who bought it in good faith. The plaintiff brought an action against Averay for the return of the car, or its value and
damages for conversion.

Lord Denning: The real question in the case is whether on May 8, 1969, there was a contract of sale under which the
property in the car passed from Lewis to the rogue. If there was such a contract, then, even though it was voidable for
fraud, nevertheless Averay would get a good title to the car. But if there was no contract of sale by Lewis to the
rogue—either because there was, on the face of it, no agreement between the parties, or because any apparent
agreement was a nullity and void ab initio for mistake, then no property would pass from Lewis to the rogue. Averay
would not get a good title because the rogue had no property to pass to him.

.. Who is entitled to the goods? The original seller? Or the ultimate buyer? The courts have given different answers.
In Phillips v Brooks, the ultimate buyer was held to be entitled to the ring. In Ingram v Little the original seller was
held to be entitled to the car....It seems to me that the material facts in each case are quite indistinguishable, the one
from the other. In each case there was, to all outward appearance, a contract: but there was a mistake by the seller as
to the identity of the buyer. This mistake was fundamental. In each case it led to the handing over of the goods. Without
it the seller would not have parted with them.... [I]t has been suggested that a mistake as to the identity of a person is
one thing: and a mistake as to his attributes is another. A mistake as to identity, it is said, avoids a contract: whereas a
mistake as to attributes does not. But this is a distinction without a difference. A man's very name is one of his
attributes. It is also a key to his identity. If then, he gives a false name, is it a mistake as to his identity? or a mistake
as to his attributes? These fine distinctions do no good to the law.

As I listened to the argument in this case, I felt it wrong that an innocent purchaser (who knew nothing of what passed
between the seller and the rogue) should have his title depend on such refinements. After all he has acted with
complete circumspection and in entire good faith: whereas it was the seller who let the rogue have the goods and thus
enabled him to commit the fraud. I do not therefore, accept the theory that a mistake as to identity renders a contract
void. I think the true principle... is this: When two parties have come to a contract - or rather what appears, on the face
of it, to be a contract - the fact that one party is mistaken as to the identity of the other does not mean that there is no
contract, or that the contract is a nullity and void from the beginning. It only means that the contract is voidable, that
is, liable to be set aside at the instance of the mistaken person, so long as he does so before third parties have in good
faith acquired rights under it.

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Applied to the cases such as the present, this principle is in full accord with the presumption stated by Pearce L.J. and
also Devlin L.J. in Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, 61, 66 . When a dealing is had between a seller like Mr. Lewis
and a person who is actually there present before him, then the presumption in law is that there is a contract, even
though there is a fraudulent impersonation by the buyer representing himself as a different man than he is. There is a
contract made with the very person there, who is present in person. It is liable no doubt to be avoided for fraud, but it
is still a good contract under which title will pass unless and until it is avoided. In support of that presumption, Devlin
L.J. quoted, at p. 66, not only the English case of Phillips v. Brooks, but other cases in the United States where "the
courts hold that if A appeared in person before B, impersonating C, an innocent purchaser from A gets the property in
the goods against B." That seems to me to be right in principle in this country also. In this case Mr. Lewis made a
contract of sale with the very man, the rogue, who came to the flat. I say that he "made a contract" because in this
regard we do not look into his intentions, or into his mind to know what he was thinking or into the mind of the rogue.
We look to the outward appearances. On the face of the dealing, Mr. Lewis made a contract under which he sold the
car to the rogue, delivered the car and the logbook to him, and took a cheque in return. The contract is evidenced by
the receipts which were signed. It was, of course, induced by fraud. The rogue made false representations as to his
identity, But it was still a contract, though voidable for fraud. It was a contract under which this property passed to the
rogue, and in due course passed from the rogue to Mr. Averay, before the contract was avoided. Though I very much
regret that either of these good and reliable gentlemen should suffer, in my judgment it is Mr. Lewis who should do
so.

MEGAW L.J.
For myself, with very great respect, I find it difficult to understand the basis, either in logic or in practical
considerations, of the test laid down by the majority of the court in Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31 . That test is, I
think, accurately recorded in the headnote, as follows:

"- where a person physically present and negotiating to buy a chattel fraudulently assumed theidentity of an existing
third person, the test to determine to whom the offer was addressed was how ought the promisee to have interpreted
the promise."

The promisee, be it noted, is the rogue. The question of the existence of a contract and therefore the passing of property,
and therefore the right of third parties, if this test is correct, is made to depend upon the view which some rogue should
have formed, presumably knowing that he is a rogue, as to the state of mind of the opposite party to the negotiation,
who does not know that he is dealing with a rogue.

...in my view this appeal can be decided on a short and simple point. It is the point which was put at the outset of his
argument by Mr. Titheridge on behalf of the defendant appellant. The well-known textbook Cheshire and Fifoot on
the Law of Contract 7th ed. (1969), 213 and 214, deals with the question of invalidity of a contract by virtue of
unilateral mistake, and in particular unilateral mistake relating to mistaken identity. The editors describe what in their
submission are certain facts that must be established in order to enable one to avoid a contract on the basis of unilateral
mistake by him as to the identity of the opposite party. The first of those facts is that al the time when he made the
offer he regarded the identity of the offeree as a matter of vital importance. To translate that into the facts of the present
case, it must he established that at the time of offering to sell his car to the rogue, Mr. Lewis regarded the identity of
the rogue as a matter of vital importance. In my view, Mr. Titheridge is abundantly justified, on the notes of the
evidence and on the findings of the judge, in his submission that the mistake of Mr. Lewis went no further than a

JGLS [Re-sit Examination of Semester A, November’2016] Page 4

mistake as to the attributes of the rogue. It was simply a mistake as to the creditworthiness of the man who was there
present and who described himself as Mr. Green. (4+ 4+4+4+4 = 20 Marks)

Question 3. Imagine you are a District court judge in Delhi. In the case before you, Nutan, an elderly oman, defaulted
on the land contract for her home. The DRB Bank wants to repossess the house and keep Rs.25,70,000 in payments
she made thus far on the Rs.48,00,000 contract. Nutan does not contest her default and she is willing to let the Bank
repossess the house. However, she insists on the return of Rs.25,70,[Link] following case is the only relevant
precedent in her jurisdiction, Delhi.

Arun v. Era, AIR 1960 Delhi 196

Arun defaulted on a Rs 50,000 land contract after making Rs. 32,000 in payments. The lower court denied Arun's
request for return of the Rs. 32,000. We affirm. There is a fundamental difference in our law between land contracts
and mortgages. A land contract is an installment plan under which the purchaser does not get title to the property until
the last payment. Those who buy property on a mortgage have it financed through a third party and receive title
immediately. It may be a hard result, but those who buy property on a land contract take the risk of losing everything
for failure to make payments. If this were a mortgage, we would reach a different result.

The following case is from the highest court of Karnataka:

Darius v. Naveen, AIR 1994 Kant 777

In 1980 Darius entered into a land contract with Naveen for Rs.80,000. Darius defaulted in 1990 after making
Rs.34,000 in payments. The lower court held that Naveen was entitled to repossess the property and retain Darius's
payments. We reverse. Had Darius entered into a typical mortgage arrangement, he would have title to the property
and the mortgagee who provided the purchase price would have a lien on the property to secure the loan. Upon his
default and the mortgagee's foreclosure, he would lose the property but his Rs.34,000 would be returned. To hold that
a land contract is conceptually different from a mortgage is to elevate form over substance. In both cases, the seller
gives up possession of the property in exchange for the purchase price. In the case of a land contract, the seller retains
legal title to the property as security for the price. In the case of a mortgage, the mortgagee retains a lien on the property
as security. It is inequitable to hold that the defaulting buyer under the first arrangement must forfeit 40% of the
purchase price while the defaulting buyer under the second arrangement forfeits nothing.

Swamy J., concurring. A buyer who enters into a land contract must make a clear showing of inequity in order to avoid
forfeiture of his payments. Otherwise, the court's opinion can be read as a Wholesale repudiation of the land contract
as an accepted instrument of commerce.

a. Is Darius entitled to have the money refunded? Justify your decision.

b. Are you bound by the decision in Arun v. Era? If so, justify.
c. Are you bound by the decision in Darius v. Naveen? Justify your answer.
d. Will the outcome be different if Darius v. Naveen was decided by the Supreme Court. Explain.
(5 + 5 + 5 + 5 = 20 Marks)

JGLS [Re-sit Examination of Semester A, November’2016] Page 5

Question 4. What is the doctrine of separation of powers? In this context, explain the difference between conditional
and delegated legislation. (20 Marks)

Question 5. Study the Statute and the Text and answer the question based on them.

The Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (the “Act”) came into force in the State of Maharashtra on 3 August
1994. One of its aims was to regulate hospitals carrying out organ transplantation and to prevent unqualified medical
practitioners from performing transplants. Prior to the Act coming into force, all kinds of doctors were performing
transplants in hospitals which had no proper facilities.

“The Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994

An Act to provide for the regulation of removal, storage and transplantation of human organs for therapeutic purposes
and for the prevention of commercial dealings in human organs and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.
…
Chapter I
Preliminary
1. (1). This Act may be called the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994.

…
Definitions
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
...
(f) “donor” means any person, not less than eighteen years of age, who voluntarily authorizes the removal
of any of his human organs for therapeutic purposes under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section
3;
(g) “hospital” includes a nursing home, clinic, medical centre, medical or teaching institution for
therapeutic purposes and other like institution;
(h) “human organ” means any part of a human body consisting of a structured arrangement of tissues
which, if wholly removed, cannot be replicated by the body;
…
(p) “transplantation” means the grafting of any human organ from any living person or deceased person
to some other living person for therapeutic purposes.
Chapter III
Regulation of hospitals
10. (1) On and from the commencement of this Act:
(a) no hospital, unless registered under this Act, shall conduct, or associate with, or help in, the removal,
storage or transplantation of any human organ;
…
Chapter VI
Offences and Penalties
20. Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act or any rule made, or any condition of registration granted,
thereunder for which no punishment is separately provided in this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.”

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On 15 September 2015, Rahul Sharma sustained a severe head injury in a road traffic accident in Mumbai. He was
taken to Reliance Hospital nearby where, on investigation, he was found to be brain-dead. Rajesh had previously
informed his parents that after his death he would want his organs to be donated. Doctors at the hospital informed
Rahul’s parents that there was a young man suffering from an end-stage liver disease, and Rahul’s liver would be
suitable for donation. Although the hospital had the necessary equipment and facilities for follow-up medical care,
Rahul’s cadaver would have to be transferred to a hospital registered under the Act in order for the transplant to be
performed. The nearest registered hospital was the Hindu Hospital. The doctors stated that there was a high probability
that instability during transfer may make Rahul’s cadaver unsuitable for donation, and the young patient was in urgent
need of a transplant. The doctors opined that the only option was to request the organ transplant team from the Hindu
Hospital to come and perform the operation. Rahul’s parents agreed. The Hindu Hospital team successfully performed
the operation at Reliance Hospital on the morning of 16 September 2015.

Using tools of statutory interpretation, and relevant case law, discuss whether Reliance Hospital has contravened
section 10(1)(a). (20 Marks)

PART B

Answer any four (4) out of following five (5) questions. (4 X 10 = 40 Marks)

1. Explain the difference between Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta by any suitable illustration. (10 Marks)

2. Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution states, “all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the
right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion”. Since we wish to propagate Hinduism, the majority religion
in the country, we shall ban the slaughter of cows. Identify the fallacies in this statement. (10 Marks)

3. The practice of judicial law making can be thought of as a socio-legal experiment that has succeeded to great
measure in enabling access to justice in India. Rely on a Supreme Court precedent and write a response justifying
that Public Interest Litigation (PIL) cases in India have led to significant systemic reforms. (10 Marks)

4. Explain the hierarchy of courts in the Indian legal system. Whose judgments are binding on whom? (10 Marks)

5. What are some of the advantages of a civil law system over the common law system? (10 Marks)

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