SECTION 17.

ARTICLE VII
Section 17
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

David vs GMA
G.R. No. 171409
May 3, 2006

Doctrine
Lock’s "theory of prerogative," to Watkins’ doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship"
and, eventually, to McIlwain’s "principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to
solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing
areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while ensuring that such
powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective
limitations and checks.
In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a
certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive
but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed
procedural limitations.
Facts
In the nation’s celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I on
February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and General order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5).
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to
the President’s mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests
and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant)
petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president
of party-list Akbayan.
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran,
representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went
after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine
Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf
and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist.
Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed
efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon
the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Further claimed
that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance
of PP 1017.
Issue
Whether or not PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate decrees.
Ruling
The court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees”. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of
the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied
in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. President Arroyo’s ordinance power granted to her is
only limited to the issuances stipulated under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive
Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She cannot issue decrees similar to
those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they
were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the
period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the
military?
The Court stated that President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows
that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to
"laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations
and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to
enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

IBP vs Zamora
G.R. No. 141284
August 15, 2000

Facts
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies,
kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP
and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression.
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence.6 Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the
instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional. Asserting itself as the
official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the
President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has
no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for
judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization
and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police
officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause in the Constitution.
Issue
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military and the civilian character of the PNP.
Ruling
The petition has no merit. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to
bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and
to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines
in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. Moreover,
the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI
of the Constitution.

Lacson vs. Perez

G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001

Doctrine
When an issue or case no longer presents a justiciable controversy or when the
matter in dispute has already been resolved, it becomes “moot”. As a rule, the
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or to declare principles or rules
of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.
The Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.
Facts
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National
Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, petitioners assail the declaration of a state of
rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. In
connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson,
Aquino, and Mancao pray that the "appropriate court before whom the information
against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding
with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved.
Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of
the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila.
Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.
Issue
Whether or not the warrantless arrests of the petitioners pursuant to the
declaration of rebellion are legal.
Ruling
The Court ruled that the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless
arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of
rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781
(Defensor-Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under
imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to
the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual
subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law.
Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit
himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain
under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.
Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper
judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery
of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person
arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is
without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other
remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for
prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules
of Court)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and
congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and, in their behalf, are hereby enjoined
from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of
Malacañang.

Kulayan vs. Tan

G.R. No. 187298
July 3, 2012

Doctrine
The Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts provides that where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in
either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the
issuance of such writ must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly
and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this Court is a
court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to
it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. It cannot be burdened with
deciding cases in the first instance. Except, however, when a case stems from a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court possesses
original jurisdiction.
Facts

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,
Sulu.1 Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City,
Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a
Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later
confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). 2 The leader of the
alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu
Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known
leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. 13 It
cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as
a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372).

It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon
the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence.

In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set
up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop

Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 19 claiming that Proclamation 1-09
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.

Issues
1. Whether or not the respondent governor can exercise the calling out power
of the President invoking Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. 7160); and
2. Whether or not the governor is authorized to convene CEF.
Ruling
1. The respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state
of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official,
even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified
by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

The Court find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government
Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Not
even Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16. The Local
Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers
inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the
prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters
of security and defense. The intent behind the powers granted to local
government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature. The Code
is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic
services more effective to the constituents, 61 and should not be unduly
stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.
 2. Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization
of private citizen armies is proscribed. Section 24 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution mandates that: Private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All
paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not
consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall
be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.

Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace

and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions
shall be the responsibility of the National Government. Taken in conjunction
with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize
the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the
respondent Governor.

Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the

creation of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) in the present case, is also
invalid.

Therefore, the said proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared NULL
and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Section 18. Article VII

Commander-in-Chief Powers (Section 18 Article VII)

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

Gudani vs Senga

G.R. No. 170165

August 15, 2006

Facts

On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several

senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28
September 2005. Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant
General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were among the several AFP officers who
received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005
hearing.

then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was
transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as
follows:
PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL
APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER
APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER
BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.

The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time
informing the senator that “no approval has been granted by the President to any
AFP officer to appear” before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both
testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.

A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony,
the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared
before the Senate Committee “in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given
that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance;” that
such directive was “in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of
Command;” and that the two officers “disobeyed a legal order, in violation of
A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be
subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x xx” Both Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-

Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that
the E.O. “enjoined officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.”

In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that

petitioners be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a
superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good
order and military discipline.

It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
was filed, particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed
through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without
her prior approval be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges stated in the
charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga, Col. Galarpe,
Col. Roa, and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf
or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a
consequence of their having testified before the Senate on 28 September 2005.

Issue

Whether or not the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.

Ruling

The court holds that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also
hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a
military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under
law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not
so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on
the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in
matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank
promotions, [51] yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the
position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the
armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Section 18. Article VII

Calling-Out Power (Section 18 Article VII)

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts

Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed
into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27,
2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other
things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of
the Philippine National Police (PNP).

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring “a state of
rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

Petitioner, Party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM),

contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. 3 They further submit
that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient
factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an
indefinite period.
Issue

Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.

Ruling

It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution
does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section
18, Article VII provides:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of

“graduated power[s].”30 From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling
out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the
Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.

Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion.

Ampatuan vs. Hon. Puno

G.R. No. 190259

June 7, 2011

Doctrine

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, it would generally defer top her judgment on the matter.

Facts
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and
women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946,1 placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) "to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named places.

Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued Administrative
Order 273 (AO 273)2 "transferring" supervision of the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy,

petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-
Generale, all ARMM officials,4 filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65.
They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary
to take over ARMM’s operations and seize the regional government’s powers, in
violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known
as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG
Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control
over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.

Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and
the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment
of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the
President’s emergency powers.6 Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well
as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG
Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.

Issue

Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

Ruling

NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The
President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides.17

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must
respect the President’s actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Declaration of Martial Law

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ.

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

Lagman vs Medialdea

G.R. No. 231658

July 4, 2017

Facts

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Both Houses expressed their full support of the Proclamation, under the Senate
P.S. Resolution No. 388 and House Resolution No. 1050, finding no cause to revoke
the same.

Three consolidated petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of

Proclamation No. 246 were filed before this Court.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 246. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, which extended Proclamation No. 216
until December 31, 2017.

Four Consolidated petitions were filed before this Court assailing the
constitutionality of the second extension of Proclamation No. 216.

The Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part
of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute
rebellion12 since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any
part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory; that the
declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because the President's
Report contained "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts.

Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to:
(1)"exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and
nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for lack of sufficient factual basis

Issues

1. Whether or not there exists sufficient factual basis for the extension of
martial law in Mindanao.

2. Whether or not the Constitution limits the number of extensions and the
duration for which Congress can extend the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling

1. The requirements of rebellion and public safety are present to uphold the
extension of Martial Law in Mindanao from January 1, 2019 to December 31,
2019.

The sufficiency of the factual basis for the extension of martial law in
Mindanao must be determined from the facts and information contained in
the President’s request, supported by reports submitted by his alter egos to
Congress. These are bases upon which Congress granted extension. The
quantum of proof applied by the President in his determination of the
existence of rebellion is probable cause. The court need not delve into the
accuracy of the reports upon which the President’s decision is based, or the
correctness of his decision to declare martial law or suspend the writ, for
this is an executive function. The primary justification for the President’s
request for extension is the on-going rebellion in Mindanao, the situation
remains the same despite the death of the leaders, and the addition of rebel
 groups whose activities were intensified and pronounced after the first and
second extensions.

Public Safety requires the extension of Martial Law in Mindanao. Citing the
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Joaquin Bernas, SJ:

The need for public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence
of rebellion, is not verifiable through the visual or tactile sense. Its existence
can only be determined through the application of prudential estimation of
what the consequences might be of existing armed movements.

2. The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution
does not limit the period for which it can extend the same. The only
limitations to the exercise of congressional authority to extend proclamation
or suspension are: the extension should be upon the President’s initiative; it
should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the
demands of public safety; and it is subject to the court’s review of the
sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

Section 18 of Article VII of the constitution did not fix the period of the
extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and granted Congress the authority to decide its duration is
fully explained in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the
matter.

The extensions of Proclamation No. 216 are the Chief Executive’s decisive
response to several existing rebellions throughout Mindanao. Each of these
persisting challenges to the authority of the legitimate government is
certainly a basis of sufficient to warrant the declaration of martial law.

Padilla vs Congress

G.R. No. 231671

July 25, 2017

Doctrine

Political Question Doctrine

Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.

The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.

Facts

On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and necessity of public
safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.

According to President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216 and his Report to the
Congress, the declaration of a state of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao ensued from the
series of armed attacks, violent acts, and atrocities directed against civilians and
government authorities, institutions, and establishments perpetrated by the Abu
Sayyaf and Maute terrorist groups, in complicity with other local and foreign
armed affiliates, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), to sow lawless violence, terror, and political disorder over the said region
for the ultimate purpose of establishing a DAESH wilayah or Islamic Province in
Mindanao.

According to petitioners, the resolutions separately passed by the Senate and the
House of Representatives, which express support as well as the intent not to
revoke President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, injure their rights "to a proper
[and] mandatory legislative review of the declaration of martial law" and that the
continuing failure of the Congress to convene in joint session similarly causes a
continuing injury to their rights.

Petitioners also allege that, as citizens and taxpayers, they all have locus standi in
their "assertion of a public right" which they have been deprived of when the
Congress refused and/or failed to convene in joint session to deliberate on
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senator De Lima adds that she,
together with the other senators who voted in favor of the resolution to convene
the Congress jointly, were even effectively denied the opportunity to perform their
constitutionally-mandated duty, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, to
deliberate on the said proclamation of the President in a joint session of the
Congress.

On the propriety of resorting to the remedy of mandamus, petitioners posit that

''the duty of Congress to convene in joint session upon the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not require
the exercise of discretion." Such mandate upon the Congress is allegedly a purely
ministerial act which can be compelled through a writ of mandamus.

The mandate upon the Congress to convene jointly is allegedly intended by the
1986 Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to serve as a protection against
potential abuses in the exercise of the President's power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is "a mechanism purposely
designed by the Constitution to compel Congress to review the propriety of the
President's action x x x [and] meant to contain martial law powers within a
democratic framework for the preservation of democracy, prevention of abuses,
and protection of the people.

Issue

Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the
President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling

The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated
to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the President's
declaration or suspension. By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, the Congress is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution vests on the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces, in recognition that the President, as Chief Executive,
has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-
Chief, the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence. However, to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the
exercise of his power to proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through the same provision,
institutionalized checks and balances on the President's power through the two
other co-equal and independent branches of government, i.e., the Congress and
the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
requires the President to submit a report to the Congress after his proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
grants the Congress the power to revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation
and/or suspension; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency
of the factual basis for such proclamation and/or suspension.

There is no question herein that the first provision was complied with, as within
forty-eight (48) hours from the issuance on May 23, 2017 by President Duterte of
Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao, copies of President Duterte's
Report relative to Proclamation No. 216 was transmitted to and received by the
Senate and the House of Representatives on May 25, 2017.

The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the
Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the purpose of
revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and
House of Representatives already separately adopted resolutions expressing
support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the express support of
both Houses of the Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident
lack of intent to revoke the same, the provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution on revocation did not even come into operation and, therefore,
there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint session.

Judicial Power to Review

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Sec. 1 Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
(Section 18 Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

Congressional Power to Revoke

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. (Sec. 1 Article VIII, 1987
Constitution)
Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it
is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers,
which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in
the hands of the Court. (Fortun vs GMA)

Writ of Habeas Corpus vs Privilege of the Writ of Habeas

Corpus

Writ of Habeas Corpus Privilege of the Writ of Habeas

Corpus
As to Definition
An order issued by a court of An order coming from the court to
competent jurisdiction, directed to immediately release the prisoner if
the person detaining another, the court finds out that the
commanding him to produce the detention is without legal cause or
body of the prisoner at a designated authority.
time and place and to show
sufficient cause for holding in
custody the individual so detained.

An action that protects an individual

from unlawful detention.

It prevents an agency from holding

an individual without reason
Scope of the Writ of Habeas Article III, Section 15, 1987
Corpus Constitution

1. Cases of Illegal Confinement The privilege of the writ of habeas

or detention by which a corpus shall not be suspended
person is deprived of his except in cases of invasion or
liberty; rebellion, when the public safety
requires it.
2. Cases by which the rightful
custody of the person is
withheld from the person
entitled thereto.

Purpose
 To inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary and to
relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.

Fortun vs GMA

G.R. No. 190293

March 20, 2012

Facts

On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a
highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar
lawless violence in Central Mindanao.

Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and
secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the
constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a
report in person or in writing of her action.

On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President’s action.
But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President
issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293,
190294, 190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions
to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting
Maguindanao.

Issue

Whether or not petitioners can still challenge the constitutionality of

Proclamation No. 1959 after it has been promptly lifted by the President.

Ruling

The petition is moot and academic.

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act
in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in
a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation
of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable
one in the hands of the Court.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review.
The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.

Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been
meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and
control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any
law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were
arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.
Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting
arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by her
action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province.
In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of
a determined and amply armed government presence.

Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily
would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient
basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review. The proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case,
unlike similar Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like
saber-rattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary use of political power.