क्षतिग्रस्त ट् रांसतिशन लरइन टॉवर ां पर तवशेषज् ां की स्थरयी

सतिति की ररप टट
(अप्रैल २०१९ –तिसम्बर २०२१)
REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
ON FAILURE OF EHV TRANSMISSION LINE TOWERS
(APRIL 2019 – DECEMBER 2021)

भररि सरकरर
Government of India
के न्द्रीय तवि् यु ि प्ररतिकरण
Central Electricity Authority
तवि्यु ि िां त्ररलय
Ministry of Power
=

नई तिल्ली
New Delhi

(तवि् युि अतितनयि,2003 की िररर 73(एल) के िहि के.तव.प्रर. के िरतयत्व कर तनवट हन करिे हुए )
(In fulfilment of CEA’s obligation under section 73(l) of Electricity Act, 2003)
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sl. No. Description Page No.

1. Executive Summary 2

2. Appendix 19
Investigation reports of failure of towers
of various transmission utilities

3. Annexure – A 188
Composition of Standing Committee of
Experts

4. Annexure – B 193
Minutes of the Meeting

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION:

1.1 A Standing Committee of Experts in the field of design & operation of EHV
Transmission lines (from CEA, POWERGRID & research/academic institutes)
constituted by Central Electricity Authority in 1999 as per the Electricity
(Supply) Act No. 54 of 1948, continues to carry out investigation of failure of
transmission line towers of Power utilities as per the Section 73(l) of the
Electricity Act, 2003. Office order vide which Standing Committee was
constituted is enclosed at Annexure-A. As per the requirement of the
Standing committee, all utilities / transmission licensees are supposed to
report the failure of towers of 220 kV and above voltage class transmission
lines to CEA.

1.2 The objective of Standing Committee is to investigate and analyze the

probable causes of failure of towers of the transmission lines of power utilities
in different parts of the country and recommend remedial measures to
prevent repetition of such failures in future. In cases, where the visit to site
of failure of tower does not materialize, analysis of failure is done based on
information provided by the utilities and their participation in the Standing
Committee’s meeting.

1.3 The failure cases of EHV transmission towers of different power utilities,
which are reported to CEA, are discussed during the meeting of Standing
Committee of Experts and inferences are drawn in respect of causes of failure
of the transmission tower based on site investigation report, information/data
provided by the concerned utilities and deliberations during the meeting and
various recommendations are made by the Committee to avert reoccurrence
of such failure(s) in future.

1.4 The e-meeting of the Standing Committee of the Experts was held virtually on
11th & 12th January 2022 to discuss the causes of failure of the transmission
line towers of different voltage levels belonging to various power transmission
utilities which had failed during the period from April, 2019, to December,
2021. During this period, the failure of towers of EHV transmission lines of
various transmission utilities [POWERGRID, M/s MPPTCL, M/s KPTCL, M/s
RVPNL, M/s UPPTCL, M/s Sterlite Power, M/s DMTCL and M/s RSTCL] were
reported to CEA. Accordingly, the Committee discussed in detail the nature
and causes of failure of towers of transmission lines of these utilities. Minutes
of the meeting are enclosed at Annexure-B.

2.0 BRIEF DETAILS OF FAILURE OF TOWERS OF VARIOUS TRANSMISSION

LINES REPORTED TO CEA FROM APRIL, 2019 TO DECEMBER, 2021

2.1 Failure of total 179 Nos. of towers of forty seven (47) transmission lines of
POWERGRID, M/s MPPTCL, M/s KPTCL, M/s RVPNL, M/s UPPTCL, M/s
Sterlite Power, M/s DMTCL and M/s RSTCL were reported to CEA during

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April, 2019, to December, 2021. Details of these failures are given in Table-1
below:

Table-1

S. Name of the Name of Date of Year Wind No. of Towers

No. Transmission Line Utility Failure of Zone Failed Conductor
Comm Su Tens To
issioni sp ion tal
ng en
si
on
1. 400 kV D/C POWER 16.04.2019 2016 2 - 1 1 Vertical/
Khandwa- Indore I GRID Twin ACSR
and II transmission Moose
line
2. 400 kV D/C POWER 28.04.2019 2008 Line in 9 1 10 Vertical/
Narendra- GRID WZ 1 Twin ACSR
Devangere Tension Moose
transmission line towers
for WZ2
&
Suspens
ion
tower for
WZ1
3. 400 kV D/C POWER 03.05.2019 2011 5 - 1 1 Vertical/
Pandiabili – Duburi GRID Twin ACSR
– Baripada Moose
transmission line
4. 400 kV D/C Gooty – POWER 27.05.2019 2013 2 7 - 7 Vertical/
Nellore PS GRID Quad ACSR
transmission line Moose
5. 400 kV D/C POWER 06.06.2019 2008 Line in 5 1 6 Vertical/
Narendra- GRID WZ 1 Twin ACSR
Devangere (Guttur) Tension Moose
transmission line towers
for WZ2
&
Suspens
ion
tower for
WZ1
6. 400 kV D/C Agra – POWER 12.06.2019 2014 4 2 1 3 Vertical/
Sikar transmission GRID Quad ACSR
line Moose
7. 400 kV D/C Silchar POWER 19.07.2019 2018 6 - 1 1 Vertical/
– Meliriat GRID Twin ACSR
transmission line Moose
8. 400 kV D/C POWER 06.08.2019 2016 4 - 1 1 Vertical/
Kishanganj – Patna GRID Quad ACSR
transmission line Moose

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9. 765 kV D/C M/s 16.04.2019 Under 4 3 6 9 Vertical/
Khandwa Pool- Sterlite Const Hexa AAAC
Dhule transmission Power ructio Zebra
line n
10. 765kV S/C M/s 07.06.2019 2015 2 5 1 6 Vertical/
Jabalpur – Bina Sterlite Quad ACSR
transmission line Power Bersimis
11. 220 kV D/C KPTCL 09.08.2019 2001 … - 1 1 Vertical/
Bagalkot-Vajjramatti ACSR
transmission line Drake
12. 400 kV D/C Malwa MPPTCL 16.04.2019 2013 Medium 2 - 2 Vertical/
(TPH)- Pithampur Twin ACSR
transmission line Moose
13. 220 kV MPPTCL 16.04.2019 1982 Medium 1 - 1 Vertical/
Omkareshwar ACSR
Barwaha tap to ZEBRA
Nimrani line
14. 400 kV D/C Malwa MPPTCL 02.06.2019 2013 Medium 20 4 24 Vertical/
(TPH)- Pithampur Twin ACSR
transmission line Moose
15. 400 kV D/C MPPTCL 11.06.2019 2002 Medium 4 1 5 Vertical/
Rajgarh- Sardar Twin ACSR
Sarovar DCDS line Moose
16. 220 kV D/C MPPTCL 13.06.2019 Line Line as 1 - 1 Vertical/
Jabalpur- comm per Old ACSR Zebra
Narsinghpur ission Design
transmission line ed in
1962

Failed Failed
tower tower
erecte designed
d on for wind
07.06 zone 4
.2019
17. 765 kV S/C Raichur RSTCL 03.06.2019 2014 2 6 1 7 Vertical/
Sholapur Quad ACSR
transmission line Bersimis
18. 400 kV D/C DMTCL 15.08.2019 2017 4 - 1 1 Vertical/
Motihari- Quad AAAC
Gorakhpur 25.09.2019 1 - 1 Moose
transmission line
19. 400 kV D/C Barh- DMTCL 04.09.2019 2017 4 - 1 1 Vertical/
Motihari Quad AAAC
transmission line 07.10.2019 1 - 1 Moose

Total (2019) 67 23 90

20. 765 kV S/C New POWER 21.04.2020 2014 2 3 - 3 Delta/

Ranchi- GRID Quad ACSR
Dharamjaygarh Bersimis
transmission line-I
21. 400 kV D/C POWER 30.04.2020 1989 Russian 4 - 4 Vertical/
Vindhyachal- GRID Design Twin ACKC
Jabalpur Ckt I & II
transmission line

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22. 765 kV S/C POWER 10.05.2020 2013 4 4 - 4 Delta/
Varanasi-Fatehpur GRID Quad ACSR
transmission line Bersimis
23. 765 kV S/C Sasan- POWER 28.05.2020 2012 4 - 1 1 Delta/
Satna – I GRID Quad
transmission line ACSR
Bersimis
24. 765 kV S/C Sasan- POWER 28.05.2020 2013 4 1 - 1 Delta/
Satna – II GRID Quad ACSR
transmission line Bersimis
25. 400 kV D/C Agra- POWER 29.05.2020 2014 4 3 1 4 Vertical/
Sikar transmission GRID Quad ACSR
line Moose
26. 220 kV S/C RAPP POWER 03.07.2020 2000 Medium 1 - 1 Horizontal/
C- Anta GRID
transmission line
27. 400 kV D/C POWER 10.09.2020 2018 4 - 2 2 Vertical/
Dulhasti- Kishenpur GRID Quad ACSR
II & III Moose
28. 765 kV S/C Anta- RRVPNL 04.06.2020 2014 4 1 1 2 Delta/
Phagi (Ckt-II) Quad ACSR
transmission line Bersimis
29. 765 kV S/C UPPTCL 03.05.2020 2016 4 2 - 2 Horizontal/
Lalitpur-Fatehabad Quad ACSR
(Agra) Ckt-I Bersimis
Transmission line
30. 765 kV S/C UPPTCL 03.05.2020 2017 4 6 2 8 Horizontal/
Fatehabad – Lalitpur & Quad ACSR
Ckt-I transmission 28.05.2020 Bersimis
line
31. 220 kV Malanpur- MPPTCL 28.05.2020 1993 Medium 11 - 11 Vertical/
Auriya & 220 kV AAAC Zebra
Mehgaon-Adani
transmission line
32. 220 kV Malanpur- MPPTCL 29.05.2020 2017 4 3 - 3 Vertical/
Morena (Ckt I & II) ACSR Zebra
transmission line
33. 220 kV Malanpur- MPPTCL 29.05.2020 2010 4 3 2 5 Vertical/
PGCIL (Ckt I & II) ACSR Zebra
transmission line
34. 400 kV S/C Malwa MPPTCL 26.03.2020 2013 Medium 6 1 7 Vertical/
TPH Pithampur Twin ACSR
Transmission line of Moose
MPPTCL
35. 220 kV D/C KPTCL 17.04.2020 2003 Medium 1 2 3 Vertical/
Shahapur/Shahaba ACSR
d to Kapnoor Drake
transmission line
Total (2020) 49 12 61

36. 765 kV S/C Bina- POWER 05.01.2021 2014 4 0 1 1 Delta/

Gwalior-3 GRID Quad ACSR
transmission line Bersimis
37. 765 kV S/C POWER 06.05.2021 2012 4 1 - 1 Delta/
Jhatikara-Bhiwani GRID Quad ACSR
Transmission Line Bersimis

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38. ±800 kV HVDC POWER 10.05.2021 2015 4 1 - 1 Horizontal/
Agra-BNC-Pole-II GRID Hexa ACSR
Transmission Line Lapwing
39. 400 kV D/C Korba – POWER 11.05.2021 2011 2 1 - 1 Vertical/
Raipur III & IV GRID Twin ACSR
Transmission line Moose
40. 765 kV D/C POWER 27.05.2021 2014 2 5 - 5 Vertical/
Wardha-Aurangabad GRID Hexa ACSR
Transmission line Zebra
41. 400 kV S/C Korba- POWER 30.05.2021 1983 Medium 1 - 1 Horizontal
Bhilai-1 GRID /
Transmission Line Twin ACSR
Moose
42. 765 kV S/C Meerut- POWER 10.06.2021 2015 4 3 - 3 Delta/
Moga Transmission GRID Quad ACSR
Line Bersimis
43. 765 kV S/C Moga- POWER 12.06.2021 2012 4 - 3 3 Delta/
Bhiwani GRID Quad ACSR
Transmission Line Bersimis
44. 400 kV D/C Kaithal- POWER 08.07.2021 2010 4 4 - 4 Vertical/
Baghpat GRID Quad ACSR
transmission line Moose
45. 400 kV D/C POWER 23.10.2021 2017 2 - 1 1 Vertical/
Kishenpur-New GRID Twin ACSR
Wangpoh (Ckt III & Moose
IV) Transmission
Line
46. 400 kV D/C Malwa MPPTCL 29.05.2021 2013 Medium 5 - 5 Vertical/
TPH -Pithampur Ckt Twin ACSR
I&II line Moose
47. 220 kV MPPTCL 21.09.2021 1996 Medium 2 - 2 Vertical/
Amarkantak- ACSR
Panagar/SGTPS ZEBRA
Birsinghpur
transmission line
Total (2021) 23 5 28
Total :
Transmission lines failed: 47
Towers failed: 179

2.2 In the subject period, the 400 kV D/C Malwa (TPH)- Pithampur transmission
line of MPPTCL failed four times & 400 kV D/C Narendra- Devangere
transmission line & 400 kV D/C Agra – Sikar transmission lines of
POWERGRID failed two times each.

2.3 The number of suspension and tension towers at various voltage level, failed
during above mentioned period and discussed in the Standing Committee
meeting are indicated in Table-2 below:

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Table-2

Voltage Utility No. of No. of Towers failed

Level affecte
d Lines

Suspen Tension Towers Total

sion No. of
Towers towers
failed
A B C D Total
± 800 kV POWERGRI 1 1 - - - - 1
HVDC D
Total 1 1 - - - - 1
765 kV POWERGRI 9 17 3 2 - 5 22
D
Sterlite 2 8 - 1 6 7 15
Power

UPPTCL 2 8 1 - 1 2 10
RRVPNL 1 1 - 1 - 1 2
RSTCL 1 6 1 - - 1 7
Total 15 40 5 4 7 16 56
400 kV POWERGRI 15 36 3 4 4 11 47
D

MPPTCL 5 37 - 5 1 6 43

DMTCL 2 2 - - 2 2 4

Total 22 75 3 9 7 19 94

220 kV POWERGRI 1 1 - - - - 1
D
MPPTCL 6 21 - 1 1 2 23
KPTCL 2 1 3 - - 3 4
Total 9 23 3 1 1 5 28
TOTAL 47 139 40 179

As can be seen from Table-2 and Fig. 1, the number of transmission lines and
towers failed during the period from April 2019 to December 2021 was of 400
kV voltage level. Out of total 179 towers of 47 Nos. of transmission lines, 94
(52.5%) towers of 22 (46.8 %) transmission lines were of 400 kV voltage level.
This includes the failure of thirty eight (38) towers of the 400 kV D/C Malwa
(TPH)- Pithampur transmission line of MPPTCL which had failed four times
in the given period.

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94
100

80 56

60

40 28
15 1
20 22
1
0 9 No. of Towers
765 kV
800 kV HVDC No. of Lines
400 kV
220kV

No. of Lines No. of Towers

Fig. 1

2.4 The total No. of incidences of transmission line failures, and the No. of affected
tension type & suspension type towers, that have been reported to CEA during
the period of April, 2019 to December 2021 has been indicated in the Fig. 2
shown below. The No. of transmission lines and the No. of failed/affected
towers (both suspension & tension type) in the respective years were observed
to be progressively decreased during the years.

80

70 67

60
49
50

40

30
23 23
19
20 16
12 12
10 5

0
2019 2020 2021

No. of Lines No. of Suspension Towers No. of Tension Towers

Fig. 2

Out of total 179 Nos. of failed towers, 139 Nos. (77.65%) are of suspension
type towers and the remaining 40 Nos. (22.35%) are tension type towers (Fig.
3).

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TYPE OF FAILED TOWERS (TOTAL 179)

D Type Tension
tower, 15
C Type Tension
tower, 14

B Type Tension
tower, 11

Suspension
Towers, 139

Suspension Towers B Type Tension tower C Type Tension tower D Type Tension tower

Fig. 3

2.5 It has been observed that the failure rate of suspension towers is much higher
in comparison to tension towers. This may be because the Suspension towers
are not designed to withstand horizontal forces in the longitudinal direction
and hence the failures of one suspension type tower causes secondary failure
of adjacent suspension towers due to the pulling force of conductors. It is
highlighted that the loading criteria for the suspension type towers have been
made more stringent and the longitudinal and transverse force acting on
Suspension type towers under security condition has been increased in
revised IS 802 (2015). However, none of the transmission lines failed during
the period April 2019 to December 2021 was designed as per the revised IS
802 (2015). As reported by the utilities, in some of the transmission lines the
suspension towers were designed considering narrow front wind condition
and with 75% wind in security condition.

2.6 Before the revision of IS 802 in 1995, Indian wind map was divided into three
wind pressure zones i.e. light, medium & heavy. In the third revision of IS 802
which was published in 1995, 6 wind zones were specified dividing various
regions on the basis of 3 second wind gust speed. No. of transmission lines
and towers, failed during the period from April 2019 to December 2021 with
respect to various wind speed zones corresponding to which they were
designed is given below (Fig. 4). It can be seen that the maximum No. of
failures have occurred in the towers which were designed considering Wind
Zone 4; also the maximum No. of transmission lines affected due to failure of
towers traverse through Wind Zone 4. Further, the number of tower failure
incidents & the affected transmission lines which were designed as per old IS
802:1977 for medium wind zone is also higher. It may be noted that the large
percentage of the area of India was covered under the medium wind zone as

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per wind map given in old IS 802:1977 and as per latest wind map of India,
wind zone 4 covers the large area of India.
70
63 62
60

50

40
31
30
22
20 16
11
10
8
5
2 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
0
Wind Zone 1 Wind Zone 2 Wind Zone 3 Wind Zone 4 Wind Zone 5 Wind Zone 6 Medium Russian/Old
Wind Design/
Pressure Unknown
(Before Year Wind Zone
1995)

No. of Lines No. of Towers

Fig. 4

2.7 Failure sites in respect of following transmission lines were jointly visited by
representatives of CEA & the respective transmission utilities. Due to Covid-
19 pandemic and the associated lockdown & restrictions, the No. of
transmission line failure site visits by CEA officials were limited.

1. 400 kV D/C Narendra-Davangere Transmission line of POWERGRID

2. 400 kV D/C Gooty-Nellore PS Transmission Line of POWERGRID
3. 400 kV D/C Agra-Sikar Transmission line of POWERGRID
4. 765 kV S/C Bina – Gwalior-3 Transmission line of POWERGRID
5. 765 kV S/C Meerut – Moga Transmission line of POWERGRID
6. 400 kV D/C Kaithal-Baghpat Transmission line of POWERGRID
7. 400 kV D/C Motihari-Gorakhpur Transmission line of M/s DMTCL
8. 400 kV D/C Barh-Motihari Transmission line of M/s DMTCL

3.0 OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE:

3.1 Committee observed that in cases of tower failures reported to CEA that have
occurred during April 2019 to December 2021, the failure mostly can be
attributed to high intensity wind, use of old IS code, use of lower reliability
level, misalignment of stub, change in course of river, land slide etc. The
details of all reported failures have been provided at Appendix.

3.2 Committee noted that as per Central Electricity Authority (Technical

Standards for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines)
Regulations, towers with more than two sub-conductors per phase and triple
and quadruple circuit towers upto 400 kV are required to be designed for
Reliability level 2. However, some of the 400 kV towers of the lines having
conductors in Quad configuration (e.g. 400 kV Agra-Sikar transmission line,

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400 kV Nellore-PS Gooty transmission line, 400 kV Dulhasti-Kishenpur-II
transmission line, 400 kV D/C Kaithal-Baghpat transmission line) which
have been commissioned after the notification of CEA Regulations, 2010, have
been designed as per Reliability level-1 instead of Reliability level-2.
Committee noted that CEA Regulations have been drafted after detailed
consultation with the stakeholders and shall be adhered to in any case and
the utilities shall ensure that Reliability level to be adopted for all the future
transmission lines shall be in accordance to CEA Regulations.

3.3 In many of the cases the transmission utilities have attributed the cause of
tower failure to high intensity wind. However, the utilities expressed their
inability to make available the actual wind speed data. The Standing
Committee observed that wherever cause of tower failure is reported to be
wind, the utility needs to get the wind data for the area which would serve as
representative wind speed prevailing in that area at the time of failure. It was
agreed that the high wind velocity during storm and local condition of whirl
wind might have exceeded the design wind speed for which the tower is
designed, however the same could not be verified as wind data was not
available. Assistance of India Meteorological Department (IMD) and other
agencies involved in metrological field may be taken by the affected utilities
in this regard to share the wind data obtained from observatory/
Satellite/Radar.

3.4 Committee noted that in case back to back dimensions are not in accordance
to tower designs, the residual stresses may develop in the tower structure
which may lead to its collapse. Committee advised utilities to ensure good
erection practices and ensure that casting of chimneys and placement of
stubs are done as per approved drawings. Further, in future during
investigation of failed towers, wherever possible, stub setting dimensions,
including back to back distance measurements, should be measured and
submitted to the Committee along with the failure report.

3.5 Few cases of failure of 765 kV Single circuit Delta configuration towers of
POWERGRID have been observed. It was brought to the notice of Standing
Committee that the failure pattern of the 765 kV Delta configuration
suspension type tower of POWERGRID have been examined in detail in the
previous Standing Committee meetings including the design review analysis
carried out by CPRI and the Standing committee had suggested strengthening
of suspension towers (with delta configuration) of 765 kV S/C line by
replacing the existing six (6) members with higher size members and adding
two (2) more redundant members. POWERGRID has got reviewed this design
by M/s Manitoba Hydro, Canada and they have also suggested strengthening
of some of the members.

Committee was briefed by POWERGRID about the status of strengthening of

such towers as advised in previous standing committee meetings.
POWERGRID officials informed that, the strengthening of existing 765 kV S/C
delta configuration suspension type towers which are located in Wind zone 4
& Wind zone 2, is being executed in phased manner and at present, only fifty-
six (56) numbers of S/C 765 kV towers (Delta configuration) in the Western
Region-1 are remaining to be strengthened. The method of strengthening of
towers includes clamping of some of the members as well as replacement of

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few tower members. Strengthening of towers in same manner as suggested
by the Standing Committee in the previous meetings, i.e. by replacement of
all members, is not possible for already erected tower members as long
shutdown of transmission lines will be required. However, failed towers are
always replaced by completely strengthened tower in line with the
recommendations of the Committee. Further, strengthening of few other
tower members, as suggested by M/s Manitoba Hydro is also being adopted
by POWERGRID. The tower with strengthening currently being adopted by
POWERGRID (i.e. clamping of few members and replacement of some
members) had also been successfully tested at the CPRI test bed.

3.6 Over the years the Indian Standards for design of transmission line tower has
undergone changes. As revision of codal provisions is a continuous process,
the changes are to be implemented prospectively. Strengthening of existing
transmission line towers due to change in the codal provisions could be
decided on case to case basis, if repeated failures are observed in a particular
line.

3.7 In some of the cases, it is observed that even after the revision of IS codes,
the transmission utilities have used the transmission towers which have been
designed as per old IS codes. Committee noted that transmission utilities
continue to use old designs of towers even after revision of IS codes to save
the cost of designing & testing. Committee recommended that such type of
practices should not be adopted by the utilities and it should be ensured that
the transmission lines are designed and erected as per latest IS codes,
Regulations and recommendations of the Standing Committee / Task Force,
as applicable.

3.8 Committee deliberated on the possibility of designing of towers which are

erected in open fields, with considering Terrain category-I. POWERGRID
officials highlighted that out of a complete length of transmission line, there
are few small sections which are located in the open areas & fall under Terrain
Category-1, and it is not possible to design separate few towers specific to
these locations considering Terrain Category-I factors. POWERGRID had
executed a study in the Kutch area of Gujarat regarding Terrain category and
it was found that the towers designed with Terrain category-II and 400 m
span have to be spotted with reduced span of 370 m in locations under
Terrain category-I conditions. Committee noted the above and highlighted
that Utilities pay utmost care in adopting the design parameters as per the
terrain category faced along the route of transmission lines.

3.9 Committee deliberated on the prospect of adopting wind speed corresponding

to Wind zone-2 for designing of transmission towers located in area under
Wind zone-1 and concluded that the decision of modification in wind zone
cannot be taken on basis of single event of failure and holistic view based on
analysis of frequency of failures of transmission lines in Wind zone-1 need to
be taken. Thus, the decision to modify the wind zone can be taken at later
stage in case multiple failures are observed in the Wind zone-1 area.

3.10 Committee deliberated on the likelihood of increase in the wind loads on the
structures due to tunneling effect in the valley regions and the influence of
topography of the location on the wind loads acting on the transmission

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towers. Representative from CPRI highlighted that topographical factor (of up
to 30%) is included in the IEC 60826 for transmission lines located in
mountains/complex topographical areas, however, at present the same is not
considered in the design of transmission towers as per IS codes and this issue
will be taken up in the next meeting of Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS).

3.11 Committee noted that all the utilities should intimate the failures of
transmission lines timely and should provide all the relevant
details/documents including images, duly filled CEA proforma, wind speed
data, coordinates of failed towers, material test reports, etc, so that a proper
investigation of cause of failure may be carried out. IMD and other agencies
involved in metrological field may be requested to assist the affected utilities
for obtaining the wind speed data of the failed tower locations.

3.12 Representative from SERC stated that in the North Western region of India,
many towers had failed in past years in the pre-monsoon period. In 2016,
SERC published a research paper in which it was observed that dust storms
occur in the north western region particularly in the Gangatic region, every
year, which may lead to tower failures. He informed that increase of 0.01% of
dust in wind (by volume) will increase the load on the tower by ten (10)
percent. Committee requested SERC to share the research paper and studies
with the Committee for further examination and evaluation.

3.13 Committee noted that wind map of India may also need further revision as
latest wind map was published by SERC in year 2009. Committee requested
SERC to carry out the exercise for revision of Wind Map of India.

4.0 INSIGHTS INTO TOWER FAILURE INCIDENTS DURING PAST 10 YEARS

(2012-2021)

4.1 The details of previous transmission line and tower failure incidents which
were reported to CEA and have been discussed in the previous Standing
Committee meetings from the year 2012 onwards have been analyzed by CEA.

4.2 The graph depicting the failures of towers occurred during past 10 years that
have been discussed in the previous Standing committee meetings are shown
below in Fig. 5. It is observed that the failure rate of suspension towers is
much higher in comparison to tension towers which is due to the cascading
effect of failure of suspension type towers i.e. secondary failure of adjacent
suspension towers due to the pulling force of conductors which have been
developed due to failure of another tower and due to the fact that in any line,
suspension towers are more in numbers than tension towers (approximately
75:25 in plain area).

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TOWER FAILURE BETWEEN YEAR 2012 TO 2021

180 180
163
160 160

140 50 140
118
120 107 120
101
23 90
100 16 100
30
80 23 80
61
60 48 52 60
113 12
95 91 37 12
40 9 28 40
71 67
18 49 5
20 39 40 20
19 23
0 0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Suspension Tension Total

Fig. 5

4.3 The graph depicting the failures of towers at various voltage level that have
occurred during past ten (10) years and intimated to CEA which have been
discussed in the Standing committee meetings are shown in Fig. 6. It may
be observed that towers of 400 kV voltage level have maximum incidents
of failure. It may be noted that the mandate of the Standing Committee is
to investigate failure of towers of 220 kV and above voltage class
transmission line and the graph shows the details of only those
transmission line failure which have been intimated to CEA and the large
percentage of tower failure incidents reported to CEA pertains to
POWERGRID which has maximum No. of transmission lines of 400 kV
voltage level.

NO. OF TOWERS FAILED AT VARIOUS VOLTAGE

LEVELS BETWEEN YEAR 2012 TO 2021
350 350
400 kV, 293
300 0 300
28
250 220 kV, 216 250
265
765 kV , 185 1
200 38 200
38
150 177 150

100 100

50
147 50
±800 kV, 4 ±500 kV, 2
0 3 0
1 2
Suspension type Tension Type NA (Tower type not available)

Fig. 6

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS & REMEDIAL MEASURES SUGGESTED BY THE
COMMITTEE

After detailed deliberations/discussions among all participants, the committee

has recommended/suggested the following remedial measures

(a) It is observed that intensity of wind has changed in some parts of the
country due to climate change and the wind map prepared by SERC in
2009 has been incorporated in the National Building Code 2016 Vol. 1 of
BIS, however, IS 875 has not been amended to include this wind map.
Till the time IS 875 is not revised, utilities should follow wind map given
in National Building Code for designing of towers.

(b) After every failure the concerned utility needs to submit the actual wind
velocity prevailed in the affected area so that the investigating team of
standing committee could get reference wind speed prevailed over that
area. In this matter, the respective utility may seek the help of IMD to
estimate the wind speed in affected areas based on data obtained from
observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

(c) In order to optimize the tower designs, the values of drag coefficient
considered for flat sided tower members have been reduced in the revised
version of IS:802 (Part-1/Section-1)- 2015. In the process the tower
design margins got reduced. Hence, the lattice type towers shall be
designed as per IS-802 (2015), however the drag coefficient considered for
flat sided tower members shall be as follows:

Solidity Ratio Drag Coefficient

Up to 0.05 3.6
0.1 3.4
0.2 2.9
0.3 2.5
0.4 2.2
0.5 and above 2.0

(d) Reliability level to be adopted for all the future transmission lines shall be
in accordance to Central Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for
Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations.

(e) Additional precautions should be taken for routing of transmission lines

so as to keep location of towers away from river banks. Pile type
foundation shall be used for towers located in river or creek bed or on
bank of river having scourable strata or in areas where river flow or
change in river course is anticipated, based on detailed soil investigation
and previous years’ maximum flood discharge of the river, maximum
velocity of water, highest flood level, scour depth & anticipated change in
course of river based on river morphology data of at least past 20 years to
ensure availability and reliability of the transmission line.

(f) As revision of codal provisions is a continuous process, the changes are

to be implemented prospectively. Strengthening of existing transmission

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
line towers due to change in the codal provisions could be decided on case
to case basis by the Standing Committee, if repeated failures are observed
in a particular line.

(g) Transmission lines to be laid within 50 km of the border of the wind zones
may be designed with higher of the two zones. However, whether 50 km
is appropriate or any change is required for this interface distance, shall
be suggested by SERC based on studies.

(h) Utilities, while designing/erection of transmission lines in coastal areas,

should follow the recommendations of “Task Force on Cyclone Resilient
Robust Electricity Transmission & Distribution Infrastructure in coastal
areas”.

(i) Wherever, transmission lines are passing through cyclone prone areas i.e.
areas upto 60 km from coast following practices shall be adhered to:

 Terrain category with terrain roughness factor (K2) shall be

considered as per IS 802 (part 1/ Sec 1), as amended from time to
time, for tower design.
 Importance factor for cyclonic region (K4) of 1.3 shall be considered
for tower design.
 The number of consecutive spans between the section points/ angle
point shall not exceed 10 spans or 3 km instead of conventional
practice of 15 spans or 5 km, in order to reduce the failure of such
towers in coastal areas due to cascading effect. The section shall be
terminated with tension tower/ angle tower and angle of deviation
should be based on the site requirement.
 The fabricated tower parts and stubs shall have a minimum overall
zinc coating of 900 gram/m2 of surface area except for plates and
sections below 5 mm which shall have a minimum overall zinc coating
of 610 gram/m2 of surface area. The average zinc coating for all
sections and plates 5 mm and above shall be maintained as 127
microns and that for plates and sections below 5 mm shall be
maintained as 87 microns.
 Ready mix concrete of M30 Grade shall be used to avoid use of locally
available saline water. However, design mix concrete of M30 Grade
conforming to IS 456 with potable water can be used at locations
where transportation of ready-mix concrete is not feasible. Minimum
cement content in any case shall not be less than 330 kg/m3.
 The surface of the reinforced steel shall be treated with epoxy-based
coating to enhance corrosion performance of foundation. Use of epoxy
coated reinforcement in foundation shall be as per IS 13620. In
addition, two (2) coats of bituminous painting of minimum 1.6 kg/m2
per coat shall be applied on all exposed faces of foundation (i.e.
pedestal & base slab).
 Double coat 20 mm thick cement plaster shall be provided on all
exposed concrete surface as well up to 300 mm below ground level to
give protection to concrete surface from environmental and saline
effect.
 Before coping of chimney top portion, three coats of anti-corrosive
paint of minimum 30-35 microns dry film thickness each shall be

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applied on the stub in the 50 mm coping portion as well as up to 350
mm above CL portion

(j) Due to climatic change, incidents of high winds are increasing.

Transmission utilities need to take proactive measures such as increased
line patrolling, immediate replacement of missing members/bolts.

(k) Utilities should take necessary precautions to ensure that there are no
deficiencies such as missing members, missing bolts, bent members,
incorrect attachment of cross arm, chimney covered with soil, rusted
stub/members etc which are attributed to poor workmanship, erection
deficiency, O&M issues etc. Utilities should carry out proper maintenance
of their lines so as to avoid failure of towers due to such deficiencies.

(l) Coping of Chimneys of tower foundations, wherever required, should be

taken up to avoid rusting of stubs.

(m) In case of towers in critical locations with regular high speed wind
phenomenon, redundant members of tower should be designed with
actual loads and non-linear analysis of tower should be carried out.

(n) Modern technique/methods should be adopted for erection & stringing of

towers.

(o) The transmission towers erected near river banks should be frequently
patrolled and assessment based on history should be made to anticipate
the change in course of river and necessary protection should be provided
to towers to avoid its damage during such incident.

(p) Best practices in quality control process for raw material, manufacturing,
transportation, construction, storage, erection and stringing of towers
shall be adopted.

(q) Frequency of patrolling of transmission lines should be more for the

vulnerable tower locations (for thunder & cyclonic prone area, towers
located close to river banks). Proper protection shall be provided for
towers located in areas affected by soil erosion.

(r) Utilities shall assess the condition of structure of towers, conductors,

earthwire, all associated accessories, foundation and earthing system
periodically using modern techniques & diagnostic tools and shall take
appropriate action, wherever abnormality is noticed.

(s) All transmission towers should be checked on topmost priority after major
wind event to remove fatigue and distortions, if any, so as to restore the
original strength and avoid failures in subsequent event of high intensity
winds.

(t) In case of damage of foundation of towers, the foundation design is

required to be examined.

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(u) Material test for failed members including nuts and bolts of the tower
should be carried out in NABL accredited laboratory to ascertain the
quality, composition and mechanical properties of the material. Impact
tests should also be conducted.

(v) Intensive care should be taken during erection and installation of towers
such as Slope correctness, filling unplugged holes, tightening of Bolts,
Tack welding, straightness of tower members etc.

(w) Regular patrolling of the lines is required for smooth and trouble free
operation of line. During patrolling any unauthorized construction/use/
storage under & around the towers should also be checked and if such
activity is observed, local administrative authority should be immediately
informed for assistance and necessary action.

(x) Providing proper revetment & use of geo-synthetic material in foundation,

concrete encasing & painting of stub in water logging areas etc. may also
be considered, wherever required.

(y) Utilities shall ensure that casting of chimneys and placement of stubs are
done as per approved drawings. Due to improper erection, residual
stresses are developed in the towers which causes failure of towers.

(z) In future during investigation of failed towers, wherever possible, stub

setting dimensions, including back to back distance measurements,
should be measured and submitted to the Committee along with the
failure report.

(aa) Practices of using towers designed as per older versions of IS codes shall
not be adopted by the utilities and it shall be ensured that the
transmission lines are designed and erected as per latest IS codes,
Regulations and recommendations of the Standing Committee / Task
Force, as applicable. The failed towers, which are designed as per old
codes/Regulations shall be replaced by towers designed as per latest IS
codes.

(bb) Proper geological investigation of the land mass is carried out before the
spotting of tower structures and the necessary strengthening measures,
for tower foundations for the hill slope, if required, shall be taken
proactively, so that such incidences do not repeat and lead to failure of
other towers.

(cc) In case of erection of towers with high body extensions, normally the stub
setting templates are not available and props are used for erection of
towers. Special precaution should be taken while erecting the towers with
body extension so that the slope of stubs and back to back distance
between the stubs are correctly maintained as per approved drawings.

(dd) Black (un-galvanized) towers shall not be used by the utilities in the
erection of future transmission lines.

***************************************************************************

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

APPENDIX

INVESTIGATION REPORTS OF
FAILURE OF TOWERS OF VARIOUS
TRANSMISSION UTILITIES

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

DETAILED REPORTS OF FAILURE OF TOWERS

A. POWERGRID

The towers of following Transmission Lines of POWERGRID had failed

during above mentioned period :

No. of Towers
Year Failed
of Su
S. Name of the Name of Date of Wind
Comm sp Conductor
No. Transmission Line Utility Failure Zone Tens To
issioni en
ng ion tal
si
on
400 kV D/C
Vertical/
Khandwa- Indore I POWER
1. 16.04.2019 2016 2 - 1 1 Twin ACSR
and II transmission GRID
Moose
line
Line in
WZ 1
Tension
400 kV D/C towers
Vertical/
Narendra- POWER for WZ2
2. 28.04.2019 2008 9 1 10 Twin ACSR
Devangere GRID &
Moose
transmission line Suspens
ion
tower for
WZ1
400 kV D/C
Vertical/
Pandiabili – Duburi POWER
3. 03.05.2019 2011 5 - 1 1 Twin ACSR
– Baripada GRID
Moose
transmission line
400 kV D/C Gooty – Vertical/
POWER
4. Nellore PS 27.05.2019 2013 2 7 - 7 Quad ACSR
GRID
transmission line Moose
Line in
WZ 1
Tension
400 kV D/C towers
Vertical/
Narendra- POWER for WZ2
5. 06.06.2019 2008 5 1 6 Twin ACSR
Devangere (Guttur) GRID &
Moose
transmission line Suspens
ion
tower for
WZ1
400 kV D/C Agra – Vertical/
POWER
6. Sikar transmission 12.06.2019 2014 4 2 1 3 Quad ACSR
GRID
line Moose
400 kV D/C Silchar Vertical/
POWER
7. – Meliriat 19.07.2019 2018 6 - 1 1 Twin ACSR
GRID
transmission line Moose

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
400 kV D/C Vertical/
POWER
8. Kishanganj – Patna 06.08.2019 2016 4 - 1 1 Quad ACSR
GRID
transmission line Moose
Total (2019)
Transmission lines failed : 8 23 7 30

765 kV S/C New

Delta/
Ranchi- POWER
9. Dharamjaygarh 21.04.2020 2014 2 3 - 3 Quad ACSR
GRID
Bersimis
transmission line-I
400 kV D/C
Vindhyachal- POWER Russian Vertical/
10. 30.04.2020 1989 4 - 4
Jabalpur Ckt I & II GRID Design Twin ACKC
transmission line
765 kV S/C Delta/
POWER
11. Varanasi-Fatehpur 10.05.2020 2013 4 4 - 4 Quad ACSR
GRID
transmission line Bersimis
Delta/
765 kV S/C Sasan-
POWER Quad
12. Satna – I 28.05.2020 2012 4 - 1 1
GRID ACSR
transmission line
Bersimis
765 kV S/C Sasan- Delta/
POWER
13. Satna – II 28.05.2020 2013 4 1 - 1 Quad ACSR
GRID
transmission line Bersimis
400 kV D/C Agra- Vertical/
POWER
14. Sikar transmsison 29.05.2020 2014 4 3 1 4 Quad ACSR
GRID
line Moose
220 kV S/C RAPP
POWER Horizontal/
15. C- Anta 03.07.2020 2000 Medium 1 - 1
GRID
transmission line
400 kV D/C Vertical/
POWER
16. Dulhasti- Kishenpur 10.09.2020 2018 4 - 2 2 Quad ACSR
GRID
II & III Moose
Total (2020)
Transmission lines failed : 8 16 04 20

765 kV S/C Bina- Delta/

POWER
17. Gwalior-3 05.01.2021 2014 4 0 1 1 Quad ACSR
GRID
transmission line Bersimis
765 kV S/C Delta/
POWER
18. Jhatikara-Bhiwani 06.05.2021 2012 4 1 - 1 Quad ACSR
GRID
Transmission Line Bersimis
±800 kV HVDC Horizontal/
POWER
19. Agra-BNC-Pole-II 10.05.2021 2015 4 1 - 1 Hexa ACSR
GRID
Transmission Line Lapwing
400 kV D/C Korba – Vertical/
POWER
20. Raipur III & IV 11.05.2021 2011 2 1 - 1 Twin ACSR
GRID
Transmission line Moose
765 kV D/C Vertical/
POWER
21. Wardha-Aurangabad 27.05.2021 2014 2 5 - 5 Hexa ACSR
GRID
Transmission line Zebra
Horizontal
400 kV S/C Korba-
POWER /
22. Bhilai-1 30.05.2021 1983 Medium 1 - 1
GRID Twin ACSR
Transmission Line
Moose

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
765 kV S/C Meerut- Delta/
POWER
23. Moga Transmission 10.06.2021 2015 4 3 - 3 Quad ACSR
GRID
Line Bersimis
765 kV S/C Moga- Delta/
POWER
24. Bhiwani 12.06.2021 2012 4 - 3 3 Quad ACSR
GRID
Transmission Line Bersimis
400 kV D/C Kaithal- Vertical/
POWER
25. Baghpat 08.07.2021 2010 4 4 - 4 Quad ACSR
GRID
transmission line Moose
400 kV D/C
Kishenpur-New Vertical/
POWER
26. Wangpoh (Ckt III & 23.10.2021 2017 2 - 1 1 Twin ACSR
GRID
IV) Transmission Moose
Line
Total (2021)
Transmission lines failed : 10 17 4 21

Total :
Transmission lines failed (POWERGRID): 26
Towers failed: 71

DETAILS IN RESPECT OF EACH TRANSMISSION LINE

A.1 400 kV D/C Khandwa-Indore I & II transmission line failed on

16.04.2019
[Tower at Location No.196 (DD+0)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Khandwa-Indore I & II transmission line of POWERGRID was

commissioned in July 2016. The towers of this line were designed as per
IS 802 (1995) considering Wind zone 2 with Twin ACSR Moose conductor
in vertical configuration with Porcelain Disc insulators.

 Observations

a. The 400 kV Khandwa-Indore transmission line of POWERGRID was

crossed over between tower locations 196(DD+0)-197(DC+9) by the
765 kV Khandwa - Dhule D/C transmission line of M/s Sterlite Power.
At the time of failure incident, the 765 kV Khandwa - Dhule D/C
transmission line with Hexa AAAC Moose conductor per bundle
configuration was under construction, however, the stringing of
crossing span between Towers AP4/0 and AP5/0 was complete.

b. As reported by POWERGRID, on 16.04.2019, there was high speed

wind conditions in the affected area (village Toksar near Sanavad)
during which the crossing Towers AP4/0 and AP5/0 of 765 kV D/C
Khandwa-Dhule line of M/s Sterlite collapsed due to which the
conductors of this line fell over POWERGRID’s 400 kV D/C Khandwa-
Indore Line in the span between towers 196-197.

c. Due to falling of Hexa AAAC Moose conductor on the span, the tower

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
at Location No. 196 (DD+0)) was damaged from above waist level. Both
earthwire peaks and two cross arms of the tower were damaged. The
conductor and insulators in the span were also damaged. At Location
No. 197 (DC+9) tower was intact, however, the insulators were
observed to be damaged.

Location No. 196( DD+0)

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted the above and concluded that the failure of

transmission tower of POWERGRID located at 196 (DD+0) was due to
the sudden impact of Hexa Bundle conductors of 765 kV D/c line of
M/s Sterlite Power falling on it.

A.2 400 kV D/C Narendra-Davangere Transmission line failed on

28.04.2019
[Towers at Location No. 237 (DA+6), 238 (DA+3), 239 (DA+3), 240 (DA+0),
241 (DA+3), 242 (DA+0), 243 (DA+3), 244 (DB+0), 245 (DA+3), 246 (DA+0)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Narendra-Davangere line was designed by POWERGRID itself

and was constructed by M/s L&T. The line was commissioned in February
2008 and total length of the transmission line is 155.5 km and falls under
Wind Zone 1 as per the wind map provided in IS code. The suspension
towers used in the line were designed for Wind Zone 1 (33 m/s) and

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
tension towers were designed for Wind Zone 2 (39 m/s). These towers have
been designed as per the provision of IS 802-1995 in vertical configuration
with Twin Moose ACSR Conductor. The towers were designed considering
Terrain category-II. The line was constructed using Porcelain Disc
insulators, however, in year 2012-13, the Disc insulators in suspension
towers were replaced by Composite Long Rod (CLR) insulators. This line
was in successful operation for last 11 years since commissioning and this
was the first incident of failure.

 Observations:

a. The affected tower locations 237 to 246 were located in undulated

agriculture field with few trees in vicinity near village Kadkol, Savanur
Taluk in Haveri district (Karnataka). All the ten towers had fallen in the
direction perpendicular to the line. Indicative diagram of the fallen
towers is shown below:

b. All the affected towers were collapsed completely to the ground in

transverse direction of the line. The details of damaged towers are as
follows:

Span Angle Extent of Damage

SI. Loc. Tower
(in of
No. No. Type
m) Dev.

 Tower collapsed completely.

 All the four stubs were intact.
1 237 DA+6 360 NIL  Minor damage to chimney at leg C was
observed. Coping of the chimney was
also damaged.
 Tower collapsed completely.
 Stub cleat of Leg C & Leg D of the tower
2 238 DA+3 400 NIL
were damaged & other two stubs along
with foundation & chimney were intact.
 Tower collapsed completely.
 All the four stubs of the tower along
3 239 DA+3 400 NIL
with foundation and chimney were
intact.

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
 Tower collapsed completely.
 All the four stubs of the tower along
4 240 DA+0 370 NIL
with foundation and chimney were
intact.
 Tower collapsed completely.
5 241 DA+3 370 NIL  Stubs were observed to be bent, though
foundations were intact.
 Tower collapsed completely.
6 242 DA+0 380 NIL  Stubs were observed to be bent, though
foundations were intact.
 Tower collapsed completely.
7 243 DA+3 378 NIL  Stubs were observed to be bent, though
foundations were intact.
 Tower collapsed completely.
3o24’  Tower members below first cross arm
8 244 DB+0 381
LT level were badly damaged and
entangled.
 Tower collapsed completely.
 The land at tower location was with
gradient. The fall of the tower was
9 245 DA+3 381 NIL towards the slope.
 Stubs (cleats) of leg C & Leg D of the
tower were failed. Other two stubs and
chimney were intact.
 Tower collapsed completely.
 All the four stubs of the tower along
10 246 DA+0 380 NIL
with foundation and chimney were
intact.

Tower at Loc. No.237 (DA+6) Tower at Loc. No. 238 (DA+3)

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Tower at Loc. No. 239 (DA+3) Tower at Location No.240 (DA+0)

Tower at location No. 241 (DA+3)

Tower at location No. 242 (DA+0) Tower at location No. 243 (DA+3)

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Tower at location No. 244 (DB+0) Tower at location No. 245 (DA+3)

c. Representative from POWERGRID informed that the affected tower

structures were examined and any of the tower members/ nut & bolts
were not observed to be missing from the tower structures. Further,
samples of tower parts were collected by CPRI from the tower failure
site and testing was carried out by them. All the tower steel samples
were found acceptable as per the relevant Indian Standards.

d. POWERGRID representative informed that, discussion was held with

nearby local village residents and it was gathered that thunderstorm
condition with high wind velocity prevailed in the area and the tower
failure was initiated due to this high intensity localized wind observed
during the storm. It was informed that the above windstorm has also
caused damages to nearby trees. The same was reported in local
newspapers as well.

e. Ministry of Power vide its order dated 02.09.2019 advised POWERGRID

to carry out the detailed investigation of the cause of failure of towers
of this line. Accordingly, a committee comprising of members from
CEA, CPRI & CTU was constituted. The committee visited the tower
failure site in January 2020 and key observations of the committee are
as follows:

 There were very few obstructions in the vicinity of the transmission

line to dampen the intensity of wind speed caused due to
thunderstorm.
 Tower foundation chimneys were covered in the soil and surrounded
by long grass.
 Stub levelling difference at the top of the stubs & Longitudinal and
traverse deflections of tower were within limits.
 Coping of some of the chimneys were found damaged & due to ingress
of water to the chimney, stubs were rusted.

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 To ascertain the quality and workmanship of the concreting work

done for the foundations, Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) – Rebound
Hammer Test was conducted at locations 226 and 220 of the line in
the presence of the Committee Members.
 The towers have been constructed generally in order and no major
structural deficiency has been observed.
 The basic dimensions of the foundations, galvanization thickness on
the tower parts, section sizes and type of steel (MS or HT) were found
to be within the permissible tolerance limits.
 Extra/additional holes on the main legs and other tower members
were not plugged with nut & bolt in few towers. Pitting corrosion on
the face of the bracing was observed.

 Committee concluded that the combined effect of deficiencies in the

erection and maintenance of transmission line like corrosion of stubs
& bracings, unplugged holes etc and the wind storm observed in the
area might have caused the failure of towers. Since, wind speed data
during the storm was not available, it was not possible to ascertain
whether the wind speed exceeded the specified wind speed
corresponding to Wind Zone 1 (33 m/s) for which tower has been
designed.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that nine (9) out of total ten (10) failed towers were
of the suspension type. Further, the failed towers were located in
the open field areas with very few trees/vegetation around the

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towers, however, these were designed considering Terrain Category-
II. Committee also noted that some of the erection and O&M
deficiencies, like unplugged holes, rusting of stubs & bracings etc.
improper coping of the chimney & covered in the grass, etc. were
observed by the committee constituted to examine the failure
incident.

Committee also noted that the towers were observed to be

constructed generally in order and no major structural deficiency
has been observed by the team which visited the tower failure site.
Further, the chemical & strength tests conducted on the tower
samples were found to be in order.

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.

Committee suggested that the patrolling frequency of the line may be

increased. Committee noted that the small deficiencies in the tower
structure may lead to its collapse in the event of occurrence of high
speed wind. Committee advised that utilities should improve their
erection and operation & maintenance practices and ensure that
structural strength is not compromised due to deficiencies like,
unplugged holes, rusting of stubs, etc.

A.3 400 kV D/C Pandiabili -Duburi- Baripada transmission line failed on

03-05-2019
[Location No. 717 (DD+25+4m RC)]

 Brief Background

The portion of 400 kV D/C Pandiabili-Duburi-Baripada transmission line

in which the tower collapsed, was constructed by M/s Tata Projects Ltd
and the line was commissioned on 01.09.2011. Total length of the
transmission line from Baripada to Pandiabili is 300 km. One Circuit of the
line has been made LILO at Duburi substation of OPTCL. The length of
Baripada to Duburi is 188.76 km and Duburi to Pandiabili-is 127.28 km.
This is the first incident of tower failure in the transmission line.

As per wind map in IS -802 & IS -875, this line falls under wind zone -V
(50 m/s). Towers of this line were designed for Wind Zone-5 (basic wind
speed of 50 m/sec) and reliability level 1 as per IS 802-1995 for ACSR twin
moose conductor with double tension disc insulator strings.

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 Observations

f. The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as follows:

Loc. Forward Angle of

No. Type of Tower
No. Span (m) Dev.
1 715 DA Nil

330

2 716 DD+9 30029M8 LT

165
44051 '08'
3 717 DD+25+4m RC
RT
170

4 718 DD+25+4m RC 31 05444 'LT

372

5 719 DB+0

g. As reported by POWERGRID, the affected tower was situated in plain

field with few trees in vicinity. On one side of the location, there was a
hill at about 75 m-100 m distance, whereas other side was plain land
with few undulations and sparse low height vegetation. In forward and
backward span of collapsed tower, line was crossing over 400 kV D/C
and 220 kV D/C (ckt-I & II) lines of OPTCL.

h. As reported by POWERGRID, the tower located at Location No. 717

(DD+25+4 RC) collapsed completely on the ground in the transverse

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direction. The Main leg/stubs of the failed tower were double angle (star
angle) parts. In three legs out of four legs, one of star angle section got
torn near joint with stub, whereas in fourth leg, one of the angle section
of the stub was torn.

i. The cyclone “Fani”, which was categorized by IMD as extremely severe

Cyclone with a gust wind speed ranging upto 200 kmph, made its
landfall on the coast of Odisha on 02.05.2019. The impact of cyclone
severely affected the transmission & distribution infrastructure in the
State of Odisha. The intensity of the wind might have increased due to
plain area with few vegetation in the vicinity of collapsed tower on the
one side and the hill on the other side.

j. As reported by POWERGRID, the tower foundations were also checked for

any damage and no failure of foundation was observed except the
damage in chimney portion of foundation of one leg. The towers were
checked thoroughly and no members and bolts & nuts were found
missing.

Tower at location No. 717 (DD+25+4m RC)

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 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

The massive damage to trees, electric poles, and public properties

were observed due to the Cyclone “FANI” and as per the press release
issued by IMD high gust wind speed were observed in the region.
Committee observed that the failure of tower has taken place during
the impact of Fani cyclone due to which high wind speed may have
been observed at the failed tower location which led to failure of
tower. The failed tower was designed with +25 m body extension and
the chimney was raised with +4 m. The effect of high speed wind
may have further increased due to increased height of tower and also
due to topography of the area (i.e. nearby hills).

The recommendations of “Task Force on Cyclone Resilient Robust

Electricity Transmission & Distribution Infrastructure in coastal
areas” should be followed by utilities while designing/erection of
transmission lines in cyclone affected area. Committee suggested
that frequency of patrolling of transmission lines should be more for
the vulnerable tower locations particularly in thunder & cyclone
prone areas.

A.4 400 kV D/C Gooty-Nellore PS Transmission Line failed on 27.05.2019

[Towers at Location Nos. 546 (DA+0), 547 (DA+0), 548 (DA+0), 549 (DA+0),
550 (DA+0), 551 (DA+0) & 552 (DA+9)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Gooty-Nellore PS transmission line of was designed by

POWERGRID itself and executed by M/S KPTL. The transmission line was
commissioned in April 2013. Total length of the line is 289 km. This line
falls under wind zone - 2 (39 m/s) as per wind map provided in IS -802 &
IS -875. The towers used in this line were designed as per IS 802-1995 for
Reliability level 1 with vertical configuration having Quad Moose ACSR
Conductor and one OPGW & one normal earth wire. Porcelain Disc
insulator string was used in the line. As reported by POWERGRID, this line
is in successful operation since commissioning and this was the first
incident of tower failure in this line.

 Observations

a. The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as follows:

Sl. Loc. Type of Forward Extent of

Angle of Dev.
No. No. Tower Span (m) damage
1 544 DA+0 395 m Nil Intact
2 545 DB+0 400 m 0o32'23" LT Intact
One top cross
3 546 DA+0 400 m Nil
arm damaged
4 547 DA+0 400 m Nil Collapsed
5 548 DA+0 395 m Nil Collapsed

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6 549 DA+0 395 m Nil Collapsed

7 550 DA+0 395 m Nil Collapsed
8 551 DA+0 360 m Nil Collapsed
9 552 DA+9 378 m Nil Collapsed
10 553 DB+3 412 m 2 o0’25" RT Intact

b. All the affected towers were suspension type towers. The towers at
location nos. 547 (DA+0), 548 (DA+0), 549 (DA+0), 551 (DA+0), 552
(DA+9) were completely collapsed & lying on ground and tower at
location No. 550 (DA+0) was damaged above the 2nd panel level and
tower at location No. 546 (DA+0) was intact however, damaged from top
cross arm only. Anti-climbing device were provided and no missing of
tower members observed in any of the tower.

c. Tower at Location No. 546 (DA+0) was located in plain terrain. When
facing towards Gooty, the left side top cross arm of the tower was
observed to be broken and conductor had fallen on ground. The rest of
the tower structure was intact. All the foundation chimneys & stubs
were intact. All Chimneys were above ground level. Anti-climbing device,
name plate of tower, danger plate and phase sequence plate were
provided.

Tower loc. No. 546 (DA+0)

d. Tower at Location No. 547 (DA+0) was completely collapsed to the

ground from the stub level in transverse direction, towards left side

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when observed facing Gooty. All the four stubs of the tower were bent.
Coping of legs were damaged due to the impact of falling tower. Chimney
of leg A & leg C were damaged and other two chimneys were intact.
Rusting at the bottom end of all the stubs and nuts & bolts (near to
chimney) was observed. No missing tower members/nut bolts were
observed in the failed tower.

Tower loc. No. 547 (DA+0)

e. Tower at Location No. 548 (DA+0) was completely collapsed to the

ground from the stub level in transverse direction towards left side when
observed facing Gooty. All four stubs of the tower were bent. Rusting at
the bottom end of all the stubs (near to chimney) was observed. All
chimneys were almost covered in the soil and found damaged. Coping
of legs were damaged. No missing tower members/ nut bolts were found.

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Tower loc. No. 548 (DA+0)

f. Tower at Location No. 549 (DA+0) was completely collapsed on the

ground from the stub level in transverse direction towards left side when
observed facing Gooty. All foundation chimneys were almost covered in
the soil & grass. Rusted stub of Leg A was broken from bottom end (near
to chimney) and the remaining three were bent. No missing tower
members/ nut bolts were found.

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Tower loc. No. 549(DA+0)

g. Tower at Location No. 550 (DA+0) was bent from 1st panel level and
collapsed to the ground in transverse direction to the line towards left
side when observed facing Gooty. All four stubs of the tower were bent.
Rusting of all stubs, nuts & bolts at the bottom end of stubs (near to
chimney) was observed. Coping of legs were damaged due to the impact
of falling tower. No missing tower members/ nut bolts were found.

Tower
Tower at Location
loc. No. 550No. 550
(DA+0)

h. Tower at Location No. 551 (DA+0) was completely collapsed to the

ground from the stub level in transverse direction towards left side when
observed facing Gooty. All four stubs of the tower were bent.

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Tower loc. No. 551 (DA+0)

i. Tower at Location No. 552 (DA+9) was located in plain terrain. The
tower had completely collapsed to the ground from the stub level in
transverse direction towards left side when observed facing Gooty. The
Stub of leg D was observed to be not in centre of chimney. Stubs of Leg
C & Leg D were broken from bottom end (near to chimney) and the
remaining two stubs were bent. Rusting at the bottom end of stubs (near
to chimney) was observed. Chimneys were found to be damaged.

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Tower loc. No. 552 (DA+9)

j. As reported by POWERGRID officials, a high intensity localized wind

prevailed near Kajhwan village, which was confirmed by broken tree
branches, damage to the teen sheds of houses located in the vicinity of
failed towers, damage to the wall & teen sheds of a Dal Mill located near
by the failed towers etc. Numerous concrete poles of 11 kV line were
also damaged. The same was confirmed by local people and was reported
in the local newspapers. However, no damages was observed in the 765
kV D/C Kurnool-Kadapa line, one 220 kV D/C Transmission line and
under construction 800 kV HVDC Raigarh-Pugalur transmission line
which are traversing parallel/nearby to the 400 kV D/C Gooty-Nellore
Transmission line.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the transmission line has been commissioned

after the notification of CEA (Technical Standards for Construction
of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations, 2010. As per this
Regulation, towers for transmission line with quad conductor
configuration is to be designed for Reliability level-2. However, the

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towers were designed as per Reliability level-1 which are inferior to
towers designed for Reliability level 2.

Committee also observed that there are deficiencies in the erection

of transmission line i.e. the mis-alignment of stub (i.e. tower legs not
located in the centre of the chimneys) in Leg D of tower at location
No. 552 (DA+9). The photographs of such observations were shared
with the Committee. Committee deliberated on the impact of stubs
being offset from the chimney, on the tower structure and noted that
in case back to back dimensions are not in accordance to tower
designs, the residual stresses may develop in the tower structure
which may lead to its collapse.

The committee noted the above and concluded that due to improper
erection, residual stresses were developed in the towers and these
have failed due to loads developed due to high wind speed observed
in the area on the date of failure.

Committee noted that CEA Regulations have been drafted after

detailed consultation with the stakeholders and shall be adhered to
in any case and advised POWERGRID to ensure that Reliability level
to be adopted for all the future transmission lines shall be in
accordance to CEA Regulations.

Committee also advised utilities to ensure good erection practices

and ensure that casting of chimneys and placement of stubs are done
as per approved drawings. Further, in future during investigation of
failed towers, wherever possible, stub setting dimensions, including
back to back distance measurements, should be measured and
submitted to the Committee along with the failure report.

It was emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility

needs to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected
area so that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/Satellite/Radar.

A.5 400 kV D/C Narendra-Davangere (Guttur) Transmission Line failed on

06.06.2019.
[Towers at Location No. 360 (DA+0), 361 (DA+3), 362 (DA+3), 363 (DA+9),
364 (DA+9)& to 365 (DB+0)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Narendra-Davangere line of POWERGRID was designed by

POWERGRID and was constructed by M/s L&T. The line was

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commissioned in February 2008 and total length of the transmission line
is 155.5 km and falls under Wind Zone-1 as per the wind map provided in
IS. The suspension towers used in the line were designed for wind zone-1
(33 m/s) and tension towers, designed for wind zone-2 (39 m/s), were used
in the line. These towers have been designed as per the provision of IS 802-
1995 in vertical configuration with Twin Moose ACSR Conductor. The
towers were designed considering Terrain category-II. Composite long rod
(CLR) insulators were used in the line at the failed tower locations except
Porcelain Disc insulator string at location No. 365(DB+0). This line had
previously failed on 28.04.2019 in which 10 towers (09 suspension and 01
tension) type tower at location No. 237 to 246 had failed. The line was
restored on 29.05.2019 and was in charged condition at the time of second
failure incident.
 Observations

a. The affected tower locations 361 to 365 were located in undulated field
with few trees in vicinity near village Medleri Village, Ranebennur Taluk,
in Haveri district (Karna- taka). The details of tower spotting in the
relevant sections are as follows:

Sl. Loc. Tower Span Angle of Extent of

No. No. Type Dev. Damage
1 359 DA+3 396 m Nil Intact
2 360 DA+0 398 m Nil Earth wire peak
bent
3 361 DA+3 398 m Nil Collapsed
4 362 DA+3 390 m Nil Collapsed
5 363 DA+9 400 m Nil Collapsed
6 364 DA+9 400 m Nil Collapsed
7 365 DB+0 420 m 110 07' 51'' Collapsed
RT
8 366 DA+0 364 m Nil Intact

b. Tower at location No. 360 (DA+0) was located in plain terrain with
slope terrain in both side. Right side OPGW Earth wire peak of the tower
was bent when facing towards Davangere. Anti-climbing device, name
plate of tower, danger plate and phase sequence plate were provided.

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Tower at location No. 360 (DA+0)

c. Tower at location No. 361 (DA+3) was located in sloped terrain. The
tower had completely collapsed to the ground in transverse direction
towards right side when observed facing Davangere. Failure of Stub
Cleat of leg — A & C was observed. Other two stubs of the tower along
with foundation & chimney were intact. Chimney of leg C was covered
in the soil and remaining three chimneys were above ground. Rusting
at the bottom end of all the Stubs (near to chimney) was observed. The
tower got bent from 1st panel level and had fallen in transverse direction
to the line. Coping was also damaged due to the impact of tower collapse.
No missing tower members / nut bolts were found.

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Tower at location No. 361 (DA+3)

d. Tower at location No. 362 (DA+3) was located in plain terrain. The
tower got bent from 1st panel level and completely collapsed to the
ground in transverse direction to the line towards right side when
observed facing Davangere. All the four stubs of the tower along with
foundation were intact. Leg B of the tower was found broken and other
three legs were bent from 1st panel level. The leg member of the +3 m
extension was found to be bent but the bracing members / diagonals of
+3 m extension was found to be in order. All Chimneys were above
ground level. Coping of chimneys were not done properly.

Tower at location No. 362 (DA+3)

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e. Tower at Location No. 363 (DA+9) was completely collapsed to the

ground from the stub level in transverse direction towards right side
when observed facing Davangere. The Stub of Leg B was not in the
center of chimney and it was broken from bottom end (near to chimney).
The remaining three stubs were bent. Rusting at the bottom end of all
the Stubs (near to chimney) was observed. All the chimneys were intact
however, almost covered in the soil. Coping of the chimneys was found
damaged.

Tower at location No. 363 (DA+9)

f. Tower at location No. 364 (DA+9) was completely collapsed to the

ground from the stub level in transverse direction towards right side
when observed facing Davangere. All the four stubs of the tower were
bent. All chimneys were covered in the soil and rusting at the bottom
end of all the Stubs (near to chimney) was observed. Chimneys of leg C
& leg D were damaged and other two were intact. Coping of all chimneys
was found damaged. Extra holes were not plugged with nuts & bolts.

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Tower at location No. 364 (DA+9)

g. Tower at location No. 365 (DB+0) was B-Type Tension Tower with
double string porcelain insulators. The tower got completely collapsed
to the ground in transverse direction towards right side when observed
facing Davangere. All 4 stubs of the tower were bent. Rusting at the
bottom end of all the Stubs (near to chimney) was observed. Foundation
chimneys were covered in the soil except leg A. Chimneys of leg C & leg
D were damaged and other two were intact. Coping of all chimneys was
found damaged. Many nuts & bolts of tower were plugged out.

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Tower at location No. 365 (DB+0)

h. POWERGRID officials informed that it was gathered from nearby local

village residents that thunderstorm condition with exceptionally high
wind velocity prevailed at the time of tower collapse and the Tower
failure was initiated due to this high intensity localized wind observed
during the storm. The windstorm had also caused uprooting of two
trees near the tower at location No. 365. However, one 220 kV D/C
Transmission line, which was running near to the failed tower locations
of 400kV D/C Narendra-Davangere Transmission line was reported to
have no damage due to wind. The high speed wind incident was also
reported in local newspapers.

i. POWERGRID officials highlighted that the transmission line is

designed considering wind loads for Wind zone- I and is approximately
in the 70-75 km from the boundary of the wind zone 2.

j. To examine the chemical and material properties, samples from the

affected tower were selected from site and sent for testing at
independent NABL accredited lab and the parameters were found to be
within limits.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that two incidences of failure of this line had

occurred within a time span of two months and in total sixteen (16)
towers of the line had failed. Committee noted that deficiencies like,
rusting in the stubs, miss-alignment of stubs & concrete pedestal,
unplugged holes, improper coping of the chimney & covered in the
grass, etc. were observed by the team which visited the tower failure
sites. Further, the failed towers were located in the open field areas
with very few trees/vegetation around the towers, however, these
were designed considering Terrain Category-II.

The committee noted the above and concluded that due to improper

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erection, residual stresses were developed in the towers and these
have failed due to loads developed due to high wind speed observed
in the area on the date of failure.

Committee suggested that since this transmission line has failed

twice in a year, the patrolling frequency may be increased.
Committee noted that even small errors during erection or
compromises in the integrity of structure may lead to its collapse.
Utilities should improve their erection and operation & maintenance
practices and ensure that structural strength is not compromised
due to deficiencies like, unplugged holes, rusting of stubs, etc.

A.6 400 kV D/C Agra-Sikar Transmission line failed on 12.06.2019.

[Towers at Location Nos. 339 (DA+0), 340 (DA+0) & 341(DC+0)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Quad Agra-Sikar Transmission Line was designed by

POWERGRID itself. The line was executed by M/s EMC and was
commissioned in January, 2014. The length of line was 393.90 km. This
line traverses through plain terrain & cultivating fields. The towers have
vertical configuration Quad MOOSE conductor and one OPGW & one
conventional earth wire. The towers were designed for Reliability level -1
and wind zone-4 as per IS 802:1995. POWERGRID informed that in design
for suspension type towers, special consideration for narrow front wind (1.5
times basic wind speed i.e. 250 kmph) and 75% full wind under security
condition were considered. The line had failed in year 2019 & 2020.

 Observations

a. The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as follows.

S. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Extent of

No. Dev. damage
1 338 DA+O 380 Nil Intact
2 339 DA+O 380 Nil Collapsed
3 340 DA+O 380 Nil Collapsed
4 341 DC+O 377 20o10’48’’(R) Collapsed
5 342 DA+O 375 Nil Intact

b. The affected towers location was in plain terrain & cultivating fields with
few trees in the vicinity. Name plates of tower, danger plates and phase
sequence plates were provided. Anti-climbing devices were not provided.
Extra holes present in the tower structures were not plugged with nuts
& bolts.

c. Tower at Location No. 339 (DA+0) was completely collapsed to the

ground in transverse direction towards right side when observed facing

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Sikar. There were minor damages to all four stubs. No tower members/
nut bolts were found missing. It was observed that leg C and leg D were
bent from stub level (near to chimney) and the remaining two legs were
bent from 1st panel level. All the foundation chimneys were intact.
Coping of chimneys were not provided. Rusting at the bottom end of all
the Stubs (near to chimney) were observed. Few bolts were found
missing in the Butt joint connecting leg B and stub. The spacing of bolts
from the edge of the members was observed to be inadequate.

Tower loc. No. 552 (DA+9)

d. Tower at Location No. 340 (DA+0) was completely collapsed to the

ground from the stub level in transverse direction towards right side when
observed facing Sikar. Foundation chimney of leg D was found damaged
& other three chimneys were observed to be intact. Chimneys of leg A &
leg C were fully covered in soil. Coping of chimneys were not done. All
four stubs were damaged.

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Location No. 340 (DA+0)

e. Tower at Location No. 341 (DC+0) was completely collapsed to the

ground in transverse direction, towards right side when observed facing
Sikar. All four stubs were fully damaged. Coping of the chimneys was not
provided and rusting at the bottom end of all the stubs (near to chimney)
was observed. Extra holes were not plugged with nuts & bolts.

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Location No. 341 (DC+0)

f. POWERGRID reported that a high intensity localized windstorm prevailed

near the tower failure site, which was confirmed by broken tree branches,
damage to the teen sheds of houses located in the vicinity of failed towers,
damages to the numerous poles of 11 kV line etc. The same was confirmed
by local people and was reported in the local newspapers.

g. As per POWERGRID, as all the failed towers had collapsed in transverse

direction of the line, it is observed that the high intensity localized
windstorm had resulted in large wind load on phase conductors and
earthwire and on tower structure leading to its failure and subsequent
transverse cascading failure of nearby towers. Further, considering the
damage of one unreinforced brick wall in the affected area, the wind speed
could be estimated to be in between 50 to 55 m/sec, as per the Guidelines
on Improving Wind/ Cyclone Resistance of Housing 2010 released by
BMTPC (Building Materials & Technology Promotion Council) under
Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation.

h. POWERGRID was requested to provide the wind speed data received from
any authenticated observatory indicating speed of wind prevailing at the
failure location at the time of the failure, however, the same was not
provided. The coordinates of the failed tower structures were also shared
by CEA to IMD and wind data at the date & time of failure was requested.
However, the requested information was not available.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the transmission line has been commissioned

after the notification of CEA (Technical Standards for Construction
of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations, 2010. As per this
Regulation, towers for transmission line with quad conductor
configuration is to be designed for Reliability level-2. However, the
towers were designed as per Reliability level-1 which are not as
robust as to towers designed for Reliability level-2.

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Committee noted that there was deficiency in the erection/O&M
practices of line/towers adopted by POWERGRID as number of bolts
were found missing in the leg members at some of the failed tower
locations. Also, the distance of bolt hole from the edge of the
members also appeared to be on lower side.

The committee noted the above and concluded that due to improper
erection, the strength of structure was reduced and these have failed
on account of loads developed due to high wind speed observed in
the area on the date of failure.

Committee advised POWERGRID to improve their operation &

maintenance activities as there are many failures in Agra region in
past years. Special measures like higher frequency of patrolling of
the lines may also be adopted by POWERGRID. Committee also
advised POWERGRID to ensure that Reliability level to be adopted for
all the future transmission lines shall be in accordance to CEA
Regulations and as per latest IS codes, recommendations of the
Standing Committee and Task Force, as applicable.

It was emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility

needs to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected
area so that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

A.7 400kV D/C Silchar - Meliriat Transmission Line failed on 19.07.2019

[Tower at location No. 377 (DC+0)]

 Brief Background

400kV D/C Silchar-Melriat Transmission line of POWERGRID was

constructed by M/s IVRCL and was commissioned at 132 kV Voltage Level
in the month of Dec'2018. Total line length is 143 km. The 400 kV D/C
Silchar-Melriat Line falls in wind zone-6 and connects Silchar substation
in Assam with Melriat Substation in Mizoram. The Mizoram portion of the
line traverses through hilly terrain mostly alongside the National Highway
54. The line has vertical conductor configuration with twin ACSR Moose.
This is the first incident of tower failure in this transmission line.

 Observations

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections are as follows:

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Sl. Loc. No. Type of Forward Angle of

No. Tower Span Deviation

1 375 DD+9 260 m 54o00'34"RT

2 376 DD+18 353 m 37o 54'22"LT

3 377 DC+0 235 m 25o33'30"RT

4 378 DB+0 181 m 03o08'10"LT

5 379 DB+0 441 m 05o52’47"LT

b. The tower at location No. 377 (DC+0) is located in Mualkhang Village,

Sub Division Kawnpui, District Kolasib, Mizoram and was on uphill side
of the NH 54. The Tower had collapsed completely in the direction as
indicated in the diagram below.

c. As reported by POWERGRID, there was a landslide due to which a huge

land mass got separated from the hill downwards creating a deep
canyon in between the hill. The fault line of the separation passed
through the foundation of the Leg-A due to which tower completely
collapsed. Due to the landslide, large boulder/stones also fell on the NH-
54 and blocked it completely damaging about 150 m of the National
Highway.

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Destroyed Highway 54

Location No. 377 (DC+0)

d. As reported by POWERGRID, the collapsed tower was checked for

healthiness and completeness thoroughly. No missing members and
missing bolts & nuts were found in the affected tower.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted the above and concluded that due to sudden

movement of the landmass during the landslide, the foundation of
the tower became instable which led to collapse of tower at location
No. 377 (DC+0).

Committee suggested that Utilities should ensure that proper

geological investigation of the land mass is carried out before
spotting of the tower structures and the necessary strengthening

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measures, for tower foundations for the hill slope, if required, should
be taken proactively, so that such incidences does not repeat and
lead to failure of other towers.

A.8 400 kV D/C Kishanganj – Patna Transmission Line failed on

06.08.2019
[Tower at Location No.409 (DD+25)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C (Quad moose) Kishanganj- Patna transmissions Line of M/s

POWERGRID was commissioned on 29.03.2016. The total length of the line
is 346.718 km. Towers of the line were designed for Wind Zone 4. The line
was constructed by M/s EMC Ltd. However, the pile foundations were
constructed by M/s Simplex. The transmission line had failed due to
change in the course of river Ganga in the year 2016. Also, three towers of
the same transmission line had again failed in September, 2018 due to
change in course of River Ganga and the same was under breakdown since
02.09.2018.

 Observations

a. The affected tower location was in village Dhamhara Ghat near Phungo
halt, on Saharsa-Mansi Railway section, Dist. Khagaria, Bihar. Location
was approx. 35 km from Saharsa and about 15 km from Simri
Bakhtiyarpur Railway Station. Affected location was on the right bank
of river at about 300 m of Kosi River Railway Bridge. POWERGRID
reported that based on the discussion held with the local villagers, it
was gathered that every year the river course was changing towards
right bank due to bank erosion and approximately 13-14 m soil erosion
took place just approx. 500 m downstream the location 409 in 2019.

b. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections are as follows:

TOWER Loc. No. Type of Forward Span Angle of

No. Tower (m) Deviation
406 99F/0 DB 12°55'29"LT
400
407 99G/0 DD 22°14'36"LT
280
408 99G/1 DD 00°00'00"
650
409 99G/2 DD 00°00'00"
370
410 99H/0 DC 24°36'30"RT
230
411 99H/1 DB 10°48'01"LT

c. A schematic representation indicating affected location on piles and

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normal foundation is shown below:

d. Tower at location No. 409/0 (DD+25) of 400 kV D/C (Quad) Patna-

Kishanganj transmission line was designed with Pile foundation. As
reported by POWERGRID officials, during the recent heavy flood in the
Kosi River, the tower had become vulnerable due to sinking of two legs
due to soil erosion by the river. Leg D and some other members were
deformed due to differential settlement of pile foundation under leg A
and leg D. POWERGRID officials at site undertook de-stringing work
between loc. 409 to 410 to isolate the location number 409 for protecting
other locations of possible damage due to likely collapse of tower at
location 409. However, on 06.08.2019 during de-stringing work between
locations 409 & 410, deformed tower at location 409 collapsed
completely at and fell down in the river Kosi towards location number
408.

e. Leg A & D: Pile caps were partially submerged in water and it was
excessively tilted. Differential settlement of the pile caps was clearly
visible. Chimney of both legs were intact however stub was sheared
from the top.

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Leg B & C: Chimney were completely torn/broken and some of
reinforcement of the chimney was exposed/deformed. Stubs were
torn/bend and separated from concrete of chimney. Pieces/lump of
concrete of chimney were observed to be fallen on ground.

f. The details of failed tower pile foundations considered for designing are
as follows:

Pile Foundations– 4.0 Nos., 1.2 m dia pile of 37.6 m length under each
leg with 1.2 m deep pile cap with 3.5 m raised chimney. Scour depth–
27.0 m & HFL*- 40.27 m respectively.

* CWC HFL as mentioned on a post near the old railway bridge is 38.55
m.

Location No. 409 (DC+0)

(Just before Collapse of Tower)

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Location No. 409 (DC+0) (After Collapse)

g. As reported by POWERGRID, due to river flow, the tower foundations

got displaced from their original position and the back to back distances
between legs were different from the design dimensions.

h. POWERGRID informed that the failed tower has been shifted to another
location for restoration and higher scouring depth has been considered
for new pile foundation.

i. POWERGRID submitted the reports of Concrete cube tests & the Non
Destructive Tests conducted on the pile foundations which were done at
the time of erection of the line and these were found to be in order.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the transmission line had failed earlier in the
years 2016 & 2018 due to similar cause of change of river course of
River Ganga. Committee also observed that at the time of
construction of line, the location 409 was on the right bank of River
Kosi, and the river course is changing towards right bank. The
erosion of bank had got extended up to the tower location and two
legs on pile foundation which has led to failure and subsequent
collapse of the tower have now come in the main stream.

Committee noted that even though the highest water level measured
during the flood was lower than the HFL level considered in designing
of pile foundations, the Pile foundations had failed. Further,
Committee noted that one of the failed tower had been tested for +9
m body extension and has been erected with +25 m body extension
with the tower structure. Committee requested POWERGRID to review
the design of Tower extension part adopted in the failed tower
location to ensure the stability of bottom most panels as the K-
bracing placed at this panel appears to be not bearing the loads
because of very high base width to height ratio.

Committee recommended that proper anticipation of change in

course of river on the basis of river flow data of previous years should
be done by the transmission utilities. Additional precautions like
routing of transmission lines few kilometres away from the river
bank/ anticipated future river course, use of pile
foundation/additional piles etc. should be adopted by utilities.
Moreover, in case of damage of foundation of towers, the foundation
design is required to be examined.

Providing proper Protection (retaining wall, Gabion wall etc., proper

revetment & use of geo-synthetic material in foundation, concrete
encasing & painting of stub in water logging areas etc. may also be
considered, wherever required.

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A.9 765 kV S/C New Ranchi-Dharamjaygarh transmission line-I failed on
21.04.2020
[Towers at Location No. 90 (A+3), 91 (A+0) & 92 (A+3)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Ranchi-Dharamjaygarh transmission line-I of M/s

POWERGRID was constructed by M/s EMCO and the same was
commissioned on 31-03-2014. The total length of the line is 302 km. The
suspension towers (Delta Configuration) of this line were designed for basic
wind speed of 39 m/s corresponding to Wind Zone-2 and reliability level 2
as per IS 802-1995. Further, narrow front wind on tower body and 75%
wind in broken wire (security) condition have also been considered for
designing the tower. The line is having Quad ACSR BERSIMIS conductor
with porcelain insulators in I-V-I configuration. This is the first incidence
of failure of towers in this transmission line.

 Observations

a. The affected towers were located in open agricultural field of village-

Burka, Police station- Sisai, District-Gumla (Jharkhand) and was about
50 km from New Ranchi SS of POWERGRID. Collapsed tower at location
No.-92(A+3) was in low lying area between location No.-91 and 93. There
were very few low height trees around the collapsed tower location.

b. The details of tower spotting in the relevant section are as follows:

Sl. No. Loc. No. Type of Forward Angle of Extent of

Tower Span Dev. damage

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
(m)

1 Earth peak
90 A+3 390 Nil
damaged

2 Partial
deformatio
91 A+0 395 Nil
n above
third panel

3 Tower
92 A+3 390 Nil
collapsed

4 30° 9’ Tower
93 D+0 345
00” LT intact

c. Tower at location No. 90 (A+3) was in erect position. The earthwire

peaks of the suspension tower have got damaged due to sudden force
exerted by conductor due to collapse of tower at location number 92.
Rest of the tower was reported to be intact with no missing tower
members and nuts & bolts.

Tower Location No. 90 (A+3)

d. Tower at location No. 91 (A+0) was partially damaged due to sudden

jerk exerted by the pull of conductors during collapse of tower at location
No. 92. POWERGRID informed that the main leg along with bracing
members and few redundant members of the tower had buckled.
Foundations of all the four legs were intact. The tower was also checked
for any missing members /nuts & bolts. No missing members/bolts &
nuts were found. However, few blank holes were visible in members at
different places.

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Tower Location No. 91 (A+0)

e. Tower at location No. 92 (A+3) had collapsed above the +3 M body

extension portion and fell over in twisted condition in transverse
direction. Due to tower collapse, two stubs were also observed to be
damaged. POWERGRID official informed that the tower was checked
thoroughly and no missing tower members/ nut bolts were found. The
anti-climbing device (ACD) was also in place and condition of concrete
in the visible chimney portion were observed to be good.

Tower Location No. 92 (A+3)

f. As reported by POWERGRID, the records of line patrolling of this line

were checked and as per the data furnished by site, patrolling of above
locations were carried out on 18th March 2020 and no defects like
missing members, missing nut & bolts were reported. Further, for
collapsed tower location different foundation dimensions like back to

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back, diagonal distance, levels and the same were found to be generally
in line with approved drawing. Further, patrolling of 3-4 other towers
adjacent to the affected towers were also carried out and no
abnormalities were observed.

g. POWERGRID official reported that based on the previous failures of the

765 kV Delta type suspension towers of wind zone 2 in other
POWERGRID lines, POWERGRID had taken up the process of
strengthening of all such suspension towers in phased manner and
Strengthening of towers in this line was scheduled from the month of
April’20 but couldn’t be taken-up due to complete lockdown caused by
COVID-19.

h. POWERGRID informed that the localized whirlwind storm has also

caused widespread damages in the vicinity. Many big trees were
reported be found uprooted/broken around the nearby villages which
indicate that strong wind storm was prevailing at the time of tower
collapse.

i. The report of patrolling of POWERGRID site team and the material test
reports of the parts of failed towers were found to be in order.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

The committee noted that this is the first tower failure incident of
this line since commissioning. It was observed that tower at location
No. 92 (A+3) failed first, which led to secondary partial damages to
nearby suspension type towers at location No. 90 (A+3) and location
No. 91 (A+0) due to pulling force of the conductors.

The Committee noticed that transmission line was erected using 765
kV S/C Delta configuration designed for wind zone-2. The high wind
velocity might have induced the failure of towers. The Committee in
its previous meeting had recommended that the rate of failure of
suspension towers (with delta configuration) of 765kV S/C line
traversing through wind zones, other than Wind Zone -4, and areas
prone to cyclone / storm needs to be monitored. In case repeated
failure is observed in those lines, exercise for review of design, as has
been done for 765 kV Gaya-Fatehpur S/C transmission line (Wind
Zone-4) with Delta configuration towers, has to be taken up by PGCIL
for different wind zones for suspension towers (with delta
configuration) of 765 kV S/C line. In case further failures are
observed in the line, POWERGRID need to take up the exercise for
review of design.

Committee also noted that due to climatic change, incidents of high

winds are increasing. Transmission companies need to take
proactive measures such as increased line patrolling, immediate
replacement of missing members/nuts & bolts and intensive care

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should be taken during erection and installation of towers (Slope
correctness, filling unplugged holes, tightening of Bolts, Tack
welding, straightness of tower members etc.).

A.10 400 kV D/C Vindhayachal-Jabalpur Ckt-I & II Transmission line failed

on 30.04.2020
[Towers at Location No. 948 (DA+0), 949 (DA+0), 950 (DA+0) & 951 (DA-6)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Vindhyanchal-Jabalpur–I & II transmission line of

POWERGRID was constructed by M/s TPE (USSR) and was commissioned
on 07.11.1989. Length of the transmission line is 360 km and the towers
used in the transmission line were designed by Russian agencies as per
Russian Codes/Standards. The transmission line is designed with Twin
ACKC conductor with Glass Disc insulators in single suspension I String
configuration. The transmission line had previously failed in year 2009 in
which three suspension type towers were failed.

 Observations

a. The affected suspension towers were situated/located in open field

having very few trees in village Gosalpur, Police station Siroha, District
Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh. The Tower spotting details of relevant
section of the transmission line is as follows:

Sl. Loc. No. Type of Forward Angle of Extent of

No. Tower Span Dev. damage
(m)
1 946 DB 356
2 947 DA+0 340 00
3 948 DA+0 365 00 Tower
collapsed
4 949 DA+0 415 00 above 1st
5 DA+0 00 level and
950 380 stubs are
6 951 DA-6 359 00 intact.

7 952 DA+0 336 00

8 953 DA+0 335
9 954 DA+0 390
10 955 DA+0 330
11 956 DA+0 325
12 957 DA+0 375

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13 958 DA+0 350
14 959 DA+0 375
15 960 DB 335

b. All the collapsed towers fell in the same transverse direction of line and
all the failed towers had collapsed above the 1st section level. All of the
stubs, in each of the four towers, were reported to be intact.

c. POWERGRID officials informed that at the time of tower collapse, heavy

localized whirling wind storm prevailed in the vicinity of affected stretch
of transmission line and the above windstorm has also caused extensive
wide spread damages to nearby trees and nearby other structures. The
same was also reported in local newspapers as well. From the failure
pattern it appears that tower failure was initiated due to high intensity
localized wind storm at Location number 951(DA-6) and because of
cascading effect, other three towers at location numbers 948(DA+0),
949(DA+0), 950(DA+0) also collapsed.

Tower Location No. 948 (DA+0)

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Tower Location No. 951 (DA-6) Tower Location No. 950 (DA+0)

d. As per information received from POWERGRID, the patrolling of above

locations was carried out on 17th Jan 2020 and no major defects like
missing members, missing nuts/bolts were reported.

e. The material tests were conducted on samples selected from site at

independent lab and it was observed that three members (member 4, 8
& 9) failed in ultimate stress test and two members (member 3 & 6) had
silica content more than prescribed limit. POWERGRID representatives
highlighted that these tower members are also satisfying the minimum
yield strength criteria required as per IS codes. Further, the
transmission line was commissioned in 1989. The tower structure steel
was imported from Russia and was designed as per Russian standards,
however, the copies of codes used in design of these towers are not
available with POWERGRID. As these towers had been designed as per
Russian Codes, it is not prudent to compare the minimum properties
requirement as per present codal requirements.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that UTS of the transmission tower members may

be degraded since the line is in operation for so many years, but the
chemical composition should remain same. Committee further
concluded that in most of the failed transmission towers, the tower
got bent from the panel above the diaphragm level indicating that
the tower is not able to take the torsional load. Further, as different
design codes had been used for design of these towers, it is not

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correct to compare the material properties with respect to codes
currently in practice.

Committee advised POWERGRID to observe & monitor the

transmission line and if further incidences of failures are observed
in the line in future, POWERGRID may review the design of the towers
in view of present codes & practices and the decision for adopting
any strengthening of transmission line, if any, may be discussed and
finalized in the subsequent meetings of the Committee.

A.11 765 kV S/C Varanasi-Fatehpur transmission line failed on 10.05.2020

[Towers at Location No. 640 (A+3), 641(A+0), 642(A+0), & 643(A+0)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Varanasi-Fatehpur transmission line of POWERGRID was

constructed by M/s EMCO and was commissioned in June 2013. The
length of the transmission line is 222.5 km. The suspension towers were
designed in Delta configuration as per IS: 802:1995 for wind zone-4 with
Quad ACSR Bersimis Conductor with porcelain insulators. In addition to
existing codal provisions the suspension towers have also been designed
considering narrow front wind condition and with 75% wind in security
condition. As reported by POWERGRID, this is the first incident of failure
of tower in this line.

Further, this line was earlier known as Gaya-Fatehpur transmission line

and after the LILO to the Varanasi substation, it was renamed as Varanasi-
Fatehpur transmission line. The Gaya-Fatehpur transmission line had
earlier instances of failure, the details of which are as under:

Date of tower Section affected No. of Towers

collapse affected

11/ 12th April’ 314 (A+0) 1

2012
31st May’ 2014 305(A+3), 306(A+0), 311(A+0), 315(A+3), 15
320(A+0), 321(A+0), 322(A+0), 323(A+0),
324(A+0), 325(A+0), 326(A+0),
327(A+0), 328(A+0), 329(A+0), 330(A+0)

14th May’ 2015 283(A+3) , 284(A+0) 2

12th June’ 2015 334 (A+0) 1

7th March 2016 715 ( A+3) 1

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In addition to above the 765 kV Gaya-Varanasi Transmission line had also
failed on 17th May 2017 (5 towers) & 13th May 2018 (1 tower).

 Observations

a. The affected suspension towers were situated/located in open

agricultural field of Deori Hardo Patti, Police Station Baghrai, Tehsil
Kunda, Pratapgarh (U.P.) and were about 70 km from Allahabad
substation of POWERGRID. Google map & profile of failed tower stretch
is produced below:

b. The Tower spotting details of relevant section of the transmission line is

as follows:

Sl. Loc. No. Type of Forward Extent of damage

No. Tower Span
(m)
1 639 D+0 397
2 640 A+3 395 Both Earthwire Peak Bent
3 A+0 Collapsed and 1 Stub
641 379
damaged
4 A+0 Collapsed and 3 Stubs
642 381
damaged
5 643 A+0 387 One Earthwire Peak Bent
6 644 A+0 400
7 645 C+0 373

c. Tower at location No. 642 (A+0) had collapsed from second panel level
and fell over in transverse direction. Due to tower collapse, three stubs
were also observed to be damaged. The top portion of the tower was
toppled and hit the bottom panel. POWERGRID official informed that
the tower was checked thoroughly and no missing tower members/ nuts
& bolts were found and condition of concrete in the visible chimney

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portion were observed to be good.

Tower at Location No. 642 (A+0)

d. Tower at location No. 641 (A+0) had failed from third panel level and
collapsed in diagonal direction towards location No. 640. It was observed
that the main leg along with the bracing members and few redundant
members on one of the transverse faces were severely buckled and
jumbled together. The stub of one of the leg was observed to be damaged.

Tower at Location No. 641 (A+0)

e. Towers at location No. 640 (A+3) & 643 (A+0) were in erect condition.
One Earthwire peak of the tower at location No. 643 was damaged
whereas both of the earthwires peaks were damaged at tower at location
No. 640. These were observed to be secondary failures due to sudden
force exerted by tower collapse at nearby locations. It was reported by
POWERGRID that rest of the structure of these towers were intact and
no missing members/nut bolts were observed at these sites.

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Tower at location No. 640 (A+3) Tower at location No. 643 (A+0)

f. The previous failures of the 765 kV S/C Delta configuration towers were
investigated by Standing Committee and the Committee had suggested
strengthening of these towers. It was informed by POWERGRID that the
failed tower locations were already strengthened. POWERGRID also
informed that they have got reviewed this tower design by M/s Manitoba
Hydro, Canada and they have also suggested strengthening of some of
the members. However, the strengthening suggested by M/s Manitoba
Hydro was yet to be executed at the failed tower locations.

g. As reported by POWERGRID, a localized whirlwind storm prevailed in

the vicinity of transmission line which was confirmed by the local people
from nearby villages and the local newspaper. It was reported that some
trees were found uprooted/broken in nearby area of the failed tower
location.

h. As reported by POWERGRID, the records of line patrolling of this line

were checked and as per the data furnished by site, patrolling of above
locations were carried out on 1st Feb 2020 and no defects like missing
members, missing nuts & bolts were reported. Further, for collapsed
tower location different foundation dimensions like back to back,
diagonal distance, levels and the same were found to be generally in line
with approved drawing. Further, patrolling of 3-4 other towers adjacent
to the affected towers were also carried out and no abnormalities were
observed.

i. The material tests were conducted on samples selected from site at

independent NABL accredited lab and these reports were generally
found to be within limits except the elongation percentage of two MS
members was observed to be marginally lower, i.e., 21.84 % and 22.10%
in place of desired 23%. POWERGRID representatives highlighted that

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the material testing has been performed on tower members gathered
from failed tower site and the lower values observed in the elongation
may be due of failure of samples near gripping point.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

The Committee noticed that this transmission line has faced multiple
failure incidences in the past. The failure of these 765 kV Gaya-
Fatehpur S/C transmission line (Wind Zone-4) with Delta
configuration suspension type towers had been investigated by the
Standing Committee of Experts for investigating failure of
transmission line towers in the year 2015. Design review analysis of
this type of tower of PGCIL was carried out by CPRI on directions of
the Standing Committee and strengthening of few members above
waist level by replacing existing members with new members were
proposed. Committee enquired POWERGRID about the status of
strengthening of such towers as advised in previous standing
committee meetings.

POWERGRID officials informed the Committee that, the

strengthening of existing 765 kV S/C delta configuration suspension
type towers which are located in Wind zone 4 & Wind zone 2, is being
executed by POWERGRID in phased manner and at the time of
meeting, only fifty-six (56) numbers of S/C 765 kV towers (Delta
configuration) in the Western Region-1 are remaining to be
strengthened.

The strengthening of towers includes clamping of some of the

members as well as replacement of few tower members.
Strengthening of towers in same manner as suggested by the
Standing Committee in the previous meetings, i.e. by replacement of
all members, is not possible for already erected tower members as
long shutdown of transmission lines will be required. However, failed
towers are always replaced by completely strengthened tower in line
with the recommendations of committee. Further, strengthening of
few other tower members, as suggested by M/s Manitoba Hydro is also
being adopted by POWERGRID. The tower with strengthening
currently being adopted by POWERGRID (i.e. clamping of few members
and replacement of some members) had also been tested at the CPRI
test bed.

Committee noted that the failed tower was already strengthened by

POWERGRID. Committee advised that failed tower should be replaced
with already strengthened tower and POWERGRID should ensure that
the strengthening mechanism adopted is in accordance with the
suggestions of Standing Committee which were recommended in
previous meetings. Committee also advised that Best practices in
quality control process for raw material, manufacturing,

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transportation, construction, storage, erection and stringing of
towers should be adopted by utilities.

A.12 765 kV S/C Sasan-Satna-I transmission line failed on 28.05.2020

[Tower at Location No. 430(B+0)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Sasan-Satna-I transmission line of POWERGRID was

constructed by M/s KPTL and the same was commissioned in December
2012. The ‘B’ type towers of this line having Delta Configuration were
designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/s corresponding to Wind Zone 4
and reliability level 2 as per IS 802-1995. The line is having porcelain
insulators in double V-V-V (DSV string) configuration. This was reported
as the first incidence of tower failure in this line.

 Observations

a. The affected suspension tower was situated/located in Belhai village of

Satna District, Madhya Pradesh. The tower was situated in forest land
and is located on hillock land. Google map and profile of failed tower
stretch is shown below:

b. Tower spotting details of relevant section of the transmission line is as

follows:

Sl. Loc. No. Type of Forward Extent of damage

No. Tower Span

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
(m)

1 428 D+0 557 Nil

2 429 C+0 368 Nil
3 430 B+0 283 One side Cross arm, K-
frame section & above
damaged
4 431 C+9 264 Nil

5 432 C+0 387 Nil

c. Tower at location No. 430 (B+0) was damaged from the cage section
at side cross arm level. One of the cross arms, the K-frame portion of
the tower body and both earth-wire peaks were damaged.

d. As reported by POWERGRID, tower members in cross arm cages and K-

frame portion have failed due to excessive transverse wind load on
conductor and tower during the localized wind storm which had
prevailed on the date of occurrence. Further, the tower was checked
thoroughly and no tower members/nuts & bolts were found missing in
the affected section of the tower.

Tower at Location No. 430 (B+0)

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e. As reported by POWERGRID, a localized wind storm prevailed in the
vicinity of transmission line which has caused widespread damages in
the vicinity of Satna & Rewa, M.P. Some towers of 220 kV Satna-
Chhatarpur (MPPTCL) transmission line, 132 kV Satna- Satna (Prism
Cement), 132 kV Satna -Majhgawan transmission line, 132 kV Satna-
Satna Cement transmission line were also reported to be collapsed
during the aforementioned cyclonic wind storm. It was reported that
some trees were found uprooted/broken in nearby area of the failed
tower location.

f. The material tests were conducted on 8 samples selected from site at

independent NABL accredited lab and these reports were generally
found to be within limits except for two members which were found
marginally higher than limit i.e. Member 6 [Phosphorous (0.062 > 0.05)]
and Member 7 [( Carbon (0.231 > 0.23)].

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

This was the first failure incident of the transmission line. The
Committee noted that the material content observed in the failed
tower structure members was marginally higher than the prescribed
limit & further, the increase in content of Phosphorous & Carbon,
though decreases the ductility of the tower members but also
increases the strength of steel.

Committee noted that multiple incidents of tower failure had

occurred in the transmission lines traversing in the same region of
Madhya Pradesh on the date of failure of this transmission line, i.e.,
on 28.05.2020. The committee noticed that the high wind velocity
might have prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the
transverse direction leading to failure of tower at location No. 430
(B+0). However, wind speed data from any authenticated observatory
indicating speed of wind prevailing at the failure location at the time
of the failure was not provided by the transmission utility. In absence
of wind speed data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible
to conclude that wind speed might have exceeded the designed wind
speed.

Committee further noted that the failure of tower has been observed
in the Cage portion of the tower, which is peculiar to the failure of
the Delta Configuration towers observed & discussed in previous
Standing Committee meetings. Committee advised that the
transmission line utilities should avoid the use of the Delta
Configuration towers in the future.

A.13 765 kV S/C Sasan-Satna-II transmission line failed on 28.05.2020

[Tower at Location No. 673(A+0)]

 Brief Background

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765 kV Sasan-Satna-II transmission line of POWERGRID was constructed

by Ranjit Singh Company and the same was commissioned on 30.04.2013.
The suspension type towers of this line have Delta Configuration and have
been designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/s corresponding to Wind Zone
4 and reliability level 2 as per IS 802-1995. The line is having porcelain
insulators in I-V-I (DI -DV-DI String) configuration. This was reported as
the first incidence of tower failure in this line.

 Observations

a. The affected suspension tower was situated/located in Amdari village of

Satna District, Madhya Pradesh. The tower was situated in plain terrain
with very few low height trees around the location. Google map and
profile of failed tower stretch is shown below:

b. Tower spotting details of relevant section of the transmission line is as

follows:

Sl. Loc. No. Type of Forward Extent of damage

No. Tower Span
(m)
1 670 A+0 344 Nil
2 671 D+3 397 Nil
3 672 C+0 385 Nil
4 673 A+0 383 Tower bent from above
the waist Level

5 674 A+0 376 Nil

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6 675 B+0 400 Nil

c. Tower at location No. 673 (A+0) was bent from above the waist level
in the transverse direction. The delta portion of the tower members got
buckled and was resting on lower tower body. All stubs (including
chimneys) and legs just above stubs were intact.

d. As reported by POWERGRID, tower failure was initiated due to high

intensity localized wind storm. Tower members in K-frame portion have
failed due to excessive transverse wind load on conductor and tower.
Further, the tower was checked thoroughly and no tower members/nuts
& bolts were found missing in the tower.

Tower at Location No. 673 (A+0)

e. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

out on 16th March 2020 and no defects like missing members, missing
nuts & bolts were reported. Further, patrolling of 3-4 other towers
adjacent to the affected tower were also carried out and no abnormalities
were observed.

f. It was informed by POWERGRID that as suggested by the Standing

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Committee during the investigation of previous failures of the 765 kV
S/C Delta configuration towers in some of the lines, it has taken up the
process of strengthening of such towers in a phased manner and
strengthening work was underway in this line also, however, the failed
tower location was not strengthened.

g. As reported by POWERGRID, a localized wind storm prevailed in the

vicinity of transmission line which has caused widespread damages in
the vicinity of Satna & Rewa, M.P. Some towers of 220 kV Satna -
Chhatarpur (MPPTCL) transmission line, 132 kV Satna- Satna (Prism
Cement), 132 kV Satna-Majhgawan transmission line, 132 Kv Satna -
Satna Cement transmission line were also reported to be collapsed
during the aforementioned cyclonic wind storm. It was reported that
some trees were found uprooted/broken in nearby area of the failed
tower location. The details of damage occurred due to the wind storm
was also got covered in the local newspaper.

h. The material tests were conducted on 10 samples selected from site at

independent NABL accredited lab and various parameters in these
reports were generally found to be within limits.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

This was the first failure incident of this transmission line.

Committee noted that there were multiple incidences of tower failure
in the transmission lines traversing in the same region of Madhya
Pradesh on the date of failure of this transmission line, i.e., on
28.05.2020.

The Committee noticed that this transmission line was erected using
same tower design as in the 765 kV Gaya-Fatehpur S/C transmission
line (Wind Zone-4) with Delta configuration. The failure of these 765
kV Delta configuration suspension type towers had been investigated
by the Standing Committee of Experts for investigating failure of
transmission line towers in the year 2015. Design review analysis of
this type of tower of PGCIL was carried out by CPRI on directions of
the Standing Committee and strengthening of few members above the
waist level by replacing existing members with new members were
proposed. The failed tower had not been strengthened. The pattern
of failure of transmission towers from the waist level, i.e. from the
K-frame section, is similar to past failures of towers of similar
configuration observed in previous years. The inadequacy in tower
structure of 765 kV S/C Delta configuration suspension type towers
coupled with the reported storm caused the failure of towers.

Committee advised POWERGRID to ensure that the strengthening

mechanism adopted is in accordance with the suggestions of
Standing Committee in previous meetings. Committee recommended
that the transmission line utilities should avoid the use of the Delta

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Configuration towers in the future.

A.14 400 kV D/C Agra-Sikar I & II Transmission line failed on 29.05.2020

[Towers at Location Nos. 12 (DA+0), 13 (DA+0), 14 (DA+0) & 15(DD+0)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Quad Agra-Sikar Transmission Line was designed by

POWERGRID itself. The line was executed by M/s EMC and was
commissioned in January, 2014. The length of line is 393.90 km. This line
traverse through plain terrain & cultivating fields and towers were designed
for wind zone 4 as per IS 802:1995 with Quad MOOSE conductor and one
OPGW and one normal earth wire. The towers were designed for Reliability
level 1 with vertical configuration. POWERGRID informed that in design for
suspension type towers, special consideration for narrow front wind (1.5
times basic wind speed i.e. 250 kmph) and 75% full wind under security
condition were considered. Porcelain Disc Insulators was used in the line
at the failed tower locations. The line had previously failed on 12.06.2019
in which two suspension & one tension towers at Location Nos. 339 (DA+0),
340 (DA+0) & 341(DC+0) had failed.

 Observations

a. The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as follows.

Sl. Loc. Tower Span Angle of Extent of damage

No. No. Type Dev.
1 11 DC+0 337 16o4’11’’(R) Intact
2 12 Collapsed and all four
DA+0 360
stubs damaged
3 13 01 No. top Cross arm
DA+0 360
damaged
4 14 01 No. top Cross arm
DA+0 311
damaged
5 15 DD+0 312 45o45’10’’(L) 01 No. top Cross arm
damaged & detached
from tower
6. 16 DA+0 355 Intact

b. A schematic representation indicating affected location is shown below:

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c. Tower at location No. 12 (DA+0) was completely collapsed to the

ground in transverse direction towards ckt-I side. As reported by
POWERGRID, all four stubs were damaged and no tower members/nuts
& bolts were found missing at the location.

Tower at Location No. 12 (DA+0)

d. Tower at location No. 13 (DA+0) was in erect position. The top cross
arm of the tower (ckt-II) was damaged due to the jerk developed by
conductors.

e. Tower at location No. 14 (DA+0) was in erect position. The top cross
arm of the tower (ckt-II) was damaged. As reported by POWERGRID, the
conductor between location No. 14, 15 & 16 broke and crossed over ckt-
I top conductor and fell on the ground. The Broken cross arm at the
tower No. 14 was pulled towards location No.13.

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Tower at Location No. 13 (DA+0) Tower at Location No. 14 (DA+0)

f. Tower at location No. 15 (DD+0) was in erect position and the top box
cross arm (ckt-II) of the tower was almost detached from the tower body
and major portions were reported to be found at the other side in the
field. Some of the members of the cross arm were also reported to be
hanging from the tower body. The top two panel members, leg & bracing
members in longitudinal direction were also damaged due to impact of
counter weight of broken insulator string. It was reported that the top
conductor of the span between locations 15 to 16 had went to other side
of the towers, however earth wire peaks were not damaged. As reported
by POWERGRID, the conductor between location Nos. 14, 15 & 16 broke
and crossed over ckt-I top conductor and fell on the ground. The Broken
cross arm at the tower No. 14 was pulled towards location No.13.

Tower at Location No. 15 (DD+0)

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g. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried
out on 30th April 2020 and no defects like missing members, missing
nut & bolts were reported. Patrolling of 3-4 other towers adjacent to the
affected tower were also carried out and no abnormalities were observed.
Further, for collapsed tower location different foundation dimensions
like back to back dimensions, diagonal distance, difference in levels etc.
were found to be generally in line with approved drawing.

h. As per POWERGRID, at the time of tower collapse, localized wind storm

prevailed in the vicinity of affected stretch of transmission line and the
same had caused widespread damages in the vicinity. Tower failure was
initiated due to this high intensity localized wind storm. POWERGRID
officials informed that the above windstorm has also caused extensive
wide spread damages to nearby trees and other structures. The same
was also reported in local newspapers as well.

i. The material tests were conducted on 4 samples selected from failed

tower structure at independent NABL accredited lab and various
parameters in these reports were generally found to be within limits.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that this transmission line had failed in two

consecutive years, i.e. 2019 & 2020. The line has been designed as
per Reliability level 1 instead of Reliability level 2 which is to be
adopted for quad conductor configuration lines as per Central
Electricity Authority (Technical Standards for Construction of
Electrical Plants and Electric Lines) Regulations. Further, in the
previous failure incident, committee observed that there was
deficiency in the erection/O&M practices adopted by POWERGRID as
number of bolts were found missing in the Leg members at some of
the failed tower locations. Also, the distance of bolt hole from the
edge of the members also appeared to be on lower side.

Committee noted that the high wind velocity might have prevailed in
the vicinity of transmission line. However, POWERGRID could not
provide wind speed data from any authenticated observatory
indicating speed of wind prevailing at the failure location at the time
of the failure. Committee noted that the due to the deficiency in
erection/O&M of the transmission line, the tower structures were
inherently weak which failed during the high wind incident observed
in the area. The wind had caused failure of transmission tower at
location No. 12 (DA+0) which subsequently led to failures of the
towers at Location Nos. 13, 14 & 15 due to pulling force of the
conductors.

Committee also noted that CEA Regulations have been drafted after
detailed consultation with the stakeholders and shall be adhered to
in any case. Considering the fact that there have been many failures

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in Agra region in past few years, Committee advised POWERGRID to
improve their operation & maintenance activities and to increase
frequency of patrolling of the lines. Committee also advised
POWERGRID to ensure that Reliability level to be adopted for all the
future transmission lines shall be in accordance to CEA Regulations.

It was emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility

needs to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected
area so that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

A.15 220 kV S/C RAPP C-ANTA transmission line failed on 03.07.2020

[Tower at location No. 213 (A+0)]

 Brief Background

220 kV S/C RAPP C-ANTA transmission line of POWERGRID was

constructed by M/s Hythro Corporation and the same was commissioned
on 10.01.2000. The suspension towers used in this line are of 400 kV S/C
type (Horizontal Configuration) and have been designed for medium wind
zone as per IS 802-1977. The line is having polymer insulators in I-I-I
configuration. This was reported as the first incidence of tower failure in
this line.

 Observations

a. The affected suspension tower was situated/located in open agricultural

field of Gopalpura, PostThikariya, Tahsil Anta, District Baran
(Rajasthan) and was about 70 km from Kota Substation of POWERGRID.
The tower was situated in plain terrain with very few low height trees
around the location. Google map of failed tower stretch is shown below:

b. Tower spotting details of relevant section of the transmission line is as

follows:

SI. No. Loc. No. Type of Forward Angle of Extent of damage

Tower Span Dev.

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1. 207 A+3 410
2. 208 A+0 400
3. 209 A+0 430 Nil
4. 210 A+0 430
5. 211 A+0 380 Nil
6. 212 A+0 420 Nil
7. 213 A+0 420 Tower damaged
from waist level
8. 214 A+0 430
9. 215 A+0 430
10. 216 B+0 400 3°10’(LT) Nil

c. Tower at location No. 213 (A+0) was bent from the waist level in the
transverse direction. The lower part of the tower was in erect condition
and no damage was observed to the foundation and stubs. The top
portion of tower structure toppled and bent from tower waist level. As
reported by POWERGRID, the tower was checked thoroughly and no
tower members/nuts & bolts were found missing in the tower. Further,
for collapsed tower location different foundation dimensions like back to
back dimension, diagonal distance, difference in levels etc were found
to be generally in line with approved drawing.

d. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

out on 1st June 2020 and no defects like missing members, missing nuts
& bolts were reported. Further, patrolling of 3-4 other towers adjacent
to the affected tower were also carried out and no abnormalities were
observed.

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e. As per POWERGRID, at the time of tower collapse, heavy localized

whirling wind storm prevailed in the vicinity of affected stretch of
transmission line and the tower failure was initiated due to this high
intensity localized wind storm. POWERGRID officials informed that the
above windstorm has also caused extensive wide spread damages to
nearby trees and other structures. The same was also reported in local
newspapers as well.

f. The material tests were conducted on 04 samples selected from site at

independent NABL accredited lab and various parameters in these
reports were generally found to be within limits.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the 220 kV transmission line has been strung
on the towers designed for 400 kV voltage level. However, the spans
between the towers has been increased/ optimized by POWERGRID.
Committee also noted even though the transmission line was
commissioned in year 2000, the line has been designed as per old IS
802:1977 instead of IS 802:1995. Committee advised POWERGRID to
examine the background of adoption of old designs for these
transmission lines and submit the reasons for the same to the
Committee. POWERGRID subsequently informed that towers available
for 400 kV S/C has been used in 220 kV RAPP C-Anta transmission
line at few locations. Foundation for the failed tower location was
casted in July 1999 and the line was commissioned in 2000.

Committee noted that in order to save the cost of designing & testing,
transmission utilities might continue to use old designs of towers
even after revision of IS codes. Committee recommended that such
type of practices should not be adopted by the utilities and it should
be ensured that the transmission lines are designed and erected as
per latest IS codes, Regulations and recommendations of the
Standing Committee and Task Force, as applicable.

Further, the committee noted that this transmission line is around

20 years old. The high wind velocity might have prevailed in the
vicinity of transmission line in the transverse direction leading to
failure of tower at location No. 213(A+0). However, POWERGRID could
not submit wind speed data from any authenticated observatory
indicating speed of wind prevailing at the failure location at the time
of the failure. In absence of wind speed data from authenticated
observatory, it is not possible to conclude that wind speed might have
exceeded the design wind speed.

Committee noted that this was the first failure incident of this
transmission line and advised POWERGRID to observe & monitor the

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transmission line and in case repeated failures are observed in the
line in future, the decision for adopting the strengthening of
transmission line by providing hip bracing in the bottom most panels
for the towers designed according to IS 802:1977, may be discussed
and finalized in the meetings of the Committee.

A.16 400 kV D/C (Quad) Dulhasti-Kishenpur II & III Transmission line failed
on 10.09.2020
[Towers at location No. 261 (DB+6) & 262 (DC+4.5)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Quad Dulhasti-Kishenpur line of POWERGRID was

constructed in two different packages by M/s Tata Projects and M/s R S
Gill & Company and was commissioned on 19.01.2018. The total length
of the transmission line is 119.438 km. The section involving the affected
towers (location Nos. 261 & 262) was executed by M/s Tata Projects. The
towers of the line were designed as per IS 802:1995 in vertical
configuration considering wind pressure for Wind Zone 5 and Non-Snow
Zone (zero ice loading). The towers were designed considering Reliability
level 1. The line is having Porcelain insulators with 25 insulators in each
sub-string of the quad tension string. Only one of the circuits was strung
on the tower at the time of failure incident.

 Observations

a. The affected towers were situated/located in Village Sewna of Udhampur

District at around 70 km from Udhampur town in Jammu & Kashmir.
The tower was situated in forest area with no local habitation present
near the towers.

b. Tower spotting details of relevant section of the transmission line is as

follows:

Tower Type of Angle of Span Level

No. Tower Deviation Length difference Remarks
(m) (m)

DC+3 17°46'15" L-“A” has 9 m. Leg Extn

260 LT L-“B”, “C” & “D” have 3 m
Leg Extn.

262 159.07
DB+6 12°32’30" L-“A” has 9 m Leg Extn
261 (Rnf) RT L-“B”, “C” & “D” have 6 m
Leg Extn.

425 165.76

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DC+4.5 22°09'17" L-“A” has 7.5 m Leg Extn
262 (Rnf) RT L-“B” has 6 m Leg Extn.
L-“C”&“D” have 4.5 m LE

c. The diagram depicting the details of failed towers is shown below:

d. Tower at location No. 261 (DB+6) was having reinforced tower

foundations. The tower had collapsed completely to the ground in
almost transverse direction to the line. All the four main legs and the
stubs were damaged. As reported by POWERGRID, Leg ‘C’ of the tower
was observed to be sheared near the stub joint. Common plan bracings
and some of the members in the cage section of the tower were fractured
and deformed.

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Tower at Location No. 261(DB+6)

e. POWERGRID informed that no major landslide/ settlement was

observed at the failure site. The Level and diagonal dimensions were
measured and it was observed that differential settlement seems to have
occurred over a longer period of time which might have resulted in
sinking of Legs A & B.

f. The measurements of Level difference with respect to leg “C” were as

under:
 Leg A - 0.667 Meter down
 Leg B — 0.597 Meter down
 Leg C — 0.00 Meter (Reference)
 Leg D — 0.014 Meter Up

g. The back to back and diagonals measured by POWERGRID site officials

were as under:
 Back to Back of Stub

Leg to As per Drawing (in As per Actual (in m)

Leg m)
A to B 17.011 16.7568 m
B to C 16.432 16.6224 m
C to D 16.432 16.0669 m
D to A 17.011 17.2671 m

 Diagonals (Stub 200 X 20, Length 4023 mm)

Diagonal As per Drawing (in As per Actual (in

m) m)
A to CP (Half 12.416 12.783
Diagonal)
C to CP (Half 11.597 11.877
Diagonal)
A to C (Full 24.013 24.660
Diagonal)
B to CP (Half 11.597 11.337
Diagonal)

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D to CP (Half 11.597 11.290
Diagonal)
B to D (Full 23.194 22.627
Diagonal)

h. As reported by POWERGRID officials, some of the Uphill Boulders were

also found hitting the lower legs, however, the upper soil strata was
observed to be stable.

i. Tower at Location No. 260 (DC+4.5) was in erect condition. The top
cross arm of the tower was found to be damaged due to the pulling force
of the conductors. This was observed to be a secondary failure.

Tower at Location No. 260(DC+4.5)

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j. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

out on 1st June 2020 and no defects like missing members, missing nuts
& bolts were reported. Further, patrolling of 3-4 other towers adjacent
to the affected tower were also carried out and no abnormalities were
observed.

k. The material tests were conducted on 04 samples selected from site at

independent NABL accredited lab and various parameters in these
reports were generally found to be within limits.

l. Committee noted that single circuit was strung on the double circuit
tower and enquired whether the towers were designed & tested
considering the single side stringing. POWERGRID informed that the
strength of tower to withstand single side stringing was verified during
testing of tower at the test bed.

m. POWERGRID informed that a geo-technical investigation of the affected

locations is also being carried out.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the transmission line has been commissioned

after the notification of Central Electricity Authority (Technical
Standards for Construction of Electrical Plants and Electric Lines)
Regulations 2010. However, the line is designed as per Reliability
level 1 instead of Reliability level 2 which is to be adopted for quad
conductor configuration lines as per aforementioned Regulations.

Committee observed that the failure of tower at location No. 261

(DB+6) had occurred due to buckling/deformation of tower members
due to differential settlement of foundation pits. POWERGRID is
required to take suitable safety measures considering the
geotechnical investigation and suggested that an avalanche
protection / retaining wall may also be constructed around the tower
to safeguard the tower from hitting of the boulders.

Committee also noted that even though the transmission line was
commissioned in year 2018, the line has been designed as per old IS
802:1995 instead of IS 802:2015.

Committee also advised POWERGRID to ensure that Reliability level

to be adopted for all the future transmission lines shall be in
accordance to CEA Regulations. Committee recommended that
practices of using old designs of towers even after revision of IS codes
should not be adopted by the utilities and it should be ensured that
the transmission lines are designed and erected as per latest IS
codes, Regulations and recommendations of the Standing Committee
and Task Force, as applicable.

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A.17 765 kV S/C Bina–Gwalior-III Transmission line failed on 05.01.2021
[Tower at Location No.611 (B+0)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Quad Bina-Gwalior-III Transmission Line of POWERGRID was

executed by joint venture of M/s Lanco & Unitech and was commissioned
in May, 2014. Total length of the transmission line is 231.3 km. This line
traverse through plain terrain and tension towers were designed for wind
zone 4 as per IS 802:1995 with Quad Bersimis conductor. The towers were
designed with delta configuration. This was reported to be the first failure
of the transmission line.

 Observations:

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Extent of damage

No. Dev.
150 38’ 38” Intact
1 609 C (Delta) + 9 425
LT
2 610 A (Delta) + 6 340 Intact
3 611 B (Delta)+0 300 10 44’17’’ Tower Collapsed,
RT Theft of tower
members and
cutting of main
bracings observed.
4 612 A (Delta) + 0 300 0 Theft of all cross
bracings, three
main plan members
and all redundant
members of bottom
panel observed
5 613 A (Delta) + 0 301 0 Intact
6 614 A (Delta) + 0 420 0 Intact
7 615 A (Delta) + 0 380 0 Intact
8 616 C (Delta) + 0 160 06’ 01” Intact
LT

b. Tower at Location No. 611 (B+0) was located near village Bilauaa,
Jaurasi Ghati Dabra Taluk in Gwalior district (Madhya Pradesh). The
tower was completely collapsed from stub level to the ground and only
one stub of the tower along with its foundation was found intact. It was
observed that Leg B was bent from top of chimney level and the
remaining two legs were sheared from just above concrete/chimney
level. All the redundant members connected to leg A & leg B below belt
level of bottom panel were stolen. In leg-C and leg-D, all redundant
members from cross bracing to the main legs were missing. Removed

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tower member pieces, bolts and nuts were found scattered at the tower
collapse site.

Tower at Loc. No.611 (B+0)

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Bolts/Nuts, cutting tools & Removed tower members Found at Site

c. Tower at Location No. 612 (A+0) was in erect position, however it was
observed that all the redundant members of bottom section and three
main plans bracing of the tower had been removed. Number of tower
pieces removed from bottom panel, bolts/nuts along with cutting tools
were also found at location No. 612(A+0).

d. POWERGRID officials informed that as per the data available in

PATROSOFT, the patrolling of above locations were carried out on 12th
October 2020 and no missing tower members / nuts & bolts were
observed at that time.

e. POWERGRID informed that the incidence of theft has been reported to

the local police station and FIR has been lodged. In this line, incidences
of theft had been observed earlier also and many communications with
the local administrative bodies in this regard had been made.

Tower at Loc. No.612 (A+0)

f. To examine the chemical and material properties, samples from the

affected tower location were selected from site and sent for testing at

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independent NABL accredited lab for testing. All the tower steel
samples were found acceptable as per the relevant Indian Standards.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee observed that the failure of towers has been caused due
to theft or sabotage by miscreants in the area. This is also evident as
tools used by miscreants and removed tower parts were also found
lying in the vicinity of collapsed tower.

Committee discussed the issue and noted that there are many
incidences of thefts/sabotage in the Gwalior region. MPPTCL
informed that they are also facing these types of problems in some
of their transmission lines and had adopted painting of transmission
towers with Tarcoal paint. POWERGRID informed that they had
increased the patrolling frequency and had installed vibration
sensitive cameras at some of the locations to avoid thefts/sabotage.
Committee advised POWERGRID to improve their patrolling activities
in the area to ensure safe & reliable operation and to avoid
theft/sabotage by miscreants.

A.18 765 kV S/C Jhatikara–Bhiwani Transmission line failed on 06.05.2021

[Tower at Location No. 33/3 (A+0)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Quad Jhatikara-Bhiwani Transmission Line of POWERGRID

was erected by M/s EMCO and was commissioned in October, 2012. The
towers of this line were designed for Wind Zone 4 (47 m/sec) and reliability
level 2 as per IS 802-1995. In addition to existing codal provisions the
suspension towers have also been designed considering narrow front wind
condition and with 75% wind in broken wire condition. The towers were
designed with Quad ACSR Bersimis Conductor. The suspension towers of
this line were designed with Double “I-V-I” Polymer insulator string in
Delta configuration. The line had earlier failed in May, 2018 in which one
of suspension tower at Location No. 17 (A+0) was affected.

 Observations:

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. damage
1 33/0 C+0 390 10 11’ 37” LT Intact

2 33/1 A+0 385 Intact

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3 33/2 A+0 391 Intact

4 33/3 A+0 387 Collapsed

5 33/4 A+0 381 Intact

6 33/5 A+0 396 Intact

7 33/6 A+3 400 Intact

8 33/7 A+0 390 Intact

9 33/8 A+0 396 Intact

10 33/9 A+3 400 Intact

11 34/0 C+0 Intact

b. Tower at Location No. 33/3 (A+0) was located in plain field with few
trees in vicinity near village Jhatikara (New Delhi) at around 20 km
from Jhatikara substation of POWERGRID. Tower was damaged from
the waist level and damaged part was still hanging in the transverse
direction. Most of the members above waist level were in jumbled
condition. Bulging of tower members below the waist level and above
basic tower level was observed. It was also observed that one arm of
the ‘V’ insulator string (of middle phase) was detached from tower while
the other was still connected. Insulators of outer phases were damaged
and both the ‘I’ string (outer phases) were still attached with tower.

c. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

out on 04.03.2021 and no defects like missing members, missing nuts
& bolts were reported. Examination of 3-4 other towers adjacent to the
affected tower were also carried out and no abnormalities were
observed. Further, for collapsed tower location different foundation
dimensions like back to back, diagonal distance, levels and the same
were found to be generally in line with approved drawing.

Tower at Loc. No. 33/3 (A+0)

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d. POWERGRID informed that at the time of tower collapse, heavy

thunderstorm condition with exceptionally high wind velocity prevailed
in the narrow strip in the vicinity of affected stretch of transmission
line and the Tower failure was initiated due to this high intensity
localized wind storm.

e. The previous failures of the 765 kV S/C Delta configuration towers had
been investigated by Standing Committee and the Committee had
suggested strengthening of these towers. It was informed by
POWERGRID that the failed tower locations were already strengthened.
POWERGRID also informed that they had got reviewed this tower
design by M/s Manitoba Hydro, Canada and they have also suggested
strengthening of some of the members. The strengthening suggested
by M/s Manitoba Hydro was also executed at the failed tower.

f. To examine the chemical and material properties, samples from the

affected tower locations were selected from site and sent for testing at
independent NABL accredited lab. All the tower steel samples were
found acceptable as per the relevant Indian Standards.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted the failed tower was already strengthened by

POWERGRID prior to the failure and enquired about the adequacy of
strengthening mechanism adopted by POWERGRID for these
structures. POWERGRID official informed that the strengthening of
towers includes replacement of few tower members with large size
members as well clamping of additional members to the existing
members. Strengthening of towers in same manner as suggested by
the Standing Committee in the previous meetings, i.e. by
replacement of all members, is not possible for already erected tower
members as long shutdown of transmission lines will be required.
However, failed towers are always replaced by completely
strengthened tower in line with the recommendations of committee.
Further, strengthening of few other tower members, as suggested by
M/s Manitoba Hydro is also being adopted by POWERGRID. The tower
with strengthening currently being adopted by POWERGRID (i.e.
clamping of few members and replacement of some members) had
also been successfully tested at the CPRI test bed.

Committee noted the above and concluded that a narrow front of

high intensity wind observed in the area had led to failure of the
tower. Committee advised that failed tower should be replaced with
already strengthened tower and POWERGRID should ensure that the
strengthening mechanism adopted is in accordance with the
suggestions of Standing Committee recommended in previous
meetings. It was emphasized that after every failure the concerned

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utility needs to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the
affected area so that the investigating team of standing committee
could get reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this
matter, the respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the
wind data obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

Committee also advised that best practices in quality control process

for raw material, manufacturing, transportation, construction,
storage, erection and stringing of transmission line should be
adopted by utilities.

A.19 800 kV HVDC Agra–BNC-Pole-II Transmission line failed on 10.05.2021

[Tower at Location No. 3118 (A+0)]

 Brief Background

800 kV HVDC Agra-BNC Transmission Line of POWERGRID was

constructed by M/s INABENSA and pole-II of the transmission line was
commissioned in November, 2015. The towers of this line were designed
for basic wind speed of 47 m/s corresponding to wind zone 4 as per IS
802:1995 also taking into consideration narrow front wind on tower body
& 50 % wind in broken wire condition. The line was designed with Hexa
ACSR Lapwing conductor with Y string glass insulators in horizontal
configuration. The line had earlier failed on 02.05.2018 in which three
towers at location Nos. 4328, 4347 & 4348, which were located near Agra
region, were affected.

 Observations:

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. damage
1 3116 C+0 390 15 ֯45’ 12” LT Intact

2 3117 A+0 390 Intact

3 3118 A+0 370 One cross arm

damaged

4 3119 A+0 414 Intact

5 3120 B+0 415 10 ֯13’ 25” LT Intact

b. Tower at Location No. 3118 (A+0) was located in plain field area near
village Baraijot/Sekhpura, Kalwari Taluk in Basti district (Uttar
Pradesh). The tower was in erect condition and only one cross arm of
pole-II of tower was damaged. All the stubs and rest of the tower were

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found intact.

Tower at Loc. No. 3118 (A+0)

c. POWERGRID informed that discussion was done with nearby local

village residents and it was gathered that at the time of tower collapse,
heavy thunderstorm condition with exceptionally high wind velocity
prevailed in the narrow strip in the vicinity of affected stretch of
transmission line and the Tower failure was initiated due to this high
intensity localized wind storm. It was informed that the above
windstorm has also caused extensive wide spread damages to nearby
trees and nearby other structures. The same was also reported in local
newspapers as well.

d. POWERGRID officials highlighted that the failed transmission tower

was designed for wind speed corresponding to wind zone 4, however,
the tower is located at approx. 15 km from the boundary of Wind Zone
5.

e. The material tests were conducted on samples selected from affected

portion of the tower at independent NABL accredited lab and various
parameters in these reports were generally found to be within limits.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.

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It was emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility needs
to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected area so
that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

Committee also noted that the failed tower was in vicinity of

boundary of higher wind zone 5. Committee advised that
Transmission lines to be laid within 50 km of the border of the wind
zones may be designed with higher of the two zones.

A.20 400 kV D/C Korba–Raipur-III & IV Transmission line failed on

11.05.2021
[Tower at Location No.303 (DA+0)]
 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Korba-Raipur-III & IV Transmission Line of POWERGRID was

commissioned in July, 2011. Total length of the transmission line is 212.8
km. This line traverse through plain terrain and “DA” type suspension
towers of this line were designed for wind speed of 39 m/s corresponding
to Wind Zone 2 and reliability level 1 and also taking into consideration
narrow front wind on tower body & 75% wind in broken wire condition.
The towers were designed in vertical configuration with Twin ACSR Moose
conductor and Single “I” Porcelain insulator string.

 Observations:

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of damage
No.
1 301 DD+0 395 39 ֯44’ 53” RT Intact

2 302 DA+6 370 De-capping of

Insulator
3 303 DA+0 380 Collapsed

4 304 DA+0 370 Intact

5 305 DA+3 395 Intact

b. Tower at Location No. 303 (DA+0) was located in plain field with few
trees in vicinity near village Khajuri, Takhatpur Taluk in Bilaspur
district (Chhattisgarh) at around 40 km from Bilaspur Substation.
Both of the top cross arms & one middle cross arm of the tower were
damaged and rest of the tower along with stubs was intact and still
standing erect. The damaged portion of the tower was resting on the
tower structure. POWERGRID informed that the damaged tower was

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also examined for any defects like missing members, nuts & bolts etc.,
and no such defects were observed.

c. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

out on 20.04.2021 and no defects like missing members, missing nut
& bolts were reported.

d. It was informed that other towers adjacent to the affected tower location
303 were also examined and no abnormalities were observed except for
Tower at Location No. 302 (DA+6) insulator de-capping was observed
which might be because of sudden jerk of conductors.

e. POWERGRID officials informed that discussion was done with nearby

local village residents and it was gathered that at the time of tower
collapse, heavy windstorm condition with exceptionally high wind
velocity prevailed in the vicinity of affected stretch of transmission line
and the Tower failure was initiated due to this high intensity localized
wind storm. It was informed that the above windstorm has also caused
extensive wide spread damages to nearby trees and LT pole structures.
The same was also reported in local newspapers as well.

f. To examine the chemical and material properties, few samples from the
affected tower were selected from site and sent for testing at
independent NABL accredited lab. All the tower steel samples were
found acceptable as per the relevant Indian Standards except one in
which percentage of Carbon composition was marginally high. (0.24%
in place of allowable 0.23%), however, the mechanical properties were
within limit.

Tower at Location No. 303 (DA+0)

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 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee observed that there was damage of the cross arm of the
tower at location No. 303 (DA+0) and due to the jerk de-capping of the
insulator at the tower at location No.302 (DA+6) occurred.
Representative from MPPTCL also confirmed that the transmission
lines of MPPTCL is also facing similar problems in this region and a
pilot project considering line surge arrestors is being implemented by
MPPTCL to overcome the issue.

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.

It was emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility needs
to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected area so
that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

Committee advised that Utilities should assess the condition of

structure of towers, conductors, earthwire, insulators and all
associated accessories, foundation and earthing system periodically
using modern techniques & diagnostic tools and should take
appropriate action, wherever abnormality is noticed.

A.21 765 kV D/C Wardha–Aurangabad Transmission line failed on

27.05.2021
[Tower at Location No. 318(DA+3), 319(DA+0), 320(DA+0), 321 (DA+3),
322(DA+6)]

 Brief Background

765 kV D/C Wardha-Aurangabad Transmission Line of POWERGRID was

executed by M/s Gammon India and was commissioned in July, 2014.
This line traverse through plain terrain & and suspension towers of this
line were designed for basic wind speed of 39 m/s corresponding to Wind
Zone 2 reliability level 2 as per IS 802-1995. POWERGRID informed that
narrow front wind on tower body & 75% of wind in broken wire condition
was also considered in design of these towers. The line was designed with
Hexa ACSR Zebra conductor with Double “I” glass insulator string in
vertical configuration. This was reported as the first incident of failure in
the transmission line.

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 Observations:

a. The affected suspension towers were located in the plain field area near
Gimbha village, Mangrulpir Tahsil of Washim District (Maharashtra) at
around 116 km from Wardha substation. The details of tower spotting
in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. damage
1 323 DC+0(TP) 395 0o Intact
2 322 DA+6 405 Tip of earth
wire peak of
circuit-I was
buckled/
damaged
3 321 DA+3 390 Collapsed
4 320 DA+0 354 Collapsed
5 319 DA+0 387 Collapsed
6 318 DA+3 393 Collapsed
7 317 DA+0 365 Intact
8 316 DA+0 394 Intact
9 315 DA+0 360 Intact
10 314 DA+0 357 Intact
11 313 DA+0 398 15 o 10’ 10” LT Intact

b. Tower at Location No. 322 (DA+6) was in erect condition. The tip of
earth wire peak of circuit-I was buckled/damaged. All the stubs and
other tower members were intact.

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Tower at Location No. 322 (DA+6)

c. Tower at Location No. 321 (DA+3) was damaged from stub level and
was collapsed in transverse direction to the line. All the four stubs of
tower were completely damaged.

Tower at Location No. 321 (DA+3)

d. Tower at Location No. 320 (DA+0) & 319 (DA+0) were buckled from
middle cross arm level and the top portion of the towers were resting
on the base structure. All the four stubs of both the towers were intact.

Tower at Location No. 320 (DA+0)

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Tower at Location No. 319 (DA+0)

e. Tower at Location No. 318 (DA+3) was in erect condition. The top
cross arm for circuit-II was damaged. All the four stubs of tower were
intact.

Tower at Location No. 318 (DA+3)

a. POWERGRID informed that the damaged towers were also examined

for any defects like missing members, nut & bolts etc. and no such
defects were observed. Further, it was reported that different
foundation dimensions like back to back, diagonal distance, levels were
also examined by POWERGRID officials and the same were found to be
generally in line with approved drawing and there were no missing
members in the tower structure.

g. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

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out on 20.01.2021 and no defects like missing members, missing nuts
& bolts were reported. Further, other towers adjacent to the affected
tower locations were also examined and no abnormalities were
observed.

h. POWERGRID officials informed that at the time of tower collapse, heavy

thunderstorm activities were reported during which high wind velocity
prevailed in the vicinity of affected stretch of transmission line and the
same led to tower failures. It was informed that nearby trees were also
damaged during the windstorm. The same was also reported in local
newspapers as well.

a. To examine the chemical and material properties, 08 samples from the

affected tower location No. 321 were selected from site and sent for
testing at independent NABL accredited lab for testing. All the tower
steel samples were found acceptable as per the relevant Indian
Standards.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that this was the first incident of tower failure in
the line. Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have
prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.

Committee emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility

needs to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected
area so that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

Committee advised that all transmission towers should be checked

on topmost priority after major wind event to remove fatigue and
distortions, if any, so as to restore the original strength and avoid
failures in subsequent event of high intensity winds.

A.22 400 kV S/C Korba–Bhilai-I Transmission line failed on 30.05.2021

[Tower at Location No. 320 (A+3)]

 Brief Background

400 kV S/C Korba-Bhilai Transmission Line of POWERGRID was executed

by M/s SAE and was commissioned in January, 1983. The suspension

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towers of this line were designed as per IS 802 – 1977 considering Medium
Wind zone. The tower was designed with twin moose conductor with Single
“I” insulator string in horizontal configuration. This is reported as the
second instance of such tower failure in this line. Earlier in June-2009,
three suspension towers at location at location Nos. 88, 89 & 90 had
collapsed.

 Observations:

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. damage
1 312 A+0 374 0 ֯0’ Intact

2 313 A+0 388 Intact

3 314 A+0 412 Intact

4 315 A+3 415 Intact

5 316 A+0 395 Intact

6 317 A+0 405 Intact

7 318 A+0 395 Intact

8 319 A+0 415 Intact

9 320 A+3 420 Collapsed

10 321 A+0 390 Intact

11 322 A+0 381 Intact

12 323 B+0 380 14 ֯04’ RT Intact

b. Tower at Location No. 320 (A+3) was located in plain field area at
about 73 km from Bhilai sub-station. The tower got collapsed
completely to the ground from the stub level in transverse direction to
the line. All the stubs of the tower were damaged. POWERGRID
informed that different foundation dimensions like back to back,
diagonal distance, levels were also checked and the same were found
to be generally in line with approved drawing and there were no missing
members in the tower structure.

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Tower at Loc. No. 320 (A+3)

b. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

out on 17.02.2021 and no defects like missing members, missing nuts
& bolts were reported. Further, other towers adjacent to the affected
tower location were also examined and no abnormalities were observed.

c. POWERGRID officials informed that discussion was done with nearby

local village residents and it was gathered that thunderstorm condition
with exceptionally high wind velocity prevailed at the time of tower
collapse and the Tower failure was initiated due to this high intensity
localized wind observed during the storm. It was informed that the
above windstorm has also caused damages to nearby trees. The same
was also reported in local newspapers as well.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that this transmission line is around 38 years old

and it had previously failed in the year 2009. Committee noted that
the towers were designed as per IS 802 (1977) and narrow front wind
load on these towers would not have been considered in the design.
Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have
prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.

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Committee observed that high intensity wind observed in the area
may have led to failure of this old tower structure. It was emphasized
that after every failure the concerned utility needs to submit the
actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected area so that the
investigating team of standing committee could get reference wind
speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the respective utility
may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data obtained from
observatory/ Satellite/ Radar.

A.23 765 kV S/C Meerut–Moga Transmission line failed on 10.06.2021

[Tower at Location No.558 (A+0), 559 (A+3), 560 (A+3)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Meerut-Moga Transmission Line of POWERGRID was

constructed by M/s KEC India and was commissioned in May, 2015. Total
length of the transmission line is 337.5 km. This line traverse through
plain terrain and suspension towers of this line were designed for
reliability level 2 and basic wind speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to Wind
Zone 4 as per IS 802-1995, taking into consideration narrow front wind
on tower body and 75% of wind in broken wire condition. The towers were
designed in Delta configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMIS Conductor.
The suspension towers of this line were designed with Double “I-V-I”
insulator string in Delta configuration. Polymer insulators have been used
in the line at the failed tower locations. In the forest area both Horizontal
configuration and delta configuration towers have been used in this
Transmission Line. The line had earlier failed on 13.05.2016 in which
tower at location No. 649 (A+0) had failed from above the waist level in the
middle of one side of K-frame portion.

 Observations:

a. The affected suspension towers were located in the plain field area near
to village Dhanetha, Tehsil Samana, District Patiala, Punjab and about
164 km from Moga sub-station. The details of tower spotting in the
affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Angle of
Loc. No. Tower Type Span Extent of damage
No. Dev.
19⁰ 20” Intact
1 557 C+3 375
29’ RT
Tower collapsed
just above the K-
2 558 A+0 390
frame level & 1st
panel level.
Tower failed from
3 559 A+3 350 upper side of Delta
section

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4 560 A+3 355 Right Peak Damage
5 561 A+0 375 Intact
6 562 A+0 375 Intact
7 563 A+0 385 Intact
8 564 A+9 331 Intact
9 565 C+9 371 Intact

b. Tower at Location No. 558 (A+0) was collapsed from the first cross
bracing level in transverse direction to the line towards left side when
observed facing Moga end. Tower’s Leg A was found bent from just
above the second panel level and other three legs were bent from just
above the K-frame level. All the foundations chimneys and stubs were
intact. All chimneys were covered in the soil. It was also observed that
extra holes were not plugged with nuts & bolts.

Tower at Loc. No.558 (A+0)

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c. Tower at Location No. 559 (A+3) was in erect condition. The cage
portion of tower body i.e. K fame was completely distorted and buckled
inwards and the same was resting on tower structure below waist level.

Tower at Loc. No.559 (A+3)

d. Tower at Location No. 560 (A+3) was in erect position. The right side
peak of the tower got buckled and remaining tower structure was
intact.

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Tower at Loc. No.560 (A+3)

e. It was informed that the patrolling of the affected section of the

transmission line was done on 29.05.2021 and no major defects like
missing members, missing nuts & bolts were reported. Failed towers
were examined for missing members and bolts & nuts. It was found that
there were no missing members and bolts & nuts.

f. POWERGRID officials highlighted that the transmission line has been

designed for Wind Zone 4 as per IS 802:1995. However, as per the latest
wind map available in National Building Code, 2016, the affected section
of the line is located under Wind Zone 5. The intensity of wind speed
had increased in the affected area and the affected towers were not
designed for these wind speeds.

g. It was informed that heavy thunderstorm activities were reported during

which high velocity wind followed by rain were observed in the vicinity
of affected stretch of transmission line. It was reported by POWERGRID
that the failure of transmission towers was due to this high speed wind.
Trees branches has been broken in the nearby area of the failed towers.
However no major up-rooting of trees and permanent structure
damaged were seen in the nearby area.

h. Strengthening of towers:

 The previous failures of the 765 kV S/C Delta configuration towers

had been investigated by Standing Committee and the Committee had
suggested strengthening of these towers. It was informed by
POWERGRID that the failed towers were strengthened two times after
commissioning. In the first stage additional members (shown as dark)
for strengthening were provided as below:

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First Stage Tower Strengthening Drawing

 In the Second stage, tower strengthening of cross arms/peak

members and redundant members was done at these failed location
towers (as highlighted in attached drawing).

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Second Stage Tower Strengthening Drawing

 The above mentioned tower strengthening in both the stages was

done with clamping of additional members rather than replacing old
members with new one.

b. To examine the chemical and material properties, samples from the

affected tower locations No. 558 & 559 were selected from site and sent
for testing at independent NABL accredited lab. All the tower steel
samples were found acceptable as per the relevant Indian Standards.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted the failed tower was already strengthened by

POWERGRID prior to the failure and enquired about the adequacy of
strengthening mechanism adopted by POWERGRID for these
structures. POWERGRID official informed that the strengthening of
towers includes replacement of few tower members with large size
members as well clamping of additional members to the existing
members. Strengthening of towers in same manner as suggested by
the Standing Committee in the previous meetings, i.e. by
replacement of all members, is not possible for already erected tower
members as long shutdown of transmission lines will be required.
However, failed towers are always replaced by completely
strengthened tower in line with the recommendations of committee.
Further, strengthening of few other tower members, as suggested by
M/s Manitoba Hydro is also being adopted by POWERGRID. The tower
with strengthening currently being adopted by POWERGRID (i.e.
clamping of few members and replacement of some members) had
also been successfully tested at the CPRI test bed.

Committee further noted that the wind map of India has been revised
and as per the latest wind map available in the National Building
Code, 2016, the wind zone of the area in which the failed towers are
located has been changed from Wind Zone 4 to Wind zone 5.

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.

Committee advised POWERGRID to ensure that the strengthening

mechanism adopted is in accordance with the suggestions of
Standing Committee recommended in previous meetings. It was

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility needs to
submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected area so
that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

Committee also advised POWERGRID to monitor the failure of

already strengthened towers and in case repeated failure of such
towers is observed, than POWERGRID should review the
strengthening mechanism adopted for such structures.

A.24 765 kV S/C Moga-Bhiwani Transmission line failed on 12.06.2021

[Tower at Location No.292 (C+0), 293 (B+25), 294 (C+9)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Moga-Bhiwani Transmission Line of POWERGRID was

constructed by M/s EMCO and was commissioned in June, 2012. This
line traverse through plain terrain. The ‘B’ type towers of this line were
designed considering 15° angle of deviation and basic wind speed of 47
m/sec corresponding to Wind Zone-4 and reliability level 2 as per IS 802-
1995, and also taking into consideration narrow front wind on tower body
and 75% wind in broken wire condition. The towers were designed in Delta
configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMIS Conductor. This was reported
as the first incident of tower failure in the line.

 Observations:

c. The affected towers were located in plain field with few trees in vicinity
near village Gajuwala, Bhiwani Taluk in Fatehabad district (Haryana)
and about 100 km from Bhiwani sub-station. The details of tower
spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. damage
1 290 A+0 370 Intact
2 291 A+0 385 Intact
3 292 C+0 365 29 ֯09’ 52” LT 1 No. Earth
wire peak
damaged
4 293 B+25 230 0֯ Tower
Collapsed
5 294 C+9 393 15 ֯45’ 47” RT 1 No. Earth
wire peak
damaged
6 295 A+0 394 Intact
7 296 A+3 394 Intact

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d. Tower at Location No. 293 (B+25) was spotted at 0° angle of deviation

with +25M extension for Power line crossing of 220 kV D/C Kirori-
Samain transmission line of HVPNL. The tower was observed to be
hanging and tilted in the transverse direction to the line and tower
portion above 0 M level, i.e. basic body of tower was intact. The tower
body portion below 0 M level, i.e. the body extension part, was severely
damaged and most of the tower members in this portion were jumbled.
Due to the collapse of tower, the stubs of all four legs were also
damaged. There was superficial damage to the chimney concrete as
well.

Tower at Loc. No.293 (B+25)

e. Towers at Location No. 292 (C+0) & at location No. 294 (C+25)
were in erect position. One side earth wire peak of the towers was
damaged. POWERGRID informed that the towers had damaged due to
the sudden jerk caused by collapsed tower at location No. 293.

Tower at Loc. No.292 (C+0) Tower at Loc. No.294 (C+25)

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

f. POWERGRID informed that the damaged towers were also examined

for any defects like missing members, missing nuts & bolts etc and no
such defects were observed. Further, it was reported that different
foundation dimensions like back to back, diagonal distance, levels were
also examined by POWERGRID officials and the same were found to be
generally in line with approved drawing.

g. POWERGRID informed that their team of officials also checked the

records of line patrolling of this line. As per the data furnished by site,
patrolling of the failed location was carried out on 19.03.2021 and no
defects like missing members, missing nuts & bolts were reported.
Further, other towers adjacent to the affected tower locations were also
examined and no abnormalities were observed.

h. POWERGRID officials informed that discussion was done with nearby

local village residents and it was gathered that at the time of tower
collapse, heavy thunderstorm condition with exceptionally high wind
velocity prevailed in the narrow strip in the vicinity of affected stretch
of transmission line and the Tower failure was initiated due to this high
intensity localized wind storm. It was informed that the above
windstorm has also caused extensive wide spread damages to nearby
trees and LT poles. The same was also reported in local newspapers as
well.

i. To examine the chemical and material properties, 05 samples from the

affected tower locations were selected from site and sent for testing at
independent NABL accredited lab. All the tower steel samples were
found acceptable as per the relevant Indian Standards.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that only the +25 m Body extension part was
damaged and basic body structure of the failed tower was intact.
Committee also noted that the failed tower at location No. 293 was
of B type tower with +25 m body extension and was spotted with a
lower span

Committee observed that case of +25 m body extension, normally the

stub setting templates are not available and props are used for this
purpose. Special precaution is required to be taken to ensure the
correct slope of stubs in addition to the correct back to back distance
between the stubs.

Committee noted that in this case the B type tower have been spotted
with lower span values and with zero degree deviation angle and
hence, have inherent safe margin. In case failure was due to high
speed wind as reported by POWERGRID, the nearby suspension type
towers would have collapsed instead of this tower. Further, as only
the extension part had collapsed and basic body structure is intact,

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it indicates that there must have been some erection deficiency in
erection of extension part which had led to collapse of tower.

Committee advised POWERGRID to review the design & erection

practice adopted by them for the construction of +25m body
extension parts of the tower to avoid similar incidences of failure in
future.

A.25 400 kV D/C Kaithal-Baghpat Transmission line failed on 08.07.2021

[Towers at Location No. 388 (DA+0), 389 (DA+0), 390 (DA+0), 391 (DA+0)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C (Quad) Kaithal-Meerut Transmission Line of POWERGRID

was commissioned in November, 2010. LILO of this line was done at
Baghpat Substation in May 2016. The LILO portion of this line was
constructed by M/s Jyoti Structures Limited. The tower collapsed in the
Loop-in portion of 400 kV D/C (Quad) Kaithal-Baghpat Transmission line.

The suspension towers of this line were designed for basic wind speed of
47 m/s corresponding to Wind Zone 4 and reliability level 1 as per IS 802-
1995. Also narrow front wind on tower body and 75% of wind in broken
wire condition were considered. The towers were designed with Quad
ACSR Moose conductor with double I string having porcelain disc
insulators. At present, the line is having polymer insulators.

Observations:

a. The affected towers were located in plain field with few trees in vicinity
near village Bijraul in Baghpat district (Uttar Pradesh). The details of
tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. damage
1 386 DD+18 393 26 ֯44’ 01” LT Intact
2 387 DA+0 325 Intact
3 388 DA+0 275 One
Earthwire
Peak damage
4 389 DA+0 211 Collapsed
5 390 DA+0 317 Both
Earthwire
Peak damage
6 391 DA+0 350 One middle
crossarm
damage
7 392 DB+0 242 07 ֯59’ 04” RT Intact

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b. Tower at Location No. 389 (DA+0) was located in the agricultural

field. The tower was collapsed from the first panel level in transverse
direction to the line. One of the stubs was bent and three stubs were
found to be intact. The coping of the chimneys were cracked.

Tower at Loc. No.389 (DA+0)

c. Tower at Location No. 388 (DA+0) & 390 (DA+0) were in erect
condition. The earth wire peak of the circuit-I side of the tower at
location No. 388 (DA+0) was damaged, whereas at location No. 390
(DA+0) both the earth wire peaks were damaged.

Tower at Loc. No.388 (DA+0) Tower at Loc. No.390 (DA+0)

d. Tower at Location No. 391 (DA+0) was located in agricultural field

and all the foundations/legs of the tower were covered with
vegetation/crops. The tower was in erect condition. The middle cross

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
arm of circuit-II of the tower was damaged.

Tower at Loc. No.391 (DA+0)

e. The affected towers were also examined for any defects like missing
members, missing nuts & bolts etc and no such defects were observed.
However, the foundations of the towers were covered with
vegetation/crops. Few of the extra holes in tower structures were also
not plugged with nuts & bolts.

f. The trees/vegetation located near the towers were damaged, however,

there was no visible uprooting of the trees.

g. POWERGRID officials informed that as per the revised wind map

published in the National Building Code 2016, the affected area was
now covered in Wind Zone 5.

h. As reported by POWERGRID officials, from the discussion with nearby

local village residents, it was gathered that at the time of tower collapse,
heavy thunderstorm condition with exceptionally high wind velocity
prevailed in the narrow strip in the vicinity of affected stretch of
transmission line and the Tower failure was initiated due to this high
intensity localized wind storm. The wind event was widely reported in
the local print media and as per the newspaper reports, heavy damage
occurred in the area on 08-07-2021 due to high intensity localized
thunderstorm. HT & LT lines were also found fallen in nearby area.

a. POWERGRID informed that the last patrolling of the failed location was
carried out on 23.06.2021 and no defects like missing members,
missing nuts & bolts were reported.

j. To examine the chemical and material properties, samples from the

affected tower locations were selected from site and sent for testing at

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independent NABL accredited lab. All the tower steel samples were
found acceptable as per the relevant Indian Standards.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

The towers had failed within 6 years from the date of commissioning.
It was also noted that the transmission line has been commissioned
after the notification of CEA Regulations, 2010. However, the line is
designed as per Reliability level 1 instead of Reliability level 2 which
is to be adopted for quad conductor configuration lines as per
aforementioned Regulations.

Committee further noted that that at the time of erection, the towers
were designed considering wind zone 4 as per the wind map
applicable at that time, however, the wind zone of the area has been
updated to wind zone 5 in the latest wind map published in National
Building Code.

Committee observed that although print media published about

heavy wind in the area, no uprooting of trees was observed at the
site. It is very difficult to ascertain whether wind speed exceeded the
design speed for which towers were designed. It appears that failure
of the tower at location No. 289 (DA+0) led to its collapse in
transverse direction of line and subsequently due to jerk during
collapse, peak of tower at locations No. 388, 390 and cross arm at
location No. 391 were also damaged.

Committee emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility

needs to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected
area so that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. In this matter, the
respective utility may seek the help of IMD to get the wind data
obtained from observatory/ Satellite/Radar.

Committee advised that the transmission lines should be designed

and erected as per latest IS codes, Regulations and recommendations
of the Standing Committee / Task Force, as applicable.

A.26 400 kV D/C Kishenpur-Wanpoh (ckt-III & IV) Transmission line failed
on 23.10.2021
[Tower at Location No.145 (DC+3R)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Kishenpur-Wanpoh (ckt-III & IV) Transmission Line of

POWERGRID was constructed by M/s Tata Projects Limited and was
commissioned in July, 2017. The towers of this line were designed for
basic wind speed of 39 m/s corresponding to wind zone-2 and reliability

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
level-1 as per IS 802:1995. The towers were designed with Twin ACSR
Moose conductor and are having porcelain disc insulator string in vertical
configuration. This was reported as the first incident of tower collapse in
this transmission line.

 Observations:

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. damage
1 143 DD+6 26 ֯24’ 11” LT Intact
305
2 144 DB+0 7 ֯14’ 31” RT Bulging of tower
members
354
3 145 DC+3R 23 ֯54’ 38” LT Tower
Collapsed
273
4 146 DB+6R 2 ֯51’ 33” LT Intact
254
5 147 DB+6 3 ֯32’ 43” LT Intact

b. Tower at Location No. 145 (DC+3R) was located in hilly terrain near
village Kathar (Upparmadha), Chenaini Taluk in Udhampur district
(Jammu & Kashmir), around 47.3 km from Kishenpur substation. The
tower was completely collapsed and all four stubs of the tower were
bent/damaged.

c. POWERGRID officials informed that there was a drifting of foundation

at location No. 144 towards tower No. 143, which resulted in tightening
of conductors between Tower Nos. 144 & 145 and increase in sag of
conductors between towers at location Nos. 144 & 143.

d. POWERGRID informed that the similar occurrence was observed by

POWERGRID site officials in April 2020. At that time also, there was
loosening & tightening of conductors between spans 143-144 and 144-
145 respectively due to sinking of foundation at location No. 144 and
in order to reduce the tensile load on towers from 145 to 144 during
the month of April-2020, POWERGRID site officials had put additional
polymer insulators in some of the phases to reduce the tension in the
section 144-145 and back stays at tower 145. Further, as a result of
sliding of location 144 towards 143, sag of the conductors in section
144-143 was visibly more due to reduction in tension in the
conductors. In order to stabilize tower No. 144, back stay at tower No.
144 was also provided.

e. POWERGRID informed that patrolling of the failed location was carried

out on 07.07.2021 and no defects like missing members, missing nuts
& bolts were reported. Further, examination of tower at location No.
146, adjacent to the affected tower, was also carried out and no

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abnormalities were observed. For collapsed tower location different
foundation dimensions like back to back, diagonal distance, stub levels
and the same were found to be generally in line with approved drawing.

f. POWERGRID informed that their officials also visited tower at location

No. 144 and a wide crack in the land and bulging of soil near to the
tower location was found. It was informed that the bulging of soil
indicates gradual land sliding in the near vicinity of the towers.

Tower at Loc. No.145 (DC+3R)

Tower at Loc. No.145 (DC+3R): Leg-A, B, C, D

Bulging of Soil in the Vicinity of Tower at Loc. No.144 (DB+0)

g. Due to this sliding of foundation, many tower members of tower of

location 144 were seen bent. Bracing of the lower panel was also

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observed bulging outward.

Bulging of Tower at Loc. No.144 (DB+0)

Insertion of Extra Polymer Insulators for Tower at Loc. No.144 (DB+0)

h. POWERGRID informed that their discussion with the local people in

the nearby villages revealed that there was hailstorm at the time of
tower collapse in the area and felling of trees in nearby village,
snapping of conductors, breaking of electric poles etc had also occurred
during this heavy hailstorm. The event was widely reported in the local
print media and it was mentioned in newspaper reports that the heavy
hailstorm occurred in the area on 23-10-2021 due to sudden change
of temperature.

i. According to POWERGRID, it was evident that there has been sliding

tendency in the whole land mass surrounding the foundation of tower
No. 144 downhill towards location No. 143. The gradual sliding of
landmass at location 144 led to increased tension in span 144-145
causing excess loading on tower No. 145. During the hailstorm, heavy
winds and contraction of conductor due to sudden fall in temperature

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
on 23-10-2021(day of incident) further aggravated the stress on tower
No. 145 which caused its failure.

j. The material tests were conducted on samples selected from site at

independent NABL accredited lab and these reports were generally
found to be within limits.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted the above and concluded that due to land slide the
tower located at lower height was shifted due to which the tension
in the conductor had increased which had led to failure of adjacent
tower located at higher location i.e. tower at location No.145 (DC+3
(R)).

Committee advised POWERGRID to ensure that the geological

investigation of the land mass is carried out and based on the report,
take the necessary strengthening measures required for tower
foundations and/or for the hill slope, so that such incidences do not
repeat.

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
B. MADHYA PRADESH POWER TRANSMISSION COMPANY LTD.
(MPPTCL)

The towers of following Transmission Lines of MPPTCL had failed during

above mentioned period:

Year No. of Towers

of Failed
S. Name of the Name of Date of Wind
Comm Sus Conductor
No. Transmission Line Utility Failure Zone Ten
issioni pen Total
sion
ng sion
Vertical/
400 kV D/C Malwa
Twin
1. (TPH)- Pithampur MPPTCL 16.04.2019 2013 Medium 2 - 2
ACSR
transmission line
Moose
220 kV
Vertical/
Omkareshwar
2. MPPTCL 16.04.2019 1982 Medium 1 - 1 ACSR
Barwaha tap to
ZEBRA
Nimrani line
Vertical/
400 kV D/C Malwa
Twin
3. (TPH)- Pithampur MPPTCL 02.06.2019 2013 Medium 20 4 24
ACSR
transmission line
Moose
Vertical/
400 kV D/C
Twin
4. Rajgarh- Sardar MPPTCL 11.06.2019 2002 Medium 4 1 5
ACSR
Sarovar DCDS line
Moose
Line
comm Line as
ission per Old
ed in Design
220 kV D/C
1962 Vertical/
Jabalpur-
5. MPPTCL 13.06.2019 1 - 1 ACSR
Narsinghpur Failed
Failed Zebra
transmission line tower
tower
erecte
designed
d on
for wind
07.06.
zone 4
2019
Total (2019)
28 5 33
Transmission lines failed : 5
220 kV Malanpur-
Vertical/
Auriya & 220 kV
6. MPPTCL 28.05.2020 1993 Medium 11 - 11 AAAC
Mehgaon-Adani
Zebra
transmission line
220 kV Malanpur- Vertical/
7. Morena (ckt I & II) MPPTCL 29.05.2020 2017 4 3 - 3 ACSR
transmission line Zebra
220 kV Malanpur- Vertical/
8. PGCIL (ckt I & II) MPPTCL 29.05.2020 2010 4 3 2 5 ACSR
transmission line Zebra
400 kV S/C Malwa Vertical/
TPH Pithampur Twin
9. MPPTCL 26.03.2020 2013 Medium 6 1 7
Transmission line of ACSR
MPPTCL Moose

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
Total (2020)
23 3 26
Transmission lines failed : 4
Vertical/
400 kV D/C Malwa
Twin
10. TPH -Pithampur ckt MPPTCL 29.05.2021 2013 Medium 5 - 5
ACSR
I&II line
Moose
220 kV
Amarkantak- Vertical/
11. Panagar/SGTPS MPPTCL 21.09.2021 1996 Medium 2 - 2 ACSR
Birsinghpur ZEBRA
transmission line
Total (2021)
7 - 7
Transmission lines failed : 2
TOTAL:
Transmission lines failed: 11*
Towers failed: 66

*In the subject period, the 400 kV D/C Malwa (TPH)- Pithampur transmission line of
MPPTCL failed four times

B.1 400 kV D/C Malwa (TPH)- Pithampur transmission line

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Malwa (TPH)-Pithampur transmission line of MPPTCL was

commissioned in 2013. Total length of the transmission line is 93.44 km.
This line traverses through plain terrain. The towers of this line were
designed by MPPTCL for medium wind zone as per IS 802:1977. The line
has vertical configuration with ACSR Twin Moose conductor.

The transmission line failed four times in the period from April 2019 to
December 2021. The details of each of the failure incident is produced
below:

B.1.1. Failure of transmission line on 16.04.2019

[Towers at location No. 216 (FD0) & 217 (FD0)]

 Observations:

a. 400 kV D/C Malwa (TPH)- Pithampur transmission line of MPPTCL

was crossed over by the 765 kV Khandwa-Dhule D/C transmission
line of M/s Sterlite Power. At the time of failure incident, the 765 kV
Khandwa-Dhule D/C transmission line having Hexa AAAC Moose
conductor per bundle configuration was under construction, however,
the stringing of span crossing over the line of MPPTCL was complete.

b. As reported by MPPTCL, there was high speed wind conditions on

16.04.2019 in the affected area during which the towers of 765 kV
D/C Khandwa-Dhule line of M/s Sterlite collapsed due to which the
conductors of this line fell over MPPTCL’s 400 kV D/C Malwa (TPH)-
Pithampur transmission line resulting into damage of towers at
locations No. 216 (FD0) & 217 (FD0).

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
c. Falling of Hexa AAAC Moose conductor on the span resulted into
excessive loading and damaged the towers at locations No. 216 (FD0)
& 217 (FD0). The top portion of the tower at location No. 216 (FD0)
was damaged and at location No. 217 (FD0) peak, top cross arm &
middle cross arm of one of the circuits were damaged. The conductor
in the span and insulators were also damaged.

Tower at location No. 217 (FD0)

B.1.2. Failure of transmission line on 02.06.2019

[Twenty (20) suspension type towers at location Nos. 126 to 131, 133 to 137, 139
& 160 to 167, and four (4) tension towers at location Nos. 132, 138, 159 & 168]

 Observations:

a. MPPTCL representative informed that the failed transmission towers

were located in plain terrain in Maheshwar tehsil of Khargone District
Madhya Pradesh. As reported by MPPTCL, during the high wind
incident that occurred on 02.06.2019, twenty (20) suspension type
towers and four (4) tension towers were affected. The details of
damages observed in the failed towers is as follows:

SI. Loc Tower

Observations/ Extent of damage
No. No. Type

Tower was partially damaged and was in erect condition.

The top part of the tower, above the bottom cross arm
1 126 FD0
level, was damaged & buckled and was resting on lower
tower body. One of the stubs was reported to be bent.

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Tower was collapsed from second panel level in
2 127 FD0 transverse direction. Two of the stubs were bent. The
chimneys were reported to be intact.
Tower was collapsed from second panel level in
3 128 FD0 transverse direction. All the four stubs and chimneys
were reported to be intact.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground in
transverse direction from first panel level. All four stubs
4 129 FD0
were bent/damaged. Chimneys were observed to be
intact.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground in
5 130 FD0+3 transverse direction from stub level. All four stubs along
with chimneys were bent/damaged.
Tower was collapsed from second panel level in
6. 131 FD0 transverse direction. All the four stubs & chimneys were
reported to be intact.
Tower was collapsed completely in transverse direction
7. 132 FD 60 from stub level. All four stubs were bent/ damaged.
Chimneys were observed to be intact.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground from the
first panel level in the transverse direction. One of the
8. 133 FD0+3
stubs was reported to be bent and all the chimneys were
reported to be intact.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground in
9. 134 FD0 transverse direction from stub level. All four stubs were
bent/damaged.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground from the
10. 135 FD0 first panel level in the transverse direction. All of the
stubs the chimneys were reported to be intact.
Tower was collapsed completely in transverse direction
from stub level. All four stubs were bent/damaged. Two
11. 136 FD0
of the Chimneys were reported to be damaged and two
were intact.
Tower was collapsed completely in transverse direction
12. 137 FD0 from stub level. All four stubs and one chimneys were
reported to be bent/damaged.
Tower was partially damaged and was in erect condition.
The top part of the tower, above and including the top
13. 138 FD 30 cross arm was damaged & buckled and was resting on
lower tower body. All of the stubs the chimneys were
reported to be intact.
Tower was partially damaged and was in erect condition.
The top part of the tower upto the middle cross arm level
14. 139 FD0+6 was damaged & buckled and was resting on lower tower
body. All of the stubs the chimneys were reported to be
intact.
Tower was in erect condition. The middle cross arms of
FD
15. 159 the tower were damaged. All of the stubs and the
30+3
chimneys were reported to be intact.
Tower was in erect condition. The peak of the tower was
damaged. The conductor of one of the middle cross arms
16. 160 FD0
also got detached and was lying on the ground. All of the
stubs and the chimneys were reported to be intact.
Tower was collapsed from second panel level in
17. 161 FD0 transverse direction. All the tower members above the
second level were buckled, got twisted and jumbled with

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 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
each other. All the four stubs were reported to be
damaged. The chimneys were reported to be intact.
Tower was collapsed from the first panel level in
18. 162 FD0 transverse direction. All the four stubs & three of the
chimneys were reported to be damaged.
Tower was collapsed completely in transverse direction
19. 163 FD0+3 from stub level. All the four stubs were damaged/bent.
Crack were observed in three of the chimneys.
Tower was collapsed completely in transverse direction
20. 164 FD0 from stub level. All the four stubs were damaged/bent.
Crack were observed in two of the chimneys.
Tower was collapsed completely in transverse direction
21. 165 FD0 from stub level. All the four stubs and the four chimneys
were damaged.
Tower was collapsed completely in transverse direction
22. 166 FD0+6 from stub level. All the four stubs were damaged/bent
and one of the chimneys was damaged.
Part of the tower structure above the first panel level got
bent and sheared from the lower tower body and was
lying on the ground in transverse direction. The lower
23. 167 FD0+10
part of the tower structure was twisted and jumbled.
Three of the stubs were observed to be damaged and
cracks were observed in one of the chimneys.
Tower was in erect condition. One of the peaks and all
the three cross arms of one of the circuits were damaged.
24. 168 FD 30
All of the stubs and the chimneys were reported to be
intact.

Tower at loc. No. 126 (FD0) Tower at loc. No. 127 (FD0)

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Tower at loc. No. 128 (FD0) Tower at loc. No. 129 (FD0)

b. MPPTCL representative informed that the towers at the location Nos.

159 to 168 failed in transverse direction towards the south direction
from the line whereas towers at the location Nos. 126 to 139 failed in
transverse direction towards the north direction from the line.

Tower at loc. No. 130 (FD0+3) Tower at loc. No. 131 (FD0)

Tower at loc. No. 132 (FD 60) Tower at loc. No. 133 (FD0+3)

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Tower at loc. No. 134 (FD 0) Tower at loc. No. 135 (FD0)

c. MPPTCL representative informed that on 02.06.2019 heavy

thunderstorm with cyclonic wind was observed in the area which
resulted in the failure/ collapse of these towers in transverse direction
to the line. To examine the failure, a Team of Experts was constituted
by MPPTCL. The team along with Expert of Design of towers visited the
tower failure site to investigate the cause of failure of structures and
had opined that these structures had failed due to heavy cyclonic
circulation in the area.

Tower at loc. No. 136 (FD 0) Tower at loc. No. 137 (FD0)

Tower at loc. No. 138 (FD 30) Tower at loc. No. 139 (FD0+6)

d. MPPTCL representative informed that these towers were designed as

per old IS code i.e. IS 802:1977 and they had taken up the matter with
Designer for strengthening the designs as per IS 802: 1995 and

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MPPTCL will take up the strengthening work of all suspension towers
of this design in a phased manner.

Tower loc. No. 159 (FD 30+3) Tower at loc. No. 160 (FD0)

Tower loc. No. 161 (FD 0) Tower at loc. No. 162 (FD0)

Tower loc. No. 163 (FD 0+3) Tower at loc. No. 164 (FD0)

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Tower loc. No. 165 (FD0) Tower at loc. No. 166 (FD0)

e. MPPTCL representative informed that the high speed wind also caused
uprooting of various trees and severe damage to structures located in
the vicinity. The same was also covered in the local newspaper and was
confirmed by the residents of the nearby villages.

Tower loc. No. 167 (FD0+10) Tower at loc. No. 168 (FD 30)

f. To verify the mechanical strength and chemical composition of failed

tower members, material tests were conducted on samples collected
from failed towers at independent NABL accredited lab. As per the test
report some of the members failed to conform to desired
specifications/values of the tensile strength, yield stress and elongation
parameters.

B.1.3. Failure of transmission line on 26.03.2020

[Towers at location No. 13(FD0), 14(FDT 30), 15(FD0), 16(FD0), 17(FD0),
18(FD0) & 19 (FD0)]

 Observations:

a. The failed transmission towers were located in plain terrain in

Pithampur tehsil of Dhar District in Madhya Pradesh. As reported by
MPPTCL, a high wind speed incident occurred on 26.03.2020 in the

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area during which six (6) suspension towers and one tension tower
were damaged/collapsed. The details of damages observed in the failed
towers is as follows:

SI. Loc Tower

Observations/ Extent of damage
No. No. Type

Tower was partially damaged and was in erect condition.

Some of the leg members & cross bracings at the top
1 13 FD0
part of the tower structure got bent. The stubs and
chimney were reported to be intact.
The tower structure got twisted, deformed, and jumbled
2 14 FTP 30 up and was lying on the ground. All of the stubs &
chimneys were reported to be damaged.
Tower was observed to be twisted from middle of the
structure and collapsed to the ground in transverse
3 15 FD0
direction. Two of the stubs and their chimneys were
reported to be bent/damaged.
Tower was observed to be twisted from middle of the
structure and collapsed from the second panel level to
4 16 FD0
the ground in transverse direction. One of the stub and
its chimney were reported to be bent/damaged.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground in
5 17 FD0+6 transverse direction from stub level. All the four stubs
were damaged and two of the chimneys were damaged.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground in
6. 18 FD0+3 transverse direction. All the four stubs and chimneys
were reported to be damaged.
Tower was collapsed completely to the ground in
7 19 FD0 transverse direction. All the four stubs and chimneys
were reported to be damaged.

b. As reported by MPPTCL, on the date of failure heavy thunderstorm

and high speed wind were observed in the area and the affected towers
failed during this thunderstorm. The high speed wind also caused
uprooting of various trees and severe damage to LT lines and other
structures located in the vicinity. However, due to first lockdown
period of Covid-19, the same was not covered in the local newspaper.

Tower at location No. 13 (FD0) Tower at location No. 14 (FTP 30)

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Tower at location No. 15 (FD0) Tower at location No. 16 (FD0)

Tower at location No. 17 (FD0+6)

Tower at location No. 18 (FD0+3) Tower at location No. 19 (FD0)

c. MPPTCL representative informed that they had requested IMD to

provide the data of speed of wind observed at the location and at the
time of tower failure. IMD informed that they do not have departmental
meteorological observatory situated at Dhar District, M.P and the
nearest observatory was in Indore. However, the continuous record of
wind was not available with observatory and maximum wind data

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could not be provided.

d. MPPTCL representative informed that these towers were designed as

per old IS code i.e. IS 802:1977 and they had taken up the matter for
strengthening the designs as latest IS codes and MPPTCL will take up
the strengthening work of all suspension towers of this design in a
phased manner.

e. MPPTCL informed that theft of tower members and any shortage of

tower parts was not observed in the failed tower structures.

f. To verify the mechanical strength and chemical composition of failed

tower members, material tests were conducted on samples collected
from failed towers at independent NABL accredited lab. The reports of
these tests were found to be within limits as per relevant IS codes.

B.1.4. Failure of transmission line on 29.05.2021

[Towers at location No. 148(FD0), 149(FDT 30), 150(FD0), 151(FD0+6) &
152 (FD0+3)]

 Observations:

a. MPPTCL representative informed that the failed transmission towers

were located in plain terrain near Akhipura Village in Maheshwar
tehsil of Khargone District Madhya Pradesh. As reported by MPPTCL,
Five towers (suspension type) damaged/collapsed during the high
wind incident on 29.05.2021. The details of damages observed in the
failed towers is as follows:

SI. Loc Tower

Observations/Extent of damage
No. No. Type

Tower was completely collapsed to the ground in

transverse direction from the stub level. All the four
1 148 FD0
stubs and two of the chimneys were reported to be
damaged. All the hardware fittings were damaged.
Tower was completely collapsed to the ground in
2 149 FD0 transverse direction from the stub level. All of the four
stubs & chimneys were reported to be damaged.
Tower was collapsed from the second panel level in the
transverse direction and was lying on the ground.. All of
3 150 FD0+6
the four stubs and two of the chimneys were reported to
be bent/damaged.
Tower was collapsed from the second panel level in the
4 151 FD0 transverse direction and was lying on the ground. All of
the stubs and chimneys were reported to be intact.
Tower was partially damaged and was in erect condition.
The peak of the tower was damaged. All of the cross
5 152 FD0+3 arms of one circuit and top cross arm of second circuit
were also damaged. All of the stubs and chimneys were
reported to be intact.

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Tower at location No. 148 (FD0)

Tower at location No. 149 (FD0) Tower at location No. 150 (FD0+6)

Tower at location No. 151 (FD0) Tower at location No. 152 (FD0+3)

b. The failed towers were located in the similar area/stretch of the

transmission line in which the failure of towers was observed in the
year 2019. The towers located on both sides of the failed towers, i.e.
from tower locations No. 126 to 139 and between tower locations No.

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159 to 168 were affected in the previous tower failure incident.

c. MPPTCL informed that at the time of failure, both the circuits of the
transmission line were under shutdown condition for carrying out the
modifications/shifting work of the transmission line.

d. MPPTCL representative informed that on the date of failure heavy

thunderstorm and high speed wind were observed in the area. The
wind observed was of whirling nature and the affected towers were
failed during this thunderstorm. The high speed wind also caused
uprooting of various trees and severe damage to LT lines and other
structures located in the vicinity and the same was also covered in the
local newspaper.

e. MPPTCL representative informed that these towers were designed as

per IS 802:1977 for medium wind zone. As per IS 802:2015, the area
of the subject incident comes under Wind Zone 2. As per calculations
of MPPTCL, the wind pressure load corresponding to wind zone 2
comes around 49.12 kg/m2 , whereas the towers were designed for
medium wind zone as per IS 802-1977 with wind pressure load of 45
kg/m2 with F.O.C. of 2 for normal conditions and 1.5 for Broken wire
conditions. Further, the net transverse load for these towers comes
around net transverse load calculated as per IS 802:2015.

f. MPPTCL representative informed that they will take up the

strengthening work of all suspension towers as per latest IS codes in
a phased manner.

g. To verify the mechanical strength and chemical composition of failed

tower members, material tests were conducted at independent NABL
accredited lab on samples collected from failed towers. The reports of
these tests were found to be within limits as per relevant IS codes.
However, the Mass of Zinc observed on some of the samples were lower
than the prescribed values mentioned in relevant IS.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

1. Committee noted that this transmission line had failed four times
in the period from April 2019 to December 2021.

2. 400 kV D/C Malwa (TPH)- Pithampur transmission line of MPPTCL

was crossed over by the 765 kV Khandwa-Dhule D/C transmission
line of M/s Sterlite Power. Committee concluded that the failure of
towers 216 (FD0) & 217 (FD0) of 400 kV transmission line on
16.04.2019 was due to the sudden impact of Hexa Bundle
conductors of 765 kV D/c line of M/s Sterlite Power falling on it.
Committee suggested that in order to minimize the chances of
secondary failure of transmission lines due to snapping of
conductors of transmission lines crossing overhead, minimum two
sets of insulators per phase per circuit shall be adopted by the
utilities.

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3. Committee observed that though the transmission line has been
commissioned in 2013, towers designed as per old code IS
802:1977 were used in the transmission line. Committee noted
that as these towers were designed as per old IS 802:1997,
diaphragm bracing members are not present in the towers near
the cross bracings and as such oblique wind loads and narrow
front wind loads are not considered in design of these towers.

4. Committee recommended that practices of using old designs of

towers even after revision of IS codes should not be adopted by the
utilities and it should be ensured that the transmission lines are
designed and erected as per latest IS codes, Regulations and
recommendations of the Standing Committee and Task Force, as
applicable.

5. Committee noted that repetitive failure incidents have been

observed in two of the transmission lines (400 kV Katni-Damoh
transmission line & 400 kV Malwa-Pithampur transmission line)
and MPPTCL had created a plan to strengthen the suspension
towers of these transmission lines in a phased manner. Committee
suggested MPPTCL that in case multiple tower failures are
observed in the other transmission lines, towers of those lines can
also be considered for strengthening.

Committee also suggested that as there is huge capital investment

involved in the strengthening procedure, MPPTCL may consider a
third party vetting of proposed design modifications which are to
be adopted for strengthening of the transmission lines.

6. Committee suggested MPPTCL to ensure that whenever failure of

transmission towers occurs, the failed towers should be replaced
by towers designed as per latest IS codes.

7. Committee also noted that as per the material test reports

submitted by MPPTCL, some of the tower members had failed in
the chemical and mechanical tests. Committee also observed that
some of the tower structures appeared to be heavily rusted &
Further, mass of zinc in some of the failed samples appeared to
be lower than values specified in IS codes.

Committee noted that due to these deficiencies, the tower

structures becomes vulnerable and advised MPPTCL to increase
the scrutiny of material testing to ensure good quality raw
material is used in erection of transmission lines. Further,
Committee advised MPPTCL to review the procedure currently
adopted by MPPTCL and ensure that all the necessary steps are
taken to avoid rusting of tower members.

B.2 220 kV Omkareshwar Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission line of

MPPTCL failed on 16.04.2019
[Tower at location No. 22 (DA+0)]

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 Brief Background

220 kV D/C Omkareshwar Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission line of

MPPTCL was commissioned in 1982. Total length of the transmission line
is 93.44 km. This line traverse through plain terrain. The towers of this
line were designed by MPPTCL for medium wind zone as per IS 802:1977.
The line has vertical configuration with ACSR Zebra conductor.

 Observations:

d. 220 kV Omkareshwar Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission line of

MPPTCL was crossed over by the 765 kV Khandwa-Dhule D/C
transmission line of M/s Sterlite Power. At the time of failure incident,
the 765 kV Khandwa-Dhule D/C transmission line with hexa AAAC
Moose conductor per bundle configuration was under construction.
However, the stringing of the span crossing over 220 kV Omkareshwar
Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission line of MPPTCL, was complete.

e. As reported by MPPTCL, on 16.04.2019 there was high speed wind

conditions in the affected area during which the towers of 765 kV D/C
Hexa Khandwa-Dhule line of M/s Sterlite collapsed due to which the
conductors of this line fell over MPPTCL’s 220 kV Omkareshwar
Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission Line. This resulted into damage
of Tower No. 22.

f. Falling of Hexa AAAC Moose conductor on the span resulted into

excessive loading and damaged the tower at Location No. 22. The top
portion of the tower was bent and rested on the lower tower body. The
conductor in the span & insulators attached were also damaged.

Tower at location No. 22 (DA+0)

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 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

220 kV Omkareshwar Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission line of

MPPTCL was crossed over by the 765 kV Khandwa-Dhule D/C
transmission line of M/s Sterlite Power. Committee concluded that
the failure of transmission tower of MPPTCL located at location No.
22 was due to the sudden impact of Hexa Bundle conductors falling
on it.

Committee suggested that in order to minimize the chances of

secondary failure of transmission lines due to snapping of
conductors of transmission lines crossing overhead, minimum two
sets of insulators per phase per circuit shall be adopted by the
utilities.

B.3 400 kV D/C Rajgarh-Sardar Sarovar transmission line of MPPTCL failed

on 11.06.2019
[Towers at location No. 562(DA+0), 563(DA+6), 564(DA+0), 565(DA+6) &
566(DC+10)]

 Brief Background

220 kV D/C Rajgarh- Sardar Sarovar transmission line of MPPTCL was

commissioned in 2002. Total length of the transmission line is 178 km, of
which 114 km length of the line is in Madhya Pradesh and rest is in
Gujarat. The line traverses through hilly terrain. The towers of this line
were designed by MPPTCL for medium wind zone as per IS 802:1977 and
the line was erected by M/s RPG. The line has vertical conductor
configuration with Twin ACSR Moose conductor and Porcelain insulators.

 Observations:

a. The failed transmission towers were located in hilly terrain near the
village Chhatkala, M.P. As reported by MPPTCL, four suspension type
towers and one tension tower were affected in the high wind incident
that occurred on 11.06.2019. The details of damages observed in the
failed towers is as follows:

Loc. Tower
SI. No. Extent of damage
No. Type

Tower was partially damaged and was

in erect condition. One Earthwire peak
1 562 DA+0
and one top cross arm damaged. All
stubs were intact.
Tower was partially damaged and was
in erect condition. One Earthwire peak,
2 563 DA+6
top cross and canopy portion damaged.
All stubs were intact.

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Tower was completely collapsed in
3 564 DA+0 transverse direction from stub level.
All four stubs were damaged/bent.
Tower was completely collapsed in
4 565 DA+6 transverse direction from first panel
level. All four stubs were bent.
Tower was partially damaged and was
in erect condition. One of the earthwire
peak was damaged. One of the top
5 566 DC+10
phase conductor was snapped and
rested on bottom phase conductor of
second circuit.

Tower at loc. No. 562 Tower at loc. No. 563

Tower at loc. No. 564

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Tower at loc. No. 565

Tower at loc. No. 566

b. MPPTCL representative informed that the transmission line failed

during the period of effect of Vayu Cyclone which affected Gujarat and
western parts of M.P. It was also gathered from the discussion with
nearby villagers that at the time of tower collapse, heavy whirling wind
prevailed in the affected area which led to collapse of the towers. The
above windstorm has also caused extensive damages to nearby trees
and other structures.

c. MPPTCL representative informed that the samples were collected from

the failed tower structures and were sent to NABL accredited lab for
strength and material testing. The values of tested parameters were
found to be within limits.

d. MPPTCL representative informed that they had initiated the project of

strengthening of the suspension type towers of this design and
suspension towers of this line will also be strengthened in second
phase of the project.

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 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the tower failure incident occurred during the
Vayu cyclone which affected western part of Madhya Pradesh and
state of Gujarat. The failed towers were located in hilly/ undulated
terrain which had also amplified the high wind effect on the tower
structures. Committee also noted that tough the transmission line
was commissioned in year 2002, the line was designed as per old IS
802:1977 instead of IS 802:1995. Committee concluded that the
aforementioned factors led to collapse of towers at location No. 564
& 565 which subsequently led to partial damage of nearby towers
due to cascading effect.

Committee recommended that practices of using old designs of

towers even after revision of IS codes should not be adopted by the
utilities and it should be ensured that the transmission lines are
designed and erected as per latest IS codes, Regulations and
recommendations of the Standing Committee and Task Force, as
applicable.

B.4 220 kV D/C Jabalpur-Narsinghpur transmission line of MPPTCL failed

on 13.06.2019
[Tower at location No. 11A (DA+10)]

 Brief Background

220 kV D/C Jabalpur-Narsinghpur transmission line of MPPTCL was

commissioned in year 1962. Total length of the transmission line is 74.65
km. The line traverses through plain terrain. The towers of this line were
designed as per old codes applicable at that time. The line has vertical
conductor configuration with ACSR Zebra conductor and Porcelain
insulators.

 Observations:

a. It was reported by MPPTCL that for raising the road clearance between
towers at location No. 11 & 12, which was affected due to widening of
National Highway 7 by NHAI, the tower at location No. 11A(DA+10)
was erected. This tower was designed and constructed by MPPTCL.
The tower was designed for wind zone 4 as per IS 802:1995 and was
of suspension type with +10 m body extension.

b. The failed tower at location No. 11A (DA+10) was damaged from the
bottom portion of the structure. All the four stubs of the tower were
bent. Approximately 15 m (including +10 m body extension) bottom
portion of the tower was damaged and rest of the tower structure was
connected to the conductors and was in slanted position as can be
seen in the picture given below.

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Tower at location No. 11A

c. As reported by MPPTCL, on the date of failure a thunderstorm with

high speed wind and rains was observed in the area. The tower at
location No. 11A failed during this thunderstorm which also caused
uprooting of various trees and severe damage to structures located in
the vicinity.

d. MPPTCL representative informed that a tower failure investigation

committee was constituted by MPPTCL to investigate the failure
incident. This committee observed that back to back distance of
foundations was in order and no member was missing.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the transmission line is almost 50 years old.

However, failed tower was newly erected at location No. 11A on
07.06.2019 and the same had failed on 13.06.2019, i.e. within a
period of one week. Committee observed that as the basic tower
structure of failed tower is intact and only the body extension part
had failed, it appears there might be some deficiencies in the
erection of tower which had led to failure of tower structure in the
high wind speed event observed in the area on 13.06.2019.

Committee advised MPPTCL to ensure that good erection practices

are adopted for construction of transmission lines and special
precaution is taken while erecting the towers with body extension
so that the slope of stubs and back to back distance between the
stubs are correctly maintained as per approved drawings.

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B.5 220 kV Malanpur-Auriya & 220 kV Mehgaon-Adani transmission line of

MPPTCL on same tower failed on 28.05.2020
[Eleven (11) suspension Towers at location Nos. 14 to 24]

 Brief Background

220 kV Malanpur-Auriya & 220 kV Mehgaon-Adani transmission line of

MPPTCL was constructed in year 1993. Total length of the 220 kV
Malanpur-Auriya transmission line is 145.8 km and that of 220 kV
Mehgaon-Adani transmission line is 37.88 km. The line traverses through
plain terrain. The towers were designed by MPPTCL for medium wind zone
as per IS 802:1977 and as per present wind map of India, this area falls
under Wind Zone 4. The line has vertical conductor configuration with
AAAC Zebra conductor and Porcelain insulators. The line had previously
failed in year 2015 in which eight towers (loc. Nos. 107 to 113 and 305)
were damaged/collapsed.

 Observations:

a. The failed towers were located in plain terrain. All the failed eleven
towers were suspension type (DA+0) towers. All the affected towers
were collapsed completely to the ground in transverse direction from
stub level. The details of damaged towers is as follows:

Loc. Tower
SI. No. Extent of damage
No. Type

Tower was completely collapsed from

1. 14 DA+0 the stub level. All the stubs and
chimneys were damaged.
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
2. 15 the stub level. Two of the stubs and
chimney were damaged.
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
3. 16 the stub level. One of the stubs and
chimney were damaged
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
4. 17 the stub level. Three of the stubs and
chimney were damaged
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
5. 18 the stub level. One of the stubs and
chimney were damaged
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
6. 19 the stub level. Two of the stubs and
chimney were damaged.
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
7. 20 the stub level. One of the stubs and
chimney were damaged

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Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
8. 21 the stub level. One of the stubs and
chimney were damaged
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
9. 22 the stub level. Two of the stubs and
chimney were damaged.
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
10. 23 the stub level. Two of the stubs and
chimney were damaged.
Tower was completely collapsed from
DA+0
11. 24 the stub level. One of the stubs and
chimney were damaged

Tower at location No. 14 Tower at location No. 15

Tower at location No. 17 Tower at location No. 18

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Location No. 19 Location No. 20 Location No. 21

Tower at location No. 22 Tower at location No. 23

b. As reported by MPPTCL, on the date of failure heavy thunderstorm

and high speed winds were observed in the area in the vicinity of failed
tower locations. The high speed wind also caused uprooting of various
trees and severe damage to structures located in the vicinity. The same
was also covered in the local newspapers.

c. It was observed that non-galvanized towers had been used in

transmission lines. The transmission towers were heavily rusted and
some of the nuts/bolts were observed to be missing in these
structures.

d. MPPTCL representative informed that they had requested IMD to

provide the data of speed of wind observed at the location at the time
of tower failure. IMD informed that they had Meteorological
observatory situated at Gwaliar, M.P. However, the continuous record
of wind was not available with observatory and maximum wind data

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could not be provided.

e. As reported by MPPTCL, to verify the mechanical strength and

chemical composition of failed tower members, material tests were
conducted at independent NABL accredited lab on samples collected
from failed towers. The reports were generally found to be within limits
except for one of the samples which had failed in tensile strength test.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that multiple incidents of tower failure have been

reported of the transmission lines traversing in the same region of
M.P. on the date of failure of this transmission line, i.e., on
28.05.2020.

Committee also noted that as per the material test reports submitted
by MPPTCL, the yield strength of one of the samples was not as per
Indian Standard. Further, non-galvanized black towers had been
used by MPPTCL for erection of the line which were observed to be
rusted. Some of the bolts were also found to be missing in the
structures. Committee noted that due to these deficiencies, the
tower structures were vulnerable which failed during the high speed
wind event observed on 28.05.2020.

Committee advised MPPTCL to enhance the scrutiny of material

testing to ensure that good quality raw material is used in erection
of transmission lines. Committee highlighted that the strength of
tower structures gets compromised due to missing bolts and utilities
should be highly cautious to ensure that erection deficiencies are
avoided in the tower structures. Further, the Committee decided
that black (un-galvanized) towers should not be used by the utilities
in the erection of future transmission lines.

B.6 220 kV Malanpur-Morena ckt I & II transmission line of MPPTCL failed

on 29.05.2022
[Towers at location No. 31 (DA+0), 32 (DA+3) & 33 (DA+3)]

 Brief Background

220 kV Malanpur-Morena ckt I & II transmission line of MPPTCL was

commissioned in year 2017. Total length of the transmission line is 29.8
km. The line was designed by MPPTCL and executed by M/s Varrsana
Ispat Limited Gujarat. The towers of this line were designed corresponding
to wind zone 4 as per IS 802:1995. The line has vertical conductor
configuration with ACSR Zebra conductor and Polymer insulators. It was
reported as the first incidence of failure of the line.

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 Observations:

a. The failed transmission towers were located in plain terrain with few
trees in the vicinity. The towers were located near village Bamour
Tehsil, Morena District, M.P. All the affected towers were suspension
type. The details of damaged towers is as follows:

Loc. Tower
SI. No. Extent of damage
No. Type

Tower was completely collapsed to the

ground in transverse direction. All the
1 31 DA four stubs were damaged. The portions
of chimneys, above the ground level,
were also damaged.
Tower was partially damaged above the
bottom cross arm level. The portion of
tower structure above the lowest cross
2 32 DA+3
arm level got bent & sheared from the
tower. The lower tower structure was
erect. All the stubs were intact.
Tower was in erect condition and was
partially damaged. One of the bottom
3 33 DA+3 cross arms of the tower of ckt-II was
damaged and got bent. All of the stubs
were intact.

Tower at loc. No. 31 (B0) Tower at loc. No. 31 (B0 +3)

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Tower at loc. No. 32 (B0 +3)

b. MPPTCL representative informed that on the date of failure heavy

thunderstorm and high speed winds were observed in the area. The
high speed wind also caused uprooting of various trees and severe
damage to structures located in the vicinity. The same was also
covered in the local newspaper.

c. MPPTCL representative informed that they had requested IMD to

provide the data of speed of wind observed at the location and at the
time of tower failure. IMD informed that they had Meteorological
observatory situated at Gwaliar, M.P. However, the continuous record
of wind was not available with observatory and maximum wind data
could not be provided.

d. As reported by MPPTCL, to verify the mechanical strength and

chemical composition of failed tower members, material tests were
conducted at independent NABL accredited lab on samples collected
from failed towers. The reports of these tests were found to be within
limits as per relevant IS codes.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that even though the transmission line was

commissioned in year 2017, the line has been designed as per old IS
802:1995 instead of IS 802:2015. Committee further noted that
multiple towers had failed in the region on 28.05.2021 and on
29.05.2021.

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is

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not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.
However, Committee observed that during the high wind speed event
that occurred on the previous day, residual stresses might have
developed in the tower structures which led to failure of these towers
in the high wind speed event observed on 29.05.2021.

Committee advised that the transmission lines should be designed

and erected as per latest IS codes, Regulations and recommendations
of the Standing Committee and Task Force, as applicable. Committee
advised MPPTCL that if failure of transmission towers occurs, the
failed towers should be replaced by towers designed as per latest IS
codes.

B.7 220 kV Malanpur-PGCIL ckt. I & II transmission line of MPPTCL failed

on 29.05.2020
[Towers at location No. 90, 91, 92, 93 & 94]

 Brief Background

220 kV Malanpur-PGCIL ckt. I & II transmission line of MPPTCL was

commissioned in year 2010. Total length of the transmission line is 39
km. The line traverses through plain terrain and was designed & executed
by MPPTCL. The towers of this line were designed corresponding to wind
zone 4 as per IS 802:1995. The line has vertical conductor configuration
with ACSR Zebra conductor and Porcelain insulators. This was reported
as first incidence of failure in the line.

 Observations:

a. The failed towers were located in plain terrain with few trees in the
vicinity. As reported by MPPTCL, three suspension towers were
collapsed and two tension towers were partially damaged in the high
wind incident that occurred on 29.05.2020. The details of damages
observed in the failed towers is as follows:

Loc. Tower
SI. No. Extent of damage
No. Type

Tower was in erect condition. The tower

was partially damaged and buckled
1 90 Tension
from the bottom cross arm level. All
stubs & chimneys were intact
Tower was completely collapsed to the
2 91 Suspension ground in transverse direction. One of
the stubs was damaged.

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Suspension Tower was completely collapsed to the
3 92 ground in transverse direction. Three
of the stubs were damaged.
Suspension Tower was completely collapsed in
4 93 transverse direction from first panel
level. Two of the stubs were damaged.
Tower was partially damaged and was
in erect condition. The Middle phase
cross arm of ckt-I was damaged and
5 94 Tension was found lying on the ground. The
peak portion of the tower was buckled.
One of the earthwire peaks was
damaged.

Tower at location No. 90 Tower at loc. No. 94

Tower at location No. 91

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Tower at loc. No. 92 Tower at loc. No. 93

b. As reported by MPPTCL, on the date of failure heavy thunderstorm

and high speed winds were observed in the area which caused the
failure of towers. The high speed winds also caused uprooting of
various trees and severe damage to structures located in the vicinity.
The same was also covered in the local newspaper and was confirmed
by the residents of the nearby villages.

c. MPPTCL representative informed that they had requested IMD to

provide the data of speed of wind observed at the location and at the
time of tower failure. IMD informed that they had Meteorological
observatory situated at Gwalior, M.P. However, the continuous record
of wind was not available with observatory and maximum wind data
could not be provided.

d. As reported by MPPTCL, to verify the mechanical strength and

chemical composition of failed tower members, material tests were
conducted at independent NABL accredited lab on samples collected
from failed towers. The reports of these tests were found to be within
limits as per relevant IS codes.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee observed that the transmission towers used in the line

were heavily rusted. Committee further noted that multiple towers
had failed in the region on 28.05.2021 and on 29.05.2021.

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed

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data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.
However, Committee observed that during the high wind speed event
occurred on the previous day, residual stresses might have developed
in the tower structures which led to failure of these towers in the
high wind speed event observed on 29.05.2021.

Committee advised that black (un-galvanized) towers should not be

used by the utilities in the erection of future transmission lines.
Committee observed that rusting of tower members severely
compromises the strength of these structures and advised that the
best practices in quality control process for raw material,
manufacturing, transportation, construction, storage, erection and
stringing of towers should be adopted by utilities. Committee also
advised that all transmission towers should be checked on topmost
priority after major wind event to remove distortions, if any, so as
to restore the original strength and avoid failures in subsequent
event of high intensity winds.

B.8 220 kV Amarkantak-Panagar/SGTPS Birsinghpur transmission line of

MPPTCL failed on 21.09.2021
[Towers at location No. 84 (A0) and 85 (NB0)]

 Brief Background

220 kV Amarkantak-Panagar/SGTPS Birsinghpur transmission line of

MPPTCL was commissioned in year 1996. Total length of the transmission
line is 230 km. The line traverses through plain terrain. The line was
designed and erected by MPPTCL. The towers were designed as per IS
802:1977 and for medium wind zone. As per latest wind map of India these
areas fall under Wind Zone 4. The line has vertical conductor
configuration with ACSR Zebra conductor and Porcelain insulators.

 Observations:

a. The failed towers were located in plain terrain near Village Pipariya,
Budhar Tehsil, Shahdol District, M.P. As reported by MPPTCL, a high
wind incident was observed on 29.05.2020, during which two
suspension type towers were damaged. The details of damaged towers
are as follows:

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SI. Loc. Tower

Extent of damage
No. No. Type

1. 84 suspension The tower was damaged from the

second panel level and collapsed in
transverse direction of the line. The
upper portion of the tower got
sheared and was lying on the
ground. All the stubs and chimneys
were intact. The members were
heavily rusted.
2. 85 suspension The tower was damaged from the
second panel level and collapsed in
transverse direction of the line. The
stubs and chimneys were intact. The
members were heavily rusted.
b. As reported by MPPTCL, on the date of failure high intensity storm
was observed in the area which caused the failure of towers. The high
speed winds also caused uprooting of various trees and severe damage
to structures located in the vicinity. The same was also covered in the
local newspaper and was confirmed by the residents of the nearby
villages.

Tower at location No. 84 Tower at location No. 85

c. MPPTCL representative informed that they had requested IMD to

provide the data of speed of wind observed at the location and at the
time of tower failure. IMD had informed that their wind observatory is

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not present at Shahdol Disrict, M.P and the record of wind velocity at
the time of incident is not available with them.

d. To verify the mechanical strength and chemical composition of failed

tower members, material tests at independent NABL accredited lab on
the samples collected from failed towers were conducted. The reports
of these tests were found to be within limits as per relevant IS codes.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee observed that the transmission towers used in the line

were heavily rusted and noted that rusting of tower members severely
compromises the strength of these structures. Committee also noted
that though the transmission line has been commissioned in year
1996, the transmission towers were designed considering old IS
802:1977 in which oblique wind & narrow front wind were not
considered. Committee observed that the high speed wind have
prevailed in the area on the failure date and caused the failure of
these towers.

Committee advised that as a precautionary measure, MPPTCL may

review the design of these towers with respect to latest code of IS
802:2015, Regulations and recommendations of the Standing
Committee and Task Force, as applicable, and whenever failure of
transmission towers occurs, the failed towers should be replaced by
towers designed as per latest IS codes.

B. UTTAR PRADESH POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION

LTD. (UPPTCL)

C.1 765 kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad (Agra) ckt-I Transmission line of UPPTCL

failed on 03.05.2020
[Towers at Location No.146 (A+0) & 147 (A+6)]

 Brief Background

765 kV D/C Lalitpur-Fatehabad (Agra) ckt-I Transmission Line of UPPTCL

was executed by M/s POWERGRID and was commissioned in October,
2016. This line traverse through plain terrain. Towers of this line were
designed for wind zone-4 with Quad Bersimis ACSR conductor in
Horizontal configuration.

 Observations:

a. It was informed by representative of UPPTCL that on 03.05.2020 a high

speed localized thunderstorm was observed and following suspension
type towers were affected during the storm:

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Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Extent of Damage

No.

1 146 A+0 Peak Damaged

2 147 A+6 Collapsed

b. Tower at Location No. 146 (A+0) was reported to be in erect condition.

One of the peaks of this tower supporting OPGW link was damaged.

Tower at Loc. No.146 (A+0)

c. Tower at Location No. 147 (A+6) was located in plain field with few
trees in vicinity. The tower was collapsed in the transverse direction to
the transmission line from 1st panel level. All the four stubs of the tower
along with foundation were reported to be intact.

Tower at Loc. No.147 (A+6)

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d. UPPTCL officials informed that high speed localized thunderstorm

condition with exceptionally high wind velocity was observed in the
vicinity of failed transmission towers on 03.05.2020. Further, the
towers are located in valley portion having small hills at both sides.
Due to these conditions the wind load acting on the towers was
increased which ultimately caused failure of tower at location No. 147
(A+6). The peak at location No. 146 was damaged due to pulling
load/jerk of earthwire/OPGW developed due to failure of tower at
location No. 147.

e. UPPTCL representative informed that IIT Kanpur had been requested

to examine the root cause of failure of towers of the line and IIT Kanpur,
in its preliminary analysis had highlighted that twenty two (22)
members of A type tower and sixteen (16) members of D type tower
have slenderness ratio greater than unity and had recommended
strengthening of these towers. However, the final report is still awaited.

f. POWERGRID officials informed that the POWERGRID in its 765 kV

Delhi-Meerut transmission line have used towers of same design and
as such no incidences of tower failure have been observed in the same.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the towers were located in valley portion

having small hills at both sides and due to the tunnelling effect, the
intensity of wind might have increased. The high intensity wind was
observed in the area on 03.05.2020 which had led to failure of the
tower at location No. 147 and subsequently due to cascading effect,
damage of earthwire peak at location No. 146.

Committee further deliberated influence of topography of the

location on the wind loads acting on the transmission towers.
Representative from CPRI highlighted that topographical factor [of
upto 30%] is included in the IEC 60826 for transmission lines located
in mountains/complex topographical areas, however, at present the
same is not considered in the design of transmission towers as per
IS codes and this issue will be taken up in the next meeting of BIS.

Committee noted that UPPTCL had approached IIT Kanpur for design
review of the towers and IIT Kanpur, in its preliminary analysis had
highlighted that twenty two (22) members of A type tower and sixteen
(16) members of D type tower have slenderness ratio greater than
unity and had recommended strengthening of these towers. However,
the final report is still awaited. Committee advised UPPTCL to take
necessary precautionary actions based on the final report of IIT
Kanpur to avoid similar failures in the line. UPPTCL was also
advised to share the report with the Committee.

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C.2 765 kV Lalitpur-Fatehabad (ckt-II) Transmission line of UPPTCL failed
on 03.05.2020 & 28.05.2020
[Towers at Location No. 161 (A+6), 162 (A+6), 163 (A+0) & 164 (D+3) failed
on 03.05.2020 and Towers at location No. 179 (A+3), 180 (A+3), 181 (A+9),
182 (B+6) failed on 28.05.2020]

 Brief Background

765 kV D/C Lalitpur-Fatehabad (Agra) ckt-II Transmission Line of

UPPTCL was executed by M/s POWERGRID and was commissioned in
April, 2017. This line traverse through plain terrain. Towers of this line
were designed for wind zone-4 with Quad Bersimis ACSR conductor in
Horizontal configuration. It is highlighted that ckt-I of 765 kV Lalitpur-
Fatehabad Transmission line of UPPTCL had also failed on 03.05.2020.

 Observations:

a. The details of tower spotting in the affected sections is as follows:

Sr. No. Loc. No. Tower Extent of Damage

Type

Failed on 03.05.2020

1 161 A+6 Collapsed

2 162 A+6 Collapsed

3 163 A+0 Collapsed

4 164 D+3 Collapsed

Failed on 28.05.2020

1 179 A+3 One Earthwire peak damaged

2 180 A+3 Cross arm damaged

3 181 A+9 Collapsed

4 182 B+6 K Portion of tower Collapsed

b. UPPTCL officials informed that high speed localized thunderstorm

condition was observed in the affected area on 03.05.2020 in which
four (4) towers of the line at location No. 161 to 164, were collapsed.

c. Towers at Location No. 161 (A+6) & 162 (A+6) were located in hilly
field with few trees in vicinity. The towers were collapsed from basic
body level above the +6 m body extension portion in the direction of
transmission line. All the four stubs of the towers along with

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foundations were reported intact.

Tower at Loc. No.161 (A+6) Tower at Loc. No.162 (A+6)

d. Tower at Location No. 163 (A+0) was collapsed completely from the
first panel, in the transverse direction perpendicular to the
transmission line. All the four stubs of the tower were reported to be
damaged.

Tower at Loc. No.163 (A+0)

e. Tower at Location No. 164 (D+3) was collapsed in the transverse

direction. One out of four stubs of the tower was reported to be
damaged.

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Tower at Loc. No.164 (D+3)

f. UPPTCL representative informed that the restoration work of the failed

towers was under execution and subsequently on 28.05.2020, in
another high wind speed condition developed in the area and failure of
four (4) towers at location No.179 to 182 were observed. The towers of
the affected sections were located in valley portion having small hills at
both sides.

g. Towers at Location No. 179 (A+3) & 180 (A+3) were in erect
condition. The Earth Wire peak of the tower at Location No. 179 (A+3)
& the Cross Arm of the tower at Location No. 180 (A+3) was damaged.
The remaining tower structures and all the four stubs along with
foundation of the tower were intact in both the towers. UPPTCL
representative informed that these were secondary failures occurred
due to pulling force/ jerk of conductor/ Earthwire developed due to
failure of nearby tower at location No. 181.

Tower at Loc. No.179 (A+3) Tower at Loc. No.180 (A+3)

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h. Tower at Location No. 181 (A+9) was collapsed form the first cross
arm bracing level in the transverse direction to the transmission line.
All the four stubs along with foundation of the tower were found
reported to be intact.

Tower at Loc. No.181 (A+9)

i. Tower at Location No. 182 (B+6) was in erect condition. The tower
portion above waist level i.e. K portion of the tower was damaged. All
the four stubs along with foundation of the tower were intact. UPPTCL
representative informed that this was the secondary failure occurred
due to pulling force/ jerk of conductor developed due to failure of
nearby tower at location No. 181.

Tower at Loc. No.182 (B+6)

j. UPPTCL representative informed that IIT Kanpur had been requested

to examine the root cause of failure of towers of the line and IIT Kanpur,
in its preliminary analysis had highlighted that twenty two (22)

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members of A type tower and sixteen (16) members of D type tower
have slenderness ratio greater than unity and had recommended
strengthening of these towers. However, the final report is still awaited.

k. UPPTCL representative highlighted that the on the date of 28.05.2020,

the failure of transmission lines of MPPTCL had also occurred. The
subject transmission towers are located in the nearby area to MPPTCL
transmission line and high velocity incident have been observed in the
complete area. The towers are located in passage like terrain having
small hills at both sides and the failure have been observed in this
passage area. Both side hilly terrain and Valley portion causes
tunneling effect

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the towers were located in valley portion

having small hills at both sides and due to the tunnelling effect, the
intensity of wind might have increased. The committee noted that
the high intensity wind was observed in the area on 03.05.2020
which had led to failure of the towers. Committee also noted that
there were multiple incidents of tower failure in the transmission
lines traversing in the same region of M.P on the date of failure of
this transmission line, i.e., on 28.05.2020 which indicates a high
speed wind was observed in the area. Committee observed that the
tower at location No. 181 (A+9) had collapsed in this high speed wind
and led to secondary failure of nearby towers.

Committee noted that UPPTCL had approached IIT Kanpur for design
review of the towers and IIT Kanpur, in its preliminary analysis had
highlighted that twenty two (22) members of ‘A’ type tower and
sixteen (16) members of ‘D’ type tower have slenderness ratio greater
than unity and had recommended strengthening of these towers.
However, the final report is still awaited. Committee advised UPPTCL
to take necessary precautionary actions based on the final report of
IIT Kanpur to avoid similar failures in the line.

C. RAJASTHAN RAJYA VIDYUT PRASARAN NIGAM LTD. (RVPN)

D.1 765 kV S/C Anta-Phagi (ckt-II) transmission line of Rajasthan Rajya

Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd.,(RVPN) failed on 04.06.2020
[Towers at location No. 355 (61/0 (TTC+3)) & 394 (72/1 (TTA+3))]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Anta-Phagi (ckt-II) Transmission line of RVPN was designed

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by M/s PGCIL and was executed by M/s L&T. The line was commissioned
in 2014. The line was initially charged at 400 kV voltage level on
04.01.2014 and subsequently at 765 kV voltage level on 08.01.2015. The
line traverse through plain terrain and Delta configuration towers
designed by M/s PGCIL. These towers were designed as per IS: 802:1995
for wind zone-4 with Quad ACSR Bersimis Conductor and porcelain
insulators. The line had earlier failed in March, 2015 in which seven (7)
towers (six suspension and one tension type) at location No. 18/0 to 18/6
were collapsed.

 Observations:

a. Representative from RVPN informed that a high wind storm was

observed in the area on 04.06.2020 during which two towers at
separate sections/ locations of the line were observed damaged/
collapsed. However, no information regarding the wind speed observed
during the incident is available with RVPN.

b. Tower at location No. 394 (72/1(TTA+3)) was located in the plain

field with few trees in the vicinity. The tower was completely collapsed
to the ground. Two No. of stubs were reported to be damaged and two
No. stubs were buckled.

Tower at location No. 394 (72/1(TTA+3))

c. Tower at location No. 355 (61/0(TTC+3)) was located in the plain

field with few trees in the vicinity. The tower was in erect condition. The
members of the tower in the delta portion were bent & buckled inwards.
The lower portion of the tower & the stubs/foundations were intact. All
four conductors of Y-phase with tension strings, extension links and
connecting plates with two members detached from tower main body
and fell down towards location No. 356. Due to this detachment, top
portion of tower bent in opposite direction towards location No. 354).

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Tower at location No. 355 (61/0(TTC+3))

d. RVPNL representative informed that some of the erection deficiencies

like unplugged holes, loose nuts & bolts etc. were observed in the
affected tower locations. Further, the material tests were conducted on
the samples collected from failed tower locations and the reports were
observed to within limits.

e. Representative from RVPN informed that the previous failure of

incidence of failure of seven (7) towers of this line was discussed in the
earlier meeting of the Standing Committee. Standing Committee of
Experts had recommended for strengthening of suspension type delta
configuration towers of this line in similar way as suggested for 765 kV
Gaya-Fatehpur transmission line of POWERGRID. However, the
strengthening was not executed by RVPN and after the recurrence of
failure incident in the line, RVPN had consulted POWERGRID and had
adopted the same procedure as currently adopted by POWERGRID for
strengthening of delta configuration towers and at present, the
strengthening process is under bidding stage.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that in the incident one tension and one suspension
type tower of two different sections had failed. The Committee noted
that the transmission line has been erected with Delta configuration
towers designed by POWERGRID similar to that of 765 kV Gaya-
Fatehpur S/C transmission line (Wind Zone-4) and it has been
suggested to RVPNL in the previous meeting of Standing Committee
to carry out strengthening of these towers. However, the
strengthening has not been completed by RVPN.

Committee also noted that at some locations deficiencies like,

unplugged holes, loose nut& bolts, etc. were observed in the failed
towers. Due to the above, it was observed that the towers were

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structurally weak and the occurrence of high speed wind incident
led to failure of the towers.

Committee suggested RVPN to strengthen their towers as suggested

in the previous meeting of Standing Committee. Committee also
suggested RVPNL to plan and conduct a Structural quality Audit of
towers of this line at random basis.

D. KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LTD.

(KPTCL)

E.1 220 kV D/C Bagalkot-Vajjramatti Transmission line failed on

09.08.2019.
[Tower at Location No. 319 (DB+6)]

 Brief Background

220 kV D/C Bagalkot Vajjramatti transmission line of KPTCL was erected

by KPTCL and was commissioned in year 2001. The towers were designed
with vertical configuration having ACSR Drake Conductor and Porcelain
Disc insulator strings. As reported by KPTCL, this was the first incidence
of failure in the transmission line.

 Observations

a. As reported by KPTCL representative, due to heavy rains observed in

the area, flash flood was observed in the Ghataprabha River on 8th &
9th August 2019. The length of the 220 kV Bagalkot-Vajjramatti
transmission line which was damaged in the incident was 2.5 km.

b. Due to increase water level in the vicinity, the foundations of towers at

location No. 318 to 326, located near Bhantanur and Machakanur
villages were submerged in water. Subsequently, the tower at location
No. 319 (DB+6), which was the river crossing tower, collapsed and top
portion of nearby tower was damaged.

c. The conductor of the transmission line was snapped at multiple places

and some portion of the conductor was flooded away in the forced water
flow in the flash floods leading to damage of insulators and hardware
fittings of the transmission line.

d. KPTCL representative informed that normal type foundations were

considered at the failed tower location. These foundations were
observed to be intact however, the stubs were bent from base level
leading to collapse of the tower.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the failed tower was erected using normal type
foundations. However, the foundation of the tower was reported to be

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intact. Committee observed that the failure of tower at location No.
319 (DB+6) was due to increased flow of water caused by the flash
floods in the Ghataprabha river. The damage to the upper portion of
the nearby tower was secondary failure caused due to pull of
conductor towards collapsed tower at loc. No. 319/0 (DB+6)

Committee recommended that routing of transmission lines few

kilometres away from the river bank/ anticipated future river course,
use of pile foundation/additional piles etc. should be adopted by
utilities especially for the river crossing tower locations. Committee
also recommended that Pile type foundation may be considered for
all towers in flood prone area based on soil investigation report and
latest high flood data, to avoid this type of failure. Providing proper
Protection (retaining wall, Gabion wall etc.), proper revetment and
use of geo-synthetic material in foundation, concrete encasing &
painting of stub in water logging areas etc may also be considered,
wherever required.

E.2 220 kV D/C Shahapur/Shahabad to Kapnoor transmission line of

KPTCL failed on 17.04.2020.
[Towers at Location Nos. 389(DB+18), 390(DB+15) & 391 (DA+3)]

 Brief Background

220 kV D/C Shahapur/Shahabad to Kapnoor transmission line of KPTCL

was designed by M/s L&T and was executed and commissioned by M/s
Deepak Cable (India) Limited in year 2003. The length of 220 kV Shahapur
to Kapnoor transmission line is 101.94 km and that of 220kV Shahbad-
Kapnoor line is 52.6 km. The towers used in this line were designed for
medium wind zone as per IS 802-1977 with vertical configuration having
ACSR Drake Conductor. The towers were designed for Reliability level 1.
Porcelain Disc insulator string was used in the line. As reported by KPTCL,
the transmission line had earlier failed on 21.05.2010 in which four (4)
towers at Location Nos. 522 to 526 were failed. Further, the line had also
failed on 10.04.2012 in which two towers (location Nos. 404 & 405) were
affected.

 Observations

a. KPTCL representative informed that on the date of failure

i.e.17.04.2020, rainy and stormy weather with whirl wind were
observed in the area in which the failed towers are located and during
the above mentioned high wind conditions following towers were
affected:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Extent of Damage

No.
1 388 DC+15 Intact

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2 389 DB+18 Leg Members and
Bracings Buckled
155
3 390 DC+15 Collapsed
340
4 391 DA+3 Peak members buckled.

b. Tower at location No. 390 (DC+15) was collapsed from the stub level.
All the foundations were reported to be intact. The conductors of the
line were intact and the upper portion of the collapsed tower was
hanging in tilted position by the conductors.

Tower at location No. 390 (DC+15)

c. Tower at location No. 389 (DB+18) & 391 (DA+3) were in erect
condition. The leg members and bracing members of the tower at
location No. 389 were buckled. At location No. 391, the peak members
were buckled. There was no damage to the foundations of these towers.
These were reported as secondary failures caused due to pulling
forces/ jerk of conductors/earthwires.

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Tower at location No. 389 (DB+18)

d. Representative from KPTCL highlighted that the towers of this line were
designed as per old IS code (IS 802:1977) in which only transverse load
(wind at 0 degree) was considered for calculation of wind load on
conductor, insulator, ground wire and tower body and these towers
were vulnerable to high wind as oblique wind was not considered.

e. KPTCL representative informed that the wind speed data on the date of
failure was gathered from the nearby observatory located at about 15
km from the tower location. However, the measurements of
instantaneous wind speed were not recorded at the observatory and
the wind speed was recorded in an interval of every 15 minutes and
hence the wind data could not be used to deduce the wind speed at the

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tower site. Further, the data recorded by observatory indicates a slight
increase in the speed of wind at the time of failure, however the
recorded wind speed value at this site was very low. This may be due
to the localized nature of the windstorm which affected the tower site.
The localized windstorm had also caused extensive damages to nearby
trees.

f. KPTCL representative informed that the investigation of failure was

also done by technical committee of KPTCL and the committee had
observed that the Span length between location Nos. 389 (DB+18) to
390 (DB+15) was 155 m and between location Nos. 390 (DB+15) to 391
(DA+3) was 340 m. In case of towers with higher body extensions such
as +15 m, +18 m & +24 m, the wind load is the major governing factor
under normal condition. Hence in order to compensate for the higher
wind pressure, the wind spans are generally reduced such that the
total wind load (wind on conductor, insulator string) on the tower
remains same as original design. As long as the wind is within
permissible limits, the tower sustains the load. In the instant case, the
wind span is on the higher side and hence more wind loads have acted
on the tower No. 390. Heavy whirl wind which passed through this
stretch acted on the tower which could not resist the heavy wind.

g. KPTCL representative informed that the transmission line has been

restored and the failed “DB+15” tower was replaced by 220 kV “DD+15”
at location No. 390.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that this was the third incident of failure of tower
observed in the transmission line. It was further noted that even
though the transmission line was commissioned in year 2003, the
line was designed as per old IS 802:1977 instead of IS 802:1995.

Committee observed that as the failed tower at location No. 390 was
spotted with a zero degree deviation angle, there was sufficient
safety margin available for B type tower even with considered span
of 390 m.

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. KPTCL had gathered the wind
speed data from nearby wind observatory located at around 15 km
from the tower failure site, however, the measurements of
instantaneous winds are not available. In absence of required wind
speed data, it is not possible to conclude that wind speed might have
exceeded the design wind speed.

Committee noted that the towers were designed as per old IS codes,
the narrow front wind factor and oblique wind load on tower
structure would not have been considered in the design of towers
and advised KPTCL to review the design of towers with respect to
latest codes.

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Committee recommended that practices of using old designs of
towers even after revision of IS codes should not be adopted by the
utilities and all transmission towers should be checked on topmost
priority after major wind event to remove fatigue and distortions, if
any, so as to restore the original strength and avoid failures in
subsequent event of high intensity winds.

E. STERLITE POWER

F.1 765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool-Dhule transmission line of M/s Sterlite

Power failed on 16.04.2019
[Towers at location No. 3/0 (DD+30+RC3), 3/1 (DC+9), 3/2(DA), 3/3(DA),
4/0(DD+30), 5/0 (DD+30), 6/0 (DD+30), 7/0 (DD+18) & 7/1]

 Brief Background

The 765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool-Dhule transmission line of M/s Sterlite

was under construction/erection at the time of failure incident. The
transmission towers of the line were designed by M/s Sterlite and the
erection of the line was being executed by M/s KEC. The towers of the line
were designed for wind zone 4 with vertical configuration. Hexa AAAC
Zebra conductor per phase and Polymer type insulators were used in the
line.

 Observations

a. The transmission line was under construction/ erection at the time of

failure of the towers. However, the stringing of the affected tower
section was completed.

b. As reported by the M/s Sterlite representative, the failed towers were

located in plain field in Toksar and Aali Village in Sanawad Tehsil of
Khargone District, Madhya Pradesh. The details of damaged towers is
as follows:

Observations/Extent of damage
SI. Loc. Tower
No. No. Type

 Tower was erected with raised chimney

of +3 m.
 The tower collapsed completely to the
DD+30+ ground in transverse direction to the
1 3/0
RC 3 line, towards left when observed
watching towards Dhule substation.
 The stubs were bent at the chimney
level.
2 3/1 DC+9  Tower was in erect condition.

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 Both of the top cross arms of the tower
were damaged and tower structure
above top cross arms was buckled.
 Stubs along with foundation & chimney
were intact.
 Both the towers were of suspension
Suspensi type. The towers were in erect condition.
3 3/2  The earthwire peaks of the towers were
on type
damaged.
 The insulators were under tension due
to the load of conductors.
Suspensi  All the four stubs of the tower along
4 3/3 with foundation and chimney were
on type
intact.

5 4/0 DD+30  The towers collapsed completely to the

ground in transverse direction to the
6 5/0 DD+30 line, towards right when observed
watching towards Dhule substation.
7 6/0 DD+30  The Stubs were observed to be bent at
the chimney level.
 All the hardware fittings were observed
8 7/0 DD+18
to be completely damaged.
 Tower was in erect condition.
 The cross arms tower were observed to
Suspensi
9 7/1 be damaged.
on type
 Stubs along with foundation & chimney
were intact.

Tower at location No. 3/0 (DD+30+RC 3)

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Tower at location No. 3/1 (DC+9)

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c. The affected section of the 765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool-Dhule
transmission line was crossing over the 400 kV D/C Khandwa-Indore
I & II transmission line of POWERGRID and 400 kV Malwa-Pithampur
line (ckt-1 & 2) and 220 kV Omkareshwar Barwaha tap to Nimrani
transmission lines of MPPTCL. Due to collapse of the transmission
towers of 765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool-Dhule line, the conductor fell and
impacted the underlying transmission lines of POWERGRID and
MPPTCL.

d. Representative from Sterlite informed that on 16.04.2019, a heavy

thunderstorm like weather conditions prevailed in the vicinity of
transmission lines. Strong winds and heavy rainfall were observed
during the thunderstorm which led to collapse of the towers. The high
wind incident was also covered by the local newspapers.

e. Sterlite representative also highlighted that four of the failed towers of

765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool-Dhule transmission line had collapsed
towards right side of the center line of transmission line and one had
failed towards its left indicating that a circular rotation of the
movement of wind was observed in the area at the time of tower failure
incident and as most of the failed towers were provided with body
extensions, the effect of this rotating wind would have been higher on
these towers which led to their collapse.

i. Sterlite representative informed that to ascertain the quality of material

used in the transmission line, samples from the affected tower locations
were sent for testing at independent NABL accredited lab and these test
reports were generally found to be within limits.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee observed that the 765 kV voltage level D type towers of

M/s Sterlite, which are generally considered inherently strong towers
as are designed with reliability level 2 and are used as anti-
cascading towers, had failed in the wind event however, no damage
has been observed in the lines of POWERGRID & MPPTCL which were
also in the vicinity of the 765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool- Dhule
transmission line.

Committee noted that failure of towers of this line of M/s Sterlite

power led to cascading failure of 400 kV Khandwa-Indore
transmission line of POWERGRID and 400 kV Malwa(TPH)-Pithampur
and 220 kV Omkareshwar-Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission
lines of MPPTCL, which were passing below the 765 kV D/C Khandwa
pool-Dhule transmission line.

Committee observed that as the failed towers had collapsed on both

the sides of the transmission line indicates that a circular rotation
of the movement of wind was observed in the area at the time of tower
failure incident. However, wind speed data received from any

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authenticated observatory indicating speed of wind prevailing at the
failure location at the time of the failure is not provided by the
transmission utility.

Committee concluded that in the absence of wind speed data from

authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude that wind
speed might have exceeded the design wind speed. Further, D type
towers are considered inherently strong and should not have failed
in the high speed wind event and advised M/s Sterlite to ensure that
best practices in construction, erection and stringing of towers
should is adopted. Committee also advised that material tests should
be conducted on the failed tower members as well as on the Nut &
Bolts to ensure the chemical & mechanical properties.

F.2 765 kV S/C Jabalpur–Bina transmission line of M/s Sterlite Power failed
on 07.06.2019
[Towers at location No. 17/8 (SA+0), 17/9 (SA+3), 17/10 (SA+3), 17/11
(SA+0), 17/12 (SA+9) & 18/0 (SD+0)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C Jabalpur-Bina transmission line of M/s Sterlite Power was

commissioned in June 2015. Total length of the transmission line is
235.19 km. The line was designed by M/s Sterlite Power and was executed
by M/s C&C Constructions Limited. The line traverse through plain
terrain and towers were designed for wind zone-2 as per IS 802:1995 with
Quad Bersimis conductor in vertical configuration. Long Rod Polymer type
Double-I suspension insulator strings were used in the line with
suspension towers.
 Observations

a. Sterlite representative informed that the affected towers were located

in plain terrain with few towers in the vicinity. Details of towers is
given below:

Sr. Loc. No. Tower Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of

No. (m) damage
1 17/7 A+3 Intact
420.88
2 17/8 A+0 Partially
damaged
413.75
3 17/9 A+3 Collapsed
416.57
4 17/10 A+3 Collapsed

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424.28
5 17/11 A+0 Collapsed
415.62
6 17/12 A+9 Collapsed

403.92
7 18/0 D+0 45 ֯55’ 55” Partially
RT damaged

b. The towers at location No. 17/9 to 17/12 were all suspension towers
and were completely collapsed to the ground in perpendicular
direction to the line. The tower at location No. 17/8 (A+0) was in erect
condition and was partially damaged.

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c. The cascading impact was controlled by the consecutive angle type
tower. However, the top portion of the angle type tower above the top
cross arm got damaged.

Tower at location No. 18/0 (SD+0)

d. Sterlite representative highlighted that all the failed towers were of

suspension type. Some of the towers failed in the direction
perpendicular to the direction of line and subsequently, nearby
suspension towers were damaged/collapsed as cascading failure due
to pulling force of conductors/earthwires.

e. It was reported by Sterlite representative that no missing members/

missing nuts and bolts were observed in the affected towers. Further,
the material tests were conducted on the tower members and
nuts/bolts and the reports were found to be satisfactory.

f. As reported by Sterlite Power, discussion with the local people in the

nearby villages revealed that high wind condition prevailed for some
time in the area and tower had collapsed during high wind conditions.
The high wind incident was also covered by the local newspapers.

 Probable Cause of Failure

Committee observed that a high intensity wind was observed in the

area which had led to collapse of the one of the tower in the
transverse direction which subsequently led to failure of nearby
suspension towers due to the cascading effect. The effect of the pull
force/jerk developed due to the conductors got reduced along the
distance and the cascading failure was stopped by the next tension
tower spotted in the line.

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Committee emphasized that after every failure the concerned utility
needs to submit the actual wind velocity prevailed in the affected
area so that the investigating team of standing committee could get
reference wind speed prevailed over that area. Committee concluded
that in the absence of wind speed data from authenticated
observatory, it is not possible to conclude that wind speed might have
exceeded the design wind speed.

Further, the failed towers were located in the open field areas with
very few trees/vegetation around the towers, however, these were
designed considering Terrain Category-II. Committee highlighted
that Utilities should pay utmost care in adopting the design
parameters as per the terrain category faced along the route of
transmission lines and adopt requisite measures, such as reduction
of span length, accordingly.

Committee concluded that the high wind velocity might have

prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line in the transverse
direction leading to failure of towers. However, wind speed data
received from any authenticated observatory indicating speed of
wind prevailing at the failure location at the time of the failure is
not provided by the transmission utility. In absence of wind speed
data from authenticated observatory, it is not possible to conclude
that wind speed might have exceeded the design wind speed.

Committee advised that best practices in quality control process for

raw material, manufacturing, transportation, construction, storage,
erection and stringing of towers should be adopted by utilities.
Committee also advised that material tests should be conducted on
the failed tower members as well as on the Nut & Bolts to ensure the
chemical and mechanical properties.

F. DARBHANGA-MOTIHARI TRANSMISISON COMPANY LTD.

(DMTCL)

400 kV D/C Motihari-Gorakhpur Transmission line failed on

15.08.2019 and 25.09.2019, and
[Towers at Location No.26/5 (DA+0) & 27/0 (DD+0)]

400 kV D/C Barh-Motihari Transmission line failed on 04.09.2019 and

07.10.2019
[Tower at Location No.25/5 (DA+3) & 26/0 (DD+0)]

 Brief Background

400 kV D/C Barh-Motihari and 400 kV D/C Motihari-Gorakhpur

transmission lines of M/s Darbhanga Motihari Transmission Company
Limited (DMTCL) were designed and executed by M/s Jyoti Structures.

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Both of the transmission lines were commissioned in August 2017. The
affected towers of these lines were part of the Line-in-Line-Out (LILO) of
400 kV Barh-Gorakhpur transmission at Motihari Substation. The total
length of 400 kV Barh-Motihari transmission line is 37.5 km and that of
400 kV D/C Motihari-Gorakhpur transmission line is 38 km. The
transmission lines passes through plain terrain and the towers of both of
these lines were designed for wind zone 4 as per IS 802:1995 with Quad
AAAC Moose conductor in vertical configuration.

It was reported that, one of the legs of the tower at location No. 26/1 of
400 kV D/C Barh-Motihari transmission line, which is part of the LILO
section, was washed away due to sudden release of water from
Valmikinagar barrage on 13.08.2017 and impact of hitting of rock to the
pile foundation of the tower in the year 2017.

 Observations:

a. Two towers of each of the 400 kV D/C Barh-Motihari and 400 kV D/C
Motihari-Gorakhpur transmission lines, which were part of the Line-
in-Line-Out (LILO) of 400 kV Barh-Gorakhpur transmission line at
Motihari Substation, were reported to be damaged and washed away
due to change in the course of river Gandak. All the four towers were
located in close proximity to each other on the Gopalganj side of the
river bank.

b. As reported by DMTCL, both of the transmission lines were affected

due to change in the course of river Gandak. The details of failure of
the towers, in chronological order, is produced below:

Date Tower Tower Details of Consideration taken

of Location Type Failure in Foundation design
Failur
e

15.08. 27/0 of 400 DD+0 Foundation was The foundation of the

2019 kV D/C washed away by tower was Open cast type
Motihari- flowing water of foundation, designed for
Gorakhpur river Gandak. fully submerged
transmission condition. As per M/s
line Tower was DMTCL officials, Three
collapsed. (3) numbers of pile (500
mm dia, 2.0 m long) were
additionally provided
under each leg of
location No. 27/0 during
construction.

04.09. 26/0 of 400 DD+0 Foundation was The foundation was

2019 kV D/C Barh- washed away by Open cast type
Motihari flowing water of foundation, designed for
river Gandak. fully submerged

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transmission Tower was condition. Three (3)
line collapsed. numbers of pile (500 mm
dia, 2.0 m long) were
additionally provided
under each leg of
location No. 26/0 during
execution as an
additional protection
measure

25.09. 26/5 of 400 DA+0 Foundation was The foundation was

2019 kV D/C washed away by Open cast type.
Motihari- flowing water of
Gorakhpur river Gandak.
transmission
line Tower was
collapsed.

07.10. 25/5 of 400 DA+3 Foundation was The foundation was

2019 kV D/C Barh- washed away by Open cast type.
Motihari flowing water of
transmission river Gandak.
line
Tower was
collapsed.

c. Details of tower spotting of the relevant portions of the line are

produced below. All of these towers were located in between a 9 km
bund that was set up to protect the villages in case the region is
impacted by floods:

 400 kV D/C Barh–Motihari Transmission Line (Line in)

Sl. Locat Type Forwa Angle of Foundation Type

No. ion of rd Deviation
No. Tower Span
(m)
71 25/0 DC+0 387 3°02'18"R Open cast
72 25/1 DA+0 414 Open cast
73 25/2 DA+0 Open cast
402
74 25/3 DA+0 395 Open cast
75 25/4 DA+0 425 Open cast
76 25/5 DA+3 424 Open cast foundation
Open cast foundation
77 26/0 DD+0 20°40'39"L designed for fully
314 submerged condition

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78 26/1 DC+9 525 Pile foundation
79 26/2 DC+9 291 Pile foundation
Open cast designed for
80 26/3 DC+0 359 fully submerged
condition

 400 kV D/C Motihari-Gorakhpur Transmission Line (Line Out)

Sl. Loc. Type Forwar Angle of Foundation Type

No. No. of d Span Dev.
Tower (m)
73 26/0 DC+0 390 2°30'20"R Open cast
74 26/1 DA+0 420 - Open cast
75 26/2 DA+3 430 - Open cast

76 26/3 DA+3 400 - Open cast

77 26/4 DA+0 380 - Open cast
78 26/5 DA+0 387 - Open cast foundation
Open cast foundation
79 27/0 DD+0 304 22°38'40"L designed for fully
submerged condition
80 27/1 DC+9 523 - Pile foundation
81 27/2 DC+9 303 - Pile foundation
- Open cast designed for
82 27/3 DC+0 365 fully submerged
condition

d. The team which visited the failure site and interacted with local
villagers and gathered the following regarding the change in course of
River Gandak in the past:

 The river was flowing as a stream near village Sareya (towards left
bank of the river) around 25-30 years ago.

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 Later the river was understood to be flowing as a stream between
village Rupan Chhap and Semaria (approximately 5 to 6 km away
from pile locations towards right bank of the river).
 In the year 2012-13, in order to ensure that the river flows away
from the villages referred above, the flood control department of
Bihar Government widened a small passage between Rupan Chhap
and Sareya and since then the river has been flowing through this
passage.

e. In the floods that ravaged the region in 2017, the pile foundations at
location No. 26/1 (of Barh-Motihari line-one pile leg got washed away)
and location No. 27/1 (of Motohari-Gorakhpur line - one pile leg got
settled and pile cap got tilted) were affected. As informed by DMTCL
representative, a new pile foundation, with 40 meter depth, for tower
at location No. 26/1 (Barh-Motihari line) was constructed and line was
restored using this tower. A new pile foundation, with 40 m depth was
also planned for location No. 27/1 (Motihari-Gorakhpur line) and the
same was under construction at the time of failure. The team which
visited the tower failure site observed that the tower at location No.
27/1 (Motihari-Gorakhpur line) was still in tilted position and has not
been restored and the same is prone to failure. However, despite
flooding of the river banks and high water levels, this already tilted
tower was not affected further in 2019. DMTCL representative
informed that the tower has been shifted to new pile foundations in
March, 2020.

Tower Loc. 26/1 of Barh-Motihari

line restored on Pile foundation

f. As reported by DMTCL representative, at the time of planning &

erection of transmission lines, the towers at location nos. 26/1 and
26/2 (of Barh–Motihari 400 kV D/C line) and location nos. 27/1 and
27/2 (of Motihari–Gorakhpur 400 kV D/C line) were located in the
river and pile foundations were used for these locations. The towers at
locations next to these towers which have failed in 2019, were located
on the river bank and were designed as normal foundations on ground
as they were away from the river. As an additional measure they were
designed for fully submerged condition.

g. DMTCL representative informed that in the monsoon season of 2019,

due to heavy rains in the region and continuous change in discharge

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from Valmiki barrage located upstream of river, the Gandak River
changed its course and caused unprecedented floods in the Bihar
State. Due to change in course of river and continuous cutting of the
right bank of the river, a complete land mass up to the distance of 0.5
km from the original passage of river was washed away. The towers
located in this land mass were originally away from the river and were
not designed with pile foundation and due to change in course of river,
these towers had failed. DMTCL also submitted the copy of Press
release issued by IMD stating the high amount of rainfall received in
July to September 2019.

h. DMTCL representative informed that as a preventive measure, the

river banks near the tower locations were protected by DMTCL using
sand and Geo bags prior to the monsoon season to prevent soil erosion
or washing out of the banks. Also, after the first incident of tower
failure, as a precautionary measure to avoid failure of nearby towers,
DMTCL tried to save the towers by mounting a massive protection
effort using the experience of the Gandak Authorities and District
Administration in flood control measures. However, given the floods
and the water current, the protective measures could not prevent the
towers from getting washed away.

i. DMTCL was requested to share the Soil investigation reports used for
design and construction of the tower foundations. However, DMTCL
representative informed that they are not the original developers who
designed and developed the transmission line project and the line was
transferred to them by the original owner. The data regarding the soil
investigation report is not available with them.

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Tower Loc. 26/5(DA+0)

Submerged in River Water Tower Loc. 27/0(DD+0)
Submerged in River Water

Tower at Loc. No.26/5 (DA+0) Tower at Loc. No.27/0 (DD+0)

of Motihari-Gorakhpur Line

Tower at loc No. 26/0 of Barh-Motihari Line (after failure)

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j. DMTCL representative informed that to avoid the failure of
transmission line in future and to take extra precaution in respect of
change of course of river, in addition to the collapsed four towers, six
more towers had been shifted to the pile foundations as per the
recommendations of the team which visited the tower failure site.
Further, DMTCL had also increased the span within these towers from
earlier 450 m to 650 m, due to which the first towers with open cast
type foundations had moved further upto 2 km away from river on the
both bank sides.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee noted that the towers were designed and erected on

normal open cast foundation and pile type foundations were not
considered at these locations. A new water course was created due
to high floods & the foundation of towers could not withstand
against scouring effect/action of the river and transmission lines had
failed due to the change in the river course.

Committee highlighted that adoption of Pile type foundation should

be envisaged by the transmission utilities on the basis of river flow
data of previous years & previous changes in the course of river
observed in the region and, additional precautions like, routing of
transmission lines few kilometers away from the river bank/
anticipated future river course, Providing proper revetment & use of
geo-synthetic material in foundation, concrete encasing & painting
of stub in water logging areas, etc. should be adopted by utilities,
wherever required.

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 182
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
G. RAICHUR SHOLAPUR TRANSMISSION COMPANY PRIVATE
LIMITED (RSTCL)

H.1 765 kV S/C Raichur-Sholapur transmission line of M/s RSTCL failed

on 03.06.2019
[Towers at location No. 431 (A+3), 432 (A+3), 433 (A+0), 434 (A+0), 435
(A+3), 436 (A+0) & 437 (B+0)]

 Brief Background

765 kV S/C (Quad) Raichur-Sholapur transmission line was constructed

by M/s RSTCL and was commissioned in July 2014. The line connected
765/400 kV substation of POWERGRID located near Askihal Village,
Raichur District, Karnataka State with 765/400 kV substation of
POWERGRID located near Limbi Chincholi Village, Solapur District,
Maharashtra State. The length of the transmission line is 208.083 km.
Around 180 km of the line lies in Karnataka, while the balance line portion
is in Maharashtra. The transmission line towers were designed by M/s
Trucon Associates as per IS 802: 1995 considering wind zone 2. In addition,
additional loading of narrow front wind in horizontal directions of 00,450 &
900 was also considered in the design. The towers were designed in Vertical
delta configuration with Quad ACSR Bersimis conductor. Polymer type
insulator were used in the line and it was reported as the first incident of
failure in the transmission line.

 Observations:

a. As informed by RSTCL, whirl wind followed by thunderstorm was

observed in the vicinity of transmission line on 3rd June 2019. During
patrolling, RSTCL team observed that six (6) suspension towers and
one tension tower (B type) were collapsed/damaged. The details of
damaged/collapsed towers is as follows:

Sr. No. Loc. No. Tower Type Damage

1. 431 A+3 Towers fully

collapsed, foundation
2. 432 A+3 damaged
3. 433 A+0

4. 434 A+0 Tower collapsed from

mid portion

5. 435 A+3 Top cross arm

damaged
6. 436 A+0

7. 437 B+0

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 183
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

b. Towers at location No. 431(A+3), 432 (A+3) & 433 (A+0) were
collapsed in transverse direction to the line. The foundations of these
towers were observed to be damaged.

Tower at location No. 431 (A+3)

Tower at location No. 432 (A+3)

Tower at location No. 433 (A+0)

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 184
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
c. Tower at location No. 434 (A+0) was collapsed from mid portion of
the tower structure. The bottom cage portion of the tower was in erect
condition and the top portion of the tower structure got sheared away
from the lower tower body and was lying on the ground. The
foundations of the tower were reported to be intact.

Tower at location No. 434 (A+0)

d. Towers at location No. 435(A+3), 436 (A+0) & 437 (B+0) were in erect
position. The top cross arm of the tower at location No. 435 (A+3) was
sheared away and was lying near the tower structure. Whereas in case
of towers at location No. 436 (A+0) & 437 (B+0), the top cross arms
were twisted and resting on the tower structure. The lower portions of
the tower structures were observed to be intact.

Tower at location No. 435 (A+3) Cross arm Lying near tower

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 185
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

Tower at location No. 436 (A+0) Tower at location No. 437 (B+0)

e. RSTCL representative informed that collapsed towers were located at a

distance of 38 km from Solapur substation. On the date of tower failure
incident, RSTCL’s representative were not able to reach the tower
failure sites due to heavy rain, wind, and lightning prevalent at the site
location. The approach to failure site was further restricted due to black
cotton soil & water logging.

f. To check the chemical composition and mechanical strength of the

tower members, material tests were conducted at CPRI lab on samples
selected from site and yield and ultimate strength of these members
were found to be within limits. However, the one member (member 2)
had more carbon content than the prescribed limit, two members
(member 10 & 11) had silica content more than prescribed limit and
three members (members 6, 10 & 11) had Phosphorous content more
than prescribed limit. RSTCL representatives highlighted that these
tower members are satisfying the minimum yield strength criteria
required as per IS codes.

g. RSTCL representative informed that at the failed tower locations,

certain cracks in the top of the chimney of failed towers were observed.
However, no members were found missing from the tower structures.

h. RSTCL representative informed that to as per their Patrolling report,

there was no missing member or missing nuts and bolts observed in
the last patrolling executed by their team in the month of March 2019.

i. RSTCL submitted the analysis report of M/s Trucon Associates

regarding the design of these towers. The parameters considered in the
designing of these towers were examined and found to be in order.

j. RSTCL highlighted that no wind speed observatory was present near

the tower failure site and their attempts for gathering of the actual wind
speed data were unproductive. Subsequently, they had consulted M/s

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 186
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
Reconnect Energy Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Bengaluru, for the same which
provide the wind speed data by simulating the same environment in
their lab. On the basis of the report prepared by M/s Reconnect
Energy, RSTCL highlighted that the failure of towers was because of
the two factors deduced in the study namely, Nocturnal shear prevalent
over the tower failure site across the temporal window spanning from
23:30 hours IST 02/06/2019 to 23:30 hours IST 03/06/2019. And
also the thunderstorm and associated hazard called mesocyclone
observed around 17:40 hours IST 03/06/2019 adjacent to tower
collapse. RSTCL also highlighted that some sudden un-natural
updraft/downdrafts rapid movement of winds are the reason behind
the tower collapse.

 Committee Observations and Recommendations :

Committee discussed the failure pattern observed in the case and

noted that the chemical composition of some of the failed tower
members was not as per IS codes. Due to higher percentage of Carbon,
and Phosphorous observed in the samples, the material might have
become prone to brittle fracture.

Committee noted that speed of wind prevailing at the failure location

at the time of the failure could not be gathered from any
authenticated observatory by transmission utility. The high speed
wind event indicated in the report of the M/s Reconnect Energy is
based on the simulations. Committee further noted that due to the
improper chemical composition of the steel used in tower members,
the towers were prone to brittle fracture which failed during the high
wind incident observed in the area.

Committee suggested that Best practices in quality control process

for raw material, manufacturing, transportation, construction,
storage, erection and stringing of towers should be adopted.

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 187
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

ANNEXURE A

COMPOSITION
OF
STANDING COMMITTEE
OF
EXPERTS

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 188
 CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY

ANNEXURE B

Minutes of the Meeting

Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period April 2019 to December 2021 193
 File [Link]-PS-14-173/4/2018-PSETD Division-Part(1) 167
I/20918/2022

भारत सरकार
Government of India
विद्युत मंत्रालय
Ministry of Power
के न् द्री य वि द्यु त प्रा धि क र ण
Central Electricity Authority
विद्युत प्रणाली अभियांत्रिकी एवं प्रौद्योगिकी विकास प्रभाग
Power System Engineering & Technology Development Division
__________________________________________________________________________________

सेवा में,

As per attached list

विषय: Minutes of the Meeting of Standing Committee of Experts to investigate the

failure of various transmission lines failed during the period April, 2019 to
December 2021, held on 11.01.2022 & 12.01.2022-reg

महोदया/महोदय,

As you may be aware that an e-meeting of Standing Committee of Experts was held
on 11th and 12th January 2022 to investigate the causes of failure of various transmission
lines failed during the period April, 2019 to December 2021.

The minutes of the meeting are attached herewith for information and further necessary
action please.

संलग्न/ Encl. – ऊपरोक्त/ as above

भवदीय

(मोहित मुदगल )
उप निदेशक
 File [Link]-PS-14-173/4/2018-PSETD Division-Part(1) 168
I/20918/2022

Address List:

1. Director General,
Central Power Research Institute,
Mechanical Engineering Division, CPRI
Post Box No.8066, Prof. Sir C.V. Raman Road, Sadashivnagar,
Bangalore -560 080

2. Member Secretary,
NRPC,
Shaheed Jeet Singh Marg, Katwaria Sarai,
New Delhi-110 016
(Fax No.91-11-26865206)

3. Member Secretary,
ERPC,
Gold Club Road, ERPC Building, Tollygunge,
Kolkata-700033
(Fax No. 033-24171358)

4. Member Secretary,
WRPC,
F-3, MIDC Area, Andheri(East),
Mumbai-400093
(Fax No.022-28370193)

5. Member Secretary,
SRPC, CEA,
No.29, Race Course Road,
Bangalore-560009
(Fax:080-22352616)

6. Member Secretary,
North Eastern Regional Power Committee,
NERPC Complex, Dong Parmaw, Lapalang,
Shillong – 793006 (Meghalaya).
email: nerpc@[Link]

7. Director,
TCD, CEA,
Sewa Bhawan, R.K. Puram,
New Delhi

8. Head of the Department,

Civil Engg., Delhi Technological University,
Shahbad Daulatpur, Bawana Road,
Delhi-110 042
(Fax No.011-27852188)
 File [Link]-PS-14-173/4/2018-PSETD Division-Part(1) 169
I/20918/2022

9. Director,
Structural Engineering Research Centre,
CSIR Campus, Taramani, Post Box No.8287,
Chennai–600 113
(Fax No.044-22641734).

10. Director General,

India Meteorological Department,
Mausam Bhawan, Lodhi Road,
New Delhi- 110 003
(Ph.011-24616051)

11. Chairman & Managing Director,

POWERGRID,
Saudamini, Plot No.2, Sector 29, Near IFFCO Chowk,
Gurgaon – 122 001

12. Chief General Manager (Engg-TL),

POWERGRID,
Saudamini, Plot No.2, Sector 29, Near IFFCO Chowk,
Gurgaon – 122 001

13. Shri E.V. Rao,

KEC International Limited,
RPG House, 463, Dr. Annie Besant Road, Worli,
Mumbai-4000 030

14. Chairman
Sterlite Power
The Mira Corporate, Suit,
Plot No. 1&2, C Block, 2nd Floor,
Ishwar Nagar, Mathura Road,
New Delhi – 110065

15. Shri Kaushal Thakkar,

Manager,
Kalpataru Power Transmission Ltd.,
Plot No. 101, Part III, GIDC Estate, Sector 28,
Gandhinagar-382028, Gujarat

16. Shri P.G. Suresh Kumar,

Director,
L&T IDPL, Kudgi Transmission Ltd.,
1st Floor, TCTC Building, Mount Poonamallee Road, Manapakkam,
Chennai-600 089

17. Dr. Deepak Lakhpati,

Chief Design Officer,
Sterlite Power
 File [Link]-PS-14-173/4/2018-PSETD Division-Part(1) 170
I/20918/2022

F-1, Sterlite Power, The Mira Corporate Suits,1 & 2, Ishwar Nagar,
Mathura Road,
New Delhi-110 065
18. Mr. Bipin B. Shah,
Vice President–Transmission, Torrent Power Limited,
3rd Floor, Jubilee 2. House, Shahpur, Ahmedabad380001
19. Managing Director,
Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited No. 82, Shakti
Bhawan, Race Course Road, Bengaluru – 560001
20. Chairman & Managing Director,
Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Co. Ltd. Block No.2, Shakti
Bhawan, Rampur, Jabalpur (M.P.) – 482008.
21. Chief Engineer (EHT-M&I),
Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Co. Ltd., 3rd Floor, Block
No.2, Shakti Bhawan, Rampur, Jabalpur (M.P.) – 482008.
(0761-2702270, 2660757)
22. Chairman & Managing Director,
Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. Vidyut Bhawan,
Janpath, Jyoti Nagar,
Jaipur (Rajasthan) - 302005
23. Chairman & Managing Director,
Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. Shakti
Bhawan, 14-A, Ashok Marg,
Lucknow – 226001
24. Director,
Darbhanga – Motihari Transmission Co. Ltd. 6th Floor, Plot No. 19
& 20, Film City,
Sector 16 –A, Noida, Uttar Pradesh – 201301
25. Chairman & Managing Director,
Raichur Sholapur Transmission Company Private Limited, Plot No
6. Sy No. 20/A Above VKG TATA Show Room Gunj Area,
Hyderabad Road, YADGIR 585-201 Karnataka
Minutes of Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on Failure of
Transmission Line Towers held through Video Conferencing on 11.01.2022
& 12.01.2022 to Analyse failure of towers in EHV transmission Lines
during the period April, 2019 to December 2021.

The list of Participants is enclosed as Annex -II.

1. Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) & Chairman of the Standing Committee welcomed all the
participants and informed that during the period of April, 2019 to December 2021, failure
of 174 Nos. of transmission towers in 48 transmission lines of 220kV, 400 kV and 765
kV AC and ±800 kV HVDC voltage class has been reported to CEA. Out of these 174
Nos. of failed towers, 29 nos. of towers were of tension type while the rest were
suspension type (List of failed transmission lines is provided at Annex-I.). He stated that
the number of towers collapsed have gradually decreased in the past few years. He
requested all the utilities to intimate the tower failure incidents in a prompt manner so that
a visit of team to tower failure site can be planned. He further requested utilities to
provide all the relevant details/documents including images, duly filled CEA proforma,
wind speed data, coordinates of failed towers, material test reports, etc., so that a proper
investigation of cause of failure may be carried out. He requested Indian Meteorological
Department (IMD) to provide the wind speed data of the tower failure location(s) so that
detailed analysis of the failure of the transmission tower with respect to wind as a cause
of failure can be carried out. He further requested Director (PSE&TD) to take up the
agenda of the meeting.

2. Director (PSE&TD) welcomed all the participants and highlighted that transmission
towers are important asset for the transmission systems and failure of transmission tower
can cause havoc in the grid. Therefore, it is important to analyze and find out the causes
which led to the failure of transmission towers and requested participants to actively
participate in the deliberation to arrive at a conclusive cause of failure of transmission
towers and suggest remedial measures to avoid the recurrence of such incidents in future.
He highlighted that number of failure cases remains unreported to CEA as many of the
Power Transmission utilities (State Transmission utilities, Private Transmission utilities
/licensees) in the country neither report the failure of towers of transmission line nor
participate in such national level meeting and requested all the utilities to intimate the
failures of transmission line timely so that a proper investigation may be carried out.
Also, he informed that there is a tower failure intimation format available on the CEA
website through which utilities can intimate tower failure incidents with all the relevant
documents mentioned in the format. He requested all the utilities to also provide detailed
colored photographs/videos for detail analysis of tower failure, as with limited strength in
CEA, COVID restrictions & travel restrictions, some of the times it was not possible to
depute officers for site inspection of all the transmission tower failures. He requested that
all the utilities may coordinate with IMD for Wind speed data of the time and location of
failure, as wind has been highlighted as the major cause of collapsing of the tower. In
 such cases, it is important to have wind data from authentic observatory to collaborate
that whether the speed of wind around the collapsed tower exceeded the wind speed for
which the towers are designed. The availability of data indicating change in wind speed in
a particular area may help to take necessary modifications in design parameters so that the
failure of towers may be avoided. He further requested members from utilities to present
their respective failure incidents before the Committee for deliberation.

3. Representative from POWERGRID gave a presentation summarizing the failures of

towers, important highlights of which are summarized hereunder:

i. In 2019, total number of towers affected are thirty-one in the total population of
2,56,000 towers of Powergrid. In 2020, total number of towers affected are
twenty-one in the total population of 2, 69,000 towers. And in 2021, total number
of towers affected are twenty-one in the total population of 2, 90,000 towers.
Hence, there has been gradual decrease in the percentage of tower failure.

ii. In the past three years a total of 73 towers had collapsed of which 59 towers are
of suspension type and 14 towers are of tension type. It has been observed that
the majority of the towers which got collapsed are of 400kV level Double Circuit
configuration towers (44 towers) and the 765kV towers with delta configuration
(18 towers)

iii. Percentage of incidences of failure with respect to total population of towers of

POWERGRID for the year 2019, 2020 & 2021 are 0.012%, 0.007% and 0.007%
respectively.

iv. Out of seventy-three number of tower failures, sixty towers had collapsed due to
High velocity wind storms, cyclones and local phenomenon of whirlwind. Other
towers were collapsed due to theft/ sabotage of the tower members, erosion of the
tower foundation due to landslides and flash floods and large differential
settlement of the footing.

4. Representatives from POWERGRID further informed that they had prepared the
presentation based on the agenda circulated by CEA along with the meeting notice and
the presentation does not cover in-detail case to case basis information of tower failure
incidents. Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) stated that the details presented by POWERGRID
in the table format is not clearly visible to participants and detailed case to case
presentation having images of failed towers is required for detailed discussion and
informed opinion of the Committee members. Director (PSE&TD) added that it is
responsibility of the individual utilities to present their cases and such kind of ill
preparedness from POWERGRID is disappointing. POWERGRID officials were directed
by the committee that utmost care shall be taken by them to avoid such incidences in
future. Further, representative from POWERGRID presented details of the individual
cases of failures in their transmission lines from the presentation circulated with Agenda
 of meeting and the causes of failure of towers were discussed in detail and important
highlights are summarized hereunder:

i. It has been observed by the Committee that some of the 400kV lines of Powergrid
having conductors in Quad configuration (400 kV Agra-Sikar transmission line, 400
kV Nellore-PS Gooty transmission line, 400 kV Dulhasti-Kishenpur II transmission
line, 400 kV D/C Kaithal-Baghpat transmission line etc.)are commissioned after the
notification of CEA regulations, 2010. However, these lines are designed as per
Reliability level-1 instead of Reliability level-2 which is to be adopted for quad
conductor configuration lines as per aforementioned regulations. Committee noted
that CEA regulations have been drafted after detailed consultation with the
stakeholders and shall be adhered to in any case and directed POWERGRID to
ensure that Reliability level to be adopted for all the future transmission lines shall
be in accordance to CEA regulations.

ii. In case of 400kV Narendra-Devanagari Transmission line, it was highlighted that

two incidences of failure of this line had occurred within a time span of two months
and in total seventeen (17) towers of the line had failed. Committee noted that
deficiencies like, rusting in the stubs, miss-alignment of stubs & concrete pedestal,
unplugged holes, improper coping of the chimney & covered in the grass, etc. were
observed by the team which visited the tower failure sites. Further, the failed towers
were located in the open field areas with very few trees/vegetation around the
towers, however, these were designed considering Terrain Category-II. Committee
suggested that since this transmission line has failed twice in a year, the patrolling
frequency may be increased. Committee noted that small trade-off in the integrity of
structure may lead to its collapse. Utilities shall improve their erection and operation
& maintenance practices and ensure that structural strength is not compromised due
to deficiencies like, unplugged holes, rusting of stubs, etc.

iii. In some of the failed tower location in lines of POWERGRID (like 400kV
Narendra-Devanagari Transmission line&400kV Quad Nellore-Gooty Transmission
line) deficiencies in the erection of transmission lines like the mis-alignment of
stubs (i.e. tower legs not located in the center of the chimneys) was observed. The
photographs of such observations were shared with the Committee. Committee
deliberated on the impact of stubs being offset from the chimney, on the tower
structure and noted that in case back to back dimensions are not in accordance to
tower designs, the residual stresses may develop in the tower structure which may
lead to its collapse. Committee directed utilities to ensure good erection practices
and ensure that casting of chimneys and placement of stubs are done as per
approved drawings. Further, in future during investigation of failed towers,
wherever possible, stub setting dimensions, including back to back distance
measurements, should be measured and submitted to the Committee along with the
failure report.
iv. In case of 400kV D/C Quad Agra-Sikar transmission line which had failed in
2019& 2020, Committee noted that there was deficiency in the erection/O&M
practices adopted by Powergrid as no. of bolts were found missing in the Leg
members at some of the failed tower locations. Director (PSE&TD) also
highlighted that at one location, distance of bolt hole from the edge of the members
also appeared to be on lower side. Committee noted the above and directed
POWERGRID to improve their operation & maintenance activities and as there are
many failures in Agra region in past years, special measures like, higher frequency
of patrolling of the lines may also be adopted by Powergrid.

v. Committee noted that in failure of 400kV D/C Kishanganj-Patna Transmission line,

even though the highest water level measured during the flood was lower than the
HFL level considered in designing of pile foundations, the Pile foundations had
failed. POWERGRID informed that the failed tower has been shifted to another
location for restoration and higher scouring depth has been considered for new pile
foundation. The testing of the damaged pile foundation has been carried out and
reports are still awaited. Committee requested POWERGRID to share the report of
foundation testing. Further, Committee noted that one of the failed tower had been
tested for +9 m body extension and has been erected with +25 m body extension
with the tower structure. Committee requested Powergrid to review the design of
Tower extension part adopted in the failed tower location to ensure the stability of
bottom most panels as the K- bracing placed at this panel appears to be not bearing
the loads because of very high base width to height ratio and share the analysis
report with the Committee.

vi. In case of failure of 400kV D/C Vindhyachal-Jabalpur transmission line, in the

material test report of the collapsed tower members, the Ultimate tensile strength
(UTS) of some of the members of the tower were found to be lower than the
specified values required as per IS codes. POWERGRID representative informed
that the transmission line is quite old and was commissioned in 1989. The tower
structure steel was imported from Russia and was designed as per Russian
standards, however, the copies of codes used in design of these towers are not
available with POWERGRID. Representative from CPRI highlighted that UTS of
the transmission tower members may be degraded since the line is in operation for
so many years, but the chemical composition shall remain same. Representative
from SERC highlighted that in most of the failed transmission towers, the tower got
bent from the panel above the diaphragm level indicating that the tower is not able
to take the torsional load. Committee noted that the narrow front wind load on the
tower body might not have been considered in the design of these towers. Further,
as different design codes had been used for design of these towers, it is not correct
to compare the material properties with respect to codes currently in practice.
vii. Committee noted that suspension type towers of many765 kV transmission lines of
Powergrid having S/C delta configuration (like 765 kV S/C Varanasi-Fatehpur
transmission line, 765 kV Sasan-Satna II transmission line, 765 kV Jhatikara-
Bhiwani line,765 kV Meerut-Moga transmission line) had failed during the April
2019 to December 2021 period and enquired about the status of strengthening of
such towers as directed in previous standing committee meetings. Powergrid
officials informed the Committee that, the strengthening of existing 765 kV S/C
delta configuration suspension type towers which are located in Wind zone 4 &
Wind zone 2, is being executed by Powergrid in phased manned and at present, only
fifty-six (56) numbers of S/C 765kV towers (Delta configuration) in the Western
Region-1 are remaining to be strengthened. In 765 KV Jhatikara-Bhiwani
Transmission Line, the tower was collapsed after the strengthening work of S/C
765kV towers (Delta configuration) has been done. In rest of the cases the failure of
S/C 765kV towers (Delta configuration), the strengthening work is done after the
incident of tower failure.
The strengthening of towers includes clamping of some of the members as well as
replacement of few tower members. Strengthening of towers in same manner as
suggested by the Standing Committee in the previous meetings, i.e. by replacement
of all members, is not possible for already erected tower members as long shutdown
of transmission lines will be required. However, failed towers are always replaced
by completely strengthened tower in line with the recommendations of committee.
Further, strengthening of few other tower members, as suggested byM/s. Minitoba
Hydro is also being adopted by Powergrid. The tower with strengthening currently
being adopted by Powergrid (i.e. clamping of few members and replacement of
some members) had also been tested at the CPRI test bed.

viii. In case of 220kV RAPP C-Anta transmission line, Committee noted even though
the transmission line was commissioned in year 2000, the line has been designed as
per old IS 802:1977 instead of IS 802:[Link] in case of 400 kV Quad
Kishenpur-Dulhasti transmission line, the line was commissioned in 2018, however,
the towers used were designed as per old standard IS 802:1995 instead of IS
802:2015. Committee directed Powergrid to examine the background of adoption
of old designs for these transmission lines and submit the reason for the same to the
Committee. Further, Committee noted that in order to save the cost of designing &
testing, transmission utilities might continue to use old designs of towers even after
revision of IS codes. Committee recommended that such type of practices shall not
be adopted by the utilities and it shall be ensured that the transmission lines are
designed and erected as per latest IS codes, regulations and recommendations of the
Standing Committee / Task Force, as applicable.

ix. In the failure of 400kV Quad Kishenpur-Dulhasti transmission line, Committee

noted that single circuit was strung on the double circuit tower and enquired
whether the towers were designed & tested considering the single side stringing.
Powergrid representative informed that the strength of tower to withstand single
 side stringing was verified during testing of tower at the test bed and informed that a
geo-technical investigation of the affected locations is also being carried out by the
Powergrid. Committee requested Powergrid to take suitable safety measures
considering the geotechnical investigation and suggested that anavalanche
protection retaining wall may also be constructed around the tower to safeguard the
tower from hitting of the boulders.

x. In case of 400 KV Purnea- Gokarna -400 kVPurnea-Farakka transmission line,

Committee noted that due to continuous land cutting by river, the tower became
vulnerable and the same was intentionally felled down by Powergrid after taking the
shutdown. Committee decided that the incident may not be considered as tower
failure as the remedial action was taken by Powergrid and may not be discussed in
the meeting.

xi. In case of the 765kV Bina-Gwalior transmission line, Powergrid representative

informed that severe theft of tower members was observed at the failure site.
Representative from MPPTCL also confirmed that there are many incidences of
thefts/sabotage in the Gwalior region and MPPTCL is also facing these types of
problems in some of their transmission lines and had adopted painting of
transmission towers with Tarcoal paint. POWERGRID informed that they had
increased the patrolling frequency and had installed vibration sensitive cameras at
some of the locations to avoid thefts/sabotage. Committee noted the above and
requested utilities to proactively adopt such practices and to increase the frequency
of patrolling at theft prone areas to avoid failure of towers.

xii. In the failure of the 400kV Korba-Raipur III & IV transmission line, it was observed
that there was de-capping of the insulator, which resulted in damage of the cross
arm of the tower. Representative from MPPTCL also confirmed that the
transmission lines of MPPTCL is also facing similar problems in this region and a
pilot project considering line surge arrestors is being implemented by MPPTCL to
overcome the issue. Also, MPPTCL is planning to install anemometer at the EHV
substations to measure the wind speed. Powergrid representative informed that
Powergrid had also installed Anemometers on its substations and experience report
of the same will be shared to MPPTCL for reference purpose.

xiii. In case of 400 KV Kishenpur-New Wangpoh 3&4 Transmission Line, Powergrid

informed that due to land slide the tower located at lower height was shifted due to
which the tension in the conductor had increased which had led to failure of
adjacent tower located at higher location. Committee requested Powergrid to ensure
that the geological investigation of the land mass is carried out and based on the
report, take the necessary strengthening measures required for tower foundations
&/or for the hill slope, so that such incidences does not repeat and lead to failure of
other towers.
 xiv. In case of 765 kV Meerut-Moga line, Powergrid representative highlighted that at
the time of erection, the towers were designed considering wind zone 4 as per the
wind map applicable at that time, however, the wind zone of the area has been
updated to wind zone 5 in the latest wind map published in national building code.
Committee noted the above and requested Powergrid to share the image screenshot
of Google earth depicting the transmission line superimposed on the wind map of
India and clearly indicating the failed transmission tower locations with the
Committee.

xv. In case of failure of 765 kV Moga-Bhiwani line, Powergrid representative informed

that the failed tower was of B type tower with +25 m body extension and was
spotted with a lower span and with zero degree deviation angle. Committee noted
that only the +25 m Body extension part was damaged and basic body structure of
the failed tower was intact. Representative from Torrent Power highlighted that in
case of +25 m body extension, normally the stub setting templates are not available
and props are used for this purpose. Special precaution is required to be taken to
ensure the correct slope of stubs in addition to the correct back to back distance
between the stubs. Committee also noted that in this case the B type tower have
been spotted with lower span values and hence, have inherent safe margin and in
case failure was due to wind the nearby suspension type towers would have
collapsed instead of this tower. Further, as only the extension part had collapsed and
basic body structure is intact, it indicates that there must have been some erection
deficiency in erection of extension part which had led to collapse of tower.

5. Powergrid representative highlighted that due to non-availability of observatory of IMD

at the tower failure locations, it is not possible to collect the authentic information of wind
speed prevailing at the tower failure location. Representative from IMD responded that
that due to limited no. of observatories of IMD it will not be possible to find out the exact
speed of the wind around the tower on the date of failure of transmission tower. Further,
if observatory is not available at the location, the only way to conclude the wind speed at
the failure site location is through indirect calculation or estimation by considering the
damages observed in the area. However, utilities can approach National Data Centre of
IMD, Pune for details of maximum wind speed recorded at observatories. Committee
noted the above and directed that for all the transmission line failures in which High wind
speed is claimed as the major cause of failure, utilities shall approach IMD with the
details of failed towers of all the transmission lines (including coordinates and date &
time of failure incident) to obtain the actual wind speed observed in the area. Committee
also directed the utilities that the details of failure shall be submitted to CEA as soon as
the failure incident occurs and wind speed details obtained from IMD shall also be
submitted along with the duly filled tower failure intimation format available on CEA
website.
6. Committee deliberated on the possibility of designing of towers which are erected in open
fields, with considering Terrain category-I. Powergrid officials highlighted that out of a
complete length of transmission line, there are few small sections which are located in the
open areas & fall under Terrain Category-1, and it is not possible to design separate few
towers specific to these locations considering Terrain Category-I factors. Powergrid had
executed a study in the Kutch area of Gujarat regarding Terrain category and it was found
that the towers designed with Terrain category-II and 400 m span have to be spotted with
reduced span of 370 m in locations under Terrain category-I conditions. Committee noted
the above and highlighted that Utilities shall pay utmost care in adopting the design
parameters as per the terrain category faced along the route of transmission lines.

7. Committee deliberated on the prospect of adopting wind speed corresponding to Wind

zone-II for designing of transmission towers located in area under Wind zone-I.
Representative from the M/s. KEC International Ltd. suggested that the area covered
under Wind Zone-1 is limited and lines passing through this area may be designed
considering higher wind zone as there is huge gap in the basic wind speed specified for
the Wind Zone-1 (i.e. 33 m/s) and that specified for Wind zone 2 (i.e. 39m/s).
Representative from M/s. Sterlite Power also added that in some of the areas, there might
have been change in the wind speed due to the continuous deforestation and higher wind
zone may be considered for future designs. Committee deliberated on the issue and
concluded that the decision of modification in wind zone cannot be taken on basis of
single event of failure and holistic view based on analysis of frequency of failures of
transmission lines in wind zone-I need to be taken. Thus, the decision to modify the wind
zone can be taken at later stage in case multiple failures are observed in the Wind zone-I
area.

8. Representative from CPRI highlighted that as seen from the past data, most of the failure
of the transmission towers occur in the month from April to July and there is a possibility
of certain seasonal effect due to which the higher wind speed is observed in this period.
Representative from SERC stated that in the North Western region of India, many towers
had failed in past years in the pre-monsoon period. In 2016, SERC published a research
paper in which it was observed that dust storms occur in the north western region
particularly in the Gangatic region, every year, which may lead to tower failures. He
informed that increase of0.01% of dust in wind (by volume) will increase the load on the
tower by ten (10) percent. Representative from IMD added that during the period April to
July, there are many thunderstorms in the different regions of the country. Committee
discussed the issue and requested SERC to share the research paper& studies with the
Committee for further examination and evaluation.

9. Representative from MPPTCL highlighted that cyclonic circulation of wind is observed

in some part of the MP which causes torsional wind load on the tower structures.
Representative from M/s Sterlite also added that these torsional winds are more
prominent in few months of summer seasons and lead to cascading failure of towers.
Representative from Powergrid informed that Powergrid had proposed some
 modifications to BIS in regard of inclusion of effect of cyclonic wind in the relevant IS in
line with CIGRE guidelines.

10. Committee noted that wind map of India may also need further revision as latest wind
map was published by SERC in year 2009. Committee requested SERC to carry out the
exercise for revision of Wind Map of India.

11. Representatives from KPTCL presented details of the failures in their transmission lines
(copy of presentation attached) and the causes of failure of towers were discussed in
detail. Regarding the failure of 220kV Kapnoor-Shahbad-Shahpur D/C transmission line,
representative of KPTCL informed the Committee that the line was commissioned in
2003, however, the towers used in the transmission line were designed as per old IS 802:
1977 in which only transverse load (wind at 0 degree) was considered as wind load on
tower body. In this case, as highlighted in the investigation of failure done by technical
committee of KPTCL, the wind span length between tower locations 390 (DB+15) and
391 was 340 m, which is on higher side considering the +15 m body extension and hence,
the wind acting on the tower led to failure of towers. Committee noted that as the towers
are spotted with a zero degree deviation angle, there is sufficient safety margin available
for B type tower even with considered span of 390 m. However, as the towers are
designed as per old IS codes, the narrow front wind factor and oblique wind load on
tower structure would not have been considered in the design of towers. Committee
requested KPTCL to share the colored photographs of the failed towers.

12. Representatives from MPPTCL presented details of the failures in their transmission lines
(copy of presentation attached) and the causes of failure of towers were discussed in
detail and important highlights are summarized hereunder:

i. It was informed that in the period from April 2019 to December 2021,five
transmission lines of 400kV voltage level (in which 37 suspension towers and 6
tension towers) and six transmission lines of 220kV voltage level ( in which 21
suspension towers and 2 tension towers) were affected.

ii. Regarding the failures of 400kVMalwa-TPH-Pithampur transmission line, it was

noted that the transmission line had failed four times in the period from April
2019 to December 2021. MPPTCL representative informed that the line was
commissioned in 2013, however, the transmission towers were designed as per old
standard IS 802:1977considering medium Wind zone. Committee noted that as
these towers were designed as per old IS 802:1997, diaphragm bracing members
are not present in the towers near the X bracings and as such oblique wind loads
and narrow front wind loads are not considered in design of these towers.
MPPTCL representative further highlighted that whirlwind kind of pattern is
observed in particular patch of area of MP which lead to failure of multiple
transmission lines in recent years. Committee noted the above and directed that
 whenever failure of transmission towers occurs, the failed towers shall be replaced
by towers designed as per latest IS codes.

iii. MPPTCL representative informed that repetitive failure incidents have been
observed in two of the transmission lines (400 kV Katni-Damoh transmission line
& 400 kVMalwa-Pithampur transmission line) and MPPTCL had created a plan to
strengthen the suspension towers of these transmission lines in a phased manner.
Committee noted the above and suggested MPPTCL that in case multiple tower
failures are observed in the other transmission lines, towers of those lines can also
be considered for strengthening. Committee also suggested that as there is huge
capital investment involved in the strengthening procedure, MPPTCL may
consider a third party vetting of proposed design modifications which are to be
adopted for strengthening of the transmission lines.

iv. Committee noted that as per the material test reports submitted by MPPTCL, the
elongation percentage and yield strength of some of the failed tower members of
some of the transmission lines (like, 400kV Malwa-TPH-Pithampur transmission
line&220 kV Malanpur-Auraiya transmission line) were not as per IS standards
which might have also contributed to failure of towers. MPPTCL was directed to
increase the scrutiny of material testing to ensure good quality raw material is
used in erection of transmission lines.

v. In the failure of the 400kV Rajgarh SSP transmission line MPPTCL representative
informed that the transmission line failed during the period of effect of Vayu
Cyclone which affected Gujarat and western parts of M.P. Committee requested
MPPTCL to share the photographs of failed tower structures with the committee
and the supporting documents suggesting high wind speed observed at the
location due to the Vayu cyclone.

vi. In the failure of the 220kV Omkareshwar Barwaha tap Nimrani transmission line,
it was highlighted that the line was failed due to the collapse of the 765kV
Khandwa-Dhule of the M/s Khargone Transmission Corporation Limited.

vii. In the failure of 220kV Jabalpur Narsinghpur transmission line it was highlighted
that the tower was erected to increase the height of the line due to crossing of
NHAI road expansion work, but the newly erected tower failed within a week of
erection. Committee noted that as the basic tower structure of failed tower is intact
and only the body extension part had failed; there might be some deficiency in the
erection of tower which had led to failure of tower structure.

viii. In the failure of the 220 kV Malanpur-Auriyaline& 220 kV Mehgaon-Adani line,

it was observed that non-galvanized black towers had been used by MPPTCL for
erection of the line. Further, some of the bolts were also found to be missing in the
structures. Committee noted the above and highlighted that the strength of tower
 structures get compromised due to missing bolts and utilities shall be highly
cautious to ensure that erection deficiencies are avoided in the tower structures.
Further, the Committee decided that balck (un-galvanized) towers shall not be
used by the utilities in the erection of future transmission lines.

ix. In case of failure of 220 kV Amarkantak SGTPS Birsinghpur/Panagar, Committee

enquired about the details of previous failure of transmission line. Committee
noted that the transmission towers have been designed considering old IS
802:1977. Committee noted that most of the transmission towers of MPPTCL
which had failed are designed as per old IS 802:1977, in which the oblique wind
load and narrow front wind load was not considered. As a precautionary measure,
MPPTCL may review the design of these towerswith respect to latest code of IS
802:2015, Regulations and recommendations of the Standing Committee / Task
Force, as applicable.

13. Representatives from UPPTCL presented the details of the failure of 765kV Lalitpur –
Fatehabad transmission line (copy of presentation attached). Committee noted that
POWERGRID had installed an anemometer on the Agra substation and requested thatthe
wind speed data of the date of failure of lines of UPPTCL and; the details of maximum
wind speed observed in a period of six months basis may be shared with the Committee
for reference and analysis purpose. UPPTCL representative informed that IIT Kanpur had
been requested to examine the root cause of failure of towers of these lines and IIT
Kanpur had found in their analysis that twenty two (22) members of A type tower and
sixteen (16) members of D type tower have slenderness ratio greater than unity and had
recommended strengthening of these towers. Committee requested UPPTCL to share the
tower failure report, colored photographs, material test reports so that the same can be
included in the report of the Committee. UPPTCL was also requested to share the report
of IIT Kanpur with the Committee for reference.

14. RVPNL representative presented the details of the failure of 765kV Anta-Phagi
transmission line to the Committee (copy of presentation attached). She informed that
the765 kV Anta-Phagi transmission line has been erected with delta configuration towers
designed by Powergrid and in year 2015, Standing Committee of Experts had
recommended for strengthening of suspension type delta configuration towers of this line
in similar way as suggested for 765 kV Gaya-Fatehpur transmission line of Powergrid.
RVPNL had consulted Powergrid and had adopted the same procedure as currently
adopted by Powergrid for strengthening of delta configuration towers and at present, the
strengthening process is under bidding stage. Committee noted the above and highlighted
that Powergrid is adopting the strengthening procedure which has been verified by
Powergrid by testing at the CPRI test bed and suggested RVPNL to ensure that the
similar strengthening procedure is adopted by RVPNL to strengthen their towers.
Committee noted that at some locations deficiencies like, unplugged holes, loose nut&
 bolts, etc. were observed in the failed towers and suggested RVPNL to plan and conduct a
Structural quality Audit of towers of this line at random basis. Committee further
requested RVPNL to share the colored photographs, material test reports, copy of
presentation and any other relevant document for inclusion in the report of Committee.

15. Committee deliberated on the likelihood of increase in the wind loads on the structures
due to tunneling effect in the valley regions and the influence of topography of the
location on the wind loads acting on the transmission towers. Representative from CPRI
highlighted that topographical factor [of upto 30%] is included in the IEC 60826 for
transmission lines located in mountains/complex topographical areas, however, at present
the same is not considered in the design of transmission towers as per IS codes and this
issue will be taken up in the next meeting of BIS.

16. Director (PSETD) stated that at present only two grades of steel (E250 & E350) are
specified for tower structure and enquired whether the higher grade steels (such as E410)
may also be allowed for transmission lines. Representative from M/s. Sterlite highlighted
that his experience for usage of super high tensile steel, which was adopted around 20
years ago in design of one of the transmission lines, was not satisfactory. As carbon
content of the steel increases, the strength of steel increases but the steel becomes brittle
and elongation properties reduces which led to multiple failure of towers. Over the time,
the developers of higher strength steel have developed and the same are also being used
in Monopole structures, however, a cautious approach based on the detailed studies &
tests of material properties is required to be adopted. Torrent Power representative added
that the issue of modification of properties of super high tensile steel during the Hot dip
galvanization process was observed earlier. The practices & precedence of usage of such
steels in the overseas countries may be studied before adoption of such steels in
transmission lines. Representative from CPRI added that with usage of super high
strength steel can be tested and the associated advantages can be explored on pilot basis.
Committee deliberated on the issue and noted that the nature of loads acting on
transmission towers is different than the other structures and usage of higher grade of
steel require further studies before adoption in the transmission sector and a cautious
approach is required to be taken in this field.

17. Representatives from M/s Sterlite Power presented details of the failures in their
transmission lines (copy of presentation attached). Regarding the failure of 765 kV D/C
Khandwa pool-Dhule transmission line, Committee noted that failure of towers of this
line of M/s Sterlite powerled to cascading failure of 400 kV Khandwa-Indore
transmission line of Powergrid and 400 kV Malwa(TPH)-Pithampur & 220 kV
Omkareshwar - Barwaha tap to Nimrani transmission lines of MPPTCL, which were
passing below the 765 kV D/C Khandwa pool-Dhule transmission line. Representative of
M/s Sterlite briefed about the damages observed at various tower locations and
highlighted that some of the failed towers of 765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool- Dhule
transmission line had collapsed towards right side of the center line of transmission line
and some had failed towards its left indicating that a circular rotation of the movement of
 wind was observed in the area at the time of tower failure [Link] noted that
the 765 kV voltage level D type towers of M/s Sterlite, which are generally considered
inherently strong towers as are designed with reliability level 2 and are used as anti-
cascading towers, had failed in the wind event observed in the area however, no damage
has been observed in the lines of Powergrid & MPPTCL which were also in the vicinity
of the 765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool- Dhule transmission line. Committee further requested
M/s. Sterlite to share the details of all the failure incidents including the color images of
failed towers, material test reports, reports of test conducted on nuts& bolts, duly filled
CEA format& preliminary investigation reports covering the details of failure and the
presentation with the committee.

18. Representatives from DMTCL presented details of the failure of 400kV D/C Motihari-
Gorakhpur transmission line and 400kV D/C Barh- Motihari transmission line (copy of
presentation attached). He highlighted that around 0.5 kilometers of land from the bank of
the river got washed away due to change in the course of Gandaki River. Two towers
each of 400kV D/C Motihari- Gorakhpur transmission line and 400kV D/C Barh-
Motihari transmission line failed due to change of the river course. He further briefed
about the preventive & restoration measures adopted by DMTCL to avoid the failure of
transmission line and informed that in addition to the collapsed towers, to take extra
precaution in respect of change of course of river in future, six more towers had been
shifted to the pile foundations as per the recommendations of the Committee, constituted
by CEA, to study the failure. Committee deliberated on the issue and appreciated the
efforts taken by DMTCL to avoid the failure of line in future. Further, DMTCL was
requested to share the old soil testing report considered at the time of erection &
commissioning of the transmission line for which they expressed their inability due to
non-availability of old data with them as the line was transferred to them by the original
owner. Committee noted that new water course was created due to high floods and
transmission line failed due to change of the river course. Committee highlighted that
adoption of Pile type foundation should be envisaged by the transmission utilities on the
basis of river flow data of previous years& previous changes in the course of river
observed in the region and, additional precautions like, routing of transmission lines few
kilometers away from the river bank/ anticipated future river course, Providing proper
revetment & use of geo-synthetic material in foundation, concrete encasing & painting of
stub in water logging areas, etc. shall be adopted by utilities, wherever required.

19. Representatives from RSTCL presented the details of the failure of 765kV S/C Raichur-
Sholapur transmission line (copy of presentation attached). Committee discussed the
failure pattern observed in the case and noted that the chemical composition of some of
the failed tower members was not as per IS codes. Due to higher percentage of Carbon,
and Phosphorous observed in the samples, the material might have become prone to
brittle fracture. Committee observed that the failure tower images shown by RSTCL are
taken from a distance and does not clearly show the condition of stubs, legs and other
tower members and further requested RSTCL to submit the colored photographs and any
other relevant information for further analysis and inclusion in the report.
20. Committee noted that all the utilities should intimate the failures of transmission line
timely and should provide all the relevant details/documents including images, duly filled
CEA proforma, wind speed data, coordinates of failed towers, material test reports, etc. so
that a proper investigation of cause of failure may be carried out. IMD and other agencies
involved in metrological field may be requested to assist the affected utilities for
obtaining the wind speed data of the failed tower locations.

21. After detailed deliberations / discussions among all participants, the Committee observed
the various causes which attributed to failure of EHV towers and various suggestions
emerged which shall be adopted to avert failure of towers. These will be incorporated
appropriately in the Report of the Committee which shall be circulated to all the
Committee members and Stake holders.

Meeting ended with the Vote of Thanks to the Chair.

**********************************************************************
 Annexure – I

No. of
S. No. Name of the Transmission Line Name of Utility Date of Failure Towers
Failed
1. 400kV D/C Khandwa- Indore 1 and 2 line POWERGRID 16.04.2019 1

2. 400kV D/C Narendra- Devangere transmission line POWERGRID 28.04.2019 10

400 kV D/C Pandiabili – Duburi – Baritada
3. POWERGRID 03.05.2019 1
transmission line
400kV D/C Quad Nellore PS – Gooty transmission
4. POWERGRID 27.05.2019 7
line
400kV D/C Narendra- Devangere (Guttur)
5. POWERGRID 06.06.2019 7
transmission line
6. 400kV D/C Quad Agra – Sikar transmission line POWERGRID 12.06.2019 3

7. 400kV D/C Silchar – Meliriat transmission line POWERGRID 19.07.2019 1

8. 400 kV D/C Kishanganj – Patna transmission line POWERGRID 06.08.2019 1

765 kV D/C Khandwa Pool- Dhule transmission

9. M/s Sterlite Power 16.04.2019 5
line

10. 765kV S/C Jabalpur – Bina transmission line M/s Sterlite Power 07.06.2019 5

11. 220 KV Bagalkot-Vajjramatti line KPTCL 09.08.2019 1

400 kV Malwa TPH (TPH)- Pithampur one
12. MPPTCL 16.04.2019 2
transmission line
13. 220KV OmkareshwarBarwaha tap to Nimrani line MPPTCL 16.04.2019 1
400 kV DCDS Malwa TPH (SSTPH)- Pithampur
14. MPPTCL 02.06.2019 24
Circuit I & II transmission line
15. 400 KV Rajgarh- sardarsarovar DCDS line MPPTCL 11.06.2019 5
220 kV DCDS Jabalpur-Narsinghpur transmission
16. MPPTCL 13.06.2019 1
line
17. 765 kV D/C Raicursholapur transmission line M/s RSTCL 03.06.2019 6

15.08.2019 1
18. 400kV D/C Motihari- Gorakhpur DMTCL
25.09.2019 1
04.09.2019 1
19. 400kV D/C Barh- Motihari transmission lines DMTCL
07.10.2019 1

20. 765 KV New Ranchi-Dharamjaygarh LINE-I POWERGRID 21.04.2020 3

21. 400KV D/c Vindhyachal-Jabalpur Ckt 1&2 Line POWERGRID 30.04.2020 4

22. 765KV S/C VARANASI-FATEHPUR POWERGRID 10.05.2020 4
23. 765KV Sasan- Satna - I POWERGRID 28.05.2020 1
24. 765KV Sasan- Satna - II POWERGRID 28.05.2020 1
25. 400kV Quad Agra Sikartransmsison line POWERGRID 29.05.2020 4
26. 220KV S/C ANTA-RAPP transmission line POWERGRID 03.07.2020 1
27. 400 KV Dulhasti- Kishenpur II & III POWERGRID 10.09.2020 2
28. 400 KV PurneaGokarna&400 KV PurneaFarakka POWERGRID 11.09.2020 1

29. 765KV Anta-PhagiCkt-II line RRVPNL 04.05.2020 2

30. 765 kV Fatehabad–LalitpurCkt-I transmission line UPPTCL 03.05.2020 2

03.05.2020&
31. 765 kV Fatehabad–LalitpurCkt-I transmission line UPPTCL 8
28.05.2020
220 KV Malanpur-Auriya line & 220 KV Mehgaon-
32. MPPTCL 28.05.2020 11
Adanickt
33. 220KV Malanpur-MorenaCkt I&II MPPTCL 29.05.2020 3

34. 220 KV Malanpur-POWERGRIDckt I&II MPPTCL 29.05.2020 5

400 kV S/C Malwa TPH Pithampur Transmission
35. MPPTCL 26.03.2020 7
line of MPPTCL
220KV Shahapur/Shahabad to Kapnoor
36. KPTCL 17.04.2020 2
transmission line
37. 765 KV Bina-Gwalior-3 transmission line POWERGRID 05.01.2021 1

38. 765 KV Jhatikara-Bhiwani Transmission Line POWERGRID 06.05.2021 1

39. ±800 KV HVDC Agra-BNC Transmission Line POWERGRID 10.05.2021 1

40. 400 KV Raipur-Korba Transmission line POWERGRID 11.05.2021 1
41. 765 KV Wardha-Aurangabad Transmission line POWERGRID 27.05.2021 5

42. 400 KV Korba-Bhilai-1 Transmission Line POWERGRID 30.05.2021 1

43. 765 KV Meerut-Moga Transmission Line POWERGRID 10.06.2021 3
44. 765 KV Moga-Bhiwani Transmission Line POWERGRID 12.06.2021 3
400 KV D/C (Quad)Kaithal-Baghpat transmission
45. POWERGRID 08.07.2021 4
line
400 KV Kishenpur-New Wangpoh 3&4
46. POWERGRID 23.10.2021 1
Transmission Line
400 KV D/C Malwa TPH (SSTPH)-PithampurCkt I&II
47. MPPTCL 29.05.2021 5
line

48. 220 KV Amarkantak-Panagar/SGTPS Birsinghpur MPPTCL 21.09.2021 2

 Annexure – II

List of Participants

Central Electricity Authority:

1. Shri Ashok Kumar Thakur, Chief Engineer, PSE&TD Division

2. Shri Y.K. Swarnkar, Director, PSE&TD Division
3. ShriBhanwar Singh Meena, Deputy Director, PSE&TD Division
4. ShriMohitMudgal, Deputy Director, PSE&TD Division
5. Shri Deepak Singh Raghuvanshi, Deputy Director, TCD Division
6. ShriAkshayDubey, Deputy Director, PSE&TD Division
7. Shri Karan Sareen. Assistant Director, PSE&TD Division
8. ShriApoorvGoyal, Assistant Director, PSE&TD Division

Southern Regional Power Committee:

1. Shri J. B. Len, Executive Engineer

CSIR- SERC:

2. Dr. Napa Prasad Rao

Central Power Research Institute (CPRI):

1. Dr. Selvaraj. Joint Director

2. Shri Vijay Kumar

Indian Meteorological Department (IMD)

1. Shri S. C. Bhan

POWERGRID:

1. ShriSurendra Kumar, Senior General Manger (Engg-TL)

2. Shri G.K. Gupta, Senior Deputy General Manager
3. ShriNitesh Kumar Sinha, Deputy General Manager (Engg-TL)
4. ShriManoj Kumar Singh, General Manager (Asset Management)

Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Limited:

1. ShriAvinash Vajpayee, Director (Technical)

2. Shri N.P. Gupta, Chief Engineer

Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Limited:

1. ShriPankajBalia, Director (Operations)

2. ShriR.N. Yadav, Chief Engineer, TSW
3. ShriBinod Kumar Bhasker, Executive Engineer

Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited:

1. ShriRamesh Pavey, Executive Engineer

2. ShriSrinivasan Murthy, Assistant Executive Engineer

Rajasthan VidhyutPrasaran Nigam Limited:

1. Shri K. K. Meena, Chief Engineer

2. Smt. Mamta Mehta

Darbhanga-Motihari Transmission Corporation Limited

1. ShriNeeraj Kumar Verma

2. ShriVijayanandSemletty

Raichur-Sholapur Transmission Corporation Limited

1. ShriBirendra Kumar Singh

M/s. Sterlite Power:

1. ShriDeepak Lakhpati,

M/s. Torrent Power:

1. ShriBipin B Shah, Vice President

M/[Link] Energy Limited:

1. ShriNimish Seth, Chief Operating Officer

KEC International Limited:

1. Shri E.V. Rao

2. Shri Ravi Ratna Patel, General Manager
 STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON
FAILURE OF EHV TRANSMISSION LINE
TOWERS
Standing Committee of experts in the field of design &
operation of EHV Transmission line (from CEA, POWERGRID &
research/academic institutes) constituted by Central Electricity
Authority in 1999 as per old Electricity (Supply) Act No. 54 of 1948,
continues to carry out investigation of failure of transmission line
towers of Power utilities as per the Section 73(1) of Electricity Act
2003.
 Details of Transmission line towers failed / damaged during the
period from April, 2019 to March, 2021 (Reported to CEA)
No. of Affected Suspension No. of Towers
Voltage Level Utility Tension Towers
Lines Towers Affected
800 kV (HVDC) POWERGRID 1 1 0 1
POWERGRID 9 17 5 22
UPPTCL 2 - - 10
765 kV RRVPNL 1 1 1 2
RSTCL 1 5 1 6
Sterllite 2 10 0 10
POWERGRID 16 40 9 49
400 kV MPPTCL 5* 37 6 43
DMTCL 2 2 2 4
POWERGRID 1 1 0 1
220 kV MPPTCL 6 21 2 23
KPTCL 2 0 3 3
Total 48 135 29 174
*400 kV Malwa TPH (SSTPH)- Pithampur Circuit I & II transmission line of MPPTCL failed four times.
 400kV D/C Khandwa-Indore Transmission Line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 16.04.2019/July 2016
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Tower Configuration :- Vertical
• Conductor Type :-Twin ACSR Moose
• Insulator type :-“I” Suspension insulator string

• Reason Given by Utility :- The crossing Towers AP4/0 and AP5/0 of 765 KV D/C Hexa
Khandwa-Dhule line of M/s Sterlite had collapsed and conductor of that Hexa D/C line had
fallen over POWERGRID’s existing 400KV D/C Khandwa-Indore Line over the conductor span
between tower 196-197 . This has resulted into damage of Tower 196(DD+0), insulators and
conductor in the span (196-197).
 400 kV D/C NARENDRA- DAWANGERE TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 28.04.2019 /Feb 2008
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 9
tower
Total 10
Observations • Vertical configuration, Conductor Type :- Twin Moose ACSR
• Line designed as per IS:802 1995, Wind Zone-1
• All the ten towers have fallen in the perpendicular direction to the transmission line.
• The suspension towers are designed for wind zone-1 and tension towers are designed for
wind zone-2
• The towers from tower locations 237 to 246 have collapsed completely to the ground. There
is no failure of foundation.
• Material test Results are within limit.
Reason Given by Utility :- All the ten towers are collapsed due to high speed localized
thunderstorm/ windstorm in this area which has resulted in the large wind load on phase
conductors and earth wire as well as on the tower body itself beyond the design values.
Loc. No. 237
Loc. No. 239 DA+3’ Loc. No. 240’DA+0’
 400 kV D/C BARIPADA-DUBURI-PANDIABILI Transmission line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 03.05.2019/01.09.2011
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Tower at location no. 717 (DD+25+4m RC) failed completely to ground in transverse
direction..
• Conductor Type :- ACSR Twin Moose
• The tower at location no. 717 collapsed completely on the ground in the transverse
direction.
• Tower designed for wind zone -V (50 m/s), IS 802-1995
Reason Given by Utility :- Due to the cyclone ‘FANI’, speed of the winds were more than 200
Km/hr which initiated the tower failure.
Loc. No. 717 (DD+25+4m RC)
 400 kV D/C QUAD GOOTY-NELLORE PS TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 27.05.2019/Apr. 2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 7
tower
Total 7
Observations • Tower Configuration :- Vertical
• Conductor Type :- Quad Moose ACSR
• All six towers collapsed in the direction perpendicular to the transmission line.
• Line designed as per IS:802 1995, Wind Zone-2
• Towers at location no. 547 to 552 were collapsed,
• At location no. 546 --top cross arm got damaged.
Reason Given by Utility :- All towers were collapsed due to the high speed localized
thunderstorm in this area.
Location no. 546 Location no. 547
Location no. 548 (DA+0) Location no. 549 (DA+0)
Location no. 550 Location no. 552
 400 kV D/C NARENDRA-DAVANGERE(GUTTUR) Transmission line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 06.06.2019/Feb 2008
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 6
tower
Total 7
Observations • Ten towers of the same transmission line had collapsed on 28.04.2019.
• Tower Configuration :-vertical
• Conductor Type :- Twin Moose ACSR Conductor
• 5 numbers of towers (4 no. A type & 1 no. B type) starting from Loc — 361 to loc - 365 had
collapsed during localized windstorm
• EW peak of 360 & 366 damaged
• there is no failure of foundation
• minor damage to some foundation chimneys observed due to falling impact loading. In some
of the locations, stub was also found to be damaged
• Tower designed for wind zone -1(33 m/s) ; IS 802-1995
Reason Given by Utility :- High speed localized windstorm/ thunderstorm
Location 361 Location 364
 400 kV D/C Quad AGRA-SIKAR Ckt I & ll Transmission line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 12.06.2019/17.10.2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 2
tower
Total 3
Observations • Tower Configuration :-Vertical configuration
• Conductor Type :-Quad Moose ACSR Conductor.
• The towers at locations no. 339 to 341 have collapsed completely to the ground.
• Wind Zone 4(47 m/s);
• Line is designed as per IS 802-1995
Reason Given by Utility :- All towers were collapsed due to the high intensity localised
windstorm in this area.
Location no-339
Location no. 340
Location no. 341
 400kV D/C SILCHAR - MELRIAT TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 19.07.2019/Dec 2018
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Tower Configuration :- Vertical
• Conductor Type :-Twin ACSR Moose
• The Tower Location No. 377 fully collapsed laterally due to displacement of landmass
suddenly during landslide.
• The foundation of the Leg-A fell on the fault line of the separation and completely collapsed.
• The tower had a deviation of 25033'30" towards right.
• Wind Zone 6
Reason Given by Utility :- The tower at this location collapsed due to the displacement of
landmass during landslide.
 400 kV D/C Kishanganj – Patna Transmission Line Of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 06.08.2019/29.03.2016
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Tower Configuration :- Vertical
• One of the main leg (Leg-D) was in the main river course and some members of the tower
were deformed due to the differential settlement of pile foundation under Leg-A and Leg-D.
• Wind Zone-4
• Tower with Pile foundation no. 409/0 ( DD+25)
• HFL had not crossed the design value, still the pile had failed.
• Reports of pile foundation testing is awaited.
Reason Given by Utility :- At the time of construction, tower at location no. 409 was on the
right bank of the Koshi river. The pile foundation of the tower got failed due to change in river
course towards right bank during recent heavy flood in the river Koshi resulting in bank erosion
upto tower location.
Tilt in tower legs causing bending of members
 765kV D/C Khandwa Pool-Dhule Transmission Line of M/s. Sterlite Power
Date of Failure/ 16.04.2019/ under construction
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 5
tower
Total 5
Observations • Details were requested from Sterlite Power vide letter dated 23.04.2019.
• M/s Sterlite vide letter dated 27.04.2019 submitted the following
• As the transmission line is under construction, the Investigation of failure is being done
at their end.

Reason Given by Utility :- due to strong wind and heavy rainfall.

 765kV S/C Jabalpur – Bina Transmission Line Of M/s. Sterlite Power
Date of Failure/ 27.05.2019/June 2015
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 5
tower
Total 5
Observations • Tower Configuration :- Vertical
• Conductor Type :- ACSR Bersimis conductor
• Towers at Location no. 17/9(SA+3), 17/10(SA+3), 17/11(SA+0), 17/12(SA+9) collapsed &
17/8(SA+0) partially damaged
• Wind zone-2
• Line designed as per IS 802: 1995
• Tower Coordinates provided with Failure intimation report were forwarded to IMD for inputs
on wind speed. No inputs received from IMD.
Reason Given by Utility :- High wind conditions
 220 kV Bagalkot Vajjramatti Transmission Line Of KPTCL
Date of Failure/ 09.08.2019/01.05.2001
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Conductor Type :- Drake ACSR
• Insulator type :- Tension insulator string
• One river crossing tower collapsed at location 319 (DB+6)
• Foundation was alright but stubs were bend at the bottom portion of the tower due to
which tower collapsed.

Reason Given by Utility :- Due to flash floods in Gathaprabha river on 8th and 9th August 2019,
the tower locations from 318 to 326 of 220kV Bagalkot-Vajjarmatti line were submerged.
Consequently, tower at location 319 (DB+6) collapsed.
 400kV Malwa TPH-Pithampur DCDS Transmission Line of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 16.04.2019/17.10.2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 2
tower
Total 2
Observations • Conductor Type :- Twin Moose ACSR
• Insulator type :- “I” Suspension insulator string
• 2 no. of tower partially damaged at the location No. 216 (FD0) and 217 (FD0)
• Tower located in Wind Zone 2
• Line designed as per old IS 802 :1977

Reason Given by Utility :- On 16.04.2019, five towers of 765kV Khandwa-Dhule line of M/s
Khrgone transmission Corporation Ltd. collapsed, due to which conductor of this line fall on the
crossing position of 400kV TPH-Pithampur DCDS line of MPPTCL which partially damaged the
crossing location towers (216(FD0) & 217(FD0)).
Tower at location 217
 220 kV Omkareshwar Barwaha tap to Nirmani DCDS TRANSMISSION LINE OF MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 16.04.2019/19.02.1982
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • Conductor Type :- Zebra ACSR
• Insulator type :- “I” Suspension insulator string.
• Designed as per old IS 802 : 1977
• One tower partially damaged at location no. 22(A0)
• Located in Wind Zone 2.

Reason Given by Utility :- On 16.04.2019, five towers of 765kV Khandwa-Dhule line of M/s
Khrgone transmission Corporation Ltd. collapsed, due to which conductor of this line fall on the
crossing position of 220kV Omkareshwar Barwaha tap to Nirmani DCDS line of MPPTCL which
partially damaged the crossing location towers (22(A0)).
Tower at location 22
 400 kV DCDS Malwa TPH (SSTPH)- Pithampur Circuit I & II TRANSMISSION LINE OF MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 02.06.2019/17.10.2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 4
Towers tower
failed Suspension 20
tower
Total 24
Observations • Tower Configuration :- Vertical
• Conductor Type :- Twin Moose ACSR Conductor.
• 24 numbers of towers of 400 kV DCDS Malwa TPH (SSTPH)- Pithampur Circuit I & II were
collapsed.
• 20 nos. suspension tower at location no. 126 to 131, 133 to 137, 139, 160 to 167, and 4 nos.
tension tower 132, 138, 159 and 168 are partially damaged.
• Wind Zone 2- medium
• Coordinates of failed tower locations sent to IMD for wind data. No inputs received.
• Line is designed as per IS 802-1977 (commissioned in 2013)
• As per the test report attached, some of the failed tower members failed to conform to desired
specifications/values of the Tensile strength, yield stress and elongation parameters.
• Wind data provided by Tehsildar– after two hours of tripping– 3km/min.
Reason Given by Utility :- All towers were collapsed due to the high windstorm in this area.
Tower at Location 126
Tower at Location 127
Tower at Location 128
Tower at Location 129
Tower at Location 130
Tower at Location 131
Tower at Location 132
Tower at Location 133
Tower at Location 134
Tower at Location 135
Tower at Location 136
Tower at Location 137
Tower at Location 138
Tower at Location 139
Tower at Location 159
Tower at Location 160
Tower at Location 161
Tower at Location 162
Tower at Location 163
Tower at Location 164
Tower at Location 165
Tower at Location 166
Tower at Location 167
Tower at Location 168
 400 kV DCDS Rajgarh-SSP TRANSMISSION LINE OF MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 11.06.2019/2002
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 4
tower
Total 5
Observations • Conductor Type :- Twin Moose ACSR
• Insulator type :- I insulator string
• Two suspension towers at location no. 565(FDO+6) & 564(FDO) are collapsed and three
towers at location no. 566(FD30+10), 563(FDO+6) & 562(FDO+O) are partially damaged.
• Wind Zone- medium
• As per the test report attached, one of the failed tower members failed to conform to
desired specifications/values of the Tensile strength, yield stress and elongation parameters.
• Line designed as per IS:802 1977 though commissioned in 2002

Reason Given by Utility :- Heavy Wind Storm

Tower at location 562
Tower at location 563
Tower at location 564
Tower at location 565
Tower at location 566
 220kv Jabalpur-Narsinghpur DCDS Transmission line of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 13.06.2019/07.06.2019 ( line was commissioned in year 1962)
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • Conductor Type :- Zebra ACSR Conductor
• 1 no. tower between location no. 11 and 12 (B0+10 m) is collapsed.
• Collapsed Tower was erected in 2019 for crossing of NHA1 between location no.
11 & 12.
• Tower collapsed by bending all 4 stubs with +10 m extension portion completely
& 5 mtr lower portion of the tower super structure collapsed.
• Line was designed for medium wind zone; IS: 802-1977.
• Design details of new tower are awaited.
Reason Given by Utility :- Heavy wind and thunderstorm
Tower at location 11A
 765kV S/C Raichur-Solapur Transmission Line Of RSTCL
Date of Failure/ 03.06.2019/July 2014
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 5
tower
Total 6
Observations • Conductor Type :- Quad ACSR Bersimis
• Insulator type :- “I” Suspension insulator string (Polymer type)
• 5 suspension & one B type tower failed.
• Cracks in chimney top of foundation observed after failure.
• Wind Zone 2

Reason Given by Utility :- due to thunder storm and whirlwind

 400kV D/C Motihari-Gorakhpur TRANSMISSION LINE OF DMTCL
Date of Failure/ 15.08.2019 & 25.09.2019 /2017
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 1
tower
Total 2
Observations • Conductor Type :- Quad AAAC Moose
• Insulator type :- Tension type string at location no. 27/0 and I type string at location no. 26/5
• Line designed as per IS:802 1995, Wind Zone-4
• One tower at location no. 27/0 (DD+0) (Pile type foundation) collapsed on 15.08.2019 and
other tower at location no. 26/5 (Suspension type) collapsed on 25.09.2019
Reason Given by Utility :- Due to subsequent change in course of Gandak river which results in
erosion of river banks in short span by strong river current. This caused collapse of tower at
location no. 27/0. Subsequently, there was heavy rains in the region and the washing of the
river bank still continued which results in washing away of tower foundation of tower at
location no. 26/5 and resulting in collapse of tower.
Tower Loc. 27/0(DD+0)
submerged in river water Tower Loc. 26/5(DA+0)
submerged in river water
 400kV D/C Barh-Motihari TRANSMISSION LINE OF DMTCL
Date of Failure/ 04.09.2019 & 07.10.2019/ 2017
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed
Suspension 1
tower
Total 2
Observations • One tower at location no. 26/0 (Tension type) collapsed on 04.09.2019 and other tower at location
no. 25/5 (Suspension type) collapsed on 07.10.2019
• Conductor Type :- Quad AAAC Moose
• Insulator type :- Tension type string at location no. 26/0 and I type string at location no. 25/5
• The tower at location 26/0 and 25/5 was initially located on land and nearest water stream was
around 600m and 1000m away respectively.
• Short piles of 2 meters depth were provided to develop additional uplift resistance force and to
improve the factor of safety.
• Line designed as per IS:802 1995, Wind Zone-4
Reason Given by Utility :- Due to sudden change in course of river, the tower at location no. 26/0 and
25/5 experienced very high current and continuous change in discharge rate of water from Valmiki
dam causing drastic change in water levels causes rapid cutting of one river bank and washing away
of tower foundation which results in collapse of tower. Conductor along with other line material on
Tower Loc. 27/0(DD+0) Tower 26/0 before failure
submerged in river water
Tower 26/0 after failure
 765 KV S/C RANCHI- DHARAMJAYGARH -I TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 21.04.2020/31.03.2014
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 3
tower
Total 3
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1995
• Wind Zone-2
• Horizontal Configuration
• Quad ACSR Bermisis Conductor
• One tower at Loc. no. 92 (A+3) has collapsed completely
• Partial damage to peak / cross arms of towers at loc. nos. 91 (A+0) and 90 (A+3).
• Material test reports found to be in order.

Reason Given by Utility :- High intensity whirlwind

Tower at location 92 (A+3)
 Tower at location 90 and 91

Bent Main leg of Loc. 91 (A+0)

 400 KV Vindhyachal-Jabalpur-I&II TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 30.04.2020/07.11.1989
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 4
tower
Total 4
Observations • The tower used in this line is were designed and supplied by Russia (Erstwhile USSR)
• Vertical Configuration
• Twin ACKC Conductor
• Four suspension towers at location no. 948,949,950 ( all DA+0) and 951 (DA+6) collapsed
• The line is having glass insulators in single suspension I string configuration.
• Wind speed submitted by utility– approx. 120 kmph.
• Last patrolling reported to be done on 17.01.2020
• Previous failure of line was in 2009. Three suspension towers collapsed.
• Material Test report-
• Three members ( Member 4, 8 & 9) failed in ultimate stress test.
• Two members ( member 3 & 6) had silica content more than prescribed limit.

Reason Given by Utility :- High speed windstorm

Tower at location 948 and 949
 Tower at location 950 and 951

Tower no. 950 (DA+0) Tower no. 951 (DA+6)

 765 KV S/C Varanasi-Fatehpur Transmission Line Of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 10.05.2020/June 2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 4
tower
Total 4
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1995
• Wind Zone-4
• Delta Configuration
• Two towers at location no. 641 (A+0) and 642 (A+0) are completely collapsed and towers at
location no. 640 (A+3) and 643(A+0) was partially damaged.
• The line is having porcelain insulators in I-V-I configuration.
• ACSR Bersimis conductor
• As per POWERGRID, the strengthening of the failed towers was completed.
• Material testing report found generally to be within limits except the elongation percentage
of two MS members which is marginally lower (21.84% & 22.10%)– required 23%
Reason Given by Utility :- High speed windstorm
Tower at location 641 and 642
Tower at location 640 and 643
 765 KV S/C SASAN-SATNA-I TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 28.05.2020/December 2012
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1995
• Wind Zone-4 & in Delta Configuration
• One tower at Location No. 430 (B+0) damaged.
• The line is having porcelain insulators in double V-V-V (DSV string ) configuration.
• Patrolling of the failed location- 29th February 2020 -15 no of redundant missing members were
reported in bottom sections of the tower. The same were fixed in the month of March’ 2020.
• As reported by utility, some towers of 220kV Satna -Chhatarpur (MPPTCL) transmission line, 132
KV Satna- Satna (Prism Cement), 132 KV Satna -Majhgawan transmission line, 132 kV Satna -
Satna Cement transmission line were also collapsed
• Material Testing- chemical composition of two members found marginally higher than limit:
• Member 6 Pottasium (0.062 > 0.05)
• Member 7  Carbon (0.231 > 0.23)
Reason Given by Utility :- High speed windstorm
Tower at location 430
 765 KV S/C SASAN-SATNA-II TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 28.05.2020/ 30.04.2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1995
• Wind Zone-4
• Delta Configuration 765 kV S/C suspension tower failed.
• One tower at Location Nos. 673 (A+0) bent from above waist level
• The line is having porcelain insulators in I-V-I (DI -DV-DI String) configuration.
• Failed tower location was not taken up for strengthening.
• As reported by utility, some towers of 220kV Satna -Chhatarpur (MPPTCL) transmission line,
132 KV Satna- Satna (Prism Cement), 132 KV Satna -Majhgawan transmission line, 132 kV
Satna -Satna Cement transmission line were also collapsed
• Material Testing report found to be within limit.
Reason Given by Utility :- High speed windstorm
Tower at location 673
 400kV D/C Agra-Sikar I&II TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 29.05.2020/January 2014
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 3
tower
Total 4
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1995.
• Previous failure in June 2019- locations no. 339 to 341 ( 2 suspension one tension) have
collapsed completely
• Wind Zone-4
• Vertical Configuration
• Tower at location no. 12(DA+0) has collapsed and all four stubs damaged.
• Cross arms of towers at location no. 13(DA+0), 14(DA+0) and 15 (DD+0) has been damaged.
• Material testing report found to be within limit.

Reason Given by Utility :- High speed localized thunderstorm

Tower at location 12
Tower at location 13 (DA+0) Tower at location 13 (DA+0) Tower at location 15 (DD+0)
 220kV S/C RAPP C-ANTA TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 03.07.2020/10.01.2000
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1977
• Medium Wind Zone
• Horizontal Configuration
• Reported as First incident of failure in transmission line by utility.
• Tower used for transmission line is of 400 kV S/C (Horizontal Configuration)
• One tower at location no. 213 (A+0) has damaged from the waist level.
• Material testing report found to be within limits.

Reason Given by Utility :- High speed localized thunderstorm

Tower at location 213 (A+0)
 400kV Quad Dulhasti-Kishenpur II TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 10.09.2020/19.01.2018
Commissioning
No. of Tension 2
Towers tower
failed Suspension 0
tower
Total 2
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1995
• Wind Zone-4
• Vertical Configuration
• Tower at location no. 261 (DB+6) has collapsed
• Damage in top cross arm of the tower at location no. 262 (DC+4.5)had occurred.
• No landslide & uphill landslip noticed at location & soil seems to be stable.
• Material test report found to be in order.

Reason Given by Utility :-

• Gradual differential settlement of Pits A and B and jerk from hitting by boulders from upside
hill.
• Single circuit stringing may have caused unequal load distribution & torsional stress in tower
which may have aggravated the tower collapse.
Photograph of uphill side boulders
Tower at location 261
 400 kV Purnea-Farakka and Purnea-Gokarna TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 11.09.2020/
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Tower at location no. 1103 (DD+0), sitauated on right bank of Ganga river became critical
due to continuous erosion of river bank.
• The shut down of line was taken by Powergrid citing continuous erosion on 04.09.2020.
• Conductors & EW in the span 1102 to 1103 were lowered to reduce stress on tower.
• The tower failed on 11.09.2020

Reason Given by Utility :- Continuous cutting of river bank of Ganga

 765 kV Anta-Phagi Transmission line of RRVPNL
Date of Failure/ 04.06.2020/08.01.2015
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 2 [Location Nos.: 72/1(A+3) & 61/0(C+3) ]
Observations • Conductor Type :- ACSR Bersimis Conductor
• Tower at Location Nos.: 72/1(A+3) collapsed and at location no. 61/0(C+3) got
partially damaged from top.
• Tower designed for wind zone 4
• Horizontal configuration tower designed by POWERGRID.
• Further Inputs requested on 15.07.20- not received.

Reason Given by Utility :- Heavy Thunderstorm

 766 kV Fatehabad - Lalitpur Ckt-I Transmission Line Of UPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 03.05.2020 /1.10.2016 (CKT-I)
Commissioning
No. of Tension
Towers tower
failed Suspension
tower
Total 2
Observations • Tower erection work in consultancy with POWERGRID.
• Transmission line restored on 21.05.2020
• Failure intimated vide letter dated 29.05.2020.
• Letter requesting detailed information sent on 15.07.2020. no inputs received.

Reason Given by Utility :-high wind storm

 766 kV Fatehabad - Lalitpur Ckt-II Transmission Line Of UPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 03.05.2020 & 28.05.2020 /11.04.2017(CKT-II)
Commissioning
No. of Tension
Towers tower
failed Suspension
tower
Total 8
Observations • 4 towers failed on 03.05.2020 & 4 towers failed on 28.05.2020.
• Tower erection work in consultancy with POWERGRID.
• Failure intimated vide letter dated 29.05.2020.
• Letter requesting detailed information sent on 15.07.2020. no inputs received.

Reason Given by Utility :- high wind storm

 220 kv Malanpur-Morena (Ckt-I & II) Transmission line of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 29.05.2020/16.02.2017
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 3
tower
Total 3 [Location Nos.: 31(B0), 32(B0+3) & 33(B0+3) ]
Observations • Conductor Type :- ACSR Zebra
• Tower at location 31(B0) collapsed, tower twisted from bottom phase cross arm
at location 32(B0+3) and only bottom phase cross arm of CKT-II damaged at
location 33(B0+3).
• Tower designed for wind zone 4 (wind speed 47m/s = 169.2kmph)
• Tower designed as per IS: 802-1995
• Wind speed informed by IMD to MPPTCL on 29.05.2020 – 7 kmph
• Continuous record of wind is not available with IMD.
• Material Test reports are found within limits.

Reason Given by Utility :- Heavy Thunderstorm/Cyclone

Tower at location 31
Tower at location 32 Tower at location 33
220 KV Malanpur-Auraiya & 220 KV Mehgaon-Adani Transmission line of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 28.05.2020/17.11.1993
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 11
tower
Total 11 [Location Nos.: 14 to 24 ]
Observations • Conductor Type :- AAAC Zebra
• 11 nos (Suspension) towers collapsed from ground level.
• No damage to Foundation is reported
• Tower designed as per IS: 802-1977
• Wind speed informed by IMD to MPPTCL on 28.05.2020 – 5 kmph
• Continuous record of wind is not available with IMD.
• Material Test reports- One of the sample failed in tensile strength test.
• Members Rusted & Bolts are missing ( As observed from images).

Reason Given by Utility :- heavy Thunderstorm/cyclone

Tower at location 14 Tower at location 15
Tower at location 17
Tower at location 18
Tower at location 19 Tower at location 20 Tower at location 21
Tower at location 22 Tower at location 23
Tower at location 24
 400 kV S/C Malwa TPH Pithampur Transmission line of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 26.03.2020/2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 6
tower
Total 7 [Location Nos.: 14 to 19]

Observations • Conductor Type :- Twin ACSR Moose Conductor

• Desiged as per old IS 802 1977
• Tower located in Wind Zone 3
• 6 nos towers(Loc no 14 to 19) completely collapsed and 1 no (loc no 13)
partially damaged due to cyclone
• Utility suggested that strengthening of towers is required.
•Material test report found to be within Limits.
 220 KV Malanpur-PGCIL (Ckt-I & II) Transmission line of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 29.05.2020/ 2010
Commissioning
No. of Tension 2
Towers tower
failed Suspension 3
tower
Total 5 [Location Nos.: 90 to 94 ]

Observations • Conductor Type :- ACSR Zebra

• 05 nos (03 nos suspension & 02 no Tension) towers are collapsed
• Tower designed for wind zone 4
• Tower designed as per IS: 802-1995
• Wind speed informed by IMD to MPPTCL on 29.05.2020 – 7 kmph
• Continuous record of wind is not available with IMD.
• Material Test [Link] to be within limits.

Reason Given by Utility :- Heavy storm/cyclone

Tower at location 90 Tower at location 91
Tower at location 92 Tower at location 93 Tower at location 94
 Shahapur/Shahabad to Kapnoor D/C Transmission line of KPTCL
Date of Failure/ 17.04.2020/2003
Commissioning
No. of Tension 2
Towers tower
failed Suspension 0
tower
Total 2[ Location Nos.: 389 & 390 ]

Observations • Conductor Type :- Drake

• 02 nos (Tension) towers ( B type) are collapsed.

• There is no damage to Foundation
• Tower designed for wind zone 2

Reason Given by Utility :- Heavy rain and swirl wind

Photographs of Collapsed Towers
 765 KV Bina-Gwalior-3 transmission line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 05.01.2021/ May 2014
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Delta Configuration
• The Tower is designed as per IS 802: 1995 and Wind Zone-4
• The tower at location no. 611 has collapsed from top of concrete, just above stub level on
the ground in the transverse direction.
• Removed tower member pieces, bolts and nuts were found scattered at the tower collapse
site.
• Cutting of main bracing observed.
• All the redundant members of bottom section and three main bracing of the adjacent
suspension tower at location no. 612 (A type) has also been removed, but the tower is
standing.
• Last patrolling was done on 12.10.2020- No theft observed by utility representatives.
Reason Given by Utility :- Theft/ Sabotage of Tower members
Tower at location 611
Legs of tower at location 611
Removed bolts & nuts and Tower members
Tower at Location 612
 765 KV Jhatikara-Bhiwani Transmission Line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 06.05.2021/01.10.2012
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • Delta Configuration
• Quad ACSR Bermisis Conductor
• Line is designed as per IS 802:1995 and Wind Zone-4
• Tower is designed with Double I-V-I insulator string
• Tower at location no. 59 (33/3) (A+0) has been damaged from the cross arm level
• Previous failure on 16.05.2018- one tower failed (suspension type)- location no. 17 (A+0).
• All strengthening, including as suggested by Manitoba Hydro, has been completed at the
failed site location.

Reason Given by Utility :- Highly localized Thunderstorm with high speed wind
Tower at location 59 (33/3)
 +-800 KV HVDC Agra-BNC Transmission Line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 10.05.2021/ Nov 2015
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • Cross Arm of Pole-II at location no. 3118 was found damaged
• Hexa ACSR Lapwing Conductor
• Line is designed as per IS 802:1995 and Wind Zone-4
• Tower is designed with Y string having Glass insulator.
• Last failure inline on 2.05.2018 (Agra Region) at location no. 4328,4347,4348 (DD+25)

Reason Given by Utility :- High Speed Thunderstorm

Tower at location 3118
 400 KV Raipur-Korba Transmission line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 11.05.2021/01.07.2011
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • ACSR Moose Conductor
• Line is designed as per IS 802: 1995 and Wind Zone-2
• The ‘DA’ type towers of this line were designed with Single “I” porcelain insulator string.
• At location no. 303 (DA+0) both of top cross arms and one middle cross arm of the tower
got damaged
• At location no. 302 (DA+0) insulator de-capping occurred in top phase.

Reason Given by Utility :- Due to lightining decapping of insulator at location no. 302. high
speed wind coupled with sudden jerk due to decapping resulted in failure of cross arms.
Tower at location 303
 765 KV D/C Wardha-Aurangabad Transmission line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 27.05.2021/ July 2014
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 5
tower
Total 5
Observations • Hexa Zebra ACSR Conductor
• Line is designed as per IS 802: 1995 and Wind Zone-2
• The Tower is designed with Double I String having Glass insulator.
• Tower at location no. 321 (DA+3) collapsed.
• Peak of the tower at location no. 322 (DA+6) was damaged.
• Tower at location no. 319 and 320 got buckled from middle cross arm.
• At tower location 318, Top CKT-II cross arm got damaged.
• This is first incident of failure of towers in this line.
• Reliability Level

Reason Given by Utility :- High speed Windstorm/ Thunderstorm

Tower at location 321
 Partial damaged towers

Tower location 318 Tower location 319 Tower location 320 Tower location 322
 400 KV Korba-Bhilai-1 Transmission Line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 30.05.2021/03.01.1983
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 1
tower
Total 1
Observations • Line is designed as per IS 802:1977
• Horizontal Configuration
• Suspension towers are designed with Single “I” Insulator Strings
• Tower at location no. 320 (A+3) has bee collapsed from stub level.
• 2nd instance of failure in line.
• 1st failure in 2009

Reason Given by Utility :- Highly Localized Thunderstorm with high speed wind
Tower at location 320
 400 KV D/C (Quad) Kaithal-Baghpat transmission line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 08.07.2021/ Nov 2010/ LILO of Kaithal Meerut in Baghpat done in 2016
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 4
tower
Total 4
Observations • Tower is located in LOOP in portion of 400 kV Kaithal-Baghpat transmission line.
• Line is designed as per IS:802 1995 and Wind Zone 4.
• Reliability Level-I used for designing these towers
• As highlighted by utility, as per NBC map-2016 location lies in WZ-5.
• The tower is designed for Quad ACSR Moose conductor with double I string having porcelain
disc insulators. At present, the line is having polymer insulators.
• Tower at location no. 389(DA+0) has collapsed.
• Tower at location no. 388 (DA+0) : Earth wire peak of CKT-I side has damaged.
• Tower at location no. 390 (DA+0) : Both earth wire peak damaged
• Tower at location no. 391 (DA+0) : Middle cross arm of CKT-II damaged.
• Material Test report awaited.
Reason Given by Utility :- High speed windstorm/ thunderstorm
Tower at location 389
 Partial damaged towers

Tower location 388 Tower location 390 Tower location 391

 400 KV Kishenpur-New Wangpoh CKT 3&4 Transmission Line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 23.10.2021/29.07.2017
Commissioning
No. of Tension 1
Towers tower
failed Suspension 0
tower
Total 1
Observations • Twin ACSR Moose conductor
• Tower is designed as per IS 802: 1995 and Wind Zone-2
• Tower is having Porcelain Disc insulators
• Tower at location 145 (DC+3) has collapsed
• A wide crack adjacent to location no. 144 was seen which indicates gradual land sliding
around location 144.

Reason Given by Utility :- The gradual sliding of landmass at location no. 144 has led to
increases tension between span 144-145 causing excess loading on tower no. 145. During
Hailstorm, heavy winds and contraction of conductor due to sudden fall in temperature on the
day of incident has further aggravated the stress in tower at location no. 145 which caused its
failure.
Tower at location 389
 Cracks near Tower at location no. 144

Bending of members of Tower at location

no. 144
 765 KV Meerut-Moga Transmission Line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 10.06.2021/ May 2015
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 3
tower
Total 3
Observations • Delta Configuration towers
• Line is designed as per IS:802 1995 and Wind Zone 4
• Quad ACSR Bermisis Conductor
• Tower is designed with Double I-V-I insulator string
• Tower at location no. 558 (SA+0) has been collapsed
• Cross arm of Tower at location no. 559 (SA+3) has damaged
• Peak of the Tower at location no. 560 (SA+3) has damaged

Reason Given by Utility :- High speed windstorm/ thunderstorm

Tower at location 558, 559 & 560
 765 KV Moga-Bhiwani Transmission Line of POWERGRID
Date of Failure/ 12.06.2021/ 01.06.2012
Commissioning
No. of Tension 3
Towers tower
failed Suspension
tower
Total 3
Observations • Line is designed as per IS:802 1995 and Wind Zone 4
• Quad ACSR Bermisis Conductor
• Delta Configuration
• Type B Tower is designed with Double V-V-V insulator string
• One tower at location no. 293 ( B +25) has collapsed
• Earth peaks of adjacent towers at location no. 292 and 294 has damaged

Reason Given by Utility :- Highly Localized Windstorm with high speed wind
Tower at location 293
Tower at location 292 & 294
 220 KV Amarkantak-Panagar/SGTPS Birsinghpur of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 21.09.2021/ 1996
Commissioning
No. of Tension
Towers tower
failed Suspension 2
tower
Total 2
Observations • Located in Wind Zone 4
• Line is designed as per IS:802 1977
• ACSR Zebra Conductor in Vertical configuration.
• No damage to foundation reported by utility
• Detailed failure report, photographs, Material test report, wind speed data etc. awaited from
MPPTCL.

Reason Given by Utility :- heavy cyclonic wind & thunderstorm

 400 KV D/C Malwa TPH (SSTPH)-Pithampur Ckt I&II line of MPPTCL
Date of Failure/ 29.05.2021/ 2013
Commissioning
No. of Tension 0
Towers tower
failed Suspension 5
tower
Total 5
Observations • Tower located in Wind Zone 3
• Line is designed as per IS:802 1977- medium wind pressure.
• Twin Moose ACSR Conductor in vertical configuration.
• Line failed in 2019, 2020 & in 2021- different locations.

Reason Given by Utility :- Heavy wind storm

Tower at location 148
Tower at location 149
Tower at location 150
Tower at location 151
Tower at location 152
 MADHYA PRADESH
POWER TRANSMISSION
COMPANY LIMITED
Abstract of Tower collapse in MPPTCL from
Apr-19 to Mar-21
No of
Voltage Suspension Tension Total
affected
Level Towers Towers Towers
lines

400 kV 5 37 6 43

220 kV 6 21 2 23

Total 11 58 8 64

400 kV Malwa Pithampur DCDS line failed four times.

DETAILS OF FD-SERIES TOWERS IN MPPTCL
Sr. Name of line Route Total Total Collapsing of Total Collapsing of Tension
No. length Tower Suspn. Suspension Towers Tensio Towers
Towers n
Tower

2020
2019

2021

Total

2019

2020

2021

Total
s

1 400kV Kirnapur LILO 2.06 10 1 -- -- -- 0 9 -- -- -- 0

2 400 KV Birsinghpur - Katni 117.63 324 210 -- -- -- 0 114 -- -- -- 0
3 400 KV Katni - 117.3 316 250 -- -- -- 0 66 -- -- -- 0
Damoh(PGCIL)
4 400kV Katni-Damoh (Chrged 9.95 31 18 -- -- -- 0 13 -- -- -- 0
on 220kV)
5 400 KV Bhopal-Bina 138.41 363 310 -- -- -- 0 53 -- -- -- 0
6 400 KV Sarni-Seoni 43.75 130 1 -- -- -- 0 129 -- -- -- 0
7 400 KV Sarni-ISP 191.33 535 10 -- -- -- 0 525 -- -- -- 0
8 400 kV SSTPH-Pithampur 136 397 301 22 6 5 33 96 4 1 0 5
DCDS
9 400 kV Chhegaon-Julwania 113.64 340 270 -- -- -- 0 70 -- -- -- 0
DCDS
10 400 kV SSTPH-Chhegaon 52.22 158 120 -- -- -- 0 38 -- -- -- 0
11 400 kV Indore(Hatuniya)- 63.55 193 145 -- -- -- 0 48 -- -- -- 0
Pithampur
12 400 kV Nagda-Badnawar 53.62 145 113 -- -- -- 0 32 -- -- -- 0
13 400 kV Badnawar-Rajgarh 51.52 137 116 -- -- -- 0 21 -- -- -- 0
14 400 kV Rajgarh-SSP 113.68 305 232 4 0 0 4 73 1 0 0 1
Total 1204.66 3384 2097 26 6 5 37 1287 5 1 0 6
 1. 400kV Malwa TPH – Pithampur

 Date of Failure: 16/04/2019, Commissioning: 2013

 Line designed as per IS 802:1977, Wind Zone Medium.
 Conductor: Twin Moose, Insulator: I String
 Number of Tower collapsed: 2 numbers Suspension
Towers.
 Reason of Failure: Collapse of 765kV Khandwa Dhule
Transmission line of M/s Khargone Transmission
Corporation Limited.
 Excessive loading on our Transmission Line resulting
into partial damage of tower.
Tower at
 2. 400kV Malwa TPH Pithampur
 Date of Failure: 02/06/2019, Commissioning: 2013
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977, Wind Zone: Medium
 Conductor: Twin Moose, Insulator: I String
 Number of Tower collapsed: 20 numbers Suspension
tower and 4 numbers Tension towers
 Reason of Failure: Cyclonic circulation in the area
resulting into collapse of location number 159 to 168
across the line in south direction and 126 to 139 across
the line in north direction.
 Collapse pattern suggests presence of strong cyclonic
circulation.
 2. 400kV Malwa TPH Pithampur
 Our Team of Experts along with Design Expert visited
to investigate the cause of failure of structures.
 The committee opined that structure failure was due
to heavy cyclonic circulation in the area.
 The wind data of the local area also indicates strong
wind presence.
 We have taken up the matter with Designer for
strengthening the design as per IS 802: 1995
 Accordingly the strengthening of tower has been
designed by our designer.
 MPPTCL will take up the strengthening work of all
suspension towers of this design in a phased manner.
Location Number 126
Location Number 127
Location Number 128
Location Number 129
Location Number 130
Location Number 131
Location Number 132
Location Number 133
Location Number 134
Location Number 135
Location Number 136
Location Number 137
Location Number 138
Location Number 139
Location Number 159
Location Number 160
Location Number 161
Location Number 162
Location Number 163
Location Number 164
Location Number 165
Location Number 166
Location Number 167
Location Number 168
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress Min 350 334
% Elongation MS Min 23 18.8,
% Elongation HT Min 22 17.3, 18.6
Tensile Strength HT Min 490 484
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Carbon Max 0.2 Within Limits
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.55 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.45 Within Limits
 3. 400kV Malwa TPH Pithampur

 Date of Failure: 26/03/2020, Commissioning: 2013

 Line designed as per IS 802:1977, Wind Zone: Medium
 Conductor: Twin Moose, Insulator: I String
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977
 Number of Tower collapsed: 6 numbers Suspension
and 1 number Tension tower.
 Reason of Failure: Cyclonic circulation in the area
resulting into collapse of location number 13 to 19.
 MPPTCL will take up the strengthening work of all
suspension towers of this design.
Location Number 13
Location Number 14
Location Number 15
Location Number 16
Location Number 17
Location Number 18
Location Number 19
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress HT Min 350 Within Limits
% Elongation MS Min 23 Within Limits
% Elongation HT Min 22 Within Limits
Tensile Strength HT Min 490 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Carbon Max 0.2 Within Limits
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.55 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.45 Within Limits
 4. 400kV Malwa TPH Pithampur

 Date of Failure: 29/05/2021

 Year of Commissioning: 2013
 Wind Zone: Medium
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977
 Number of Tower collapsed: 5 numbers Suspension
towers.
 Reason of Failure: Cyclonic circulation in the area
resulting into collapse of location number 148 to 152.
 Line towers also collapsed in 2019 and 2020.
 MPPTCL will take up the strengthening work of all
suspension towers of this design.
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress HT Min 350 Within Limits
% Elongation MS Min 23 Within Limits
% Elongation HT Min 22 Within Limits
Tensile Strength HT Min 490 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Carbon Max 0.2 Within Limits
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.55 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.45 Within Limits
 5. 400kV Rajgarh SSP

 Date of Failure: 11/06/2019

 Year of Commissioning: 2002
 Wind Zone: Medium
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977
 Number of Tower collapsed: 4 numbers Suspension
and 1 number Tension tower.
 Reason of Failure: Cyclonic circulation in the area
resulting into collapse of location number 564, 565
and partial damage to 562, 563 & 566.
 MPPTCL will take up the strengthening work of all
suspension towers of this design.
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress HT Min 350 Within Limits
% Elongation MS Min 23 Within Limits
% Elongation HT Min 22 Within Limits
Tensile Strength HT Min 490 Within Limits
Carbon Max 0.2 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.55 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.45 Within Limits
 Strengthening of Towers

 400 kV Towers designed as per IS 802: 1977 had been

used in 14 Transmission Lines.
 Failure of structures observed mostly in 2 Transmission
lines namely Malwa - Pithampur and Katni - Damoh,
that too in specific areas.
 Strengthening of Towers proposed in two Transmission
lines (569 numbers Suspension towers).
 Key Members (Main Leg) can not be replaced.
 Availability of shutdown to replace members of Cage
and Cross Arm.
6. 220kV Omkareshwar Barwaha Tap Nimrani

 Date of Failure: 16/04/2019

 Year of Commissioning: 1982
 Wind Zone: Medium
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977
 Number of Tower collapsed: 1 numbers Suspension
 Reason of Failure: Collapse of 765kV Khandwa Dhule
line of M/s Khargone Transmission Corporation
Limited.
 This resulted in excessive loading on our Transmission
Line resulting into partial damage of tower.
Location Number 22
 7. 220kV Jabalpur Narsinghpur

 Date of Failure: 13/06/2019

 Year of Commissioning: 1962/2019
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977 Wind Zone Medium.
 Collapsed Tower designed as per IS 802:1995 and Wind
Zone 4.
 Number of Tower collapsed: 1 numbers Suspension
location bottom portion with +10M Extension.
 Reason of Failure: Heavy wind and Thunderstorm in
the area.
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress Min 250 Within Limits
% Elongation Min 23 Within Limits
Tensile Strength Min 410 Within Limits
Carbon Max 0.23 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.5 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.4 Within Limits
8. 220kV Malanpur Auraiya & Mehgaon Adani

 Date of Failure: 28/05/2020

 Year of Commissioning: 1993
 Wind Zone: Medium
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977
 Number of Tower collapsed: 11 numbers Suspension
location from 14 to 24.
 Continuous record of wind speed is not available with
IMD.
 Reason of Failure: Heavy Thunderstorm and Cyclone in
the area.
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress Min 250 Within Limits
% Elongation Min 23 Within Limits
Tensile Strength Min 410 372
Carbon Max 0.23 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.5 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.4 Within Limits
 9. 220kV Malanpur Morena

 Date of Failure: 29/05/2020

 Year of Commissioning: 2017
 Wind Zone: Medium
 Line designed as per IS 802:1995
 Number of Tower collapsed: 3 numbers Suspension
location.
 Continuous record of wind speed is not available with
IMD.
 Reason of Failure: Heavy Thunderstorm and Cyclone in
the area.
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress Min 250 Within Limits
% Elongation Min 23 Within Limits
Tensile Strength Min 410 Within Limits
Carbon Max 0.23 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.5 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.4 Within Limits
 10. 220kV Malanpur PGCIL
 Date of Failure: 29/05/2020
 Year of Commissioning: 2010
 Wind Zone: 4
 Line designed as per IS 802:1995
 Number of Tower collapsed: 3 numbers Suspension
location and 2 numbers Tension location.
 Continuous record of wind is not available with IMD.
 Reason of Failure: Heavy storm and Cyclone in the
area.
 As may be seen total 19 towers damaged in the area of
different transmission lines. This indicates presence of
strong cyclonic wind resulting into damage.
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress Min 250 Within Limits
% Elongation Min 23 Within Limits
Tensile Strength Min 410 Within Limits
Carbon Max 0.23 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.5 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.4 Within Limits
 11. 220kV Amarkantak SGTPS Birsinghpur/
Panagar

 Date of Failure: 21/09/2021

 Year of Commissioning: 1996
 Wind Zone: Medium
 Line designed as per IS 802:1977
 Number of Tower collapsed: 2 numbers Suspension
location collapsed.
 Reason of Failure: Heavy cyclonic wind and
Thunderstorm in the area.
Location Number 84
Location Number 85
 Material report
Particulars Specification Result
Yield Stress Min 250 Within Limits
% Elongation Min 23 Within Limits
Tensile Strength Min 410 Within Limits
Carbon Max 0.23 Within Limits
Bend Test Should Pass Pass
Sulphur Max 0.045 Within Limits
Phosphorus Max 0.045 Within Limits
Manganese Max 1.5 Within Limits
Silicon Max 0.4 Within Limits
 CONCLUSION

 In recent years , there is increase in tower collapse

incidences in the country.
 Major cause of failure of Transmission Tower may be
attributed to cyclonic weather conditions.
 Collapse of Towers can also be attributed to ageing of
structures.
 Due to climatic changes, wind pattern and intensity
also changed which in turn is affecting the old design
towers.
 Strengthening of Old Design towers is the possible
solution to avoid damage although there are inherent
problems of funding and shutdown associated with it.
THANK
YOU
 REPORT
OF
DAMAGED/COLLAPSED
TOWERS/CONDUCTORS
OF
765 KV ANTA-PHAGI LINE (CKT. II)
1
REPORT OF DAMAGED / COLLAPSED TOWERS OF 765 KV ANTA-
PHAGI LINE ([Link])- LOCATION NO. 72/1 (TTA+3)
Probable cause of failure:

Non-strengthening of towers by replacement of members

with higher section and non-providing additional members.

Few photographs are in the upcoming slides

2
REPORT OF DAMAGED / COLLAPSED TOWERS OF 765 KV ANTA-
PHAGI LINE ([Link])- LOCATION NO. 72/1 (TTA+3)

3
REPORT OF DAMAGED / COLLAPSED TOWERS OF 765 KV ANTA-
PHAGI LINE ([Link])- LOCATION NO. 72/1 (TTA+3)

4
REPORT OF DAMAGED / COLLAPSED TOWERS OF 765 KV ANTA-
PHAGI LINE ([Link])- LOCATION NO. 72/1 (TTA+3)

5
REPORT OF DAMAGED / COLLAPSED TOWERS OF 765 KV ANTA-
PHAGI LINE ([Link])- LOCATION NO. 61/0 {Loc No. 355}(TTC+3)
All four conductors of Y-phase with tension strings, extension links and
connecting plates with two members marked as APC 373 detached from
tower main body and fell down towards location No. 356. Due to this
detachment, top portion of tower bent in opposite direction towards location
No. 354).
While inspecting all four tension strings, it was observed that there is no
flash over mark on Discs, which shows that there is no electrical reason of
failure.
Lower portion of the tower is found in good condition.

6
REPORT OF DAMAGED TOWER OF 765 KV ANTA-PHAGI LINE
([Link])- LOCATION NO. 61/0 {Loc No 355} (TTC+3)

7
REPORT OF DAMAGED / COLLAPSED TOWERS OF 765 KV ANTA-
PHAGI LINE ([Link])- LOCATION NO. 61/0 {355} (TTC+3)

8
ENQUIRY REPORT OF DAMAGED TOWERS / CONDUCTORS OF 765 KV
ANTA-PHAGI LINE (CKT. II) -RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE

1. 765 kV single circuit A-Type tower strengthening is required as per PGCIL

pattern.
2. If the soil surrounding the chimney top is above the chimney top level,
extension of chimney should be done to protect the stub from rusting,
coping if damaged or not done, should be properly done.
3. ACDs (Anti Climbing Devices), if not provided or have been stolen, should
be provided now.
4. All the Tower members and plates must be fitted with nut and bolts of
proper size. No any hole should be remained empty.
5. Over size or loose nut & bolts must be replaced by proper size nut & bolts
and proper tightening should be done.
6. All the towers must be checked thoroughly regarding tightening all its
members and plates.
9
8. Missing members If any must be provided by new members with
same section and type of steel (MS/HT).
9. If revetment at any location is required, it should be done
immediately.
10. The representative of the firm may be called in the field and in his
presence fitting of spacers should be checked so frequent loosening
of spacers should be resolved.
11. If any sub-conductor of the quadruple bundle of 765 kV line is
repaired/replaced, the tension of all four sub-conductors must be
equalized to avoid the damage of conductors due to spacers.
12. Corona rings where ever not provided on the lines must be provided
immediately.
10
THANK YOU

11
 Details of Transmission line towers failed / damaged in May

Line Name
tjdmcm
2020
Utility Suspension Tension No. of
Towers Towers Towers
affected
765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad UPPTCL 2 0 2
(Agra) Ckt-I
765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad UPPTCL 7 1 8
(Agra) Ckt-II
Total UPPTCL 9 1 10

During heavy Thunderstorm in the month of May- 2020, 10 towers of

765kV Lalitpur - Fatehabad lines got damaged on 03.05.2020 and
28.05.2020

These both Lines were constructed and commissioned by

PGCIL under LTS project in Oct. 2016 and April 2017
respectively. 1
2
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-I Transmission
Line
Commissioning 01/10/2016
date
Date of Failure 03/05/2020
Date of 21/05/2020
restoration
Tower No and 146 (A+0)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR

OPGW peak of this tower had damaged.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to the

high speed localized thunderstorm in this
area.

3
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-I Transmission
Line
Commissioning 01/10/2016
date
Date of Failure 03/05/2020
Date of restoration 21/05/2020
Tower No and 147 (A+6)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR
This tower collapsed in the direction
of perpendicular to the transmission line.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Complete tower had been collapsed

but foundation safe.

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized thunderstorm
in this area.

4
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt- II Transmission Line

Commissioning 11/04/2017
date
Date of Failure 03/05/2020

Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No and 161 (A+6)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR

This tower collapsed above 0+6 mtr

in the inclination of the transmission
line. Foundation not damaged.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized thunderstorm
in this area.
5
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-II Transmission
Line
Commissioning 11/04/2017
date
Date of Failure 03/05/2020
Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No and 162 (A+6)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis
ACSR

This tower collapsed in the

inclination of the transmission line.
Foundation not damaged.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized
thunderstorm in this area.
6
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-II Transmission Line
Commissioning 11/04/2017
date
Date of Failure 03/05/2020
Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No and 163 (A+0)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR

This tower collapsed in the direction

of perpendicular to the transmission
line and all 4 stub were also found to be
damaged.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized thunderstorm
in this area.
7
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-II Transmission
Line
Commissioning 11/04/2017
date
Date of Failure 03/05/2020
Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No and 164 (D+3)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR

This tower collapsed in the direction

of inclination/ perpendicular to the
transmission line and 1 No. stub was
also found to be damaged.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized thunderstorm
in this area.
8
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-II Transmission Line
Commissio 11/04/2017
ning date
Date of 28/05/2020
Failure
Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No 179 (A+3)
and Type
Observation Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
s Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR

EW peak damage at this tower due to

tension in conductor.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to the

high speed localized thunderstorm in this
area.

9
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-II Transmission Line

Commissioning 11/04/2017
date
Date of Failure 28/05/2020
Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No and 180 (A+3)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR

Cross arm of This tower damage due

to tension in the conductor.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized thunderstorm
in this area.

10
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-II Transmission
Line
Commissioning 11/04/2017
date
Date of Failure 28/05/2020
Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No and 181 (A+9)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis ACSR

This tower collapsed in the direction of

perpendicular to the transmission line.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized thunderstorm
in this area.

11
 765 kV Lalitpur- Fatehabad (Agra) Ckt-II Transmission
Line
Commissioning 11/04/2017
date
Date of Failure 28/05/2020
Date of 29/06/2020
restoration
Tower No and 182 (B+6)
Type
Observations Tower Configuration :- Horizontal
Conductor Type :- Quad Bersimis
ACSR

K portion of this tower had

collapsed.

Line designed as per Wind Zone-4

Reason :- Tower was collapsed due to

the high speed localized
thunderstorm in this area.

12
To find out the root cause of failure of tower, IIT
Kanpur was requested to examine the cause of
failure.

IIT Kanpur had submitted report and found in

analysis that 22 members of A type Tower and 16
members of D Type Tower have slenderness ratio
greater than unity and recommended additional
back-to-back angles, channels and plate as
appropriate to the failed members and adopting HT
steel of the strengthening of these failed towers.

These reports already sent to Design section of

UPPTCL and Power grid in April, 2021. 13
 KPTCL
FAILURE OF 220KV
KAPNOOR-SHAHBAD-
SHAHPUR D/C LINE AT
LOC NO 389 & 390
 DETAILS OF TRANSMISSION LINE
1 Name of Tr line 220kV Kapnoor-Shahbad-Shahpur D/C
line
2. Length of line(Km) 220kV Shahpur-Kapnoor- 101.94Km
220kV Shahbad-Kapnoor-52.60Kms
3. Type of configuration D/C
4. No of towers and type of towers failed Two (Tension)
5. Tower Loc No 389(DB+18), 390(DB+15)
6. Name and size of conductor Drake , 28.13mm dia
7. No of sub-conductors per bundle and NIL
bundle spacing
8. Number and size of conductor 1
9. Type of insulator in use Porcelain, 120kN
10 Configuration of insulator Tension
11 No of insulator per string and no of strings 16 Nos, Double tension strings
per phase
12 Year of construction/commissioning 2003
13 Executing Agency M/s Deepak Cable(India)
Limited
14 Weather condition on date of failure Rainy & stormy
wind(Whirl wind around
the area)
15 Terrain category 1
16 Wind zone and velocity of wind Medium wind,
43Kg/sqmm
17 Details of earthing of tower Pipe type
18 Line designed as per IS 802 IS 802, 1977
19 The agency who designed the line L&T
20 Any special consideration in design NIL
21 Date and time of occurrence/discovery of 17.04.2020, 17:15 Hrs
failure
22 Any missing member found before/after Nil
failure of towers
23 Condition of foundation after failure Intact
24 Brief Description of On 17.04.2020 at 17:15HRs the 220kV line tripped on DPR
failure at both ends. On inspection it was found that tower no
390(DB+15) was collapsed and [Link] 389(DB+18) main leg
member damaged due to heavy rain and whirl wind.

25 Probable cause of failure  Towers designed as per IS 802:1977 in which only

transverse load(wind in 0 deg) was considered for
calculation of wind load on conductor, insulator, ground
wire and tower body. Hence these towers are vulnerable
to high wind loads.
 Span length between loc 389(DB+18) to 390(DB+15) was
155M & between Loc No 390 (DB+15)to 391 (DA+3)was
340M. In case of towers with higher body extensions such
as +15M, +18M & +24M, the wind load is the major
governing factor under normal condition. Hence in order
to compensate the higher wind pressure, the wind spans
are generally reduced such that, the total wind load (wind
on conductor, insulator string) on the tower remains same
as original design. As long as the wind is with in
permissible limits, the tower sustains the load. In the
instant case, the wind span is found to be on the higher
side and hence more wind loads have acted on the tower
No 390. Heavy whirl wind which passed through this
stretch acted on weakened tower which could not resist
the heavy wind.
26 Details of previous failure of line/tower 4 nos of 220kV tower failed in
21.05.2010.(Loc no 522 to 526)
2 No of 220kV failed on 10.04.2012(
Loc no 404 to 405)
Wind data on the date of failure

155M

340M
Photographs
TREE FELLING IN SURROUNDING AREA
DUE TO WHIRL WIND
WIND SPEED DATA
 Remedial Measures
• The failed “DB+15” tower was replaced by
220kV “DD+15” at loc No 390.
• “DB+18” tower was provided at location no
389.
• The Buckled peak members of the tower at
location no 391 (DA+3) was replaced.
THANK YOU
Jabalpur-Bina
Tower failure Report

Dr Deepak Lakhapati
9 th June 2019
Jabalpur-Bina – Towers collapsed on
the evening at 16:34 hours on 07th
June, 2019 due to localised stormy
wind, Line was in service since 30th
JUNE 2015
LOCAL NEWS OF INCIDENCE

3
LOCAL NEWS OF INCIDENCE

4
LOCAL NEWS OF INCIDENCE

5
TOWER COLLAPSE

6
TOWER DAMAGES

7
TOWER DAMAGES

8
TOWER DAMAGES

9
Observations

1) Exceptionally high wind condition prevailed for some

time in the area on the day of failure of tower.
2) All suspension towers collapsed due to cascading
3) All plain area for long distance
4) Tower collapse in perpendicular direction pulling
down balance towers

10
KTL Tower failure Report

Dr Deepak Lakhapati
21 st April ,2019
KTL – Towers collapsed on the evening
of 16 th April due to localised stormy
wind causing damage to PGCIL and
MPTCL Transmission lines .
LOCAL NEWS OF INCIDENCE

3
LOCAL NEWS OF INCIDENCE

4
DIRECTION OF TOWER FAILURES

5
PHOTOS OF SITE VISIT ON 18 th and 19 th APRIL ,2019

A) Foundation Damages

B) Tower Damages

C) Hardware fittings damages

6
FOUNDATION -DAMAGES

7
FOUNDATION -DAMAGES

8
FOUNDATION -DAMAGES

9
TOWER –DAMAGES

10
TOWER –DAMAGES

11
TOWER –DAMAGES

12
TOWER –DAMAGES

13
TOWER –DAMAGES

14
TOWER -DAMAGES

15
TOWER -DAMAGES

16
HARDWARE FITTINGS –DAMAGES

17
HARDWARE FITTINGS –DAMAGES

18
HARDWARE FITTINGS –DAMAGES

19
SITE VISIT ON 18 TH AND 19 TH APRIL ,2019

20
SITE VISIT ON 18 TH AND 19 TH APRIL ,2019

21
 SITE OBSERVATIONS
A) 5 Towers ( 4 nos – DD+30 , 1 – DD+18 ) towers collapsed perpendicular to the line.
B) Conductors fell on the Powerlines of PGCIL and MPTCL damaging their towers and
caused their outage .
C) 2 tower cross-arms damaged as cascading impact .
D) 2 suspension tower earth-wire peaks damaged , and towers are under tension on
insulators , need to be supported by guys to prevent possible collapse
E) Stubs are bent at the Chimney, Foundation chimney shall need to be broken for
providing the Butt Joints and then additional reinforcement shall be provided to
reinforce the chimney .
F) All the hardware fittings got completely damaged ,
G) Panel nos 3,4 &5 , main leg cut and separated .

22
DMTCL - River changing course in 2019

➢ 0.5 km
Landmass
washed away

1
Internal
DM, district authorities camping at site with NDRF team

21 - 24 August 2019

Internal
2
Difficulties during protection of collapsed towers

3
Internal
Difficulties during protection of collapsed towers

4
Internal
Committee Recommendation

• All four collapsed tower to be shifted on Pile foundations

• Considering change in river course of Gandaki River , additional two towers also to
be shifted to Pile foundations and increase in span may also be considered
• Tower at location no. 27/1 which has titled to be shifted to new pile foundation
• New pile foundations shall be designed considering maximum scour depth as per
IRC 78:2014
• DMTCL to take up with relevant government agencies to take up dredging or any
other protection measures at suitable places in river to control washing away of
the river bank and protect the transmission line

5
Internal
 Status of Committee recommendation

Gopalgunj
Bund
Aeraj
Committee Bund
Recommendation
28
/0

27
/0

Towers and Transmission lines

Committee recommended – 6 Pile foundations excluded from the insurance
Note: Yellow
DMTCL color of10line
has moved policy
and to Pile foundations
towers
towers depicts that the asset is
covered, DMTCL
Further under thehas
policy
also increased the Span from Avg. 450m to Avg. 650m

As a result the first open cast foundation has been moved to 2 kms from the Gopalgunj side bank
and 1 km from the Aeraj side Bank
6
Internal
Interim measures for restoration

• The LILO section of DMTCL was restored through Emergency Restoration System in
the month of March 2020 ( within 7 to 8 months period) {6 ERS systems also got washed
away by nature fury during restoration}
• A temporary solution, a single circuit - single conductor solution was implemented
which ensured power flow to the northern districts of Bihar
• Further, amidst Covid and unprecented flooding's in the region in the month of March
2020, complete scheme incorporating all recommendation of the Committee on
Tower Failures was implemented and line was charged restoring the complete power
supplies

7
Internal
 Raichur – Sholapur
Transmission Company Private
Limited.

Presentation on
Raichur to Sholapur 765KV, Quad
S/C Transmission Line.
INTRODUCTION
Raichur Sholapur Transmission Company Private Limited (RSTCPL) is a
consortium company of three companies namely, Patel Engineering Limited,
Mumbai (Lead Partner); Simplex Infrastructures Limited, Kolkata; and BS
Transcomm Limited, Hyderabad. RSTCL has won the bid in Dec 2011 on
BOOM basis as a Transmission Service Provider (TSP) to construct Raichur-
Sholapur 765 kV Single Circuit Transmission Line – 1, forming the transmission
system associated with Krishnapattnam UMPP – Synchronous Interconnection
between Southern Region and Western Region (Part-B), in response to an
invitation by REC Transmission Projects Company Ltd.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The Project consists of construction of 765 kV Single Circuit Transmission

Line-2 between Raichur and Sholapur, forming the transmission system
associated with Krishnapattnam UMPP – Synchronous interconnection
between Southern Region and Western Region (Part-B). The utilization of
transmission line will depend upon the load demand and power availability.
The line length is about 210 km.

The line commences from Power Grid’s 765/400 kV substation near Askihal
Village, Raichur District, Karnataka State;
And

Terminates at Power Grid’s 765/400 kV substation near Limbi Chincholi

Village, Solapur District, Maharashtra State.

Around 180 km of the line lies in Karnataka, while the balance line portion is
in Maharashtra
Report On Raichur Sholapur 765 Kv S/C Quad
transmission line Tower Collapse.
On 03.06.2019 we came to know of an astonishing damage by act of God to
the 765 KV Raichur – Sholapur transmission line.
 Tower Collapse-:

 On 3rd June-2019 Due to heavy Rain, Thunder & Twisting Wind our 07 nos.

Tower Collapse.

Detail Of Tower Collapsed

[Link] Tower No. Type of tower Remark
1 431 Foundation Damaged A+3 Jewergi K
2 432 Foundation Damaged A+3 Jewergi K
3 433 Foundation Damaged A+0 Jewergi K
4 431 Fully Damaged A+3 Jewergi K
5 432 Fully Damaged A+3 Jewergi K
6 433 Fully Damaged A+0 Jewergi K
7 434 Partially Damaged A+0 Jewergi K
8 435 Partially Damaged A+3 Bablad
9 436 Partially Damaged A+0 Bablad
10 437 Partially Damaged B+0 Bablad
11 Stringing done from Tower No. 431 to Tower No. 439, 3.124 Km
We get the information of our Line Tripping On 3rd of June-2019,

at 17:54, Our Maintenance team reach the spot to find out the

reasons for Line Tripping But due to heavy rain, wind &

Lightning they are not able to get down from their Vehicle. But

from Inside the Vehicle they saw that some towers are collapsed.

Next day Our Maintenance team found that 07 No’s tower were

collapsed as per above mention table. Not only Our tower but

GESCOM Surrounding area Poles, Many trees are also damaged.

 RSTCPL is having experience staff & they are well aware of tools,

devices & equipment which are used in transmission Line,

Knowing the situation we immediately deployed the team &

started the removing collapsed tower to clear the site the

location to construct the new tower.

 It was very difficult task as it was the rainy season & we are not

getting full day to work, also because of Black Cotton Soil, water

Logged ground, Vehicle movement was very difficult in monsoon

season. Moreover The Tower was collapsed in Border Line of

Karnataka & Maharashtra (431,432,433,434 in Karnataka &

435,436 & 437 are in Maharashtra.)

 Material Test Report-:

 As require by CEA/SRPC & to know the material quality we tested few member

from tower parts in CPRI Bangalore. We took the samples randomly from the

debris of collapsed tower.

 Meteorological data: -

As per requirement of CEA/SRPC and RSTCPL to know the Meteorological

data for particular tower collapse area we approach many agency but since

tower collapse area is very interior no one has meteorological data for that

area. Even Govt. Meteorological department close their office at 17:30. For

this after long search we come to know that RE-Connect Energy is doing this

Meteorological analysis in their office lab by creating some models. This

method is time taking to analysis actual condition there are four stages. For

RSTCPL case they gone to all level 1 to 4 of analysis.

 Trucon Associates RSTCPL Tower Designer Report:-

 Trucon Associates had design the all tower for RSTCPL Raichur-Sholapur Line II.

Trucon Associates also check the all parameters of design and found that there is

no issue on tower design. The Tower may collapse because of up and down thrust

movement of wind on that day & time as mentions by Reconnect energy report.

RSTCPL noted the same that the tower collapsed may be because of up thrust

twister movement on tower. Local villagers also witnessed the same on that day.
Tower Collapse Pictures
Thank You…..