Drilling & Blasting Method Statement
Drilling & Blasting Method Statement
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ......................................................................................5
2. Introduction about contractor ...........................................................5
3. Objective .........................................................................................5
4. Preamble .........................................................................................6
5. Scope ..............................................................................................7
6. Storage of Explosives ......................................................................7
7. Definitions & Terminology ...............................................................7
8. Production Planning ......................................................................10
9. General Requirement ....................................................................11
10. Manage Blasting Operations .........................................................11
11. Personal Protective Equipment and Special Equipment for the
Blasting ..........................................................................................11
12. Required Competencies and Training ...........................................13
13. Risk Assessment ...........................................................................14
14. Safe and Secure storage and Transportation of Explosives .........16
15. Licensing and Regularity Requirement .........................................19
16. Blasting Notification .......................................................................19
17. Blast Planning and Record Keeping..............................................21
18. Basic Calculation ...........................................................................23
19. Bench Preparation and Demarcation ............................................23
20. Blast Design ..................................................................................25
21. Measuring and Priming Blastholes ................................................28
22. Charging and Stemming Blastholes ..............................................32
23. Surface Tie-Up ..............................................................................36
24. Initiation Sequencing Methods ......................................................38
25. Implementation Plans ....................................................................39
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26. Safety Procedures .........................................................................40
27. Emergency Plan ............................................................................41
28. Pre-Blast Meeting ..........................................................................42
29. Monitor and Control Manual ..........................................................42
30. Blast Clearance and Firing shot. ....................................................45
31. Fly rock ..........................................................................................47
32. Post Blast Inspection and Assessment...........................................47
33. Misfire Management. .....................................................................50
34. Misfire Reduction ...........................................................................54
35. Secondary Breakage Procedure. ..................................................61
36. Typical Blast Design ......................................................................62
36.1. Firing Pattern ............................................................................63
36.2. Drill Plan. ..................................................................................64
36.3. Chargin Pattern. .......................................................................65
1. Introduction
ARAMCO is one of the world's largest integrated energy and chemicals companies,
creating value across the hydrocarbon chain, and delivering societal and economic
benefits to people and communities around the globe who rely on the vital energy
we supply.
Nesma has extensive expertise in various regions of Saudi Arabia, and has gained this
experience over the course of dozens of years of hard work appreciated by clients,
through the design and implementation of many vital successful projects with many
of the largest and most respected institutions and bodies.
Nesma Company is working in Aramco and was working in NEOM projects in many
Work orders in different regions of Neom, as well many projects around Saudi
kingdom
3. Objective
The Work Order involves the earthworks for Making pipelines trench
and ROW. The scope includes controlled excavation to formation
level, segregation, management of stockpiles within the Site
boundary limits, installation of approved slope stabilization,
transportation of excavated
materials to the Employer’s stockpiles and storage areas from the Site
boundary, and all associated temporary works.
4. Preamble
The use of explosives to break rock involves the sudden application of large
amounts of energy and is therefore a process requiring the effective
management and control of activities to ensure that hazards are identified and
appropriately controlled. On a surface blast site, the potential hazards are
increased by the need to handle sensitive initiating explosives while working in
a harsh environment. The blasting process must be handled and managed in a
way that minimizes the risk of the unplanned detonation of explosives, and
associated undesired outcomes, and uncontrolled blast behavior at the time of
firing.
In considering the safety of blasting personnel, contractors and the public,
hazards associated with the blasting process include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Loss or theft of explosives from the blasting site, representing a security risk.
Unplanned detonation of explosives due to incorrect handling or
application, or during transportation.
Unplanned detonation during placement due to impacts associated with operating
equipment (e.g., as drills and excavators in adjacent areas); impact from passing
equipment; or snap-slap-shoot risks from passing equipment.
Unplanned detonation of explosives after placement, from an external source of
initiation such as hot/reactive ground, or lightning. (in case of electronics).
Unplanned detonation of explosives due to the application of electrical energy for
testing orfiring of electronic initiation systems, e.g., following undetected damage
by lightning.
Fly rock risks to persons, equipment, and infrastructure, outside the blast exclusion
zone, generated by an inadequately confined blast, within a blast exclusion zone that
has not been adequately cleared prior to firing, or an exclusion zone inadequately
determined based on ground conditions.
Environmental compliance risks (overpressure and ground vibration) associated with
overloaded blastholes, large (reinforcing) blasts, and unfavorable meteorological
conditions.
Persons at risk from dust and fumes generated by the blast, outside the blast exclusion
zone or potentially outside the site boundary.
Persons at risk from misfired blastholes, particularly during subsequent excavation or
re-drilling of the blast area.
This method statement has been developed to provide practical guidance regarding on-bench
activities that must be considered as part of the risk assessment process, and during the
development of a safety management plan and associated operating procedures and work
instructions. The method statement is necessarily generic in order to remain applicable across
a broad range of applications, using a variety of explosive products, to achieve different
blasting outcomes, etc.,
5. Scope
This method statement sets out recommendations and precautions to ensure the safety of
employees, sub- contractors, members of the public and the environment, in relation to
activities associated with the blasting process. These recommendations principally apply to
‘on-bench’ activities, including the preparation of a blast area, the priming and charging of
blastholes, stemming and the tie-up of charged blastholes ready for firing.
6. Storage of Explosives
Explosive storage, Materials will be supplied by the explosives Supplier Company directly form
Suppliers’
stores to site or Blasting store magazines will be used for explosives storage.
Bench Height – The vertical distance between the base of one bench and the base of the
overlying bench. The bench height is designed by the blast planner. The main constraint on
height of bench is usually the limiting thickness that can be handled by the drills and/or the
loading equipment.
Blast Boards – Designated boards located in areas where general mining personnel gather or
pass, dedicated to the site blasting activities and indicating the location, time and date of any
scheduled blasting on a mine/quarry site.
Blast Location – The location where blastholes are to be charged and fired, and within which
access will be restricted to authorized persons, authorized vehicles, or personnel/vehicles
under the supervision of an authorized persons. The blast area may also include clearance
distances outside the immediate charging area. For example, drilling, excavation, and other
operations may be restricted, adjacent to, above or in front of the immediate charging area.
Blast controller – or blast machine, the apparatus used to initiate a blast(s) by the responsible
approved shot firer
BE – blast engineer
Blast Exclusion Zone – The area that is determined by a risk assessment process, to ensure that all
the expected
/ Foreseen effects of the blast, are maintained within a controlled area. The Blast Exclusion
Zone can be layered, with an inner zone being defined as the exclusion area for equipment and
a wider area being defined as the exclusion area for personnel.
Blast Guard - Industry terminology for a hard barrier consisting of a suitable person and
equipment (visual indicators, suitable vehicle, and communications equipment), strategically
located to prevent access of unauthorized personnel and traffic into a designated Blast
Exclusion Zone.
Blast Supervisor – A person who is appointed and responsible for the logistics of the clearance
of the Blast Exclusion Zone, including the removal of personnel and equipment, the
positioning of blast guards, and completion of a final sweep prior to firing. In some cases, this
may be the Shotfirer.
B&S – burden and spacing, burden the perpendicular distance from a blast hole to the free
face, spacing the linear distance between two blast holes in the same row
Blasting wire – also called harness wire, bell wire, a thin 2 core copper cable, usually on 500-meter-
long rolls
Fly rock – is rock that is projected by the blast outside the blast clearance zone.
Misfires – The attached document in the appendix under the heading “A Protocol to
Reduce the Risk of Dealing with Misfires” explains misfires
The BMS deals with misfires and cover the below mentioned points in the misfire
section in this blasting method statement
• Type(s) of misfires
• Treatment of misfires
• Reasons for misfires
• Prevention of misfires
ID – Identification
Post-Blast Fume – The plume of material generated after the initiation of ammonium
nitrate-based explosives, which is sometimes a yellowish through to a red/brown color.
Pre-Blast Meeting – A meeting sometimes conducted at the edge of the delineated shot, prior
to the shot being fired. The meeting should include the Shotfirer, Blast Supervisor, nominated
Blast Guards and other personnel relevant to the blast such as technical representatives
and/or supervisors.
Pre-Shift Meeting – A meeting conducted on a site prior to, or at the beginning of, each shift
where relevant information is communicated to operational personnel, such as road reports,
blasting activities, sleeping shots, new hazards, misfires, changes to procedures, safety tool
box etc.
a) Class A: Public street, road or thoroughfare, railway, navigable waterway, dock, wharf, pier
or jetty, marketplace, public recreation and sports ground or other open place where the
public is accustomed to assemble, open place of work in another occupancy, river-wall,
seawall, reservoir, water main (above ground), radio or television transmitter, main electrical
substation, private road which is a principal means of access to a church, chapel, community
halls, college, school, hospital or factory.
b) Class B: Dwelling house, public building, church, chapel, college, school, hospital, theatre,
cinema or other building or structure where the public is accustomed to assemble, shop,
factory, warehouse, store, building in which any person is employed in any trade or business,
depot for the keeping of flammable or dangerous goods; major dam
They must be notified prior to start Blasting activity by using email and approval from different
stakeholders.
Shotfirer – An appointed person who uses blasting explosives and is responsible for preparing,
charging, and firing explosives and ensuring all shots went off by inspecting for misfires. A
Shotfirer will be nominated for each blasting activity.
Sleeping Shot – A blast area containing explosives that is not yet ready for firing (i.e.,
loading is incomplete) or has been delayed due to charging constraints or unsuitable
conditions (e.g., weather conditions).
Unauthorized Persons – Personnel not associated with blast charging and shot-firing
activities, who are not permitted to enter the blast area without permission of the
nominated Shotfirer and then only under appropriate supervision.
Unauthorized Traffic – Personnel operating machinery / vehicles not associated with blast
charging and shot- firing operations, which are not permitted to enter the blast area without
permission of the nominated shotfirer and then only under appropriate supervision.
Number Drilling Drilling Drilling Drilling Bit Specific Cubic Cubic Cubic
of Drill Rate for Rate for Rate/ Rate / Diameter design Meter Meter meter/
Machine one 5 week month / Day / week Month
machine machine
/ Day / Day
10 150 M 1,500 M 9,000 36,000 76 mm 9 M2 13,500 81,000 324,000
M M M3 M3 M3
8. Production Planning
Overall Plan for completion 1 year
9. General Requirement
Management systems and procedures which must be in place to control the blasting process and must satisfy
applicable regulatory and Aramco requirements. This method statement should be used when developing or
reviewing management systems that relate to blasting and explosives.
It is the responsibility of site management to ensure all personnel involved in blasting operations are suitably
qualified and trained and adhere to all relevant site-specific SOPs/SWPs. It is the responsibility of all persons
working on the blast bench to adhere to the relevant site specific Standard Operating Procedures and Standard
Work Practices when engaging in on-bench activity.
It is the responsibility of all persons involved in the blasting process to use risk management principles to assess
hazards and implement necessary controls for activities or processes, where there is a risk of personal injury or
equipment damage. This applies to activities on the blast bench, or to consequences of such activities while the
shot is ‘sleeping’, when the blast is fired, or at some later time.
Prior to the operation of any equipment used in the blasting process, all relevant pre-start inspections must be
completed and recorded for all equipment that is used in the operation. Equipment is not to be operated by any
person where it is not safe to do so, or where that person is not trained and authorized to do so. Equipment can
include dewatering and stemming equipment and light vehicles suitable for the transportation of the shot crew
and/or explosives.
Where vehicles are used for the transportation of bulk explosives, precursors or initiating explosives to/from the
blast area, such vehicles must comply with applicable standards. Such vehicles must be approved for use on site,
be clearly identifiable and placarded in terms of the products being transported, comply with the legislativeand
site conditions, and be managed in a manner that prevents unauthorized access to explosives and precursors.
Site-specific guidelines for the transportation and storage of explosives, and secure management and handling
of explosives and other security sensitive materials, must be documented within a Site Security Management
Plan and associated operating procedures.
11. Personal Protective Equipment and Special Equipment for the Blasting
The personal protective equipment required for the task will be in accordance with the company and site
requirements like Approved Hi-Visibility Clothing, Safety Footwear, Eye Protection, Hard Hat, Ear Protection and
Hand Protection etc.,
The special equipment required for the blasting may include the following items:
(a) Site compliant two-way communication.
(b) Approved blast area demarcation and road closure items (signage, witches’ hats, flashing lights, bunting
etc.).
(c) Approved blasthole measuring devices, such as weighted measuring tapes or measuring lines, face profiling
devices and blasthole tracking systems.
(d) Approved and calibrated monitoring devices, such as temperature probes for hot holes, gas monitoring
systems where noxious gases are expected on the bench or after the blast, and vibration/overpressure monitors.
(e) Non-explosive blasthole accessories such as gas bags, blasthole savers, stem plugs, collar pegs and initiating
explosives retention devices.
(f) Approved cutting devices for detonating cord and explosives packaging.
(g) Approved circuit testing devices and firing systems/devices for electric, electronic, and signal tube firing
systems.
(h) Approved calibrated vibration and AOP recording devices.
(i) Video recording devices.
Face profiling and blasthole tracking systems may be required to assess variable free face burdens
i) Sites must maintain a regular review and renewal of training and competency requirements as required by
legislative or company requirements.
Risk assessments at a broad operational level, and more specifically focusing on the management of blasting
and explosives, provide guidance for dealing with the hazards and potential consequences of undesired
outcomes and impacts. Controls to manage the identified hazards/risks should consider the hierarchy of controls
so that the most effective measures are employed. These exercises must be conducted by a representative group
of stakeholders, including management, technical and operational personnel.
Specific risk assessments must also be carried out, identifying the hazards that could be presented by an
individual shot, and the controls required at each stage of the blasting process. Operational risk assessments
should also be conducted on a daily or shift change basis as relevant.
The main areas to consider include:
a) Planning and design – Identifying the hazards and controls associated with specific blast types and ground
conditions, and the potential impacts on subsequent mining activities, wall stability, environmental impact,
downstream processing etc.,
b) Bench preparation and demarcation – Identifying the hazards and controls associated with equipment and
personnel working within the blast area, including broken ground, cavities, vehicle rollover, unsafe high-
walls/low-walls, adverse slope and crest conditions, unauthorized access, water management and interaction
with other mining processes.
c) Priming, charging, and stemming blastholes – Avoiding hazards associated with the snap/slap/shoot of signal
tube downlines, unplanned detonation in elevated temperature and/or reactive ground, and fly
rock/overpressure associated with overloaded or under-burdened holes.
d) Blast clearance & shot firing – Ensuring adequate blast clearance and controls are in place to prevent
unauthorized access into the blast exclusion zone while blasting is in progress and until after the ‘all clear’ has
been given. Identifying where post-blast inspection of any critical areas is required, such as unstable wall
conditions and misfires, and where physical barriers need to be established after the blast.
e) In some cases, additional risk assessments will be required for specific high-risk processes, such as blasting in
elevated temperature and/or reactive ground areas, blasting in areas with a known history of generating post-
blast fume, working in areas with cracked and/or unstable ground conditions, working under steep walls or
slopes, or working in areas with noxious gases such as carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides, either on the bench
or during re-entry after the blast. Consideration should also be given to any old underground workings in the
vicinity.
f) While the above risk assessment stages are not all directly associated with on-bench blasting activities, the
various hazards and controls must be understood by personnel working on-bench to ensure that potential
consequences are understood for the complete process.
g) Operational or specific risk assessments of on-bench activities are best carried out at the work area, prior to
the commencement of work.
g) Access to and from the proposed Blast Exclusion Zone. An exclusion zone should be identified prior to the
commencement of charging and maintained at all times, in the event that evacuation is required due to
approaching electrical storm, bushfire or some other emergency response. Blasting processed adjacent to the
blast area should not hinder this access.
h) Interaction with other mining processes adjacent to the blast area, such as drilling and excavation, and safety
hazards associated with steep slopes, noise and dust.
i) Slip, trip, fall and manual handling hazards within the blast area, associated with uneven or muddy ground, or
poor weather conditions.
j) The intended application and combination of specific bulk explosives, boosters, and initiating systems must
be consistent with supplier guidelines. For example, suitability for use in elevated temperature conditions, or
compatibility of initiating explosives such as detonating cord and boosters.
k) All explosives, blasthole accessories, equipment and tools must be approved by management for use on site,
with appropriate technical data sheets and safety data sheets provided by the supplier.
l) Specific risks associated with particular explosive products such as electric detonators and electrical hazards;
safety fuse and burning speed variability; and the potential for stretch- snap-slap-shoot events when using signal
tube systems.
m) Previous history of fly rock, poor fragmentation, inadequate/excessive blast movement, and/or excessive
blast damage.
n) Previous history of excessive vibration, overpressure and dust, or complaints of disturbance from nearby
workplace.
o) The previous history of, and potential for, generation of post-blast fume (NOx) and associated blast size and
sleep time restrictions, firing time limitations, or meteorological constraints.
p) The forecast weather conditions (particularly rainfall, lightning, dust storm, wind, and fog which may reduce
visibility).
q) The location of equipment and personnel at the time of firing and any radio communication black-spots.
r) Daily planning/scheduling requirements and time available to complete necessary tasks.
s) Where required, blast design, measuring and monitoring devices (face profiling, blasthole tracking,
temperature probes, gas monitoring systems, vibration/overpressure monitors, video equipment, etc.) should
be available and calibrated.
t) Documented blast design parameters, including blasthole diameters, burden and spacing; bench height range;
relative elevation of the bench; range of charge mass per hole or per deck; designed blast powder factor; timing,
including the required inter-hole, inter-row, and downhole delays, and firing direction, and stemming
parameters.
u) Additional controls and QA/QC records for any blasts deemed unusual or ‘high risk’. This may include
secondary blasting considerations, firing multiple shots as a single event, or firing blasts in close proximity to
each other (measured horizontally or between different levels).
v) Once work in a blast area has commenced, all personnel must continually assess conditions and report
hazards to the relevant supervisor of the work area. The site change management process must be well
understood by all personnel and work should not continue if it is not safe to do so.
w) All incidents and accidents must be reported though the relevant safety management systems for the site.
locations and should aim to have all personnel at a safe distance within 45 minutes of a fire starting and
engulfing explosives. In addition, the storage location should not impede an evacuation.
The following must be risk assessed when determining the location of any underground ANE store:
− The distance from major service installations to manage the effects of a fire and explosion upon winders,
electrical substations, pump stations, ventilation equipment or other critical infrastructure.
− Proximity to other Dangerous Goods stores (fuel, explosives etc.) and associated cross propagation risks.
Requirements for Storage
These requirements apply to both permanent (fixed) locations and temporary stores except where noted.
a) Access
The hazards of an out-of-control vehicle or locomotive entering the store should be addressed. Control options
may include vehicles having to make at least one 90 degrees turn to access the store. For rail access, a suitable
de-railer or equivalent should be adjacent to the store. For temporary stores alternative methods may be
required to address the hazard.
b) Traffic Management
There must be adequate floor area for vehicle movements. A traffic management plan is to be
developed that considers planned vehicle movements in the normal operation of the store.
c) Unplanned movement
Unplanned vehicle interactions with transfer equipment and storage containers should be
addressed. Control options may include physical barriers or elevated storage.
d) Security
Access to explosives is to be controlled as it is a security sensitive product. Control measures should
align with regulatory requirements and should include physical barriers.
− to all access points on bulk containers (lockable lids, transfer valves, drain bungs, etc.); and/or
− security gates with appropriate locking devices at the storage access. (Note, where security gates are used,
consideration should be given to appropriate direction of swing to ensure safe exit in an emergency, safety of
products, trafficable routes, etc.)
e) Drainage
The store should be constructed such that large spills are drained away from the storage. Bunding
is not recommended (refer to Spill Recovery section).
The access should be inclined or similar to provide adequate drainage to prevent deterioration of the access
roadway and prevent water entering and pooling in the store.
f) Spill Recovery
Spillage containment is generally not applied to explosives storages due to the high viscosity of the material
(does not flow readily) and to reduce the risk that containment may concentrate fuels under the storage during
fire conditions.
The design shall consider the management and recovery of spilled explosives. The store should be constructed
so that large spills do not accumulate near the storage.
g) Ground Conditions
The backs and walls of the store should be in a condition as to prevent a rock fall from impacting persons or
products. The backs and walls should be free from loose or protruding rocks or meshed and bolted to secure
from possible rock falls.
All intersecting boreholes are to be grouted and butts identified to ensure they are free of residual explosives.
The floor of the storage should be:
− Smooth for extensive foot traffic
− Stable to prevent rutting from vehicle access
− Suitable for storage container stability and vehicle operations and
− Suitable to recover spills.
For fixed ANE storage, concrete or stabilized floors are recommended to address the above hazards and
minimize the potential for tramp material being introduced.
For temporary ANE storage alternative methods may be employed provided these are assessed for risk.
h) Fire Fighting Equipment (FFE)
The specific requirement for FFE must be addressed in the risk assessment.
All storages require portable fire extinguishers to be located near vehicles or equipment where spot fires are
more likely to occur.
i) Additional Safety Equipment
All stores where product transfers take place are to be provided with
− Spill kits with appropriate clean up equipment and labelled waste containers,
− Eyewash stations, and
− Additional PPE such as face shields, gloves and aprons as required, e.g., for acid and gasser solution transfer.
j) Signage and Notification
All personnel entering the blasting operation are to be made aware of the location and access requirements
for all explosives storages.
In addition, the location of fixed explosives stores is to be recorded on the current mine plan. All
explosives’ stores shall display the following signs:
− Placarding (as appropriate to the storage, and in line with local legislative requirements)
− “No Smoking” and “No Hot Work”
− Firefighting equipment
− Eyewash (if required)
− Store product names and quantity limits
− “Authorized Access Only” or similar wording
− Emergency contact numbers
− Required PPE.
k) Documentation
explosive stores are to be provided with the following documentation in an accessible and protected
location.
− Store operation rules, including requirement for preventing unauthorized access
− MSDS and TDS for all products stored
− Emergency response plan with actions for the different emergencies (Fire, unauthorized access, loss / theft
of explosives, large spill)
− Location and type of FFE and or other equipment such as eyewash bays
− Stock records – Current stock and transfers.
l) Lighting
Lighting should be sufficient to enable a person to easily read markings, instructions, signs, etc.
To improve illumination, walls and the roof may be painted white.
There is no specific requirement for fixed lighting unless identified as a control in the risk assessment. Where
fixed lighting is installed, it shall have a rating of at least IP55 to protect from corrosion or the rating applicable
to the underground operation.
Electrical installations inside a storage area should be minimized.
Transportation of Explosives
The transport of explosives to blasting location needs to be conducted without other dangerous goods or
explosives being carried on the same vehicle, at the same time as explosives & detonators.
Procedures for the blasting location of explosives need to detail the control measures to ensure safe transport.
Such control measures should include:
− Driver training. All personnel responsible for the transport of explosives must be trained in appropriate
emergency response for transport scenarios
− Driver authorization to have unsupervised access to security sensitive products
− Site induction
− Pre-start equipment checks
− Emergency response for transport scenarios
− Incident reporting
− Traffic management / route planning / interaction management
− Vehicle requirements (safety equipment, PPE, fire extinguishers, placarding)
− Emergency information (Explosive Emergency Procedure Guide – manufacturer handbook, Safety Data
Sheets, etc.)
− Compliance with the MPU Code of Practice, where applicable
− Load limits
− Load restraint
− Product / load security.
As the transport may be conducted by contractor or site personnel, where appropriate the procedures need to
include mine site inductions, mine specific PPE requirements and the blast specifications for vehicles operating
underground
Waste Management Procedure
The requirement to minimize waste shall be incorporated in the relevant site operating procedures.
The storage of waste shall be minimized, with regular review and management of waste inventory, including
prompt disposal.
Waste ANFO shall be noted in stock reconciliation and shall be secured from unauthorized access.
Note where waste ANFO has been treated with an appropriate surfactant and diluted to less than 45% ANFO
content it no longer has security requirements.
Waste materials shall be kept in separate, labelled and lidded containers constructed of compatible material and
stored in appropriate secure locations. No other waste (e.g. gasser, clean-up rags, combustible material, etc.) is
to be stored or mixed with the ANFO waste.
Wastes shall be removed and/or disposed of in accordance with site procedures which must recognize
environmental, organizational, and legislative guidelines.
g) The Technical Services personnel associated with the blast will provide a scaled plan or map to be
presented at the pre-blast meeting.
The Blast Plan and the scaled plan or map should provide the following information: -
The blasting schedule will be provided to the designated blast personnel (e.g. Open Cut Examiner) and details
such as blasting inspections (sleeping shots and reload areas) shall be entered into the relevant blast reports
where the information can be communicated to the general mining personnel at the morning pre-shift
meetings.
The communications of blasting activities to the general blasting personnel on the work site should include
blast identification, the blast type, the location, Blast Exclusion Zone distances and the firing times.
Additional forms of blasting notification such as: -
− A site-specific blasting hotline which could be a recorded message, providing the site-specific forecast blast
firing times for all relevant persons.
− A general radio announcement made each day at a nominal time to indicate the blasting requirements of the
day.
During the day of the shot, the Shotfirer shall review the site Blast Exclusion Zone plan in conjunction with the
other relevant personnel (Technical Services Representative, Blast Supervisor, Open Cut Examiner) regarding
the following: -
− Blast Guard positions.
− Sweep areas.
− Production and ancillary equipment locations.
− Personnel locations, including the location of maintenance personnel.
− Any exceptional circumstances related to the blast.
− The location of any structure or mobile equipment that will be within the personnel exclusion zone.
− Fume management zone
The Blast Supervisor shall confirm that the appropriate people have been notified in relation to machinery and
people to be removed from the exclusion zone. (e.g. Pit Foreman, Maintenance Foreman, Pump Crew
Foreman, machine Operator).
This should be done as early as possible prior to the shot being tied in and again the information shall be
conveyed to all at the Blast Guard meeting.
If it has been determined that the blast exclusion area encompasses a public roadway and/or rail line, it will be
confirmed at the pre-blast meeting that the relevant authorities have been notified and appropriate controls
are in place.
sleep time can be dependent upon ground conditions (elevated temperature, dynamic water etc.), or the sleep
time parameters of either the bulk explosives (e.g. dry/damp/wet conditions) or the initiating explosives
j) The sleeping of blasts outside normal operating hours must take into consideration requirements for
maintaining restricted access and explosives security, with appropriate demarcation, guarding and supervision,
to also be effective during any night shifts.
2. Record Keeping
All relevant information regarding the blast must be maintained as part of the blast management system, with
appropriate approval and responsibility recorded throughout the process. A copy of this information must also
be available for each blast, in a ‘blast pack’ for use by the shotfirers. This is likely to include:
(a) Blast summary sheet showing nominal blast pattern, total drill meters, estimated bulk explosives
requirements and design powder factor, stemming requirements, and quantities/types of initiating explosives
and blasthole accessories.
(b) Plans and specifications detailing blast location, blast boundary and bench preparation requirements.
(c) Risk assessments for the blast work area at various stages in the blasting process with a record of all persons
entering the blast loading area to be maintained. This is to ensure that all persons within the blast loading area
have reviewed the risk assessment and are aware of the identified hazards and the controls and can be
interviewed in the event of an incident.
(d) Drill pattern showing blasthole layout, with blasthole ID, location, depth, angle, direction, and diameter of all
blastholes. Cross-sections are desirable where varying depths (e.g., stab holes) and different angles (e.g., face
holes) apply across the shot. A table of this information may also be available in the form of drill sheets, so that
actual drilled records can be compared to design.
(e) Charge sheets detailing the location of primers, charge mass and length, length of inert decks (gravel, air or
water), and stem heights for each blasthole. Cross-sections are desirable where multiple decks are used, to show
the required deck and primer location. Product selection requirements should be specified where dictated
(f) by ground conditions (e.g., depth of water, hard/soft areas, face holes etc.). Actual dipped depths and charged
quantities are also to be recorded and compared with design quantities on a hole-by-hole basis (variations to be
recorded).
(g) Additional records may be required to define specific blasting conditions, such as temperature logs for
blasting at elevated temperature, identified voids when blasting over underground workings, blocked blastholes
in cracked ground, the location of slumped holes after a rain event, the location of known or potential misfires
where lost downlines cannot be recovered.
(h) Tie-up plan showing the initiation hole, initiation sequence and firing direction, and connection sequence
(For electronic systems). Guidelines to deal with additional or missing holes are also recommended.
Modifications to the design tie-up should be recorded on the plan, particularly where changes have been made
to accommodate additional or missing holes.
(i) Blast clearance plan(s) showing the name/identity of the blast, location of the blast with respect to roadways
and other blasting activities, blast notification requirements, blast guard positions, the extent of the blast
exclusion zone for personnel and equipment, the Shotfirer’s firing position, and the location of sensitive
locations/infrastructure. This information is required at the start of charging activities, in the event of an
emergency situation such as an electrical storm or fire on an explosive’s vehicle, when rapid clearance of the
blast area may be required, or in the event that emergency firing is required (expected flooding, identification
of hot ground etc.).
(j) Magazine records, showing explosive quantities taken from the magazines, used on the shot and returned to
the magazine. This must be recorded in a way that allows appropriate reconciliation of initiating explosives for
specific product types, in order to identify unexplained losses or theft, and to ensure explosives storage limits
are not exceeded.
(k) Bulk explosives delivery records by truck and shift, that allow reconciliation of actual and design densities
and quantities, of explosive products used.
(l) Bulk explosives delivery records that allow identification of which holes were loaded by which truck (if
applicable).
(m) Shotfirer’s daily/shift/roster report, including blast summary information, firing time/date, weather
conditions at the time of firing, and blast performance comments regarding fragmentation, heave profile,
fly rock, fume, misfires etc. Separate reports may need to be completed regarding misfires and environmental
impacts.
(n) A video record of the blast event, and pre/post blast photographs provide an essential visual record,
particularly in the event of an unexpected blast outcome or impact.
(o) All site records should be completed and maintained for an appropriate length of time consistent with
relevant management systems.
Calculating subdrill
The purpose of subdrill is to maintain the required grade level. The length of subdrill required varies according
to geological conditions but is often taken as 1/3 x Burden
Stemming
The function of stemming is to contain the explosion gases to assist in fracturing rock, heave and to reduce
blast nuisances such as air blast and fly rock. Stemming length increases with in blasthole diameter.
General rule of thumb for stemming is 20-30 diameters
If walls show evidence of movement, slabbing or section failure a detailed geotechnical review should be
conducted.
At sites where the blast crew are not in regular attendance or not familiar with the high-walls or low-walls a
risk assessment must be conducted, or half the height of the wall must be used as the stand-off distance.
A crest berm or windrow should be constructed equivalent to half the height of the largest vehicle wheel
working on the bench. If a continuous crest berm or windrow is not achievable, or if cracking or crest damage
extends past the foot of the berm, the crest must be clearly demarcated by a paint line, flutter tape, cones or
other identifiable means at least two meters from the crest edge.
h) The width and stability of narrow terraces within the blast area must be sufficient for all equipment likely to
access those terraces.
i) Bench surfaces to be adequately prepared to provide a safe work area for the shot crew without
unnecessary trip/fall hazards or climbing required. This must be done in a manner that does not push material
into drilled blastholes.
j) Bench surface to be prepared with consideration for natural drainage in the event of rainfall, to avoid
accumulation of water on the shot and/or the creation of boggy ground conditions. Additional drainage may
need to be established to remove accumulated water from the blast area or prevent accumulation after
charging has commenced.
k) Designated vehicle parking areas and tipping areas for stemming material. Access to the blast area is best
restricted to essential vehicles, with non-essential vehicles parked safely outside the perimeter where possible.
Stockpile areas for stemming material are also best maintained outside the blast area, with suitable access and
stable ground for trucks to dump loads of stemming. Where stemming is dumped within the blast area, for
manual stemming or placement by loading equipment, it should be placed prior to the commencement of
priming and charging, with care to avoid driving over or covering drilled holes.
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Following the bench preparation process, the bench standard should be formally accepted, in writing, by those
conducting activities on the bench associated with blasting.
2. Demarcation and Communication of Active Blast Areas
Physical demarcation and signage must be established to minimize the risk of inadvertent access to the blast
area (or on-bench reload area) by unauthorized personnel/equipment, or access to unsafe crests or under
unsafe wall conditions by personnel/equipment on the shot. Safe exclusion distances from all crests and walls
should also be observed.
Demarcation can include a combination of physical barriers (safety berms), traffic cones, bunting, flashing lights
etc. Signage should indicate an active blast area and must also indicate the status of that area (e.g., loaded shot,
tied-up shot). This should include the area on the bench below the shot to prevent personnel and/or equipment
moving too close to the face.
Demarcation and signage also define the secure blast area within which explosives security restrictions apply
and unsupervised personnel are required to hold security clearance and site authorization. Unauthorized
persons must obtain permission from the Shotfirer (or other authorized person) prior to entering the blast area
(or reload area). A guard should be positioned to prevent unauthorized access if other supervision, inspection
and security measures are not deemed adequate.
Communication of active blast areas (where charging has commenced) can be facilitated via suitable blast
boards and at pre-shift meetings, so all personnel are aware of blasting locations, clearance areas and the
route(s) being used to transport explosives to/from those locations.
A traffic management plan should be used to define entry/exit points for vehicles, park-up areas, reload areas,
and the required loading sequence.
Blast Geometry
The diameter which are used for rock blasting usually the range 38 – 150 mm.
Height of Bench
Heigh of bench is limited by the design requirements of the project / Aramco
Burden
Burden is one of the most critical parameters in bench blasting. The value of the burden is controlled by the
rock blast ability, the diameter of the blast hole and the performance of explosive charged.
Spacing
The distance between adjacent blast holes, measured perpendicular to the burden, is spacing.
Sub Drilling
To avoid leaving a hump or toe in bench floor after blasting, the blast holes are drilled below the floor level.
Stemming
Stemming is the portion of blast hole which has been packed with inert material above the charge in order to
confine and retain the gases produced by the explosion, thus improving the fragmentation process. Most
stemming material ~ 4mm crushed stone.
Optimum stemming length varies between 25d to 40d (where d is diameter of the drill hole)
Blast hole pattern
In surface blasting, there are two types of blast hole patterns, quadrangular pattern and staggered pattern. For
improving bench top fragmentation, when blasthole pattern is large than 2.5 x 2.5 m in hard rock, some
additional small charge can be used.
The main aim of the blast design is to safely place explosives where they will do the most work. This means
that most of the explosive’s energy is used to advantage and little possible is wasted. The results of any blast
will depend on the total amount of explosive energy, how quickly energy released, the positions of charges
and strength of rock around the explosives.
Design Principals
Burning front
Immediately after an explosive column detonates the rock surrounding it begins top fracture and displace. This
is an essential, and desirable, part of the fragmentation process. Where the ground is weak, laminar or heavily
jointed and where weaknesses in the collar region exist the blast effects may extend over a considerabledistance.
The distance between detonating holes and the nearest unfired initiation surface connection is knownas the
burning front.
The combination of spacing and burden timing elements is often describing as “Relief”.
Main Points – Blast Design
a) The main aim of blast design is to safely place explosives where they will do the most useful work and
produce a minimum of undesirable results.
b) The result of any surface blast will always depend on the properties of rock surrounding the explosives.
c) Blast design must consider explosives properties, the size and positions of charges, the firing sequence and
delay times between charges.
d) Typical blast design guidelines are based on “ideal “conditions, including consistent rock properties and
geometry.
e) To break rock most efficiently, blastholes are usually drilled parallel to an open free face which is suitable
“burden” distance away.
f) Blast design must include details of priming, including the type and number of primers used, and their
positions inside blastholes.
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g) A bench blast design will also specify details of the proposed initiation sequence and delay timing between
charges.
h) The lead hole should generally be close to a free face or corner so that it can break out effectively.
i) All blast must be documented and recorded as part of statutory requirement.
The measuring and priming process requires the handling and management of sensitive initiating explosives and
must be carried out by authorized and appointed personnel. This part of the blasting process must be conducted
in a controlled, sequential manner to facilitate the tracking of explosives usage, and minimize the risk of
damage/impact to initiating explosives from vehicles in the blast area.
1. General
The following activities and/or considerations will help to ensure safe and efficient on-bench activities
associated with measuring and priming of blastholes:
a) Ensure that the blast area is suitable for charging activities, and that charging activities will not be
compromised by other activities, such as bench preparation, drilling, excavation or vehicle movements in an
adjacent area.
b) A clear blasthole identification system (such as row and blasthole number) must be in place to allow the
correct treatment of all blastholes. This can be done by marking blasthole ID’s on a peg or other marker at the
collar.
c) Ensure that blastholes have been drilled to design (diameter, spacing, burden, location, depth, angle, and
orientation) prior to charging, by reference to the blast pack showing the required layout and any available drill
logs. If this is unclear discuss with the supervisor, drill operator and/or engineer to clarify.
d) Variances in blast parameters require further assessment prior to charging, or remedial action such as re-
drilling, backfilling or adjustments to the blast design such as charge quantity or initiation sequence. Acceptable
variances must be communicated clearly to the Shotfirer, as such variances may be more critical in some cases
(for example stem height variation when blasting near infrastructure, or explosives selection in fume-prone
areas).
e) Where re-drills are required adjacent to (or within) the blast pattern, priming and charging of blastholes must
be managed to prevent drilling in close proximity to explosives, with minimum acceptable drilling clearances
from any charged blasthole. This must take into account the separation of angled and/or deviated holes at depth,
and equipment capability. Re-drilling within, or adjacent to, a loaded shot and loading operations must take place
under supervision of the Shotfirer, with clearly defined exclusion zones in accordance with applicable legislation
and approved site practices. The relocation route of the drill and ancillary equipment (fuel and water trucks)
through the blast area must be clearly defined and managed to avoid damage to other blastholes.
f) Clear blocked holes where possible to allow the placement of correct charge quantities. Where blastholes
cannot be charged, or changes to priming requirements and/or charge quantities are identified outside the
expected range for the blast area, this must be communicated to the supervisor for authorization, and recorded.
g) Where blastholes have been drilled too deep they are to be back-filled with suitable stemming material (or
drill cuttings in dry conditions) to achieve the required depth in the presence of short firer.
h) Where blastholes have been redrilled, then previous ‘abandoned’ blastholes are to be identified and filled
with suitable stemming material. Alternatively, ‘abandoned’ blastholes can be sealed with a gas bag and
stemmed to prevent ejection when adjacent holes are fired. However, the creation of a cavity in close proximity
to a charged blasthole should be assessed as it is likely to affect localized blast performance and may also result
in additional fume.
i) When blastholes have been sealed at the collar with a gas bag then caution must be used when removing
these devices to avoid ejection of material towards the operator’s face.
j) Where elevated temperature and/or reactive ground is expected or encountered, specific blasting
procedures, explosives and controls will be required.
h) Where blastholes are to be dewatered this must be carried out prior to the placement of any explosives in
the blasthole, and in a sequence that avoids run-off into dry or previously dewatered blastholes and avoids the
creation of boggy conditions for operating equipment. A sufficient delay between de-watering and charging the
blasthole is necessary to determine if ‘dynamic’ water is present, as this will influence the product type loaded
and the sleep time available.
2. Measurement
All blastholes must be measured prior to charging, in the event that re-drills or adjusted charging is required. If
measurement was carried out prior to the day of charging, and a physical change to the blasthole is likely (e.g.
following a rain event or wind), then it is recommended that blastholes be re-measured prior to charging.
Blastholes are to be measured with a suitable (non-ferrous) weighted measuring tape or cord, of adequate
length, to measure the deepest blastholes. Check that the tape has not been damaged and starts at the ‘zero’
mark.
Depths are to be measured from the bottom of the blasthole to the collar at the bench surface, disregarding the
height of the drill cuttings, and recorded on a blasthole-by-blasthole basis.
End of tape must be attached to a small rock by string so that the tape rolls down quicker without obstructions.
Where specific strata or ground conditions needs to be identified (e.g. through-seam blasting, or blasting near
underground workings), the use of geophysical logging equipment or borehole camera equipment may be
required to identify the location of target horizons or structures. More accurate placement of explosive charges
and aggregate decks will then be required.
3. Priming
Priming considerations should include the following:
a) Initiating explosives used in blasting need to be compatible with each other, with the bulk explosives used
and with the environment in which the blasting is to be carried out. Further, they need to be used in accordance
with the manufacturer’s/supplier’s recommendations.
b) A record of initiating explosives taken from the magazine, used, and returned to the magazine, must be
maintained as required under the Site Security Plan. Boosters and detonators must be kept separate until
assembly as primers immediately prior to placement in the blasthole.
c) The required number of boosters and downlines should be available for the shift, and laid out at the blasthole
collars as required, with a peg (or other suitable retention device) to secure the downline at the collar.
d) Place initiating explosives on the same side of each blasthole in the row or echelon, on the opposite side from
that being used by charging and stemming equipment (depending on traffic management guidelines for the blast
area).
e) Carry out priming (and subsequent charging) in an identified sequence to facilitate the tracking of explosives
usage and minimize the risk of damage/impact to initiating explosives from vehicles in the blast area.
f) The use of initiating explosives retention devices at blasthole collars should be considered for the
housekeeping of initiating explosives, as there is a potential for detonators and boosters to be misplaced within
the drill cuttings or in soft/muddy ground or fall into the blasthole during or after placement. Further, such
identification and retention minimize the potential for interaction with vehicles in the area.
g) Do not throw or mistreat initiating explosives. When making up primers, a detonator must not be forced into
the booster. When cutting detonating cord, approved cutters must be used. Primers should be lowered carefully
into the blasthole, not allowed to free fall to the bottom of the hole.
h) Primers are to be positioned as per decking guidelines (i.e. primed at the top, middle or bottom of the deck),
subject to blasthole depth and blasthole condition.
i) In water-filled blastholes the primer(s) is normally lowered to the bottom of the blasthole at the start of
pumping and pulled up into the explosive column as it is charged. A member of the blast crew must monitor
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the primer when charging wet blastholes, to ensure floating of the primer on top of the explosive column is
prevented.
j) Additional primers may also be required in broken ground or areas likely to generate significant post-blast NOx
fumes. Such primers should be timed to initiate simultaneously within the explosives column to eliminate the
potential for column disruption, resulting in misfires.
k) Once primed, downlines must be secured at the blasthole collar, usually on the same side of the blasthole.
Loose tails must also be secured at the collar preferably on the side away from the charging vehicle, where they
cannot be driven over or caught by passing traffic.
l) Primers should not be left unsupervised overnight in uncharged blastholes where they present a security risk.
Where direct supervision cannot be satisfactorily addressed, primers must be removed from the blasthole,
disassembled, and returned to the magazine.
m) Collect all waste packaging and dispose of according to site waste management practices. Check that such
packaging is empty of all explosive products and ‘Explosives’ markings removed/covered prior to disposal.
n) The recording and reconciliation of initiating explosive quantities must be carried out against the quantities
specified in the blast design, and the quantities issued from and returned to the magazine to identify correct
usage and unexplained losses. Unexplained losses must be reported in accordance with site and regulatory
requirements.
The charging and stemming process requires close attention to quality control, in terms of charge quantities,
column rise, and stem height. Equally important is the need for safe on-bench traffic management, in terms of
the interaction between equipment and personnel and the use of large equipment close to charged blastholes
and initiating explosives.
Arabian Arrow Mining Company
c) Bulk explosives must be selected with appropriate properties for the intended application, including water
resistance, minimum diameter, critical density, and depth limitation, and suitable explosive performance for the
ground type and pattern size being used.
d) Dry hole explosives (ANFO) can be augured into dry blastholes, or dry-sided blastholes where contact with
water at the toe has been effectively sealed with a gas bag and drill cuttings (If required).
e) Pumped emulsion blends suitable for wet conditions can be pumped into blastholes containing water, as long
as the hose is lowered to the bottom of the hole and retracted slowly during the pumping process in order to
effectively displace water from the hole, rather than entrap it within the explosive’s column. These blends
must not be pumped into a wet blasthole from the collar, as this will seriously degrade the product. The presence
of dynamic (flowing) water requires a bulk explosive with good water resistance and ongoing monitoring to
ensure that the column is not being washed away. Dynamic water can degrade a column of pumped emulsion,
even if loaded correctly.
f) Blasthole loading is to be sequenced in such a manner that water displaced from wet holes does not run into
previously loaded dry holes, or (where possible) create boggy conditions in areas still to be loaded. The
treatment of blastholes as dry, damp or wet should also take into consideration the condition of surrounding
blastholes, and whether significant rainfall runoff and water accumulation in low areas is anticipated.
g) When charging decked holes (particularly in pre-split or through-seam applications) additional care is
required in terms of primer location, column rise, positioning of gas bags and stemming material.
Where necessary, a spotter shall be used to assist the operator of mobile equipment maneuver close to walls
and crests, in close proximity to blastholes on tight patterns, when reversing or turning around on the bench, or
in any situation where restricted visibility presents a risk.
All attempts should be made to prevent driving over blasthole collars, regardless of whether they are empty,
primed or charged. If this is unavoidable then empty blastholes should be sealed with a gas bag to prevent
backfilling, and primed holes must have their primers removed and be similarly sealed. Under exceptional
circumstances it may be necessary to traverse a charged blasthole. In this case, a risk assessment must first be
conducted, and were deemed acceptable, visible downlines must be buried within the stemming zone and a
spotter used to direct the vehicle such that it can safely straddle those blastholes and not drive over the collars.
Arabian Arrow Mining Company
Blastholes are to be charged systematically, in sections on large shots, allowing completion of a reduced blast
area if unfavorable conditions are likely to prevent firing within the required timeframe. Where blastholes
cannot be safely charged or stemmed using explosives trucks or stemming vehicles, such holes may need to be
In case, charging during hours of darkness requires additional controls and safety measures that include specific
risk assessment, appropriate lighting, not working directly under or above any walls reduced vehicle access into
the blast area, and additional demarcation (e.g. flashing lights).
3. Charging Quantities
During charging operations, consideration should be given to the following:
a) Check column rise during charging using a bobbing tape or dip stick, to ensure that blastholes are not over (or
under) loaded outside acceptable tolerances for the blast. Delivered charge mass and measured deck length will
usually be close to expected values, based on bulk explosive density and the nominal blasthole diameter,
otherwise additional checks will need to be made.
b) Bulk explosive density and charge mass may need to be increased where excessive toe burdens are identified
at the face, or adjacent to short holes, to achieve a higher localized powder factor. This should only be done
following consultation with the Shotfirer.
c) Bulk explosive quantities may need to be reduced (or removed) from free-face blastholes with inadequate
burden to contain explosive energy, or in areas of broken ground.
d) Where blastholes have been under-charged, additional top-up amounts may be acceptable within design
charging and stem height guidelines. Stem heights should not be reduced to accommodate design charges.
e) Where blastholes have been overcharged, excess product may need to be removed. Following a satisfactory
risk assessment, an approved scoop or vacuum equipment appropriate for the task may be used to remove bulk
explosives and stemming in order to achieve correct column rise or height. Care must be taken to ensure metal
parts are removed from hoses and to secure downlines. This process must be carried out under supervision of
the Shotfirer. Alternatively, excess bulk explosives can be purged (displaced) from the blasthole using water
pumped from the explosives truck or a water cart.
f) If bulk explosives appear to be running away in broken ground (e.g., a lack of column rise) charging must be
halted and the situation assessed on a case-by-case basis. The subsequent behavior of that charge (when
detonated) will be uncertain, with a potential for excessive fly rock, overpressure or fume. The safest practice
is to attempt to remove the primer (if possible) then stem and abandon the hole. Alternatively, charging shoul
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be halted, the Shotfirer contacted and an appropriate process determined e.g. a risk assessment is carried out
and an increased blast exclusion zone considered;
g) Care must be taken not to lose downlines in the blasthole during the charging and stemming process.
Preferably, downlines are to be hand-held during charging/stemming or, if this is not possible, secured at the
collar. If lost downlines cannot be retrieved, then the blasthole must be reprimed prior to further charging; (with
accounting for any additional explosives required).
h) If bulk explosives have slumped after charging and the downlines lost and unrecoverable, the blasthole will
need to be re-primed with additional charging in an attempt to minimize the risk of misfires. Such holes represent
additional misfire risk and must be recorded and checked after firing; (with accounting for any additional
explosives required).
i) The location of overloaded blastholes must be communicated to the Shotfirer while charging is still taking
place in the blast area. If this cannot be rectified then increased blast clearance distances may need to be applied.
j) When using packaged explosives in small diameter and pre-split applications, follow supplier guidelines
regarding priming practices, placement and securing at the collar. Additional care needs to be taken to ensure
that packaged product is reliably positioned along the length of the blasthole, suitably primed and securely
fastened to avoid loss down the hole.
k) Recording and reconciliation of the quantities of explosives (and raw materials) delivered according to the
delivery docket, should be carried out against the quantities specified in the blast design, and those loaded on
a hole-by-hole basis during charging. This provides a check against average density and the ratio of AN, ANE and
diesel in blended explosives.
4. Stemming
Stemming should be placed to design depths with previous bulk explosive column height checked after charging.
Stem heights should be recorded to a specified accuracy, consistent with a safe and environmentally acceptable
blast design.
Stemming must not commence in blastholes containing gassed explosives until such explosives have had
sufficient time to reach their design density, and a check has been made that design column rise has been
achieved and meets the requirements of the shot design.
Appropriate stemming material (size, type and quality) must be used. If aggregate stemming is specified, but not
available, an increased length of drill cuttings may be required (dry holes only) to achieve adequate confinement
and must be authorized by the Shotfirer or relevant site representative.
During the placement of stemming, either by mechanical or manual methods, downlines need to be secured to
prevent loss down the blasthole, and to ensure that they are not damaged. Stemming should be delivered at a
rate that minimizes the risk of bridging of the stemming column. Ideally, a spotter should be available to assist
and protect downlines during the stemming process.
Stem heights may need to be increased where broken ground is evident at the collar, or where reduced face
burdens are identified for the blasthole profile. Aggregate decks may be required where reduced burdens are
identified lower in the blasthole profile. Actual stem heights and aggregate deck lengths should be recorded.
In wet holes, additional time needs to be provided to enable stemming to seat effectively.
Downlines can be loosened after stemming to reduce the risk of stretching or snapping due to possible slumping.
Blastholes that have slumped after stemming must be recorded and reported to the Shotfirer. These holes shall
be monitored, have their downlines loosened where necessary and re-secured and the stemming topped up as
appropriate.
Note: Precautions need to be taken to prevent interaction between the downlines and personnel/traffic.
Uncharged blastholes must be backfilled, to prevent excessive venting/cratering when adjacent blastholes are
fired.
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3. Electronic System
When employing electronic detonator initiating systems, the following factors are relevant:
a) There is a number of electronic detonator systems available for initiation. These should not be inter-mixed
and should only be used in accordance with the relevant manufacturer’s/supplier’s directions.
b) A tie-up plan, with firing times for each hole and deck of explosive and programming/logging path, must be
available prior to connection. This may have been generated using a computer program compatible with the
electronic system being utilized, or using some other system;
c) Electronic detonators should be logged in accordance with the manufacturer’s/supplier’s recommendations.
d) Once programming/logging is complete, test for leakage, missing detonators, and unprogrammed
detonators, and rectify where possible.
e) Prior to connection, test firing line continuity (if using a wired blasting control box) or radio communication
(if using a remote blasting box) to ensure any issues can be rectified prior to firing time.
f) Once the blast exclusion zone has been cleared, and the site radio procedures followed, the security system
can be enabled and firing procedure for the shot can commence. If necessary, document all error messages
during the firing procedure and rectify where possible.
g) If the electronic system allows the blast to continue after notifying of potential errors, it is the Shotfirer’s
responsibility to assess the situation before allowing the blast to continue with known issues.
h) Adhere to the specific minimum re-entry times required by each system (depending on voltage bleeding
rate) before the post-blast inspection or if the blast is aborted due to an error that requires re-entry. Typical
minimum re-entry time is 5 minutes post-firing as long as there is no fume or fire visible.
i) Never connect electronic detonators to energy sources other than those designed to be used with the
specific systems.
j) Never connect conventional electric detonators to electronic detonator circuits or electronic detonator
control equipment.
k) Never connect electronic detonators from different suppliers to the same circuit or different suppliers’
electronic detonator control equipment.
l) Never use an electronic system unless trained in its use and passed as competent by the supplier. Always use
approved electronic system devices and hardware for each system.
m) Ensure the security system which allows firing of the electronic system is secure.
n) When lightning is suspected to have hit the general blast area, re-test all detonators for leakage and damage
and remove any damaged detonators from the control line – do not attempt to fire downlines showing heavy
leakage or damage.
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The following plans and responsibilities have been identified from the Risk
Assessment and must be executed before the commencement of the project.
ACTIONS PERSON
Establish “No Smoking” onsite while explosives are onsite
Obtain/submit notifications to Work cover
Provide written and verbal communications to neighbors if applicable
Provide additional blast sentries (2) where needed
Provide stemming (7-10 mm clean drainage aggregate)
and place in piles
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All explosive movement will take place in police approved vehicles/containers accompanied by their security.
All the work of movement of explosives as well as charging & blasting will take place under the supervision of
Police & Licensed Blasting Engineer.
a. Sign boards “DANGER BLASTING ZONE “will be posted at required places so that all the people in the
vicinity is aware.
b. No battery-operated equipment’s like GSM, camera, radio transmitters etc. will be allowed beyond this point.
c. No unauthorized persons will be allowed to enter the blasting area.
d. The area to be blasted will be clearly demarcated by posting red flags around it.
e. All vehicles and equipment will be kept away from the blasting area.
f. Detonators will be stored in a separate box specially made for the purpose shall be in the custody of the Police
or
licensed blasting engineer till all of them are not consumed.
g. Metallic tools will not be used for pricking or cutting of explosives or accessories. Cutting tools will be of brass
or
non-sparking material.
h. Lighter, cigars, match sticks, fuels, gases stored at high pressure etc. shall not be carried in the explosive
carrying trucks or to be stored at the blasting site.
i. Ten minutes before commencing the charging, the blasting engineer will ensure that there are no machines in
a
radius of 500 m of the blasting area.
j. Blasting Engineer will fire from a point from where he can have a clear view of the blast site and the guards
posted for cordoning the area.
k. Signaling arrangement will be established for communication between the blasting engineer and the guards
posted.
1. Visual: Using different colored flags
a. Red: All entries closed and ready to blast.
b. Green: Firing the blast.
c. White: All clearance for resumption of work.
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An assembly point will be marked outside the danger zone of blasting and all concerned shall be informed. All
concerned shall report there in case of any emergency. All persons other than those required for blasting shall
be
evacuated to a safe place before blasting. Persons will not take shelter under any temporary structures or at
places
other than those indicated by the Blasting Engineer, Police on duty or the guards deputed for the purpose
Emergency scenarios relevant to blast activities include those that could lead to the unplanned detonation of
explosives, such as lightning strike, fire on an explosive’s vehicle, heating caused by elevated temperatures
or reactive ground, and those that could result in significant misfire risks such as major wall failure above a
blast area or flooding. These scenarios are managed according to site emergency response procedures.
In the event of an emergency situation that could lead to unplanned detonation, all personnel working within
the designated Blast Exclusion Zone must be evacuated. Blast guards must be posted to the relevant positions
to ensure that the effects of any potential unplanned initiation are minimized.
In the case of lightning, established response procedures should define how to identify the point at which an
approaching thunderstorm is considered a risk. The communication and clearance protocols necessary to
evacuate and secure the emergency blast exclusion zone and re-entry procedures. Storm warning systems
should be utilized so that sufficient time is available to empty MPU hoses and augers, evacuate equipment and
personnel, and secure safe exclusion zones around the blast area and explosives vehicle park-up area.
In the case of a fire on an explosives transport vehicle an attempt to extinguish must only be made if the fire has
been witnessed to have just started, if it is safe to do so (i.e., not directly associated with an AN, ANFO or
explosives storage area), and the person has been appropriately trained. In such cases, an emergency is to be
called on the radio, the vehicle fuel isolated and the fire managed with on-board extinguishers. Otherwise, the
area shall be immediately evacuated and an emergency exclusion zone established, with no other vehicles are
to enter the area. The fire will be managed by the fire response team and re-entry prevented until the fire has
burned out and the area has been cleared.
In the case of expected flooding or wall failure, where immediate evacuation is not deemed necessary,
restricted access may apply while the partially completed blast is prepared for firing to remove an otherwise
significant misfire risk at a later time.
In emergency response scenarios, personnel may be directed to close the roadways and access paths to the
designated Blast Exclusion Zone for the duration of the emergency event at the discretion of the site
management team.
In accordance with site emergency procedures and/or the explosives company emergency procedures, the Blast
Exclusion Zone may be altered from the original plan, with due consideration given to the risk potential of the
situation. In this event the parameters of the Blast Exclusion Zone will be communicated to all personnel in
accordance with site procedures.
Before the trial blasting for intake area, site emergency team shall be organized and require emergency
equipment shall arrive at the site.
When work is carried out in the intake area, a fully functional and suitably equipped ambulance with driver and
a paramedical staff trained in First Aid shall be available close to the site of works and not obstruct with
movement of construction machinery and personnel or performance of construction activity.
The Contractor shall also provide trained crew in the immediate vicinity of ongoing works at all times that work
is taking place, in case of emergency.
At the workface entrance, one Sign Board for emergency shall be set and all signs shall be described in three
languages: English, Arabic and Urdu. And post all emergency response telephone numbers, including medical
response and fire department, phone numbers of all site supervisors. Plan should be clearly communicated and
understood by all personnel.
In case of emergency or accident, the discoverer shall immediately report to the employer, the engineer
Supervisor
and the project manager after verification, meanwhile calling the emergency telephone, and report the specific
situation to the engineer and the employer after investigation and verification.
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Ground Vibration
The ground vibration from blasting is the radiation of mechanical energy within a rock mass or soil. The
magnitude of the ground vibration together with ground vibration frequency are commonly used to define
damage criteria.
To limit MIC on a production blast a number of options are available. In order of application these would be
Fire single hole per delay. Every hole in the blast is separated in delay from every other hole in the blast. Place
an inert, stemming deck into the blast hole and fire single deck per delay. This will reduce the MIC below what
is loaded into a single hole. Realistically two decks are achievable in a production environment although three
deck blasts in very tight conditions have also been used.
Reduce blast hole diameter. This will have a significant effect on MIC but may require different drills to be used.
Also a large reduction in diameter will incur a significant cost increase and may result in drill deviation errors.
Reduce explosives density. May be of benefit where the allowable MIC is only slightly exceeded.
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The vibration that results from a blast can be calculated using a formula of form
PPV = K(R/Qi)-b
Were,
PPV – Predicted peak particle velocity in mm/s
K – a constant which is determined by the characteristics of the ground that the vibration passes through and
affected by the explosive’s power.
Q – Maximum charge weight per delay interval in kg
R – Distance in m between the blast and the measuring point
d – Charge exponent (d = ½)
b – Attenuation exponent
Follow limitation on ground vibration and Overpressure as per EPM / Aramco instruction.
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continuous monitoring mode and are leaving it set out to record a series of events.
Seismograph calibration
When monitoring for legal protection purposes, have the instrument calibrated annually. Between
calibrations, the instrument's self-check is usually sufficient to verify that the sensors are function properly
and that the geophone is sufficiently level to provide an accurate reading.
Measurement of Air blast
Air blast is measured in decibels (dB) using the `Li scale. This scale relates to the pressure of the air pulses
travelling through the air. Note that the 'A' scale often used to measure industrial noise as it is weighted for
human response.
The relationship between Air Overpressure and Scaled distance
1. Blast Clearance
The Blast Supervisor will instruct the shotfirer to conduct a safety sweep or clearance of the Blast Exclusion Zone
once all of the Blast Guards have confirmed that they are in the correct location and access is blocked and secure.
Prior to conducting the sweep of the Blast Exclusion Zone, the Short firers will familiarize themselves with the
operations and work areas currently in use within the designated Blast Exclusion Zone.
During the sweep of the Blast Exclusion Zone the Short firers will verify the position and conformity of the Blast
Guard position during the sweep.
The Short firers must complete a full clearance inspection of the designated Blast Exclusion Zone to ensure the
following: -
a) All personnel have been removed from the designated Blast Exclusion Zone
b) Where possible, all equipment has been removed from the designated Blast Exclusion Zone. If equipment
remains within the Blast Exclusion Zone acceptance of the potential for damage must be noted on the blast
report.
c) As a minimum requirement all equipment that cannot be removed must: -
− Stop operation and shutdown
− Be appropriately isolated
− Be secured against the effects of the blast.
The sweep inspection may be performed using a drone but only if there are no structures and mobile
equipment within the personnel exclusion zone.
During the inspection, the short firers may be required to leave the vehicle to check any areas that are not
accessible by vehicle, to ensure that all persons have been evacuated (e.g.: - crib huts, amenities buildings,
temporary buildings).
In this case the short firer must remain in direct radio contact with the Blast Supervisor by the use of a hand held
2-way radio.
In areas such as crib huts, amenities, temporary buildings, bunded work areas and parked machinery where
personnel may be working remotely or out of radio contact, the short firer may use a device, such as an audible
alarm upon entry to the area, to alert personnel to their presence and await any response.
On completion of the clearance inspection, the short firer must return to the Blast Guard location nominated
during the Blast Guard meeting and report the clearance run has been completed and No Personnel are within
the Blast Exclusion Zone.
When the Blast Supervisor has received confirmation from the Blast Guards and short firer the Blast Exclusion
Zone is clear.
A number of factors associated with on-bench work will, however, require additional consideration when
determining clearance distances, guard locations and shot firing position. These must be communicated to, and
agreed with the Blast Supervisor and include the following:
a) Are there any over-loaded or under-burdened holes that could not be rectified?
b) Were any potential misfire risks identified during charging, that have not been rectified?
c) Does the presence of broken ground increase the risk of fly rock, overpressure or fume, from
otherwise apparently well contained areas?
d) Is the blast in an area with a known history of generating post-blast fume? Has the shot been sleeping longer
than usual? Has slumping of blastholes taken place during loading? This may indicate an increased potential for
NOx generation and subsequent transmission outside the blast danger zone, or blasting site.
e) Is the blast in a hot/reactive area? Can the shot be fired in the necessarily short ‘load and shoot’ time that
may be required?
f) Are there any ground stability issues that will require further assessment after the blast has been fired and
delay re-entry?
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g) Are multiple shots in the vicinity of each other being fired by one or more shotfirers in the same firing
window? Ensure clearance zones reflect the multiple shots, ensure all blasting devices are secured if re-entry
to a particular shot is required, and consider the impact one shot may have on another with respect to the
initiating systems used, and the sequence in which they will be fired.
Presplit wall
h) Any and all variations to the blast, or measures undertaken to limit risks of potential hazards during blasting,
should be agreed, recorded and signed off by the Blast Supervisor or relevant blasting representative.
2. Firing the Shot
The Blast Supervisor will advise the Shotfirer that the Blast Guards and flag man are in position and the Blast
Exclusion Zone is secure and clear of unauthorized personnel and equipment.
The Shotfirer will raise any concerns regarding the blast guards and/or the clearance procedure before
accepting the control of the blast and designated blast area.
The Shotfirer will confirm the Blast Exclusion Zone is blocked and secure and accepts control of the blast and
designated blast area.
The Shotfirer will call for radio silence at the 2-minute mark from the firing time; silence shall be maintained
unless an emergency situation arises.
By using the agreed radio protocol to confirm the security of the Blast Exclusion Zone and announce the 2-
minute warning, the Shotfirer has accepted control of the blast and the designated Blast Exclusion Zone.
The Shotfirer will call a 2-minute warning prior to firing.
The Shotfirer will broadcast a 15 second warning alarm over the 2-way radio system prior to firing.
The Shotfirer will complete the site firing procedure in accordance with the site accepted practices and fire the
blast.
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Fly rock is the most common cause of explosives related injuries. Blast that are properly designed, drilled and
charged should minimize the potential for fly rock however always allow for this possibility when determining
safety distance and location for firing.
Fly rock can occur when blastholes are drilled too close to an open rock face, allowing charges to easily
“breakout” through the small burden.
fly rock can be controlled through considering the following blast parameters
• Stemming length
• Stemming type
• Condition of face
• Delay intervals
• Front row burden
• Blast hole diameter
Special care is required to avoid fly rock when blasting rock that contains cracks, cavity, weak layers or soft
materials such as clay
If the rock contains large cracks or cavities, it can be very easy to overcharge blastholes unless the position of
the top of the charge is continuedly checked.
A blast that has been carefully designed and drilled can be ruined by a single overcharged blasthole that causes
fly rock.
The uncharged collars of blastholes are drilled in the wrong places, at incorrect angles or deviate towards
open rock faces.
Inaccurate drilling can cause fly rock. If blastholes are drilled in the wrong places, at incorrect angle or deviate
towards open rock faces.
fly rock may also cause by insufficient delay time between blastholes or charge that fire out of sequence.
*
Drilling & Blasting Method Statement
The recovery and securing of all types of initiating devices from firing lines
− If there is a need for more than one person to return to the shot for the inspection
− Whether fume dispersal has occurred
− Whether dust dispersal/settlement has occurred
− The identification of any apparently unstable ground
− The safety and suitability of access and egress
− Aspects of the blast that may indicate that not all of the charges have been initiated
− In the case of a misfire, or a suspected misfire, whether the minimum waiting time has been observed
− The availability of a competent person to inspect for safety, ground or material that did not move as
intended
Who may enter the exclusion zone prior to conducting the post-blast inspection?
When advised by the Blast Supervisor, the Shotfirer will then inspect the blast and may confirm the “ALL
CLEAR” after giving due consideration to: -
− Identification of any misfire and/or the associated corrective action required to make the area safe
− Procedures to be adopted, if the inspection reveals that the “ALL CLEAR” cannot be given
− Continuous inspection procedures during the approach to the post blast site that might identify unusual or
abnormal results indicating possible hazards
− Whether there is a need to wash down/or scale exposed surfaces
The Shotfirer may then communicate:
− That a misfire or other problem has been identified and the “ALL CLEAR” cannot be given and that further
action is required, or
− That the “ALL CLEAR” has been given and that normal operation may recommence
Where the “ALL CLEAR” has been given by the Shotfirer, the Blast Supervisor will then release the Blast Guards
in numerical order. (Blast Guards must reply to the message).
While not strictly within the scope of this Code of Practice, it is not uncommon for a shot crew to return to an
adjacent area after firing, in order to commence work on the next blast. Alternatively, site personnel may return
to an area after firing, in order to commence excavation.
Treatment of misfires
There is inevitably a risk of a premature ignition during the remedial process. To compound the problem, it is
often difficult to be sure that a misfire has occurred and if so, exactly which hole malfunctioned. While the use
of Electronic Delay Detonator is a big step forward, in that their use does allow for misfires to be more easily
detected, misfires will still be problematical.
Detection of misfires
Measuring performance of the D&B process are done before, during and after a blast event. The quality of and
process control of D&B activities directly relates and influence safety and the outcome(s). Risks and hazards
evolving from blast effects are detrimental to the environment, property, the process, and people, which can be
mitigated by the below mentions measures.
The actual detonation sequence can be compared with the designed sequence. Any charge which misfired
can be detected and the cause can be identified through experimentation or past experience. The
performance of new explosives and accessories can be tested during production blasting.
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Blast vibration and noise monitoring has been proven to be of use in upgrading blasting practices in both
underground and surface mining. The vibration record contains a range of information used to assess the
performance of a blast. The charges which resulted in the highest vibration levels can be located. These are
likely to be responsible for the greatest amount of breakage and damage. From this, the effects of charge
weight, charge length and explosive strength can be measured.
The actual detonation sequence can be compared with the designed sequence. Any charge which misfired can
be detected and the cause can be identified through experimentation or past experience. The performance of
new explosives and accessories can be tested during production blasting.
Vibration enhancement from successive charges separated by insufficient delays can be detected near the blast
and at the surface at some distance. This potential source of damage and litigation may be
avoided by increasing delays or changing the blast sequence.
Vibration and noise meter will be used in every blast. The measuring device will be placed at the nearest
area of interest (tower, office etc.) and the recording will be reported after every blast.
Dust control is an essential part of excavation works. The type of rock in this area is Granite rock, minimum
amount of dust is expected, however, if needed water supply will be used one day before blasting, and if needed,
rubber mats will be used to protect the spread of dust. Another method complimenting visual inspection of the
blast is the real time capture of the blast event by a drone for surface events, and video camera for underground
blast events, with the latter that will require more setup. The recorded video of surface blast(s) will be replayed
on the spot to confirm a cut off or misfired location(s) in real time during a suspicious blast event(s).
Drone license applications for approval to record Aramco surface blasting activities, also including site
clearance and or nearby interface with adjacent contractors during blasting activities will be coordinated
with the Aramco Digital department.
3. After a blast monitoring - during the visual inspection by the shotfirer of the rock pile or blast face, a “cut off”
or misfired location is normally noticeable. A cutoff is caused by shrapnel i.e. the firing of a surface connector
breaks the shock tube before the next hole can fire. The latter is probably the commonest cause of misfires.
Prevention of misfires
In the event of a misfire being declared by the Shotfirer or authority in charge, all Blast Guards are to
remain in position and ensure the Blast Exclusion Zone is maintained.
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The Shotfirer will control the mechanics of the misfire and keep the Blast Supervisor informed in regard to
action that result from the misfire.
If a misfire which has been identified during the initial firing sequence, or during the post blast inspection, can
be safely re-fired while the Blast Guards are in position, the suitable notifications and preparations
are to be implemented and re-firing conducted as soon as possible. However, the Blast Exclusion Zone
parameters may have to be extended to a greater distance at the discretion of the Shotfirer.
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All instructions issued by the Shotfirer during the re-firing of a misfire, must be complied with and confirmed by
each Blast Guard. This may include a second safety sweep (clearance) of the Blast Exclusion Zone by the Sweepers
if it is deemed required prior to the re-firing of the misfire.
Once the misfire is ready to be re-fired, the normal firing sequence will commence from the 2-minute warning
and Blast Guard checks.
Misfires scheduled to be fired after the initial firing schedule, must follow the firing process as per any normal
blasting activity, and include a risk assessment which would include the number and placement of suitable Blast
Guards required for the blast.
Handling Misfire
Misfire may be handled as a following step.
− Secure the misfire area
− Determine the extent and type od the misfire
− Communicate the incident
− Full investigation to determine actual situation
− Develop recovery plan
− Recovery plan risk assessment
− Execute the recovery plan
− Analyses the evidence to determine the root cause
− Document the incident
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Misfire management
The procedure for dealing with misfires will vary for different situations and products.
In the event of a suspected misfire when firing a blast, you must not attempt to approach or allow anyone else
to approach the blast area until the following times have elapsed
a. Electric, Non-Electric and Electronic Firing: 5 minutes after attempting to fire the blast.
Regardless of type or scale the process for dealing with misfires should follow the ten (10) step process
detailed in the next section.
1. Misfire Identification 6. Risk assesses recovery plan
2. Isolation 7. Recover misfire
3. Communication 8. Handover to production
4. Investigation 9. Analyze for root cause
5. Plan for recovery 10. Report
Misfire identification
All blasts should be inspected by a competent person (shotfirer) before bogging however this will not confirm
that there are no misfires. Most underground misfires are identified by production personnel as the heading or
stope is bogged. This means that production personnel need to be trained in misfire identification.
Misfire awareness of all personnel leads to early identification. This prevents downstream exposures and reduces
risk of incident escalation. Personnel should be vigilant when performing their duties as undetected misfires can
be located in all underground areas where blasting has previously taken place.
Production and Jumbo Drillers must look for any sign of misfires prior to the commencement of drilling and
monitor the returns and fines particularly while collaring.
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Causes of Misfire
− Non-continuous firing line. Breaks in electrical firing lines as well as exposed connections can cause current
leakage leading to misfires. Note that earth leakage faults may not be picked up by resistance testing as the
leakage may only occur at high (firing) voltages.
− Deteriorated explosives. Packaged explosives will progressively become
− less sensitive with age. This process will eventually lead to misfires. Magazine management must ensure all
explosives are within the recommended use-by date.
− Product Failure. Most products have a very high reliability when sourced from a good quality supplier and
properly stored. For example the current detonator failure rate is less than 1 in 100,000 units. Detonating cord
reliability is ensured by using ‘two path’ hook-ups.
− Shrapnel cutoffs of detonating cord or shock tube may occur when connections are not made carefully and
at right angles
− Desensitized explosives / dead pressing. Where explosives are subject to high levels of shock and pressure the
density, and critical diameter, may increase and cause failure. Dead pressed holes may appear largely intact.
Where ANFO is used the explosives may have been pressed into a solid mass and be difficult to remove. Whilst
it is likely the primer has functioned this cannot be confirmed until the hole has been washed out
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− Detonators are also susceptible to dead pressing. Electronic detonators may fail through a process known as
‘shrink wrapping’ where dynamic pressure collapses the tube and causes the electronics to fail. Note that this is
not identified in any pre-blast testing
− Dislocated and cut off blast hole. Ground movement during the blast may dislocate the column of explosives
leading to misfires. Column dislocation may be reduced by modifications to blast design to increase relieve and
my multiple priming
Discontinuous explosives column (Air decked holes). Where up-holes are loaded it
may be possible to get an airgap in the column. Where this gap is more than a few
hole diameters this will cause failure due to dead pressing. Where multiple primers
are used to address this, they must fire at the same instant which means electronic
initiation.
Area Inspection
− Shift Supervisors are to inspect all blasts on the working shift to identify possible
misfires as soon as possible after re-entry is complete.
− On identification of a misfire the affected area should be thoroughly inspected to
deter- mine the extent / number of holes and the type of misfire.
− Bogger Operators must be vigilant of any potential misfires as the fired material
(broken rock) is being removed in both development and production areas.
− Any large toe, bump or lump in the wall back or floor of a development heading
must be identified and inspected to determine if explosives are present.
− All drill hole remnants in a development heading must be inspected prior to drilling
or mechanical scaling. If the toe of a hole is not visible then a misfire is to be assumed.
− Oversize rock must be closely inspected for any sign of production drill holes & explosives. The Drill rig
Operator, Rock Breaker Operator or Bogger Operator must look for any sign of misfires in oversize rock material
before commencing secondary breakage activities.
− Oversize rock can be rolled over to check for misfires wherever possible
Isolation
− Misfires should be treated as charged faces and isolated from other activities. This isolation should remain in
place until the misfire is cleared.
− When a misfire has been identified CHARGED FACE signs or DANGER tape is to be used to barricade all access
points to the affected area.
− If any leg wired from electric or electronic detonators are protruding these shall be short circuited. Shock
tubes shall be taped to prevent moisture ingress.
− All detonating cord remnants must be assumed to be live.
− Where misfires are identified drillers and bogger operators should halt work until the area has been
inspected by a competent person.
− All misfires are to be barricaded at all times unless under during recovery under the direct supervision of an
Authorized Person
Communication
− The presence of a misfire must be communicated to supervisors and to all persons who may work in the area
of the misfire.
− Report the misfire to the Shift Supervisor and Blast Control for recording in the Misfire Record Book or file
(even if the misfire has been treated and made safe).
− Identified Misfires are to be added to the record of charged faces.
− Identified misfires are to be communicated to operators in the same manner as sleeping charged blasts are
communicated
Investigation
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Misfire investigation determines the extent of the misfire (how many holes) and the type of the misfire (impact
sensitive, probably not impact sensitive) in order to guide the recovery plan.
The site shall be thoroughly examined to determine the extent of the misfire. To assist in an investigation,
notes should be taken as to the location and status of any misfired explosives.
Without disturbing any of the evidence, make a thorough examination of the misfire and surrounding areas in
order to fully define the misfired area and document the extent.
Misfires are categorized based on the potential for accidental initiation of the misfired explosives as follows:
1. Category A
− where “impact sensitive” explosives are confirmed. Typically, where initiation systems, detonating cord,
detonators or boosters, are involved. These products contain impact sensitive explosives which are susceptible
to accidental initiation by the application of sufficient impact/friction energy, typically during excavation.
2. Category B
– where “impact sensitive” explosives are not indicated. Typically, where bulk, packaged or ANFO based
explosives, are implicated.
– The level of investigation and the recovery strategy of misfires is directly related to the determined Category.
It is the responsibility of the shotfirer to determine with certainty the presence/absence of impact sensitive
explosives in any misfire.
Recovery Plan
The recovery of any misfire is potentially hazardous and recovery strategy must be under the direct supervision
of the appointed shotfirer. The recovery of simple, single hole misfires in surface blasting and shafts inking is
relatively straight forward, however were
multiple misfires have occurred, particularly where unfired detonating cord is present, the recovery process is
complex and should be based on a thorough investigation and a risk assessment of the proposed recovery plan.
The recovery plan is a step-by-step description of how to move from the current situation to a state where the
misfire is rendered safe and the site handed back to production for normal excavation. The plan should be
documented for significant misfires as this will provide the basis for an effective risk assessment.
Recovery of misfires may involve:
– Removal of product
– Refiring
– Firing a relieving hole
– Excavation
Each of these techniques involves some risk.
1. Removal of Product
Removal of misfired product offers the opportunity to examine the misfire to determine if product failure,
particularly initiation failure, is a contributing factor.
– Wash the drill hole out with water using a 32 mm poly hose.
– A combination of water and compressed air can also be used
– Alternatively, or use a non-ferrous scraper (brass or stainless steel) to remove explosives
– Packaged explosives can be removed using a brass pigtail on a length of poly pipe
– Care must be taken to avoid impact on the detonator
– The objective is to remove the primer at the toe of the hole
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2. Markup
If the drill hole cannot be cleared of explosives, it is to be marked up with a circle with a 0.5 m radius with ‘MF’
painted on its side and re-fired at the end of the shift (where practical).
3. Repriming / Refiring
Misfires that appear to contain live explosives may be refired. Where live downlines are identified attempts may
be made to refire these by taping to detonating cord, however moisture ingress may prevent the tube from
firing. It is more reliable to remove explosives to enable a new primer to be placed against the remnant
explosives.
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4. Development
If a misfire affects the profile of a development bench, then it is to be fired off.
Blow out or remove sufficient explosives to enable a collar primer to be secured against the remaining
product.
Where minimal uncharged collar is available load and tamp the priming cartridge first then insert the
detonator.
Water should not be used as it will desensitize the explosives column.
5. Removal of Stemming
Stemming may be removed by air and or water. Note that when ANFO is the main charge removing the
stemming with water will desensitize it making it problematic to refire.
In this case air only should be used however additional precautions should be taken to minimize the hazards
from static and impact. I.e., use minimum pressure.
6. Removal of Primers
If the explosives column can be removed attempts should be made to recover the misfired primers. Gentle
pressure on the downlines should remove the primers. If the primers get stuck in any way they are to be left and
reprimed and refired.
7. Mechanical Excavation
The main risk with mechanical excavation is unplanned detonation due to impact. Products that are impact
sensitive include detonators, detonating cord, packaged explosives traced with detonating cord and cast
pentolite boosters. All of these will readily initiation under moderate levels of impact from bogger buckets.
Mechanical excavation of an identified misfire shall take place under the direct control of an Authorized Person.
Where impact sensitive product is identified a risk assessment should be conducted to control the excavation
process.
No person, apart from the machine operator, shall remain in the vicinity of a misfire whilst excavation is being
undertaken.
Any excavated material containing suspected misfires should be placed in a safe location, such as a stockpile,
and inspected by a competent person before being added to the run of mine production.
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8. Recovery
Recovery of misfires must be done under the direct control of an authorized person. All persons involved must
be aware of the plan for recovery and the risks involved.
To manage risk the recovery of the misfire must be in accordance with the recovery plan.
Where additional information becomes available during the recovery it is likely that the plan will change.
Where the change has the potential to increase risk the recovery plan and risk assessment must be reviewed.
All product recovered from a misfire is to be treated as waste explosives and deal with ac- cording to the site
procedure. Where recovered product is stored in the magazine it must be properly labelled and added to the
stock records.
9. Misfire Analysis
The objective of analysis is to understand why the misfire occurred and what changes need to be implemented
to prevent it happening again.
A focus on root cause is required. For example, if a hole was not hooked up the root cause is not ‘failed to hook
The likely root cause of the misfire is to be recorded in the misfire book. The shotfirer and shift supervisor are
to sign off on the root cause.
Appropriate corrective actions are to be identified and documented, generally by the drill and blast engineer,
in the misfire book. Corrective actions should also be entered into the site incident management system.
10. Report
A report of all misfires is required to be made and kept including details of the following:
– Blast location
– Source Blast
– Date fired
– Date misfire identified
– Date misfire closeout / handover to operations
– Appearance of misfire / investigation details / holes misfired / location
– Products involved / recovered
– Probable Cause of misfire
– Misfire recovery technique including any associated risk assessments
– Recommended corrective actions
1. Assess material
i. Size of material
ii. Material type
iii. Blast outcomes
iv. Potential for drilling
v. Available explosives
2. Design secondary blast
i. Powder factor and charge mass
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Secondary break blasts need to be assessed for risk before loading and firing.
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36.2 Drill Plan
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Insert drill log / Rig log format here for drilling and charging of drill holes
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Application
- General purpose blasting.
- Surface blasting.
- Tunneling and Underground blasting (SANEL LP series).
- Initiation with delayed pattern.
Advantages
- Wide range of delay time variability reduce blasting vibration, improves fragmentation, and reduce
cost of blasting.
- Wide variety of lengths.
- Excellent water resistance.
- Fast and simple connection.
- Higher variability of timing patterns.
- No limitation on blast round size.
- Can be initiated by electric, non-electric detonators and detonating cord.
- Easy color coding.
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Arabian Arrow Mining Company
1. SANEL UNIDET
SANEL UNIDET is a system with the same relatively long delay time in all in-hole detonators (475 &
500ms).
The firing sequence is built up on the surface with connectors with different delay times.
SANEL UNIDET is designed for bench and trench blasting. An infinite number of holes can be connected in
one round.
In a normal bench blast, each hole is primed with a primer cartridge with a SANEL UNIDET detonator, which
in the case of U500 gives each hole a basic delay of 500 ms.
SANEL UNIDET can be initiated with surface connectors (SANEL QR) or with 5g/m detonating cord.
2. SANEL QR
SANEL QR specially designed to provide surface connection initiation network and transmission of
initiating signal to the next shock tube.
SANEL QR 0, QR17, QR25, QR42 and QR67 relay the initiation signal to the next shock tube with 0, 17, 25,
42, and 67 ms delay respectively.
Available for special request SANEL QR109, and QR176.
Advantages of using SANEL QR series Connector Blocks color coding indicates delay time.
- Enables all in-hole detonators to be initiated on the surface before any rock displacement
begins.
- Easy connecting blocks color coding.
- SANEL QR blocks can hold up to 8 shock tubes each.
The new design of the connector blocks is such that up to 8 SANEL tubes are in intimate contact with the
detonators thus ensuring initiation of the shock tubes.
Principles of Initiation of SANEL UNIDET and SANEL QR
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Arabian Arrow Mining Company
The basic principle of initiation is transferring initiation from a surface connector (SANEL QR) to a
detonator in a hole (e.g. SANEL U500) and to another surface connector. The figure on the right shows
properly timed blasting pattern. The holes are initiated well before the rock starts moving.
Example of Ideal Firing Pattern using SANEL U500 and Surface Connectors QR 25
NOTICE
For a successful blast, it is necessary that a hole is initiated well before the initiation network is
destroyed by a blast itself. This is ensured by suitably designed blast pattern.
3. SANEL CR
SANEL CR is a cord relay unit for blasts with detonating cord in both ends. SANEL CR relays the
detonation with 25 MS when connected between rows/holes. SANEL CR can be used with 5 and 12
g/m detonating cord.
SANEL CR units may be ordered with tube lengths from 1.2 m and upwards in intervals of 0.6 m.
4. SANEL QUICKDET
SANEL is a combination of SANEL UNIDET in-hole detonator and QR connector [Link] QR unit
has been fitted to the in-hole detonator tube creating a practical and easy to useinitiation
device.
As of SANEL QR, SANEL comes with 0,17,25,42, and 67 ms delay connectors.
SANEL units may be ordered with tube lengths from 1.2 m and upwards in intervals of 0.6 m.
5. SANEL MS
SANEL MS is a short delay detonator system of 25 MS increments from period No. 3 (75 ms) to period
No. 20 (500 MS).
SANEL MS is mainly used in small bench blasting operations on surface and underground, as
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Arabian Arrow Mining Company
well as in underwater blasting and sub-level caving. SANEL MS units may be ordered with tube
lengths from 1.2 m and upwards in intervals of 0.6 m.
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Arabian Arrow Mining Company
Project Details: WO-007 (CH 75+000 to CH 81+840) Framework Agreement for Site Preparation
Contract No. 4200000029
Contract Name. The connector Rail corridor early works
Name of the Project: WO-007 (CH 75+000 to CH 81+840) Framework Agreement for
Site Preparation
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Arabian Arrow Mining Company
• During Blasting
During blasting, monitoring for any flying birds, fauna movement will be
undertaken. As appropriate, fauna & avifauna, if observed during blasting,
should be scared off site.
Monitoring of environmental parameters as per Section requirements
attached below.
• Post -blast
Post-blast monitoring surveys (targeted to earlier identified archeology/
ecology receptors) will be undertaken to check and document any damages
or observations.
The environmental checklist will be completed attached below– after blast
section, Review of measured parameters e.g., noise levels and AOP and
compare with target thresholds and report any exceedances.
Blasting Environmental Checklist (to be completed for every blast)
Blast Reference
Location s
Area
Coordinates
Blast Date
Blast
Number
PIC
CEM
Suppression?
Are dump suppression water tanker
separately dedicated and available
during the time of blasting?
if water is used, is water treatment
according to permit conditions?
18 Groundwater monitoring in place?
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Arabian Arrow Mining Company
A. Blast Management
I. Blast Fumes – The blasting process generates blast fumes, AYC will be adhere
following techniques to mitigate the Blast fumes:
a. The purpose of blast is to remove the jebel as a part of work scope
b. Blasting process to remove the hard rock, which is present in jebel.
c. Blast fumes will be mainly managed through the blasting approach
d. In confined spaces, AYC ensure effective ventilation as a key safety
requirement
e. AYC ensure Water sprays, when applicable, will be used to aid in reduction of
blast fume
f. During surface blasting, AYC CEM will measure wind direction to ensure blast
fume will not affect sensitive receptors.
g. Windsocks will be installed at blasting location
II. Blast induced vibrations – all blasting induces vibration (calculated in Peak Particle
Velocity (PPV)
a. AYC will carry out PPV, and to ensure to calculated PPV kept below the
limitset,
b. AYC will use Vibrographs to use monitor vibration levels.
c. After the initial trail blast, charge weights or blast patterns will be modified as
required to ensure no adverse effects
III. Air Over Pressure – The initiation of explosives creates a high volume of gas which
causes displacement of the air crating a pressure wave. This can cause damage and
loss.
a. AYC will calculate AOP to design mitigation pressure. AYC will ensure no
Blasting will be carried out, if AOP exceeds more than limits.
b. Industry standard seismographs, namely digital seismographs that deliver full
waveform capture, plus microphone suitable for air overpressure
measurements will be used for monitoring during blasting (capable of
simultaneous recording Longitudinal, Vertical, and Transverse Peak Particle
Velocity (PPV) in mms-1; Resultant Peak Particle Velocity (PPV) in mms 1; and
Air Overpressure in dB)
c. AYC will ensure mitigations for air overpressure such as blast design, ballast,
mats, blast doors to be discussed as required from the risk assessment and
sensitive receiver review.
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IV. Fly Rock – debris and flying particles expected during blasting
a. AYC ensure, fly rock generation will be limited by the charge/blast design to
avoid direct exposure to adjacent receptors.
b. In the situation where fly rock may arise, control measures and definition of
unsafe zones, NO GO zones will be identified and cardon with efficient
security measures.
c. AYC ensures that any blast close to the exclusion zone, mitigation measures
to control fly rock will be used e.g. use of blast mats, tunnel blast doors, etc.
B. Timing
a. Blasting will be restricted to favorable weather conditions avoiding electrical
storms, temperature inversions, heavy low cloud or where sensitive
receptors are downwind under windy condition
b. Blasting will take into account the working hours of any potential sensitive
receptors e.g. camps, offices … etch
C. Security
a. AYC will fence off all LUP boundaries to avoid, and restrict un authorized
entries, Animal protection.
b. The LUP boundary will be fenced with hard barricading, only single-entry
exitwill be operated. Patrol vehicle will be drive-off for 24hrs security
c. All blasting activities shall be compliant with KSA HR Decree #38 legal
obligations. The use of explosives is strictly managed in KSA via HR Decree
38 which is overseen by the Ministry of the Interior
Blasting Checklist
For every blast, the Environment checklist mentioned above will be completed and signed
by the PIC and CEM for before and after blast checks.
I. Record Keeping – Nesma ensure to keep records for all blast will be documented
andarchived for future audits:
a. Data regarding the blast itself including blast number, location of blast, no.
of holes, diameter of holes, burden and spacings, explosive type(s),
detonation method, stemming, and maximum instantaneous charge weight
(MIC).
b. Receptors Mapping (summary table and map)
c. Pre-blast surveys
d. Blast Checklist
e. Monitoring results (noise, AOP, vibration)
f. Videos of blast
II. Monitoring
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BLASTING REPORT
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BLASTING PLAN
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
9 Loading of Explosion due to Personal 5 2 10 Ensure Blasting zone should be 5 1 5
explosive in tampering/prematu Injury/Proper properly barricaded, evacuate entire
holes/Charging redecoration ty and area, permitted only authorized
Fire Environment person (Restricted Zone).
al damage Person with RED flags and whistles to be
deputed at entry point. Site Blasting
Charging of explosive in holes shall be engineer/Super
done in presence of explosive engineer, visor/
police and work supervisor. Foreman/Safet
Charging will be done by y
authorized, trained and
experienced explosive handling
team.
Ensure blasting team will wear anti-static
clothing and footwear.
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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RISK ASSESSMENT
Avoid stemming shorter than the burden
distance. Too short stemming may create
crater effect.
Use of good and proper size of stemming
material.
Proper drilling and firing pattern
Check that right amount of explosive
Leave some rock from previous blast in
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RISK ASSESSMENT
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43. Appendices
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Blasting Exclusion Zone Readiness Check sheet
Contractor: Blast Number:
Blast Date: Planned Blasting Time:
Worksite / Lot: Exclusion zone radii:
ALL CHECKS TO BE CONFIRMED BY SIGNATURE DATE AND TIME, NO BOXES ARE TO BE LEFT BLANK UNLESS SHADED
Contractor Blasting Contractor Construction
Contractor Shotfirer Engineer Manager EPM Construction Manager
Site Evacuation and Re-entry Actions /
Full Name Full Name Full Name Full Name Comments:
Checks
Initials Date and time Initials Date and time Initials Date and time Initials Date and time
Section 1 - Blast Notification
Blast notification submitted at least 48 hours prior
planned blast, is correct and has sufficient detail
In case of misfire detection (N/A if no misfire), has Note: If misfire detected, exclusion
a misfire confirm notification been issued and zones & blast guards with flags to
acknowledged by all parties? remain in place
Confirmation that all explosives have fired -
Confirmation of all clear to enter
Prillex 11,425 kg
kgs.
pcs kgs.
Booster 200g
pcs
Sanel pcs
0.00 pcs
(Submitted by)
Rev_01
Blasting Notifications Instructions
Timeline (in
Accountable
relation to Action
owner(s)
planned blast)
Create Blast Notice Document
Notice to ensure it is representative of the site
including but not limited to:
- Excavation extents
- Access roads inside and outside the site
Contractor
1 T - 96 to 48 hrs - Site entrances
Blasting Eng.
- Safety person and “No Entry” sign positions
- Adjacent sites
- Office locations
- Sensitive Receptors with recording locations
identified
Contractor
2 T - 48 hrs Submit Blast Notice in EDMS
Blasting Eng.
3 T - 48 to 36 hrs Review Blast Notice EPM CM
EPM Gov.
Once accepted, distribute blast notice to all
4 T - 36 hrs Relations
stakeholders
Officer
Blast notification board updated at all relevant office
5 T - 36 hrs Contractor CM
areas
Confirm acknowledgement of blast notice receipt Contractor CM
6 T - 36 to 24 hrs
from all stakeholders EPM CM
DAY OF BLAST
Complete pre-blast safety briefing, led by the
Start of blast Contractor CM
7 Contractor CM, attended by all involved with blast.
day All parties to agree with blast continuation EPM CM
Inform all stakeholders of blast progression via
8 T - 3 hrs Contractor CM
verification group
Prepare exclusion zone notification boards and
Contractor CM
9 T - 2 hrs ensure all signs and flags are in position, ready to
display EPM CM
Remove all plant from minimum 300m plant
10 T - 1 hr Contractor CM
exclusion zone
Remove all personnel from minimum 500m
11 T - 1 hr Contractor CM
personnel exclusion zone
When blasting preparation is complete, full visual
sweep of the blast area exclusion zone is to be
Contractor
carried out. During the sweep, upon passing access
Shotfirer (within
control persons, the Contractor CM will ensure “No
exclusion zone)
Entry” signs are displayed and flags risen in all
12 T - 30 mins required locations. E.g.
Contractor CM
- Roads
(around the
- Site Offices
exclusion zone
- Adjacent Sites
boundary)
- Site Entrances
- Spine Excavation
Confirm blast area exclusion zone is clear of Contractor
13 T - 10 mins
personnel and plant Shotfirer
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Timeline (in
Accountable
relation to Action
owner(s)
planned blast)
Confirm blast is prepared as per the approved blast Contractor
14 T - 10 mins
plan Shotfirer
Complete confirmation of blast readiness radio call, Contractor
15 T - 5 mins led by the Contractor shotfirer, with all involved with Shotfirer
blast. All parties to agree with blast continuation EPM CM
Contractor
16 T – 0 mins Initiate blast
Shotfirer
Complete 15-minutes waiting period after blast prior Contractor
17 T + 0 to 15 mins
to any re-entry Shotfirer
Contractor
18 T + 15 mins Complete post-blast inspection for misfire detection
Shotfirer
If misfires detected, issue notification to the
T + 15 to 30 Contractor CM
19 verification group confirming misfires found and
mins EPM CM
exclusion zone is to be maintained until further notice
Contractor
Shotfirer
20 As required If misfires detected, repeat items 12 – 16
Contractor CM
EPM CM
If confirmed that all explosives have fired, verification Contractor CM
21 T + 30 mins
group updated to confirm “all clear” EPM CM
Remove “No-entry” signs and flags from all blast
22 T + 30 mins Contractor CM
guard locations
T + 30 to 60 Complete post-blast safety briefing with all on site, Contractor CM
23
mins led by the Contractor CM EPM CM
Removable
flag
Sign size: A0
(841mm x 1189mm)
(Blasting Contractor)
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Classification | Internal
Any visual presence of avifauna/ fauna near/ within exclusion zone during pre-blast survey?
12
if yes, were they scared off - guided out of area to safe zone?
13 Any bird nests detected near within exclusion zone? (If yes, inform EPM and postpone blasting activities)
Any presence of Spiny Tail Lizards or burrows visually identified near or within exclusion zone before pre blast survey? (If yes, inform
14
EPM and postpone blasting activities)
15 Any presence of roosting bats visually identified during pre-blast survey? (if yes, inform EPM and postpone blasting activities)
16 Are identified heritage sites inspected before blasting and status documented for a pre-post blast assessment?
PIC
CEM
Classification | Internal
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Classification | Internal
Classification | Intern
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Emergency Evacuation Plan
An assembly point will be marked outside the danger zone of blasting and all
concerned shall be informed. All concerned shall report there in case of any
emergency. All persons other thanthose required for blasting shall be evacuated to a
safe place before blasting. Persons will not take shelter under any temporary
structures or at places other than those indicated by the Blasting Engineer, Police on
duty or the guards deputed for the purpose.
Emergency scenarios relevant to blast activities include those that could lead to the unplanned
detonation of explosives, such as lightning strike, fire on an explosive’s vehicle, heating caused
by elevated temperatures or
reactive ground, and those that could result in significant misfire risks such as major wall failure
above a blast area or flooding. These scenarios are managed according to site emergency
response procedures.
In the event of an emergency situation that could lead to unplanned detonation, all personnel
working within the designated Blast Exclusion Zone must be evacuated. Blast guards must be
posted to the relevant positions to ensure that the effects of any potential unplanned initiation
are minimized.
In the case of lightning, established response procedures should define how to identify the point
at which an approaching thunderstorm is considered a risk. The communication and clearance
protocols necessary to evacuate and secure the emergency blast exclusion zone and re-entry
procedures. Storm warning systems should be utilized so that sufficient time is available to
empty MPU hoses and augers, evacuate equipment and personnel, and secure safe exclusion
zones around the blast area and explosives vehicle park-up area.
In the case of a fire on an explosives transport vehicle an attempt to extinguish must only be
made if the fire has been witnessed to have just started, if it is safe to do so (i.e. not directly
associated with an AN, ANFO or explosives storage area), and the person has been
appropriately trained. In such cases, an emergency is to be called on the radio, the vehicle fuel
isolated and the fire managed with on-board extinguishers. Otherwise, the area shall be
immediately evacuated and an emergency exclusion zone established, with no other vehicles
are
to enter the area. The fire will be managed by the fire response team and re-entry prevented
until the fire has burned out and the area has been cleared.
In the case of expected flooding or wall failure, where immediate evacuation is not deemed
necessary, restricted access may apply while the partially completed blast is prepared for firing
to remove an otherwise significant misfire risk at a later time.
In emergency response scenarios, personnel may be directed to close the roadways and
access paths to the designated Blast Exclusion Zone for the duration of the emergency event
at the discretion of the site management team.
In accordance with site emergency procedures and/or the explosives company emergency
procedures, the Blast Exclusion Zone may be altered from the original plan, with due
consideration given to the risk potential of the situation. In this event the parameters of the
Blast Exclusion Zone will be communicated to all personnel in accordance with site procedures.
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Before the trial blasting for intake area, site emergency team shall be organized and require
emergency equipment shall arrive at the site.
When work is carried out in the intake area, a fully functional and suitably equipped ambulance
with driver and a paramedical staff trained in First Aid shall be available close to the site of
works and not obstruct with movement of construction machinery and personnel or performance
of construction activity.
The Contractor shall also provide trained crew in the immediate vicinity of ongoing works at all
times that work is taking place, in case of emergency.
At the workface entrance, one Sign Board for emergency shall be set and all signs shall be
described in three languages: English, Arabic and Urdu. And post all emergency response
telephone numbers, including medical response and fire department, phone numbers of all site
supervisors. Plan should be clearly communicated and understood by all personnel.
In case of emergency or accident, the discoverer shall immediately report to the employer, the
engineer Supervisor and the project manager after verification, meanwhile calling the
emergency telephone, and report the specific situation to the engineer and the employer after
investigation and verification.
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ESIA, cat3, environmental & social impact assessment
Date of issue:
# Title
1 Delivery Date
2 Delivery Point
3 Blasting Number
4 Planned Pull Length
5 Registered shotfirer
6 Site Engineer
7 Construction Manager
8 Blaster
9 Blasting Engineer
10 Blasting Manager
11
QUANTITY
TYPE SPECIFICATION UNIT
REQUESTED ARRIVED CONSUMED REMAINING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Classification | Internal
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33
34
35
36
……………………… ……………………..
Blaster Senior Blaster
…………………….. ……………………..
Blasting Manager
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Nesma
Description
Blast Number/ID
Blast Location
Misfire location coordinates/chainage
Blast date & time
Re-blasting time of misfire
Quantity and/or Type of misfires
Misfire hole ID's
Photo
Recovery by Who:
Explosives remains found Y
Quantity(s) and comments
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Detonator(s) found Y/N
Quantity
Other comments
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POST BLASTING INSPECTION CHECKLIST
Information
Inspection Date & Time:
Date
Location:
Address
Customer / Site:
Conducted By:
Blasting Crew
Blasting Engineer:
Authorized Shotfirer:
Team Members:
Pre-Charging Controls
Pre-start meeting is held to delegate the daily duties and to discuss hazards.
Yes
No
Shotfirer reviews blast design and, if required, notifies Blasting Engineer.
Yes
No
N/A
Shotfirer inspects bench and faces prior to operation.
Rev_01
Yes
No
N/A
Hole depths vs. planned depths are inspected and recorded.
Yes
No
Holes are inspected for wet conditions prior to charging and inspections are recorded.
Yes
No
Risk Management
Take Risk assessment completed for identified hazards and required controls are
implemented.
Yes
No
Blasting Report Risk Assessment Form is completed prior to blast hole charging operations.
Yes
No
The distance to closest structure, clearance zone distance and burden spacing are identified
on Blasting Report Risk Assessment Form prior to charging operations.
Yes
No
Incomplete
Hazards such as fly rock, misfire and/or NOx identified during risk assessment.
Yes
No
What controls are in place to control those risks?
A clearance distance is identified for working near free face/ under highwalls.
Yes
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No
N/A
Blasting Crew is aware of and complying with the clearance distances.
Yes
No
N/A
Fall protection is provided for works near free face or where fall from height is potential.
Yes
No
N/A
Blasting Area Clearance and Delineation
Blasting area is clearly demarcated to prevent unauthorized access.
Yes
No
Blasting Area is inspected before commencing any work.
Yes
No
N/A
Access to blasting area is under control.
Yes
No
N/A
Authorized Shotfirer and Blasting Team are familiar with the Blasting Area Entry
Procedure.
Yes
No
Incomplete
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Add Photo
Media
Traffic Management and Blasting Operation Vehicles
Is there any site-specific Traffic Management Plan in place?
Yes
No
Risks of potential hazards arise from vehicle/ truck traffic on site are identified and
managed.
Yes
No
N/A
What controls in place to manage traffic?
Completed
Incomplete
Add Photo.
Media
Records & Documentation
Delivery trucks are stock taken prior to unloading and stock take records are maintained.
Yes
No
Excessive/ Surplus products are return in compliance with the Product Return Procedure.
Yes
No
N/A
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Randomly select one of product types on delivery truck, conduct blind stock take and
compare results with Road Permit & Dispatch Note data.
Compliant
Noncompliant
Comments (in case of discrepancy)
Add Photo.
Media
Blasting Area Clearance
Spotters are identified and assigned for blasting safety zone.
Yes
No
Blasting clearance distances are in place as 300 m (for machinery/ equipment) and 500 m
(for human & animals).
Yes
No
N/A
No any structure/ plant/ equipment is present inside the clearance zone.
Yes
No
structure/ plant/ equipment inside the clearance zone have been included in risk
assessment and notified to stakeholders.
Yes
No
N/A
Transportation
Explosives and detonators are transferred with different vehicles or in separate
compartments at the same vehicle.
Yes
No
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N/A
Explosives are kept locked and supervised during break/ rest times.
Yes
No
N/A
Post Blasting Inspections
Spotters do not leave their area of duty while post blasting inspections are carried out and
ensure clearance zone safety.
Yes
No
Explosives packaging’s are disposed in compliance with the procedures post blast.
Yes
No
Other
Other (specify):
Shotfirer is familiar with actions to take in case of any misfire
Yes
No
N/A
Results
General Comments
Conducted By:
Designation:
Date:
Signature:
Rev_01
PRE-BLAST MEETING
Contractor/Subcontractor:
Rev: Date: …… / ….. / 202 ….
Portal: Time: ….. : …..
Tunnel: Blast No: ………………
S: Short Hole
L: Long Hole
C: Clogged
Le: Left Empty
Ex: Extra Charg.
Notes: ………………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Name Name Name
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Blast Location
Safety
SHEQ checklist
Blast Date
15
34
Safety Blast
Location
Blast Date
Blast
Drilling and Blasting Number
After Blast
Shot exploder disconnected from
the firing line
Confirm blast result, any misfires?
Misfire, destruction of old
explosives procedures
followed?
All-clear notices & signal given for
re-entry?
Ventilation started?
Air quality monitoring?
Access control activated for re-
entry?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Nos. of
1077
Holes
Average
7
Depth
Holes
Diameter 64
Volume of
Blasted
Powder
Factor 0.3 kgs. per cubic m.
Remarks:
Classification | Internal
Rev_01
Effective priming of explosives in blasting operations requires careful consideration of several factors to ensure compatibility and safety. Firstly, the selection of the appropriate type and quantity of explosive is critical, taking into account the blasthole diameter, burden, spacing, and ground conditions . Following this, the detonation method must match the explosive type to prevent misfires, which can occur due to incorrect handling or application . Proper storage and transportation, in compliance with regulatory and site-specific standards, are essential to prevent unauthorized access and ensure the explosives remain in optimal condition . Comprehensive risk assessments are necessary to identify potential hazards, and adequate controls must be in place, including secure management of the blasting site and a well-demarcated exclusion zone to protect personnel from fly rock and misfires . Training and competency of personnel are vital, encompassing the use of personal protective equipment and emergency response procedures . Regular audits and reviews of safety plans ensure continual improvement and adherence to best practices .
Emergency scenarios during blasting activities are managed by evacuating all personnel from the designated Blast Exclusion Zone and establishing an emergency exclusion zone. The site management team plays a crucial role in directing the closure of roadways and access paths, altering the Blast Exclusion Zone as necessary, and ensuring all personnel are informed of the current exclusion zone parameters as per site procedures . The fire response team manages fires, while flood or wall failure situations may lead to restricted access rather than immediate evacuation . Blast guards are posted to minimize the effects of any unplanned initiation, and an assembly point is marked outside the danger zone for personnel to gather . Additionally, emergency response equipment and trained medical staff must be available on-site, with emergency plans communicated and understood by all personnel .
A blasthole should be reprimed in scenarios such as after slumping of bulk explosives resulting in the loss of downlines, in water-filled blastholes to prevent primer floating, or if bulk explosives appear to be running away in broken ground . Improper repriming can lead to risks of misfires, excessive fly rock, overpressure, or generation of significant post-blast NOx fumes . Additionally, uncorrected blasthole deviations or changes in expected blasthole charging parameters without appropriate adjustments can also compromise blast performance and safety .
Recording stem heights and explosive column heights is essential in a blasting operation to ensure quality control and prevent unwanted outcomes. Accurate recording of these parameters helps manage the charge quantities and column rise efficiently, which is critical for the safe and effective execution of blasting activities . It prevents column dislocation and other failures that could lead to misfires or dangerous fly rock situations . Proper stem height ensures the containment of explosion gases, aiding in effective rock fragmentation and minimizing nuisances such as air blast and fly rock .
Having approved, trained personnel for operating equipment and handling explosives in a blasting site is crucial for ensuring safety and compliance with regulations. Trained personnel must adhere to site-specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Standard Work Practices (SWPs) to mitigate risks and prevent personal injury or equipment damage . Only authorized and trained individuals can operate equipment and access explosive materials to prevent unauthorized access and ensure safe handling . The presence of trained personnel helps in assessing risks and implementing controls for the handling of explosives and associated equipment, which are critical to preventing accidents and ensuring the effectiveness of safety management plans . Additionally, a qualified Shotfirer is responsible for the preparation, charging, and firing of explosives, which is vital for managing potential misfires and ensuring all safety protocols are observed .
To prevent fly rock during blasting operations, the following factors must be considered: ensure proper blast design and charge selection, maintaining appropriate stemming length and quality, and properly accounting for face condition, burden, and stemming material . The length and type of stemming are crucial to confine explosive energy and control rock fragmentation . Utilizing blast mats or similar coverings can contain debris . Exclusion zones must be established, and unauthorized personnel must be kept away during blasts . Proper drilling and firing patterns should be adhered to, and effective monitoring of blast parameters like vibration and overpressure should be in place to ensure the safety of surrounding areas . Additionally, the condition of the face and any cracks or weaknesses in the rock must be identified to prevent unexpected fly rock .
Excessive explosive quantities in blastholes should be managed by conducting a careful risk assessment and, if necessary, removing surplus material using an approved scoop or vacuum equipment to achieve the correct column rise or height while ensuring safety and regulatory compliance . If bulk explosives have slumped, the blasthole needs to be reprimed and potentially recharged . In situations where explosives run away in broken ground, it is safer to stem and abandon the hole after attempting to remove the primer, as further handling is unsafe . Additionally, explosives need to be charged systematically, with measurements taken regularly to ensure that column rises are within acceptable tolerances and adjustments made as needed . Proper communication within the blast area and supervisory control are essential for preventing overcharge incidents .
Safety measures for transporting explosives include using approved explosive vans with spark arresters on exhausts, and ensuring explosives and detonators are transported separately to reduce the risk of explosion or fire . Transport must be conducted by authorized, licensed personnel under police supervision, with police convoying the explosive van . Vehicles used must comply with applicable standards, be clearly identifiable, placarded, and managed to prevent unauthorized access . Safety measures should incorporate risk assessments to address hazards and implement controls, such as securing the transport area and managing potential impacts from careless handling or external threats .
Pre-blast meetings are crucial for ensuring safety and effectiveness during blasting operations. They focus on confirming the Blast Area Exclusion Zone plan, establishing communication protocols, detailing the firing location, and identifying any changes or hazards from the original blast design. Involved personnel include the Shotfirer, Blast Supervisor, Sweepers, Blast Guards, Safety Officer, and other relevant personnel . The meetings also ensure that all necessary notifications are made and that everyone involved is clear about their roles and responsibilities, including the verification of communication equipment functionality .