Noscitur a sociis [Latin, it is known by its associates]: a doctrine or rule of construction:

the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word (as in a statute or contract) should be

determined by considering the words with which it is associated in the context.
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW; "DE FACTO" GOVERNMENT; PRESENCE OF GUERRILLA
BANDS. — The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in
towns of the Philippines whenever these towns left by Japanese garrisons or by the
detachments of troops sent on patrol to these places, was not sufficient to make the
military occupation ineffective, nor did it cause that occupation to cease, or prevent the
constitution or establishment of a de facto government in the Islands. The belligerent
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders became an accomplished fact
from the time General Wainwright, Commander of the American and Filipino forces in
Luzon, and General Sharp, Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao,
surrendered and ordered the surrender of their forces to the Japanese invaders, and the
Commonwealth Government had become incapable of publicity exercising its authority,
and the invader had substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government
in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

2. ID.; ID.; HAGUE CONVENTIONS; DUTY OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPANT TO

CONTINUE COURTS AND MUNICIPAL LAWS IN FORCE, FOR BENEFIT OF
INHABITANTS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY. — The provisions of the Hague
Conventions which impose upon in belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts
as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in
order to reestablish and insure :Pordre et al vie publice," that is, the public order and
safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for
the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants
of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary
pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; MEANING OF "PROCESSES" USED IN

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR OF OCTOBER 23, 1944;

MAXIM OF "NOSCITUR A SOCIIS." — The word "processes," as used in the
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted
to mean judicial processes; that term should be construed to mean legislative and
constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this
maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d., pp. 194-196.) Since
the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void,"
the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Orders
of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, ordinances promulgated by
the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of
said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with
which the word "processes" is a associated.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the
word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar
as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should
be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power.
Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on
petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like." For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We
5

view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known
principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only
to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what
6

was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to
manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its
being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription. Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should
7

be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." The desirability of removing in that
8

fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself.
The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a
statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation
rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that
score.9
T he proposition that Republic Act No. 623, as amended, protects only the containers of the
soft drinks enumerated by petitioner and those similar thereto, is unwarranted and specious. The
rule of ejusdem generis cannot be applied in this case. To limit the coverage of the law only to those
enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose
of the law. Such rule of ejusdem generis is to be resorted to only for the purpose of determining what
the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other parts of
the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by
the appreciation of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. 18
- November 14, 2020
RATIONALE:

The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted
to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50)

FACTS:

1. On October 25, 1977, Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate
informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 772.

2. Said fiscal alleged that sometime in 1974 up to the present, the accused, with stealth
and strategy, enter into, squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land physically
occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna Jr. as successor to the
pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919.

3. Said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant
from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is
preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr

4. Five (5) of the accused were tried by herein respondent, Judge Echaves, who motu
proprio issued a December 9, 1977 omnibus order dismissing the five information on
the grounds that:

(1) it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy",
whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner", and

(2) under the rule of ejusdem generis, the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a
grazing land

5. The fiscal then amended the information and used the expression "with threat, and
taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranch
owner" instead of "stealth and strategy" and asked that the dismissal order be
reconsidered and the amended information be admitted.

6. The lower court denied the motion enunciating that the phrase "and for other
purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble
does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

7. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts,
applies to agricultural lands.

RULING:

NO. The decree does not apply to pasture lands.

PD no. 772's preamble:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction

No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public
Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC
General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency,
Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an
illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those
along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private
property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country;

Said decree's preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made
by well-to-do individuals.

In the case at bar, the squatting filed against violation of PD no. 772 involves pasture
lands in rural areas.

On the other hand, it R.A. No. 947 punishes any person, corporation or association to
forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands.

Although the ruling of the trial court is affirmed, The rule of ejusdem generis (of the
same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case since the
intent of the decree is unmistakable.

It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions.

The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted
to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.
They are predicated upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned." 23

Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation in
favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts mentioned in Section 232
are criminally punishable under Sections 26124 and 26225 of B.P. Blg. 881. Since Sections 261 and
262, which lists the election offenses punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict
interpretation means that private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Section
232.

This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without any sanction. Though not
a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the
imposition of administrative penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC may recommend to the President the imposition of disciplinary action on any officer or
employee the COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive, order or decision. 26 Also, under
the Revised Administrative Code,27 the COMELEC may recommend to the proper authority the
suspension or removal of any government official or employee found guilty of violation of election
laws or failure to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings.