SAUSSURE’S THEORY OF THE LINGUISTIC SIGN:

A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE
Svitlana Zhabotynska
Cherkasy National University
Cherkasy, Ukraine
Abstract

This paper elaborates Saussure‟s idea of the

linguistic sign as a bilateral unit combining the
signifier (a concept / meaning) and signified (a sound
image). It is argued that onomasiologically their
relation is accounted for by cognitive mapping which
evolves in the direction (1) the experienced world 
the thought / meaning of a linguistic sign; (2) the
meaning of a linguistic sign  its internal form; (3)
the internal form of a linguistic sign  its external
form; (4) the external form1  the external form2.
Semasiologically, the relation between the signified
and the signifier evolves in an opposite direction and
grounds on mental construal. Therefore, a cognitive
approach to Saussure‟s definition of a sign provides a
better understanding of the interaction between its
conceptual and formal aspects.
Key words: Suassure, sign, signifier, signified, cognitive
mapping, mental construal.

Introduction
According to F. de Soussure (1966: 66-67), the linguistic
sign is a two-sided psychological entity (Fig. 1), with the
two intimately united elements being a concept and a sound
image (drawing (a)). The latter is not a material sound, a
purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the
sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. A sound
image is the signifier, and a concept is the signified
(drawings (b) and (c)). Each of them recalls the other.

Fig. 1. Sausssure‟s interpretation of a sign

Today, the above insights, which have become classical

for the theory of language, may be given interpretation in
terms of mapping and construal conceptions developed in
cognitive science. Such interpretations aim to expose the
nature of the signified, and the way it is exteriorized by the
signifier.

Discussion
The further discussion includes: defining the term construal
used in different cognitive disciplines, relating construal
and mapping, and exposing the relevance of mapping and
construal for the process of semiosis as an activity that
involves (linguistic) signs.
In cognitive science, the term construal refers to the
way in which people perceive, comprehend, and interpret
the world around them. S o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y says that
construal plays a crucial role in situations when people are
obliged to venture beyond the information immediately
provided by the direct observation or secondhand report of
a stimulus event. In this case, a person infers the additional
details of content, or meaning from the information
available. In other words, when a person lacks the
knowledge to correctly deal with a given situation he or she
employs construal. Initially viewed as an obstruction in
one‟s perception of the world, construal has evolved into a
mechanism used to explain how or why people think the
way they do (Ross 1987; Aronson, Wilson & Akert 2010).
The importance of construal is specifically emphasized in c
o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , which studies conceptual
schemata / schemas (Bartlett 1932) as structures that, being
non-specific, organize information of our prior experiences
(Neisser 1967: 287) and thus are applicable in construal,
since they help perceivers to resolve ambiguity, fill in the
gaps, and provide predictability and coherence of
information (Ross 1987). C o g n i t i v e l i n g u i s t i c s
considers various linguistic expressions to be dependent on
construal, which is understood as the way of our processing
information. This understanding is highlighted in R.
Langacker‟s cognitive grammar (2008), which maintains
that the meaning of a linguistic expression is not just the
conceptual content it evokes – equally important is how that
content is construed. Construal is a particular way of
“viewing” a “visual scene”. What we actually see depends
on: (a) what we chose to look at – focusing, (b) where we
view it from – perspective, (c) how carefully we examine it
– specificity, and (d) which elements we pay attention to –
prominence (Langacker 2008: 55). In a number of my
works (Zhabotynska 2009, 2010, 2013 among others) I
argue that conceptual construal as information processing
has two stages: first, we identify constituents of the given
information and combine them within a coherent conceptual
structure; then, we apply different cognitive operations (like
the ones described by Langacker as construals) to the
obtained structure. As a result, we get various modifications
of this structure. Therefore, we should differentiate between
the terms “conceptual model” and “cognitive model” used
in cognitive linguistics as synonyms. The conceptual model
should be understood as an information structure taken
without any cognitive operation(s) applied to it. The
cognitive model should be understood as an information
structure modified by some cognitive operation(s).
Cognitive operations create several cognitive models on the
basis of one and the same conceptual model.
Mental construing deals with the results of cognitive
mapping. In c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , cognitive
mapping is broadly defined as representation of the
experienced world in the human mind. It is a process
composed of a series of psychological transformations by
which an individual acquires, codes, stores, recalls, and
decodes information about the world. Cognitive map is the
term used to refer to one's internal representation of the
experienced world. Cognitive maps are invariably
incomplete and partially distorted (underlined by me –
S.Z.), the properties that can be revealed in external
representations or in spatial behaviors (Downs & Stea
1973). Information about the world retained in a cognitive
map is a subjective image, a world‟s model, an
interpretation of the world, which must not be equated with
the world per se, since “a map is not the territory”
(А.Коrzybski), as well as “a menu is not the food”
([Link]). The list may be extended with the analogies: “the
blueprint is not the house, the recipe is not the dish, the
computer simulation of wheather does not raine on us”
(Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 4). The fundamental
hypothesis of c o g n i t i v e l i n g u i s t i c s is that
linguistic meaning involves motivated mappings from
conceptualization to expression, This hypothesis underlies
many investigations in metaphor theory, the role of
iconicity in grammar, processes of grammaticalization, etc.
(Shina 1999: 229-230).
In semiosis, cognitive mapping may be attributed to the
Speaker and the respective onomasiological approach “from
the meaning – to the linguistic form”, and mental construal
may be attributed to the Listener and the respective
semasiological approach “from the linguistic form to its
meaning”. Hence, mapping and construal are mirror
phenomena that establish the relation between the domains
of EXPERIENCED WORLD, THOUGHT (MIND), and
LINGUISTIC SIGNS
(LANGUAGE). This relation may be represented with an
extended semiotic triangle (Fig. 2). Onomasiologically,
when a linguistic sign is created, the process of semiosis
involving mapping proceeds in the direction: (1) from the
information obtained through experience to the concept in
the mind, or meaning; (2) from the concept to the internal
form of a linguistic sign; (3) from the internal form of a
linguistic sign to its external form. Semasiologically, when
a linguistic sign is understood, or interpreted, the process of
semiosis involving construal (reconstructing the whole from
its part) evolves in the opposite direction.
EXPERIENCED
WORLD
(domain of referents)
1
LINGUISTIC SIGNS:
NAME OF CONCEPT
(domain of symbols)
THOUGHT:
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
THE WORLD =
Internal form CONCEPT / MEANING
2
External form of the sign (domain of meanings)
of the sign
3

Fig. 2. Directions of mapping / construal in semiosis

Below, I will consider the sequential process of mapping
with the emphasis on its two major properties – i n c o m p l
e t e n e s s , or fragmentary nature of conceptual maps, and
their occasional d e v i a t i o n s , or departures from a
conventional pattern. The latter, subjective in nature, tends
to be iconic, compatible with that which exists “in reality”,
or that which we bodily perceive. The theoretical issues are
illustrated with linguistic signs that belong to different
levels – lexical, syntactic, and textual.
 1. WORLD  THOUGHT / MEANING OF A SIGN.
Mapping, as an incomplete and sometimes deviant mental
representation, is grounded on attention, which singles out
only particular fragments of the perceived (experienced)
entity. According to L. Talmy (2000: 76-77), such
fragments, taken together, constitute a pattern of attention.
Due to focusing on its particular parts, a single attention
pattern can be overlaid in different ways onto the same
referent scene. In Langacker‟s cognitive grammar
(Langacker 2008: 70-73), different focused patterns of
attention are compatible with the prominence construal of
the trajector / landmark alignment. The trajector is the
primary, and the landmark is the secondary semantic focus.
Both are equally important for the meaning of a linguistic
expression. E.g. In the situation The clerk sold the goods to
the customer the focal attention is mapped onto the
SELLER (the trajector), while in the situation The customer
bought the goods from the clerk the focal attention is
mapped onto the CUSTOMER (the trajector). Information
registered by a pattern of attention is a concept which
becomes the signified (meaning) of a linguistic signs. I n c o
m p l e t e n e s s of the signified is a topic of the long-
standing discussion about the boundaries between
“linguistic” and “encyclopedic” meanings. Anyway, our
knowledge about the named object, even if this knowledge
is “encyclopedic”, remains incomplete.
D e v i a t i o n of a linguistic meaning from the canonical
pattern may be illustrated by Langacker‟s (2008: 74)
examples of changing the viewer's position from static to
dynamic, as in the sentence The forest is getting thicker,
where the meaning of the sentence implies that the viewer
is in motion. In a text, deviation is exhibited by
perspectivization manifested with “late indefinites” (Dirven
& Verspoor 1999: 203). In English, the indefinite article
used with a name of the entity already introduced before
signals the change of perspective: the described event is
“seen” by another person, different from a previous
narrator.
2. MEANING  LINGUISTIC FORM / internal

form. When created, a linguistic sign is always

motivated, i.e. somehow related to the meaning which it
evokes. Motivation that facilitates access to the meaning
may be provided by the external and internal linguistic
forms. The external form is the sound form (sound
image) of a linguistic expression. The internal form, or
motivator (Potebnya 1993: 100; Kubryakova 2004: 62)
is a f r a g m e n t of meaning immediately represented
in the external form. Cf. “Form does not represent
meaning but instead picks out regularities that run
throughout meanings. Form prompts meaning and must
be suited to its task”
(Fauconnier & Turner 2000: 5). The relation between the
meaning and the external form of a linguistic expression is
iconically manifested in onomatopoeic words (e.g. to hiss,
to buzz, to quack, etc.), and in sound symbolism (e.g. the
sound [i] is associated with a small size: pin, thin, bit). The
relation between the meaning and the internal form of a
linguistic expression is manifested via mapping as
fragmentary, i n c o m p l e t e representation of the
meaning in the internal form (catchaiser, food-begger – of a
dog). D e v i a t i o n s of the internal form, or motivator
may occur when it departs from the “real state of things”
represented through iconicity or metonymy. The examples
of such deviations are metaphors (a lion „a brave person‟)
and counterfactuals – oxymoron (terribly beautiful), and
irony (bright in the meaning „stupid‟).
3. LINGUISTIC FORM: internal form  external

form. The internal form of a linguistic sign is structured

with an onomasiological model (Dokulil 1962,
Kubryakova 1978) which includes the basis (the target
concept), the feature (characteristics of the basis), and
the link (the relation between the basis and its feature).
E.g. three-wheel bike, three-wheeler – “BIKE (basis)
HAS (link) THREE WHEELS (feature)”. The external
form of a linguistic expression may represent the
onomasiological model in its complete form (coffee-
maker = this machine makes coffee). However, in most
cases the onomasiological model has its fragmentary, i n
c o m p l e t e representation. The missing elements are:
the link (Londoner = one [lives in] London) or the link
and the basis (the young = [people] [are] young).
Fragmentary representation of the internal form results
in the compression of linguistic expressions (three-piece
suit > three-piecer > threer > (the) three). In syntax,
fragmentary representation of the internal form may be
exemplified by different cases of compressing the
predicative structure of a sentence (Winter has come >
Winter). In a literary text, fragmentary representation of
its internal form in its external form may be exemplified
by various verbal images – metonymic or metaphoric.
 E.g. (a metaphoric image of aging): NOTHING GOLD
CAN STAY. Nature’s first green is gold, / Her hardest
hue to hold. / Her early leaf’s a flower, /
But only so an hour. / Then leaf subsides to leaf. / So Eden
sank to grief,/ So dawn goes down to day. / Nothing gold
can stay. (R. Frost). D e v i a t i o n of the external form, its
considerable departure from the internal form of a linguistic
expression, is demonstrated by the examples like crazy
prices, guilty money, mortal land, etc. In the expression
crazy prices the onomasiological model is “PRICES (basis)
make (link) A PERSON CRAZY (feature)”. The model has
a complex propositional feature “A PERSON is/becomes
CRAZY”. The logical subject (A PERSON) is omitted, and
the predicate (CRAZY) is added to the onomasiological
basis PRICES, without being its immediate characteristics.
D e v i a n t external forms are also exhibited by
implicatures discussed in linguistic pragmatics. They may
be both conventional (She is beautiful but smart) and
conversational (А. Do you know the news? – B. I was on a
business trip).
4. LINGUISTIC FORM: external form  external
1

form2. The phenomenon of mapping as fragmentary, i n

c o m p l e t e representation of a whole is also extended
into the domain of linguistic forms per se. A larger
linguistic form may be represented by a shorter form, as
in: сlippings – lab, аbbreviations – UNESCO, lexical
blends – newseum, and haplology – Englaland >
England.
Conclusions
Presumably, language as a sign system results from
cognitive mapping / construal. While our thought maps
upon the experienced world (represents the information
about it with gaps and deviations), language is mapped
upon our thought. In language, the external form of a
linguistic expression is mapped upon its internal form. In
the domain of external forms, a smaller form is mapped
upon the larger one. This observation has theoretical
implications for different linguistic fields. For typology, it is
important that languages may exhibit differences at various
levels of mapping / construal (content of the linguistic
meaning, the choice of a motivator for representing this
meaning, the choice of a sound form to externalize the
motivator). Different stages of mapping / construal are also
relevant for contemporary cognitive theories of language,
particularly, for the Theory of Conceptual Metaphor and the
Theory of Conceptual Integration. The Theory of
Conceptual Metaphor focuses on metaphoric conceptual
models, but leaves for further in-depth discussion the
patterns of their verbal manifestation. The Theory of
Conceptual Integration happens to analyze mental and
formal blends on a par. Meanwhile, a mental blend may be
signified by a non-blended form, while a blended form does
not obligatory signify a mental blend.

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